Beyond core affect: appraisal dimensions and emotions



Psy 531 Affects and emotions A Brief Introduction to Appraisal Theories

As we’ve discussed, many theorists believe it is definitional of emotions that they are intentional states, i.e., that they are about something such as an object or event. In particular, they reflect an assessment of the meaning of that object or event. The dimensions along which meanings are assessed are often referred to as appraisal dimensions.

Appraisal along some dimensions, e.g., the dimensions of valence and some version of arousal or activation or salience, seems necessary to defining a state as affective. Russell and Feldman Barrett identify the affective states determined by appraisal along just these two dimensions as “core affects.” But core affects can exist without being clearly attached to an object/event. The resulting “free-floating” or diffuse affects arguably should not be classified as emotions unless or until they are attributed to an object/event.

Other appraisal dimensions, such as certainty and responsibility/agency, seem important to distinguishing among different emotional states. For some theorists, all these dimensions are clearly “cognitive” in nature, because they involve interpretation and the assessment of meaning. For others, some of these dimensions reflect built-in behavioral and/or affiliative dispositions, which become clearly “cognitive” only when reflected upon and/or “managed.”

Are some of these appraisal dimensions “basic” or fundamental? Those who answer “yes” tend also to believe that there is a relatively small set of fundamental emotions (or of families of emotions), such that particular combinations of appraisals can predict (and be predicted by) self-reported/experienced emotion. These authors (e.g., Lazarus, Scherer, Roseman, C. Smith, Ellsworth) point to a set of abstract (i.e., relatively content free) dimensions of appraisal. It is important to note that these authors do not deny that there are important social and cultural influences on the interpretation of specific eliciting situations, on expressive and behavioral tendencies, and on conceptual (especially linguistically-mediated) representations of emotions. Nor do they deny the importance of differences in physical and social environments. But they do suggest that:

. . . the relationship between appraisals and emotions is culturally general, perhaps even universal . . . If people from different cultures appraise a situation in the same way, they will experience the same emotion. If they experience a different emotion, it is because they have appraised the situation differently.

Ellsworth, P. & Scherer, K. (2002). p. 584.

Opposed to these appraisal theorists are authors (e.g., Ortony, Feldman Barrett) who believe that the number of possible appraisal dimensions and the number of different possible emotional experiences is, essentially, unlimited. This is another case in which different views arise from focusing on commonalities or on differences across individuals and cultures.

Appended is a table in which three sets of proposed cognitive appraisal dimensions are organized to highlight their similarities. On the back of the page is Roseman’s (1991) structural theory of appraisals. Finally, I also append an analysis of sadness and anger emotion episodes on several emotion episode components, including appraisal dimensions.

Suggested reading: appraisal dimensions (does not include papers assigned for March 5)

Ellsworth, P. & Scherer, K. (2002). Appraisal processes in emotion, In Davidson, R.J., Scherer, K. & Goldsmith, H. (2002). Handbook of Affective Sciences, Oxford University Press, pp. 572-595. (LR and one copy in Psych Lounge)

Ellsworth, P.C. (1994). Some reasons to expect universal antecedents of emotion, In Ekman, P. & Davidson, R.J. (Eds). The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, Oxford University Press, pp. 150-154. (LR)

Lazarus, R. (1994). Universal antecedents of emotion. In In Ekman, P. & Davidson, R.J. (Eds). The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, Oxford University Press, pp. 163-171. (LR)

Lewis, M.D. (1996) Self-organising cognitive appraisals, Cognition & Emotion, 10, 1-25.

Mauro, R., Sato, K, & Tucker, J. (1992). The role of appraisal in human emotions: a cross-cultural study, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 62(2), 301-317.

Scherer, K.R. (1997). Profiles of emotion-antecedent appraisal: testing theoretical predictions across cultures, Cognition & Emotion, 11(2), 113-150.

Scherer, K.R., Schorr, A. & Johnstone, T. (2001). Appraisal Processes in Emotion, Oxford University Press. Especially the introductory chapter by Roseman & Smith.

Special issue of Cognition & Emotion: Appraisal and Beyond, 7(3/4), 1993.

“Classics”

Roseman, I. J., (1991). Appraisal determinants of discrete emotions, Cognition & Emotion, 5(3), 161-200.

Smith, C.A. & Ellsworth, P.C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 48(4), 813-838.

Smith, C.A. & Lazarus, R.S. (1993). Appraisal components, core relational themes, and the emotions, Cognition & Emotion, 7(3/4), 233-269.

Comparison of Anger and Sadness Episodes

In terms of core affects:

Both are negatively valenced (normally)

Sadness nearly always negative, anger more likely to have some pleasant aspects (especially when pleasant and unpleasant rated on separate scales)

Anger generally more aroused and, thus, intense

Both are considered by many to be “basic” emotions

Anger associated with increased sympathetic nervous system activity, sadness more variable – sometimes parasympathetic dominant

Dimensions of cognitive appraisal

Presence of goal-related obstacle in both

Urgency higher for anger than sadness

Clear differences in agency

Anger: usually other person (but can be object), certainty variable

Sadness: situational source (can be specific), certain loss

Legitimacy low, usually lower for anger

Ability to cope (potency)

Anger: high

Sadness: low (loss usually irrevocable)

Behavioral responses

Anger: approach, aggression, assertiveness

Sadness: withdrawal, lethargy

Distinct facial expressions (sadness consistently recognized, anger more variable)

Functional analyses:

Sadness: time to re-evaluate, evocation of social support

Anger: assertion of status, demand for reparation or change in behavior

Relationships to other emotions

Sadness can lead to anger if a distinct source of blame can be identified

Can be accompanied by fear/anxiety if loss leaves one in threatened state

Depression: pathological sadness?

Grief: sadness-related emotion syndrome

Anger can lead to happiness if reparation/change achieved

To fear or to sadness if attempt to change situation fails,

To shame if inappropriate (function-unrelated or overly intense) responses occur

To guilt if source initially misidentified

Pathological anger: antisocial personality

Cardiovascular consequences of “hostile anger”

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