Elections: Aff



Elections: AffTrump Wins: 2ACTrump will win – secret Trump supporters Stephens, Sept. 29 (Bret, writer for New York Times, )Anatomy of a secret Trump voterThese voters aren't donning MAGA hats, but there are more of them than you think.Not all Trump voters advertise their support, but their presence will be felt on election day.Chris is a registered Democrat in her 50s who lives in Manhattan. She's well-educated, well-traveled and well-informed. She has voted for candidates of both parties over the years and was enthusiastic for Bernie Sanders in 2016.She's asked me not to publish her last name. It would not go down well for her at the store where she works as a manager if her colleagues knew that she plans to vote for Donald Trump.Chris is also gay. "Being a lesbian who's voting for Trump is like coming out of the closet again," she tells me.Liberal readers who conjure an image of a Trump voter probably think of people like Mark and Patricia McCloskey, the couple who pointed guns at protesters outside their St. Louis home in late June. But if Trump defies current polling and wins again, it will be thanks to a discreet base of support from voters like Chris, who fit into none of the cultural or demographic stereotypes of the Trump base.It's worth understanding where she's coming from.Start with the economy. "I haven't seen double digit [gains] in my 401(k) since the internet boom of the late '90s," she says. "It went up 19.6%" in the year before the pandemic. "Look at the stock market," she says. (Up about 35% from four years ago.)"Look at gas prices." (About the same as what they were when Trump took office, but well below the $3.31 per gallon at the midpoint of the Obama administration.)"This is everyday stuff that affects me," she says. "I don't care about Afghanistan and the Middle East. I care about having a job. I care about having health care through my company. I was out of a job a few years ago. Obamacare priced me out [of private insurance]. It was like, $560 a month. Then Obama's website blew up. He can't get the website right?"Then there's the pandemic. "Is Trump trying to play it down?" she asks. "Yeah. But when this first started, the news media was saying that millions of people were going to die. And look at it: 200,000, compared to the population."What worries her more are the effects of the response to the pandemic in a liberal city like New York."Crime is in my neighborhood now. There's a homeless encampment near me that's growing and growing. They have a living room and a shower curtain and that's where they go to the bathroom. I have a guy who walks in front of the store every day. In a diaper! And there's lawlessness coming into the store every day, with an attitude of 'Who's gonna stop me?' "Regarding Mayor Bill de Blasio of New York, she adds, "I can't put into words how inept this guy is."I ask Chris whether Trump's behavior has ever come close to being a deal breaker for her. She asks me to name some of the lowlights."Grab 'em by the. …""Didn't bother me at all. For every cad out there, there's equally a gold digger who will let you do it."The media as the enemy of the American people:"These days, yeah. Whenever I read a front-page story and I get to a disparaging adjective, I stop reading."The Brett Kavanaugh nomination:"I didn't believe Christine Blasey Ford for one second. Her lack of recollection; the fact that nobody could [contemporaneously] corroborate her account."Trump-Russia:"The Clintons' fingerprints are all over this. I'm really glad we have Bill Barr as AG to look into it."Trump's truculence on the world stage:"Everyone kowtows to Iran because they're crazy. Now we have our own bit of crazy.""Very fine people on both sides":This one stops her. "That was really bad. He didn't think it through but I think he believes himself."So how does Chris feel about the Biden-Harris ticket? "Fifteen years ago, maybe I wouldhave voted for Joe Biden. But he's weak. And what did he do with his 40-odd years in Washington?"As for Kamala Harris, Chris dismisses her outright. "She doesn't know what she believes. She won't be the adult in the room."You don't have to agree with Chris on any of these points. You can note some of the inconsistencies in her views, most of all between her support for Sanders, who as president would have waged war on Wall Street, and her support for Trump, whose pro-Wall Street policies are a big reason that she supports him. And you can easily dismiss Chris as an outlier, an anecdote, a red voter in a blue state.That would be a mistake. If good political analysis were merely a matter of looking at big data, Hillary Clinton would be president today. Analysis also requires us to listen attentively to individual voters. If the Democratic Party and its allies can't hold on to a voter like Chris, who else might they be losing?Trump Wins: ExtTrump will win – Enthusiasm determines Voting Patterns over PollsPolitico, Sept. 13 ()A senior Trump campaign adviser said Sunday he believes it's likely the president will trail in the polls and mail-in voting requests going into Election Day but come from behind to win, similar to his victory in 2016.“I would concede that it's probably going to be a similar scenario where, when we look back retrospectively we will probably see that the president was down into Election Day, and then won Election Day itself by an incredibly wide margin,” senior Trump campaign adviser Steve Cortes said on “Fox News Sunday.”Cortes’ remarks come as Democrats outpace Republicans in mail-in ballot requests, especially in key battleground states. A?new Fox News national pollshows Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden winning 71 percent of likely voters who said they planned to vote by mail.Cortes suggested more Democrats requesting ballots didn't necessarily indicate they would vote for Biden, but said that, regardless, Donald Trump would likely close the gap on Nov. 3.The president has repeatedly attacked mail-in voting, claiming without evidence that it could lead to more instances of ballot fraud.?Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," Republican National Committee Chair Ronna McDaniel also predicted Trump would prevail, despite Democrats' lead in fundraising."I feel very good about the investment that the RNC's put in place, and I feel very confident in the plan that the campaign has," she said. "The plan, the campaign will have the money and it has the strategy to win."On Fox, Cortes explained his belief in an Election Day win for Trump stemmed in large part from the gap in enthusiasm between Biden and Trump supporters.?Trump has continued to lead Biden in enthusiasm, though the new Fox poll indicated Biden may be bridging that divide: 43 percent of likely Biden voters said they were enthusiastic about voting for Biden, up 12 points from Fox’s June poll.?The Fox News poll of 1,191 likely voters was conducted Sept. 7-10 with a margin of error of plus or minus 2.5 percentage points.Trump wins—five reasons-Incumbency bias-Strength-Economic rebound-Anti-elitism-Outsider biasFeehery 9—8 [John Feehery, partner, EFB Advocacy, “Feehery: How Trump Wins,” THE HILL, 9—8—20, , accessed 9-16-20] **NCC Packet 2020**Most political analysts believe that Joe Biden will beat Donald Trump in the coming election. They are wrong. Here are five reasons why Trump wins reelection:1) Beating an incumbent is hard: Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama won their reelections not because they were great presidents but because they were incumbents. Reagan lost the Senate in 1982 and endured a crippling recession but still was able to bounce back to win a landslide in 1984. Clinton’s first two years were so bad that Democrats lost the House for the first time in 40 years. Bush blundered America into a very unpopular war in Iraq after the devastating attacks on 9/11, and yet was able to beat a hapless John Kerry in 2004. Obama’s response to the fiscal crisis of 2008 was to pass an unpopular health care law while presiding over the worst economic recovery since the Great Depression and yet he was able to beat Trump’s biggest critic, Mitt Romney. The power of incumbency is a huge advantage, which the current occupant of the White House is using very effectively, from handing out aid personally in places like Kenosha, to pardoning convicted prisoners who had turned their lives around, to using the bully pulpit to set the media narrative day after day.2) Strength vs. Weakness: The American people typically like their presidents to exhibit strength. Neither Jimmy Carter nor George H.W. Bush, despite his victory in Iraq in 1991, were seen as exceptionally strong leaders. Carter’s American “malaise” speech backfired on his spectacularly. When Bush looked at his watch during the first town-hall debate with Bill Clinton, he seemed largely uninterested in running for reelection. Reagan showed strength by standing up to the Soviet Union, Clinton showed strength by besting Newt Gingrich, W. showed strength by using his megaphone standing on the debris on 9/11, and Obama showed strength by confronting the Tea Party movement. Trump’s is showing his strength by standing up to the radicals who are destroying many of America’s finest cities. They are the perfect opponent.3) The Economy Stupid: It’s not about the unemployment rate. It’s not about GDP. It’s about where the bulk of the American people perceive things are going for them personally. Under Jimmy Carter and H.W., most Americans felt things were going down the tubes. Under Reagan, Clinton, W. and Obama, there was a general sense that the economy was moving in the right direction. No rational American blames Trump for what COVID-19 did to the economy and indeed, they give the president high marks for how he handled it before the crash. Now, all indications are that unemployment is dropping and people are getting back to work. That usually means good things for the incumbent president.4) The Elites Don’t Have it: Reagan, Clinton, W. and Obama were all perceived to be more in touch with the desires of middle America than their opponents. Reagan, of course, torched Walter Mondale on his desire raise taxes on the working class. Clinton spent his whole presidency cultivating the Bubba vote. W’s campaign mocked John Kerry as an effete flip-flopping windsurfer. And Romney’s career as a vulture capitalist proved easy pickings for the Obama campaign. Donald Trump is most anti-elite president since Andrew Jackson and it will serve him well as a contrast to career politician Joe Biden.5) Insiders lose, Outsiders Win: The last true insider to win a presidential election was George H.W. Bush, and he lost reelection. There is a long litany of political insiders who have lost in their efforts to gain the White House. Mondale, Bob Dole, Al Gore, Kerry, John McCain, and Hillary Clinton were all perceived by the media establishment to have superior resumes and the experience necessary to be successful presidents. None of them won, with Gore coming closest because he was running against another political insider, W. Bush. Joe Biden is actually campaigning on his 50 years of political experience as the man who can make America calm again. But the American people haven’t suddenly fallen in love with the Washington establishment and his efforts will likely meet a similar fate to all the other insiders who have come before.Trump Wins: Norpoth Model—2ACTrump wins—Norpoth modelKLTV 8—21 [KLTV, staff, “Prolific Predicor of Elections Says rump Wins 2020 in Landslide,” 8—21—20, , accessed 9-12-20] **NCC Packet 2020**The chances that President Donald Trump wins re-election in 2020 is near certain, according to a political science professor whose election model has a history of correctly predicting election results.Stony Brook University professor Helmut Norpoth’s Primary Model shows President Trump has a 91-percent chance of winning re-election, according to his interview with Stony Brook News.Norpoth’s model relies on the results of presidential primaries, not polls that are often used as indicators of popularity. According to Norpoth, Biden is in a much weaker position than Trump because of his poor showing in the first two primary races.Norpoth was one of a handful of pollsters who correctly predicted Trump’s victory in 2016, and his Primary Model has predicted five of the six presidential elections since 1996. When applied to previous elections, the model correctly predicted 25 of the last 27 elections, missing only the 2000 election in which George W. Bush defeated Al Gore and the 1960 election in which John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon.“The key to the November election is the primaries,” Norpoth told Fox News in July. “The early primaries are giving us a lot of information. Based on that, Donald Trump won them very easily in his party. Joe Biden, the likely nominee for the Democrats, had a great deal of trouble, pulled it together, but on balance is that stronger performance of primaries that gives Donald Trump the edge in November.“People have forgotten how Joe Biden did in New Hampshire,” Norpoth added during his interview with Stony Brook News. “He was terrible. He got 8.4 percent of the vote, which is unbelievable for a candidate with any aspirations of being president.”As of early August, CNN polled Joe Biden at 51 percent and President Trump at 42 percent. Reuters, ABC/Washington Post, CBS/YouGov, and Fox News polls showed similar results, forecasting Biden between 49 percent and 53 percent of the popular vote. It is important to note that in the U.S., the president is elected by the electoral college, not by the popular vote, and national polls only approximate the popular vote.U Overwhelms: Woodward—2ACUniqueness overwhelms – Woodward’s book dooms TrumpElkind 9/10 – Digital Coordinating Producer for CBS (Elizabeth, “How Woodward's book could put Trump in a "place of vulnerability" ahead of November”, CBS News, , September 10, 2020) **NCC Packet 2020**Newly-released excerpts and audio recordings from journalist Bob Woodward's new book, "Rage," could undo the Trump campaign's efforts to paint a "law and order" portrait of the United States under Donald Trump by returning to a conversation the president had been trying to steer away from — the coronavirus pandemic. "It resurrects the pandemic as an issue," CBS News chief Washington correspondent Major Garrett told "CBS This Morning" Thursday. "These revelations bring the pandemic and all of its complications, all of its disruptions right back front and center. And that is a place of vulnerability for this president." Mr. Trump took part in 18 interviews with Woodward over the course of seven months. In a February audio recording obtained by the Washington Post, the president admitted the severity of the coronavirus even as he held indoor campaign rallies and repeatedly compared the virus to the flu. In the recorded interview, Mr. Trump acknowledged that COVID-19 "goes through air" despite continuing to speak at packed events. "It's also more deadly than your, you know, even your strenuous flus," the president can be heard saying. "This is 5% versus 1% and less than 1%, you know, so this is deadly stuff." In contrast, the Trump campaign has spent months bolstering the White House's response to the pandemic — but according to Garrett, the revelations puncture the president's "confidence and optimism" about the coronavirus in the U.S. He referenced Mr. Trump's March 7 trip to the CDC in Atlanta, where he spoke to doctors and was "essentially projecting to the country, a month after he'd already disclosed to Bob Woodward how serious he knew the virus was, that he knew everything that needed to be known, and it wasn't a big deal." "What did that cost the country? It cost the country the ability to mobilize," Garrett said. By publicly downplaying the virus, Mr. Trump had delayed "a serious national conversation" about containment measures such as masks, social distancing and prioritizing which places should open and what should stay closed, Garrett said. "We did not have that conversation," Garrett said. "It was lost in the president's perpetual optimism about where the virus was and where it was going — that he misread that is an absolute fact and will be on the ballot in November." The pandemic has hit the U.S. harder than any other nation in the world, leading in both number of cases and deaths. With the national death toll climbing past 190,000, Garrett said the president's reelection numbers could slide, even in Mr. Trump's politically safest areas. "Lots of his supporters know that he's optimistic and strong, true. But if that optimism and that strength cost the country things that it wishes it hadn't been cost and imposed difficulties people are so tired of, there's only one person to blame for that — the president of the United States," he said. That uncertainty could prove useful to Mr. Trump's rival, former Vice President Joe Biden, Garrett said. Throughout the pandemic, the Democratic nominee has emphasized the importance of social distancing and mask wearing, as well as listening to scientists whose views often clashes with the president's. "That gives the Biden campaign something it hasn't had in two and a half weeks — a clear shot to reengage the conversation about what this president did, what he knew, and most importantly what he didn't say about the pandemic," Garrett said.Thumper: Hacking—2ACHacking thumpsTHE WEEK ’20 [THE WEEK, staff, “Russia’s 2020 Plan,” 6—8—20, , accessed 9-6-20] **NCC Packet 2020**Will Russia interfere again?It never stopped. The Russian trolls and military hackers who undermined U.S. democracy in 2016 have continued their efforts to confuse and divide Americans, all U.S. intelligence agencies agree. As November approaches, the Kremlin is engaged in a multi-front cyberattack. Russia deployed social media bots to boost Sen. Bernie Sanders' (I-Vt.) presidential campaign, U.S. officials said, and last week, the National Security Agency announced that a hacking group called Sandworm — part of the Russian military unit that stole 50,000 Democratic National Committee emails in 2016 — has launched a campaign to penetrate email servers in the U.S. Security experts were puzzled why Russia didn't wreak more havoc in 2016 after targeting election systems in all 50 states and penetrating Illinois' registration database. It was probably "reconnaissance," Michael Daniel, a cybersecurity expert, told Congress — preparation for an even more ambitious future strike. What's their objective? To sow chaos, inflame existing political divisions, and destroy public faith in elections and democracy. Dezinformatsiya, the tactic of pumping propaganda into rival nations, flourishes on social media, where Russians can easily pose as Americans. Russian deceit, however, is not limited to online activities: Russia infiltrated the National Rifle Association and evangelical groups in 2016 and organized at least 22 political rallies on U.S. soil. Russians tamper with election infrastructure and then exaggerate the success of their efforts, seeking to make Americans believe that election outcomes could be illegitimate. If Hillary Clinton won in 2016, Russia planned to spread the hashtag #DemocracyRIP. What did Russia do in 2016? Four U.S. spy agencies, a GOP-controlled Senate committee, and Special Counsel Robert Mueller all concluded that Moscow ordered the attack in 2016 to spread disinformation and help elect Donald Trump. Russia's cyber operation, directly approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin, employed more than 800 people who created memes, fake accounts, and bogus news articles to stoke Republican fear and anger and to convince Sanders supporters and African Americans that Clinton was corrupt and a racist. The DNC emails Russia stole and selectively published via WikiLeaks showed that party officials wanted Clinton to win the ?primaries — angering Sanders' supporters. In his 22-month investigation, Mueller did not find proof of an explicit criminal conspiracy between the Russians and the Trump campaign, but he did conclude that Russia had interfered "in a sweeping and systematic fashion" and that the Trump campaign had been "receptive" to Russia's help. Some 272 contacts between Trump's campaign and Russia-linked operatives were documented, with 38 in-person meetings. Trump aides overheard Roger Stone — later convicted of obstructing the Mueller probe — discussing coming WikiLeaks dumps with Trump. Trump's campaign manager, Paul Manafort, gave detailed state polling data to a Russian oligarch and later lied about it. Standing beside Putin at a summit meeting in Helsinki in 2018, Trump said, "I don't see any reason" why Russia would have interfered. What's Russia's strategy this year? Disinformation campaigns will be more sophisticated. Russians often did a sloppy job imitating Americans in 2016, posting in broken English from accounts traceable to St. Petersburg. Now Russians are thought to be working from U.S. servers. An analysis of Russia-linked Facebook posts last fall found a focus on stirring up racial resentments, spreading fear of immigrants and Muslims, and inciting gun owners. The accounts targeted battleground states such as Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, Arizona, and Florida. Are election systems vulnerable? The nation's nearly 8,000 local voting jurisdictions use a complex patchwork of websites, databases, and hardware, giving hackers countless potential targets. In the 2018 midterm elections, an estimated one-third of jurisdictions used voting machines that were at least 10 years old. Russia is clearly keen to exploit American weaknesses, and in February, an aide to Director of National Intelligence Joseph Maguire told Congress that Moscow will try to ensure Trump's re-election. Trump berated Maguire for the briefing and fired him days later. The new DNI, former Rep. John Ratcliffe (R-Texas), is a fierce Trump defender who has questioned whether Russia really favored Trump in 2016.Thumper: Voter Suppression—2ACVote suppression alone thumpsWoodbury & Reddy ’20 [Terrance Woodbury, partner, HIT Strategies and Tanvi Reddy, Research Fellow, HIT Strategies, “Voter Suppression Could Cost Democrats the Election—Here’s What They Should Do,” THE HILL, 5—8—20, , accessed 9-1-20] **NCC Packet 2020**The coronavirus pandemic has upended every facet of American society and left many of us scrambling to adjust to “new normals” in the ways that we interact, work and live. Unfortunately, not enough attention has been given to how the pandemic changes the way we vote. While the foreseeable future remains largely uncertain, there is one certainty that remains — Nov. 3, 2020 will be election day for all 50 states in America. Although it is imperative to alleviate the medical and economic pressures caused by this pandemic, equal attention must be paid to safely and securely administer what is arguably one of the most consequential elections of our lifetimes. Especially, we must center the underserved communities that have been impacted by COVID-19 the hardest and face the most structural barriers to voting. Current attempts to flatten the COVID-19 infection curve are starting to slow the rate of new cases and deaths per day, but the threat of a second wave of infections in the fall has many Americans worried about the safety of voting in the general election. In fact, the majority of Americans believe the pandemic will disrupt voting in November and want safer alternatives to cast their vote. Also, just as the economic and medical impacts of COVID-19 have disproportionately affected young, urban and diverse communities — the base of the Democratic coalition — disruption to voting in November threatens to disenfranchise the exact same communities. With millions of college students displaced from their primary residence, the coronavirus is making many young people unsure of how they will vote in November. Additionally, over half of black voters have never voted by mail. Confusion and misunderstanding around the voting process during this pandemic threaten to suppress turnout among these critical voting blocs. These voters are already cynical towards voting by mail, as younger, minority voters face twice the absentee ballot rejection rate as older, white voters and are more likely to vote on Election Day. The 2020 primary election has already revealed just how disproportionately COVID-19 voting would impact the electorate. In Wisconsin, the Republican legislature blocked an order from Gov. Tony Evers (D) that would have delayed the election to pursue safer alternatives for voting. The result: thousands of poll workers refuse to participate, 6+ hour lines to vote and hundreds of ballots not delivered on time. In Milwaukee County, home to 600,000 people including 70 percent of the state’s African American population, polling locations were reduced from 180 in 2016 to only 5 in 2020 with a 41 percent drop in turnout. Imagine scaling this scenario nationally with over 100 million Americans attempting to cast a vote on the same day — mass disenfranchisement the likes of which we have not seen since the Civil Rights Movement. Republicans around the nation have already begun pursuing more ways to limit access to voting during this pandemic to improve their political odds. Kentucky just passed a new photo-ID law requiring voters to show a valid photo-ID to vote despite the state offices that issue such IDs being indefinitely closed. Trump recently selected a high-ranking RNC fundraiser with no relevant experience to be the Postmaster general for USPS at a time when vote by mail is expected to rise. Moreover, the Republican National Committee has been suing across the country in key swing states including Wisconsin and Pennsylvania to oppose expanding vote access. Elections: NegBiden Wins: 1NCBiden is ahead – Debates and , Sept. 30 ()The Market ReactionWith Trump trailing Biden in the polls, the 1st?debate would have been an opportunity for Trump to close the gap.As Biden went for the President’s obvious failings, however, there was little in response other than the interruptions.If the market reaction was anything to go by, then the 1st?live televised debate would have to go to Biden.In response, the U.S and European futures fell into negative territory after kicking off the day in the green.The market movements also cleared up any uncertainty over which side of the fence the markets are sitting.A 2nd?Term for the U.S incumbent is considered to be market positive. While spending would likely be drastically reduced, there would be no tax hikes. This would support the U.S equity markets should the economic recovery continue.All in all, there was nothing dramatic from the debate that could swing the polls in either direction.At the time of writing, the Dow mini was down by 308 points, with DAX futures down by 68 points. While the risk-off sentiment drove demand for the U.S Dollar, the Japanese Yen also found support. At the time of writing, the Japanese Yen was up by 0.16% to ??105.49. The rest of the major currencies were in the red this morning.The Road AheadWhile the polls put Biden ahead, the current fear is that he may not reach the magic number of 270 college votes. This would bring a period of uncertainty for the U.S. When considering the fact that Trump has vocally stated that he may not concede is another issue.Postal voting has been a hot topic and this may well become a major issue in the event that Biden wins???The markets will now look ahead to the next debate on 7th?October. The vice-president debate may have more to offer the markets. How Kamala Harris performs will be of great importance to the Democrats and Biden???Then the markets can look forward to the 2nd?live presidential candidate debate on 15th?October.Biden Wins: 2NCBiden’s ahead, but small changes swing itBrownstein 9—15 [Ronald Brownstein, “Why the Stability of the 2020 Race Promises More Volatility Ahead,” CNN, 9—15—20, , accessed 9-16-20] **NCC Packet 2020** Biden by any measure retains the upper hand in the presidential race. He holds a consistent lead in national polls and usually leads in five of the swing states both sides consider the most competitive (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Arizona and Florida), with the two men usually running about even in the sixth (North Carolina).All of those were states Trump won in 2016; by contrast, the President does not lead in any state that Hillary Clinton carried last time. And polls put Biden within range, to varying degrees, in four other states Trump carried: Iowa and Georgia, especially, but also Ohio and even Texas.But even Democrats acknowledge that Biden's advantage isn't large enough to guarantee him victory in the Electoral College. Because all of the key swing states lean slightly more Republican than the nation overall, even a slight improvement for Trump might put him in position to win 270 Electoral College votes.What's more, Biden's national advantage over Trump isn't meaningfully different than it was a year ago, despite the searing intervening event of a pandemic that soon will have claimed 200,000 American lives. To take one measure, the Real Clear Politics average of national polls last October showed Biden at 50.1% and Trump at 43.4%; the result last weekend was 50.5% to 43% -- virtually unchanged.Biden is ahead narrowly – best studies proveThe Hill, Sept. 28 ()Democratic presidential nominee?Joe Biden?holds a narrow lead over?President Trump, according to a new Harvard CAPS-Harris poll, released exclusively to The Hill one day before the first presidential debate.?Forty-seven?percent of likely voters said they would vote for Biden if the election were held today, while 45 percent said they would back Trump. The survey marks a 3-point improvement for Trump and a 2-point decline for Biden from the last poll that was conducted in August.?Biden also led with likely voters who said they were unsure of who they were going to vote for, with 52 percent saying they were leaning toward supporting the former vice president at the ballot box and 48 percent leaning toward voting for Trump.?"The poll shows the race closing to 2 points with likely voters and 4 points with leaners as the president showed improvement in the economy that dipped below double-digit unemployment and hit the theme of curbing unrest on which he gained," said Harvard CAPS-Harris Poll director?Mark Penn.The same survey showed Biden with an advantage on likeability, with 44 percent of respondents saying they like the former vice president personally and 38 percent saying they disliked him. Fifty-five percent of respondents said they disliked Trump personally, while 33 percent said they liked him personally.?The findings come as Biden and Trump prepare to meet face-to-face for Tuesday's presidential debate. The?forum is expected to cover a number of topics including the coronavirus pandemic, the economy, Trump's Supreme Court nominee, and the fallout over a New York Times?investigation that found the president paid just $750 in federal income tax in both 2016 and 2017.?Biden wins now, but Trump can still rally his base and winSchoen 9—13 [Douglas Schoen, political analyst, “Presidential Race Is Much Closer than Many Now Think,” THE HILL, 9—13—20, , accessed 9-16-20] **NCC Packet 2020**With just over 50 days until the election, most objective observers will tell you that Joe Biden is favored to win. Indeed, Biden leads Donald Trump by more than 7 points nationally, according to Real Clear Politics.However, there is still a clear path to victory for Trump, and this race is actually much closer than many now believe it to be. While Biden leads nationally and in several battleground states, many of his leads in swing states are even tighter than they were for Hillary Clinton in 2016, notably in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Florida, all states that she lost.Some of his leads in battleground states are within margins of error, as in Nevada, where Biden leads by 4 points, and in New Hampshire, where he leads by 3 points, according to polling by the New York Times and Siena College. His lead in Arizona has dropped to 2 points, according to polling from Gravis. Indeed, this past week, the Cook Political Report changed its election forecast, moving Florida from “lean Democrat” to “toss up,” and moving Nevada from “likely Democrat” to “lean Democrat.”The tightening race could be attributed to the fact that margins for Biden are shrinking with the critical constituencies of Hispanic voters and white working class voters. Hispanic voters comprise a significant portion of the eligible population for swing states like Florida and Arizona. As a bloc that votes reliably blue when they do turn out, notably Hispanics not of Cuban descent, Democrats have to turn them out in large numbers in order to be successful. This would take a robust targeted advertising campaign and a significant investment in a major voter outreach operation.While Biden has employed neither strategy to the extent he should, Trump is making inroads with Hispanic voters through targeted advertising along with media, notably within Miami Dade County. Trump has outspent Biden by around $4 million on television commercials in this media market, most of which are Spanish language ads. In addition, the conservative allies are heavily engaged in voter outreach. Such investment is helping Trump gain ground among Cuban American voters, who are receptive about his tough stance toward Havana, cultural conservatism, and likely also his attacks on Democrats for backing policies that lean toward socialism.This clear Hispanic engagement is raising the chances of Trump winning this swing state rich in delegates. Biden still has a lead in Florida, but that has shrunk since last month, and is now at less than 3 points, according to Five Thirty Eight. The challenges for surveying Hispanics include sampling issues and language barriers, Their overall support for Trump in states like Florida and Arizona could even be understated, given that the president is making gains with this core group that is difficult to survey.While Hispanics not of Cuban descent swung for Clinton, turnout among these voters was lower than her campaign anticipated, as it assumed that scathing remarks from Trump about Hispanics would drive these voters to show up for Clinton in 2016. Regrettably, Biden and his campaign seem to run with this same miscalculation. While he leads Trump among Hispanics overall by 16 points in Florida, according to polling by Equis Research, he is trailing those numbers that Clinton had by 11 points. Clinton won these voters by 27 points, even as she still lost the state to Trump.Likewise, Biden is losing ground for Midwestern and Rust Belt states with high populations of white working class voters, such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, which swung for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 but then for Trump in 2016. Indeed, the failure of Biden to convey a narrative focused on jobs has likely contributed to his polling lead diminishing in states like Pennsylvania. His polling lead over the president there has fallen by more than 1 point since last month, according to Five Thirty Eight.Further, over the last four years, there has been a critical swing with voter registration toward Republicans in key states such as Pennsylvania, which signals the potential for another victory by Trump in that state. As recent analysis from Politico detailed, Republicans have netted several times as many registered voters for Pennsylvania than Democrats have since 2016. Republicans added nearly 198,000 registered voters in the last four years, while Democrats have gained only 29,000 registered voters.Further, as the New York Times argued, anecdotally and using statistical evidence from past elections, this race could truly be about rural voters across the country, who turned out for Trump in 2016, though Biden has overall ignored them, and it could be part of the undoing of Democrats once more, as it was in 2016. So while Biden is ahead at the moment, a second term for Trump is well within the realm of possibility.Biden is ahead, but the race is tight enough to swingKilgore 9—17 [Ed Kilgore, journalist, “Biden Maintains Electoral College Lead, But Its Fragile,” NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 9—17—20, , accessed 9-18-20] **NCC Packet 2020**Now that we are in the stretch drive of the 2020 presidential election, polls are coming in hot almost every day, and on any given day there’s some good news for both Biden and Trump. The big picture is a bit ambivalent: Biden continues to enjoy a broad advantage in the battleground states that will determine the Electoral College winner, but his margin for error remains small.Biden’s lead in national popular-vote polling is slowly eroding but remains formidable compared to past Democratic candidates, particularly given the fact that most pollsters have already begun applying likely voter screens that usually benefit Republicans. In the FiveThirtyEight polling averages, Biden leads Trump 50.3 to 43.5, or by 6.7 percent (down from a peak of 9.1 percent on August 29). At RealClearPolitics (which averages raw polling data without the weighting and adjustments FiveThirtyEight deploys), Biden’s lead is down to 5.8 percent (likely because a new Rasmussen poll shows Trump actually leading, the first in RCP’s database to show that since February). One national survey that’s been getting a lot of attention is the USC-Dornsife tracking poll, the only major national pollster that consistently showed Trump ahead just prior to Election Day in 2016 (though that meant it was even more inaccurate than some others, since HRC did win the popular vote by 2.1 percent even as the final USC survey showed Trump up by three points). As recently as last week, USC-Dornsife showed Biden with a double-digit lead, but its latest numbers have cut that to under seven points. It does seem to have a pattern of regularly oscillating pro-Biden and pro-Trump trends.But it’s state polls that have drawn the most attention this week, and they provide relatively good news for Biden, as Nate Silver explains in a handy graph showing recent polling trends in all the competitive states:As Geoffrey Skelley explains, the Arizona and Minnesota numbers are particularly significant if they hold:Biden’s improvement in Arizona is particularly noteworthy as Arizona is a cornerstone of most Electoral College maps in which Trump wins. That is, if Trump carries the state, he wins the election 59 percent of time, according to our forecast; but if Biden wins Arizona, Trump has less than a 7 percent chance of winning overall …Meanwhile, Biden’s improvement in Minnesota is also bad news for Trump, as the campaign has long viewed Minnesota as a potential target to expand the map — the president only lost the state by about 2 points in 2016. However, Minnesota seems to be steadily moving away from Trump.Arizona remains close, though: A new Monmouth survey released after Skelley wrote about the state showed Biden up by just two points (48-46) among likely voters if turnout is higher than in 2016 (more likely than not), and tied with Trump at 47 percent if turnout drops (e.g., because of fresh COVID-19 concerns or voter-suppression efforts).Florida’s the most important state providing relatively good news to Team Trump in the last few days, with Biden’s lead in the RCP polling averages declining to 1.4 percent (it’s at 2.1 percent at FiveThirtyEight) and two recent polls (from Florida Atlantic University and NBC News–Marist) showing the race tied. The megatrend in Florida is that Biden is overperforming with the senior voters who went heavily for Trump in 2016, while Trump is posting big margins among South Florida’s intensely anti-communist Latino communities. Florida Democrats took a big hit late last week, however, when a federal appeals court upheld the state GOP’s efforts to halt implementation of a voter initiative reenfranchising ex-felons.The big picture remains: Trump’s Electoral College advantage (as illustrated by his relative standing in battleground state as opposed to national polls) means Biden starts losing a lot of states if his national lead drops to below, say, 3 percent. Above that level, he has a lot of ripe targets in states Trump really must carry.Biden Wins: A2 “U Overwhelms”Trump loses now, but it is close enough he could swing itECONOMIST 9—12 [THE ECONOMIST, staff, “Donald Trump Could Still Stage a Comeback (Again),” 9—12—20, , 9-16-20] **NCC Packet 2020**The newest polls and economic data have shored up the president’s odds, though they remain worse than in 2016Every four years, political journalists and prognosticators deem America’s presidential contest the “election of the century”. By definition, each cannot be. But at the risk of causing readers’ eyes to roll backwards, the stakes really do appear higher than usual this time round. In early June The Economist published its own statistical forecasting model for this November’s presidential contest to guide such handicapping. Back then, it gave Donald Trump at best a one-in-five chance of winning a second term. But by July, as unrest and the coronavirus ravaged the nation, his odds had slumped to as low as one-in-ten. There they stayed until the middle of August. Now, our model shows Mr Trump has clawed back a sizeable chunk of support.His nationwide deficit in vote-intentions versus Joe Biden has shrunk from ten points at its peak to just eight on September 9th. And in the key states of Florida and Pennsylvania—the two most likely to provide Mr Trump or Mr Biden with their 270th electoral vote—the president’s deficit has narrowed even more. Sunshine-state voters favoured Mr Biden by eight points at his peak in July. Now, they prefer him by just four. One high-quality pollster, Marist, has the candidates level in Florida (though more polls are surely needed to determine whether this is an outlier). In Pennsylvania, Mr Trump has risen from a nine-point deficit to a six-point one.Other election indicators have also been good for the president of late. Our index of economic growth—which combines annual change in eight different indicators, from the unemployment rate to real personal income and manufacturing output—has been improving steadily since July. The August jobs report, which recorded a nearly two percentage-point drop in unemployment, contributed to a positive trend.Mr Trump’s job-approval ratings have also gone up. In early August we calculated that 15 percentage points more Americans disapproved of the job he was doing as president than approved of it. By September his popularity had improved a bit, to just an 11-point deficit. Taken together, these economic and political variables alone suggest the president will lose the popular vote by five points; up from a negative-six-point projection two months ago.Right now the most likely outcome of the election is still that Mr Trump loses. Our election-forecasting model projects that he will fall about 70 electoral votes shy of winning, though there is enough uncertainty in the election to suggest he could still prevail. We predict a relatively low (but by no means impossible) one-in-seven (14%) chance of a Trump victory. For context, our model would have given him more than twice the chance (37%) at this point in 2016. Because of Mr Trump’s deficit in swing-state polls and the virus-stricken economy, he will have a tough slog to get a second term—despite voters’ marginally improving evaluations of his candidacy.Thumper Ans: HackingNo hacking problem—tech and process reforms, Russia’s not tryingMarks ’20 [Joseph Marks, journalist, “The Cybersecurity 202: Election Security Officials Sound Confident About November,” WASHINGTON POST, PowerPost, 8—6—20, , accessed 9-12-20] **NCC Packet 2020**Election security officials are confident they made key changes to make in-person voting safer in November. But lawmakers are farther apart than ever on how best to protect the election that’s just three months away. The Department of Homeland Security’s top election security official, Chris Krebs, ticked off a slew of accomplishments during an address at an online version of the annual Black Hat cybersecurity conference. They include an extensive cybersecurity testing program for state and local election offices and digital sensors that can alert DHS about hacking attempts at thousands of county election offices. “It’s night and day compared to what existed in 2016,” Krebs said. He said he’s confident that “2020 will be the most protected and most secure election in modern history.”Lawmakers, meanwhile, have fallen into partisan bickering with Republicans and Democrats accusing each other of aiding U.S. enemies rather than combating them. That split screen has been a relative constant during the past four years. And it comes as officials are facing a new kind of insecurity – a potentially massive wave of mail-in ballots as fewer people go to physical polling places during the coronavirus pandemic.With some notable exceptions, federal, state and local officials have made steady progress with changes to transition to more secure paper ballots and implement cybersecurity protections and post-election audits. Congress, meanwhile, has failed to pass any significant campaign or election security legislation. It has delivered about $1.2 billion to states to improve cybersecurity and make voting safer during the pandemic, but that’s far less than Democrats have requested and many experts say is necessary. Recently, the congressional wrangling has focused on a Republican investigation into work in Ukraine by Joe Biden’s son Hunter.For the past several weeks, Democrats including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Calif.) and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (N.Y.) have warned about a foreign disinformation campaign trying to get Congress to undermine the election — a likely reference to the investigation led by Sens. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa). Biden campaign spokesman Andrew Bates has accused Johnson of “facilitating a foreign influence operation to undermine our democracy” in part to distract from the Trump administration’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, Paul Sonne, Karoun Demirjian and David L. Stern report. Johnson and Grassley punched back yesterday, arguing it was Pelosi and Schumer who were undermining election security by questioning their investigation. “It is certainly our goal to eradicate foreign influence from our elections. But your use of this issue to knowingly and recklessly promote false narratives for political purposes is completely contrary to that goal,” the lawmakers wrote. Then they got harsher: “Although it is undisputed that Russia interfered in the 2016 elections, as they have done in the past and will continue to do in the future, you have twisted this fact beyond recognition to forge a weapon for the purpose of attacking your political opponents no matter its tenuous relationship with facts or the truth.” So far, Russia doesn't appear to be trying for a repeat of 2016. That year, Russian hackers compromised voter databases in at least two states, though there’s no evidence they changed any information or compromised actual voting infrastructure. They also scanned but did not hack into election systems in dozens of other states in addition to hacking and leaking embarrassing information from the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton campaign. Krebs warned of “a whole lot of scanning” of election-related computer networks by U.S. adversaries this year, a list that might include China and Iran as well as Russia. But there has been “nothing at the directed, focused level of 2016,” he said. That’s good news for election officials who are trying to remain secure against Russian hacking even as they tackle a slew of challenges related to running an election during the pandemic. Hacking’s not a problem --- major upgrades since 2016Brumfield 20 – veteran communications and technology analyst who is currently focused on cybersecurity. She runs a cybersecurity news destination site, , Cynthia, 1/21. “US elections remain vulnerable to attacks, despite security improvements.” **NCC Packet 2020**Certainly, voting security has made great strides since 2016. State and local governments took advantage of a funding boost under the Help America Vote Act to improve their infrastructure and better coordinate among themselves to harden election systems. Congress allocated an additional $425 million as part of a spending compromise that was passed and enacted in late-December, giving election officials even more latitude to make improvements.A spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) tells CSO that the agency has seen marked improvements in security over the past few years. “In our work with all 50 states and more than 2,400 local jurisdictions, we’ve seen a maturation in the risk management practices across the sector,” the spokesperson says. “Whether implementing controls like multifactor authentication and intrusion detection systems or exercising incident identification, communications, and response, the progress for election security is real.”Even more improvements to how the country responds to election threats could flow from a decision announced last week by the FBI to alter its policy regarding how it informs state officials about local election security breaches. In the past, the FBI informed state officials of cybersecurity attacks on local election infrastructure after informing local officials, allowing state officials to proceed with vote tallies and other efforts without full information. Now the bureau plans to keep state officials informed in a timelier manner, hoping to improve federal and state cooperation on election security matters.Thumper Ans: Voter SuppressionDemocrats control the voting process in most swing statesFord 20 --- Matt Ford is a staff writer at The New Republic, “The Blue Wave That Saved the Vote”, Soapbox, May 22nd 2020, **NCC Packet 2020**When most people think about the significance of the 2018 midterms, they think about the House of Representatives. Democrats, propelled by voter antipathy toward President Donald Trump, retook the chamber for the first time in eight years. The breakthrough ended two years of complete Republican control of the federal government. It also paved the way for Trump’s eventual impeachment in the Ukraine scandal last fall. As the 2020 election nears, however, it seems like the most decisive result of the last cycle may not have been at the federal level. Voters also went to the polls in 2018 to elect a variety of state and local officials. In certain key states that Trump had won in 2016, they opted to elect Democrats to critical positions—posts crucial to the preservation of voting rights. Democrats ultimately flipped governorships in seven states, as well as the secretary of state’s office in Arizona, Colorado, and Michigan. Those relatively unheralded results will have a profound effect on voting rights ahead of the 2020 election. In some states, the Democratic gains will provide a bulwark against potential degradations of the electoral system in the months leading up to the November vote. In others, they will provide an opportunity for Democrats to push back on restrictive measures and ensure that more Americans might have a voice in choosing their next president. Either way, it could be a grim sign for Trump’s already flagging reelection chances. Trump is increasingly showing signs of fear about greater voter participation in November. In a series of Twitter posts this week, he railed against officials in Nevada and Michigan for their plans to send vote-by-mail applications to every registered voter in their states. “Michigan sends absentee ballot applications to 7.7 million people ahead of Primaries and the General Election,” he wrote on Wednesday. “This was done illegally and without authorization by a rogue Secretary of State. I will ask to hold up funding to Michigan if they want to go down this Voter Fraud path!”Doesn’t impact resultsHoekstra & Koppa 20 --- Mark Hoekstra Texas A&M University, and Vijetha Koppa, Institute of Management Technology, Dubai International Academic City, “Strict Voter Identification Laws, Turnout, and Election Outcomes”, CATO, Feb 19th 2020, **NCC Packet 2020**Results indicate that there is little scope for strict voter identification laws to affect voter turnout. This finding stems directly from the extremely small number of votes cast by individuals without IDs, even in settings where such votes are explicitly allowed and counted. Specifically, we show that a voter identification law would reduce turnout by no more than 0.06 percent in Florida and 0.2 percent in Michigan. This suggests that at least in these two states, very few voters without IDs choose to vote even when they can. Unsurprisingly, the small effects on turnout imply that there are very few elections in our sample that could have been affected by a strict voter ID law. Even under the most extreme assumption — that all votes for the winner (and none for the runner‐?up) cast without an ID would be excluded under strict law — we estimate that a strict law could have changed the outcome in fewer than 0.35 percent of local elections and 0.09 percent of state and national elections in Florida. Similarly, we show that fewer than 0.55 percent of state and national elections in Michigan could have been affected. Estimates under more reasonable assumptions result in even smaller (and likely more accurate) potential electoral impacts. In short, the evidence presented here indicates that even if the worst fears of critics or proponents were true — that all those who would have voted without IDs are fraudulent or that all would be disenfranchised — it would have at most a tiny effect on election turnout and outcomes.Warming: Biden Solves—ParisBiden will rejoin Paris Commitment Harvey ’17 – (Chelsea Harvey, freelance journalist covering science. She specializes in environmental health and policy June 5, 2017 “Withdrawing from the Paris deal takes four years. Our next president could join again in 30 days.” )While President Trump has vowed to formally withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, sparking international outrage, it doesn’t necessarily mean the end of U.S. involvement forever. A future president could have us back in the agreement in as little as 30 days, legal experts say. Under the rules of the Paris agreement, parties are allowed to exit and reenter as they choose, although withdrawing is a much lengthier legal process than returning. And there are no provisions stipulating how much time has passed after withdrawal before a nation can begin the process of rejoining the agreement. “A subsequent president would thus be able to submit a document stating the United States’ intention to become a party to the Agreement as soon as she or he wanted to,” Michael Burger, executive director of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, said in an email to The Washington Post — although he added that such an action is certainly outside the norm. “Countries don’t typically withdraw from complex international agreements that they led the way in negotiating,” he said. The rules of withdrawal As it is, Trump’s verbal pledge to withdraw, which he revealed in an internationally resounding announcement last week, is not final — yet, anyway. Withdrawal requires a formal process, which will take nearly four years to complete. The earliest a U.S. withdrawal could be finalized is Nov. 4, 2020. According to the rules of the Paris agreement, nations wishing to exit must first submit a document to the United Nations specifying their intent to withdraw. However, this is permitted only after three years have passed since the agreement entered into force — and that date was Nov. 4, 2016. This means that the U.S. can submit its written notice Nov. 4, 2019, at the earliest. After that, the rules specify that the official withdrawal will take effect exactly one year later at the earliest, or potentially on a later date of the party’s choosing. In that intervening year, a nation may decide to cancel its withdrawal at any point, said Maria Manguiat, a climate expert with the United Nations Environment Program’s Law Division. “It doesn’t make the country look very good, but legally it’s entitled to do that,” she told The Washington Post. Altogether, if Trump acted as quickly as possible to withdraw from the agreement, the process could be completed Nov. 4, 2020, at the earliest. That’s the day after the next presidential election. Rejoining the agreement And as Burger pointed out, there’s nothing stopping a future president from adding us right back in. According to the agreement’s rules, parties may officially join in one of two ways. First, they can join by signature and ratification — that is, by participating in the agreement’s original negotiations and then signing on board. This is how the United States originally became a part of the agreement. After the deadline for signature has passed, which occurred April 21 of this year, parties may join through a process called accession, which is essentially the legal term for joining an agreement at a later date, after it has already been negotiated and signed by other nations. Parties that join by accession are subject to all the same conditions as parties that joined by signature, and nothing in the rules prevents a nation from joining by signature, withdrawing and then rejoining by accession. According to Manguiat, the United States could do just that by simply submitting another document to the United Nations, which it may do at any time after withdrawal takes effect — even immediately, if the president so chose. Its reentry would take legal effect just 30 days later. In theory, our next president could start this process immediately upon taking office — potentially right after the Jan. 20, 2021, inauguration, if a transition occurs at that time. And in the meantime, it’s likely that rejoining Paris will feature as a key campaign promise for any liberal candidates running against Trump in 2020. International outrage aside, polls suggested that most Americans wanted the U.S. to remain in the Paris agreement, and it’s likely that many would support an immediate reentry under a new leader.Warming: A2 “Too Late”We are near but not at key tipping points – Paris accord key to solveMichael Marshall 9/19/20, The Guardian, “The tipping points at the heart of the climate crisis”, accessed 9/28/20 togThese developments show that the harmful impacts of global heating are mounting, and should be a prompt to urgent action to cut greenhouse gas emissions. But the case for emissions cuts is actually even stronger. That is because scientists are increasingly concerned that the global climate might lurch from its current state into something wholly new – which humans have no experience dealing with. Many parts of the Earth system are unstable. Once one falls, it could trigger a cascade like falling dominoes.Tipping pointsWe have known for years that many parts of the climate have so-called tipping points. That means a gentle push, like a slow and steady warming, can cause them to change in a big way that is wholly disproportionate to the trigger. If we hit one of these tipping points, we may not have any practical way to stop the unfolding consequences.The Greenland ice sheet is one example of a tipping point. It contains enough ice to raise global sea levels by seven metres, if it were all to melt. And it is prone to runaway melting.This is because the top surface of the ice sheet is gradually getting lower as more of the ice melts, says Ricarda Winkelmann of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany. The result is familiar to anyone who has walked in mountains. “If we climb down the mountain, the temperature around us warms up,” she says. As the ice sheet gets lower, the temperatures at the surface get higher, leading to even more melting. “That’s one of these self-reinforcing or accelerating feedbacks.”We don’t know exactly how much warming would cause Greenland to pass its tipping point and begin melting unstoppably. One study estimated that it would take just 1.6C of warming – and we have already warmed the planet 1.1C since the late 19th century.The collapse would take centuries, which is some comfort, but such collapses are difficult to turn off. Perhaps we could swiftly cool the planet to below the 1.6C threshold, but that would not suffice, as Greenland would be melting uncontrollably. Instead, says Winkelmann, we would have to cool things down much more – it’s not clear by how much. Tipping points that behave like this are sometimes described as “irreversible”, which is confusing; in reality they can be reversed, but it takes a much bigger push than the one that set them off in the first place.In 2008, researchers led by Timothy Lenton, now at the University of Exeter, catalogued the climate’s main “tipping elements”. As well as the Greenland ice sheet, the Antarctic ice sheet is also prone to unstoppable collapse – as is the Amazon rainforest, which could die back and be replaced with grasslands.A particularly important tipping element is the vast ocean current known as the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC), which carries warm equatorial water north to the Arctic, and cool Arctic water south to the equator. The AMOC has collapsed in the past and many scientists fear it is close to collapsing again – an event that was depicted (in ridiculously exaggerated and accelerated form) in the 2004 film The Day After Tomorrow. If the AMOC collapses, it will transform weather patterns around the globe – leading to cooler climates in Europe, or at least less warming, and changing where and when monsoon rains fall in the tropics. For the UK, this could mean the end of most arable farming, according to a paper Lenton and others published in January.Tumbling dominoesIn 2009, a second study took the idea further. What if the tipping elements are interconnected? That would mean that setting off one might set off another – or even unleash a cascade of dramatic changes, spreading around the globe and reshaping the world we live in.For instance, the melting of the Greenland ice sheet is releasing huge volumes of cold, fresh water into the north Atlantic. This weakens the AMOC – so it is distinctly possible that if Greenland passes its tipping point, the resulting melt will push the AMOC past its own threshold.“It’s the same exact principles that we know happen at smaller scales,” says Katharine Suding of the University of Colorado, Boulder, who has studied similar shifts in ecosystems. The key point is that processes exist that can amplify a small initial change. This can be true on the scale of a single meadow or the whole planet.However, the tipping point cascade is very difficult to simulate. In many cases the feedbacks go both ways – and sometimes one tipping point can make it less likely that another will be triggered, not more. For example, the AMOC brings warm water from equator up into the north Atlantic, contributing to the melting of Greenland. So if the AMOC were to collapse, that northward flow of warm water would cease – and Greenland’s ice would be less likely to start collapsing. Depending whether Greenland or the AMOC hit its tipping point first, the resulting cascade would be very different.What’s more, dozens of such linkages are now known, and some of them span huge distances. “Melting the ice sheet on one pole raises sea level,” says Lenton, and the rise is greatest at the opposite pole. “Say you’re melting Greenland and you raise the sea level under the ice shelves of Antarctica,” he says. That would send ever more warm water lapping around Antarctica. “You’re going to weaken those ice shelves.”“Even if the distance is quite far, a larger domino might still be able to cause the next one to tip over,” says Winkelmann.In 2018, Juan Rocha of the Stockholm Resilience Centre in Sweden and his colleagues mapped out all the known links between tipping points. However, Rocha says the strengths of the interconnections are still largely unknown. This, combined with the sheer number of them, and the interactions between the climate and the biosphere, means predicting the Earth’s overall response to our greenhouse gas emissions is very tricky.Into the hothouseThe most worrying possibility is that setting off one tipping point could unleash several of the others, pushing Earth’s climate into a new state that it has not experienced for millions of years.Since before humans existed, Earth has had an “icehouse” climate, meaning there is permanent ice at both poles. But millions of years ago, the climate was in a “hothouse” state: there was no permanent polar ice, and the planet was many degrees warmer.‘Hothouse’ conditions will make fires such as this one in the San Gabriel mountains above Azusa, California, in August more frequent.If it has happened before, could it happen again? In 2018, researchers including Lenton and Winkelmann explored the question in a much-discussed study. “The Earth System may be approaching a planetary threshold that could lock in a continuing rapid pathway toward much hotter conditions – Hothouse Earth,” they wrote. The danger threshold might be only decades away at current rates of warming.Lenton says the jury is still out on whether this global threshold exists, let alone how close it is, but that it is not something that should be dismissed out of hand.“For me, the strongest evidence base at the moment is for the idea that we could be committing to a ‘wethouse’, rather than a hothouse,” says Lenton. “We could see a cascade of ice sheet collapses.” This would lead to “a world that has no substantive ice in the northern hemisphere and a lot less over Antarctica, and the sea level is 10 to 20 metres higher”. Such a rise would be enough to swamp many coastal megacities, unless they were protected. The destruction of both the polar ice sheets would be mediated by the weakening or collapse of the AMOC, which would also weaken the Indian monsoon and disrupt the west African one.Winkelmann’s team studied a similar scenario in a study published online in April, which has not yet been peer-reviewed. They simulated the interactions between the Greenland and west Antarctic ice sheets, the AMOC, the Amazon rainforest and another major weather system called the El Ni?o southern oscillation. They found that the two ice sheets were the most likely to trigger cascades, and the AMOC then transmitted their effects around the globe.What to do?Everyone who studies tipping point cascades agrees on two key points. The first is that it is crucial not to become disheartened by the magnitude of the risks; it is still possible to avoid knocking over the dominoes. Second, we should not wait for precise knowledge of exactly where the tipping points lie – which has proved difficult to determine, and might not come until it’s too late.Rocha compares it to smoking. “Smoking causes cancer,” he says, “but it’s very difficult for a doctor to nail down how many cigarettes you need to smoke to get cancer.” Some people are more susceptible than others, based on a range of factors from genetics to the level of air pollution where they live. But this does not mean it is a good idea to play chicken with your lungs by continuing to smoke. “Don’t smoke long-term, because you might be committing to something you don’t want to,” says Rocha. The same logic applies to the climate dominoes. “If it happens, it’s going to be really costly and hard to recover, therefore we should not disturb those thresholds.”“I think a precautionary principle probably is the best step forward for us, especially when we’re dealing with a system that we know has a lot of feedbacks and interconnections,” agrees Suding.“These are huge risks we’re playing with, in their potential impacts,” says Lenton. “This is yet another compulsion to get ourselves weaned off fossil fuels as fast as possible and on to clean energy, and sort out some other sources of greenhouse gases like diets and land use,” says Lenton. He emphasises that the tipping points for the two great ice sheets may well lie between 1C and 2C of warming.“We actually do need the Paris climate accord,” says Winkelmann. The 2016 agreement committed most countries to limit warming to 1.5 to 2C, although the US president, Donald Trump, has since chosen to pull the US out of it. Winkelmann argues that 1.5C is the right target, because it takes into account the existence of the tipping points and gives the best chance of avoiding them. “For some of these tipping elements,” she says, “we’re already in that danger zone.”Cutting greenhouse gas emissions is not a surprising or original solution. But it is our best chance to stop the warning signs flashing red.Japan: AffECS Advantage: Entrapment ScenarioJapan Escalation NowU.S. backing in the Senkakus emboldens Japan and makes their initiation of a crisis highly likely. Narang and Mehta 19 – Narang; Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.?Mehta; Ph.D. in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.Narang, Neil, and Rupal N. Mehta. “The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client State.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 1 (January 2019): 218–50. doi:10.1177/0022002717729025. **NCC Packet 2020*figures omitted but at link source The ongoing dispute in the East China Sea over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has rekindled tensions in United States–Japan–China relations. In particular, recent public affirmations of the US security guarantee to protect Japan in the event of a war with China have raised the specter of conflict in East Asia. Indeed, journalists in China have increasingly viewed the US alliance with Japan (and the Philippines) as both threatening to regional stability and its own rise in East Asia. For example, one recent editorial stated, “...it is increasingly obvious that Washington is taking Beijing as an opponent.”1 Another editorial went one step further, suggesting that Japan may be using its relationship with the United States to aggressively further its own objectives: “Japan is taking advantage of American greed to cause trouble with its neighbors (i.e., China) in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s peaceful rise will not be constrained by any other country...” In response to perceptions of Japanese revisionism, Chinese strategists have increasingly called on the United States to “publicly limit extended nuclear deterrence” out of fear that such commitments may embolden Washington’s allies (Li Bin and He Yun 2012). Similarly, Rapp Hooper (2015) argues that the United States would be unwise in deepening its commitments to extended nuclear deterrence, because:...doing so may create a moral hazard problem, encouraging allies to press their claims with more confidence. Knowing that they have guaranteed backing, Tokyo or Manila may grow more assertive in disputes with Beijing...This, in turn, could cause crisis escalation or conflict that might otherwise have been avoided. (p. 139)The crisis between China and its rivals in East Asia raises important questions about the US nuclear security guarantees in the region and about the inadvertent consequences of extended deterrence more generally. Has the US commitment to defend its allies in East Asia actually encouraged its clients to press their claims where they wouldn’t otherwise in the absence of the US “nuclear umbrella”? More generally, is it possible that commitments to extended deterrence create a moral hazard problem, whereby client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are emboldened to become more revisionary—pressing their demands in anticipation that a patron will intervene, and thereby perversely increasing the risk of a crisis? In this article, we explore the relationship between nuclear umbrellas, militarized conflict, and crisis bargaining. Drawing on existing bargaining theories of war, we argue that, because war is costly, both parties in a crisis have an incentive to avoid fighting. This implies that—in equilibrium—the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the risk of war between a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella and a potential target should generally be zero, assuming information is complete, commitments are credible, and the stakes are divisible. However, this does not mean that such commitments are benign, or that they pose no risk to potential targets and nuclear patrons. Instead, we argue that a client state’s expectation that its power will be augmented in the event of war (by that of its nuclear patron) will make it more likely to expand the scope of its demands and seek to revise the status quo. Because war is generally ex post inefficient, leaders of target states are likely to offer concessions in the amount that reflects the changed balance of power, rather than fight a costly war. Thus, we argue that the risk of moral hazard from nuclear umbrellas should be observable in the bargaining outcomes short of war, if not in the observable patterns of militarized conflict.We begin by investigating whether nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by increasing the risk of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). We find evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella slightly increases the risk that a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella will initiate an MID compared to a state that lacks this protection. However, we find that this overall effect is driven entirely by one-sided use of force initiated by the client state protected under a nuclear umbrella that never escalates to the reciprocal use of force by the target state. At the same time that targets appear to avoid the reciprocal use of force, we find strong evidence that a client state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella is positively associated with the likelihood that a crisis will include a peaceful settlement attempt and an increased likelihood that a target will offer policy concessions to the client state. Together, the results along both dimensions—conflict and bargaining outcomes—are consistent with the observable implications of the theory. The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. We begin by examining some of the extant research on alliances and entrapment or moral hazard. We then develop our theory for why, despite the conventional wisdom that security guarantees increase the likelihood of war, we should expect that—if a risk of moral hazard exists—the consequences should be observable in the terms of negotiated settlements or concessions short of war. Next, we introduce the research design and data we use to test our hypotheses. We then present our results and discuss our main findings. Following the large-n results, we examine an illustrative case of the hypothesized mechanism in the United States-Republic of China (ROC)/Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the policy implications.Alliances, Entrapment, and the Risk of War The existing literature on the causes and consequences of military alliances in international relations makes a compelling case for the general risk of moral hazard in the behavior of states protected under defensive security commitments. According to the conventional logic, alliances can increase the combined bargaining power of allied states by augmenting the military capabilities of each state with that of the other (Morrow 1994, 2000; Lake 2001; Leeds 2000, 2003). Two benefits are thought to follow: first, assuming sides are unable to settle their disputes, the formation of an alliance shifts the likely outcome of war in favor of the allied states; second, the prospect that a state will intervene on behalf of an alliance partner may deter a potential challenger from initiating a crisis in the first place (Huth 1988, 1990; Leeds 2003; Johnson and Leeds 2011)Along with these benefits, however, comes at least one important consequence. At the same time that alliances can deter potential challenges, states protected under the alliance may become emboldened to expand the scope of their demands or to become intransigent in ongoing negotiations with other states. In this way, a conventional wisdom holds that alliance commitments can actually increase the risk of war by emboldening an alliance partner to demand more from other states and run a greater risk of war in expectation of an ally coming to its aid (Snyder 1984; Jervis 1994; Smith 1995; Leeds 2003; Zagare and Kilgour 2003; Yuen 2009; Benson 2011, 2012; Kim 2011; Benson, Bentley, and Ray 2013; Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay 2014). According to Snyder (1984), this classic moral hazard problem is one reason why states attempt to leave their security commitments purposely ambiguous to avoid the risk of “entrapment.”2Despite the large volume of research on alliances, this logic of moral hazard and entrapment has yet to be investigated with respect to the specific case of nuclear umbrellas—a type of alliance in which a state with nuclear weapons makes a commitment to defend a nonnuclear alliance partner in the event of an attack.3 In particular, researchers have yet to systematically analyze whether nuclear umbrellas, otherwise known as “nuclear security assurances” or “commitments to extended deterrence” have the unintended side effect of increasing the risk of conflict.4 This is surprising, given that such assurances have long been a centerpiece of defense policy for major powers like the United States and Soviet Union (Lay 1953). The lack of empirical evidence notwithstanding, the logic of moral hazard has led many scholars to warn against the potentially perverse side effects of nuclear umbrellas (Knopf 2012). Although nuclear umbrellas vary in important ways from conventional alliances—possibly including the requirement that a crisis escalate to the use of nonconventional capabilities (V. Narang 2013) —nuclear security guarantees are analogous to conventional alliances in that they require a patron to defend nonnuclear alliance partners in the event of an attack. Thus, nuclear umbrellas may inadvertently enhance the risk of war by dramatically shifting the likely outcome of war in favor of a client state, thereby emboldening a client state to expand the scope of its demands by targeting new states or to become intransigent in ongoing negotiations. In doing so, client states may expect to entrap their nuclear patrons into undertaking costly actions—often risking the initiation of militarized conflict—to defend them against aggressors (Snyder 1984, 1997; Christensen and Snyder 1990; Yuen 2009; Fearon 1997; Crawford 2003, 2005).This conventional logic—and its application to nuclear umbrellas by security strategists—leads to the following hypotheses about the relationship between nuclear umbrellas and crisis initiation and escalation through moral hazard: Hypothesis 1: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclear weapon state are more likely than states that lack a nuclear patron to initiate a conventional militarized dispute (MID). Hypothesis 2: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclear weapon state are more likely than states that lack a nuclear patron to escalate a conventional militarized dispute (MID).Nuclear Umbrellas, Moral Hazard, and Crisis Bargaining In contrast to the conventional expectations above, we argue that it is unlikely that a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella will exhibit a greater propensity to engage in violent conflict. This is not because nuclear weapons have no impact on crises, nor is it because the logic of moral hazard in alliance politics does not apply in the specific domain of extended nuclear deterrence. Rather, we follow Gartzke and Jo (2009) in positing that the perverse consequence of moral hazard from nuclear security assurances will be observable in the crisis bargaining and subsequent distribution of benefits within negotiated settlements, if not the likelihood of violent conflict.Consider the simplest model of crisis bargaining. Fearon (1995) suggests that coherent rationalist explanations for war will fall into one of two categories: actors can fail to find a settlement because they have private information with incentives to misrepresent or because they are unable to credibly commit to the agreement. According to the first explanation, sides have asymmetric information about their own capabilities and resolve and they often have an incentive to misrepresent their ability on these dimensions to secure a better settlement. As a result, while the costs of fighting open a range of settlements both sides should prefer to war, sides also have the incentive to bluff in order to shift the bargaining range in their favor (N. Narang 2015). The second explanation is that sides may prefer to fight now if their opponent is unlikely to honor a settlement in the future (Fearon 1998; Fortna 2003; Leeds 2000; Narang 2014; Walter 1997). The bargaining logic of war has important observable implications for the impact of nuclear weapons and—by extension—nuclear umbrellas on crisis outcomes. Historically, states that have acquired nuclear weapons have generally been quick to reveal their newfound capability, so the risk of bargaining failure from private information about these capabilities is relatively remote.5 Furthermore, doubts about the credibility of a nuclear rival’s commitment to a negotiated settlement are unlikely to be sufficient to motivate a game-ending nuclear war. Together, the conditions under which crisis bargaining occurs between nuclear states—or asymmetrically between nuclear states and nonnuclear states—highly incentivizes a negotiated settlement. As Jervis (1976, 96) notes, “no country could win an all-out nuclear war, not only in the sense of coming out of the war better than it went in, but in the sense of being better off fighting than making the concessions needed to avoid the conflict.”However, it also follows that, even if nuclear weapons may reduce the danger of war in some circumstances, they should nonetheless influence shared beliefs about the distribution of power among states. A state whose power increases through the acquisition of nuclear weapons may be emboldened to revise the status quo in its favor by threatening war to extract concessions—a threat that would be credible if the status quo distribution of benefits falls outside of an expanded and shifted range of mutually acceptable agreements. Thus, while nuclear weapons may have no effect on the observable incidence of militarized conflict, they should increase the bargaining power of the nuclear capable state, which could in turn lead to substantial effects on other policy dimensions.As Gartzke and Jo (2009, 209) explain, “Diplomatic bargains tend to dampen the observable impact of nuclear weapons... . To the degree that nuclear weapons influence the concessions proliferators are likely to obtain in lieu of force, proliferation does much less to account for behavioral conflict.” One clear source of evidence that leaders “err in equilibrium” toward negotiated settlements is that war is rare (and nuclear war even more rare). Another source of evidence is a state’s level of diplomatic influence, which Gartzke and Jo show to increase significantly for nuclear-capable states.This same logic may extend beyond a state’s own nuclear capability to that of a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella. Recall that the intended purpose of a nuclear security assurance is to reduce the utility of nuclear weapons in coercive bargaining by deterring potential adversaries from threatening war, including nuclear war, against an ally (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014b).6 However, in joining the military capabilities of a nonnuclear state with the capabilities of a nuclear state, the alliance increases the combined bargaining power of the allied states relative to a third party. This may, in turn, embolden a nuclear client to spark a crisis and demand more policy concessions from other states in expectation of an ally coming to its aid. When potential target states believe the nuclear umbrella to be credible, they are likely to offer concessions sufficient to deter the initiation and escalation of a crisis. Thus, we hypothesize that although nuclear umbrellas may not create a moral hazard problem with respect to observable patterns in militarized conflict, they may nevertheless create a moral hazard with respect to client states’ willingness and ability to either spark a crisis in order to actively extract or passively receive, greater policy concessions from potential target states. We investigate the following observable implications that uniquely follow from our argument.Hypothesis 3: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclearweapon state are more likely to obtain preferred policies peacefully compared to nonnuclear-weapon states without protection under a nuclear umbrella.Gartzke and Jo (2009, 216) explain the straightforward logic behind this hypothesis clearly: the bargaining model of conflicts suggests that “nuclear nations and competitors will benefit most if they adjust diplomatic bargains in response to evolving strategic conditions rather than choosing to fight costly and unnecessary battles.” Consistent with this, Hypothesis 3 seeks to determine whether Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) settlements flow in favor of the nuclear client. Importantly, the hypotheses above all directly follow from an important ongoing policy debate in outlined above, wherein analysts specifically identify extended nuclear deterrence as uniquely emboldening (Li Bin and He Yun 2012; Rapp Hooper 2015). However, these hypotheses imply an untreated comparison group that includes both states that have a purely conventional defensive pact and states that have no military alliances. Thus, popular claims leave ambiguous whether nuclear guarantees might uniquely cause moral hazard compared to conventional military guarantees or whether nuclear guarantees only cause moral hazard compared to having no guarantee at all.7 Therefore, it is instructive to explicitly theorize about the differential risk of moral hazard when client states have access to nuclear capabilities versus when client states only have access to conventional capabilities through an alliance.Existing theory remains ambiguous about what differences one should reasonably expect across the two types of alliances with respect to the risk of moral hazard. On one hand, one might suppose that the nuclear element might amplify the risk of moral hazard when compared to conventional alliances, since a client state might be even more emboldened to seek expanded objectives. After all, if alliances facilitate capability aggregation, there is perhaps no greater military capability than nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the opposite may also be true: nuclear umbrellas run little to no additional risk of moral hazard when compared to conventional alliances. This is because threats to use nuclear may be inherently incredible (Paul 2009; Tannenwald 2007; V. Narang 2015; Avey 2015). After all, there is compelling logic to suggest an emerging norm against the use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 2007; Paul 2009) and to suggest that the use of nuclear weapons could undermine regional and global strategic stability (Lee 2007), including by increasing the potential for a retaliatory strike against the nuclear patron state itself (Avey 2015; Rapp Hooper 2015; Lanoszka 2014). These factors may combine to explain why nuclear weapons have not been used in combat since World War II.Since theory generates no strong priors about the differential effects of nuclear versus conventional alliances on the risk of moral hazard, we investigate whether there is any significant difference—either positive or negative—between the risk of moral hazard across client states that have access to nuclear weapons through an alliance versus client states that only have access conventional capabilities through an alliance. Hypothesis 4: Nonnuclear client states protected in an alliance by a nuclear weapon state exhibit a different likelihood of obtaining preferred policies peacefully compared to states that have only a conventional defensive pact.Finally, for all hypotheses the logic implies that client states generally believe alliances to be credible. However, uncertainty over the likelihood of compliance is ubiquitous to all international agreements, including alliances (Morrow 1994, 2000; Fearon 1994, 1997; N. Narang and LeVeck 2011; LeVeck and N. Narang 2016). Nevertheless, we make a more modest assumption that a formal alliance commitment—while certainly incomplete—increases the probability that the patron will honor the commitment sometime in the future by some nonzero and positive amount. Resolution of this uncertainty is perhaps the primary reason states sign formal alliance commitments at the outset: they seek to influence the beliefs of their alliance partners and any prospective challengers by publically signaling their intention to intervene in the event of a war (Morrow 1994; Smith 1995; Fearon 1997). Nonetheless, it is almost certainly the case that the impact of a nuclear umbrella and conventional alliance on the risk of moral hazard is partly mediated by factors that make the agreement more or less credible. Based on a time-series cross-sectional analysis of all nuclear umbrellas from 1950 to 2001, N. Narang (2017) provides systematic evidence that there is not only a positive average treatment effect from nuclear umbrellas on the assurance of client states, but that clients appear to behave in a way that is increasingly assured as nuclear umbrellas become more institutionalized. The finding is ascribed to the costs of negotiating and implementing more intricate and costly alliances, which serve as costly signals of more reliable commitments.8Research Design and Data We employ a directed-dyad unit of analysis on a data set that includes all countries in the international system from 1950 to 2000 to test our hypotheses. Specifically, we begin with data from V. Narang (2013) to create a data set with an observation for each state as a potential initiator of a crisis with every other relevant state in the international system.9 Directed dyads make it possible to differentiate between the behavior of the challenger and the target state, which provides more information with which to test the causal process implied by the moral hazard logic. Specifically, each hypothesis links the protection provided under a nuclear security assurance, to the crisis behavior of a client state as a potential initiator. A directed-dyad structure also allows us to investigate whether settlements flow from targeted states without protection under a nuclear umbrella to client states protected under a nuclear umbrella.Following previous work (Gartzke and Jo 2009; Bell and Miller 2013), we use probit, rare events logit, and ordinal probit to analyze the effect of our independent variables on the dependent variables, and we use Huber–White standard errors to correct for spatial dependence. We also cluster on the dyad to address heteroskedastic error variance, in addition to correcting for temporal dependence using “peace years” and splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).Independent Variable: Nuclear Umbrellas In both the academic and policy literature, the term “nuclear umbrella” is used to refer to the protection provided by a nuclear patron state to a nonnuclear client state generally under a formal defense pact (Knopf 2012, 2). In all previous research, the consensus has been to operationalize a nuclear umbrella by observing whether a state has a defensive alliance with a nuclear-weapon state (Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Verdier 2008; Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 2009a, 2009b; Horowitz and Narang 2014; V. Narang 2015; Horowitz and N. Narang 2014; N. Narang, Gartzke and Kroenig 2015). This measure is imperfect in many ways. It is possible that the nuclear-weapon state in the alliance has not made an explicit commitment to use nuclear weapons. This ambiguity is oftentimes deliberate (Knopf 2012; Rapp Hooper 2015). However, it is important to note that analysts can only observe the same public declarations of commitment—with all their attendant ambiguities—that leaders observed when deciding whether to resist a challenge or offer concessions. In this way, public declarations influence the beliefs of potential challengers similarly to the retrospective coding of analysts.10 To operationalize nuclear umbrellas, we used the Alliance Treat Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data set to identify observations in which states in a dyad received a defensive commitment from a nuclear-weapon state (Leeds et al. 2002). The variable is coded dichotomously, where an observation coded “1” has a defensive commitment from a nuclear-weapon state and “0” otherwise. According to this data, 67 of the 152 defensive pacts active from 1950 to 2001 included an alliance member that was a nuclear-weapon state, protecting sixty-four different client states.11 Directed dyads allow us to distinguish which states in a dyad are client states protected under a nuclear umbrella and which states may have lacked this protection as both the challenger and the target. In total, 26,373 observations of 192,018 include a potential challenger protected under a nuclear umbrella (13.7 percent).Dependent Variables: Conflict Behavior and Crisis Bargaining Outcomes We use two categories of dependent variables to test the expectations outlined above. In the first category, we measure conflict behavior in two ways. The first is the initiation of a MID by a challenger as recorded in the Correlates of War (COW) data (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). Specifically, we use data on MID initiation coded “1” if the challenger initiates an MID against its counterpart in a dyad in a given year and “0” otherwise. The second measure is the level of MID escalation coded ordinally from 0 to 4 for how high in intensity a dispute escalated (Bennett and Stam 2004, 63). In the second category, we use data from the ICOW project on settlement attempts of contentious issues. The ICOW data codes information on settlement attempts and the distribution of stakes in a conflict over issues on which nations disagree. We focus on whether any attempt is made to resolve an ICOW in a given year (attone), whether the attempts are peaceful (attanyp), and which side obtains concessions (resolved).Control Variables Our analyses also include several covariates that mirror Gartzke and Jo (2009) and Bell and Miller (2013). First, to control for the security environment, we include a measure for enduring rivalries to identify dyads with security challenges (Bennett 1996; Diehl and Goertz 2000). We include a dyadic rivalry coded “1” if the members of the dyad have a rivalry with each other and separate monadic rivalry status. Second, we measure military power of each county using the COW Composite Index of National Capability. Third, we measure whether dyad members share an alliance, since states that share an alliance can be more (Morrow 2000; Kimball 2006) or less (Bueno de Mesquita 1981) dispute prone. Fourth, we control for the level of democracy, constructed by Gartzke and Jo (2009) using the Polity IV data (Marshall et al. 2002) to measure monadic regime type and joint democracy (Doyle 1997; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). Finally, because neighboring states fight more (Boulding 1962; Bremer 1992; Gleditsch 2003), we include an ordinal measure of contiguity based on the six-point COW variable and a continuous metric measure of geographic distance based on the log-transformed distance between capital cities of countries.Results We present the results of our statistical tests in three parts, evaluating Hypotheses 1 and 2 on conflict behavior, followed by Hypothesis 3 on policy concessions, and then ending with Hypothesis 4 comparing nuclear umbrellas against conventional military alliances. For each hypothesis, we display the main coefficients along with the 95 percent confidence intervals in box plots, and we relegate the regression tables to the Appendix of the article.Nuclear Umbrellas and Conflict Initiation and Escalation Figure 1 shows the estimated relationship between protection under a nuclear umbrella and MID initiation (Hypothesis 1) as well as MID escalation in ongoing militarized disputes (Hypothesis 2).12 The full regression results with all covariates are shown in Appendix Table A1. In model 1, which estimates the impact on the likelihood that a state will initiate an MID of any type, the coefficient estimate on nuclear umbrella A indicates some support for Hypothesis 1: protection under a nuclear umbrella appears to be positively associated with the likelihood that a client state will initiate an MID against a target state (substantively, a 2.5 percent increase in the likelihood of any MID). At first glance, this finding appears to run counter to the logic of the bargaining model and our expectation that—if a moral hazard exists as a result of a nuclear umbrella—the effect should not be observable with respect to conflict initiation. However, following recent work by Bell and Miller (2013), which showed that nuclear dyads can be more prone to low levels of conflict but not higher levels of war, we probed these results to determine at which levels in the MID escalation ladder that nuclear umbrellas appear to have the strongest influence on the behavior of a client state. Figure 1. Impact of nuclear umbrella on probability client will initiate a militarized interstatedisputes (MID) (by MID type/MID escalation).Models 2–4 estimate the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the likelihood a client state will initiate an MID against a target state that escalates to war, the reciprocated use of force, and the one-sided use of force, respectively. Surveying the coefficient estimates on nuclear umbrella A across the escalation ladder, we find no evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella causes a client state to initiate an MID that leads to war (model 2) or even the reciprocated use of force (model 3) at a higher rate, compared to states that lack a nuclear umbrella. However, we find strong evidence for a positive association between a nuclear umbrella and the likelihood that a client state will initiate an MID through the one-sided use of force that is never reciprocated by the target state (model 4). This finding is consistent with our initial expectation that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are likely to expand the scope of their demands by challenging other states (substantively, a 15 percent increase in the likelihood of one-sided use of force), but that leaders of targets are more likely to settle than reciprocate fighting. This interpretation mirrors that of Bell and Miller (2013) who find that asymmetric nuclear dyads are more likely to experience low-level conflict that never escalates to war. They interpret the finding that nuclear capable states are more likely to “initiate disputes against new opponents... ” to be “ ... consistent with the idea that nuclear weapons lead states to expand their interests in world politics.” (p. 75) It is also consistent with the bargaining model of war, which—in assuming war is costly and thus generally ex post inefficient—treats by definition any credible threat or use of force as a rational attempt to alter the distribution of benefits to match a sufficiently changed distribution of power to satisfy the expanded demands of the challenger (Powell 1999).The results of model 5 provide additional support for this inference. It estimates the relationship between protection under a nuclear umbrella and the likelihood that a client state will escalate an MID. This dependent variable has the added advantage of determining whether a nuclear umbrella is associated with client states becoming more aggressive within ongoing MIDs. We find no evidence of such an effect, as indicated by the lack of significance on nuclear umbrella A. However, in Appendix Table A2, we demonstrate a separate finding with respect to escalation that is nevertheless consistent with our theory. Despite having no effect on the escalation of militarized conflict, client states protected under a nuclear umbrella do appear more intransigent within the underlying negotiations of a crisis based on the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set.13 Specifically, in models 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A2, we show that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are less likely to end an underlying crisis sooner by backing down in negotiations when facing a state that lacks protection under a nuclear umbrella, and that a state is simultaneously more likely to back down within the underlying crisis negotiations sooner against an opponent that benefits from protection under a nuclear umbrella. Our findings—that protection under a nuclear umbrella does not increase the likelihood that a client state will initiate a war or two-sided violence, or that a client state will escalate an ongoing military conflict—are also consistent with those of Fuhrmann and Sescher (2014). They find no evidence of moral hazard with respect to militarized conflict using a monadic research design of all states from 1950 to 2000 and the COW Formal Alliance data set. We also find little to no evidence that protection under a nuclear umbrella influences the propensity for a client state to initiate an MID that escalates to higher levels of conflict. Although— consistent with our theory and results for Hypothesis 3—our findings in Appendix Table A2 suggest that states do become more intransigent within the underlying negotiations of a crisis.The results of the other variables in Appendix Table A1 are also instructive. In contrast to the expectations of extended nuclear deterrence, we find no evidence that a target state’s protection under a nuclear umbrella has any effect on the likelihood that a challenger will initiate an MID, as indicated by the coefficient estimate for nuclear umbrella B. This result is similar to findings by Gartzke and Jo (2009): there appears to be no significant dampening effect on the likelihood of a challenge against nuclear capable actors.Nuclear Umbrellas and Moral Hazard through Bargaining ConcessionsIf nuclear umbrellas generate a risk of moral hazard by the client state, it is reasonable to expect that this risk will be observable in the results of crisis bargaining, if not the risk of militarized conflict. Figure 2 presents the results investigating the impact of a nuclear umbrella on the bargaining behavior of client states and their target. The full regression results are shown in Appendix Table A3. Model 1 evaluates whether protection under a nuclear umbrella is associated with any attempt to settle an ICOW in a given year. Note that the variable is coded inversely, with “1” indicating no attempt to settle the issue in a given year, and “0” indicating a settlement attempt was made. If our theory is correct, we expect that when state A targets state B, and state A is protected under a nuclear umbrella, the coefficient on nuclear umbrella A will be positive (because “1” indicates no settlement attempt made by the challenger) or insignificant, since the protection provided to state A should make it no more likely to offer a settlement. Consistent with our expectations, we find that targets protected under a nuclear umbrella are significantly more likely to receive settlement attempts initiated from challengers (negative coefficient on nuclear umbrella B). At the same time, we find that challengers are no more likely to initiate settlements attempts when they are protected under a nuclear umbrella themselves compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella, and—if anything— they are less likely to extend settlement attempts (positive but insignificant coefficient on nuclear umbrella A). Figure 3 displays the results of model 2 in Appendix Table A3, which estimates the relationship between a nuclear umbrella and peaceful settlement attempts. This variable is coded inversely to any settlement attempt in Figure 2: “1” for peaceful settlement attempt made and “0” if no peaceful settlement attempt. We expect the nuclear umbrella A to be negative and nuclear umbrella B to be positive. The results are as expected and similar to Figure 2: challengers are no more likely to pursue peaceful settlements when they are protected under a nuclear umbrella themselves.Figure 3. Impact of nuclear umbrella on probability challenger will make a peaceful settlement attempt, comparing challenger versus target covered under nuclear pared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella, but targets protected under a nuclear umbrella are significantly more likely to receive peaceful settlements (substantively, a 5 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving a peaceful settlement offer).The insignificant coefficients on nuclear umbrella A across models 1–4 in Appendix Table 3 are not inconsistent with our expectations, since our theory primarily yields implications about whether states protected under a nuclear umbrella are likely to receive settlement attempts, whereas nuclear umbrella A estimates the tendency for a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella to initiate a settlement. It is plausible that states protected under a nuclear umbrella may be both more likely to receive settlement offers and also more likely to initiate settlement offers in an ongoing bargaining exchange. However, our data only allow us to observe the settlement offers initiated from challengers, which means the only way we can observe whether states protected under a nuclear umbrella are recipients of settlement attempts initiated by the other states is to reverse the positions of states as we do using a directed-dyad structure. This is what we show in our estimation of nuclear client B. Furthermore, if states are more likely to receive and initiate settlement offers in an ongoing bargaining exchange, it is not clear what the theoretically expected direction of the coefficient on nuclear client A should be. Nevertheless, the coefficient on nuclear umbrella A suggests that—if anything—challengers protected under a nuclear umbrella may be less likely to make settlement offers to targets.Finally, in Figure 4, we explore whether nuclear umbrellas make target states easier to influence in crisis bargaining. The full regression results are shown in Figure 4. Impact of nuclear umbrella on probability challenger renounces issue under dispute, comparing challenger versus target covered under nuclear umbrella. Appendix Table A4. We use two different portions of the ICOW resolved variable. In model 1 of Appendix Table A4, the dependent variable is coded “1” if the issue was renounced by the challenger, while in model 2 the dependent variable is coded “1” if the issue was renounced by the target. The results are consistent with our expectations. Figure 4 shows the results of model 1, where the challenger’s status as a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella does not appear to be a significant determinant of whether it concedes. The target’s status as a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella does appear to be a significant determinant of whether a challenger concedes.While not shown in Figure 4, in model 2 in Appendix Table A4, the results for whether the issue was renounced by the target are also supportive. When it is the target that concedes, the challenger’s status as a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella predicts concessions perfectly and drops out of the regression. This result and the previous one are both in line with our theoretical expectations: states with nuclear patrons appear systematically more likely to gain concessions from their opponent compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella.Interestingly, however, we also find that the target’s status as a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella is also positively associated with it conceding. While our theory only makes predictions about the settlement behavior of opponents of state protected under a nuclear umbrella, this result is nevertheless puzzling. One plausible explanation for this finding follows from the work of Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014a). While a target covered by a nuclear umbrella may be able to achieve some additional gains, it also risks violating the patron’s trust and losing its security guarantees altogether. As a result, client states may actually adopt less aggressive stances toward potential adversaries by pressing more modest/less difficult issues. A second explanation may be that the observation of a challenge against a state protected under a nuclear umbrella is not random, and could potentially be the product of sample selection bias based on unobserved differences in the dyadic ratio of conventional capabilities or resolve that causes targets to renounce the issue despite their nominal protection under a nuclear umbrella. As one illustration, we investigated the dyadic ratio of conventional capabilities between the challenger and target in cases where the target renounced the issue while also being protected under a nuclear umbrella. We found that in these cases, the challenger benefits from a conventional capability ratio that is on average 2.5 greater than that of the target, whereas the median capability ratio in the population is 1.0.As with our tests of crisis escalation, we also probe the robustness of our findings on bargaining concessions using the ICB data in models 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A2 (as a test of Hypothesis 3). The results confirm that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are more likely to achieve victory (i.e., a state realizing all of its goals) and less likely to experience defeat in a crisis compared to states that lack a nuclear umbrella, while states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella are simultaneously less likely to achieve victory and more likely to experience defeat when their opponent is asymmetrically protected under a nuclear paring Nuclear Umbrellas versus Conventional Alliances Do nuclear umbrellas uniquely generate a risk of moral hazard compared to conventional military alliances? In Appendix Table A3, we reestimate the models with ICOW settlements as the dependent variable used to make Figures 2 and 3, but this time we include a measure for the number of conventional defensive military alliances that each potential challenger has based on the ATOP data. In Appendix Table A4, we do the same for the models with ICOW resolutions as the dependent variable used to make Figure 4. The tests allow us to compare the effects of nuclear umbrellas with the effect of strictly conventional alliances to see whether the former is more emboldening than the latter.When we estimate the effect of a conventional defensive alliance on the bargaining behavior of client states and their target while nuclear umbrella is controlled for, we find no evidence that conventional alliances are more likely to result in concessions for the client state. If anything, we actually find evidence in support of Beckley (2015): conventional alliances appear to have a constraining effect for both ICOW settlement variables in models 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A3. Challengers appear slightly more likely to initiate a settlement to a target as a function of conventional defensive alliances in model 3 and more likely to initiate a peaceful attempt in model 4. Meanwhile, the effect of a nuclear umbrella remains the opposite and consistent with the expectations of our theory: challengers are no more likely to extend settlements attempts of some kind when they are protected under a nuclear umbrella, but targets protected under a nuclear umbrella are much more likely to receive settlement attempts of some kind. Similarly, and also consistent with Beckley (2015), we find no evidence in model 3 of Appendix Table A4 that either nuclear or conventional alliances are more likely to result in concessions for the client state. If anything, conventional alliances may have a slight constraining effect for the ability of client states to gain concessions. In aggregate, since the average effect of conventional alliances is slightly negative at the same time that the coefficient on nuclear umbrella is generally positive and significant as per our expectations, the combined result suggests that—if anything—the “nuclear component” of the nuclear umbrella is so emboldening as to generate a positive effect on client states despite the generally restraining effect of the concurrent conventional commitment, which is otherwise difficult to control for in our models. It may be useful for future work to theorize about the why we observe different effects across the two types of alliances.The Taiwan Strait Crises and the United States–ROC MDT The large-n analyses provide a key piece of the puzzle about the systematic impact of security assurances on the behavior of the client states. Yet, they also suggest a need for closer examination within a case due to the potential for selection and endogeneity bias. Thus, we provide qualitative evidence of the hypothesized mechanism through the illustrative case of the United States–Taiwan MDT, in which the United States formally committed to defending the ROC from an armed attack, specifically by using nuclear weapons.Before the MDT (i.e., pretreatment), Taiwan was the repeated target of provocations from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) beginning in 1949. These provocations reached a climax with the start of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in August 1954, when Zhou Enlai, premier of the PRC, issued a declaration that Taiwan must be “liberated.” Soon after, the PRC began shelling ROC installations on the Kinmen and Matsu Islands, triggering a crisis for the United States and Taiwan. On September 12, 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Eisenhower that the US intervene militarily, including considering the use of nuclear weapons (Chang 1988). However, in the absence of any formal treaty commitments to the ROC in Taiwan, Eisenhower famously resisted pressure to deploy American troops to the conflict or to use nuclear weapons (Gordon 1988; Rushkoff 1981). In response, the PRC quickly intensified its military actions by bombing other Islands in the Taiwan Strait, including the strategically important Tachen Islands (Dachen Islands). Critically, the ROC—lacking formal military assistance from the United States—ultimately backed down by surrendering its position on the Yijiangshan Islands, only eight miles from the Tachen group. On January 18, 1955, the ROC fully abandoned the Tachen Islands, evacuating approximately 30,000 people in its retreat.Recognizing that verbal warnings were insufficient to slow the advance of the People’s Liberation Army, the United States and the ROC agreed to the Sino American MDT in December 1954, which promised military assistance to defend 234 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(1) the island of Taiwan (i.e., the treatment). On January 29 1955, only 11 days after the ROC abandoned the Tachen Islands, the US Congress then passed the Formosa Resolution establishing a US commitment to defend Taiwan, offering an even greater dosage of assurance. On February 9, 1995, the US Senate had overwhelmingly ratified the MDT.It would be difficult to overstate the impact of these agreements on the parties to the crisis. As Chang (1988) notes, prior to the ratification of the MDT and passage of the Formosa Resolution, “Eisenhower and Dulles left vague whether the commitment to the Nationalists extended to the offshore islands under their control ... to keep Beijing guessing as to U.S. intentions” (p. 100). However, the signing of the MDT “removed any doubt about Washington’s support for the Nationalists.” It all but assured the security and continuity of the ROC government in Taiwan, as Eisenhower had made clear for the first time that the United States was formally committed to defending Taiwan from an attack. With the passage of the Formosa Resolution, the US Congress granted Eisenhower the authority to use military force to defend Taiwan “as he deems necessary,” giving him “a virtual blank check” (Chang 1988, 103). And in perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of commitment to the ROC, Eisenhower and Dulles reaffirmed their commitment to the defense of the islands through “the use of atomic missiles,” with Dulles stating in a nationally televised speech that “the administration considered atomic weapons ‘interchangeable with the conventional weapons’ in the American arsenal” (Chang 1988, 103).This speech was among the first in a campaign of public statements in which “the administration deliberately introduced specific comments about employing tactical nuclear weapons if war broke out in the Taiwan Strait” culminating in a news conference where Eisenhower said he saw no reason “why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else” (Chang 1988, 108). Importantly, the ROC leader, Chiang Kai-shek, was well aware of these public affirmations, and certainty not averse to the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese on the mainland. He told Admiral Felix Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, that he would accept the use of nuclear weapons against the mainland “as a war necessity” (Chang 1988, 107).Immediately following the US commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of Taiwan under the MDT, subsequent ROC behavior was consistent with a new sense of assurance (i.e., posttreatment). Knowing that the United States did not want to be drawn into the conflict, but that it nevertheless wanted the ROC to maintain control of the islands (State Department Report 1992), the ROC submitted a request for the US approval to conduct escalatory offensive air strikes on mainland targets in the Spring of 1955 (Chang 1988, 114). Within weeks, a newly emboldened and increasingly intransigent Chiang Kai-shek refused to entertain any idea of drawing down forces deployed on the Jinmen and Mazu Islands, despite repeated requests from the United States (Chang 1988, 116).At the same time, PRC behavior clearly demonstrated a sudden concessionary shift. According to the US State Department, within weeks of the passage of the Narang and Mehta 235 MDT and Formosa Resolution, “in April 1955 in Bandung PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai announced a desire to negotiate with the United States... to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area” ( stones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises). State Department accounts suggest that “the PRC’s sudden shift could have stemmed from ... the very real possibility of war with the United States.” According to Chang (1988, 11), “the initiative that finally ended the crisis came not from Washington but unexpectedly from the Chinese Communists... On April 23, just before Robertson and Radford talked with Jiang, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai dramatically announced at the Bandung Conference that his government wanted no war with the United States.”If the Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC forces were emboldened in the First Taiwan Straits Crisis, they appeared only more emboldened in the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis that began in 1958. Indeed, even in the prelude to the crisis, as Secretary Dulles visited Taiwan in March 1958, Chiang Kai-shek urged efforts to exploit the instability he perceived on the mainland (US Department of State 1992, 6). Once the 1958 Taiwan Crisis erupted over Kinmen, a newly assured ROC this time dug in and returned fire, in contrast to the First Taiwan Straits Crisis where ROC forces conceded the Yijiangshan Islands relatively quickly.Soon after the Second Taiwan Straits crisis began, the ROC publically evoked the US commitment under the MDT, whereby Eisenhower ordered the reinforcement of the Seventh Fleet to aid the ROC in August 1958. At the same time, Dulles publically reaffirmed that a US intervention might involve nuclear weapons. As Chiang Kai-shek demanded even bolder public statements promising US support for the defense of the offshore islands, Eisenhower reportedly grew frustrated at increasing pressure from Chiang to involve the United States in the conflict (US Department of State 1992, 60).Primary speeches and memoirs suggest that the sudden emboldenment of Chiang Kai-shek immediately was not coincidental. As Gordon (1985) notes, “The Mutual Defense Treaty ... clearly encouraged the Nationalists to take bolder measures against the Communists, despite the defensive character of the pact” (p. 638). According to Gordon, “It was clear in 1956 that the U.S. and Chinese Nationalist views diverged sharply. The U.S. objective was limited to defense of Taiwan and the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands... whereas the Nationalist government sought a military potential that would enable it to recover the mainland” (p. 642). He continues that “ ... the divergent views on retaliation further strained relations between the U.S. and the Nationalist Chinese” (p. 647). Gordon notes that, as the conflict continued, “the State Department grew increasingly concerned that the Nationalists might exploit the situation and bring the U.S. into a conflict” (p. 655). More recently, Popino (2016) draws on primary sources to explain that while, “the U.S. conducted 145 nuclear test shots” between 1955 and 1957, Chiang not only refused “to at least reduce the number of Nationalist forces stationed on the offshore islands... he increased the Nationalist presence on the island of Quemoy to 85,000 military personnel.”14 (pp. 68-69)Equally important, the weight of the evidence suggests that it was specifically the nuclear element of the US commitment and not the long-standing commitment to 236 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(1) use conventional forces that appears to have emboldened Chiang Kai-shek. According to Brown (1994), in a key National Security Council meeting, Special Assistant Robert Cutler, recounted that if US intervention became necessary, “it should not do so with conventional weapons,” because “such intervention would not be decisive ... the U.S. might have to intervene with atomic weapons” (p. 70). Similarly, Tannenwald (2007) notes that General MacArthur, commander in the field, “argued that the U.S. would be able to restore Chiang Kai-shek to the mainland ... only with nuclear weapons” (p. 131). Paul (2009, 53–54) explains that Dulles proclaimed: “If we defend Quemoy and Matsu, we’ll have to use atomic weapons. They alone will be effective ... ” However, Dulles also acknowledged that “ ... it would probably lead to initiating the use of atomic weapons.” And indeed, primary statements provide direct evidence in support of the resulting impact on ROC beliefs and behavior. Eisenhower’s advisors openly worried that talk of nuclear weapons would “embolden the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek to engage in his own aggressive moves that could provoke the outbreak of hostilities that Eisenhower was striving to deter” (p. 70).Importantly, these same leaders joined Chiang Kai-shek in downplaying the conventional element of the alliance. Indeed, as the pivotal nuclear element to the commitment was being repeatedly affirmed publically, evidence from Chang (1988, 116) and Clubb (1959, 525) suggest that Chiang strongly doubted the credibility of the US conventional military commitment.As expected by our theory, the conclusion of the Second Taiwan Straits crisis took place at the negotiating table.15 On September 4, Dulles issued a statement, in which he hinted that Eisenhower would authorize US action to protect the offshore islands under the “Formosa Resolution.” Within two days, in a move that is consistent with our theoretical mechanism, then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai issued a statement on September 6 declaring the PRC government’s willingness to resume the ambassadorial talks with the United States–ROC alliance, effectively increasing the level of diplomatic recognition. In exchange, China’s Defense Minister, P’eng Te-huai announced that PRC forces would refrain from shelling the offshore islands on even-numbered days, provided that there would continue to be no US escort (US Department of State 1992, 215, 227). These were concessions that the outmatched ROC was unlikely to secure in the absence of the frequently reiterated nuclear threat provided through the MDT. However, even as the talks ended the crisis for the United States on September 30—with Dulles declaring that the United States favored the evacuation of ROC forces form the offshore islands—Taiwan persisted in the crisis bargaining for more than a month (US Department of State 1992), in a move that is consistent with our moral hazard mechanism. ConclusionIn this article, we address a long-standing question in the academic and policy communities about the role of nuclear umbrellas in broader interstate relations. Specifically, we examine how client states behave under the protection of a nuclear patron by investigating two important dimensions of behavior: the initiation of militarized disputes and bargaining outcomes short of war. We find that, although client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are no more likely to initiate MIDs against a target state that escalate to war or the reciprocated use of force, these states, nevertheless, appear more emboldened to initiate crises. However, these crises tend not to escalate to higher levels of militarized conflict because target states appear to act in equilibrium: preferring to settle disputes peacefully rather than resist militarily through costly fighting. We find that client states protected under a nuclear umbrella are more often the recipients of policy concessions from their targets compared to states that lack protection under a nuclear umbrella. Together, these results provide comprehensive support for our argument that there is some risk of moral hazard in a client state protected under a nuclear umbrella, as clients appear more emboldened and more successful at revising the status quo in expectation of a patron coming to their aid.The urgency to understand the strategic consequences of nuclear umbrellas is perhaps most real today, as the United States seeks to rebalance its overall security portfolio to the Asia-Pacific in anticipation of a rising China and to provide additional assurances to its allies in the Middle East in light of potential proliferation challenges. And yet, we have surprisingly little evidence that such commitments are effective at reducing the risk of conflict on net, given the widely presumed, but still untested, risk for moral hazard in the client state. Meanwhile, policymakers in the United States and abroad continue to propose expanding the US nuclear umbrella while further reassuring allies covered within it. Our research suggests that the expansion of the nuclear umbrella may perversely exacerbate the concerns of potential targets and inadvertently destabilize the status quo by increasing the risk of a crisis and the opportunity for bargaining to fail.The alliance emboldens Japanese aggression and ensures US entrapment – that ensures miscalc – only scaling back the alliance solvesEdelstein and Shifrinson 18 (David, Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and Associate Professor in the Department of Government, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and the Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Joshua, Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, “Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics”, ) **NCC Packet 2020Recent events in East and Southeast Asia illustrate the second aspect of unipolar entrapment, highlighting how the United States’ desire to sustain its unipolar moment is, ironically, prompting its entrapment. There are two aspects to this dynamic. First, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been worried with China’s potential power and uncertain long-term tensions. This concern has only grown over time, to the point where many policymakers and some analysts worry China may be emerging as a regional hegemon.54 Though American policymakers offered lip service throughout the 1990s to the notion of reassuring all states – including China – in the post-Cold War era, when forced to choose the United States has long prioritized backing other countries and hedging against China. 55 Indeed, increasingly, existing allies are seen as vital components of U.S. efforts to contain China’s rise by ensuring the U.S. retains physical access to East Asia and is capable of assembling a potential counterbalancing coalition.56 As importantly, countries like Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam are aware of American calculations. Towards the end of the 2000s and continuing afterwards, this knowledge afforded East Asian leaders a powerful tool with which to pressure the United States to become “more involved” in East Asia after seemingly ignoring the region amidst the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.57 In this, East Asian policymakers were simply doing what was eminently reasonable from their perspective: seeking firmer U.S. security guarantees as the distribution of power moved against them. The effect of this effort has been to entrap the United States into a simmering regional conflict once the United States announced its intent to “remain a Pacific power” and began “the Pivot” to East Asia.58 Yet although The United States may have an interest in East Asian stability, it does not have an interest in the particular ownership of contested rocks and shoals in the East and South China seas. What the ongoing shift to focus on East Asia has done, however, is inject the United States into these disputes not just as an active participant, but also to signal American resolve vis-à-vis its clients and the PRC. 59 Indeed, since the Pivot was announced in 2010, policymakers in both Asia and the United States have increasingly treated American backing for East Asian allies in the sea disputes as a litmus test of U.S. security commitments. This trend makes little sense unless entrapment is at work. That is, the United States could readily provide security to its friends in East Asia and maintain Asia’s status quo by, e.g., surging forces to the region as crises developed, providing its clients additional military aid, or simply reinforcing infrastructure to support American forces. That the United States is instead actively protesting Chinese moves (de facto placing the blame entirely on China) and devoting its own military forces to monitor and respond to Chinese actions suggests the entrapment dynamic at play. Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other American friends in the region is in the United States’ interest, only entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response. The second aspect of entrapment comes from the response by East Asian countries. It will be some time before we have detailed evidence on what was said to whom that convinced the Obama Administration to Pivot to East Asia. Nevertheless, the East Asian response since 2010 suggests allied emboldenment is creating increased entrapment risks for the United States. As Iain Johnston suggests, one of the most striking trends in East Asia since the Pivot is the renewed assertiveness of East Asian states imperiled by the rise of China.60 This trend includes independent action by the Japanese, Vietnamese, and other military forces to take a forward leaning stance on maritime disputes that, at minimum, help justify a symmetrical Chinese response. However, it is worth recalling that Japan, Korea, and others lobbied for the Pivot for the purposes of having the United States help them manage the rise of China – the implication being that, without an active American role, they would either bandwagon with China or engage in increasingly aggressive policies with a large risk of war. As things stand, it is difficult to see what else Japan, the Philippines, and others could be doing that would risk conflict with China: East Asia is already witness to an arms race and militarized interstate disputes. Thus, unless the Pivot has had no effect on allied behavior, then its main influence has been to 1) avoid bandwagoning, but 2) allow the very assertiveness the United States presumably sought to avoid! To put the issue differently, the claims employed by East Asian allies to push what became the Pivot strongly suggest the result of the Pivot has been East Asian over-assertiveness. This is emboldenment of the purest sort: take away the United States’ post-Pivot policy, and the East Asian allies would almost certainly not be tilting with China to the same extent. In sum, entrapment is alive and well in terms of both the arguments employed and policies adopted by the United States and its allies since the late 2000s. No war has occurred, but crises are ongoing and the intensity of American backing for its East Asian clients is growing. This is a recipe for miscalculation. As American forces continue to move into the region, as American diplomacy continues to take an anti-China flavor, and as allies simultaneously spur and build upon these trends, entrapment dynamics are drawing the United States into the wrong conflicts, at the wrong time, and in the wrong place. The United States has an interest in maintaining Japan and other major states as independent actors friendly to the United States; it does not have an interest in their particular island disputes with China. Entrapment is alive and well as the United States mistakes the latter for the former. Conclusion The implications of this study are stark. In contrast to a prominent argument that great powers like the United States need not fear entrapment by their foreign allies, the results of this project suggest that entrapment may be less obvious than recent critiques apply. As importantly, the risk of entrapment is not reducible to legal solutions – it varies in important ways due to the structure of the international system and the nature of great power competition itself. In effect, entrapment is the risk states run for seeking allies. These findings carry real implications for American grand strategy and foreign policy. At a time when many analysts expect American unipolarity is waning (and may already be over), the analysis here highlights that risks of American entrapment are likely to grow over time, just as maintaining an expansive set of American security commitments leaves the U.S. exposed to allied machinations and U.S. miscalculation. In turn, managing these risks requires adjustments to how U.S. policymakers understand and approach alliance commitments. First, and at the most basic level, a more realistic approach would have U.S. policymakers recognize the dangers of entrapment – whether over the choice of confrontation, or the means, timing, and goals chosen along the way – inherent in the United States’ current grand strategy. To say this is simply to call for acknowledging that alliances are ultimately tools of realpolitik – they are ways for states to seek security, such that self-interested actors may manipulate and ensnare even their allies when their interests dictate. Second, the results highlight that managing entrapment is less an issue of shaping the terms of an alliance as it is accepting that entrapment will remain a risk so long as the United States has allies. This places a premium on deciding which alliances – if any – are truly necessary for U.S. national security and retaining a clear vision with regard to the United States’ own interests in the alliance. This is no small issue. Over the last several decades, a foreign policy consensus calling for the United States to play an outsized role in world affairs – pursuing not only its security interests, but providing an array of notionally public goods – has attained dominance in the American halls of power. Accompanying this trend has been an ever-growing set of alliance commitments. The rise of China and resurgence of Russia, meanwhile, have reinforced this dynamic, creating a sense of urgency in adding additional partners with which to confront these new threats. The work here, however, challenges both the stability and logic of this behavior: the more allies the United States has, and the more the U.S. believes these alliances are needed to contain threats to U.S. dominance, the greater the likelihood it will be entrapped in some way, shape, or form. Put differently, the costs of an expansive American grand strategy are not as minimal as some analysts claim and are primed to grow as the distribution of power changes. Instead – third – policymakers might need to consider casting off those alliances which no longer suit American interests while taking steps to tie American hands in ways that minimize the risks of entrapment in those that are retained. In this, there is a logic to what proponents of a more restrained grand strategy recommend. In brief, calling for the U.S. to retrench from areas of the world in which American involvement is neither necessary nor effective, while altering U.S. military options so other countries have must be the defenders of first resort against regional security problems not only forecloses the avenues by which the United States might be entrapped, but, in embracing strategic self-abnegation, creates a disciplining device for American behavior; along the way, it may also prompt U.S. policymakers to re-consider the scope of the challenge to American unipolarity, the accompanying threat to U.S. national security, and whether and how allies are useful in addressing these problems. Ultimately, a realist foreign policy requires a more forthright appreciation for the risks that alliance commitments pose to U.S. national security. These risks, as this study indicates, are never minimal (though they can certainly vary). Present trends indicate that the United States has faced real entrapment problems during its unipolar era, and there are good reasons to expect these problems will increase in the years ahead. Adjusting to this situation thus requires not only an intellectual shift in how analysts contemplate the alliance entrapment game, but how American grand strategy itself accommodates these dynamics.Crises are unavoidable---maintaining our commitment fuels the nationalist fire and means they escalate. Taylor 18 – Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. Taylor, Brendan, Professor Taylor holds a PhD from The Australian National University, Previously Professor of Strategic Studies and Deputy Director of the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, 2018, The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War, Kindle E-book rental. **NCC Packet 2020As these waters become more crowded and contested, however, the biggest danger is not a planned military campaign, but a lower-level military clash occurring during a tense time in Sino-Japanese relations. Some might disagree, pointing to the hundreds of Soviet-American maritime incidents that occurred during the Cold War without escalation. What differentiates this situation from almost any other, though, is its strong nationalist underpinnings. What would have happened in January 2013, for instance, if the skipper of that Japanese destroyer had not held his nerve, believing in-stead that the Chinese frigate that had just locked its weapons-targeting radar on his ship was being steered by a rogue captain about to send a couple of missiles his way? And what if that Japanese skipper had fired first, sinking the Chinese vessel and unleashing a sea of anti-Japanese protests across China? In such a scenario, could China's leaders have sat idle without risking that nationalist sentiment turning against them?Useful steps have been taken to head off this possibility with the recent breakthrough on a China Japan communication mechanism. But the fact that it took a decade of negotiations to reach consensus doesn't auger well. Moreover, the new measures do not go far enough. History tells us that mechanisms intended to avoid crises are far from fail-safe. New dangers can also emerge in the midst of crisis and, as when a car goes into a skid, different techniques and approaches are often needed to navigate through these and to prevent further escalation. At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis of the 1960s, both sides made mistakes that could have ended in nuclear catastrophe. The commander of a damaged Soviet submarine momentarily believed that war had erupted and ordered the launch of his craft's nuclear torpedo. At Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, an ICBM test-firing scheduled well in advance of the crisis was conducted, which fortunately the Soviets did not detect. And as the crisis drew to a close, American radar operators incorrectly reported that a missile had been launched from Cuba due to a training error.The defense pact creates a moral hazard – encourages Japanese escalation and makes détente impossibleBandow 17 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, “Are the Senkaku Islands Worth War Between China, Japan and America?”, National Interest, 2/12, ) **NCC Packet 2020Big wars sometimes start over small stakes. For instance, Germany’s “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck, presciently warned that a European war would begin as a result of “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” Soon, a royal assassination spawned World War I, which spread conflict around the globe.? National insults, trade opportunities and territorial claims also resulted in their share of stupid, counterproductive conflicts. The assertive young American republic threatened Great Britain with war over the Canadian border and launched an invasion to vindicate its dubious territorial claims against Mexico. A few decades later, the slightly more mature United States fought a lengthy counterinsurgency campaign against independence-minded Filipinos to preserve its territorial booty from the Spanish-American War.? Alliances sometimes accelerate the race to war. Assured of the support of Russia and Germany, respectively, Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were recklessly intransigent in summer 1914. Greater flexibility might not have prevented the conflict, but alliance-backed inflexibility ensured war.? History illustrates the dangers posed by the Asia-Pacific’s many territorial squabbles. None of the contested claims is worth a fight, let alone a great-power conflict. Yet they could become a spark like that in Sarajevo a century ago. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis increased the danger on his recent trip to Japan when he “reassured” the Abe government that Washington, DC was firmly in its corner.? The Senkaku Islands—called the Diaoyus by China—are uninhabited rocks of limited intrinsic value. However, they confer ocean and seabed control and corresponding fishing, navigation and hydrocarbon benefits. Nationalist sentiments loom equally large. The islands are controlled by Tokyo but also claimed by the People’s Republic of China. Beijing’s case is serious—better, in my view, than its less credible South China Sea claims—but Japan insists that there is no issue to discuss.? That leaves the PRC with little choice but to adopt more confrontational tactics to assert its “rights.” Tokyo took direct control of the Senkaku Islands in 2012 to forestall their use by nationalists for protests, which heightened tensions. The following year, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone over the islands, though so far the ADIZ has more symbolic than real. The PRC also has engaged in fishing and oil exploration in nearby waters, sending in coast guard ships to defend Chinese operations.? Japan felt secure in its intransigence after winning the Obama administration’s commitment that the “mutual” defense treaty between the two nations covered territory administered by the central government, even if claimed by other states. Secretary Mattis was equally explicit. He affirmed not only Washington’s support for Japan’s defense, but also stated, “I made clear that our longstanding policy on the Senkaku Islands stands. The United States will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands, and as such Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies.” In other words, America will defend Tokyo’s contested claim.? The PRC responded sharply. The United States should “avoid making the issue more complicated and bringing instability to the regional situation,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said. Indeed, he explained, the U.S.-Japan security treaty is “a product of the Cold War, which should not impair China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights.”? Adding to the combustible atmosphere is the apparent belief—of at least some officials on both sides—that war is inevitable. For instance, less than a year ago Trump strategist Steve Bannon expressed “no doubt” that “we’re going to war in the South China Sea in five to ten years.” He complained that the Chinese are “taking their sandbars and making basically stationary aircraft carriers and putting missiles on those.” While the Senkaku Islands are not part of the South China Sea, the same principles apply.? War sounded almost close at Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s confirmation hearing. He insisted: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” Using force to do so would be an act of war against any country, including America.? Chinese responded accordingly. The People’s Liberation Army website quoted one senior officer as stating: “A ‘war within the president’s term’ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality.” He called for increased military deployments in the region.? The political leadership is less transparent about its views—the residents of Zhongnanhai don’t typically appear on radio shows. However, Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group opined that “the Chinese government is quite concerned about the potential for direct confrontation with the Trump administration.” Although President Xi Jinping appears reasonably pragmatic while ruthlessly repressive, he isn’t likely to abandon what he sees as “core” Chinese interests. Moreover, nationalists and unreconstructed leftists, though differing on economic policy, share a distrust of the United States.? A mutual belief in inevitable conflict could become reality. Before World War I, a number of high-ranking European officials believed that war was coming. For them, it made sense to accept, even embrace, the onset of the conflict in August 1914 and strike while victory still remained possible.? In the case of China versus the United States, such shared sentiment may accelerate military spending. The Trump administration is demanding increased outlays despite the lack of any serious threat to vital U.S. interests. Rather, the expanded force is to enhance America’s ability to intervene against other nations, particularly China.? This gives the PRC an even greater incentive to respond, since the United States is challenging what it views (and America would view, if the situation was reversed) as “core” national interests. As the United States increases military deployments in the region, so will the PRC. After Mattis’ visit, China sent three warships near the Senkaku Islands. The risks of a violent clash will rise accordingly.? Some Washington officials might be tempted to advocate a more aggressive approach today, while the PRC is weaker and America is wealthier, backed by numerous allies and able to deploy a more powerful military. In this view, let the inevitable showdown come sooner rather than later.? Alas, that could become a prescription for years if not decades of conflict. America has a vital interest in protecting its own territory, population, and constitutional and economic systems. But China threatens none of them. The United States has important interests in the independence of its allies and freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific region. So far, the PRC has not challenged either of those things.? Washington understandably views its dominance of East Asia up to China’s borders as an advantage. But it is far less important than protecting America’s own security. Such control is not even necessary for preserving navigational freedom and allied security. More important, U.S. policy conflicts with what Beijing views as its “core” interests. Imagine Washington’s reaction if China attempted to maintain a similar position along the eastern seaboard and in the Caribbean. Nor does the presumption that America could defeat the PRC offer much comfort. The price would be high. China can build missiles and submarines faster than the United States can construct aircraft carriers. The Chinese people would be more committed to a fight if it is seen as protecting their homeland—more so than Americans would be prone to getting involved in a faraway conflict that hampers Washington’s will.? Additionally, the United States count on support from allies not directly affected. Would Australia and South Korea risk the long-term hostility of China, which will be in their next-door neighbor forever? Indeed, Japan made clear that it would not join the United States’ “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea. Explained Japanese defense minister Tomomi Inada: “I told Secretary Mattis that Japan supports the U.S. military’s freedom of navigation operation in the sea. But the [Self Defense Force] will not be sent to the area.” Inada clearly means “supports” in quotation marks.? Finally, an American “victory” almost certainly would guarantee long-term hostility and future conflict. It took two world wars to determine Germany’s place in the global order. And it took “only” two because, after the second one, Germany ended up divided and well behind the United States and Soviet Union. While the PRC’s collapse as a country is possible, it is unlikely. In fact, military defeat might spur nationalist rage and result in greater centralization.? The Communist regime could fall. But that probably would spawn an authoritarian government rather than a democracy. And any democracy is more likely to be nationalist/populist than liberal. Whether the almost inevitable “Second Sino-American War” likely would turn out in Washington’s favor is less clear. There could be a third one as well, if China rebounded. The United States might find that just as battles can be pyrrhic, so can wars. It’s an experience America should avoid.? U.S. officials have good reason to remind China of the costs of conflict and the importance of settling even contentious territorial disputes peacefully. At the same time, however, the Trump administration should avoid issuing blank checks to allies seeming to exempt them from having to deal with, and even discuss, those same territorial challenges. Sometimes blank checks get cashed with disastrous consequences, like Imperial Germany’s support for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which sped Europe’s plunge into the World War I abyss.? The Senkaku Islands are of little practical importance to China and Japan, and essentially of no importance to America. But as the locus of a dangerous game of geopolitical chicken, they could spark another Sino-Japanese war, which would be disastrous. And if that turned into a Sino-American conflict, the consequences would be incalculable. President Donald Trump should never forget these dangers as he confronts China’s growing ambition and power.The US-Japan alliance is key – it puts a backstop on peaceful transition and enflames nationalism – that makes ECS disputes inevitableKim 18 (Jihyun, Assistant Professor, Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, USA, “The Clash of Power and Nationalism: The Sino-Japan Territorial Dispute”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 5, Iss. 1) **NCC Packet 2020Despite its relative weakening of status as a global hegemon, the USA is still the most influential state in the world ‘when power is measured in terms of economic and military assets’ and will remain so for some time to come (Art, 2010, p. 359). Nonetheless, the relative power and influence in some parts of the world, most notably in Asia and even beyond, is gradually tipping towards China and inevitably affecting the power dynamics between this rising Asian giant and its neighbours, including Japan, one of America’s closest allies (Goldstein, 2007; Sutter, 2010; Tammen & Kugler, 2006). In general, power transition theory (PTT) postulates that war is likely to occur against the backdrop of altering power parity between nations caused by their differential growth rates, especially when the relative power between a declining dominant state and a rising challenger approaches parity (Gilpin, 1981; Lemke, 1995; Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980). In addition, variant branches of power transition theory look into ‘[T]he relationship between changes in relative power, hierarchical structures, and joint satisfaction’ in order to assess the probability of conflict or integration (Efird, Kugler & Genna, 2003, p. 293). The theory suggests that the future of war and peace would be determined by the interaction effect between ‘relative power and the degree of satisfaction with the international order (or status quo)’ (DiCicco & Levy, 1999, p. 682). According to these theoretical assumptions, catastrophic war is likely to be averted even after a rising China would eventually become the world’s most powerful state if the country emerges as a satisfied dominant power with ‘no substantial demands for change to the international system’s organizing principles’ or to the regional order (Lemke & Tammen, 2003, p. 270). However, the probability of conflict would rise dramatically if an increasingly powerful China with deep-seated grievances against the existing order—previously established and maintained by the USA and its core allies like Japan—seeks to challenge the status quo. During most of the Cold War when there was an ordered hierarchy, Sino-Japan power relations were quite stable with neither side having enough capability to emerge as a regional hegemon or to challenge the East Asian security order, established and led by the superpowers. Whereas China was a weak country, marred by widespread poverty, Japan also fell short of becoming a major power on its own. Notwithstanding Japan’s successful post-war recovery to the point where it even became America’s economic rival, it remained under the US security umbrella while enduring constraints on its military sovereignty in line with its Peace Constitution. Simultaneously, China embraced the US-led regional order to counterbalance the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split and to encourage economically robust and militarily advanced Japan to remain low key, thus constraining the former enemy from re-emerging as a threat to China’s national security. Although the entire geostrategic context was hierarchical, dominated by the Cold War superpowers, neither China nor Japan was in a position to assume a leadership role in East Asia. It was during this time of fairly straightforward and unequivocal regional status quo when the Sino-Japan rapprochement was promoted along with the mutually beneficial economic partnership between the two with neither side willing or able to undermine the interests of the other or to challenge the existing order. Since the rise of China and the relative decline of US hegemonic outreach; however, there has been a greater tension in Sino-Japan relations as each side more openly struggles to secure its regional dominance and prevent the other from becoming a leading player in East Asia. While Beijing and Tokyo continue to share a common interest in keeping regional stability as a necessary condition for their lucrative economic cooperation, the shifting power dynamics have encouraged both sides to redefine their status in East Asia as well as their relations to each other (Jimbo, 2012). At the same time, the regional power shift has pushed nationalism on both sides, simmering underneath for decades, to resurface in a more overt and precarious way. In addition, the lingering mutual distrust, embedded in unresolved historical issues, has further complicated Sino-Japan ties, increasing the chances that the changing regional hierarchy would clash with rising nationalism. The politics of nationalism, intertwined with a heightened sense of insecurity due to shifting regional power parity, could not only affect contemporary Sino-Japan relations but also reshape the overall security order in East Asia. In effect, the rise of nationalism has emerged as one of the most potent forces that could deteriorate the relationship between China and Japan (Matthews, 2003; Zheng, 1999). Yet, nationalism is a constantly evolving and renovating phenomenon, characterized by ‘conflation, multivocality, indeterminateness, confusion, and mysticism’ (McVeigh, 2004, p. 6). It is challenging to fully grasp the workings of nationalism in addition to comprehending its role in Sino-Japan relations because nationalism could be quite ‘malleable and vulnerable to manipulation and/or guidance by leaders and media, as well as driven to some extent by events’ and even by the public (Moore, 2010, p. 298). Moreover, further analysis is needed to evaluate the linkage between power shift and nationalism, in particular how and in what ways the changing power relations between China and Japan have affected each other’s nationalism and created a regional order in which Sino-Japan tensions, rather than rapprochement and cooperation, are more likely to dominate their bilateral ties. In what follows, a country-specific approach will be taken to better explore the complex interactions between power shift and nationalism as well as their effects on the changes and continuities in Sino-Japan relations and the overall security order in East Asia. The Fall and Rise of China: Its Evolving Power and Nationalism The concept of nationalism was first adopted by Chinese elites even before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to defend the country ‘from foreign invasion and to gain its independent status, and hence acquired strong negative and reactive sense’ (Cui, 2012, p. 204). Since then, Chinese nationalism has revolved around a narrative of China’s century of humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers, including Japan. Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) earliest years, the theme of resisting Japan, embedded in the history of Japanese past atrocities against China, has been an important ‘source of political capital’ to uphold the legitimacy of the party leadership (Hughes, 2008, pp. 247–248). China’s nationalism before its rise served as an effective protective mechanism to keep Chinese national identity and bring the people together in times of weakness. Nonetheless, this early nationalism did not generate any substantial measure to demonstrate China’s greatness or reclaim its regional supremacy through assertive expansionist policies because the country was not fully capable of blatantly projecting its strength while simultaneously withstanding negative repercussions, expected in so doing. Besides, China was preoccupied with its internal struggles during the turbulent years of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Then, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the national focus shifted to preserving domestic and regional stability as a precondition for China’s economic growth. In addition, China had to carefully consider its limited policy options and the overall regional power disparity in Japan’s favour throughout the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet split made Beijing lack any reliable Communist allies without getting diplomatic and military support from another superpower, the USA, whereas the solidarity between Tokyo and Washington remained steadfast. The Sino-Soviet split increased China’s needs to accept the US-led regional order along with Beijing’s conviction that rapprochement with Washington would be strategically desirable to counter the threat posed by Moscow. Under the condition, Beijing largely practiced ‘a pragmatic nationalism based on a sober assessment of China’s domestic and global challenges and tempered by diplomatic prudence’ without recklessly exploiting nationalist sentiment to the extent that it could cause alarm even though nationalism connected with the idea of resisting Japan was an indispensable theme in Chinese political discourse (S. Zhao, 2013, p. 536). Despite nationalism playing an important part in China’s relations with Japan, Chinese foreign policy was not exclusively driven by ideological factors but by pragmatism supported by Beijing’s political, economic and strategic calculations derived from its realistic assessment of the limits of its own power, which subsequently paved the way for the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in the 1970s. After acknowledging the regional order in favour of Japan and Tokyo’s strategic value within the realm of trade, investment and aid, Beijing tried to cultivate its ties with the former enemy. As for the Chinese leaders, economic growth, partly with support from Japan, was regarded as a major component of China’s regime stability and national development. Additionally, Beijing’s fear of Japan reasserting its wartime disposition towards militarism was alleviated by ‘the fact that Japan was safely ensconced within a security alliance with the United States’ (Smith, 2009, p. 232). This set-up further encouraged China to accept the existing regional hierarchy with relative satisfaction. Under the circumstances, Beijing controlled popular nationalism when it came to making Chinese foreign policy without resorting to emotional nationalistic rhetoric. In recent years, however, China has shown a greater degree of assertive nationalism in safeguarding what it considers its core interests.2 This is not because China’s priorities for seeking economic growth while maintaining regional stability have become less important but because it has amassed considerable power and influence to express its past grievances and its desire to create a new regional order in a more overt manner. This phenomenon has been facilitated by China’s rise as a global economic behemoth with deep pockets even to enhance its military and diplomatic posture. Concurrently, the Sino-Japan power dynamics have shifted in favour of China due to Japan’s weakened status as a major economic engine in Asia and beyond in addition to the relative decline of its indispensable ally, the USA, as the world’s sole superpower. Meanwhile, China has started redressing its previous geostrategic vulnerability, originated from the Sino-Soviet split, by mending its ties with Russia (Rozman, 1998). Despite Moscow’s carefully calculated hedging strategy against Beijing to limit China’s growing influence in the region, their shared concern about America’s containment policy towards Russia and China has brought the two countries together for mutual strategic utility. The warming ties between China and Russia have granted Beijing greater diplomatic leverage when dealing with a list of controversial issues revolving around China’s more forceful projection of its national interests in recent years (Duch?tel & Godement, 2016). China’s increasingly overt nationalism, therefore, can be seen as a reflection of its outward confidence against the backdrop of altering regional power dynamics to its advantage. At the same time, China’s more explicit expression of national interests can also be seen as a manifestation of its inward sense of identity crisis and internal complications, intensified during the course of its rapid rise. This is the peculiarity of China’s new nationalism, which heightens Beijing’s dilemma to manage the discrepancy between the renewed national clout on the one hand and the unprecedented uncertainty over the future of the Chinese system on the other. The rise of China—largely made possible by its unique model of development through underplaying Communist tenets and embracing certain aspects of liberal capitalism—has caused the unintended but inevitable challenge to its own identity by widening the gap between the country’s outward confidence, especially regarding its global economic leverage, and its internal struggle to handle the increasingly complex society. Despite an inflated sense of empowerment thanks to China’s new quotient of wealth, the Chinese national spirit began to decline due to its ideological crisis by the end of the Cold War together with an uncertain future filled with growing economic, social and political tensions at home. The tangible benefits of China’s successful economic reform, although enabling the country’s splendid rise, have served as a double-edged sword by making China remain potentially vulnerable with internal developments that could destabilize its domestic cohesiveness. Under the circumstances, the needs for the Chinese elites to use nationalism as a means to maintain political legitimacy have increased as doing so could divert public discontents regarding domestic problems towards external challenges. Notwithstanding Chinese leaders’ concern over the potential dangers of depending too extensively on national sentiments that could eventually be unmanageable, Beijing has shown its growing inclination to incorporate nationalism in shaping more assertive foreign policies in order to unite the Chinese public and divert their energies and frustrations outward (Downs & Saunders, 1998/99; Fravel, 2010; Whiting, 1995). In this process, Chinese new nationalism has emerged as a potentially powerful domestic source of its muscle-flexing foreign policy, reflected in its more overt push to redefine territorial boundaries in the region. This trend has also been reinforced by China’s efforts to cope with its enduring historical recollection of outside forces’ infringement of its sovereignty and its growing aspirations/capabilities to reposition itself as the principal architect of regional order. The political utility of nationalism has further increased with the Chinese leaders more actively embracing this force ‘to fill the ideological vacuum left by the decline of Marxism and Maoism’ (Zheng, 1999, p. 90). As asserted by Yu, ‘the Chinese government is under heavy pressure’ to restore China’s historical glory through facilitating the rise of nationalism against the backdrop of ‘the declining appeal of communism, as well as the corruption and isolation of official academia’ (2014, p. 1174). With the decline of its ideology-based legitimacy, the CCP has begun to intensify patriotic education, designed to promote ‘loyalty by direct evocation of Chinese nationalism’ and to legitimize the continuation of one party rule as the best way to ensure political stability and continuing economic growth (Cui, 2012, p. 208). There has also been an effort to remember and highlight collective memory of history on the mass scale, focusing on the time of war against Japan so to facilitate national unity among the public. Promoted by Chinese state nationalism, the Chinese collective memory of Japan’s wartime atrocities and numerous unresolved historical issues, including the Nanjing Massacre, lack of apologies from Tokyo, and the territorial dispute, etc., have emerged ‘at the forefront of public perception of the Japanese,’ triggering public anger and resentment against Japan (Qin, 2006, p. 32). Yet, the rise of popular nationalistic sentiment has started constraining ‘Beijing’s control mechanisms and its ability to direct nationalist discourse in ways convenient to itself’ (Cui, 2012, p. 199). In effect, Chinese nationalism at the popular level has emerged as a considerable force, led by increasingly effective nationalist groups equipped with new communication technology that allows them to easily spread information, mobilize the public and organize mass protests. The massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China’s major cities in the past few years can be seen as the expression of Chinese bottom-up nationalism, led by societal forces that criticize not only the ‘unremorseful’ former enemy, Japan, but also the communist state that is not confident enough to protect China’s core national interests. As such, Chinese nationalism ‘has changed from an essentially state-led ideology to an increasingly society-driven phenomenon’ in the process of the CCP losing its monopoly of controlling this force with a growing tide of popular nationalist sentiment (Lampton, 2014, p. 22). One might question whether China’s rising popular nationalism has become a significant enough force, ‘compelling the Chinese leadership to take a tougher stand on a range of foreign policy issues, particularly maritime disputes in East Asia’ (Johnston, 2016, p. 7). Indeed, it would be an exaggeration to treat the role of popular nationalism as the only factor to determine China’s foreign policy because there are other elements that could also influence ‘China’s coercive diplomacy on maritime issues, such as elite opinion, the personal preferences of top leaders, security dilemma dynamics, organizational interests, or some combination thereof’ (ibid.). Moreover, the PRC as a party-state, which still remains in the driver’s seat, is not entirely swayed by public opinion in making China’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, the chances for the elite to respond to popular nationalism, instead of simply utilizing and manipulating the public sentiment for their own politico-diplomatic purposes, have increased along with the growing demands of nationalist legitimation as well as China’s increasing capabilities to accommodate such demands. China’s exceptional economic development, made possible partly by successfully implementing certain aspects of capitalism, has served as the engine behind its remarkable and much-celebrated rise. Nonetheless, the rise of China itself has made its unique system of governance potentially vulnerable by triggering a new state-society balance with individuals gaining greater control over their lives than ever before in China’s modern history. This has created a dilemma for Chinese leaders regarding the discrepancy between their externally projected strength and internally perceived weakness when governing this idiosyncratic communist state in the twenty-first century. Chinese popular nationalists share the dream with their government to make their country powerful enough to stand up against the bullies of any outside forces. Suspicious of foreign powers’ conspiracy to hamper China’s rise, popular nationalism has been vocal and emotional in criticisms of not only other countries’ harmful intentions against China but also Beijing’s failure to demonstrate stronger resolve to defend the national interests. Under this new environment, Chinese leaders have become more reluctant to control the expression of popular nationalism and willing to accept the popular nationalist’s demand to take a resolute position against any hostile outside forces, including Japan. Inexorably, Beijing has less flexibility in operating on sensitive issues, involving China’s vital interests vis-à-vis Japan such as history-related controversies and territorial disputes (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2016). This is due to its concerns about the possibility of popular anger targeting Japan turning against what the Chinese public also sees as the incompetent and weak-willed Chinese authorities, causing social and political instability. In this regard, the increasing responsiveness of the Chinese government to public opinion is an important development of China’s internal affairs that reflects ‘the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism’ with implication for a more assertive and confrontational Chinese foreign policy in the long run (S. Zhao, 2013, p. 536). All in all, Beijing’s efforts to promote harmonious relations with Tokyo to further expedite China’s rise have been constrained by some contradictory elements within its own definition of nationalism that revolves around the theme of resisting Japan and strengthening Chinese national unity against its former enemy. It has proved difficult to even-handedly ‘promote social and political stability through sustained economic growth—surely best achieved through good relations’ with its closest neighbours, including Japan, while reconciling with strident nationalist discourse, based on a clear distinction between us versus them (Cui, 2012, p. 215). As China’s President Xi Jinping (2017) has proclaimed during his nineteenth Congress speech on 18 October 2017, the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation is ‘a dream about history, the present, and the future’, working tirelessly for ‘the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’; notwithstanding his emphasis on ‘preserving world peace and promoting common development’, Xi’s speech sheds important light on the difficulties and intricacies of China’s approach to Japan. When dealing with delicate matters associated with sovereignty, national pride, and historically unresolved tensions, it has become more tempting and tactically convenient for Beijing to resort to assertive nationalism though doing so could be a strategic liability in the long run (Chen-Weiss, 2014). This is the case even though Beijing acknowledges the needs to facilitate diplomatic flexibility and mutually beneficial ties with Tokyo as doing so would be more conducive to achieving the Chinese dream in the twenty-first century, that is, as asserted by Xi Jinping, ‘to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation’ through promoting lasting peace, economic development and international security (quoted in Xinhua, 2012). Japan’s Power and Nationalism at a Crossroad By the early twentieth century, Japan was perceived as a considerable power in Asia with the burgeoning sense of hierarchical nationalism that placed the Japanese nation on top. The present usage of Japanese nationalism, embedded in the concept of minzoku (an ethnic nation), as opposed to kokumin (the constitutional sense of national identity), emerged around World War I to call for ‘one nation, one state’, envisioning the superiority of the Japanese minzoku (Doak, 2006). In effect, the political elite started connecting Japanese nationalism to the monarchy with its emperor being portrayed as the key force to unify the people in the course of Japan’s imperial expansion. After the war, however, nationalism was depoliticized (Sannosuke, 1971). During the early post-war period when Japan’s power was at its nadir, there was a widespread sense of cultural nihilism, which downgraded the Japanese traditional values as responsible for the rise of devastating pre-war nationalism. In fact, it was taboo to promote political nationalism during the early post-war period. Nonetheless, policies of economic nationalism were gradually endorsed by the Japanese leaders as necessary measures to facilitate the economic rehabilitation in post-war Japan. Subsequently, Japan experienced notable economic achievement that allowed its people to have a renewed sense of pride in their country’s abilities and cultural values, previously suppressed due to Japan’s negative status as a major perpetrator of the war. By the early 1980s, the regional economic order was in Japan’s favour as the country had become one of the world’s leading economies with significant leverage over East Asia and beyond. Against this backdrop, ideas of Japanese national distinctiveness were produced and disseminated again in the society (Yoshino, 1992). The result of this development was the emergence of a ‘new nationalist mood’, encouraging the Japanese people to feel that their country should ‘play a more active political role in international affairs commensurate with’ its global economic status (Rose, 2000, p. 171). Since the 1990s, however, Japan was in the grip of a revisionist trend associated with the emergence of neo-nationalism. As discussed by Kersten (1999, p. 191), ‘[t]he tumultuous context of the 1990s, including the Gulf War, death of Hirohito and the fiftieth anniversary of defeat in 1945, have provided a fertile environment’ for the rise of the so-called ‘liberal school of history’ with a core objective to promote a positive view of the country through nationalistic education and correction of the so-called ‘dark history’. At the end of the twentieth century, Japan has started losing its supremacy in the realm of economics without yet having acquired political goodwill and diplomatic strength sufficient enough to dissipate its neighbours’ lingering antipathy towards the country, embedded in the memories of its imperial expansion and atrocities in the past.3 Internally, a combination of Japan’s own political and economic malaise has conflicted with its basic sense of superiority as the ‘lead goose’ in the course of the Asian economic miracle and ‘the only Asian power able to beat the Westerners at their own game in the past’ (Moore, 2010, pp. 300–301). In addition, the growing economic competition from its neighbours, including China and South Korea, has started challenging Japan’s distinctive identity as the most economically powerful and technologically advanced country. Against this backdrop of shifting power parity in Asia, the nature of Japan’s nationalism has been transformed from a reflection of its confidence into a critical mechanism to safeguard its identity as a leading state in the region. In line with the so-called ‘healthy patriotism’, a positive view of Japanese history has been promoted in order to ‘allow Japan to mobilize its energies for a variety of pressing tasks, including reviving the economy … and defending against external threats’ (Berger, 2014). Simultaneously, there has been a revitalized discussion about constitutional revision to boost its military strength and keep the regional order from shifting in favour of a rising China (Mito, 2008). The reinterpretation of the peace constitution’s limits on military activities, which would allow Japanese forces to help defend its allies, most notably the USA, can be seen as Japan’s efforts to maintain the regional order, defined as the US-led status quo rather than the new power dynamics, moulded by China. Japan’s determination ‘to extricate itself from many of the military constraints’ also reflects and reinforces heightened nationalism at home and across the region (Haass, 2013). Especially with regard to the role of nationalism in Japan’s China policy, there has been a distinct evolution since the Sino-Japanese normalization in 1972 (Mochizuki, 2007). Tokyo initially pursued a conciliatory policy towards Beijing during the era of friendship diplomacy (1972–1989), promoting bilateral economic ties while taking an accommodating position regarding Japan’s past atrocities against China without concerning much about security competition from its Chinese counterpart. The rapprochement was made possible partly due to Japan’s military alliance with the USA, the insurmountable global superpower back then, as well as its economic superiority over China, the combination of which kept the regional order in Japan’s favour, allowing Tokyo to take a malleable approach towards Beijing without having to face the possibility of such a measure undermining Japan’s overall national interests. Before the emergence of the so-called China threat discourse, China was not ‘a focal point of both Left-wing and Right-wing Japanese nationalism’ or a target against which Japan should be more ‘resolute’ (Suzuki, 2015, p. 96). Throughout these periods, tensions in Sino-Japanese relations did revolve around highly controversial issues including the interpretation of history and the question of sovereignty over disputed islands. However, patriotic rhetoric in Japan was mostly aimed at a domestic audience rather than being translated into a hostile policy towards China. However, China has gradually emerged as a potentially domineering neighbour that could undermine the regional stability and Japan’s national interests. Herein, the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989 became an important turning point in Sino-Japan relations as ‘the brutal repression of the Chinese democracy movement soured the country’s image for the Japanese public’, making Japanese elites become more wary of engaging with China (Mochizuki, 2007, p. 749). Japanese public opinion regarding China was further deteriorated by subsequent episodes, including China’s assertion of sovereignty over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 1992, nuclear testing in 1995, and conducting military exercises (including missile launches) during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. With the intensification of China’s rise alongside the relative decline of America’s hegemonic influence—the backbone of Japan’s post-war security—Japan’s China policy has incorporated a more active balancing strategy through expanding the scope and strength of its own military power (Nakano, 2016). The regional power shift has been complicated by the clash of Sino-Japan nationalisms in conjunction with historically rooted animosity on both sides, creating an environment more conducive to bilateral tensions rather than mutual trust and cooperation. Mounting tensions between China and Japan challenge a widely held assumption that close economic relations would lead to a more stable regional order. Liberal optimism emphasizes that inextricably related and mutually reinforcing mechanisms, such as economic interdependence, generate substantial pacifying effects by extending the scope of shared interests among countries involved while increasing the costs of security disputes (Brooks, 1999; Gartzke, 2007). Although it would be imprudent to hastily dismiss the liberal view, the growing rivalry between China and Japan in recent years as well as their enduring struggle to achieve ‘positive peace’ could shed light on the limits of such optimism. Despite their close economic interdependence and shared understanding about devastating cost of war, the rise of China can be seen as a facilitating force for Japan’s greater openness to talk about its needs to become a ‘normal country’ with stronger military capabilities, a discussion less imaginable a decade or two ago. Japan’s nationalism has been heightened by its growing sense of vulnerability, attributable in large part to a rising China with emerging military and economic capabilities. In Japanese political discourse, the China threat theory has been ramped up as this country, which is determined to become a regional hegemon and alter the existing order, is increasingly being described as a potential national-security threat. Against this backdrop, ‘politicians seen to be “tough” on China have been praised, regardless of their party political affiliations’ whereas those seen to be more compromising have come under heavy fire for being diplomatically weak (Suzuki, 2015, p. 96). Notwithstanding the existence of partisan divides in terms of Japanese attitudes towards China, these developments allowed Japanese politicians from both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) little choice but to take a tougher stance towards China when the recent bickering between the two countries over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands plunged the bilateral ties into the lowest point.4 Such determinations to face China in a more resolute manner have become noticeable in the Japanese political discourse, widely seen as a departure from Japan’s more accommodating diplomacy vis-à-vis China in the past. All in all, the resurgence of Japan’s nationalism combined with its efforts to strengthen security posture and more actively protect national interests, including the control over the East China Sea islands, are the manifestations of its unwavering resistance to the changing relative power in East Asia, which could lead to a new regional order shaped by a rising China, irrespective of (if not against) Japan’s interests. Simultaneously, Japan’s unfulfilled historical reconciliation with China has been feeding the spirit of ‘jingoism and xenophobia’ at home while hardening nationalist attitudes in its counterpart (Kingston, 2016). This has created an environment that many liberals describe as the ‘pacifying effects’ of economic interactions could be easily offset by other competing factors, including the intensifying security dilemma caused by the shifting regional power in China’s favour and the enduring Sino-Japan strategic distrust, rooted in their unpleasantly shared past. The East China Sea Dispute Beijing and Tokyo kept their precarious nationalism at bay throughout the Cold War. Furthermore, both sides managed to build rapprochement thanks to their mutual interests in economic development as well as the relatively stable bilateral power relations, anchored in the US-led regional order, with neither side feeling the urgency or having the capacity to aggressively claim one’s national interests at the expense of the other.5 However, the chances for the clash of nationalism between these two major players in East Asia have increased in recent years together with the growing inclination on both sides to pursue their national interests in more assertive manners. Against the backdrop of shifting power dynamics in Sino-Japan relations and the overall change in the regional status quo, caused by the rise of China and the relative weakening of the US-dominated regional order that guaranteed Japan’s security, ‘undercurrents of mutual unfriendliness’ have become more pronounced (Roy, 2005, p. 201). Concurrently, the rise of nationalism in both countries has further plagued Sino-Japan relations, creating politically colder climate and even damaging their previously warm economics ties. Among a number of perennial problems in Sino-Japanese relations, the East China Sea dispute has emerged as one of the most dangerous flashpoints, posing intricate questions of legality, national pride and beyond. This is a historically rooted issue of sovereignty that could be affected by the shifting relative power in Sino-Japan relations together with intensifying Chinese and Japanese nationalisms and their effects on both countries’ increasingly unyielding foreign policy vis-à-via each other. Beijing’s official narrative is that the Diaoyu islands were taken away by the Japanese along with their acquisition of Taiwan in 1895; thus Japan’s annexation of the islands is an intrinsic part of the history of Japan’s imperialistic aggression against China. According to this view, the islands were stolen when the regional order was in Japan’s favour while China was falling prey to the Western imperialist powers and not in a position to counter Japan’s expansion. Conversely, Tokyo asserts that the islands were not Chinese sovereign territory but ‘terra nullius’ (nobody’s land) in time of Japan’s discovery; hence, Japan’s 1895 annexation was a lawful territorial consolidation, unrelated to the war between Qing dynasty China and Meiji Japan in the nineteenth century (Smith, 2013, p. 29). In the aftermath of World War II, the USA assumed administrative control of the islands as part of its greater governing responsibilities over Japan’s Ryukyu Islands chain. During those years, neither China nor Japan was in a position to challenge the regional order designed by the rising superpower. In addition, the relative power was in Japan’s favour not because Japan had a major military clout but because it was firmly placed under the US security umbrella together with economic and diplomatic support from Washington. On the other hand, Beijing was preoccupied with the task of building a communist state on the ruins left by years of the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War while starting to face its diplomatic isolation at the dawn of the Sino-Soviet split. The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were not highly valued by either China or Japan until the discovery of potentially substantial energy deposits around the area in late 1960s and the Okinawa Reversion in the early 1970s that granted Japan the administrative control of the islands. Tokyo’s claims to the island chain were contested by Beijing (and Taipei) ‘particularly during the time when the United States returned Okinawa to Japan’ (Q. Zhao, 2013, p. 47). This development led Washington to take a middle way that was to return administrative rights to Japan while asserting its neutrality doctrine on the sovereignty question and describing the Okinawa Reversion Treaty not affecting the islands’ legal status. It meant, according to then-Secretary of State William Rogers, ‘whatever the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect’ (quoted in Susumu & Selden, 2014). Nevertheless, the US neutrality doctrine was insufficient to bring about a diplomatic breakthrough and address the discontents among the parties involved. Instead of ultimately solving the controversy, it placed the given issue at the centre of a historically charged sovereignty dispute, which has been pushed to the forefront of Sino-Japan relations more recently along with the regional power shift and the resurgence of nationalism on both sides.6 Concurrently, mounting tensions over the islands have further activated the collective memories inside both countries, raising the stakes for Beijing and Tokyo in shrewdly connecting the East China Sea issue with the sense of national identity and pride. Especially with an acceleration of the regional power shift in recent years, ‘there has been a vicious cycle’ of the clash of nationalistic sentiments in both China and Japan, which has included, ‘on the Chinese side, reviving and reinforcing memories of Japan’s wartime aggression and, on the Japanese side, efforts to obscure or deny aspects of wartime history—which in turn provokes reactions from Japan’s Asian neighbours’ (Morris-Suzuki quoted in Johnson, 2016). Beyond the security, economic and geopolitical challenges, therefore, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has been ‘an identity-based conflict in which the two nations’ divergent perceptions, attitudes and intentions interact intensely with one another’; such an identity-based conflict combined with the growing shift in regional power parity could further stimulate the opposing nations’ historical experiences to influence ‘the present crisis, and activate their collective traumas and glories’ that keep bedeviling their ties (Arai & Wang, 2013, p. 99). Heightened anxiety on both sides and tougher rhetoric taken by Beijing and Tokyo regarding this issue illustrate the growing complexity of politics of nationalism. This phenomenon has been reflected in (and reinforced by) each country’s foreign policy against the backdrop of shifting regional power dynamics and simmering potential for the emergence of new security order. Thus, the given dispute is embedded in a much more substantial and intricate controversy than Sino-Japan competition for geostrategic manoeuvres or expected energy deposits in the area. In the past, however, the dispute was not considered as a major obstacle that could prevent Sino-Japan normalization due to higher political priorities and strategic considerations within both countries as well as the relatively steady regional order, which kept potentially destabilizing nationalist passions at bay. Notwithstanding their disagreement over the territoriality of the islands, both sides demonstrated restraint as neither was interested in letting the given issue undermine the prospect of consolidating bilateral ties, the priorities shared by Beijing and Tokyo. After the revelation of Washington’s intention to normalize its diplomatic relations with Beijing, Tokyo pushed further to seek rapprochement with its communist neighbour as a precaution for the potential change in the post-war regional security order away from Japan’s unique advantage as an exclusive partner of the USA. During the time of the Sino-Japan rapprochement, China, with Japan’s concurrence, ‘demonstrated that, while the island controversy was important, it was subsidiary to Beijing’s larger political goals vis-à-vis Japan’ (Smith, 2013, p. 37). Then, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a ‘tacit’ agreement to shelve the islands dispute and leave the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue to the ‘next generation’, which ‘would be wise enough to find good solutions satisfactory to all’ (Yang, 2013, p. 25). According to the Chinese records on the conversation between Prime Minister Tanaka and Premier Zhou in 1972, Zhou indicated China’s preference to defer the East China Sea issue for the sake of more urgent task of normalizing Sino-Japan relations. Tanaka did not challenge Zhou’s unwillingness to discuss the island dispute, concurring on the Chinese view to ‘talk about it sometime in the future’ (Jiping, 2012).7 For decades thereafter, the Chinese government took a markedly restrained approach, playing down the issue to maintain stable Sino-Japan ties as a necessary condition for China’s economic growth and prevent any nationalistic pro-Diaoyu demonstrations from escalating into anti-Japanese protests. Likewise, the Japanese leadership was ‘mindful of the effect a return to “old” nationalism would have on its relationship with China’, and remained ambivalent about the nationalistic inclination on the islands issue (Rose, 2000, pp. 178–179). Despite their disagreements over a range of disputes including the sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, economic ties were taken as shared priorities. In addition, the lack of capacity and willingness on both sides to revise the US-led regional order worked as a powerful force to prevent Beijing and Tokyo from letting their nationalist passions spiralling out of control. Although nationalism was an important political component in both countries, the development of Chinese and Japanese nationalism was more about domestic debates with domestic claims, thus not a powerful enough force that could adversely affect Sino-Japan relations. In retrospect, Beijing’s pragmatic posture would work as one of the key contributing factors to the Sino-Japan power shift by facilitating China’s rapid rise in the following decades. Inevitably, however, the politics of nationalism regarding the East China Sea dispute would become more complicated in the regional environment, created by China’s growing clout combined with Japan’s increasingly overt resistance to the power shift and the emergence of new security order less favourable to its interests. The changing regional security and economic power dynamics have drawn Beijing and Tokyo further into the politics of nationalism at the cost of bringing both sides closer to the edge of military confrontation. In effect, the power shift in East Asia has raised the stake in the longstanding tension over the East China Sea as this is where the Sino-Japan clash of nationalism and battle for supremacy are likely to occur during the course of China’s attempt to revise the existing order and Japan’s resistance to the rise of China-led regional security system. Especially for Beijing, the East China Sea (as well as the South China Sea where another row over disputed islands is on-going) is not merely a stage where it tries to flex its muscles and show-off its newly gained power but also an importance piece to complete the overall picture of China’s re-emergence as a dominant player in the region after its century of humiliation. China’s extraordinary growth over the past quarter century has not only led to a surge of national pride but also provided the country more resources to invest in military modernization, through which to fulfil its growing strategic ambitions to reclaim its place in the sun.8 The East China Sea dispute is particularly complicated because it is an issue, deeply rooted in the lingering animosity and unresolved historical grievances between China and Japan. China’s pursuit of national rejuvenation revolves around closely interrelated objectives, including its re-emergence as the leading architect of the security order in East Asia as well as the shedding of its national disgrace imposed by the imperial Japan and other Western powers over the past centuries. Herein, the Chinese aspiration to surpass Japan geo-strategically, economically and otherwise is a major part of their vision of national rejuvenation given that the legacy of Chinese humiliation was closely associated with Japan’s relative superiority over China in the past. This sheds important light on ‘why Beijing places significance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue’ and demonstrates greater emotional and nationalistic attachments to this matter compared to ‘other territorial disputes, such as the ones involving Vietnam, India, and the Philippines’ (Wu, 2013, p. 70). At the same time, Beijing has been more cautious in dealing with the East China Sea dispute and demonstrating its assertiveness vis-à-vis Japan. Unlike the South China Sea disputes, which have gained greater attention in recent years due to Beijing’s controversial land reclamation and militarization in contested waters, the East China Sea has been quieter even with a few high-profile developments, including Japan’s nationalization of the disputed islands and China’s declaration of air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the area. This is not only because Sino-Japan power asymmetry has been less extreme compared to China’s relations with each individual claimant in the South China Sea disputes but also because Japan’s alliance with the US has been more consolidated with greater strategic capacity to contain China’s blatant expansionism in the East China Sea. However, this pattern of relative calmness may not last given the on-going regional power shift combined with their mutual distrust and intensifying nationalism, embedded in bitter memories of shared history between China and Japan. Although the longstanding East China Sea impasse appears to have been better managed compared to the maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the Sino-Japan territorial row could become even more volatile in the long run with the clash of power and nationalism on both sides during their contest for supremacy in East Asia. Furthermore, there remains a dangerous potential for the convergence of increasingly explosive territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas. This could happen if what Japan sees as China’s blatant expansionism into the South China Sea toughens Japanese policy towards China in general and the East China Sea issue in particular, further hardening China’s dealing with Japan regarding the islands dispute and beyond. In fact, Japan has been more vocal against China’s large-scale land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea, implying that Beijing’s increasingly assertive posture towards the South China Sea disputes could be replicated in the East China Sea (AFP, 2016). Japan’s growing fear is that it might lose its regional leverage while having to deal with China’s rising military might and increasingly unyielding territorial claims, reinforced by the surge of Chinese nationalistic fervour. Concurrently, Japan’s own nationalist impulses have increased to the extent to enable conservative elements in Japanese politics to start pushing for a more resolute security posture and bolstering its own military capabilities.9 In September 2015, for example, Japan enacted bills expanding the scope of its pacifist constitution’s limits on military by allowing the country to deploy troops abroad to help allies fight in the name of collective self-defence. Despite domestic and regional concerns over the potential end of Japan’s post-war pacifism and the growing danger of Japan being ensnared in US-led conflicts, Prime Minister Abe emphasized the need for his country’s defence policy shift to ‘meet new challenges such as from a rising China’ (Sieg, 2015).10 In a larger sense, this measure could affect Sino-Japan tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by further complicating the security dilemma between the two states and their aggregated military might through alliance relations (or lack thereof) with other major powers such as the USA. Also, it has become more likely to see an open clash between Japan’s aspiration to maintain the status quo, including its de facto control over the islands, and China’s effort to ‘correct’ past injustices such as the loss of sovereignty over what it considers its own territory. There has always been a critical perception gap between the two sides over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and mutual suspicion about the other side’s long-term objectives to alter the status quo by manipulating the given dispute. What’s relatively unprecedented, however, is that the evolving economic and geostrategic power parity, caused by China’s rise and Japan’s new defence policy, have raised the stake of the issue along with the chances for overt confrontation between the two states. Pew Research Center’s 2016 survey, ‘Hostile Neighbors: China vs. Japan’, shows the continuing salience of historically rooted mutual distrust and scepticism about the future of Sino-Japanese relations (Stokes, 2016). Viewing each other as violent and with disdain, majorities in Japan and China are concerned about a prolonged dispute regarding sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands with 80 per cent of Japanese and 59 per cent Chinese fear military clash around the East China Sea. Herein, more Japanese (35%) than Chinese (18%) are ‘very concerned’ about a potential conflict over their territorial disputes. What accounts for this different degree of security concern over the same issue is the major regional power shift with China becoming more formidable in various dimensions whereas Japan is becoming relatively less dominant in East Asia.11 This change has created uncertainty, further reinforcing historically rooted tensions like the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and ‘nationalist sentiments on both sides, as people in Japan feel anxiety at China’s rising power, and people in China feel that the rest of the world does not sufficiently respect their country’s newfound status’ (Morris-Suzuki quoted in Johnson, 2016). Departing from their previous positions of playing down the question of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkakus islands, both Beijing and Tokyo have begun to use military assets in recent years to reinforce their respective claims within the disputed area (O’Rourke, 2014; Valencia, 2007). Although Beijing and Tokyo managed to reach an agreement in 2008 to co-develop the East China Sea that could have facilitated joint resources explorations, this deal was scuttled by the 2010 fishing boat collision incident, widely considered as a turning point of bilateral relations that sparked China-Japan diplomatic row. Eventually, a series of retaliatory diplomatic paroxysm and economic pressure taken by China forced the Japanese government to end the crisis in line with Beijing’s terms of resolution, including the release of the Chinese boat captain, but also fuelled Japan’s anti-Chinese nationalist sentiment (Bradsher, 2010). Sino-Japanese relations have been further strained since 2012 when Tokyo decided to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Japanese government considered that nationalization was necessary to prevent the then Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, known for his fiery nationalism, from purchasing the islands and making them a playground for more dangerous moves, causing serious diplomatic fallout in Sino-Japan ties. However, Beijing took it as a severely provocative and calculated measure designed to perpetuate Japanese occupation of Chinese territory by distorting the sovereign status of the disputed islands. The Chinese saw Tokyo’s nationalization of the islands an unacceptable infringement of China’s sovereignty and ‘conspiracy between Ishihara and the Japanese government’ to justify the purchase so as to ‘move from de facto administrative control to a more de jure exercise of sovereignty’ (Wang, 2013, p. 12). The tension over Japan’s nationalization of the islands has forced Sino-Japan relations to hit a new low, adversely affecting bilateral trade and travel while demonstrators, sometimes violently, staging protests in both countries. The economic impact caused by the demonstrations became so severe that Christine Lagarde, the chief of the International Monetary Fund, warned against the negative consequences that deteriorating ties between China and Japan, ‘distracted by territorial division’, could make on the global economy (quoted in Chan, 2012). The US-Japan alliance, under which Washington is committed to Japan’s security, has further complicated the matter. This arrangement has placed the East China Sea dispute in a more complex and strategically dangerous context given the potential for mounting friction between China and Japan escalating into regional conflicts with global implications. Notwithstanding US declaration of neutrality on the sovereignty issue regarding the East China Sea dispute, Washington has supported Japan’s administrative rights over the islands and signalled the US willingness to defend the disputed waters in case of military contingency in line with the US-Japan defence treaty. During the 1970s and 1980s, the US officials used intentionally ambiguous language, stating their ‘personal’ views that the Mutual Security Treaty ‘could be interpreted’ to cover the disputed islands (Smith, 2013, p. 40). This gave Beijing some breathing space when dealing with Tokyo (as well as the nationalistic Chinese public) regarding the East China Sea controversy. Unlike the previously cautious use of language, the US officials have been more unequivocal in recent years when it comes to discussing whether the disputed islands would fall within the scope of the alliance. These changes could be seen as a reflection of Washington’s aspiration to maintain American hegemony by consolidating its alliance with Tokyo and countering Beijing’s growing ambitions for regaining regional supremacy through attempting to revise the US-led order in East Asia. During press conference at the US embassy in Tokyo in October 2010, the then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell dispelled Washington’s long-held policy of strategic ambiguity by stating ‘very clearly about the applicability of Article V’ of the Security Treaty to the islands (US Department of State, 2010). Likewise, the then President Barack Obama acknowledged US treaty obligations to Japan in April 2014 by asserting that Washington would come to Tokyo’s aid in case of conflict in the East China Sea. Even while emphasizing Sino-Japan diplomacy for a peaceful resolution to the longstanding territorial row and Washington’s neutrality in the sovereignty dispute, Obama emphasized that the US ‘commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands’ (The White House, 2014). In a similar vein, US Defense Secretary James Mattis under President Donald Trump has reaffirmed Washington’s continuing recognition of Japan’s administrative control of ‘the Senkaku Islands … [which] fall within the scope of article five of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty’ (US Department of State, 2017). For decades, US leadership in East Asia facilitated a relatively stable regional order, peace and prosperity. America’s uncontested primacy also allowed this superpower enough wiggle room to embrace strategic ambiguity when dealing with many delicate and intractable regional problems, including the East China Sea issue. As asserted by White (2015), however, this era seems to have come to an end with China ‘resuming the challenge to US power in Asia’, forcing Washington to take a more resolute stance to preserve its hegemonic influence. Paradoxically, Washington’s policy shift from reserved strategic support towards greater clarity has exacerbated the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue by nudging Tokyo towards implementing controversial measures, including the nationalization of the disputed islands, so as to reinforce Japan’s claims over the East China Sea. US security assurances to Japan have also aggravated Sino-American tensions with the possibility of major power conflict by provoking increasingly confident and nationalistic China to see the issue not merely as a Sino-Japan bilateral dispute but also a part of America’s hegemonic strategy to constrain China’s rise by joining forces with Japan’s anti-Chinese nationalists. From China’s perspective, the US involvement in the East China Sea dispute is closely linked to the regional power shift caused by China’s rise and America’s larger strategic objectives to prevent this emerging Asian giant from challenging the post-war East Asian order, underpinned by the US-Japan alliance. Herein, Beijing has interpreted Washington’s security affirmation of defending Tokyo’s administration of the East China Sea islands ‘a carefully calculated scheme to cage the rapidly developing [China] by rallying U.S. allies and reinforcing U.S. presence’ (Xinhua, 2014a).Crisis Escalation ImpactsGoes nuclearHallinan 16 (Conn M, PhD in Anthropology from the University of California, Berkeley, independent journalist, “Dangerous Seas: China & The U.S.”, 8/17, International Policy Digest, ) **NCC Packet 2020A combination of recent events underpinned by long-running historical strains reaching back more than 60 years has turned the western Pacific into one of the most hazardous spots on the globe. The tension between China and the U.S. “is one of the most striking and dangerous themes in international politics,” says The Financial Times’ longtime commentator and China hand, Gideon Rachman.? In just the past five months, warships from both countries—including Washington’s closest ally in the region, Japan—have done everything but ram one another. And, as Beijing continues to build bases on scattered islands in the South China Sea, the U.S. is deploying long-range nuclear capable strategic bombers in Australia and Guam.? At times the rhetoric from both sides is chilling. When Washington sent two aircraft carrier battle groups into the area, Chinese defense ministry spokesman Yang Yujun cautioned the Americans to “be careful.” While one U.S. admiral suggested drawing “the line” at the Spratly Islands close to the Philippines, an editorial in the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times warned that U.S. actions “raised the risk of physical confrontation with China.” The newspaper went on to warn that “if the United States’ bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a U.S.-China war is inevitable in the South China Sea.”? Earlier this month China’s Defense Minister Chang Wanquan said Beijing should prepare for a “people’s war at sea.”? Add to this the appointment of an extreme right-wing nationalist as Japan’s defense minister and the decision to deploy anti-ballistic missile interceptors in South Korea and the term “volatile region” is a major understatement.? Some of these tensions go back to the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco that officially ended WW II in Asia. That document, according to Canadian researcher Kimie Hara, was drawn up to be deliberately ambiguous about the ownership of a scatter of islands and reefs in the East and South China seas. That ambiguity set up tensions in the region that Washington could then exploit to keep potential rivals off balance.? The current standoff between China and Japan over the Senkakus/Diaoyu islands—the Japanese use the former name, the Chinese the latter—is a direct outcome of the Treaty. While Washington has no official position on which country owns the tiny uninhabited archipelago, it is committed to defend Japan in case of any military conflict with China. On Aug. 2 the Japanese Defense Ministry accused China of engaging in “dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences.”? Tokyo’s new defense minister, Tomomi Inada, is a regular visitor to the Yasukuni shrine that honors Japan’s war criminals, and she is a critic of the post-war Tokyo war crimes trials. She also has called for re-examining the 1937 Nanjing massacre that saw Japanese troops murder as many as 300,000 Chinese. Her appointment by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seems almost calculated to anger Beijing.? Abe is also pushing hard to overturn a part of the Japanese constitution that bars Tokyo from using its military forces for anything but defending itself. Japan has one of the largest and most sophisticated navies in the world.? Over the past several weeks, Chinese Coast Guard vessels and fishing boats have challenged Japan’s territorial claims on the islands, and Chinese and Japanese warplanes have been playing chicken. In one particularly worrisome incident, a Japanese fighter locked its combat radar on a Chinese fighter-bomber.? Behind the bellicose behavior on the China and U.S. sides is underlying insecurity, a dangerous condition when two nuclear-armed powers are at loggerheads.? From Beijing’s perspective, Washington is trying to “contain” China by ringing it with American allies, much as the U.S. did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Given recent moves in the region, it is hard to argue with Beijing’s conclusion.? After a 20-year absence, the U.S. military is back in the Philippines. Washington is deploying anti-missile systems in South Korea and Japan and deepening its military relations with Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia and India. The Obama administration’s “Asia pivot” has shifted the bulk of U.S. armed forces from the Atlantic and the Middle East to Asia. Washington’s Air Sea Battle strategy—just renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons”—envisions neutralizing China’s ability to defend its home waters.? China is in the process of modernizing much of its military, in large part because Beijing was spooked by two American operations. First, the Chinese were stunned by how quickly the U.S. military annihilated the Iraqi army in the first Gulf War, with virtually no casualties on the American side. Then there was having to back down in 1996, when the Clinton administration deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups in the Taiwan Straits during a period of sharp tension between Beijing and Taipei.? In spite of all its upgrades, however, China’s military is a long ways from being able to challenge the U.S. The Chinese navy has one small aircraft carrier, the U.S. has 10 enormous ones, plus a nuclear arsenal vastly bigger than Beijing’s modest force. China’s last war was its disastrous 1979 invasion of Vietnam, and the general U.S. view of the Chinese military is that it is a paper dragon.? That thinking is paralleled in Japan, which is worrisome. Japan’s aggressive nationalist government is more likely to initiate something with China than is the U.S. For instance, the crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyus was started by Japan. First, Tokyo violated an agreement with Beijing by arresting some Chinese fishermen and then unilaterally annexed the islands. The Japanese military has always had an over-inflated opinion of itself and traditionally underestimated Chinese capabilities.? In short, the U.S. and Japan are not intimidated by China’s New Model Army, nor do they see it as a serious threat. That is dangerous thinking if it leads to the conclusion that China will always back down when a confrontation turns ugly. Belligerence and illusion are perilous companions in the current tense atmosphere.? The scheduled deployment of the U.S. Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile systems has convinced Beijing that the U.S. is attempting to neutralize China’s nuclear missile force, a not irrational conclusion. While anti-missile systems are billed as “defensive,” they can just as easily be considered part of the U.S.’s basic “counterforce” strategy. The latter calls for a first strike on an opponent’s missiles, backstopped by an anti-ballistic missile system that would destroy any enemy missiles the first strike missed.? China is pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, but, given the growing ring of U.S. bases and deployment of anti-missile systems, that may change. China is considering moving to a “launch on warning” strategy, which would greatly increase the possibility of an accidental nuclear war.? The AirSea Battle strategy calls for conventional missile strikes aimed at knocking out command centers and radar facilities deep into Chinese territory. But given the U.S.’s “counterforce” strategy, Chinese commanders might assume those conventional missiles are nuclear tipped and aimed at decapitating China’s nuclear deterrent.? According to Amitai Etzioni of Washington University, a former senior advisor to President Jimmy Carter, “China is likely to respond to what is effectively a major attack on its mainland with all the military means at its disposal—including its stockpile of nuclear arms.”? A report by the Union of Concerned Scientists concluded that if China moves to “launch on warning,” such a change “would dramatically increase the risk of a nuclear exchange by accident—a dangerous shift that the U.S. could help to avert.”? President Obama is said to be considering adopting a “no first use” pledge, but he has come up against stiff opposition from his military and the Republicans. “I would be concerned about such a policy,” says U.S. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James. “Having a certain degree of ambiguity is not necessarily a bad thing.”? But given the possibility of accidents—or panic by military commanders—“ambiguity” increases the risk that someone could misinterpret an action. Once a nuclear exchange begins it may be impossible to stop, particularly knowing that the U.S. “counterforce” strategy targets an opponent’s missiles. “Use them, or lose them” is an old saying among nuclear warriors.Sino-Japanese tensions escalate to ECS war.Lendon 6/21 – Senior producer for CNN Digital Worldwide in Hong Kong.Brad Lendon, Writer and Reporter for over 20 years on Southeast Asia, Cnn, 6-21-2020, "Tiny East China Sea islands could be the next military flashpoint in Asia," CNN, **NCC Packet 2020Both Tokyo and Beijing claim the uninhabited islands, known as the Senkakus in Japan and the Diaoyus in China, as their own, but Japan has administered them since 1972.Tensions over the rocky chain, 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers) southwest of Tokyo, have simmered for years, and with claims over them dating back hundreds of years, neither Japan nor China is likely to back down over territory considered a national birthright in both capitals.In that respect, the islands are not unlike the rocky heights of the Himalayas, where decades of tension on an ill-defined border between the territories of China and India erupted Monday night, precipitating a clash that cost the lives of at least 20 Indian troops.The fighting, though deadly, was relatively confined -- and the two sides have talked down the tensions in the days since.But an unexpected flare-up in the Senkaku/Diaoyus could trigger a military confrontation between China and the United States.That's because the United States has a mutual defense treaty with Japan. If Japanese territory is attacked by a foreign power, the United States is obligated to defend it.Fears of a possible confrontation were heightened last week with the announcement from the Japanese coastguard that Chinese government ships had been spotted in the waters close to Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands every day since mid-April, setting a new record for the number of consecutive days.By Friday, those sightings had reached 67 days in a row.Taking unyielding stancesIn response to the increased Chinese presence, Yoshihide Suga, Japan's chief cabinet secretary, reasserted Tokyo's resolve at a news conference last Wednesday."The Senkaku Islands are under our control and are unquestionably our territory historically and under international law. It is extremely serious that these activities continue. We will respond to the Chinese side firmly and calmly," Suga said.In a statement Friday, China's Foreign Ministry echoed that Japanese government's sentiments, from the reverse perspective."The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands are an inherent part of China's territory, and it is our inherent right to carry out patrols and law enforcement activities in these waters."Similar comments were recently published in China's state-run Global Times newspaper. The report, titled "Japanese conservatives disrupt recovering China-Japan ties by hyping Diaoyu Islands dispute," criticized attempts underway in Japan's Okinawa prefecture to change the administration of the islands, noting it could do serious harm to Japan-China relations.On its surface, the move, brought forward by the city council of Ishigaki, where the islands are administered, seems fairly innocuous.According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, the council wants to decouple the islands from the populated parts of Ishigaki island to streamline administrative practices.But in the resolution before the Ishigaki City Council, the city "asserts the islands are part of Japanese territory."It's the kind of language that rankles in Beijing."Changing the administrative designation at this time can only make the dispute more complicated and bring more risks of a crisis," Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times.The vote in Ishigaki is expected at Monday's council meeting.Before the past week, the most recent "crisis" over the islands occurred in 2012.That year, Japan nationalized the then-privately owned islands to ward off a planned sale to Tokyo's then-governor, a hardline nationalist who was reportedly hoping to develop the islands.On its surface, the move, brought forward by the city council of Ishigaki, where the islands are administered, seems fairly innocuous.According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, the council wants to decouple the islands from the populated parts of Ishigaki island to streamline administrative practices.But in the resolution before the Ishigaki City Council, the city "asserts the islands are part of Japanese territory."It's the kind of language that rankles in Beijing."Changing the administrative designation at this time can only make the dispute more complicated and bring more risks of a crisis," Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times.People take pictures of a Japanese car damaged during a protest against Japan's 'nationalizing' of the disputed Diaoyu Islands, also known as Senkaku Islands in Japan, in the Chinese city of Xi'an, on September 15, 2012.The plan sparked massive and highly unusual street protests across China, amid a groundswell of nationalist sentiment.Demonstrations turned violent as protesters hurled debris at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, ransacked Japanese stores and restaurants and overturned Japanese cars.In a stark illustration of how the islands are seared into the Chinese consciousness, one Chinese man was beaten into a coma by his fellow countrymen simply because he was driving a Toyota Corolla.A history of contentionChina says its claim to the islands extend back to 1400s, when they were used as a staging point for Chinese fisherman.However, Japan says it saw no trace of Chinese control of the islands in an 1885 survey, so it formally recognized them as Japanese sovereign territory in 1895.A group of settlers manufactured dried fish and collected feathers, with the islands having more than 200 inhabitants at one point, according to Japan's Foreign Ministry.Japan then sold the islands in 1932 to descendants of the original settlers, but the factory failed around 1940 and the islands were eventually deserted. The Japanese surrender at the end of World War II in 1945 only served to further cloud the issue.The islands were administered by the US occupation force after the war. But in 1972, Washington returned them to Japan as part of its withdrawal from Okinawa.Self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a Chinese province, also claims ownership of the chain.And objections to the administrative reclassification of the islands in Taiwan shows the depths to which the islands hook their respective claimants.Tsai Wen-yi, a city councilman in Taiwan's Yilan County, said if the Japanese change goes through, he'll organize a flotilla of fishing boats from the area to "defend" the islands from Japan, according to a report from the Taipei Times.Defense of the Senkaku/Diaoyus has been a priority of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in the past few years. The Council on Foreign Relations notes Tokyo has established new military bases nearby to protect the islands. The JSDF has also been building up its marines and drilling them on island warfare.Although the islands are uninhabited, there are economic interests involved, according to the CFR.The islands "have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded by rich fishing areas," it says.What could trigger a clashIt all adds up to potential trouble, says William Choong, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore"Compared to other flashpoints in the region -- the South China Sea, Taiwan, and North Korea's weapons programs -- the East China Sea combines a unique and combustible mix of history, honor and territory," Choong wrote this month on The Interpreter, the blog of the Lowy Institute in Australia.The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) paints a scenario where something easily imaged -- the crew of a disabled ship or plane landing on one of the islands -- could turn into a serious international incident."If Chinese fishing crews, coast guardsmen, or military members landed on the Senkakus, then the Japan Coast Guard would no doubt seek to remove them in a law enforcement action. But given that China does not recognize Japan's claims, it is certainly possible that Beijing could see this as an escalation, which might result in a substantial military response from China," the AMTI website says.Accidents of this sort are unavoidable, especially in the heat of crisis. Beijing and Tokyo need, with much greater urgency and ambition than they have shown, to agree in advance upon ways to manage such episodes when they inevitably occur during a major Sino—Japanese crisis. No defense—current postures make US draw-in inevitableWilliam Morris 17, Upcoming MS.c student at Oxford University (“Easing A Flashpoint for War in the East China Sea”, Defense One, August 2017, ) **NCC Packet 2020A war between the United States and China, should one occur, is less likely to start like World War II, with a belligerent invading other sovereign nations, and more likely like World War I, when a regional incident involving an allied third party triggered a descent into global catastrophe. The most likely scenario — tensions surrounding North Korea and the South China Sea notwithstanding — is a conflict between China and Japan. Since 1951, the bilateral Security Treaty Between The United States And Japan has obliged Washington to defend Tokyo should it go to war with, say, China. Japan and China’s historical animosity, which stretches back centuries and reached a head in World War II, is reflected today in each country’s overwhelmingly negative views of the other. In 2012, for example, protesters rioted in the streets of several Chinese cities over Japanese efforts to tighten their grip on the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. These small, uninhabited islands, called the Diaoyu chain by the Chinese, constitute one of the most significant flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region, in part because of their vast amounts of offshore natural resources — gas, oil, fish — but even more because of their symbolic aspects. Peter Dutton, who directs China Maritime Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, calls the Senkakus “a focal point for the challenge of power between China and Japan.” Dutton argues that influence in the East China Sea and East Asia will be among this century’s defining issues: can Japan stem the erosion of its influence, or will the region be dominated solely by an increasingly assertive China? Dutton also says the islands “serve as a political metaphor for domestic audiences.” In authoritarian systems such as China, he says, “legitimacy is not automatic” and governments “have to make sure to deliver on security and nationalistic promises.” In democratic Japan, public pressure is more direct. If the dominant Liberal Democratic Party acquiesces to Chinese expansion, it risks alienating a base that vehemently values Japanese sovereignty. Both nations are thus pressured by their citizens at home, while simultaneously being influenced by the geopolitical situation in the East China Sea. Neither China nor Japan is likely to declare war outright over the Senkaku Islands. Both nations have far too much to lose, as does the United States, which would be obliged to come to Tokyo’s defense. What is more probable is a series of miscalculations sparked by an incident such as the seizure of an island by China, or a collision of military ships operating in nearby waters. Popular outcry in both countries would press Tokyo and Bejing to escalate the situation, which in turn could lead to conflict on a larger scale. Would the United States honor its agreement to Japan in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict? Despite President Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, his administration has offered reassurances to U.S. allies in East Asia. “The United States will maintain our close coordination and cooperation with the Republic of Korea and Japan, two democracies whose people want peace,” Defense Secretary James Mattis said at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. “Our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan, to include the employment of our most advanced capabilities, is ironclad.” Largely because of such statements, Dutton says he expects an “expanding and deepening” of the U.S.-Japan alliance in coming years. Peter W. Singer, strategist at New America and author of Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, compares the current climate in the East China Sea to the alliance commitments and heightened popular nationalism that swirled in the runup to World War I. Just as the tumultuous politics of Austria-Hungary’s eastern domain did not directly concern pre-WWI Great Britain, the Senkaku Islands have no material or symbolic significance for most Americans. Yet just as a regional incident ultimately forced London to defend its continental allies, Washington would have to side with Japan or risk a collapse of its own global network of alliances.That causes US-China nuclear confrontation Michael O’Hanlon & Gregory B. Poling 20. Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He is the author of The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes. Gregory B. Poling is senior fellow for Southeast Asia and director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. He oversees research on U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific, with a focus on the maritime domain and the countries of Southeast Asia. His research interests include the South China Sea disputes, democratization in Southeast Asia, and Asian multilateralism. “Rocks, Reefs, and Nuclear War”, written 1-14-2020, published on CSIS, . **NCC Packet 2020As the 2020s begin, the world can breathe a collective sigh of relief that the United States has so far avoided a major military crisis with China. Over the past decade, China challenged the lawful rights of U.S. partners and allies in the western Pacific, built massive artificial island bases in the disputed Spratly Islands, and actively sought control over all the waters, seabed, and airspace of the South China Sea. Yet the United States has maintained its access to those waters, deterred any major Chinese use of force against its neighbors, and helped support the efforts of Japan to maintain administrative control over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. U.S. strategy has been notably less successful in preventing China from robbing Southeast Asian partners, including U.S. ally the Philippines, of their resources and rights in the South China Sea. But the United States has at least slowed China’s advance while avoiding war. It would be unwise, however, to assume that the status quo is stable. Deterrence has not failed—yet. China is unlikely to do something as brazen as forcefully denying U.S. Navy or commercial ships access to the South China Sea, attacking American or Japanese bases, or intentionally sinking Filipino sailors in disputed waters. But Beijing continues to probe and test U.S. and allied resolve, provoking low-level crises which could easily escalate. Current U.S. strategic thinking could trigger disproportionate responses that would cause such crises to spiral out of control. That is the way World War I began a century ago—and it could happen again. War games seem to confirm these historic lessons. One of us has taken part in numerous simulations over the last five years asking seasoned experts and officials to role-play how Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and American leaders might respond to crises in the South and East China Seas. The results are typically sobering. Some end in a rapid Chinese fait accompli, such as the seizure of a disputed island with minimal cost, while U.S. and allied leaders dither. This type of scenario would lead to considerable damage to international norms, U.S. alliances, and American national security. Even more simulations rapidly escalate into full-scale conflict, bringing China and the United States to the doorstep of nuclear war over stakes that no rational observer would consider worth it. The U.S. national security community tends to view the ability to defeat China (or Russia) in combat wherever an ally might be attacked as an essential goal. Direct defense or prompt reversal of any aggression, no matter how small, are the foundational principles of current strategy. Article 5 of the NATO treaty and similar mutual defense commitments to Japan and the Philippines treat all aggression as an equally existential threat. So in a scenario involving a Chinese landing on the Japanese-administered Senkakus or a threat to the Sierra Madre—a derelict Philippine navy ship intentionally ran aground at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys and now housing a dozen soldiers—American strategic culture most often leads to the conclusion that kinetic action to retake a seized feature or outpost is justified to avoid abandoning an ally and damaging U.S. credibility. But such an escalation, while it should be kept as an option, would be fraught. It might end quickly, amounting to little more than a skirmish, or large-scale conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers could ensue. Both sides would have powerful political incentives to escalate further. Military warning and communications systems might be targeted through cyberattack or other means in a way that sowed confusion. Escalation control could not be guaranteed—history and military scholarship strongly suggest as much, and many war games corroborate it. Instead of relying exclusively on such escalatory, kinetic military responses, the United States and allies should develop strategies of asymmetric defense and counterattack. An asymmetric defense would weave the economic and diplomatic instruments of statecraft into combat plans. The goal should be to punish Chinese aggression and strengthen the position of U.S. allies, thereby deterring further adventurism, but without leaping several rungs up the escalation ladder as a U.S. counterstrike would. The active elements of the strategy would center on economic warfare and diplomatic cost-imposition. For most scenarios in the East and South China Seas, it would not be crucial for the United States to immediately reverse an act of aggression. Rather, the most important goals should be to force China to pay an unacceptable price for such action, and at the same time keep the situation from snowballing out of control. Those twin goals could best be achieved via economic and diplomatic rather than military punishment. The United States would need to levy economic sanctions on Chinese entities that supported its actions. These might include construction, shipping, telecommunications, and aviation companies supporting China’s military outposts in the South China Sea, oil and gas enterprises violating its neighbor’s sovereign rights, and well-connected fishing and shipbuilding companies involved with its large paramilitary force. Such responses should also involve a campaign of diplomatic isolation and public naming and shaming. U.S. military assets should help identify, document, and disseminate evidence of Chinese aggression to the international community. This would support the efforts of U.S. diplomats to convince partners, especially in Asia and Europe, to back a campaign to condemn and isolate China in international forums, exclude it from prominent decision-making bodies, and explore broader international economic sanctions. Much of this would mirror U.S. and allied responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for paramilitaries in eastern Ukraine. As in that case, military responses would still be important but would function in a support role. For instance, it would be crucial to strengthen U.S. and allied force posture near the site of aggression, creating a defensive line against further enemy advance. In the case of a South China Sea incident, for instance, U.S. combat aircraft and fire bases might be rapidly deployed to agreed-upon Philippine military bases under the United States’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with that ally. This would bolster U.S. rapid response capabilities and hold Chinese surface vessels and military outposts at risk while giving the United States greater control over the escalation risk. U.S. military action might also be used to support the enforcement of economic sanctions levied in retaliation for the initial escalation. Of course, China should be expected to respond to such a strategy of asymmetric defense with economic retaliation of its own. The United States should therefore work to strengthen economic resiliency and deterrence before a crisis occurs and encourage allies to do the same. The White House should direct the Department of Defense to reach out to nonmilitary agencies like Treasury and Energy to develop integrated economic-military contingency plans. These agencies should also be directed to monitor the potential vulnerabilities of the economies of the United States and its allies to reprisals from China or other adversaries. The U.S. National Defense Stockpile of strategic minerals and metals should be restored to Cold War levels, roughly ten times greater than is the case today ($15 billion versus $1.5 billion) to ensure U.S. resilience in any economic war. And the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, should have its mandate broadened to incentivize, or even mandate, supply-chain diversification for key products with national security significance to avoid excessive reliance on China. Most of all, policymakers need to be sensitized to the risks of escalation in the types of military incidents most likely to occur between China and the United States. In most scenarios we have seen modeled, the United States has either underreacted to a crisis in the South or East China Seas, at great cost to U.S. and allied national security, or has overreacted, leading to a conflict neither side wanted. It would be nonsensical to risk nuclear war over remote rocks and reefs, but that does not make it impossible.It's a tinderbox—historical and political tensions overcome deterrence Brad Lendon et al. 20, Senior producer for CNN Digital Worldwide in Hong Kong, Junko Ogura, Kaori Enjoji, Shawn Deng and Katie Hunt, “Why this Japan-China island dispute could be Asia's next military flashpoint” , **NCC Packet 2020While China is engaged in a tense border standoff with India high in the Himalayas, a small group of islands thousands of miles away could be another military tinderbox waiting to explode. Both Tokyo and Beijing claim the uninhabited islands, known as the Senkakus in Japan and the Diaoyus in China, as their own, but Japan has administered them since 1972. Tensions over the rocky chain, 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers) southwest of Tokyo, have simmered for years, and with claims over them dating back hundreds of years, neither Japan nor China is likely to back down over territory considered a national birthright in both capitals. In that respect, the islands are not unlike the rocky heights of the Himalayas, where decades of tension on an ill-defined border between the territories of China and India erupted Monday night, precipitating a clash that cost the lives of at least 20 Indian troops. The fighting, though deadly, was relatively confined -- and the two sides have talked down the tensions in the days since. But an unexpected flare-up in the Senkaku/Diaoyus could trigger a military confrontation between China and the United States. That's because the United States has a mutual defense treaty with Japan. If Japanese territory is attacked by a foreign power, the United States is obligated to defend it. Fears of a possible confrontation were heightened last week with the announcement from the Japanese coastguard that Chinese government ships had been spotted in the waters close to Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands every day since mid-April, setting a new record for the number of consecutive days. By Friday, those sightings had reached 67 days in a row. Taking unyielding stances In response to the increased Chinese presence, Yoshihide Suga, Japan's chief cabinet secretary, reasserted Tokyo's resolve at a news conference last Wednesday. "The Senkaku Islands are under our control and are unquestionably our territory historically and under international law. It is extremely serious that these activities continue. We will respond to the Chinese side firmly and calmly," Suga said. In a statement Friday, China's Foreign Ministry echoed that Japanese government's sentiments, from the reverse perspective. "The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands are an inherent part of China's territory, and it is our inherent right to carry out patrols and law enforcement activities in these waters." Similar comments were recently published in China's state-run Global Times newspaper. The report, titled "Japanese conservatives disrupt recovering China-Japan ties by hyping Diaoyu Islands dispute," criticized attempts underway in Japan's Okinawa prefecture to change the administration of the islands, noting it could do serious harm to Japan-China relations. On its surface, the move, brought forward by the city council of Ishigaki, where the islands are administered, seems fairly innocuous. According to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, the council wants to decouple the islands from the populated parts of Ishigaki island to streamline administrative practices. But in the resolution before the Ishigaki City Council, the city "asserts the islands are part of Japanese territory." It's the kind of language that rankles in Beijing. "Changing the administrative designation at this time can only make the dispute more complicated and bring more risks of a crisis," Li Haidong, a professor at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University, told the Global Times. The vote in Ishigaki is expected at Monday's council meeting. Before the past week, the most recent "crisis" over the islands occurred in 2012. That year, Japan nationalized the then-privately owned islands to ward off a planned sale to Tokyo's then-governor, a hardline nationalist who was reportedly hoping to develop the islands. People take pictures of a Japanese car damaged during a protest against Japan's 'nationalizing' of the disputed Diaoyu Islands, also known as Senkaku Islands in Japan, in the Chinese city of Xi'an, on September 15, 2012. People take pictures of a Japanese car damaged during a protest against Japan's 'nationalizing' of the disputed Diaoyu Islands, also known as Senkaku Islands in Japan, in the Chinese city of Xi'an, on September 15, 2012. The plan sparked massive and highly unusual street protests across China, amid a groundswell of nationalist sentiment. Demonstrations turned violent as protesters hurled debris at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, ransacked Japanese stores and restaurants and overturned Japanese cars. In a stark illustration of how the islands are seared into the Chinese consciousness, one Chinese man was beaten into a coma by his fellow countrymen simply because he was driving a Toyota Corolla. A history of contention China says its claim to the islands extend back to 1400s, when they were used as a staging point for Chinese fisherman. However, Japan says it saw no trace of Chinese control of the islands in an 1885 survey, so it formally recognized them as Japanese sovereign territory in 1895. A group of settlers manufactured dried fish and collected feathers, with the islands having more than 200 inhabitants at one point, according to Japan's Foreign Ministry. Japan then sold the islands in 1932 to descendants of the original settlers, but the factory failed around 1940 and the islands were eventually deserted. The Japanese surrender at the end of World War II in 1945 only served to further cloud the issue. The islands were administered by the US occupation force after the war. But in 1972, Washington returned them to Japan as part of its withdrawal from Okinawa. A torn apart Japanese 'Rising Sun' flag is placed on dead fish during a demonstration in Taipei on September 14, 2010, over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain. A torn apart Japanese 'Rising Sun' flag is placed on dead fish during a demonstration in Taipei on September 14, 2010, over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain. Self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a Chinese province, also claims ownership of the chain. And objections to the administrative reclassification of the islands in Taiwan shows the depths to which the islands hook their respective claimants. Tsai Wen-yi, a city councilman in Taiwan's Yilan County, said if the Japanese change goes through, he'll organize a flotilla of fishing boats from the area to "defend" the islands from Japan, according to a report from the Taipei Times. Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces' amphibious assault vehicles hit the beach during an amphibious landing exercise in the Philippines in 2018. Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces' amphibious assault vehicles hit the beach during an amphibious landing exercise in the Philippines in 2018. Defense of the Senkaku/Diaoyus has been a priority of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in the past few years. The Council on Foreign Relations notes Tokyo has established new military bases nearby to protect the islands. The JSDF has also been building up its marines and drilling them on island warfare. Although the islands are uninhabited, there are economic interests involved, according to the CFR. The islands "have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded by rich fishing areas," it says. What could trigger a clash It all adds up to potential trouble, says William Choong, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore "Compared to other flashpoints in the region -- the South China Sea, Taiwan, and North Korea's weapons programs -- the East China Sea combines a unique and combustible mix of history, honor and territory," Choong wrote this month on The Interpreter, the blog of the Lowy Institute in Australia. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) paints a scenario where something easily imaged -- the crew of a disabled ship or plane landing on one of the islands -- could turn into a serious international incident. "If Chinese fishing crews, coast guardsmen, or military members landed on the Senkakus, then the Japan Coast Guard would no doubt seek to remove them in a law enforcement action. But given that China does not recognize Japan's claims, it is certainly possible that Beijing could see this as an escalation, which might result in a substantial military response from China," the AMTI website says. In the current climate in the Indo-Pacific, China is indicating it's ready to push its claims. For example, in the South China Sea, China has moved aircraft onto the man-made islands it has built up; it has sunk one Vietnamese fishing boat and and rammed another; it has harassed a Malaysian-chartered survey ship and sent one of its own into waters claimed by Indonesia; in the past few weeks alone, Chinese warplanes have been warned off by Taiwanese fighters at least five times. And in a ironic nod to what's going on in the East China Sea, Beijing reclassified its island claims in the South China Sea, giving the Spratly/Nansha and Paracel/Xisha islands more prominent status in the country's governmental hierarchy. Then there's the India-China border in the Himalayas. Before and after last Monday's deadly clash, state-run Chinese media was heavy with stories and images of the the new military hardware Beijing could bring to bear in the mountains. Choong argues it would be unwise to think the Senkakus/Diaoyus aren't marked for similar attention at some point. "The question is not whether China, now the target of a full-court press by America, would want to challenge Japan over the islands. The question is when, and how? This is what keeps Japanese (and American) policymakers awake at night," Choong wrote. CNN's Junko Ogura, Kaori Enjoji, Shawn Deng and Katie Hunt contributed to this report.No alt causes—alliance commitments are the most likely internal link for war AND outweighs other Asia conflictsRyan Hass 17, Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution (“Risk of U.S.-China confrontation in the East China Sea”, Brookings, December 2017, ) **NCC Packet 2020Recent press reporting of continuing Chinese construction activities at its reclaimed islands in the South China Sea has revived focus on maritime issues. These latest stories layer on top of a large body of commentary in recent years about the risk of a great power clash between the United States and China in the South China Sea. During this same period, the maritime dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea garnered less attention. Unlike the South China Sea, there were no new islands being constructed out of sand, no high-stakes arbitral rulings, and no sharp policy debates in Washington that spilled out into the press. Despite the lower profile, the dispute in the East China Sea may carry greater risk of drawing the United States into conflict with China than the various disputes in the South China Sea. Here’s why: First, the situation in the South China Sea is and will remain at a stalemate. As Singaporean official Bilahari Kausikan has observed, Washington cannot force Beijing to abandon the artificial islands it has constructed or stop China from deploying military assets on them without risking a military conflict. By the same standard, China cannot stop the United States from operating in the area without risking a major conflict that would expose Chinese forces to significant risk of defeat and potentially result in the rapid destruction of its artificial islands. In other words, neither roll-back nor exclusion are policy options that attract serious consideration by governments in Beijing or Washington. Second, the geopolitical temperature on the South China Sea has gone down considerably over the past year. Reasons for this include: President Trump’s de-emphasis of the issue as an element of the U.S.-China relationship; Beijing’s prioritization of regional economic integration via the Belt and Road Initiative; and Southeast Asian countries’ growing wariness of poking China on the South China Sea and preference instead for focusing on regional connectivity and negotiations toward a China-ASEAN Code of Conduct. Third, risk-mitigation measures are more mature in the South China Sea than the East China Sea. Whereas the United States and China have implemented protocols to prevent unsafe and unprofessional encounters at sea or in the air and gained experience managing incidents when they arise, the same types of risk management mechanisms are not in place between China and Japan in the East China Sea. Fourth, and relatedly, the frequency of close-in encounters between Chinese and Japanese ships and aircraft in the East China Sea is intensifying. This trend likely will accelerate as China and Japan each follow through on plans to introduce more air and maritime capabilities to defend their contested claims in the East China Sea. Fifth, China and Japan have a hardened view of each other as strategic competitors. Events in the East China Sea take on heightened significance because the dispute is perceived in both countries as a proxy for how they will relate to each other as Asian powers. On top of that, recent history has demonstrated that incidents in the East China Sea can activate public emotions rapidly and, in so doing, limit political space for leaders in Beijing and Tokyo to de-escalate. Against this backdrop, the United States has three top national interests in the South and East China Seas that it must protect: (1) uphold the global credibility of U.S. alliance commitments; (2) preserve unimpeded freedom of navigation and overflight for civilian and military assets; and (3) maintain sufficient stability to enable constructive relations with China. As a matter of global policy, the United States does not take a position on various claims, does not have a preferred outcome to the disputes, and typically does not seek to mediate. Rather, U.S. strategy concentrates on protecting allies, keeping the sea and air space open, and creating conditions that are conducive for claimants to manage and peacefully resolve disputes over time. Based on these narrow national interests, the two most likely U.S.-China conflict-precipitating scenarios in the South and East China Seas would be a Chinese clash with a U.S. ally that triggered a U.S. alliance commitment, or a Chinese attempt to deny access to aircraft or vessels operating in accordance with customary international law. Any attempt by China to close down waterways or airspace from lawful civilian or military activities would risk triggering a sharp international response, potentially leading to military conflict. Under present conditions, Beijing likely would not assume such risk. The other scenario, which is the most proximate risk, would be an event that implicates U.S. alliance commitments. Among the various claimants with whom China has a maritime dispute, the United States maintains alliance relationships with the Philippines and Japan. Manila and Beijing currently enjoy warm relations, which mitigates risk of a clash. The Philippines also has limited operational presence in waters and airspace in the South China Sea, which reduces the potential of inadvertent incidents. And Washington has signaled clearly and credibly to Beijing that any Chinese attempt to forcibly seize features claimed by Manila could risk implicating U.S. alliance commitments. None of this precludes the possibility that Beijing could attempt to forcibly seize Philippines-claimed features, but it limits the likelihood of such a scenario. There is greater risk of an unintended incident between Chinese and Japanese forces operating in the East China Sea. This is due to the frequency of close-in operations involving Chinese and Japanese assets, the absence of mature risk-reduction mechanisms, and the lack of consensus between Beijing and Tokyo on lines of demarcation and acceptable behaviors in areas around the Senkaku Islands. Given these factors, there is non-negligible risk of an unintended collision in air or at sea that could trigger rapid escalation and quickly implicate U.S. alliance commitments.SolvencyThe entrapment dilemma is the controlling dynamic for escalation---undermines crisis signaling and aggrandizes Japan, but the plan’s signal on this particular issue solves.Rapp-Hopper 12 – PhD, Fellow in the Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Director of CSIS’s Maritime Transparency Initiative Mira, “An Ominous Pledge,” September 26, **NCC Packet 2020The Senkakus are different however. Because the islands are uninhabited, the question of what would constitute an unprovoked attack on Japan is less clear. There are no citizens, either Japanese or American, who are at risk, and there are certainly no military bases or “trip wire” forces. And despite the U.S. position that the treaty covers the Senkakus, one could not blame the Japanese for worrying that their alliance partner may not see the same vested interest in defending the islands as they would in defending Tokyo. Behind closed doors, U.S. officials have presumably reiterated and explicated their commitment to defending the islands. But American officials may not have an incentive to doggedly insist that the U.S. military will defend the Senkakus as though they were the American homeland.The reason for this is the problem of moral hazard. An ironclad alliance promise for joint defense of the islands could theoretically create some perverse incentives when the next row with China occurs. An unflappable belief in U.S. support on this particular issue could lead the Japanese take a harder line than they would if they were slightly less sure about how the security guarantee applied to the islands. There is no reason to believe that the Japanese would escalate a crisis irresponsibly, and crisis communication between the allies has historically been excellent. But a further complication is this: In both the recent row and the 2010 standoff, both China and Japan engaged in very low-level provocations. One hopes that the conflict will not rise above this threshold at any point in the future. But if a Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute were to involve a serious use of force in the future, it could be very difficult to decide “who started it.” Was the Chinese movement of maritime vessels the first move, or was the Japanese purchase of the islands a provocation? In the first case the U.S. security guarantee is triggered; in the second case it is not. These alliance problems are extremely difficult, but make it is easy to see why the Senkakus are their own extended deterrence dilemma for both Tokyo and Washington.The second problem is one of deterrence. During the Cold War, lines of amity and enmity were reasonably clear, especially for the first two decades of that standoff. The United States had allies in NATO, its bilateral alliances in East Asia, and pacts like ANZUS and SEATO. They were all more or less constructed in opposition to the Soviet (and Chinese) communist threat. These lines got blurrier during Détente, and following Nixon’s opening to the PRC, but the basic point still stood: It was reasonably obvious who was to be deterred and who was to be reassured. When a crisis erupted (say, the various standoffs over Berlin), the United States could send clear signals that it intended to defend its allies unequivocally. These signals included things like public statements of support and enhanced military cooperation (e.g. symbols of commitment like joint exercises). But in this particular conflict, this kind of signaling is not desirable. The reason for this is that China is not an adversary, and the Obama administration has been careful not to treat it as such. The U.S. has taken pains to stay publicly neutral on this iteration of the territorial dispute, despite its obvious treaty commitments. Just last week, Secretary Panetta announced the decision to place new missile defense radar in Japan—an important, but fairly routine sort of signal of military interest in an ally during a time of crisis. The next day, however, Panetta was in China, with the primary goal of building better military-to-military ties with Beijing. The U.S. has long exhorted the Chinese to be more forthcoming about the nature of its growing military capabilities, and enhanced military-to-military ties are crucial. Panetta’s visit to a Chinese naval base was an important step towards defense transparency between the two great powers. The United States’ interest in mitigating military uncertainty with China will not and should not be a passing one. But this brings with it its own set of challenges. The Chinese have long worried that U.S. security commitments are an effort to contain the PRC. U.S. goals vis-à-vis China will have a major effect on the way that the U.S. can signal to the Japanese in times of difficulty.Contrast this, if you will, to the kinds of signals that are appropriate to send to the ROK. Following North Korean nuclear and missile tests or acts of serious provocation like the sinking of the Cheonon or shelling of Yeonpeon, the U.S. routinely reiterates its unequivocal commitment to stand by South Korea. The two countries hold very public joint military exercises, and have decided to retain their longstanding joint force structure for a few more years. The U.S.-ROK-DPRK military dynamic is by no means a desirable one, but it involves a very different type of communication than the Sino-Japanese-American relationship, especially where deterrence and reassurance are concerned. Reducing Japan’s intransigence over the Senkakus is key to avert a crisis, and even if one arises, plan prevents escalation. Absent that, nuclear escalation is inevitable.Bandow 17 – Senior Fellow at CatoDoug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, Are the Senkaku Islands worth War between China, Japan and America?, 2017, **NCC Packet 2020Big wars sometimes start over small stakes. For instance, Germany’s “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck, presciently warned that a European war would begin as a result of “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” Soon, a royal assassination spawned World War I, which spread conflict around the globe.National insults, trade opportunities and territorial claims also resulted in their share of stupid, counterproductive conflicts. The assertive young American republic threatened Great Britain with war over the Canadian border and launched an invasion to vindicate its dubious territorial claims against Mexico. A few decades later, the slightly more mature United States fought a lengthy counterinsurgency campaign against independence‐?minded Filipinos to preserve its territorial booty from the Spanish‐?American War.Alliances sometimes accelerate the race to war. Assured of the support of Russia and Germany, respectively, Serbia and the Austro‐?Hungarian Empire were recklessly intransigent in summer 1914. Greater flexibility might not have prevented the conflict, but alliance‐?backed inflexibility ensured war.History illustrates the dangers posed by the Asia-Pacific’s many territorial squabbles. None of the contested claims is worth a fight, let alone a great‐?power conflict. Yet they could become a spark like that in Sarajevo a century ago. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis increased the danger on his recent trip to Japan when he “reassured” the Abe government that Washington, DC was firmly in its corner.The Senkaku Islands—called the Diaoyus by China—are uninhabited rocks of limited intrinsic value. However, they confer ocean and seabed control and corresponding fishing, navigation and hydrocarbon benefits. Nationalist sentiments loom equally large. The islands are controlled by Tokyo but also claimed by the People’s Republic of China. Beijing’s case is serious—better, in my view, than its less credible South China Sea claims—but Japan insists that there is no issue to discuss.That leaves the PRC with little choice but to adopt more confrontational tactics to assert its “rights.” Tokyo took direct control of the Senkaku Islands in 2012 to forestall their use by nationalists for protests, which heightened tensions. The following year, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone over the islands, though so far the ADIZ has more symbolic than real. The PRC also has engaged in fishing and oil exploration in nearby waters, sending in coast guard ships to defend Chinese operations.The Senkaku Islands are of little practical importance to China and Japan, and essentially of no importance to America.Japan felt secure in its intransigence after winning the Obama administration’s commitment that the “mutual” defense treaty between the two nations covered territory administered by the central government, even if claimed by other states. Secretary Mattis was equally explicit. He affirmed not only Washington’s support for Japan’s defense, but also stated, “I made clear that our longstanding policy on the Senkaku Islands stands. The United States will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands, and as such Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies.” In other words, America will defend Tokyo’s contested claim.The PRC responded sharply. The United States should “avoid making the issue more complicated and bringing instability to the regional situation,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said. Indeed, he explained, the U.S.-Japan security treaty is “a product of the Cold War, which should not impair China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights.”Adding to the combustible atmosphere is the apparent belief—of at least some officials on both sides—that war is inevitable. For instance, less than a year ago Trump strategist Steve Bannon expressed “no doubt” that “we’re going to war in the South China Sea in five to ten years.” He complained that the Chinese are “taking their sandbars and making basically stationary aircraft carriers and putting missiles on those.” While the Senkaku Islands are not part of the South China Sea, the same principles apply.War sounded almost close at Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s confirmation hearing. He insisted: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island‐?building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” Using force to do so would be an act of war against any country, including America.The Chinese responded accordingly. The People’s Liberation Army website quoted one senior officer as stating: “A ‘war within the president’s term’ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality.” He called for increased military deployments in the region.The political leadership is less transparent about its views—the residents of Zhongnanhai don’t typically appear on radio shows. However, Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group opined that “the Chinese government is quite concerned about the potential for direct confrontation with the Trump administration.” Although President Xi Jinping appears reasonably pragmatic while ruthlessly repressive, he isn’t likely to abandon what he sees as “core” Chinese interests. Moreover, nationalists and unreconstructed leftists, though differing on economic policy, share a distrust of the United States.A mutual belief in inevitable conflict could become reality. Before World War I, a number of high‐?ranking European officials believed that war was coming. For them, it made sense to accept, even embrace, the onset of the conflict in August 1914 and strike while victory still remained possible.In the case of China versus the United States, such shared sentiment may accelerate military spending. The Trump administration is demanding increased outlays despite the lack of any serious threat to vital U.S. interests. Rather, the expanded force is to enhance America’s ability to intervene against other nations, particularly China.This gives the PRC an even greater incentive to respond, since the United States is challenging what it views (and America would view, if the situation was reversed) as “core” national interests. As the United States increases military deployments in the region, so will the PRC. After Mattis’ visit, China sent three warships near the Senkaku Islands. The risks of a violent clash will rise accordingly.Some Washington officials might be tempted to advocate a more aggressive approach today, while the PRC is weaker and America is wealthier, backed by numerous allies and able to deploy a more powerful military. In this view, let the inevitable showdown come sooner rather than later.Alas, that could become a prescription for years if not decades of conflict. America has a vital interest in protecting its own territory, population, and constitutional and economic systems. But China threatens none of them. The United States has important interests in the independence of its allies and freedom of navigation in the Asia‐?Pacific region. So far, the PRC has not challenged either of those things.Washington understandably views its dominance of East Asia up to China’s borders as an advantage. But it is far less important than protecting America’s own security. Such control is not even necessary for preserving navigational freedom and allied security. More important, U.S. policy conflicts with what Beijing views as its “core” interests. Imagine Washington’s reaction if China attempted to maintain a similar position along the eastern seaboard and in the Caribbean. Nor does the presumption that America could defeat the PRC offer much comfort. The price would be high. China can build missiles and submarines faster than the United States can construct aircraft carriers. The Chinese people would be more committed to a fight if it is seen as protecting their homeland—more so than Americans would be prone to getting involved in a faraway conflict that hampers Washington’s will.Additionally, the United States count on support from allies not directly affected. Would Australia and South Korea risk the long‐?term hostility of China, which will be in their next‐?door neighbor forever? Indeed, Japan made clear that it would not join the United States’ “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea. Explained Japanese defense minister Tomomi Inada: “I told Secretary Mattis that Japan supports the U.S. military’s freedom of navigation operation in the sea. But the [Self Defense Force] will not be sent to the area.” Inada clearly means “supports” in quotation marks.Finally, an American “victory” almost certainly would guarantee long‐?term hostility and future conflict. It took two world wars to determine Germany’s place in the global order. And it took “only” two because, after the second one, Germany ended up divided and well behind the United States and Soviet Union. While the PRC’s collapse as a country is possible, it is unlikely. In fact, military defeat might spur nationalist rage and result in greater centralization.The Communist regime could fall. But that probably would spawn an authoritarian government rather than a democracy. And any democracy is more likely to be nationalist/?populist than liberal. Whether the almost inevitable “Second Sino‐?American War” likely would turn out in Washington’s favor is less clear. There could be a third one as well, if China rebounded. The United States might find that just as battles can be pyrrhic, so can wars. It’s an experience America should avoid.U.S. officials have good reason to remind China of the costs of conflict and the importance of settling even contentious territorial disputes peacefully. At the same time, however, the Trump administration should avoid issuing blank checks to allies seeming to exempt them from having to deal with, and even discuss, those same territorial challenges. Sometimes blank checks get cashed with disastrous consequences, like Imperial Germany’s support for the Austro‐?Hungarian Empire, which sped Europe’s plunge into the World War I abyss.The Senkaku Islands are of little practical importance to China and Japan, and essentially of no importance to America. But as the locus of a dangerous game of geopolitical chicken, they could spark another Sino‐?Japanese war, which would be disastrous. And if that turned into a Sino‐?American conflict, the consequences would be incalculable. President Donald Trump should never forget these dangers as he confronts China’s growing ambition and power. A number of specific activities initiated by China or Japan could escalate---our Article V commitment is the central ingredient.Chanlett-Avery et al., specialist in Asian affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade division of the Congressional Research Service, ‘19(Emma, Caitlin Campbell, and Joshua A. Williams, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance,” June 13, 2019, ) **NCC Packet 2020Since 2010, mutual suspicion has solidified into muted hostility over the set of uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets, located between Taiwan and Okinawa in the East China Sea. Japanese security officials have been deeply concerned about Beijing’s intentions and growing capabilities for years, but the Senkakus dispute appears to have convinced politicians and the broader public that Japan needs to adjust its defense posture to counter China. The long-standing but largely quiet dispute suddenly came to the fore in 2010, when the Japan Coast Guard arrested and detained the captain of a Chinese fishing vessel after it collided with two Japan Coast Guard ships near the Senkakus. The incident resulted in a diplomatic standoff, with Beijing suspending high-level exchanges and restricting exports of rare earth elements to Japan.43 In August 2012, in a move that drew sharp objections from the Chinese government, the Japanese government purchased three of the eight land features from a private landowner in order to preempt their sale to the Tokyo Metropolitan government under the direction of its nationalist governor at the time, Shintaro Ishihara.44 Starting in fall 2012, China began regularly deploying maritime law enforcement vessels near the islets and stepped up what it called “routine” patrols to assert jurisdiction in what it called “China’s territorial waters.” Chinese military surveillance planes reportedly entered airspace that Japan considers its own, in what Japan’s Defense Ministry called the first such incursion in 50 years. In 2013, near-daily encounters escalated: both countries scrambled fighter jets, Japan drafted plans to shoot down unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that do not respond to warnings, and, according to the Japanese government, a Chinese navy ship locked its fire-control radar on a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two separate occasions.45 Chinese aircraft activity in the area contributed to an eightfold increase in the number of scramble takeoffs by Japan Air SelfDefense Forces aircraft between Japan Fiscal Year 2010 (96 scrambles) and calendar year 2016 (842 scrambles). The number of scrambles decreased to 602 in 2017 and 581 in 2018; there were 162 in the first quarter of 2019.46In November 2013, China announced an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea that includes airspace over the islets, a move that Japan and the United States condemned as a destabilizing step that alters the already delicate status-quo.47 Experts argued that the ADIZ represented a new attempt by China to pressure Japan over the dispute, and that the ADIZ— which overlaps with three other regional ADIZs—could lead to accidents or unintended clashes. Although Chinese air forces have conducted patrols in the ADIZ, public reporting does not suggest China regularly enforces the ADIZ against foreign military or civilian aircraft.48 Rising tensions between Japan and China have direct implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The intermingling of fishing vessels, military assets, and maritime law-enforcement patrols creates a crowded and potentially combustible situation. With limited crisis management tools, China and Japan are at risk of escalating into direct conflict, which in turn could involve the U.S. commitment to defend Japan. As the Senkaku dispute has resurfaced multiple times since 2010, the United States reasserted its position that it would not take a position on sovereignty but that the islets are subject to Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the administration of Japan” (emphasis added). Congress inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) a resolution that would appear to bolster the U.S. commitment by stating that “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” Then-President Obama used similar language when describing the U.S. alliance commitment in April 2014, saying “The policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.” 49 China’s military modernization, more assertive approach to its territorial claims, and increased military activities around the Senkaku Islands and other southwest Japanese islands have led Japan to bolster its defense posture in the East China Sea (see “Evolution of Japanese Defense Policy” section below.)50Excluding senkakus from the defense pact solvesCarpenter 20 (Ted Galen-senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to the National Interest, is the author of 12 books and more than 850 articles on international affairs, 1-9-2020, "Washington Needs to Jettison Its Commitment to Defend the Senkakus," Cato Institute, ) **NCC Packet 2020the United States has an array of defense commitments to allies of which the costs and risks greatly outweigh any potential benefits. Washington’s obligation under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to consider an attack on one member as an attack on all is a graphic example of such imprudence. Adding the three Baltic republics to NATO means that the United States now is obligated to defend small, vulnerable Alliance members located directly on Russia’s border. Such a perilous (and probably unachievable) mission does not serve America’s best interests and should be rescinded. U.S. leaders even need to re‐?evaluate some aspects of Washington’s bilateral mutual defense treaty with Japan. There is a credible case for maintaining that alliance for at least another decade or so. North Korea remains a disruptive factor in the region, and unlike the situation in Europe, there is no multilateral entity comparable to the European Union to which the United States could transfer significant security responsibilities in East Asia. China’s meteoric economic and military rise also provides an important reason as to why the U.S.-Japan alliance remains important for regional stability and a balance of power. However, the U.S. security pledge to Tokyo should not be a blank check. It is especially important that a continuing defense relationship with Japan does not include backing Tokyo’s dubious territorial claim to the Senkaku Islands—a chain of small, uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea. Beijing emphatically disputes Tokyo’s claim to those islets (which China calls the Diaoyus), and some nasty maritime incidents concerning the islands have occurred over the past decade. Worse, the balance of air and naval power in the immediate area appears to be shifting in China’s favor, making U.S. involvement in the dispute increasingly perilous. Yet U.S. leaders insist that the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty include the Senkakus. James Mattis, President Donald Trump’s first secretary of defense, reiterated that position in February 2017, affirming the U.S. commitment to defend all Japanese territory from attack. Mattis specifically asserted that Article 5 of the defense treaty covers the Senkaku/?Diaoyu Islands. Trump himself subsequently reaffirmed that commitment in talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Such a bold stance was not always Washington’s official position, though. In fact, it is a rather recent interpretation. Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to state explicitly that the alliance extended to the Senkakus: “The policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,” Obama stated in a 2014 interview with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun. “And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands,” he added. Washington is exposing the United States to an unnecessary security risk by adopting that stance. Beijing’s response to Mattis’ unequivocal support for Tokyo’s claims was quite firm. “Diaoyu and its affiliated islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times. These are historical facts that cannot be changed. The so‐?called U.S.-Japan security treaty was a product of the Cold War, and it should not harm China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang insisted at a press conference. “We urge the U.S. side to adopt a responsible attitude and stop making wrong remarks on the issue of the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands,” Lu added. Washington needs to rescind any implied commitment to defend the Senkakus. The current U.S. position is based on a strained, revisionist interpretation of the mutual security treaty text that only the last two U.S. administrations adopted. Worse, it needlessly inserts the United States into an emotional territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing—one in which it is unclear which party has the better case. It is one thing to continue a security partnership with Japan to maintain stability in East Asia and balance China’s rising power and influence. There are at least respectable arguments in favor of such a policy, despite the risk of exacerbating existing tensions between Washington and Beijing. But inflicting damage on America’s relations with China—and perhaps risking a war with it—over Japan’s murky claim to uninhabited rocks is a case of foreign policy folly. Such risks are imprudent, even though there are valuable fishing grounds and possible energy deposits in the waters surrounding the Senkaku/?Diaoyu chain. The Obama administration’s expansion of the U.S. security obligations to Japan was profoundly unwise. A continuation of the security relationship with Tokyo should be contingent upon the elimination of any U.S. commitment to back Japan’s claim of the Senkakus.Relations UniquenessChina-Japan relations are at a tipping point – nationalism makes ECS flashpoints inevitable Cho 19 (Daniel, Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School, “DANGEROUS ROCKS: FROM STRATEGIC MODERATION TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION”, Thesis, ) **NCC Packet 2020Structural changes had a strong domestic impact on both China and Japan but manifested in uniquely different ways that nonetheless mutually reinforced the trend toward more escalatory behavior. Specifically, structural changes produced challenges and opportunities, that influenced, and arguably, dictated, how Chinese and Japanese leaders viewed, responded, and reacted to the territorial dispute. The 2010-2013 escalation period was the culmination of the stresses that structural transitions produced on the domestic audience, which eventually elevated the territorial dispute into a new level of competitive normality. For China, the turn of the century was a decade of significant economic achievements and social transformation. These milestone achievements translated into a renewed sense of confidence within the CCP leadership and a more vocal and active citizenry, creating strong pressure that would push Beijing, intentionally and unintentionally, toward a more emboldened foreign policy posture and a stronger commitment toward reclaiming Chinese sovereignty. These internal changes would also incentivize a more willing and militarily capable China to respond more aggressively to the misunderstood and misinterpreted DPJ-led Japan, paving the way for 2nd stage escalation that strengthened support for a more assertive China under a more nationalistic leader, Xi Jinping. In Japan, two decades of economic stagnation and overall security anxiety led to increased electorate frustration toward the incumbent leadership, resulting in the 2009 landslide victory of the DPJ over the LDP. However, the ambitious political agenda of the inexperienced DPJ would be faced by similar domestic pressures of a more attentive electorate coupled with a resistant political opposition, challenging the DPJ’s legitimacy and competency in various issues, like the effective management of the S/D territorial dispute. The DPJ’s cluttered response to domestically driven issues pertaining to the S/D territorial dispute exacerbated the tenuous Sino-Japanese relations at the time, providing an opportunity for more nationalistic elements in China and Japan to capitalize on the failed diplomacy. The experience during the 2010–2013 period would not only reinforce threat perceptions, but also create opportunities for nationalist leaders in Japan to leverage the anxiety in Japanese society for their political agenda, paving the way for a return to Abe-led governance, committed to its long-term vision of realizing Japan’s security normalization amidst a changing and uncertain regional environment. The escalations that occurred at the end of the first decade of the 21st century was significant not only because the territorial dispute has evolved into a more competitive form of Sino-Japanese regional rivalry but also because it created an opportunity that strengthened the legitimacy and popularity of nationalistic leaders in both countries. When placing the structural trends, and the domestic changes that followed, within the context of the 21st century, it highlights the increasing risk of misunderstandings that further reinforce the threat perceptions that, in the absence of conflict-resolution mechanisms and dialogue-promoting mediums, help facilitate an environment that is unconducive to de-escalation but instead, toward more assertive competition with the potential for rapid escalation. Therefore, assessing the strategic implications, in particular the risks, of the S/D territorial dispute also requires an understanding of the domestic politics driving the issue in order to avoid engaging in armed conflict for all the wrong reasons.Specifically – organizational changes in Chinese posture show they’re gearing up for conflict Patalano 20 (Alessio Patalano—Senior Lecturer In War Studies at the Department of War Studies at Kings College, 8-1-2020, "A Gathering Storm? The Chinese ‘Attrition’ Strategy for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands," RUSI, ) **NCC Packet 2020A closer examination of data from the last five years would find that growing Japanese concerns are not without foundation. Since 2015, there have been two changes in Chinese operational patterns which appear consistent with a long-term – and largely unchanged – aim of eroding Japanese administrative control. First, whilst the period from January to June 2020 witnessed a decrease in the number of vessels spotted inside the territorial waters, the average of eight vessels per month, indicative of a two-vessel deployment ‘routine’, is consistent with prior patterns of four incursions per month, as experienced on average in 2019 (with peaks of groups of four vessels per incursion). Weather conditions and fishing patterns seem to be contributing to modulate the number of vessels deployed, with the highest numbers of incursions reasonably taking place during the summer season (May to September). Second, this year’s relative slowdown in the number of vessels spotted inside the territorial waters has occurred against a background of a stark climb in number of vessels spotted in the contiguous zone. Such an increase in activities here suggests a shift in operational focus. The numbers of vessels spotted in the contiguous zone in 2019 was much higher, and their deployments were designed to last longer and offer greater continuity. The operational pattern indicated an intent to emphasise the continuous nature of Chinese presence – with the possibility of promptly intervening inside the territorial waters, rather than just presence. Thus, taken altogether, Chinese operational behaviour has changed in a fashion that would reinforce the tactical objective of increasing the exercise of control. Higher continuity in presence in the contiguous zone allows for more prompt deployments inside the territorial waters to ‘engage’ with foreign fishing boats, as was the case in May and July. Within this context, there are two additional considerations worth highlighting. On the one hand, Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies underwent a considerable transformation, with a partial fusion of five organisations beginning in 2013, and the additional not insignificant organisational change that led to the integration of the new Chinese Coast Guard under the command of the People’s Armed Police in 2018. These developments meant a considerable increase in the overall tonnage available to conduct patrols, with the Chinese Coast Guard now boasting more than 500,000 tonnes of aggregated tonnage, as opposed to the Japanese Coast Guard’s overall 150,000 tonnes. Whilst the Chinese have to divide the force over three different theatres to cover the entire extended Chinese coastline, this remains a considerable fleet. This larger fleet has also been taking delivery of much improved ocean-going capabilities over the past five years, with a considerable number of them deployed in the East China Sea. On the other hand, the relative lack of regular media attention to events in the East China Sea – especially when compared to the South China Sea – is understandable, given the overall decrease in numbers of spotted vessels between the second half of 2017 and the end of 2018. One way to explain the relative reductions during this period of time is the significance of the 40th anniversary of the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship to bilateral relations. In 2018, Abe became the first Japanese prime minister to visit China in seven years, signing 52 memoranda of cooperation in a wide range of areas. In May of the same year, ahead of Abe’s visit, Tokyo and Beijing agreed to a maritime and air communication mechanism aimed at enhancing crisis prevention in the East China Sea. The mechanism, however, did not extend to the respective coast guards, leaving what today counts for the majority of frontline encounters unaddressed. By the same token, it is difficult to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the political acts taken by China and Japan to emphasise sovereign ownership and operational behaviour. In June, the Ishigaki municipality, in the Okinawa Prefecture, passed a bill to rename an administrative area including the Senkaku islands from ‘Tonoshiro’ to ‘Tonoshiro Senkaku’. The bill was nominally aimed at avoiding confusion with a locale in downtown Ishigaki, but the timing seems to relate directly to the growing intrusiveness of Chinese activities vis-à-vis local fishermen operating around the islands. In response to this, the following day the Chinese Natural Resources Ministry revealed a list of names for 50 seabed areas which included the Senkaku islets. Whilst these actions are the latest irritants in how Beijing and Tokyo manage the dispute, it seems fair to suggest that the broader political picture over the past two years has had a limited impact on the broader direction of operational behaviour. In all, it is difficult to support the notion that the pandemic created the conditions for a form of tactical opportunism in how China has sought to advance its positions in regard to the Senkaku islands. Yet, what is certain is that neither coronavirus nor warmer political ties have affected a Chinese pattern of behaviour that is clearly aimed at challenging Japanese administrative control of the islands. Indeed, as the Chinese law enforcement fleet has grown larger and more capable, the length and tactical conduct of its vessels has changed too. In an attempt at exercising law enforcement rights on a continuous and regular fashion, Chinese Coast Guard vessels have opted for longer deployments in the contiguous zone to develop the capacity to intervene when Japanese fishing boats appear at the horizon. This attritional behaviour added to the already routinised patrols inside the territorial waters to produce the long-term effect of undermining Japan’s ability to exert effective administrative control. CONCLUSIONS: THE QUEST FOR CONTROL THAT MIGHT DAMAGE STABILITY Matthew Goodman has recently summarised the Abe government’s economic approach to China as a three-pronged strategy: engage where possible; hedge when necessary; lead on regional and global rulemaking. Such a description certainly holds value in the maritime context too. Political engagement with Beijing on the management of the dispute has been complemented by tactical pushbacks on intrusions in the waters around the Senkakus, a quest for closer support from the US and a degree of renewed investment in enhancing capabilities and enhanced security coordination with the Japan Self-Defence Forces. These initiatives have also been complemented by consistent positions on the international stage on the importance of respecting the ‘rule of law’ in the management of maritime disputes, and actions in support of freedom of navigation and the maritime order in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Yet, this strategy may not suffice anymore. In July, China stepped up its game, seeking not merely to showcase presence, but rather to exercise control and as a result directly challenge the Japanese position. The question is not whether Beijing is planning to replace Tokyo in controlling the islands – the issue is when. Challenging Japan’s effective control was not the result of a short-term tactical opportunism. It was a step in a long-term plan that has, at times, slowed down based on specific political circumstances, but that has not fundamentally changed. A combination of material factors – pertaining to organisational reforms and capability improvements – have contributed to implement a new operational practice. As the high fishing season begins, the extent to which this new pattern of behaviour will constitute a new normal is likely to be fully revealed. One thing is certain. Chinese behaviour is heading towards a full challenge of Japanese control of the islands, establishing it as a contested notion first, with no indication that it will stop at that. This matters because it suggests that bilateral relations may literally be about to enter more troubled and choppy waters. It matters because Japanese authorities may need to soon start reviewing where the ‘red lines’ are on the Senkakus and what are the best ways to communicate them to their Chinese counterparts. It matters because as constabulary encounters continue to increase, mechanisms to regulate them may become an urgent requirement. It matters because as politics in Washington enters an electoral period, the substance of US support to Japan might become a matter of debate. It matters because if governments in Tokyo and Beijing fail to take action to manage this attritional situation, the East China Sea might end up being the place to gain prominence in the headlines, and it would not be a positive development if and when that happens.China is ramping up escalatory tactics now as part of a long-term strategy to undermine a threatening claim of Japanese administrative control.Patalano, reader in East Asian warfare and security at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, ‘9/10/20(Alessio, “What is China’s Strategy in the Senkaku Islands?” ) **NCC Packet 2020Chinese operational behavior in the waters around the small group of islands under Japanese administrative control known as Senkaku, and claimed by Beijing under the name Diaoyu, has entered a new, dangerous phase. In an unprecedented move, Chinese coast guard cutters in early July started to operate inside the islands’ territorial waters in a fashion that would suggest Beijing is there to exercise law-enforcement powers. It appears China no longer seeks to just showcase its “presence” in the waters around the islands. It is now starting to actively challenge Japanese control.For Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s successor, reviewing Tokyo’s approach to the management of this contest with Beijing will be a strategic priority. The stakes are high, as a war game recently indicated that escalatory behavior around the Senkaku islands takes the risk of war between Asia’s two largest economies, and America’s most consequential ally in the Indo-Pacific, one step closer.China’s recent moves are destabilizing, and Japan clearly stated as much in a newly released defense white paper. In the report, the Japanese government presents the nature of the Chinese challenge to its security — especially to the Senkaku islands — in the strongest terms yet. Chinese authorities are in fact described as “relentlessly” pressing their claims to the islands with ever-increasing levels of maritime activities undermining the status quo. Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono made clear that further intensification of activities might trigger the intervention of Japanese military assets. In response to Japanese concerns, the commander of U.S. military forces in Japan has stated that the United States would help monitor the situation. Every successful step Beijing takes in undermining the status quo around the Senkakus through coercion and force is a direct challenge to the credibility of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and, crucially, to the principles informing the maritime rules-based order centered on the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. While the United States is not party to this treaty, both China and Japan are, and Abe has clearly articulated why China’s actions around the Senkakus fundamentally undermine the principles enshrined in the convention.What is new then about these recent events, and why do they matter to the stability of the East China Sea and, more broadly, to the wider Indo-Pacific? They matter because they highlight a shift toward what I would argue is the second phase of Beijing’s three-pronged attrition strategy toward the Senkakus: normalizing Chinese presence; exercising law-enforcement rights; and taking over exclusive control. China’s objective is to reverse the current situation — controlling the islands at Japan’s expense — while trying to avoid, if possible at all, an armed conflict. This, in turn, matters because it sets a precedent on dispute management that undermines the law of the sea and the maritime order it represents. Since the islands remain uninhabited, the main focus of Chinese action is the ability to exercise maritime law-enforcement rights inside the islands’ territorial waters, especially in regards to the monitoring of fishing activities. By keeping this contest for control firmly within the realm of the exercise of law-enforcement rights, Beijing retains the initiative to challenge the status quo, limit the risk of war, or at least put Japanese authorities in the difficult position of pacing responses that may invite more escalation.Phase One: Normalizing China’s PresenceHow did this all start? China’s plans to use maritime law-enforcement vessels to intrude into the territorial waters around the Senkaku islands date back to 2006 and were first put into action in December 2008. A collision in June 2006 between a Japanese coast guard vessel and a Taiwanese fishing ship had prompted authorities in Beijing to decide to step up China’s maritime activities around the islands. Subsequently, Chinese law-enforcement vessels entered the territorial waters only sporadically: in August 2011 and again in March and July 2012. It is likely that another collision in September 2010 — this time involving a Chinese trawler and a Japanese coast guard cutter — contributed to the decision to deploy assets again. Japanese authorities arrested the Chinese trawler’s captain, triggering a serious political stand-off between Tokyo and Beijing that lasted months.The Chinese captain was eventually released, but in September 2012, after the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the Senkaku’s islands, China changed its strategy. Authorities in Beijing abandoned the logic of occasional incursions and started deploying assets inside the territorial waters on a regular basis. The goal of this new approach was not just to challenge the Japanese position on the sovereignty of the islands as implied by the exercise of administrative control. It was to prove that such statements could not possibly be true by normalizing the Chinese law-enforcement presence inside the islands’ territorial waters. As politicians in Tokyo continued to deny the existence of a territorial dispute (a denial that continues to the present day), and U.S. President Barack Obama eventually reaffirmed that Japan held administrative control over the islands, the presence of Chinese vessels was an indispensable first step to corroborate Beijing’s claims.Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies underwent a considerable transformation in the last decade and are today more akin to a paramilitary organization than a coast guard. In 2013, Beijing announced a partial fusion of five organizations, and in 2018 it set in motion the integration of the new Chinese coast guard under the command of the People’s Armed Police. These developments were not merely aimed at addressing presence requirements in the East China Sea. They were part of the Chinese Communist Party’s ambition to transform China into a maritime power, a key step to achieve the “China Dream.” China’s maritime reforms led to a considerable increase in hulls and firepower to conduct patrols. The Chinese coast guard boasts today more than 500,000 tons of aggregated tonnage, as opposed to the Japanese coast guard’s overall 150,000 tons, and has been taking delivery of much improved oceangoing capabilities, with a considerable number of them deployed in the East China Sea. By 2019, China had a fleet that could do more than just exert presence, which presents the added challenge of being fully integrated in China’s Eastern Theater military command on operations related to the Senkakus.Phase Two: Exercising ControlOn July 5, 2020, Chinese strategy changed again. On that day, two Chinese coast guard vessels set a new milestone. They exited the islands’ territorial waters after sailing for some 39 hours and 23 minutes. This marked the longest time Chinese surface assets had ever spent inside the waters’ 12-nautical-mile limit. This was no mere “incursion.” It was, as Chinese officials would have it, a “routine” law-enforcement patrol of sovereign waters. In particular, this deployment was not an isolated event. It followed a similarly extended foray of more than 30 hours completed just two days prior in the same area. Taken together, these two activities represented the longest time Chinese vessels have ever spent continuously operating inside the Senkakus’ territorial waters since September 2012.The exercise of sovereign law-enforcement rights in territorial waters was vital to sustain Beijing’s legal claims and advance its political narrative. This is why the length of these incursions represents a potentially important novelty in operational behavior. If the “routinization” of deployments distinguished the first step of China’s challenge to the status quo, these new extended deployments marked the beginning of a genuine exercise of control. During the second extended stay, the ships reportedly operated at some 4–6 miles off the islands on average, coming as close as within 2.5 miles from the shoreline. The ships also sought to approach Japanese fishing boats at least on one occasion — an act that is consistent with the attempt at exercising law-enforcement rights — prompting the Japan Coast Guard to deploy its own assets to counter China’s actions.How do we know that these two events are symptomatic of a new phase of Chinese strategy? One important indicator is the more continuous presence in the islands’ contiguous zone (which includes the 12 nautical miles adjacent to the territorial waters). Since January 2020, Chinese vessels have in fact been spotted in waters around the islands for more than 100 days without interruption. This represents the longest streak since the islands were acquired by the Japanese government in 2012. Such a continuous presence reinforces China’s ability to patrol inside the territorial waters when needed. It seems no coincidence that the relative reduction of the number of vessels spotted inside the territorial waters in the past months has occurred against a stark expansion in the number of vessels spotted in the contiguous zone. Higher continuity in presence in the contiguous zone allows for more prompt deployments inside the territorial waters to engage with foreign boats. In fact, following a case that occurred early in May, Chinese spokespersons pointed out that Chinese vessels “tracked and monitored” a Japanese boat illegally fishing inside the territorial waters. Chinese vessels asked the Japanese fishing boat to leave the area, and eventually “resolutely responded to the illegal interference of the Japanese Coast Guard.”Official Japanese figures indicate that China’s pattern of deployments and operational conduct this year are looking like the beginning of a new normal. Last year, Chinese vessels entered the contiguous zone around the Senkakus some 1,097 times, spending a total of 282 days there, far exceeding the previous record of 819 times for some 232 days collected in 2013.The sharp increase has not gone unnoticed among the leadership in Japan’s ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party. In December 2019, the Liberal Democratic Party’s General Council chair, Shunichi Suzuki, had specifically raised the party’s concerns about Chinese maritime activities, something that it expected Abe to consider as the government prepared for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s official visit the following spring. Eventually, Xi’s visit was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but Japan’s concerns over Chinese behavior in the East China Sea have not eased. Reportedly, Chinese authorities have warned Japanese counterparts that many Chinese fishing boats may enter the Senkakus from August to September. However, these intrusions would only prompt a stronger Japanese coast guard presence — reinforcing the point about Japan’s control of the islands, which is precisely what the Chinese strategy wishes to undermine.ECS Advantage: Credibility Crisis ScenarioSecurity Dilemma NowUS-lead deterrence is ineffective and leads to nuclear war – commitments create a credibility dilemma – China doubts we intervene and will deter us via nuclear escalation – we risk escalation to demonstrate we are willingGholz et al., PhD, associate professor, political science, University of Notre Dame, served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, chair of the international security section of the International Studies Association, ‘19(Eugene, Benjamin Friedman & Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect US Allies in Asia,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32) **NCC Packet 2020Planning to fight inside China’s A2/AD envelope entails significant costs, both in terms of money and reduced military effectiveness. The US military is developing capabilities to jam or spoof radar that would guide Chinese missiles and attack aircraft, to improve fleet missile defenses, and to build a more survivable long-range bomber. These are all expensive projects. Moreover, even the best tactical defenses for ships have limited capability. Multiple attacking missiles can overwhelm the number of defensive missiles on a ship, and the ship’s limited size means it can only carry so many ship-defense munitions.33 Worse, every ship-defense munition loaded onto a ship takes space away from other systems and munitions that the ship needs to conduct its (potentially offensive) mission.The other element of the US effort to maintain its offensive operational concept involves preparing to directly attack China’s defenses—launching air strikes to destroy thousands of Chinese military sites like missile launchers, communications systems, fixed radar and other sensors, and various other targets relevant to the successful operation of China’s air defenses and anti-ship missiles.34 To Beijing, these plans may look like a US capability to destroy China’s defenses with a US first strike, perhaps aimed at overthrowing Communist party rule. Chinese leaders may reasonably fear that the United States has offensive strategic intentions, despite US leaders’ claims to be only interested in defending US allies. In response, China might well arm more heavily, especially with nuclear weapons, which would drive up US spending without achieving relative gains for the United States.35 These are the fruits of exacerbating the security dilemma by implementing an offensive operational concept.To Beijing, existing plans may look like a US capability to destroy China’s defenses with a first strike.Beyond the risk of an arms race, US plans for operations that include conventional strikes against the Chinese mainland are downright dangerous. As Georgetown University political scientist Caitlin Talmadge points out, such strikes might push the Chinese government to escalate a conflict to the nuclear level.36 Chinese nuclear early warning and command-and-control systems may be intermixed with the A2/AD systems that the United States plans to destroy or blind, putting Chinese leadership in a “use it or lose it” situation regarding their nuclear deterrent: if they are not sure that they will be able to use their nuclear systems later, because they fear that they may be disabled or destroyed in an American first strike, Chinese leaders may decide to launch a first strike of their own, while they still control their weapons. It is also possible that Chinese leaders, in the early chaos and high stress of a major conventional war, might mistake a US attack on A2/AD systems for one on China’s nuclear arsenal, leading to nuclear escalation in response to what was intended as only a conventional war.Even if that scenario were avoided, China might consider any bomb exploding on its home territory to be unacceptable, and such an attack might inflame Chinese nationalism, leading China to escalate what the United States thought of as a limited conflict. It might seem reasonable to the Chinese to retaliate against US territories or even the US mainland.Fears and suppositions about these escalation scenarios also reduce the credibility of current US guarantees to its allies and increase the risk of strategic miscalculation, making war more likely. The Chinese government may see the danger of escalation as a reason that the United States would back down from intervening to stop Chinese aggression. And as long as US allies’ primary defense strategy is to rely on US forces, their relative defensive weakness could tempt China to launch an attack based on the belief that the United States would self-deter.Furthermore, to counteract that potential Chinese line of thinking, the United States might itself engage in risky behavior trying to convince the world that it is willing to intervene despite escalation risks. That strong US commitment to constantly reinforce the credibility of its alliance guarantees could itself precipitate crises.37U.S. commitments in East Asia create a fundamental paradox. Because our commitments are not credible, China will probe to undermine our aggressive strategy. BUT---those probes make the US double down and embolden our allies---it is a recipe for unintended conflict.Edelstein, PhD, Associate professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, and Shifrinson, PhD, assistant professor of international affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, ‘18(David and Joshua, “It’s a Trap! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment,” in U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, Routledge, Ch. 2) **NCC Packet 2020Since its 2010– 2011 announcement, the pivot has inserted the United States into a host of Asian political and military disputes with China involving ownership of contested maritime space and islands in the South and East China Seas. Though there may be economic resources beneath the surface around some of these locales, neither the United States nor its allies have an intrinsic interest in ownership of contested areas. Instead, the contested maritime domains are worrisome to US allies for what they suggest about China’s territorial ambitions. They are therefore important to the United States for the signal American actions send to allies over American credibility. Thus, the United States has moved to back its allies in their disputes with the P.R.C. by rhetorically portraying China as the principal aggressor, clarifying that US commitments to the allies would cover the maritime areas under dispute, and – above all – has dispatched its own military forces to enforce what the US and its allies define as the “status quo” in contravention of China’s own interests (Russell 2014; White House 2014; US Pacific Command 2015; Valencia 2016; LaGrone 2015; Panda 2016). Whatever the legitimacy of these actions, their effect is to create a self-perpetuating cycle: the more the United States stands by its allies in opposing potential Chinese ambitions, the nominally more credible the American resolve to defend its allies, the more the allies are inclined to act aggressively toward China, and the greater the likelihood of a direct US– Chinese confrontation. In other words, treating American support for its allies as a litmus test of the alliances themselves requires the United States to take steps on behalf of its allies that risk conflict with China.This is entrapment of the purest sort. The United States could readily provide security to its friends in East Asia, maintain Asia’s political status quo, or more generally limit the rise of China without involving itself in Asian maritime disputes. To the extent that the United States simply wants to preserve East Asian stability, it could negotiate directly with the P.R.C. to settle conflicts of interest on a bilateral basis. To the extent that the United States wants to prevent China from becoming an Asian hegemon or engaging in military action beyond its borders, it could simply surge forces to the region as crises develop or build up the military forces of its clients (Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Lalwani 2014; Glaser 2015; Mirski 2013). That these options are treated as insufficient suggests entrapment at play. Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners is in the United States’ interest, only entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response.3The second driver of entrapment comes from the response by East Asian countries themselves. It will be some time before we have detailed evidence on what was said to whom that convinced the Obama administration to pivot to East Asia. Nevertheless, the East Asian response since 2010–2011 suggests that moral hazard is increasing risks for the United States. One of the most striking trends in East Asia since the pivot is the renewed assertiveness of East Asian states in dealing with China (Johnston 2013; Associated Press 2015). This trend includes independent action by the Japanese, Filipino, Vietnamese, and other military forces to take a forward-leaning stance on maritime disputes that, at minimum, helps to justify a Chinese response. Japan, Korea, and others lobbied for the pivot for the express purpose of having the United States help them manage the rise of China – the implication being that, without an active American role, they would either bandwagon with China or engage in increasingly aggressive policies with a large risk of war.As things stand, East Asia is already witness to an arms race and militarized interstate disputes: Japan is taking increasing military measures to confront Chinese incursions into the disputed Senkakus, including regularly confronting Chinese aircraft flying over the disputed region (Gady 2015; Reuters 2016a; Kazianis 2016; Reynolds 2015); Vietnam and the Philippines have grown increasingly willing to confront China in the South China Sea while deepening military ties with other countries challenged by China (Torode 2015; Vietnam Right Now 2015; Bowcott 2015; Reuters 2016b); and even Australia – which has no maritime disputes with China – has taken to militarily challenging Chinese maritime claims (Defense News 2015; .au 2015). Independently, none of these countries (except perhaps Japan) has the wherewithal to defeat China. These actions are almost certainly born of the expectation that the United States will come to their aid if a dispute escalates to war.4 Thus, unless the pivot has had no effect on allied behavior, then its main influence has been to (1) avoid bandwagoning, but (2) allow the very assertiveness the United States nominally sought to avoid in the first place! To put the issue differently, the claims employed by Asian allies and partners to push what became the pivot strongly suggest that it encouraged their over- assertiveness. This is moral hazard: take away the United States’ post-pivot policy, and the East Asian allies would almost certainly not be tilting with China to the same extent. Some smaller allies, in fact, might bandwagon altogether. If so, this suggests the extent to which entrapment dynamics are at play.In sum, entrapment is alive and well in terms of both the arguments employed and the policies adopted by the United States and its allies since the late 2000s. No war has occurred, but crises are ongoing, and the intensity of American backing for its East Asian clients is growing. This is a recipe for miscalculation. As American forces continue to move into the region, as American diplomacy continues to take an anti-China flavor, and as allies simultaneously spur and build upon these trends, the United States is approaching active involvement in the wrong conflicts, at the wrong time, and in the wrong place. The United States has an interest in maintaining Japan and other major states as independent actors friendly to the United States, noting their particular island disputes with China. Entrapment is alive and well as the United States mistakes the latter for the former. And, importantly, even if the United States decides at some point that conflict with China is necessary to protect its national interests, the US could still be entrapped by its allies into fighting that conflict at an unwelcome time with unattractive goals and using extraordinary means. In short, the US need not be drawn into a wholly unwelcome war for entrapment to nonetheless occur.This dilemma is particularly true in the ECS---our commitment to defend a bunch of rocks is not fully credible---that enables risk-taking behavior from China to counter our threatening behavior.Taffer, PhD, Research Analyst in the China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses, ‘19(Andrew, “Threat and opportunity: Chinese wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute,” Asian Security, February) **NCC Packet 2020China’s shift to a coercive wedging strategy in the ECS can be traced back to the 2010 trawler incident. Before examining the incident in detail, however, it is necessary to provide the broader context in which it unfolded. Between 2008–10, and particularly with the advent of the Obama administration, the United States became increasingly active diplomatically in the region, tightening its regional alliances and deepening its security partnerships.59 It was also over this period that China’s offshore disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) grew to become a central issue of contention in US–China relations. Collectively, these trends were almost uniformly viewed by Chinese analysts to be representative of hostile US intentions and, as discussed in the following, an intensification of the containment dimension of American strategy.With respect to the SCS disputes, Chinese analysts, almost without exception, viewed the conflicts in strategic terms associated with Sino-American competition.60 Differences at the margins notwithstanding, a preponderance of analysts and publications affiliated with state and party organizations held that Washington’s strategy in the SCS was aimed at “containing” China.61 For example, a 2010 article in Red Flag Manuscript, a periodical affiliated with the CCP’s Central Committee, argued, “the specific objectives of US policy in the South China Sea are: to ensure and strengthen its military presence in the region … and to use the South China Sea issues to contain China’s development.”62Most Chinese analysts nevertheless acknowledged that Washington’s disposition toward Beijing in general was far from one of unalloyed hostility. Like many Western analysts, Chinese elites characterized US policy and strategy toward the PRC as “two-handed,” composed of both a cooperative and a competitive dimension.63 That is, on the one hand, Washington engaged productively with Beijing, maintaining that “we welcome China as a strong and prosperous … member of the community of nations,”64 while, on the other hand, it furnished the foundation to balance against – if not contain – Beijing by strengthening its existing alliances and building new political and military relationships across the region.65 In this regard, elite opinion in China came increasingly to characterize US policy toward the PRC as “contradictory.”66An article published in the People’s Daily under the byline “Zhong Sheng,” a moniker used to express official sentiments, argued: “On one hand, the United States will strengthen the containment of China through the so-called security guarantee obligations; on the other hand, it also tries to prevent conflicts and confrontation with China. The self-contradictory strategy will certainly aggravate the complexity of the Asia-Pacific security situation, and may even cause division [emphasis added].”67 In 2010, as Washington was deepening its alliances and security partnerships in Asia while simultaneously declaring its aim to build a salutary political relationship with China, Beijing’s Defense White Paper of the same year averred, “contradictions are intensifying.”68 While a contradictory American strategy in this regard no doubt posed challenges for Beijing, it was likely also perceived to present opportunities, as argued in the following.2010 Trawler IncidentWhen Hatayoma resigned in June 2010, Naoto Kan, also of the DPJ, took his place. And while China was eager to sustain positive momentum in Sino-Japanese relations, it was also “sensitive to indications that Kan was more of a China hawk than his predecessor.”69 The effort to maintain positive ties however ended with the 2010 trawler incident, which plunged bilateral relations into a deep freeze, and which Chinese analysts viewed in outsized strategic terms.The incident began when the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) arrested a Chinese trawler captain after his vessel collided with a JCG ship. Tokyo then contemplated prosecuting the captain under Japanese domestic law, a more punitive reaction relative to its previous handling of such cases. Beijing reacted with indignation, “suspend[ing] all relations between provincial and central government officials and their Japanese counterparts,”70 “halting shipments to Japan of … rare earth elements,”71 and detaining “four Japanese nationals employed by Fujita Construction.”72 Most importantly, and as illustraed in Figure 1, over the next year and a half, even before talk emerged in Tokyo of purchasing three of the S/D islands, China undertook what was at the time an unprecedented series of incursion into the waters around them.73 Over this period there were more Chinese incursions into the islands’ territorial sea (TS) than there had been over the history of the dispute stretching back to the 1970s.74 China’s conduct in this regard constituted the first time it had undertaken a concerted, if still subtle, effort to contest control of the islands themselves. As noted below, Beijing’s incursions also applied pressure on the US-Japan alliance and sowed the early seeds of intra-alliance discord.Could China’s maritime incursions not be more simply explained with reference to Japan’s unusually punitive handling of the trawler captain? While Tokyo’s conduct in this respect can certainly help explain why Beijing adopted such a combative posture during the incident itself, it cannot explain China’s continued assertiveness following the captain’s release – i.e., following the incident’s resolution. To the extent that China’s conduct was informed by Japan’s threat to prosecute the trawler captain and was intended to deter it from doing so, once Tokyo released him without prosecution, a concession characterized as “a humiliating retreat” and which effectively resolved the incident in China’s favor, Beijing’s posture should have returned to the status quo ante.75 With respect to the other punitive measures China imposed during the incident, this is precisely what occurred. Following the captain’s release, Beijing resumed high-level official intercourse with Tokyo,76 lifted its unannounced embargo on the export of rare earths,77 and released the Japanese businessmen that had been detained.78 That China’s maritime incursions continued suggests that they were animated by something other than the trawler incident itself.Chinese analysts perceived the episode as a signal event in clarifying Japan’s post-Hatoyama strategic disposition. As the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued:The boat collision was just an opportunity and excuse [for Japan] to shift policy. After the Diaoyu boat collision incident, Japan linked the territorial dispute to the security issues, exaggerating the “China threat theory,” seizing the opportunity to adjust its security policy, and strengthening the US–Japan alliance…. There was nothing left of the DPJ desire under Hatoyama for a foreign policy more independent from the United States.79Chinese officials at this time also appear to have believed that the United States was complicit in Japan’s assertive conduct. Following the captain’s release, Hu Zhengyue, an Assistant Foreign Affairs Minister, remarked, “Japanese diplomatic authorities have partnered with other nations [i.e., the United States] and stepped up the heat on the Diaoyu island issue.”80 An article appearing in Qiushi, an influential periodical published by the CCP’s Central Committee, argued, “The US exploited … the Diaoyu island incident to tighten its alliance … with Japan.”81 For Beijing, the trawler incident brought into focus in the ECS the same perceived threat that had by this time grown pronounced in the SCS. An analyst at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences argued, the United States has “sought to use problems in the SCS … ECS, and the Diaoyu Islands to enhance its ability to counter and to contain pressure stemming from China[’s rise].82 Lu Yaodong, a Japan scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), wrote that the United States was “unendingly causing trouble along China’s periphery.”83Given such a view, and because China’s maritime incursions over the next 18 months cannot be explained primarily with reference to territorial concerns, Beijing’s conduct, it stands to reason, was likely intended to address – i.e., counter – precisely this broader strategic threat perceived to be posed by the United States (and Japan). Through its incursions, China was very subtly applying pressure on the US–Japan alliance, probing for ways to expose and exploit cleavages between the allies just as they were, in Beijing’s view, working eagerly to strengthen their alliance. Beijing’s conduct increased Japanese concerns regarding the US commitment to the islands and compelled Tokyo to seek and re-seek assurances from Washington.84 Chinese incursions also alarmed the Obama administration, which made clear its desire to see “the temperature … go down on these issues.”85 To this end, Washington encouraged Tokyo “to discuss”86 the conflict with China – a proposition antithetical to Japan’s longstanding policy of refusing to acknowledge, much less discuss, its existence.87By applying pressure on the contested territories, Beijing, it appears, was beginning to use the S/D dispute to flesh out the “contradictions” perceived to characterize US strategy – i.e., although Washington was eager to tighten its alliances and support its allies vis-à-vis China, it was also eager to avoid the emergence of a potentially entangling Sino-Japanese military conflict. To the extent that the maritime incursions were intended to expose cleavages in the alliance or otherwise sow seeds of discord within it, Beijing’s conduct accords with the guidance contained in authoritative Chinese texts. A 2005 edition of Science of Military Strategy counsels to “mak[e] use of contradictions” in the “enemy’s aggression alliance,” stating that doing so is a “key of political struggle.”88 The CCP and PRC, moreover, have a deep history of “utilizing the contradictions” perceived to afflict their adversaries in order to help advance wedging goals.89Risk of conflict exists precisely because Chinese decisionmakers do not trust our position---asymmetry of interest makes it likely that small mistakes and provocations will escalate.Chong, deputy director of the Institute of Security and Arms Control Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, ‘16(Liu, “The Relationship Between Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Military Conflicts,” ) **NCC Packet 2020Changes in U.S.-China structural interdependence and in international power politics have reduced the possibility of military conflict between China and the United States. The risk of an arms race and military conflict does exist. Yet this risk is caused not by a comparison of nuclear forces between the two parties but by the lack of strategic mutual trust between them and by the nature of the Asia-Pacific security structure.With respect to an arms race, China’s military spending has significantly increased, along with the rapid development of its economic strength. However, the United States is still trying to maintain absolute military superiority over China, which is why the United States launched its Defense Innovation Initiative, also known as the Third Offset Strategy, in 2014 and is continuously strengthening its military-intervention capability. As national defense spending in China approaches the level of U.S. spending, the risk of an arms race should not be overlooked. In the context of increasingly intense U.S.-China military competition, the possibility of a conflict has significantly increased, and the risk of a conflict escalating into a military crisis has increased concurrently. With growing strategic distrust, a small incident could lead to a U.S.-China military crisis that could bring huge losses. This scenario is possible particularly because the United States has long had a great advantage over China’s conventional forces and has worked to maintain its conventional military dominance, as demonstrated by its close surveillance of Chinese naval fleet formations. If U.S. troops ignore China’s security concerns and continue to carry out high-intensity and high-frequency naval and aircraft surveillance in China’s exclusive economic zone, confrontations between U.S. and Chinese forces like the 2001 Hainan Island incident and the 2009 USNS Impeccable incident could potentially trigger a U.S.-China military crisis. Moreover, both countries have increased their investments in cyberspace and outer space; if no proper coordination is carried out in these fields, conflicts could easily occur.However, it is even more important, although China and the United States share the political desire to stabilize security relations, that other factors inevitably interfere with and undermine this process. The role of third parties in particular should not be overlooked. Japan and the Philippines have attempted to drag the United States into their disputes with China, and the United States has moderately aggravated the tensions between China and these countries with the ultimate intent of containing China. U.S. soft and hard power has declined, and with it, the United States’ ability and desire to intervene militarily in regional and global affairs have weakened. In general, one would think that the United States would not easily get involved in conflicts that are not directly related to its vital interests. However, due to global strategic needs, the U.S. military alliance system regards the maintenance of U.S. credibility and its commitments to allies to be of the utmost importance. Therefore, the United States is very likely to intervene in conflicts involving China to honor commitments to the interests of its allies. As such, a third-party crisis is harder to manage and prevent than a crisis directly between China and the United States.And even though incidents have trended downwards, China will shift back to an escalatory posture---this is part of the cycle of the dispute, recent US assurances to Japan expose greater contradictions for China to probe.Taffer, PhD, Research Analyst in the China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses, ‘19(Andrew, “Threat and opportunity: Chinese wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute,” Asian Security, February) **NCC Packet 2020Over the last several years, although China has maintained a robust presence around the S/D islands, it has not undertaken any major escalations. Beijing has rather sought to consolidate the new status quo consisting most notably of a regular Chinese presence around the islands. It might be suggested that the reason Beijing has refrained from further escalation is that, based on subsequent events, it concluded that its coercive wedging efforts failed and that it then abandoned the strategy. In 2014, President Obama became the first sitting American president to explicitly affirm that the S/D islands are covered under Article V of the MDT, and in 2015 Washington and Tokyo concluded revised bilateral defense guidelines, bolstering “cooperation around the concept of gray-zone defense.” 132 In 2017, President Trump also affirmed the US commitment in a joint communiqué with Prime Minister Abe.133Such developments amount to a degree of strategic blowback and, from Beijing’s perceptive, are certainty unfavorable. It is unconvincing, however, to suggest that on this basis the strategy has failed or been abandoned. To the contrary, they indicate that the strategy has had some success. Obama’s affirmation was clearly driven by an awareness of Tokyo’s growing unease regarding the US commitment, and the allies moved to update the terms of their defense cooperation in part out of concern that the existing guidelines may not have been up to the challenge China was posing.134After experiencing a period discord, moreover, it is to be expected that allies – particularly those of great mutual importance – would try to reassure each other and assuage their concerns. Furthermore, China’s strategy, as this article has contended, has aimed not to facilitate the rapid collapse of the US–Japan alliance but to plant seeds of uncertainty and disaffection and cultivate them over time. Chinese strategists appear to have fully understood that its efforts in this regard would progress in a non-linear fashion. As the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy states, “The struggle between containment and counter-containment…between China and the United States…is longterm and complicated. It will be difficult to avoid ‘cycles of relaxation, stimulation and relaxation.’”135It should further be noted that in terms of how Beijing views US strategy, the blowback China’s coercive conduct engendered likely had a silver lining. By tightening the US-Japan alliance (and others in the region) while continuing to pursue engagement with China, Washington’s response was, from Beijing’s perspective, not only more of the same but increasingly “contradictory.” For an actor aiming to make use of just such contradictions, this cannot be considered entirely disadvantageous. If, as argued in the following, China has scaled back the escalatory extent of its conduct in the ECS to manage its risk profile, deepening contradictions in US strategy will nevertheless continue to be viewed as a vulnerability to be exploited – particularly if Beijing has assessed that its coercive wedging efforts had some success. Far from abandoning the strategy, then, China is very likely to continue to employ it.Why, then, has Beijing recently refrained from undertaking large escalations? First, China’s recent restraint has almost certainty been intended to help mitigate the risk of a US intervention on Japan’s behalf, a possibility that Beijing must prevent if it is to successfully undermine the credibility of Washington’s commitments. It is of course to manage this risk that China has adopted a modest form of wedging and that its coercive conduct has occurred at only a low level of escalation. More generally, after several years of assertiveness in both the ECS and SCS, Beijing likely sought to manage its overall risk profile. And although it has maintained an assertive posture in the SCS, given the ambiguous American commitment to the Philippines’s offshore claims and the different occupational status of the features it has since built into islands, Beijing was electing to incur more substantial risk in the area with the lower likelihood of US intervention.Second, since 2012 Japan has refrained from the kind of escalatory conduct that has in part driven Chinese assertiveness.136 Those provocations, as we have seen, have not only been perceived by Beijing as representative of, and in part constituting, an allied containment effort, but they have also provided Beijing a plausible defensive pretext with which to muddy Washington’s assessment of the escalatory extent of China’s conduct and the degree to which it ought to support its ally. In this regard, the absence of Japanese provocations has not only limited opportunities for Beijing to combat the broader strategic threat thought to be emanating from the S/D conflict, but it has likely also decreased the perceived severity of it. Third, despite again affirming that the islets fall under the MDT, President Trump has tended to treat US alliances transactionally,137 has had public kerfuffles with allies in the region,138 and for much of his first year in office cultivated Beijing to a remarkable degree.139 Such developments almost certainty served to decrease Beijing’s perception of strategic threat.Why has Beijing not reverted back to employing another method of wedging? For one, a demonstrative wedging strategy of the kind it pursued in the early 2000s would accord uneasily with the generally assertive posture Beijing has maintained in the SCS and, indeed, it would likely make the effective execution of such a strategy impossible. Further, with Abe still at the helm, the notion that Beijing could adopt a conditioning strategy to incentivize him to abandon his long-held goal of constitutional revision or to prevent Tokyo from tightening its alliance with Washington (to say nothing of weakening it), strains the imagination.Although China has for now retrenched, assuming that, on the one hand, Washington continues to deepen its alliances in East Asia and with Tokyo in particular and that, on the other, China continues to grow in relative power such that it can increasingly afford the costs and risks associated with coercive wedging, Beijing is likely to again adopt an escalatory posture meant to sow discord between the allies. While this is a challenge to which there are no easy answers, the United States should aim to combat China’s perception of both strategic insecurity and opportunity. It should, to this end, redouble its efforts to convince Beijing that neither it nor Japan are aiming to use the S/D dispute to contain it. Washington should stress that its security commitments to Japan date to when the prospect of China’s rise was not visible on even the furthest horizon and that its obligations would obtain irrespective of structural changes in the region. Given Washington’s dismal record of reassuring Beijing of its intentions, however, this study should also add urgency to still incipient American efforts to formulate effective measures to deter Chinese coercion in its maritime disputes. To this end, the United States will need to demonstrate a greater willingness to incur risk vis-à-vis China and accept the possibility that bilateral relations with Beijing may be adversely impacted. Because this latter dimension of US strategy will likely work at cross purposes with its reassurance efforts, finding the right balance between the two will, as ever, remain the central task for US policymakers and strategists.Current U.S. commitment to the Senkakus is structurally non-credible---interest asymmetry dooms deterrence on all fronts and drives Chinese testing.Taffer 19 – Research Analyst in the China & Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses, PhD from The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityAndrew Taffer, He is the author most recently of “Threat and Opportunity: Chinese Wedging in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Conflict,” formerly served as an analyst with the Long Term Strategy Group and as a research fellow with the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, He was an International Security Program postdoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard University, 9-6-2019, "China’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands ploy to undercut the US-Japan alliance," No Publication, **NCC Packet 2020Between April and June this year, Chinese Coast Guard ships entered the contiguous zone around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea for a record 64 consecutive days. In this flashpoint area between China and Japan, the number of Chinese incursions into the islands’ territorial sea so far this year already exceeds the total number for all of 2018.While these latest incursions have occurred in the context of improving bilateral ties between China and Japan, and do not constitute or portend a major incident or crisis, it is only a matter of time until tensions spike again. Because crises over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands may carry outsize consequences for regional stability, the US-Japan alliance, and Sino-American competition, it is important to understand Beijing’s strategy.Research shows that Beijing has regularly sought to use this offshore conflict to drive a wedge into the US-Japan alliance – particularly during the major incidents over the islands in 2010, 2012, and 2013. Yet Beijing’s approach to wedging in the East China Sea has been unique.Traditionally, a country aiming to divide an alliance focuses its efforts on the alliance’s junior partner, generally the more susceptible party, as the divider seeks to induce or coerce it in ways that weaken its relationship with its patron. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict, however, China’s principal target has been the United States – the senior partner. Beijing is aware of the dramatic asymmetry in interests between the United States and Japan in the dispute, and that Washington, lacking inherent interests in the islands, is eager to avoid a potentially cataclysmic conflict with China over them. In other words, in the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict, Washington has been targeted as the more susceptible party.China has sowed discord within the US-Japan alliance and exacerbated abiding Japanese fears of US abandonment. By appealing to US interests in conflict management, crisis stability, and healthy Sino-American relations, Beijing has sought to induce and coerce the United States – and have Washington, in turn, compel Tokyo – to adopt policies inimical to the latter’s territorial interests. In so doing, China has sowed discord within the US-Japan alliance and exacerbated abiding Japanese fears of US abandonment.In this respect, far from seeking to ensure the United States does not interfere in the conflict – as Beijing’s purportedly sacrosanct policy holds – a central aspect of China’s strategy has been to involve Washington directly and robustly.In 2012–13, after raising the risk of conflict in the East China Sea by sending unprecedented numbers of ships and aircraft into the waters and airspace around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Beijing called on Washington to restrain Japan and to compel Tokyo to make concessions. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “We urge the US side to be responsible on the Diaoyu Islands issue … and take concrete actions to safeguard regional peace and stability [emphasis added].”But Beijing went further, requesting US mediation. In a high-profile speech organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a senior retired Chinese official remarked: “If the US really intends to play a neutral and constructive role, it should urge the parties to the dispute to the negotiating table and resolve the difference by peaceful means.” Adding urgency to these exhortations (and hinting at the risk of entrapment), the Chinese ambassador to the United States counselled Washington not to “lift the rock off Japan only to let it drop on its own feet.”Washington proved receptive to Beijing’s appeals. The White House urged Tokyo to offer “concessions” to Beijing while then–US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon suggested that “the parties should seek to have conversations about this through diplomatic channels,” a proposition antithetical to Tokyo’s policy of not acknowledging the dispute. It was around this time that China began to vigorously promote its concept of a “new type of great-power relations,” a broad framework for the future of US-China relations to which the Obama administration, keen to establish healthy long-term ties, was initially receptive. “Respect for core interests” was said to be the “crux” of this new framework, and in April 2013, Beijing declared for the first time that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were among its “core interests.”Beijing thus sought to link improved US-China ties to Washington’s willingness to attenuate its support for Japan’s territorial interests.The subsequent declaration of the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) by China in late 2013 over a large swath of the East China Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, was designed to set US and Japanese interests in opposition to each other. It a move only seldom noticed at the time, Beijing publicly offered to implement a long-stalled crisis-management mechanism promptly after establishing the ADIZ. Appealing to American interests in de-escalation, China’s offer was contingent on Japan de-conflicting its ADIZ with China’s, a condition Tokyo was unwilling to meet for fear of legitimising China’s territorial claims. Washington, however, was quick to endorse Beijing’s call, with vice president Joe Biden stating that the ADIZ “underscores the need for crisis-management mechanisms.” This and other episodes have led to what can be described as a “growing constituency [in Japan] that doubts the US commitment to the security guarantee”.Although US-China relations are today far from where they were during the Obama administration, Beijing can be expected to employ a broadly similar strategy against the Trump administration and others in the future. This is because no matter how antagonistic US-China relations become, there is likely to be continuity – and sustained asymmetry – in US and Japanese interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.It strains the imagination, for example, to see a future Japanese administration accommodating China in the East China Sea as, say, the Philippine’s Rodrigo Duterte has done in the South China Sea. And even if Washington becomes more willing to incur risk vis-à-vis Beijing in maritime East Asia, it will remain highly motivated to avoid being dragged into a conflict with China over eight uninhabited islets and rocks in the East China Sea.This asymmetry in US and Japanese interests is likely to continue to be exploitable and will constitute a persistent weakness in what is otherwise a strong and resilient alliance. Escalation ImpactsThose incidents will escalate to nuclear use because of strategic misperception---both sides think they have escalation dominance which means it is advantageous to use nuclear weapons early, but neither has a way to limit escalationCunningham and Fravel 19 – Cunningham is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University., Fravel is Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Fiona S. and M. Taylor, “Dangerous Confidence?” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Fall 2019), pp. 61–109 **NCC Packet 2020In this article, we have argued that China’s strategic community is relatively confident about the ability of China to avoid nuclear escalation in a conflict with the United States. The most important reason is that the members of this community believe that once nuclear weapons are used, subsequent use by either side cannot be controlled. Thus, they do not believe that a limited nuclear war would stay limited. Instead, it would likely escalate into an unlimited one. Chinese experts expect that these features of nuclear war will lead U.S. and Chinese decisionmakers to avoid any nuclear use and resolve any conflict at the conventional level. They also believe that the United States will exercise sufficient control over a crisis involving a U.S. ally or partner so that the use of nuclear weapons is not considered.China’s operational doctrine for the use of its nuclear weapons and its nuclear force structure are consistent with these views about the difficulty of controlling escalation. That is, China’s operational doctrine does not contain plans to wage a limited nuclear war, which China might pursue if it believed nuclear escalation could be controlled. The focus of China’s nuclear operations remains on how to retaliate after China is attacked with nuclear weapons to deter such attacks in the first place. Similarly, although China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding, China is not developing forces that would be optimized for use in a limited nuclear war, especially tactical nuclear weapons. The long-standing decoupling of conventional and nuclear strategy, the availability of nonnuclear strategic weapons such as cyberweapons, and the organizational biases of nuclear experts and the PLA’s missile commanders explain this relative confidence about avoiding escalation. Chinese experts likely overestimate their leaders’ ability to control escalation, because they underplay the pressures to escalate to a nuclear war that their leaders could not control—for example, if an adversary overreacts or misperceives Chinese signaling with nuclear or nonnuclear strategic weapons.Several implications follow from our analysis, all of which raise concerns about crisis stability and the ability of the United States and China to prevent nuclear escalation in a crisis between the two states. First, China’s approach to deterrence may be suboptimal—at least from the perspective of deterring either U.S. conventional strikes against its nuclear infrastructure or limited U.S. nuclear strikes against its nuclear arsenal. Although China maintains some ambiguity over whether it would respond to a conventional strike on its nuclear forces with nuclear weapons, China’s overall confidence that a U.S.- China conventional conflict would not escalate to nuclear war may reduce the effectiveness of its deterrent against this kind of attack by persuading an adversary that such strikes would not elicit nuclear retaliation. China’s confidence could even embolden an adversary to gamble that a limited nuclear first strike against China would not elicit nuclear retaliation. This, in turn, would increase the odds of such U.S. attacks and create strong pressure for China to retaliate to deter further attacks on its nuclear forces, resulting in nuclear escalation.Our research, however, does not indicate how the small size of China’s arsenal compared with that of the United States would affect its response to U.S. limited nuclear strikes. China could respond with limited nuclear retaliatory strikes; it could threaten or pursue unlimited nuclear retaliation; it could respond with nonnuclear forces; or it could respond in another way, including terminating the conflict. More research is needed to explore the relationship between the size and vulnerability of China’s arsenal and its views of nuclear escalation control. Second, the United States and China hold opposing beliefs about escalation above and below the nuclear threshold that may also contribute to instability. U.S. experts worry more than Chinese experts that the two countries might not be able to control the escalation of a conventional war to high levels of intensity, which could push a conflict over the nuclear threshold, but are more sanguine about (or at least are divided about the possibility of) controlling nuclear escalation after nuclear weapons have been used.174 This likely reflects the overwhelming superiority of U.S. nuclear forces (especially against a smaller nuclear power), decades of nuclear planning for a range of scenarios (including limited nuclear warfighting), and an emphasis on achieving dominance in conventional operations.As this article demonstrates, however, Chinese experts hold an opposing perspective. They are quite pessimistic about controlling nuclear escalation once the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been crossed. By contrast, however, they are quite confident (perhaps overly confident) about controlling conventional escalation before the nuclear threshold is crossed. As noted earlier, almost all of the available literature from Chinese military sources on escalation examines conventional escalation and not nuclear escalation. At least in the post–Cold War era, U.S. conventional operations against other militaries have emphasized seizing and exploiting air superiority, meaning that control of conventional escalation was not a concern for the United States because it had the luxury of fighting adversaries with no plausible means to escalate. Although China has not fought a war since 1979, it has engaged mostly in limited uses of force in local conflicts or displays of force and has certainly not achieved conventional dominance over an adversary to the same extent as the United States.These contrasting beliefs about the feasibility of controlling conventional and nuclear escalation suggest that a conventional conflict is more likely to escalate to high levels of intensity, increasing the chances of nuclear escalation. China, for example, could take actions it believes will deter the United States at the conventional level, only to be confronted with a U.S. desire to overmatch China in response and establish the same extent of conventional dominance that the United States has enjoyed for several decades against other adversaries.175 Yet, such actions could include steps to degrade China’s nuclear forces, either inadvertently by targeting China’s conventional missiles or intentionally to force China to either surrender or escalate to nuclear war. Those U.S. attacks might create strong pressures on China to engage in nuclear signaling or mobilization of its land-based nuclear missiles and ballistic missile submarines to protect its deterrent or even threaten nuclear use to deter further attacks on its nuclear arsenal. In response, the United States may attempt a large-scale nuclear strike to try to eliminate China’s nuclear forces or at least limit damage from China’s use of nuclear weapons. If the two countries have different views about when the natural firebreaks in a conflict will occur, they may focus on negotiating an end to the conflict at different times in this escalatory spiral and therefore miss opportunities to negotiate an end to the conflict altogether.176 In short, based on differing views about controlling escalation, escalation at both the conventional and nuclear levels may be more likely. The flip side, however, might be enhanced caution. China may anticipate U.S. efforts to escalate a conventional war to achieve conventional dominance while the United States may anticipate a disproportionate Chinese nuclear response if it were to conduct limited nuclear strikes in a conflict. Both countries may therefore be extremely cautious in a crisis or low-intensity conflict. Further, despite the views outlined above, the two countries have not always acted on their confidence about controlling conventional or nuclear escalation. Historically, China has exercised more caution (most of the time) when facing a superior adversary, based on the imperative of conserving its forces. Despite models that show U.S. nuclear superiority and the ability to limit damage using a nuclear first strike,177 U.S. leaders have appeared reluctant to accept significant nuclear risk, especially in the post–Cold War era.178Ironically, one factor that contributes to these opposing views is China’s no first-use policy. Many U.S. analysts do not believe that it is a credible pledge, because China has not stated how it plans to end a conventional war it is losing.179 China perhaps does not feel a need to reveal such plans, either because of its experience in fighting and ending limited wars without achieving its initial ambitions (in Korea and perhaps in Vietnam) or because it would not want to reveal such plans to a stronger adversary that could then exploit them. On the other hand, Chinese experts view the pledge as the guiding principle for the role of Chinese nuclear weapons in any future conflict with the United States. As they do not plan to use nuclear weapons first, even when losing, they may not explore this point in their writings. Chinese experts may also discount the likelihood that its actions in a crisis or conflict could be mistaken by the United States as preparations to use nuclear weapons first.Testing in the ECS ensures escalation is inevitable and corrodes deterrence credibility. Liff 20 – Assistant professor in Indiana University's Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies Adam P. Liff, also Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard University's Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Proactive Stabilizer: Japan's Role in the Asia-Pacific Security Order, chapter in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press): 39-78, February 2020, available at **NCC Packet 2020THE CORROSIVE EFFECT OF CHINA’S GRAY ZONE OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES Over the past decade, and with apparent impunity, China’s coercive rhetorical and physical assertion of its vast and controversial sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas has had an indirect but deeply corrosive effect on the rules-based security order, not to mention openly threatening the national security of affected countries. Beijing has relied heavily on so-called gray zone operations, which are subthreshold aggressive activities that are difficult to deter without significant escalation risks, since they constitute neither a pure peacetime nor a traditional, armed attack situation. For Japan, most provocative are the regular operations of the increasingly robust (and militarized) China Coast Guard (CCG) near the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese; below, the Senkakus).27 Since September 2012, larger and more capable CCG vessels frequently enter the Senkakus’ contiguous zone and conduct regular “presence” missions in the islands’ territorial sea to coercively challenge Japan’s decades-old effective administrative control.28 Beyond the gray zone, China’s “maritime advance” and increasing scope of its naval and air force operations place further pressure on Japan. For example, Japan’s annual scrambles of Japan Air SDF fighters against approaching Chinese planes nearly tripled between 2012 and 2017, when the frequency reached a record high of 851.29 Accordingly, nearly three dozen pages of Japan’s 2017 defense white paper discuss concerns about Beijing’s capabilities and operations, such as its “attempts to change the status quo by coercion.”30Beijing’s East China Sea maritime gray zone operations appear intended to probe, or take advantage of, a perceived “seam” in Article V of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which refers only to an “armed attack” situation. In addition to asserting its sovereignty claim, China’s actions also seem aimed at undermining Washington’s obligations by trying to establish a perception of “shared administrative control.” They also may be intending to exploit political and legal constraints on Japan’s Coast Guard (JCG) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), as well as a general and longstanding reluctance on Japan’s part to use kinetic force in situations outside of an armed attack against Japan.31 As these operations have been ongoing since late 2012, China appears to have concluded it can assert its claim coercively through these subthreshold operations with relative impunity.32 Beijing’s decision to limit its conspicuous coercion vis-à-vis the Senkakus to gray zone operations reveals how its activities are corrosive to the security order: not directly challenging it, but simultaneously undermining it in a manner that is also difficult to deter—by staying below the level of armed attack (buryoku kōshi, use of orce) prohibited by the UN Charter. It further highlights the severity of the challenge that these activities take place while the PLA operates over the horizon, occasionally engages in provocative maneuvers and actions in international waters and Japan’s contiguous zone, and is set to grow increasingly capable and active in the years ahead.SolvencyPlan shifts to a more credible and effective deterrent posture---strategy premised on Chinese aggression leads to escalation---the aff reinforces core commitments and existing capabilities solve.Shifrinson 20 – PhD, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Fredrick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, BUJoshua, “The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 43 **NCC Packet 2020These results are especially important for ongoing debates surrounding American foreign policy and efforts to address China’s rise. Over the last several years, a growing consensus in US strategic circles holds that China is a ‘revisionist’ power that can only be addressed through the firm application of American power and resolve.126 Reflecting this calculation, and as noted, the United States is adding to its military presence in East Asia, cultivating new allies and fostering intra-regional diplomatic ties, and working to limit Chinese access to sensitive economic and technological markets.127 In contrast, the argument developed in this article proposes that the United States would be better served adapting to China’s own incentives to cooperate or compete as defined by trends in the distribution of power.As noted earlier, there are two possible pathways – China as supporter of the United States, and China pursuing a mixed strategy – that China may go down if and as power continues to shift in its favour. Just as the first scenario represents the outcome most at odds with conventional thinking surrounding China’s rise, so too does it require the most strategic adjustment by the United States. To catalyse and reinforce Chinese-American partnership, US leaders would be well-advised to underscore the United States’ value to a rising China, especially its ability to assist China against other threats. This requires the United States to minimise rather than reinforce its challenge to China to avoid undercutting China’s incentives for support, while communicating its interest in US-Chinese partnership. Key elements of existing US strategy in Asia might therefore have to change – including efforts to commit additional US forces to the Asia-Pacific region and to foster a nascent anti-China coalition – to avoid needlessly upsetting US-Chinese relations, courting insecurity spirals and forestalling potential cooperative opportunities. Put differently, the United States’ current approach is potentially valuable if the United States is interested in deterring or containing China, but would diminish China’s incentive to pursue support by mitigating the United States’ geographic advantages and reifying the image of a hostile United States.128Instead, a less robust US security presence in Asia would simultaneously remind China’s leaders of the reasons the United States is an attractive partner and signal that it might embrace deeper forms of US-Chinese cooperation. This drawdown could be coupled with steps to distance the United States from other prospective threats to China. Not only would such distancing restore flexibility to US diplomacy, but it could reduce the threat posed to China by the United States relative to other regional actors and so reinforce China’s incentive to see the United States as a potential partner. Furthermore, it would undermine charges mooted in Chinese strategic discussions that the United States is organising other Asian actors against China, thereby upping the likelihood that China’s leaders see the United States as a potential partner.129 American diplomacy, meanwhile, could use bilateral and multilateral forums to communicate the United States’ desire to engage the PRC on China’s own terms while underlining the concessions the United States expects in exchange. American policy, in sum, would be oriented towards minimising the US threat to China to catalyse and reinforce China’s incentives to cooperate. This might generate uncertainty and discontent among other states (e.g., Japan, India) in the region, suggesting the United States was ganging up with China at others’ expense. Nevertheless, the approach could create conditions for the United States to unilaterally extract strategic concessions from a rising China.130However, the second scenario – China pursuing a mixed strategy – argues strongly for the United States to reinforce acquisition of military capabilities to deter or defeat Chinese aggrandisement. Prima facie, this might seem to call for the assertive strategy aimed at containing China by creating a robust coalition of allies backed with a large and forward-deployed military presence that many US policymakers appear to envision. However, retaining the ability to militarily defeat or deter China and threatening to impose costs in response to Chinese aggrandisement need not mean an expansive and open-ended arms build-up or coalition-building exercise. Rather, such an effort could otherwise involve retaining the ability to surge forces into Asia amid a crisis, moving offshore and imposing costs from afar (such as with a blockade), or positioning tripwire forces around a security perimeter while preparing to mobilise should China cross that theoretical line. The key, in other words, is that US leaders reinforce steps to acquire military forces able to harm an increasingly potent China while cultivating only those partnerships deemed necessary to operate these assets.131 Along the way, US leaders would need to carefully delineate core American interests and underline American resolve; by extension, efforts to conciliate China would be curtailed to make US deterrent efforts more credible. The goal, in sum, would be to underscore the United States’ ability to penalise Chinese aggrandisement at the United States’ expense.Yet irrespective of which scenario comes to pass, the United States should have significant latitude in its fate. Ultimately, China will remain constrained for the indefinite future in its ability to inaugurate a predatory challenge to the United States. By playing to its military and security advantages, and considering these advantages in light of what China’s own strategic landscape entails, the United States should be able to forestall Chinese predation and may be able to facilitate Chinese support. Though analysts understandably worry that a rising China will seek to push the United States into the dustbin of history, balance of power logic suggests this outcome is less likely than many scholars and policymakers expect. Facing the rise of China and concomitant decline of the United States, American strategists should be cautiously optimistic: the United States is playing a strong hand and should recognise as much. Japan Assurance DA AnswersAlliance Resilient---2ACUS-Japan alliance is resilient—nonmilitary aspects and empirics show the alliance has made it over hurdlesDaniel Russel 19, Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI). Previously he served as a Diplomat in Residence and Senior Fellow with ASPI for a one year term. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service at the U.S. Department of State, he most recently served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (“The U.S.-Japan Alliance and America First: Coping with Change in the Indo-Pacific”, Asia Society Policy Institute, ) **NCC Packet 2020These measures have incalculably improved and expanded our ability to work together on security and on other strategic issues. But it’s not just security: it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that the U.S. and Japan have much more than a military alliance. Broadly speaking, we have a political and an economic alliance as well. On the economic front, it is true that the current administration’s threat (and use) of tariffs against Japan has created considerable resentment. But despite that, the two governments did ultimately manage to resurrect many of the agricultural provisions of TPP in their recent bilateral trade deal and, more significantly, they reached agreement on a digital trade agreement that marks an important step in setting high-standard open internet rules. That’s a good thing. Trump became the first head of state to meet with the new Emperor in the Reiwa era. That’s a good thing. Today, there is still strong public support in the two countries for the Alliance, and continued positive public attitudes towards the other nation – that’s a good thing – even though the annual Pew survey shows that Japanese confidence in the U.S. president plummeted from 78% in 2016 to 30% in the most recent poll. And of course, it’s widely perceived that Prime Minister Abe has pretty deftly avoided many of the pitfalls of dealing with Donald Trump, and deflected a number of potential threats to Japan’s interests…albeit not without some cost to his dignity. Of course, it remains to be seen how Abe’s skill in damage control will fare in the upcoming negotiations over Host Nation Support. Judging by recent press reports that Trump’s opening bid is a five-fold increase, I guess the Tokyo Olympics aren’t the only games we’re going to be watching closely next year. Overall, though, I think that an objective assessment of the Alliance Partnership shows that while there are tensions and clearly some high hurdles ahead, it remains multifaceted and it retains deep roots; it has a number of attributes that gives it resilience and enhances its effectiveness; it has become steadily stronger and more balanced in many key respects; and lastly, that there are powerful geostrategic imperatives – such as the behavior of a rising China – that increase our reliance on one another.Thumpers---2ACCOVID, Korean peninsula, and Trump all thump assuranceKathrin Hille 20, Edward White in Wellington, Primrose Riordan in Hong Kong and John Reed in Bangkok, Financial Times (“The Trump factor: Asian allies question America’s reliability”, Financial Times, June 2020, **NCC Packet 2020Ever since Mr Trump was elected, Washington’s long-term allies in Asia have worried about whether his transactional approach to foreign policy would lead to their interests being sidelined. But incidents such as the president’s stand-off with South Korea have only magnified those concerns.At a time when Washington’s response to coronavirus has been heavily criticised and American society is engulfed in a debate about racial injustice, the dispute with Seoul reflects widening cracks in the entire US-built security order which has kept the peace in the region for the past 70 years — cracks that have been opened by the rapid rise of China, but which have been exacerbated by a lack of US leadership.Although South Korea is where Mr Trump’s “America First” worldview has had the biggest impact, Washington’s other Asia-Pacific allies such as Japan and Australia worry that the US, the regional hegemon for most of the past century, is less committed to and less capable of protecting them than in the past. With China using its economic and military clout in increasingly aggressive ways against its neighbours, that concern is turning into alarm.“Several countries in Asia have concerns about aligning themselves with a US that seems less predictable and not reliable,” says Bonnie Glaser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the US think-tank. “If Trump is voted out in [presidential elections in] November, there will be a sigh of relief across the region.”But Washington’s allies have doubts about US support that go well beyond the Trump[marked] administration. “The reasons are our diplomatic attention span and our military capabilities,” she says.While Washington’s ties with Europe and Nato have also frayed, including the potential withdrawal of many of the troops in Germany, the risks are greater in Asia, where global trade routes thread through dangerous flashpoints including North Korea, the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, in addition to India’s tensions with both China and Pakistan.At the same time as allies are questioning Washington’s reliability, there are new signs that the US is losing its long-held military supremacy. Beijing’s growing number of intermediate-range missiles means that America’s traditional way of projecting power in the region — through aircraft and ships deployed in big bases — has in some cases become too risky.The US military demonstrated as much in April when it ended 16 years of continuous bomber presence in Guam. Since 2004, it had been sending heavy and stealth bombers from the island through the US Pacific territory, from where they could be in the East China Sea, in Taiwan or in the South China Sea within four hours.Now, they will operate from home bases in the mainland US — a change the US Strategic Command says would make the force more resilient and unpredictable.“It is an answer to the ‘Guam killer’, and it is the right decision,” says a military official from a US ally in the region, referring to China’s DF-26 intermediate-range missile which can hit Guam from bases in the country. He added that spreading out forces and weapons and moving them around irregularly would make it more difficult and expensive for China to target them. “But of course the immediate political signal people here will pick up is that the US is weakened.”The same applies to aircraft carriers, which have been a key tool of US power projection. “They could become a dinosaur,” says Yoichi Funabashi, chairman of the Asia Pacific Initiative, a Tokyo think-tank which organises exchanges between US and Japanese military officials. “Covid-19 has demonstrated how vulnerable US aircraft carriers are,” he adds, stressing that when the outbreak of the virus forced all four carriers in the region to stay in port, no US carrier was available in the western Pacific.Washington’s difficulties in handling coronavirus have shaken confidence more broadly. The US is not addressing the pandemic as effectively or as strongly as expected from an economic, military and technological power, says Jay Batongbacal, director of the University of the Philippines’ Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea. “You can say that the armour has been tarnished, and everyone can see that.”A2AD Turn---2ACThe aff solves by incentivizing a shift to Japanese A2/AD –increases stability and is a more effective deterrent to Chinese territorial expansion – Japan has sufficient investment it just needs the plans incentive Gholz et al., PhD, associate professor, political science, University of Notre Dame, served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, chair of the international security section of the International Studies Association, ‘19(Eugene, Benjamin Friedman & Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect US Allies in Asia,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32) **NCC Packet 2020China’s capability has vastly increased, but its ability to conquer states across water remains limited. If the United States and its allies invest in their own A2/AD capabilities—counterparts to the Chinese capabilities that the US military itself says are extremely effective against US sophisticated weapons—China’s offensive potential will remain limited for many years to come.41Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are wealthy and technologically proficient states perfectly placed to capitalize on A2/AD technology to defend against any attempted Chinese conquest. As islands or peninsulas that must defend coastlines, East Asian states get special utility out of defensive military technology. These states do not need forces and weapons that mimic the US military. Their forces simply have to make the cost of aggression prohibitive for China and other potential rivals.Japan already maintains a qualitatively superior force that far outstrips China in submarine, anti-submarine, mining, and missile capabilities, backed up by a sophisticated network of sensors and a geographical position that allows it to straddle major chokepoints for the Chinese navy.42 It has long invested heavily in naval assets to defend its coast. And its GDP per capita remains about four times larger than China’s, providing it considerable capacity to ramp up spending in the event of a massive emergency, like a Chinese campaign of territorial aggression.43Japan has recently increased its investment in mobile missile systems deployed in the Ryukyu Islands in the East China Sea, a nascent modern A2/AD capability.44 Unfortunately, as MIT experts Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels explain, much of Japan’s defense budget is still devoted to a “forward defense strategy” built on fighter aircraft, destroyers, and ground forces.45 Japan has also begun exploring a greater long-range missile strike capability as a means of preemptively threatening North Korea’s ability to launch ballistic missiles or retaliating against China—an investment that potentially looks like offensive defense.46 Finally, Japan has not fully stocked the munitions needed to use its anti-ship, anti-missile, and anti-aircraft systems in an extended campaign.47Taiwan is more vulnerable.48 As an island, Taiwan has defensive advantages that make conquest difficult, but if China attacked Taiwan, its nearness to the island would enable China’s weapons to enjoy the benefit of home—larger ammunition stores, protection from strikes, better coordination, and short flight times.49 China’s missiles could destroy most fixed targets in Taiwan, including search radars, and seriously impede the operation of Taiwan’s air force.On the other hand, Taiwan is large enough to drive mobile missile systems around and rugged enough to hide weapons from enemy surveillance and strike systems.50 Taiwan also produces a modern anti-ship missile deployable on trucks or small ships that can likely evade Chinese attacks on fixed targets.Even while its defense budget has remained flat in recent years, Taiwan has developed, with some US encouragement, a sea-control strategy centered on expensive ships and aircraft meant to win battles with China off and above Taiwan’s shores—mirroring the United States’ offensive-defense posture rather than emphasizing a more prudent defensive defense.51 This strategy is not an efficient way to spend a limited defense budget. Instead, Taiwan could spend its money on relatively inexpensive, high-quality A2/AD capabilities, including ones of indigenous design and manufacture. Taiwan could also significantly expand its deployments of radar decoys and other inexpensive equipment to make it harder for Chinese stand-off weapons to weaken Taiwan's contested zone.The US military could contribute to Taiwan’s wartime defense through a more operationally defensive posture that would limit exposure to China’s A2/AD systems. In a potential war, seaborne American anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems could cover Taiwan from locations east of the island—and out of China’s A2/AD envelope. More important, in peacetime, the Unites States’ backstop would help ensure that Taiwan, which is much smaller economically than China, would not be overwhelmed in a conventional arms race.The US military could contribute to Taiwan’s defense through a more operationally defensive posture.The United States can use its weapons export policies and diplomatic sway over allies to push them to accelerate their adoption of A2/AD technologies. That push would involve shifting money out of programs focused on developing expeditionary or offensive military capability. Instead, the emphasis, which is most pressing for Taiwan, should be on having the allies buy redundant sensor capability that fully exploits decoys and other concealment techniques, robust data fusion capabilities that can maintain the ability to find and target Chinese attackers even when operating under wartime duress, plentiful mobile anti-ship cruise missile and surface-to-air missile systems, and hardened communications systems.We are not the only defense analysts to push the idea that the United States should encourage Asian allies to improve their A2/AD capabilities. But few have advanced that goal as a way to shift US force posture in Asia, as we do here. One reason to insist on that second step is that it provides a major—perhaps even necessary—incentive for allies to overcome their bureaucratic resistance and make the needed shift in their defense procurement. Moreover, without a major change in its own defense posture, the United States would miss the opportunity to enjoy cost savings and to reduce tensions with China. Indeed, encouraging allied A2/AD investments without changing the way the US military operates could increase US defense spending, as a recent report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments advocates.52Restoring a Traditional Alliance PostureTo encourage US allies to transition to a more defensive defense posture in Asia, the United States should first convey its plans and reasoning to them. US diplomats should explain US interests in the region and the US desire to limit the cost of defending Asian states and to avoid conflict with China. Diplomats should press allies to invest in A2/AD technologies at the expense of force-projection capability. The United States can incentivize allies to make the transition by paying for some of their acquisition of A2/AD-compliant defensive capabilities. The dollars for this will come by reducing funding for US offensive capabilities in East Asia, whose utility will diminish as allies become better able to resist Chinese aggression.US partners must step up to have a sustainable defense against a potential Chinese threat over the coming decades. This means restoring a more traditional alliance, where the burden is balanced: US power should back up junior partners that have the wealth and capability to hold their own front line, while allies develop operational concepts that do not simply delay until more US troops arrive, but instead try to defend without them.53 To spur change in the actions of Asian partners, the US military should shift away from a forward-defense doctrine that requires spending more and more to operate safely in the teeth of China’s defenses. The goal should be to create a fortified A2/AD zone on both sides of the seas inside Asia’s first island chain—what would be a “no man’s sea” in wartime. To contribute, the US military could develop advanced mobile anti-air and anti-ship missiles, which have not been emphasized in US acquisition planning for decades. These new weapons would be mostly aimed for export to Asian allies.The goal should be to create a fortified A2/AD zone inside Asia’s first island chain.Concurrently, the defensive defense approach would reduce the need to invest so much in speculative technologies like hypersonic weapons that are intended to be able to strike targets—notably mobile Chinese A2/AD systems—before they can move out of the way. It would also alleviate some of the burden of developing high-end ship defense systems, freeing up funds to support the allies’ A2/AD defenses.A Safer WorldThe great power advantages that the United States enjoyed against all rivals in the post-Cold War world were always bound to erode as other states grew wealthier and sought the ability to avoid being coerced. That is no great tragedy for US security, but the scramble to preserve dominance at all costs could be. By seeking total dominance over all states, even in the skies above them and in their territorial waters, the United States makes needless trouble for itself.The quest for dominance surrenders the blessings that geography and status quo interests bestow on the United States. It makes the United States pay the growing cost of maintaining an offensive edge as the relative advantages of defense grow. The offensively-oriented dominance approach comes with a growing price tag, diminishing effectiveness, and rising tension with China.Those ills are avoidable. The United States can secure its allies, partners, and interests in East Asia, even if no one dominates the contested zones between China and its island neighbors. Letting other states bear the cost of being their own first line of defense will not only lower US costs, it will limit tensions in East Asia. Washington should remember that its strategic goals are defensive, and the United States should adjust its military posture to match that reality.The aff produces precisely this change – leverages Japanese fears to increase burden sharing – results in greater Japanese responsibility but reduces entrapmentAtanassova-Cornelis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations of East Asia at the Department of Politics, University of Antwerp, and Sato, Dean of International Cooperation and Research and Professor in the College of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Japan, ‘19(Elena and Yoichiro, “The US-Japan Alliance Dilemma in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Rationales and Scope,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol 54) **NCC Packet 2020This article has examined US and Japanese responses to the alliance dilemma, notably the dynamics of abandonment and entrapment, and the impact of these responses on the evolution of the alliance’s rationales and scope. The changes in the alliance are taking place in times of a global power shift – a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, and China’s regional challenge to the US’ security dominance in the Asia-Pacific.The PRC’s economic growth and military modernisation have presented the alliance with a complex challenge. On one hand, the economic interdependence among the US, China, and Japan has reached a level at which a trade war would significantly hurt them all. On the other hand, the PRC’s military modernisation has threatened the present US dominance in the Western Pacific, under which Japan has enjoyed its security and economic growth. Although US accommodation of China’s security interests, especially in the maritime domain, may be possible, such prospects, including the role of Japan in such an arrangement, remain unclear.To some extent, Washington benefits from this uncertainty, which it has sought to maintain. A US fully committed to Japanese security would encourage Japanese free-riding or possible US entrapment in a Sino-Japanese conflict. A fully accommodating US, allowing the PRC to play a regional leadership role in Asia, would end up pitting China against Japan, inviting instability and a possible weakening of Tokyo’s alliance commitments. In the short to medium term, neither outcome would be in US interests. In the foreseeable future, Washington will continue to welcome Tokyo’s upgraded defence cooperation and move towards a more mutual alliance, extending, in return, its security guarantees to Japan, albeit in a sufficiently ambiguous way so as to avoid undesirable consequences in its relations with either Tokyo or Beijing.For Japan, as its threat perceptions have increasingly converged with those of the US (on China and North Korea), abandonment concerns have become more dominant over entrapment concerns. Tokyo’s abandonment anxieties remain subtle and increasingly tied to policies that enhance the alliance in the short term. Japan seeks to prevent abandonment through gains-maximisation, namely, increased burden-sharing, by strengthening the SDF’s defence responsibilities in the framework of the bilateral alliance, and extending support for various regional minilateral configurations that include the US and other like-minded nations.From a US perspective, the alliance’s ‘globalisation’ in scope and missions is in line with America’s broader concerns associated with the changing global order. In this regard, Washington sees Tokyo’s alliance efforts as supporting the US global position. At the same time, Japan is steadily preparing for abandonment by the US through risk-reduction measures, which include increased defence self-reliance, and pursuit of alignments with America’s allies or partners in the Asia-Pacific. In this sense, while Tokyo’s hedging has contributed to the expansion of the alliance’s scope and enhancement of bilateral operational coordination with the US, it has contemporaneously paved the way for Japan’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in the long term.That produces the most stable and responsible posture Eric Heginbotham is a principal research scientist at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a specialist in Asian security issues, and Richard J. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018, Active Denial, International Security, Vol. 42, No. 4 **NCC Packet 2020Alliances and commitments carry costs and risks as well as benefits. To a significant extent, those risks vary with the choice of military strategy. A Japanese denial strategy would lessen the potential for moral hazard—risky actions by Tokyo that exploit the sharing of potential costs. Given the limited nature of power projection in the approach we have outlined, an active denial strategy will signal Japan’s status quo objectives and should reassure its adversaries, the United States, and its own public that Tokyo will not initiate aggressive conflict. Indeed, public understanding of (and open insistence on) the defensive nature of strategy might render a larger Japanese defense effort more palatable. A less brittle (or more resilient) force posture that is primarily defensively oriented also increases crisis stability and reduces first-mover advantages and crisis instability.Japanese denial works with a range of U.S. military strategies, but works better with some than others. Given the evolving balance of power, the most effective U.S. military strategy would include a phased approach to military operations, under which the United States would pursue a denial strategy similar to Japan’s during the initial period of conflict before transitioning to more traditional operations as reinforcements arrive and Chinese inventories of long-range missiles are exhausted. Collectively, the alliance must maintain a counterattack capability that can recapture lost territory, but it does not necessarily require the ability to penetrate Chinese airspace on a grand scale to attack targets on the mainland. Nor does it require that offensive capability be available in Asia for immediate use. Maintaining counterattack capability farther offshore will also work to keep it secure from preemptive attack. Hence, this phased approach not only is efficacious for deterrence, but also diminishes first-strike incentives.ONLY the plan can get Japan to strike the right balance. BUT, it absolutely WILL NOT spur Japan to be aggressive.Klingner 9/11 – Senior Research Fellow for NEA, HeritageBruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation, U.S.–Japan Alliance Remains Insufficient Against Growing Chinese Military Threat, 11 September 2020, **NCC Packet 2020The U.S. and Japan need to bring the full potential of their alliance on the China challenge. Right now it is underperforming. It is not that Japan lacks defense capabilities, but that Japan lacks the political willingness to employ them, even in the encompassing framework of its security alliance with the United States. Japan’s security posture evolves in fits and starts and often only in response to a shock such as a strong U.S. criticism or a catalytic event that brings about a belated response to a growing threat.Despite Prime Minister Abe’s prodigious efforts to advance his country’s security posture, Japan remains tightly restricted to security operations that are strictly defensive in nature and based on a core national principle of pacifism. Much of the populace remains deeply suspicious of the use of the military as a policy instrument and fearful that any easing of the innumerable constraints will let slip the dogs of war.Japan is very risk and casualty averse, which will prevent Japanese involvement in kinetic military operations outside its own defense such as U.N. or international peacekeeping operations. It will remain a middle security power that relies on a strong alliance with the U.S. while increasing its networking with regional democracies.The challenge for U.S. policymakers and alliance managers will be to find the delicate balance of continually pushing Tokyo past its comfort zone while understanding the many constitutional, legal, budgetary, and societal restrictions that hinder Japan’s ability to become a stronger alliance partner.The plan allows the US to leverage Japanese abandonment fears---fosters burden sharing on our terms and restrains provocative behavior.Jerdén 18 – PhD, Head of the Asia Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. has been a visiting fellow at National Chengchi University, National Taiwan University and Harvard University(Bj?rn, “Misperceptions of Abandonment in the U.S.–Japan Alliance,” in Assessing the U.S. Commitment to Allies in Asia and Beyond, The German Marshall Fund, Asia Program, No. 11) **NCC Packet 2020Abandonment fears matter a lot to the U.S.–Japan alliance. Due to worries about U.S. abandonment, Japanese attempts at greater autonomy are discouraged, while security reforms supported by Washington are encouraged. This is not a story about American winners and Japanese losers, however, as growing numbers of Japan’s political elites share this agenda, and thus also benefits from Japanese abandonment fears. Because of the critical importance that the alliance has for the United States, worries about abandonment seem overstated. The alliance is asymmetrical in military capabilities — but not in the value that the partners receive from it.Despite being the militarily much stronger partner, the United States, in other words, needs Japan as much as Japan needs the United States. We should therefore perhaps hesitate to fully see Japan’s fear of abandonment as a rational response to objective alliance dynamics. Rather, it could be understood as a factor that allows the United States — and certain factions in Japanese politics — to gain the upper hand in alliance bargaining. Experienced alliance managers are unexpectedly fully aware of the crucial role played in the alliance by not only the balance of power, but also the balance of expectations. Richard Armitage, for example, says, “…the fact of the matter is we cannot want this security relationship with Japan more than they want it. We can’t. We can’t sustain that.”17 One U.S. objective thus becomes to convince the Japanese that the Americans want the security relationship less than the Japanese want it. This can be done two ways, either by increasing the Japanese desire for the alliance, or alternatively, by making them believe that the Americans want the alliance less than they actually do.Implications for the Future of the AllianceIf the risk of U.S. abandonment of Japan is smaller than commonly believed a number of policy implications result.First, the alliance appears even more robust than what many people seem to believe. Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific evidently confirm the strength of the alliance on a regular basis. If abandonment is less likely than professed by many observers, then this political rhetoric seems more credible yet. For instance, warnings in recent years that Japan needs to step up its international profile in order to save the health of the relationship seem exaggerated.18 Nevertheless, doubts about the strength of U.S. commitments make the alliance even stronger, as they contribute to policies that tie Japan even closer to the United States. So those who wish for an even deeper alliance would actually be wise to continue downplaying its durability. Second, Asian doubts about U.S. credibility are sometimes portrayed as a problem for Washington. If regional states were to start preparing for a U.S. withdrawal from the region, it could indeed generate substantial difficulties for U.S. strategy. At least in the case of Japan, however, such concerns are mostly positive for the United States since they feed into abandonment fears that work to the benefit of Washington in alliance bargaining. Therefore, it is not impossible that Trump’s loud criticism of Japan during last year’s campaign might have strengthened U.S. influence in the alliance. Though one should not take this approach too far or Japan might decide that a strategy of self-reliance is the safest bet for its future security.Third, Japan could likely get away with more behavior at odds with U.S. interests than what many Japanese believe. During the now dissolved Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) Hatoyama Yukio’s turbulent time as prime minster (2009–2010), for example, it was suggested that a failure of Japan to fall in line would lead the United States to reconsider the strategic role of the alliance.19 The argument of this paper, by implication, instead suggests that even if the DPJ government had pushed through with more of its independence-seeking campaign promises, the U.S. government would not have scaled down on its commitments. The same logic could be applied to other issues as well, such as disagreements about how to remember the wartime past of Imperial Japan. Policymakers in Japan who value the alliance, but at the same advocate more autonomous policies, could thus probably be bolder in pushing their agenda without hurting U.S. commitments.Japan: NegGeneral Defense: Alliance Theory A2: Entanglement---1NCEntanglement theory is false AND alliances prevent interventions ---over 60 year period, US had sixty alliances, but only 5 episodes of entanglement happened---most of the time allies restrain US---entanglement theory commits errors, exaggerate fearBeckley 15 [Michael Beckley is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7–48, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00197] **NCC Packet 2020The results of this analysis strongly support freedom of action theory. Over a sixty-two-year period in which the United States maintained more than sixty alliances, I find only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement—the 1954 and 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, the Vietnam War, and the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Even these cases are far from clear-cut, because in each there were other important drivers of U.S. involvement; U.S. policymakers carefully limited support for allies; allies restrained the United States from escalating its involvement; the United States deterred adversaries and allies from escalating the conflict; or all of the above. To be sure, the United States has intervened on the side of allies on numerous occasions. In most cases, however, U.S. actions were driven by an alignment of interests between the United States and its allies, not by alliance obligations. In fact, in many cases, U.S. policymakers were the main advocates of military action and cajoled reluctant allies to join the fight. In addition, there are many cases in which alliances restrained the United States, or in which the United States restrained its allies or sidestepped costly commitments. I examine only cases of military conflict and therefore cannot evaluate fully the prevalence of such cases of nonconflict. Even within my biased sample, however, there are at least four cases in which alliances prevented U.S. escalation, and another seven cases in which the United States reneged on security commitments, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or both At worst, therefore, alliances have had a mixed effect on U.S. involvement in military conflicts—some alliances at some times have encouraged U.S. military involvement; others have discouraged it; and some have simply been ignored by U.S. policymakers. The only way to build a powerful case for entanglement theory is to commit serious methodological errors. For example, one could spin correlation as causation by characterizing cases in which the United States backed allies for self-interested reasons as cases of entanglement. One also could select on the dependent variable by highlighting evidence of entanglement while ignoring instances in which the United States shirked alliance commitments or in which alliances restrained the United States or prevented con?icts from breaking out in the first place. Such practices are common in the existing literature, but they are flawed and feed an exaggerated fear of entangling alliances in American society. The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension. For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to de?ne national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry. A2: Entanglement---2NCEntanglement is wrong---allies restrain the US and alt causes to US draw in---allies stopped Korean war, crises in Laos and Berlin---history proves allies keep troops at home, and empirics show risk is manageable Beckley 15 [Michael Beckley is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7–48, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00197] **NCC Packet 2020Conclusion American concerns about entangling alliances are as old as the Republic itself. During the post–World War II era, however, there have been only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement, and even these cases are questionable. The case in which alliance obligations had the largest impact on U.S. decisionmaking (the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis) entailed minimal military action, and the case that entailed the most military action (the Vietnam War) contained only a marginal role for alliance politics in U.S. decisionmaking. In the other three cases (the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo), both the effect of alliance obligations on U.S. policy and the costs suffered by U.S. forces were moderate. And beyond these cases, entanglement was virtually nonexistent in U.S. foreign policy. Against this limited evidence of entanglement are numerous cases in which alliances restrained the United States. Allies dissuaded the United States from escalating the Korean War and crises in Laos and Berlin, and struggled in vain to prevent the United States from entering or escalating other conflicts, the 2003 Iraq War being only the latest major example. Indeed, instances of alliance-induced restraint are evident even within the five cases of entanglement discussed above: in the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis, concerns about European alliances discouraged U.S. policymakers from bombing the Chinese mainland and publicly committing to defend Jinmen and Mazu; in the Vietnam War, allies impeded U.S. entry into the war and then repeatedly im plored the United States to get out; and in Bosnia and Kosovo, U.S. allies initially restrained the United States from lashing out violently and then provided all of the NATO ground forces and most of the postcon?ict peacekeepers for the eventual operations. There also are several cases in which the United States sidestepped inconvenient alliance commitments, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or openly sided against an ally—and this list could probably be expanded by looking within other cases, including the ?ve ostensible cases of entanglement. As explained earlier, the United States blatantly retracted a pledge to Taiwan to defend Jinmen and Mazu in 1955, refused to save the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, delegated ground operations and most of the postconflict peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo to allies, and waited for eight months and the receipt of private security assurances before responding militarily to China’s provocative behavior near Taiwan in 1995–96. In sum, the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is real but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies firmly in the hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders’ perceptions of the nation’s core interests. When the United States has overreached militarily, the main cause has not been entangling alliances but rather what Richard Betts calls “self-entrapment”—the tendency of U.S. leaders to define national interests expansively, to exaggerate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention.188 Developing a disciplined defense policy therefore will require the emergence of prudent leadership, the development (or resurrection) of guidelines governing the use of force,189 the establishment of domestic institutional constraints on the president’s authority to send U.S. forces into battle, or some combination of these.190 Scrapping alliances, by contrast, would simply unleash the United States to act on its interventionist impulses while leaving it isolated diplomatically and militarily. To be sure, certain alliances may need to be revised or dissolved as circumstances change. Past performance is no guarantee of future results, and U.S. entanglement risk may shift over time. For example, China’s development of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities may substantially increase the risks to the United States of maintaining alliance commitments in East Asia.191 Conversely, U.S. allies may be able to use similar capabilities to defend themselves and thereby allow the United States to maintain alliance commitments while limiting risks to U.S. forces.192 This study does not account for such emerging trends and, therefore, cannot rule out the possibility that the U.S. alliance network will need to be revised in the future. What this study does suggest, however, is that such revisions should be modest. The historical record shows that allies often help keep U.S. troops at home not only by bearing some of the burden for U.S. wars, but also by encouraging the United States to stay out of wars altogether. Large-scale retrenchment would sacrifice these and other benefits of alliances while doing little to compel U.S. leaders to define national interests modestly or choose military interventions selectively. How to accomplish those goals will continue to be the subject of debate, but those debates will be more productive if they focus on domestic culprits rather than foreign friends.A2: Alliance Causes Chinese Aggression---1NCThe aff has it backwards – china loves the alliance – it checks back Japan---China doesn’t want a nuclear japan and recognizes that US alliance maintains thatGlassman 18 [Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Tama University Center for Rule Making Strategies in Japan, and a senior advisor at Pacific Forum International, a Honolulu-based think tank; he previously served there as executive director for 16 years. He was a member of?The Japan Times?editorial board from 1991 to 2001 and continues to serve as a contributing editor there, “Japan’s Disarmament Tightropes and Triangulation, Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia book, 1/2/18, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020Japan’s nuclear policies and their inconsistencies are largely irrelevant to its relationship with China. For Beijing, Japan’s quest for disarmament is hypocritical since Tokyo enjoys the benefits conferred by the US nuclear umbrella; an irritant (Japan suspended aid to China after its last nuclear test in 1995); or a point of convergence: Beijing is committed to nuclear disarmament but it is waiting for the US and Russia to reduce their arsenals to levels equal to that of China before it considers shrinking its own stock of nuclear weapons. China acknowledges that the US extended deterrent has prevented Japan from going nuclear and thus serves Chinese interests. A2: Alliance Causes Chinese Aggression---2NCChina loves the alliance – it ‘holds the cork’ on Japanese capabilities ---it prevents Japan from developing a stronger military and nukes which China would hate Vogel 19 [Professor Ezra F. Vogel?is the Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University. He has had a long association with Harvard, receiving his Ph.D. in sociology there in 1958, and then teaching at the university from 1967 to 2000, “Japan and China: Facing History,” Chapter 11 pg. 581-583 of the book, 7/30/19, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020Yet faced with a strong China, the Japanese have every reason to maintain their ties to the United States, which have grown stronger and deeper in the?seven decades since World War II. The Japanese have close relations with the?United States in every sphere—military, political, economic, and cultural. There?is a high level of comfort between the Americans and the Japanese, and an open?exchange of ideas and opinions. Although some in China have an interest in ex-?panding relations with Japan, it is not in China’s interest to detach Japan from?the U.S.-Japan military alliance, for an independent Japan would develop a?stronger military and possibly develop nuclear weapons to defend itself. The?Chinese have not erased their image of the Japanese as a militaristic aggressive?people, and they believe that the U.S.-Japan Alliance can still help keep the cork?in the bottle. Japanese strategists are aware that the Chinese economy will soon?be several times larger than their own, that China is putting far more resources?into its military than Japan could match, and that Japan’s military manpower cannot compare with that of China, which has ten times the population. The Japanese are therefore firmly committed to cooperation with the U.S. military. Though the Japanese are prepared to increase their cooperation with China, their relationship with the U.S. military and the U.S. government since 1945 has?made the Japanese feel far more secure working with Americans than with an?authoritarian Chinese government that has expressed so much hostility toward?Japan.China hates Japan rearm not the alliance---either aff causes it OR it’s inevitable ---China knows US isn’t a threat because they have good relations, but if Japan builds up its military, that’s scaryWang 17 [Chi Wang, a former head of the Chinese section of the US Library of Congress and former university librarian at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, is president of the US-China Policy Foundation, “Why the US is no threat to China, but a remilitarised Japan, led by Shinzo Abe, may well be”, 11-5, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Japan’s planned restoration of its military and the continued election of conservative politicians are threatening events for countries it invaded in the past. I was in the sixth grade in 1942, living with my family in Hong Kong, when the Japanese invaded . I watched as Japanese torpedoes entered the harbour and killed British troops. Japanese shell shrapnel damaged our house, blinding one of our household staff and killing another. Trapped indoors in fear of the occupying military, we were left with very little food and water for nearly 25 days – and we were among the lucky ones. Japan’s modern-day actions must be interpreted through the lens of the second world war. Abe’s visit in 2013 to the Yasukuni Shrine, the resting place of almost 1,000 war criminals from that conflict, was for many a sign of his disregard for the atrocities committed abroad by the Japanese. Because of his family history, his actions and his own hopes for the remilitarisation of Japan’s armed forces, Abe has failed to set to rest any worries about the military. The US, on the other hand, is not a threat to China. Although it has competed and will continue to compete with China on trade , it has never invaded. It never will. In the 20th century, the normalisation of Sino-US relations , both economic and political, gave China the opportunity to enter the world stage. Even during periods of tense relations, America has helped China and endeavoured to engage, in the interests of better cooperation. China need not worry about a threat from the US but, if Abe abolishes Article 9 of its constitution, the future trajectory of Japan’s military will be threatening indeed.China prefers alliance to Japanese rearm ---China will work within current alliance security framework because they fear a stronger Japan Stephen Ellis 14, is a doctoral candidate at the University of Leicester, "How U.S. Military Power Benefits China," 3-13-2014, Diplomat, , DOA: 9-13-2015, y2k **NCC Packet 2020The United States security commitment to Japan has for over six decades allowed Tokyo to “free ride” on U.S. military power in East Asia, and this has meant that Japan has not built up a conventional military capability in keeping with the size and wealth of its economy. Whilst Japan is undoubtedly today an important military actor within the region, it is highly likely that it would possess far greater conventional military capabilities were it not for the credible security guarantee provided to Japan by the strong U.S. military presence in the region. Whilst Japanese free-riding may or may not serve U.S. interests, the fact that the U.S. security guarantee has served to limit the size and power of Japan’s conventional military is highly beneficial for Beijing, given China and Japan’s history of hostility and conflict, current territorial disputes and their growing competition to be the lead East Asian nation. If in the future China was to somehow succeed in driving the United States militarily out of East Asia, Tokyo would likely respond to diminishing U.S. regional power by significantly bolstering its own conventional military capabilities. For China, this would be something of a pyrrhic victory, as Beijing would have only succeeded in replacing the U.S. presence with growing Japanese military power, something China would likely view as a much more significant threat. Thus, pushing the United States militarily out of the East Asia may prove to be of questionable value to Beijing and could even worsen China’s strategic position with regard to Japan. Given this, Beijing may instead look to continue to rise and operate within the existing regional framework built and maintained by the deployment of significant U.S. military power, which has so far proved highly effective at limiting Japan’s conventional military capabilities and aspirations.China and Korea hate the aff and love the alliance – they don’t trust Japan---they think the alliance restrains Japan from both building and acting aggressively in the regionChristensen 99 [Thomas J. Christensen?is Professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the?China and the World Program?at Columbia University.? He arrived in 2018 from Princeton University where he was William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War, Director of the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and faculty director of the Masters of Public Policy Program and the Truman Scholars Program, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma In East Asia," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Spring 1999, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020Chinese security analysts, particularly military officers, fear that Japan could again become a great military great power in the first quarter of the twentyfirst century. Such a Japan, they believe, would likely be more independent of US. control and generally more assertive in international affairs. If one considers threats posed only by military power and not who is wielding that power, one might expect Beijing to welcome the reduction or even elimination of U.S. influence in Japan, even if this meant China would have a more powerful neighbor. After all, the United States is still by far the most powerful military actor in the Western Pacific.6 However, given China’s historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan, Beijing would fear either a breakdown of the U.S.-Japan alliance or a significant upgrading of Japan’s role within that allian~e.~ This sentiment is shared outside China as well, particularly in Korea. Although Chinese analysts presently fear US. power much more than Japanese power, in terms of national intentions, Chinese analysts view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the United StatesA2: Encirclement Fears---Alt Causes---1NCAlt causes to encirclement Katagiri 19 [Nori Katagiri?is Associate Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University. He is also Visiting Research Fellow, Air Staff College, Japan Air Self-Defence Force and Fellow Cohort 4 of the Mansfield Foundation’s US-Japan Network for the Future. He received his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania., "Evolution of Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for Northeast Asia and Beyond," E-International Relations, 4-10-2019, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020Japan’s growing military ties with some of the Southeast Asian and South Asian states – especially the Philippines, India, and Australia – allow it to have an encirclement strategy against China. The ties with the Philippines allow SDF ships to operate near the contested areas of the South China Sea, both with the US Navy and independently. Japan’s reasoning for this is not to aggressively act against the Chinese Navy but rather to secure sea lanes and freedom of navigation as much of Japan’s energy import comes through the Strait of Malacca. Common strategic sense pulls Japan and India together to tighten commerce, weapons sales, and officer exchange. India and Japan also view Chinese advances into the Indian Ocean as harmful to their interests. India has historically abhorred making foreign commitments and is geographically distant from Japan, but both nations meet periodically to discuss methods of cooperation. Finally, Australia remains wary about China’s advance and is a regular participant in multilateral military exercises that include the SDF.A2: Encirclement Fears---Alt Causes---2NCQUAD is a major alt cause to Chinese Encirclement fears Buchan and Rimland 20 [Patrick Gerard Buchan is a Director, the U.S. Alliances Project and Fellow, Indo-Pacific Security, Benjamin Rimland is a research Associate, Alliances and American Leadership Program, "Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue," No Publication, 3-16-2020, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020Just as it did during the initial Quad in 2007, China has officially protested Quad 2.0 as a thinly veiled attempt at containment. Editorials in state-run Chinese media have regularly lambasted the grouping as a threat to not simply China’s own ascent to power but also traditional diplomatic touchstones such as ASEAN centrality; further criticism can also be readily found attacking the Quad nations for insufficient care regarding the infrastructure needs of Southeast Asian nations.38?The United States did not aid its case for an inclusive Quad when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made clear in an October 2019 speech to the Heritage Foundation that the Quad would “[ensure] that China retains only its proper place in the world,” an allusion to containment that made waves in the Australian foreign policy community.39General Defense: Impact Defense A2: Sino-Japanese War---1NCNo Sino Japan war – economic interdependence and domestic politics tamp down tensions Johnson 19 [Jesse Johnson is a staff writer for Japan Times citing professor from Lehigh University, “Tenuous ties: Few signs of substance behind warming Sino-Japanese relations as communist China marks 70th anniversary”, 9-30, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Economic equilibrium Despite these security concerns, one area where the two countries have maintained more of a semblance of equilibrium has been the economic sphere — especially as the U.S., Japan’s top ally, wages a bitter trade war against China. Some experts have said that the economic conflict could push Japan and Abe, who has also had to deal with his own trade threats from Trump, closer to China. “Abe is suspicious of China, but realistic enough to accept that a perpetual state of high tension with China is not in Japan’s interests,” said Hughes. He “is clearly close to the U.S. on many security issues that relate to China, but on economic issues, Japan is worried that the United States’ ire on trade might also turn on Japan and that the U.S. is doing damage to the current international trading order.” Nevertheless, Abe has successfully managed to negotiate the “first stage” of a new trade deal last Wednesday that both appeared to placate Trump’s onerous demands and minimize the economic fallout for Japan. But with both countries facing sustained economic pressure from the White House, the two economic giants will also be looking to use their improved ties to uphold the free-trade regime. Zhang Baohui, director of Lingnan University’s Center for Asian Pacific Studies in Hong Kong, noted that although the Trump factor “is one of several … motivating Japan to improve ties with China,” Abe’s efforts to improve relations with China started significantly earlier than the current U.S. administration. “China is … Japan’s largest trading partner, a plain fact that cannot be ignored,” he said. What’s more, he added, good relations with China “will also reduce domestic opposition to constitutional reform, which remains an important agenda of Abe.”A2: Sino-Japanese War---2NCNo Sino-Japan War: 1---China fears loss of legitimacy Ghosh 14 [Bobby Ghosh is a researcher for Time, “Will Japan and China Go to War?”, 1-22, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020China would have the most to lose from war, Abe suggested, pointing out that conflict would slow the economic growth that the government in Beijing needs to preserve its legitimacy. The Prime Minister made no mention of the cost to his own country, but allowed that a Sino-Japanese war would disrupt the world economy.2---Dooms Xi and CCP politically Moss 13 [Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, 2-10, ] IanM **NCC Packet 20201. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.3---Economic interdependence Moss 13 [Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, 2-10, ] IanM **NCC Packet 20202. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders.4---PLA isn’t confident they can win---they won’t risk it Moss 13 [Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, 2-10, ] IanM **NCC Packet 20203. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.5---China promotes peaceful solutions empirics prove Moss 13 [Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, 2-10, ] IanM **NCC Packet 20206. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before).6---Hurts China’s long term regional and diplomatic goals Moss 13 [Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, 2-10, ] IanM **NCC Packet 20207. China’s socialization. China has spent too long?telling the world that it poses no threat to?peace?to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners.A2: US-China War---1NCNo US-China war – nor accidental escalationTimothy Heath 17, senior international defense research analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty, and William R. Thompson, Distinguished and Rogers Professor at Indiana University and an adjunct researcher at RAND, "U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War", National Interest, **NCC Packet 2020Graham Allison's April 12 article, “ How America and China Could Stumble to War ,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely. In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis. By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views —a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation. To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict. The most important driver, as Allison recognizes, would be a growing parity between China and the United States as economic, technological and geostrategic leaders of the international system. The United States and China feature an increasing parity in the size of their economies, but the United States retains a considerable lead in virtually every other dimension of national power. The current U.S.-China rivalry is a regional one centered on the Asia-Pacific region, but it retains the considerable potential of escalating into a global, systemic competition down the road. A second important driver would be the mobilization of public opinion behind the view that the other country is a primary source of threat, thereby providing a stronger constituency for escalatory policies. A related development would be the formal designation by leaders in both capitals of the other country as a primary hostile threat and likely foe. These developments would most likely be fueled by a growing array of intractable disputes, and further accelerated by a serious militarized crisis. The cumulative effect would be the exacerbation of an antagonistic competitive rivalry, repeated and volatile militarized crisis, and heightened risk that any flashpoint could escalate rapidly to war—a relationship that would resemble the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Yet even if the relationship evolved towards a more hostile form of rivalry, unique features of the contemporary world suggest lessons drawn from the past may have limited applicability. Economic interdependence in the twenty-first century is much different and far more complex than in it was in the past. So is the lethality of weaponry available to the major powers. In the sixteenth century, armies fought with pikes, swords and primitive guns. In the twenty-first century, it is possible to eliminate all life on the planet in a full-bore nuclear exchange. These features likely affect the willingness of leaders to escalate in a crisis in a manner far differently than in past rivalries. More broadly, Allison’s analysis about the “Thucydides Trap” may be criticized for exaggerating the risks of war. In his claims to identify a high propensity for war between “rising” and “ruling” countries, he fails to clarify those terms, and does not distinguish the more dangerous from the less volatile types of rivalries. Contests for supremacy over land regions, for example, have historically proven the most conflict-prone, while competition for supremacy over maritime regions has, by contrast, tended to be less lethal. Rivalries also wax and wane over time, with varying levels of risks of war. A more careful review of rivalries and their variety, duration and patterns of interaction suggests that although most wars involve rivalries, many rivals avoid going to war. Misperceptions and strategic accidents remain a persistent feature of international politics, and it may well be that that mistakes are more likely to be lethal in periods of adjustment in relative power configurations. Rising states do have problems negotiating status quo changes with states that have staked out their predominance earlier. Even so, the probability of war between China and the United States is almost certainly far less than the 75 percent predicted by Allison. If the leaders of both countries can continue to find ways to dampen the trends towards hostile rivalry and maintain sufficient cooperation to manage differences, then there is good reason to hope that the risk of war can be lowered further still.A2: US-China War---2NCNo US-China war – bunch of warrants in the 1nc Heath evMost recent ev – diplomatic ties, economic interdependence, geography, nuclear postures, balancing powers, no ideological conflict – any crisis won’t escalate Shifrinson 2/9/19 (Joshua, assistant professor of international relations at Boston University, “The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why,” ) **NCC Packet 2020Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from 1947 through 1990. But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why. 1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory, and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic, economic or institutional links. In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s, diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally cooperative backdrop. 2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly escalate colored Cold War politics. Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert. As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds. 3. The Cold War had just two major powers The Cold War took place in a bipolar system, with the United States and Soviet Union uniquely powerful, compared with other nations. This dynamic often pushed the United States and the U.S.S.R. toward confrontation and contributed to more or less fixed alliances; moreover, it encouraged efforts to suppress prospective great powers, such as Germany. In 2019, it’s not at all clear we are back to bipolarity. Analysts remain divided over whether the U.S. unipolar era is waning (or is already over) — and, if so, whether we are heading for a new period of bipolarity, modern-day multipolarity or something else. Regardless, most analysts accept that other countries will play a central role in East Asian security affairs. Russia, for example, still benefits from legacy military investments, India is developing economically and militarily, and Japan is beginning to build highly capable military forces to complement its still-significant economic might. Even if these nations aren’t as powerful as the United States or China, their presence makes for more fluid diplomatic arrangements and more diffuse security concerns than during the U.S.-Soviet competition. The resulting security dynamics are therefore likely to look very different. 4. Ideology plays less of a role in U.S.-Chinese relations Many people see the Cold War as an ideological contest between U.S.-backed liberalism and Soviet-backed communism. But that’s not the whole story. The early 20th century saw liberalism, communism and fascism vie for ideological preeminence. With fascism defeated alongside Nazi Germany, the postwar stage was set for a struggle between communism and liberalism to reinforce the U.S.-Soviet contest. That each ideology claimed universal scope ensured that the ideologies served as rallying cries for Third World conflicts, which were subsequently associated with the U.S.-Soviet struggle. The respective “ideologies” of the United States and China do not favor this type of contest today. Indeed, analysts calling for a hard-line stance against China have faced difficulties even identifying a coherent Chinese ideological alternative. And while some researchers claim that a nascent ideological contest pitting an “autocratic” China against the “liberal” United States is emerging, this narrative ignores the political contests that shape Chinese politics (and have parallels in U.S. politics). Autocracies and democracies often cooperate. And on one important ideological issue — how they organize their economic lives — China and the United States have both embraced economic growth via trade, the private sector and semi-free markets. Likewise, while a clearer Chinese ideological “brand” may eventually emerge, it is unclear whether the ideology would claim universal applicability. This is not to deny that there are tensions between the United States and China. What we are seeing, however, is not a new cold war but a reversion to a pre-1945 form of great power politics. What changed? Put simply, the United States no longer enjoys preeminence as the only superpower, as it did in the immediate post-Cold War era. The ideological, historical and geopolitical differences between today and the Cold War years far outweigh the similarities. As David Edelstein notes, at times it’s hard to understand what the United States and China are competing over. If that’s true, then there’s reason to believe there are more nuanced ways of understanding the tensions — and options for managing great power politics — than a Cold War reboot.GeographyKeck 17 [Zachary Keck is the Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the?Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “The 2 Forgotten Reasons China and America Probably Won't Go to War”, 8-26, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020In recent years, many observers have woken up to the fact that a war between the United States and China is not unthinkable. Although this is true, there are still strong pacifying forces. Two factors strike me as the most important. The first, and most obvious one, is that both sides maintain secure nuclear arsenals. As Thomas Schelling and others have pointed out, nuclear weapons are not a game-changer simply because of their massive destructive capabilities. The speed and certainty of nuclear retaliation is just as important. These two characteristics simply aren’t present with conventional weapons. Leaders can delude themselves into thinking their conventional forces, however improbably, will end up victorious in battle. In any case, the consequences of being wrong are far in the future. For instance, Imperial Japanese leaders knew it was a tremendous gamble to take on the United States. Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese admiral who planned Pearl Harbor, warned his civilian leadership beforehand: “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.” After the American economic embargo, however, Japanese leaders were only faced with bad options: capitulating in the face of American pressure or fighting a more powerful enemy in a likely futile effort. In these circumstances, Tokyo decided to gamble. After all, it was conceivable that America would be so exhausted from fighting Nazi Germany in Europe that it would ultimately sue for peace in Asia, especially in the face of fierce Japanese resistance. While the outcome of conventional wars hinges on a number of unknowable factors, nuclear retaliation is certain. And, unlike with conventional weapons—especially before airplanes and missiles—one doesn’t have to defeat the other side’s military to wreak havoc on its cities. Nuclear weapons can do so immediately. Moreover, as Robert Jervis points out, when two countries with secure, thermonuclear arsenals go to war, “the side that is ‘losing’ the war as judged by various measures of military capability can inflict as much destruction on the side that is ‘winning’ as the ‘winner’ can on the ‘loser.’” This changes the calculation of leaders, and makes it inconceivable that rational leaders would opt for total war. This is not foolproof of course— there is still the possibility that miscalculations, gradual escalation, or the “threats that leave something to chance” will produce an outcome neither side wanted— but it is a strong incentive for peace. While it is widely recognized that nuclear weapons make a U.S.-China conflict less likely, the pacifying effect of geography is often overlooked. Geography works to attenuate tensions in two interrelated ways. First, both China and the United States are massive countries that would be extremely difficult to conquer and occupy. Second, both are separated by the largest ocean on earth, and it is extremely difficult to project power over large bodies of water. As John Mearsheimer has written: “When great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problems for attacking armies.” These two geographical factors reduce the intensity of the so-called security dilemma. Despite all their disputes over issues like Taiwan and the East and South China Seas, China and the United States generally do not have to fear that the other side will seek to invade and conquer them. This has usually not been the case for rising and ruling powers that went to war. In many of these instances, the rivals were located on the same continent or even shared a border, which generated significant insecurity and led to conflict. As Mearsheimer again explains, “Great powers located on the same landmass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each other over land.”Just like nuclear weapons, these geographical factors are not an absolute guarantee against conflict. Japan and the United States went to war despite being separated by the Pacific Ocean, and so did Spain and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. Still, China and America’s large land size and separation are both conducive to peace, and—combined with nuclear weapons—provide hope that they can avoid conflict.Self-interest Bandow 12 (May 7, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, ) **NCC Packet 2020*Note: Zhongnanhai is the compound that houses the Communist PartyStill, while the PRC’s trajectory is uncertain, China almost certainly will become a stronger competitor to the U.S. Even so, Beijing does not want conflict. Commerce has brought riches, which have helped satisfy an emerging middle class. Derail the economic gravy train and the unelected Communist Party will lose its legitimacy. Challenge America militarily and risk losing a devastating war. The residents of Zhongnanhai are ambitious, not suicidal. Anyway, the U.S. would do better to improve its game than complain. Washington’s dominance over the last two or three decades has been unnatural and will inevitably decline. Accommodating rather than resisting change will better preserve American power and influence. Particularly important will be strengthening economic competitiveness and diplomatic skills. Instead of simply issuing demands when it wants something from the PRC, such as support against Iran and North Korea, America will need to persuade Beijing that the policy is in the latter’s interest as well. As for security, the U.S. and China are bound to have disagreements over the years, but none should threaten vital American interests and thus lead to conflict. Rather than confront militarily a nuclear-armed power in its own region over interests which it views as essential, Washington should expect its allies to do much more in their own defense. Perhaps the toughest challenge will continue to be human rights. Washington long has supported democracy and liberty only in the breach. During the Cold War the U.S. backed a gaggle of thugs since they were anti-Communists. Even today Washington cheers democracy activists in the Middle East—except in Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Human rights in Central Asia are a painful afterthought when it comes to U.S. military bases. Anti-democratic excesses among friends such as Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore are passed by. And grievous human rights problems in Afghanistan and Iraq are embarrassments best ignored. Still, the fact that Washington often is hypocritical doesn’t change the fact that Beijing remains a tough authoritarian system which sometimes deploys brutal repression. Human rights are universal and Americans should promote liberty when possible. Yet the Chen saga reminds us that principle must be leavened with pragmatism when dealing with other nations. U.S. power is limited. Washington has found it impossible to compel smaller and weaker, even impoverished, starving states—Burma, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Serbia, Syria—to do its bidding. All of these ignored ever tougher sanctions, several rebuffed military threats, and a couple even resisted military attacks. America’s ability to compel China to respect human rights is even less. Wei Jingsheng, another courageous Chinese human rights activist, complained: “The Chinese leadership does not fear the United States government; it only fears the loss of its power.” But that is simple reality. War is unthinkable. Sanctions would leave America friendless across Asia and Europe, undermine the weak U.S. economy, and turn Beijing into an active adversary if not enemy. Which leaves diplomacy and publicity.Neither will gamble with nukes Keck 17 Zachary Keck, Zachary Keck is the Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Before that, he was a researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Previously, he was the managing editor of The National Interest. Keck has also been the managing editor of The Diplomat. “The 2 Forgotten Reasons China and America Probably Won't Go to War.” The National Interest. August 26, 2017. **NCC Packet 2020In recent years, many observers have woken up to the fact that a war between the United States and China is not unthinkable. Although this is true, there are still strong pacifying forces. Two factors strike me as the most important. The first, and most obvious one, is that both sides maintain secure nuclear arsenals. As Thomas Schelling and others have pointed out, nuclear weapons are not a game-changer simply because of their massive destructive capabilities. The speed and certainty of nuclear retaliation is just as important. These two characteristics simply aren’t present with conventional weapons. Leaders can delude themselves into thinking their conventional forces, however improbably, will end up victorious in battle. In any case, the consequences of being wrong are far in the future. For instance, Imperial Japanese leaders knew it was a tremendous gamble to take on the United States. Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese admiral who planned Pearl Harbor, warned his civilian leadership beforehand: “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.” After the American economic embargo, however, Japanese leaders were only faced with bad options: capitulating in the face of American pressure or fighting a more powerful enemy in a likely futile effort. In these circumstances, Tokyo decided to gamble. After all, it was conceivable that America would be so exhausted from fighting Nazi Germany in Europe that it would ultimately sue for peace in Asia, especially in the face of fierce Japanese resistance. While the outcome of conventional wars hinges on a number of unknowable factors, nuclear retaliation is certain. And, unlike with conventional weapons—especially before airplanes and missiles—one doesn’t have to defeat the other side’s military to wreak havoc on its cities. Nuclear weapons can do so immediately. Moreover,as Robert Jervis points out , when two countries with secure, thermonuclear arsenals go to war, “the side that is ‘losing’ the war as judged by various measures of military capability can inflict as much destruction on the side that is ‘winning’ as the ‘winner’ can on the ‘loser.’” This changes the calculation of leaders, and makes it inconceivable that rational leaders would opt for total war. This is not foolproof of course— there is still the possibility that miscalculations, gradual escalation, or the “threats that leave something to chance” will produce an outcome neither side wanted— but it is a strong incentive for peace.Existing deterrence checks Chinese miscalculationsGertz 18 (Bill Gertz is a journalist and author who has spent decades covering defense and national security affairs. He is the author of six national security books ,The National Interest, March 5, 2018, “Is America Preparing for a Nuclear War with China?” , accessed 8/21/18) **NCC Packet 2020Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin unveiled several new nuclear weapons last week in a replay of the Cold War. China, meanwhile, is continuing a similar buildup of high-technology strategic nuclear forces that remains largely hidden from view. Chinese secrecy about its nuclear forces and their use was a major theme of the Pentagon’s recently completed Nuclear Posture Review that outlined a new “tailored deterrence” policy for China. The new plan is aimed at persuading Chinese leaders to avoid military miscalculations – like provocative actions in the South China Sea, or hostile activities related to Taiwan or Japan – that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. The unclassified posture review shed little light on the details of the buildup of China’s nuclear forces other than identifying what were called “entirely new nuclear capabilities.” They include several new types of missiles, including hypersonic weapons, satellite-killing missiles and regional intermediate-range nuclear forces. The review takes note of the main threat of a nuclear war between the United States and China: A military encounter that escalates into a regional conflict culminating in a nuclear exchange involving China’s regional nuclear-armed missiles. “Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities, or that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is acceptable,” the review states. The Pentagon did not specify how tailored deterrence would work. It warned that the United States “will maintain the capability to credibly threaten intolerable damage as Chinese leaders calculate costs and benefits, such that the costs incurred as a result of Chinese nuclear employment, at any level of escalation, would vastly outweigh any benefit.” Strategic military planning for China, however, would likely seek to put at risk what Chinese leaders hold most dearly: Continued rule by the Communist Party of China. Thus, U.S. tailored deterrence would involve signaling to the Chinese leadership that any future conflict would result in the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party, and its military arm, the People’s Liberation Army. Robust security for Chinese leaders Chinese leadership statements and military writings make clear China probably understands that strategy, and the military has invested heavily in defending Party leaders.Senkakus: Impact DefenseNo War---No Motive---1NCNo escalation – both sides hate conflict Kolar 18 [Stefan Kolar researches East Asian Regional Studies and international relations at the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, “Sino-Japanese Relations and the Potential for Militarised Conflict in the Twenty-First Century”, December, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020***Note: MID – Militarized Interstate DisputesFindings and Conclusion Even though the Japanese government holds the official position that there is no territorial dispute over the ownership of the Senkaku/Diàoyú Islands, ample evidence suggests that a territorial dispute is in place, as the PRC is obviously not accepting and is actively challenging Japanese control over the islands. The initial dispute onset came after the PRC raised its claim in December 1971, after the discovery of natural gas and oil deposits. The dispute is driven by strong economic and strategic motives and mainly based on conflicting interpretations of legal proceedings and the imprecise wording of treaties dating back to the nineteenth century, and thus fulfils the first Step to War. Both nations have one politically relevant alliance at this point in time, Japan allied to the US, whereas the PRC is allied to the DPRK. Beyond that, analysis has shown a trend of Japanese attempts to establish closer defence ties with most of its southern regional neighbours, especially with Australia. The main goal is SLOC security and a general containment of China’s assertiveness. Nonetheless, all relationships are below-relevant alliance types, being mostly security partnerships focused on anti-piracy and operations and arms deals. There has also been a detectable shift of China towards military cooperation with Russia, but no official alliance has been established. Even though both countries alliances were formed decades before the onset of the current territorial dispute, the requirements for the second Step to War are fulfilled. The analysis of the 25-year period from the end of the Cold War to 2016 has shown that there is an enduring Sino-Japanese rivalry, and therefore a third Step to War. Table 2 shows that there have been 16 MIDs between 1991 and 2016, surmounting the necessary duration of 20 years and the required six MIDs to classify the relationship as enduring rivalry. It is noteworthy that, while the number of MIDs is high, nearly all of them are restricted to displays of force, mostly provocative naval manoeuvres and intrusions. Threats of force are very rare and so is any actual use of force—mainly seizures of civilian protestors. While the intensity of the MIDs seems to increase, especially with the growing number of military vessels employed on both sides, the clashes nonetheless appear ritualised to a certain degree. Provocations are met with assertiveness and a short MID before diplomatic efforts calms the situation until the next MID a few years later—a repeated but usually restrained cycle of military posturing and sabre-rattling. To establish whether there is a Sino-Japanese arms race or a mutual military build-up, the respective drivers for strategic development were analysed, showing that both nations are still adapting to the post-Cold War environment and the twenty-first century. For short time threats, the DPRK presents the biggest concern to Japan, while the PRC with its growing assertiveness, persisting territorial disputes, and power projection is more of a long-term threat as a regional rival and potential danger to Japanese SLOC. For China, the perceived threat of the US stayed the main influence throughout the 1990s and up to the present. The main drivers are deterring American power projection and a contingency for Taiwanese independence. While both sides are becoming more aware of their antagonism, neither Japan nor China fully commits to officially identifying the other as a strategic opponent, although Japan has become more vocal in light of China’s continuing assertiveness. Even so, Japan prefers to veil its strategic planning with topics such as threats from North Korean missiles. Regarding military expenditure, China’s spending has markedly increased during the last decade, while Japan’s defence budget has remained virtually unchanged. Nonetheless, the allocated GDP percentages have remained stable, and China’s increased expenditure is therefore not worrisome but somewhat expected due to its economic rise. Furthermore, China is also lacking the characteristic acceleration in military spending seen during arms races. Lastly, in quality and quantity, both nations have seen drops in numbers mainly as a reaction to the changed security environment after the Cold War. With the quantitative reductions, quality is boosted wherever possible, mainly for stealth aircraft and navies. China’s overall modernisation is mostly aimed at countering the US rather than Japan. In comparison, Japan’s recent modernisation is more clearly aimed on deterring China, although the modernisation largely appears to be mostly part of a continuous renewal of equipment to keep up with the newest technologies, rather than to surpass the PLA. In conclusion, most of the arms race criteria are either inconclusive or not fulfilled with only Japan mentioning the PRC as a strategic concern and Chinese modernisation being aimed at deterring the US, with expenditure remaining normal. Based on this analysis, it is clear that there is currently no arms race between Japan and China, thus leaving the fourth Step to War unfulfilled. Xí Jìnpíng and Abe Shinzō share a number of personal characteristics, beliefs, and political positions. Both men are seen as strong political leaders and reformers with a vision to strengthen their counties and to place them on top of the regional and international hierarchy. Since their respective assumption of power, China and Japan have further increased their military modernisation. The PRC has increased its power projection and assertiveness, while Japan has begun to reinterpret its constitution, in a first step to become a ‘normal’ military power. Furthermore, both leaders have an image of being ‘tough’ diplomats, willing to risk negotiations to gain concessions. On the other hand, they have also been accommodating towards each other in efforts to alleviate tensions and to avoid too intense conflicts. Overall, Xí and Abe do neither fit into the hardliner nor the accommodationist categories. Both exhibit nationalistic tendencies and beliefs, and are uncompromising on territorial issues, while also being moderate in case of other diplomatic issues. As the framework leaves no third option to categorise the leaders, the last Step to War remains inconclusive. Regarding a shift in military strategic positions, it has been shown that, at most focal points, there have been only partial changes with some developments being continuations of the geopolitical shift following the Cold War. Compared to the 1990s, the overall situation of the Senkaku/Diàoyú Islands has not changed in the twenty-first century, but even so, Chinese assertiveness is steadily on the rise. The severity of confrontations around the disputed islands and throughout the East China Sea has certainly increased and gained a more militarised character, as exemplified by the growing number of PLAN and JMSDF vessels involved, unspoken threats through aiming on ships and planes, as well as near clashes during flybys and the establishment of the Chinese ADIZ, which is the most severe out of the smaller alterations of the strategic environment. The alliances of both countries have not changed for decades, but there has been a noticeable tendency of Japan to court potential future alliance partners, especially Australia and China’s opponents in the SCSD. Likewise, the PRC has become more open to military cooperation with Russia. In terms of threat perception, expenditure, and military hardware, there have been several important changes. While adapting their military strategy to the new security situation of the twenty-first century, official perception of each other has also shifted, as Japan has identified China’s growing assertiveness and military build-up as worrying and vowed close surveillance. Expenditure did increase in both countries, though only marginally in Japan, but remained at constant GDP percentages. Militaries in both nations were modernised, with emphasis on joint operations and high tech; especially the PLA has rapidly reduced quantity in favour of quality, and put a lot of effort into the PLAN, which is China’s tool for military power projection in the twenty-first century. Likewise, Japan has sought to constantly upgrade its hardware in order to deter Chinese advances and assertiveness. Several drivers influencing the Sino-Japanese relationship and high-tension military situation have been identified. Most obviously, the economic advantages of controlling the Senkaku/Diàoyú Islands and their potential impact on the disputed EEZ delimitation in the East China Sea is a prime factor for the deterioration of bilateral relations. The strategic value of the islands is also closely tied to economic considerations while their social value is at most that of a political tool to strengthen nationalism. The enduring rivalry between both nations is, of course, another important driver, especially as the MIDs involve stronger military presences. The rivalry drives Japan’s military position and development to a stronger degree than China’s, as the PRC is driven more by Taiwan and US antagonism and containment policy. Furthermore, the ongoing SCSD has had a stronger impact on military development than the less-volatile East China Sea Dispute with Japan. For Japan, Chinese military modernisation appears as one of the biggest drivers behind its own military modernisation efforts, shifts in deployment, and new patrol areas. The threat from North Korean missiles is still a persistent influence, although it was theorised that the danger has been overstated to mask attempts to compensate for Chinese modernisation. Furthermore, Japan’s military development is also driven by US wishes for more interoperability and closer cooperation with the JSDF. Through the Simple Risk Barometer, it was determined that, with the three out of five steps that have been found to be in place, there is a notable risk of escalation between China and Japan; however, the fourth step, i.e. arms race, is not currently in place nor is the inconclusive last step of hardliners and accommodationists in power. Obviously, the onset of an arms race would be a major step towards war, and therefore one of the biggest risks. Even more so, at this point it appears that neither head of state is turning more towards their hardliner side and, thus, alienating and further antagonising their rival, whereas the formation of new relevant security alliances in the region are not the biggest threats to stability. Even a clear attempt to form a new, politically relevant alliance can put a major strain on rivalries as they spur the other nations defensive stance, increase the likelihood of the formation of new counteralliances, and create a more constricted, volatile regional environment. However, it is also important to note that there is also a certain degree of ritualisation in the relationship between the two countries, especially surrounding the territorial dispute and MIDs, which have remained mostly non-violent even amidst rising intensity. The current MID exhibits some of the most militarised actions during the last 25 years, and is indicative of the increased intensity, as even a small spark or accident during the growing displays of force might suffice to break through the ritualised sabre-rattling, turning the East China Sea into a much more volatile environment. At this current path it seems as if both nations are moving towards a point-of-no-return rather than a peaceful solution for their ongoing antagonism.No War---No Motive---2NCNo one’s going to war over rocks---this can also be defense against some deterrence DA that says Chinese invasion gives them strategic assets and energy hegHall 19 [Todd H. Hall?is an associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations and tutor in politics at St Anne’s College. His research interests extend to the areas of international relations theory;?the intersection of emotion, affect, and foreign policy; and?Chinese foreign policy, “WHY THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS ARE LIKE A TOOTHPASTE TUBE”, 9-4, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Seven years later, things have calmed down slightly. The situation in the waters around the islands, however, remains far more charged than it was before everything started in 2010. Official Chinese maritime vessels have been conducting regular incursions into the islands’ territorial waters, and official aircraft have repeatedly appeared overhead. In 2013, Beijing announced an Air Defense Identification Zone including the airspace over the islands, raising the risk of aerial confrontation. It also took two years before the leaders of both countries would even agree to meet again. And this only after both sides had hammered out statements seemingly agreeing to disagree about the existence of a disagreement. There has been some progress since Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in 2014. Apart from a general improvement in the tone of relations, both sides have established a maritime communication mechanism between the Japanese Self Defense Forces and the People’s Liberation Army. Even still, the space around the islands has become more crowded and the possibility for serious conflict remains. The Conventional Wisdom Sure, one could argue that sooner or later tensions were bound to emerge simply because the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are so valuable. A pervasive line is that the disputed islands “are close to important shipping lanes, offer rich fishing grounds and lie near potential oil and gas reserves. They are also in a strategically significant position.” This refrain is particularly echoed by hawks in China, Japan, and even the United States. Looking into this conventional wisdom, however, I have found it to be dubious at best. Strategically speaking, the islands are small and isolated. Viewed from the Chinese mainland, the first island chain is what really matters, and it is located a good distance beyond the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Yes, one could conceivably use the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a platform on which to put radar or missiles. But the islands offer scant cover. Such assets would be highly exposed and easily targeted. Granted, China does appear to have an appetite for small, vulnerable installations in the South China Sea. But to date, China has only militarized those features in the South China Sea already under its control. The regional disputants it faces in the South China Sea are also much less formidable than Japan. Trying to militarize the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands means taking them first, thereby hazarding armed conflict not only with Japan but also the United States. Such a move would entail substantial risk for marginal advantage. Besides, China has easier ways to place fixed assets in the East China Sea. In terms of their economic value, the islands are uninhabited (except for a few goats), the fishing stocks are in decline, and potential petroleum and natural gas reserves remain unconfirmed and are now estimated to be much, much smaller than originally thought. Underwater topography also means that Japan would have a hard — if not impossible — time exploiting any natural gas resources on its own. Moreover, it remains uncertain what — if any — advantage sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would provide in negotiations or judicial proceedings to divide up who gets what in the East China Sea, should these ever even occur. Viewed either strategically or economically, the islands may not be totally worthless. Few things ever are. But their potential strategic or economic value hardly appears to merit the dangers of armed conflict or war.China and Japan won’t escalate – no incentive to attack and relations have stabilized Pollack 19 [Jonathan D. Pollack is a nonresident senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center and Center for East Asia Policy at the Brookings Institution, “THE STRESS TEST: JAPAN IN AN ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION”, October, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020JONATHAN POLLACK: On the East China Sea, I would very much agree with Richard that there is a new normal there. I don’t see under prevailing circumstances, any incentives that Xi Jinping, for one, has any particular interest in making this situation go from bad to worse. Quite the contrary. There has been a quasi-normalization in the relationship between Abe and Xi. Abe made his first state visit to China last fall, and they have reasons for keeping things on a somewhat even keel here. At the end of the day, both of them have a common problem, and that is a profoundly unpredictable president of the United States.A2: China Attacks (Military)---2NCChina will never physically attack the Senkaku’s – they know there’s no rush Bosack 19 [Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He was the deputy chief of government relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan, and is a former officer in the U.S. Air Force, “China's Senkaku Islands ambition”, 6-12, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Some observers are concerned that China will eventually take military action to seize the Senkakus, worrying that countries will be dragged into a great power war over uninhabited rocks in the middle of the ocean, but this ignores a few key things. First, for China, there is no rush. Its energy situation is not so dire that it urgently needs to tap into whatever resources may exist in the vicinity of the islands. It also does not immediately need the fishing rights—besides, the China Coast Guard’s response to illegal fishing in the area actually contributes to its argument that it co-administers the waters around the Senkakus. Second, China is a gray zone revisionist power. For China, the measure of success is how much it can change the status quo without eliciting a strong, consolidated international response. The way it does that is by operating just beneath the level of illegality and exploiting gaps in the rules-based international order. After all, if it is not in direct violation of international legal provisions, there will always be a seam in any multinational effort to counter China’s behavior. For China to succeed in this plan, all it takes is for government officials from the international community to say, “What’s the big deal? Let the China Coast Guard take care of Chinese vessels.” Once the presence of Chinese assets becomes so commonplace that policymakers fail to notice or care, it will have achieved its interim step of de facto co-administration. After that, China can initiate the next step of its plan: angling for sole administration. This means that China will start pushing the boundaries on what it does in the waters and airspace around the Senkakus. Perhaps China plants an oil rig in Japanese-administered waters. Or perhaps the Chinese coast guard starts harassing Taiwanese and Japanese fishing vessels that are legally operating in the area.A2: Escalation---2NCOnly confrontation is between coast guards – empirically doesn’t go nuclear Sato 19 [Koichi Sato is a Professor of Asian Studies, College of Arts and Sciences, J. F. Oberlin University. He received his Ph. D. in International Studies from Waseda University, “The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive - A Japanese View”, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies,?50 82, DOI:?10.1080/24761028.2019.1626567] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Regarding the actual maritime conflict, we cannot find the serious illustration in relevant to high-intensity conflict between China and the Japan–US Alliance. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy has provoked the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) several times in the East China Sea (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 5 2013).4 They are relevant to the middle-intensity conflict. Still, the PLA never did challenge the Japan–US Alliance seriously, because it means all-out war including nuclear forces. If so, the most serious issue for Japan is the maritime confrontation between the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol vessels and the China Coast Guard (CCG)5 patrol vessels & Chinese fishing boats in the sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島; Diaoyu Islands [釣魚島] in Chinese).6 It is a kind of low-intensity conflict. It has continued since the Japanese nationalization of the Islands in September 2012 (Yomiuri Shimbun, September 11 2012). The Chinese government has been claiming the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea against Japan since December 30 1971.7 Why China (PRC) has a deep attachment to the Senkaku Islands, and what is the true state of affairs in the Senkaku dispute between Japan and China?A2: Japanese Nationalism---2NCNo impact to nationalism---Japan doesn’t want war, and it gets redirected to economy Kirk 19 [Donald Kirk has been a columnist for the Korea Times and South China Morning Post, among other newspapers and magazines. He wrote this for?, “Japan’s embrace of?nationalism”, 12-13, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Japanese conservatism is like a seething volcano, spewing smoke and ash but not quite ready to erupt. The reluctance reflects the great ambivalence in Japanese society. Japanese are fundamentally conservative, united in a culture dedicated to hard work and formal relationships but otherwise undecided about where they are going politically and militarily as a regional or even world power. It’s a tribute to the conservative nature of Japanese society that Shinzo Abe now rules as Japan’s longest-serving prime minister. The phenomenon of stability nurtured by a deep desire to stick to the policies that have powered Japan’s renaissance as a world power after the disaster of the Pacific War help to explain why Abe has maintained his grip. Abe brings a new kind of nationalism to the Japanese scene. He definitely stands for the traditional powers that guided Japanese leaders from the time of the Meiji restoration in the 1860s through the imperial takeover of other Asian countries, but he avoids the strident right-wing extremism that led Japan to wage war against some of the world’s strongest countries. Japan does have a clique of right-wingers, as seen in the Japan First Party, but Abe is not quite one of them. Abe does appeal, however, to nationalist instincts. He has seized upon the deep-seated, almost instinctual popular belief that Japanese forces fought well in the Pacific War and would have prevailed had the Americans not inflicted the terrible tragedies of the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If there were a slogan for Abe’s form of nationalism, it might be “Make Japan Great Again.” He has accomplished success by his skillful politicking between reformist and conventional elements in the ranks of the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which has been in power, except for brief periods of socialist rule, since 1945. In a real sense, Abe owes his conservative philosophy to his grandfather, Nobuske Kishi, who had been imprisoned by the Americans as a Class A war criminal for his cruel rule over Manchuria, the artificial state of Manchukuo during the war. So well did Kishi get along with the American conquerors that they got him out of prison and into political life at the highest level. Kishi directed his nationalism to making Japan one of the world’s largest, most vibrant economies, as did his younger brother, Eisaku Sato, who became prime minister several years after Kishi stepped down. Abe’s father, Shintaro Abe, sometimes considered for prime minister, had as foreign minister focused on economic ties, negotiating sometimes bitter trade disputes as Japan built strong balances with almost all countries, especially the United States. Abe’s international reputation as a rightist figure stems not only from his success at economic reform but also from his intense desire to get rid of Article 9 of the post-war “peace constitution,” written and imposed on Japan by Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s inner circle. The curse of Article 9, for Abe, is that it prohibits Japan’s armed forces from going overseas, much less fighting a foreign war. The words, “The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation” and “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” are embedded into the psyches of all Japanese from childhood. Japan has long since abandoned adherence to Article 9 in the strictest sense. Japanese Self-Defense forces — air, ground and naval, comprising nearly 250,000 troops — now make up one of the world’s strongest, best equipped military establishments. Abe, however, would like to go further, if not by rescinding Article 9 then by reinterpreting it so Japanese forces can go beyond their home territory in the interests of defense. He is frustrated in achieving this goal, however, by the simple fact that a significant majority of Japanese do not want to revise Article 9 at all. Japanese do not believe a war will break out in the near future, whereas Abe stresses the need for security as long as North Korea’s Kim Jong Un orders tests of missiles that might carry nuclear warheads aimed at Japan.No impact to Japanese nationalismZack Beauchamp 14, Editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for and M.Sc in International Relations, "Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China," 2-7-14, ThinkProgress, , DOA: 9-7-2015, y2k **NCC Packet 2020But there are a number of reasons to think that the resurgent Japanese nationalism Abe represents isn’t going to force war during a crisis. For one thing, his government’s coalition partners would do their damndest to block escalation. New Komeito, whose support keeps Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in power, is an odd duck: pacifict Buddhist libertarians is way oversimplified, but it gets the point across. Regardless, they are extremely serious about their pacifism — it’s at the core of their political identity, and it inclines them towards a more generous stance towards Beijing. They’d exert a calming pressure in any crisis. Now, there are rumblings that the LDP and New Komeito may part political ways. But the cause of the split — a disagreement over rewriting or reinterpreting Article 9, the pacifist article in Japan’s constitution — reveals the broadest check on Japanese nationalism. Simply put, the Japanese people still retain much of the nation’s post-World War II pacifist core, and Abe’s government has governed accordingly. Mike Mochizuki, the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair at George Washington University, took a hard look at Japanese opinion about militarization in the Abe era. He and his coauthor, Samuel Porter, found enormous Japanese opposition to anything resembling a significant return to active military status. For instance, 56 percent of Japanese voters supported seeing the treaty as prohibiting “collective self-defense” (meaning defense of its allies when attacked). A miniscule 7 percent wanted to see Japanese troops “fighting on the frontlines with the U.S. military.” So why did they support Abe’s aggressive LDP? In a word, the economy. Japan’s citizens aren’t deeply aligned with the LDP philosophy — “83 percent,” according to Mochizuki and Porter, “felt that a party that can effectively oppose the LDP is necessary” in government. Rather, they threw out the previous government because the economy was in tatters. Sixty percent of Japanese voters want Abe to focus on the economy, while only 9 percent see foreign policy as the priority. Abe’s government, nationalist stunts aside, isn’t unaware of this reality. Because China is Japan’s number one trading partner, “reviving Japan’s economy will be inordinately difficult if fractious political relations with China are allowed to damage Japan–China economic relations,” Mochizuki and Porter argue. “If Sino–Japanese relations were to deteriorate further and lead to a more precipitous drop in Japanese exports to China, this would jeopardize Abe’s growth strategy and thereby threaten his political survival.” As a consequence, they conclude, the Prime Minister’s approach to the Senkaku dispute “will be measured and will not entail full-blown militarization,” let alone short term escalation. Abe and the LDP rank militaristic nationalism a distant second to the nation’s economic health.A2: US Draw-In---2NCNo US draw in---technicalities let the US avoid involvement Kim 16 [Tongfi Kim is Programme Director International Affairs / Assistant Professor at Vesalius College, “Report Part Title: Sino-Japanese disputes and the US-Japan Alliance”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (2016), ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Finally, it is conceivable that Japan requests the activation of the US-Japan alliance against China in maritime disputes unrelated to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For instance, a Congressional Research Service Report makes the following point: “It is unclear to what extent and in which situations the US-Japan Mutual Security treaty, which refers to an armed attack on the territories under the administration of Japan, would apply in the event of a Sino-Japanese military conflict over the two countries’ maritime boundary dispute. Regardless of the treaty’s technicalities and its interpretation, however, it is likely that Japanese policymakers and citizens would expect that the treaty would apply to any Sino-Japanese military conflict, including those involving the competing maritime claims.” (Manyin 2013: 7) In my view, however, as long as the military conflict is limited in scale, technicalities of the treaty should help the United States to avoid involvement without too much damage to its credibility.US won’t escalate---it will do everything it can to avoid it Kim 16 [Tongfi Kim is Programme Director International Affairs / Assistant Professor at Vesalius College, “Report Part Title: Sino-Japanese disputes and the US-Japan Alliance”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (2016), ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Finally, despite the repeated public reassurance from the US government, it is important to acknowledge that the United States has also sought to restrain Japan to avoid the risk of escalation in Sino-Japanese disputes. From publicly available information, the Obama administration seems to have been more cautious about provoking China in its early years, especially before tension rose in September 2010.27 In August 2010, for example, Kyodo News (2010) reported that the Obama administration had decided not to state explicitly that the US-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in order to avoid irritating China.28 Even after the Obama administration increased its public support to Japan in response to the rising tension in the East and South China Seas and perceived assertiveness of China, it still continued a cautious approach. For instance, a declassified email forwarded to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reveals that the US government urged Japan to “consult and advise Beijing on their plans” before Japan nationalized three of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012 (Kyodo 2016b). Before the US Congress included the wording “unilateral action of a third party” (meaning China) in the draft for the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the US government took a position to “oppose any unilateral action to change the status quo,” not distinguishing China and Japan (Oshima 2014). Although President Obama reconfirmed the applicability of the alliance to the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes in his remark in April 2014 discussed earlier, it should also be noted that the following passage was accompanying the commitment: “In our discussions, I emphasized with Prime Minister Abe the importance of resolving this issue peacefully – not escalating the situation, keeping the rhetoric low, not taking provocative actions, and trying to determine how both Japan and China can work cooperatively together. And I want to make that larger point. We have strong relations with China. They are a critical country not just to the region, but to the world.” (White House 2014a) In the questions and answers following the remark, President Obama further stated that he has “said directly to the Prime Minister [Abe] that it would be a profound mistake to continue to see escalation around this issue rather than dialogue and confidence-building measures between Japan and China” (White House 2014a).29 Let us now turn to the position of Japan.No US draw-in to Senkaku conflictDr. Xue Li 15 is Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Xu Yanzhuo received her doctorate from Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy. "The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea," 6-19-2015, Diplomat, , DOA: 9-7-2015, y2k **NCC Packet 2020In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing. However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. As a global hegemon, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories. This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea. However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and China’s comprehensive national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea. As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean). Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue. At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area. Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China. Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace. Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move. As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.”Senkakus: Solvency Article 5 Good---1NCArticle 5 threat stabilizes deterrence – anything less causes Chinese hegemony Hass et al 19 [Ryan Hass is a fellow and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, where he holds a joint appointment to the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, and Adam P. Liff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings, and Bruce Jones is vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow in its Project on International Order and Strategy, “THE STRESS TEST: JAPAN IN AN ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION”, October, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020RYAN HASS: President Obama was the first president in American history to declare2 that the Senkakus fall under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,3 so I would quibble a little bit with that observation. ADAM LIFF: That’s an important point. I think it’s also worth noting that President Obama’s statement largely reflected longstanding U.S. policy on the matter. As Lindsey noted, there were several very important developments in the Obama years that bolstered deterrence — such as the Guidelines update and the creation of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. But it also seems fair to note that it took the Obama administration quite a while to get to the point of making a presidential-level statement about Article V’s applicability to the Senkakus. More than a year-and-a-half passed between China’s decision to significantly ratchet up operational pressure in the islands’ contiguous zone and territorial seas (September 2012) and when President Obama made his April 2014 statement. And it was in that earlier, more volatile period that commentators in all three countries (and beyond) expressed serious concerns about escalation to a conflict. A lot happened before Obama made his statement, including a change of the de facto operational status quo in the waters around the islands, and the period before Obama’s statement at least temporarily seemed to raise questions from serious people about U.S. commitments — especially in Tokyo and Beijing. All that might have happened anyway, to be sure, but given the apparent stabilizing effect of the April 2014 statement after it was made, one wonders what might have happened if it had been made earlier. BRUCE JONES: It’s not a President Obama or President Trump issue. This will be portrayed as: what does it mean politically for any president of the United States to decide to go to war with China over uninhabited rocks? If I were the president’s political advisor, I would be aware that a lot of people would be asking questions about that. ADAM LIFF: When the crisis was at its peak — in terms of potential for escalation in late 2012 and 2013 — I remember a lot of folks were asking that same question. But as Richard may have been suggesting earlier, I think what China is doing in the East China Sea is about much more than some “uninhabited rocks” and, especially if Beijing succeeds — especially if it succeeds through coercion — the potential implications transcend these particular islands and touch on bigger picture issues of immense significance for both Japan and the United States. This should matter to the U.S. for a lot of reasons, I’d argue, but let me just note a couple: First, the leaders and public of Japan — the U.S.’s most important ally in what two successive administrations identify as the most important region for America’s future — widely see this dispute as a direct threat to Japan’s territory. Despite that, in my view, Japan has shown remarkable self-restraint. What are the second- and third- order consequences for the alliance and region if the U.S. appears ambivalent? Second, it’s a clear indicator of how China’s leaders are flexing China’s growing muscles when its neighbors’ interests are out of sync with their own. If Beijing achieves such a conspicuous change of the status quo unilaterally and with relative impunity — against Japan — the implications for China’s neighbors, many of whom are also U.S. security allies or partners, could be profound — to say nothing of the U.S.-Japan alliance itself. Finally, and perhaps a bit more abstractedly, China’s activities in the East and South China Seas are already having a corrosive effect on the legal and security order. Just look at the response of the region and world to the July 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling4 on China’s South China Sea claims. So, I don’t exactly agree that the competition unfolding in the East China Sea is just “over uninhabited rocks.” I think it’s much bigger than that.Article 5 Good---2NCAff crushes deterrence and gives china and NoKo the advantageSchoff and Bin 17 [Schoff is a senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and regional engagement, Japanese technology innovation, and regional trade and security dynamics, Li was a senior fellow working jointly in the Nuclear Policy Program and Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., "A Precarious Triangle: U.S.-China Strategic Stability and Japan," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11-7-2017, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020In Tokyo’s opinion, the Asia-Pacific region suffers from an asymmetry of vulnerability. China and North Korea have acquired an invulnerable regional strike posture with road-mobile missiles, while Japan and South Korea lack any means to put them at risk. In China’s case, this is combined with an increasingly large, sophisticated, and expeditionary conventional military capability. Beijing has expressed no interest in leveraging such theater dominance for tactical advantage, but some Japanese experts have argued that this military strength—together with China’s economic influence—is an integral part of its coercion tactics in the region. Forward deployed U.S. forces and U.S. strategic strike capabilities counterbalance much of China’s (and, to a lesser extent, North Korea’s) regional advantage, but this would tip back in China’s favor if U.S. nuclear forces are deterred out of the equation.US posture on defending the Senkaku’s prevents Chinese adventurismSchoff and Bin 17 [Schoff is a senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and regional engagement, Japanese technology innovation, and regional trade and security dynamics, Li was a senior fellow working jointly in the Nuclear Policy Program and Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., "A Precarious Triangle: U.S.-China Strategic Stability and Japan," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11-7-2017, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020U.S. scholars tend to see Japan’s defense capability and the U.S.-Japan alliance as contributing to crisis stability because it discourages Chinese attempts to use military means to resolve territorial or sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea. They also believe that high-level U.S. reassurances that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty help the situation, because it is clear that any attempt by China to seize the islands would be met with combined U.S. and Japanese military power. U.S. and Japanese scholars cautioned that China’s excessive maritime claims and aggressive enforcement actions—including the use of paramilitary forces and civilian fishing fleets—represented a form of escalation that endangers regional crisis stability by bringing the parties just one small step away from military conflict on a regular basis.Any weakness in the alliance means China takes advantage Day and Norton 19?[William Day has a masters in international affairs from UC Sandigo and a masters in defense and strategic studies form the US naval war college, David Norton is a program Support Assistant specializing in research for the US army, "Reinforcing Hub-and-Spoke: Addressing People's Republic of China Influence within U.S. Indo-Pacific Alliances," DTIC, 6/16/19, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020As evidenced by our case studies, we can see that China is responding to a deterioration in U.S. alliances. Despite security issues remaining unresolved, the PRC has chosen to adopt a strategy of cooption against U.S. allies when it detects a weakness in the bilateral alliance. We are not arguing, however, that this strategy of cooption will lead to an alliance breakaway in the near future. As with many geopolitical issues, this strategy utilized by China – and its implication for the United States – is nuanced and long-term. While these issues can be precipitated by leadership and policy shifts on both sides of the alliance, they are symptoms of broader, underlying structural issues. Strong debate exists as to what constitutes adequate burden sharing in these allied relationships. Certainly, countries such as Japan and South Korea are no longer the war-torn economies of 1950 and have developed capable militaries of their own. Furthermore, we must also examine whether bilateral agreements are still the most effective solution in a shifting geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific.Aff lets China dominate East AsiaKatagiri 19 [Nori Katagiri?is Associate Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University. He is also Visiting Research Fellow, Air Staff College, Japan Air Self-Defence Force and Fellow Cohort 4 of the Mansfield Foundation’s US-Japan Network for the Future. He received his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania., "Evolution of Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for Northeast Asia and Beyond," E-International Relations, 4-10-2019, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020Overall, ongoing bilateral interactions show that in the short run, China and Japan are likely to continue economic engagement and military balancing. Over the long run, however, China is poised to have a power advantage over Japan. China is growing faster economically, demographically, and militarily, and retains an advantage in hard power as well as the power to significantly influence events at the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. Japan has boasted of its soft power to make the country culturally attractive, is making a slow economic recovery of its own, and remains protected by American forces. This means, however, that if Trump were to withdraw the United States from active engagement in East Asia, not necessarily an unreasonable possibility, China would likely become the dominant player, especially in the military sphere.A2: Caps Escalation---1NCSino Japan war escalation is inevitable – even if the plan happensNavarro 16 [Peter Navarro?is a professor at the University of California-Irvine.? He is the author of?Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World, “Senkaku Suicide Scenarios: China vs. Ameripan”, 3-31, ] IanM **NCC Packet 2020Counterattack Scenarios Professor Lyle Goldstein of the US Naval War College says the US should do absolutely nothing. Those are rocks. They're not important to anyone. They're not important to Japan. They're not important to China. They're certainly not important to the United States. If, however, the US stays on the sidelines, a war between Japan and China could quickly go nuclear. Japanese forces, outnumbered though it may be, are quite capable and may, in the early stages of any war, get the upper hand. At that point, national pride – and perhaps survival of the Chinese Communist Party -- would likely dictate China bombing Tokyo. As a second scenario, Colonel T.X. Hammes of National Defense University suggests using the same kind of thermobaric weapons Russia has used to great effect in both Chechnya and Syria. Explains Hammes in this exchange with the interviewer: HAMMES: A thermobaric weapon is a weapon that spreads a fuel air mixture, and it disseminates fuel air all the way over, and then it detonates. So it goes into the holes in the ground, you breathe it in, and then it detonates and by over pressure, it kills. The Russians used thermobarics in Chechnya – hand-held RPG type thermobarics. They're a devastating weapon. INTERVIEWER: So if we wipe out every Chinese soldier on the islands, what happens on the mainland in terms of their nationalism? HAMMES: Well, that's the problem. Nationalism will get going. There's, no accounting for stupidity, so you have to be prepared to fight Here’s still a third “embargo” response option offered up by Brookings Institution scholar Michael O’Hanlon: Japanese and US naval and air forces establish a perimeter and starve out the invaders. Would today’s China allow itself to be so intimidated? The more likely response is some form of escalatory behavior, e.g., a barrage of antiship ballistic missiles raining down on Japanese and US surface ship or ultra-quiet Russian-designed Chinese subs launching torpedoes and cruise missiles.Relations: Sino JapanDouble Bind---1NCEither the current relations solve – or its impossible due to fundamental issues Johnson 19 [Jesse Johnson is a staff writer for the Japanese Times , "Tenuous ties: Few signs of substance behind warming Sino-Japanese relations as communist China marks 70th anniversary," Japan Times, 9/30/19, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020**As Washington and Beijing increasingly clash over global primacy, Japan’s own ties with communist-ruled China are experiencing an upswing — at least on the surface — ahead of Tuesday’s 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese leader Xi Jinping said in late June that ties have returned to a “normal track,” as both talked up a “new era of Japan-China relations” at the Osaka Group of 20 summit during the Chinese leader’s first visit to Japan as leader. Furthermore, the two leaders agreed that Xi will visit Japan again next spring — this time as a state guest. The display has stood in stark contrast to the famously icy handshake in 2014 between the two Asian rivals, which highlighted how chilly relations between the world’s second- and third-largest economies had become. That handshake, however, turned out to become something of a turning point, as the two leaders continued to push for a thaw, meeting several times on the sidelines of multilateral summits. The speed of this thaw has only increased since U.S. President Donald Trump embarked on a hard-line campaign against China in 2017, with Beijing warming to Tokyo to free up some strategic breathing room and even seeking advice from Japan on how to deal with the U.S. trade war. But despite all of that, there are few signs of substance beyond the gushing language between Tokyo and Beijing. While ties between the two Asian powerhouses have warmed in recent years, the improvement is shaky — a marriage of political convenience. Behind the rhetoric about a “mutually beneficial” relationship lies a fundamentally incompatible reality, observers say. “The thaw we’re seeing now is a short-term measure pursued by both sides, who know all too well their strategic rivalry in the broader context but who do not mind reaping some practical benefits to meet certain immediate needs at home,” said Yinan He, a professor at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania. But issues such as the territorial dispute over the Japan-controlled, China-claimed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which became a focal point of tension in the early 2010s, as well as Japan’s legacy of aggression in World War II, remain the elephants in the room. Contentious issues like these will remain potential triggers for a return to a more adversarial relationship, experts say, providing a wobbly foundation for any hopes of a longer-term improvement in ties. Rather, observers expect the rivals’ recent history to repeat itself — with the promises of a brighter future ultimately marred, as in the past, by an unshakable lack of trust.Double Bind---2NCEither squo relations solve, or good relations are structurally impossible Wijaya and Osaki 19 [Trissia Wijaya is a PhD Candidate at the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. Her research interests primarily lie in ASEAN-China-Japan relations, state-business relationship, and political economy in East Asia, Yuma Osaki is a PhD Candidate at the Graduate School of Law, Doshisha University. His research interests are in International Political Economy in the Asia-Pacific region, theoretical and empirical study of regional integration, international trade governance, and foreign policy in Japan and Australia., "Is This a True Thaw in Sino-Japanese Relations?," The Diplomat, 2/16/19, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020However, even though China and Japan hail a new level to their relationship, there remains a considerable gap between rhetoric and reality, as well as paradoxical effects of any significant moves within Sino-Japanese relations. Why is that the case? Love-Hate Relationships While private capital through trade and investment govern the trust between China and Japan, distrust reigns due to both the internal and external political structures. U.S. President Donald Trump weaponizing uncertainty in the U.S.-China trade war has undoubtedly pushed China and Japan closer together in terms of economic cooperation. Accompanied by a Japanese delegation of 500 people from a range of business sectors, Abe’s visit to China pledged new commitment to explore third-party markets for infrastructure projects jointly as well as to set up three-year currency swap agreement with China. Likewise, China is set to relax or lift an import ban on food from 10 Japanese areas including Tokyo. At the regional level, two countries have also pledged to speed up the negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). To what extent is the recent rapprochement sustainable, both politically and economically? At the macro level, one should not lose sight of the fact that there has always been a traditional pattern of Chinese diplomacy to turn to Japan (and Europe) when there is an issue in relations with the United States. This trend is compounded by the fact that China and Japan came to an impasse while reaching a consensus in defining the “new historical” starting point. During his visit to Beijing, Abe raised “three principles” that he expected to guide Sino-Japanese relations going forward: First, shifting from competition to collaboration; second, becoming partners instead of threats to each other; and third, developing a free and fair trade regime. Though acknowledging the contents, Beijing refrained from using the “three principles” term when touting a “new chapter” in the bilateral relationship. Chinese reluctance to fully acknowledge the third principle, in particular, simply indicates that Beijing yielded some of its political space to minimize tit-for-tat on the field of play with the United States. What is more, at the micro level as it has been at other times, the simplified politics using the “Japan card” that have been segued into interest group politics in China and vice versa, remain intact. For instance, prior to and after the Abe’s visit, instead of discussing the essence of the “new historical starting point” like prospective joint investments in infrastructure in third countries, the bottom line of public discussion on a vast scale tended more toward a series of flashbacks on Japan’s China ODA policy which somewhat exploited by particular interest groups. A recent Chinese-edition of the Global Times inflamed that it is rather China that had been generous by not insisting on war reparations and thus paved the way for Japanese companies and goods during the reform and opening period. In other words, while China acknowledged ODA’s contribution to its remarkable economic growth, Japan should be more thankful for having been a beneficiary of China’s development. Accordingly, when it comes to Japan, perception and approach toward China’s rising influence invariably come to mesh with double-layered forces, namely gaiatsu (foreign pressure) mainly from the United States and naiatsu (internal pressure) from domestic groups. On the one hand, the alleged characteristics of Japanese defensive nature on the U.S. gaiatsu might be a thorn amidst the diplomatic détente. Only one month after the state visit, following a decision by the the United States to prohibit government purchases of Huawei telecommunication products, Japan also revised its internal rules on procurement and effectively excluded Huawei and ZTE. On the other hand, the gap between rhetoric and reality of Sino-Japanese relations has been increasingly deepening due to the incongruences of naiatsu-led policies that consequently raised two-fold problems. Falling into the Inconsistency Trap Japan in the contemporary era of a top-down leadership guided by the prime minister’s office (kantei-syudou 官邸主導) could have broken away from the long-standing fragmented bureaucratic-led policymaking process (kanryou-syudou 官僚主導) particularly pertaining to Japan’s China policy. By contrast, it seems that Japan in fact has experienced serious setbacks due to an unprecedented dissent and competing interests within inner circle of policymakers, both in kantei and kanryou – illustrating how policy associated with China’s BRI have become much more complicated, politically dynamic, if not inconsistent. Bureaucrats from the Ministry of Economic, Trade, and Industry (METI) occupying most of the key Kantei posts find hard to reach consensus with their counterparts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). METI whose primary interest has revolved around Japan’s participation in the BRI so as to courting regional infrastructure development has been voicing different stances than the MOFA which is stridently protective of its bureaucratic turf in supporting the free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. Adding complexity, Abe’s personnel policy has been swayed by a faction led by Takaya Imai and Toshihiro Nikai appeared to pit against the camp anxious about security. Imai, an executive secretary to the prime minister and former METI official, who was directly appointed by Abe, has been considered the driving force behind Abe’s pragmatic moves on China. Imai even confessed that he is the one who rewrote the content of a personal letter from Abe to Xi in 2018, including the passage highlighting Japan’s conditional support for the BRI. During his visit to Beijing, as cited by the the People’s Daily, Abe even clearly mentioned the BRI as “promising.” This touched the nerve of some key groups in MOFA; just as a Chinese expert Shin Kawashima skeptically points out that Japan’s attempts to steer China towards such “global standard” would never readily be accepted by China. In short, vested interests cliques have clearly intruded into the foreign policy structure, which has resulted in the peculiar features of contemporary Japan’s China policy. The double stances of Japan – drifting toward a more pragmatic and proactive policy at the same time – raise doubts over the longevity of Sino-Japanese diplomatic détente. Hot Politics, Cold Economics Relatedly, the dawning recognition that Japan and China had done well economically under the long-standing paradigm, “cold politics, hot economics” (seirei keinetsu) may now be reversed. The current relationship seems rather “hot politics, cold economics” (seinetsu keirei). As mentioned above, while Japan now has practically accepted China’s BRI, albeit with several conditions, the seemingly-enthusiastic business sectors are pondering 52 infrastructure projects. By and large, it is because Japanese business and Chinese SOEs, two key pillars of infrastructure collaboration, are completely and diametrically opposed in their views and perceptions about the long-term investment risks. Japan holding back a consortium with a Chinese counterpart for a $6.9 billion Thailand rail project last December epitomizes this kind of “hot politics and cold economics” on the infrastructure nexus. Although it was expected to be a symbolic model of joint project from various accounts, the 220 km rail project linking the three main airports of Suvarnabhumi, Don Mueang, and U-Tapao in one hour as well as part of core infrastructure projects in Thailand – the Eastern Economic Corridor, was apparently dismissed from the memorandum of cooperation on 52 joint projects signed. The Thai conglomerate, Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group and the China Railway Construction Company, initially planned to collaborate with Japanese firms like Itochu Cooperation and Hitachi supported by the JBIC for the project. Nevertheless, just as happened in the case of Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, the Thai government refused to provide a government guarantee and disagreed on Japan’s second proposal of a semi-high speed rail to minimize construction costs. Eventually, Itochu and Hitachi opted out of the projects. Another Japanese key stakeholder in the railway business, the Japan Railway Group is reluctant to take numerous high-risk projects even as they are simultaneously focusing on Indian high-speed railway projects. What can be implied from this case is the fact that Sino-Japanese collaboration in the infrastructure realm, which ought to be the key pillar of two countries’ mending relations, instead turned out to be an extra headwind regardless of a fair political wind. Indeed, the basis of policy paradigm currently underpinning two Asian giants’ relationships is at a crossroad.Cant Solve---General---1NCThere are too many hurdles to good relations – the aff cant resolve themKatagiri 19 [Nori Katagiri?is Associate Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University. He is also Visiting Research Fellow, Air Staff College, Japan Air Self-Defence Force and Fellow Cohort 4 of the Mansfield Foundation’s US-Japan Network for the Future. He received his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania., "Evolution of Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for Northeast Asia and Beyond," E-International Relations, 4-10-2019, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020These issues across the security and cyber dimensions have shaped the tension between the two, while still providing reasons for cooperation. To add to this already complex picture, Sheila Smith argues that several critical political issues have separated the two in the past few years – including historical disagreements, food safety, as well as political rhetoric on both sides. She points out a few contentious issues including Japanese politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, China’s export of poisoned dumplings, and the territorial disputes in the East China Sea. None of these offer a clear-cut path to compromise, yet they shape the way they interact with each other (Smith 2016).Cant Solve---General---2NCAlt causes to bad relations Vogel 19 [Professor Ezra F. Vogel?is the Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University. He has had a long association with Harvard, receiving his Ph.D. in sociology there in 1958, and then teaching at the university from 1967 to 2000, “Japan and China: Facing History,” Chapter 11 pg. 588 of the book, 7/30/19, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020The concerns that Chinese leaders have about Japan are reflected in the issues?they raise about history. The three most common issues raised by Chinese?leaders are: visits by Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan’s?failure to acknowledge the horrors of the Nanjing Massacre, and the failure of?Japanese textbooksZero chance of the aff solving relations – its impossible Katagiri 19 [Nori Katagiri?is Associate Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University. He is also Visiting Research Fellow, Air Staff College, Japan Air Self-Defence Force and Fellow Cohort 4 of the Mansfield Foundation’s US-Japan Network for the Future. He received his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania., "Evolution of Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for Northeast Asia and Beyond," E-International Relations, 4-10-2019, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020China and Japan regularly hold high-level bilateral talks and routinely participate in multilateral discussions about regional cooperation, but trust deficits keep the two nations apart. In China, the CCP has managed to contain nationalist sentiment and public demand for greater autonomy to the extent that allows the Party to continue to pursue aggressive economic development projects. The CCP has done so by making efforts to restrain its citizens by cooling public anger towards Japan (Reilly 2011). In Japan, however, incidents like the high-profile, uncivil demonstrations against Japanese businesses in 2012 remain vivid in the minds of the Japanese, and CCP’s effort to rectify its image seems too political to be true. Furthermore, to most Japanese eyes, the CCP’s effort is hardly sufficient. China’s supposed restraint has failed to convince ordinary Japanese that China has become friendlier by any measure. Public surveys constantly put both nations’ public opinions of each other at low points, and without mutual efforts, that reality is unlikely to improve anytime soon. The cyber hacks and rivalry over the islands make it quite hard for both nations to improve relations quickly. The international community can, for now at least, rest easy, as socioeconomic interdependence and deterrence against military strikes prevents further deterioration of relations.Cant Solve---Timeframe---2NCIt would take decades to resolve historical mistrust Vogel 19 [Professor Ezra F. Vogel?is the Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University. He has had a long association with Harvard, receiving his Ph.D. in sociology there in 1958, and then teaching at the university from 1967 to 2000, “Japan and China: Facing History,” Chapter 11 pg. 599 of the book, 7/30/19, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020It is unrealistic, considering the depth of the historical passions involved,?that China and Japan will quickly develop feelings of trust and become close?friends. That may be a goal for several decades in the future. A reasonable goal?for the next decade would be to manage their relations in a straightforward, frank, and businesslike way so that the two countries can become reliable partners. It is unrealistic to expect that China and Japan in the next decade will enjoy “hot politics.” But if they can continue to?expand?their?cooperation?in?such?enterprises as the Belt and Road Initiative, in developing joint projects for solving environmental issues, and in multinational organizations, it is not impossible that they could achieve “warm politics.”Rels High Now---1NCNo reason to vote aff – China Japan relations are at an all time high – COVID provesNakamura 20 [Kazuki Nakamura is a member of the Young Leaders Program at Pacific Forum. He has previously assisted with research at New York University and UNCTED., "Is the Japanese Public on Board With the ‘New Era’ of China-Japan Relations?," The Diplomat, 6-10-20, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020The relationship between the United States and China keeps deteriorating over various issues, from the U.S.-China trade war to the COVID-19 pandemic to the new Hong Kong national security law. At the same time, however, the Sino-Japan bilateral relationship seems to be getting better. Japan’s Shinzo Abe made an official visit to China in 2019, the first by a Japanese prime minister in seven years. During the visit, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Abe?agreed?to accelerate cooperation between China and Japan for a “new era.” This agreement was reflected most recently in the recent positive actions of both sides to work together to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. China and Japan have shown their willingness to stick with the promise to develop a “new era” for the bilateral relationship by finding areas for cooperation, not conflict, during the global pandemic.Rels High Now---2NCJapan China relations are not a problem – Economic incentives proveTachikawa 20 [Tomoyuki Tachikawa is a staff writer at the Japan Times news agency, "China cozies up to Japan and South Korea as ties with U.S. sour over coronavirus," Japan Times, 5-17-2020, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020While China’s tensions with the United States and Australia have been sharply intensifying over its handling of the new coronavirus outbreak, the Asian power has been apparently aiming to bolster ties with its neighbors — Japan and South Korea. As relations with Washington are expected to worsen at least until the U.S. presidential election later this year, Beijing has been making friendly overtures toward Tokyo and Seoul with an eye on economic revival after the pandemic passes, diplomatic sources said. Many foreign affairs experts are carefully watching what kind of foreign policy China will adopt at the postponed annual session of the country’s parliament, the National People’s Congress, scheduled to be convened next Friday. Recently, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has accused Beijing of failing to curb the spread of the virus, first detected late last year in the central Chinese city of Wuhan, and of not sharing relevant information in a timely manner. Trump has said the United States could even “cut off the whole relationship” with China, while threatening to impose tariffs as punishment for Beijing’s alleged mishandling of the epidemic in the critical early months. Amid growing uncertainties over ties with the United States, “China is really eager to strengthen cooperation with Japan to revive the economy, which was hit hard by the virus outbreak,” a diplomatic source said. “For Japan, China is an essential trading partner. Japan also thinks the economy cannot rebound without cooperation with China. They are unlikely to be willing to ignite a controversy,” he added. In March, the Chinese Foreign Ministry abruptly announced a temporary ban on foreigners entering the country. The measure has applied even to those who hold a valid visa or residence permit. Beijing, however, has sounded out Tokyo on partially easing the restriction so that businesspeople who test negative for the new virus can travel between the countries, Japanese government sources said. China has already started to allow the entry of South Korean businesspeople meeting certain conditions in an attempt to ensure a smooth supply chain, which has been seriously disrupted in the wake of the virus spread. President Xi Jinping was quoted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as telling South Korean President Moon Jae-in during a phone conversation on Wednesday that Beijing and Seoul “were the quickest to set up a joint response mechanism, and have maintained a track record of zero cross-border infections.” “The two sides also opened the first ‘fast-track lane’ for urgently needed travels without compromising control efforts to facilitate the unimpeded operation of the industrial chain, supply chain and logistic chain in the region,” Xi told Moon. A source familiar with the situation in East Asia said, “For the time being, China’s diplomacy may be determined by how much some countries can contribute to the economy. I’ll be paying attention to what Foreign Minister Wang Yi says at the National People’s Congress.” Tokyo has also taken a softer stand against China than other nations, as the governments of the world’s second- and third-biggest economies have been trying to improve their ties by effectively shelving bilateral rows.Status quo Japan-China relations are high Nagy 19 [Stephen R. Nagy is a senior associate professor at the International Christian University., "A reset in Japan-China relations?," Japan Times, 10-24-2019, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020Comparing the state of Japan-China relations in the wake of Shinzo Abe’s return to the prime ministership in December 2012 to today, the bilateral relationship has come back to a semblance of normality. During this transition period, we had Japanese and Chinese ambassadors dueling on the BBC, comparing each other’s political leaders to the Harry Potter villain Voldemort in a farcical war of words. We had the Chinese government hold the 70th anniversary of the victory of the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression,” and Abe himself was vilified “a political villain, who was much like the terrorists and fascists on the commonly seen blacklists.” During the same period according to the Defense Ministry, verbal jousting has been accompanied by Japanese jets being scrambled to intercept Chinese military aircraft approaching its airspace 638 times in fiscal year 2018, an increase of 27.6 percent compared to 2017. These incursions into Japanese airspace continue to occur alongside regular incursions by Chinese government and other vessels into Japan’s territorial sea and associated contiguous zone. Fast forward to the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the “new era of Sino-Japan relations” narrative begins to emerge in President Xi Jinping’s China, paving the way for the historic and long anticipated meeting in Beijing on Oct. 26, 2018, between Abe and Xi. These contradictions raise many questions as to what exactly has changed in the bilateral relationship. Looking through the lens of a glass half full, the Maritime Self-Defense Force has conducted goodwill exercises with China’s navy for the first time in eight years. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Development Bank to promote cooperation between them for projects in third country markets where Japanese and Chinese corporations are involved. This thaw in the area of security and cooperation in infrastructure are positive developments for both states. The goodwill exercises, although superficial, are a step forward in re-establishing defense exchanges after the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands.Rearmament: Solvency ***Any aff that reads rearmament link to the Japan SoPo DA***Alliance Prevents---1NCOnly US commitment prevents Japan from striking out on their own – Large-scale remil outside the alliance structure causes escalatory conflicts that draw in the USGerald Curtis 13, Burgess Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, "Japan's Cautious Hawks", Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr2013, Vol. 92 Issue 2, p77-86, DOA: 9-13-15, y2k **NCC Packet 2020Ever since World War II, that pragmatism has kept Japan in an alliance with the United States, enabling it to limit its military's role to self-defense. Now, however, as China grows ever stronger, as North Korea continues to build its nuclear weapons capability, and as the United States' economic woes have called into question the sustainability of American primacy in East Asia, the Japanese are revisiting their previous calculations. In particular, a growing chorus of voices on the right are advocating a more autonomous and assertive foreign policy, posing a serious challenge to the centrists, who have until recently shaped Japanese strategy. In parliamentary elections this past December, the Liberal Democratic Party and its leader, Shinzo Abe, who had previously served as prime minister in 2006-7, returned to power with a comfortable majority. Along with its coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, the LDP secured the two-thirds of seats needed to pass legislation rejected by the House of Councilors, the Japanese Diet's upper house. Abe's victory was the result not of his or his party's popularity but rather of the voters' loss of confidence in the rival Democratic Party of Japan. Whatever the public's motivations, however, the election has given Japan a right-leaning government and a prime minister whose goals include scrapping the constitutional constraints on Japan's military, revising the educational system to instill a stronger sense of patriotism in the country's youth, and securing for Tokyo a larger leadership role in regional and world affairs. To many observers, Japan seems to be on the cusp of a sharp rightward shift. But such a change is unlikely. The Japanese public remains risk averse, and its leaders cautious. Since taking office, Abe has focused his attention on reviving Japan's stagnant economy. He has pushed his hawkish and revisionist views to the sidelines, in part to avoid having to deal with divisive foreign policy issues until after this summer's elections for the House of Councilors. If his party can secure a majority of seats in that chamber, which it does not currently have, Abe may then try to press his revisionist views. But any provocative actions would have consequences. If, for example, he were to rescind statements by previous governments that apologized for Japan's actions in World War II, as he has repeatedly said he would like to do, he not only would invite a crisis in relations with China and South Korea but would face strong criticism from the United States as well. The domestic political consequences are easy to predict: Abe would be flayed in the mass media, lose support among the Japanese public, and encounter opposition from others in his own party. In short, chances are that those who expect a dramatic change in Japanese strategy will be proved wrong. Still, much depends on what Washington does. The key is whether the United States continues to maintain a dominant position in East Asia. If it does, and if the Japanese believe that the United States' commitment to protect Japan remains credible, then Tokyo's foreign policy will not likely veer off its current track. If, however, Japan begins to doubt the United States' resolve, it will be tempted to strike out on its own. The United States has an interest in Japan's strengthening its defensive capabilities in the context of a close U.S.-Japanese alliance. But Americans who want Japan to abandon the constitutional restraints on its military and take on a greater role in regional security should be careful what they wish for. A major Japanese rearmament would spur an arms race in Asia, heighten regional tensions (including between Japan and South Korea, another key U.S. ally), and threaten to draw Washington into conflicts that do not affect vital U.S. interests. The United States needs a policy that encourages Japan to do more in its own defense but does not undermine the credibility of U.S. commitments to the country or the region.Alliance Prevents---2NCPerceived loss of US presence causes Japanese remilitarizationCéSar Chelala 15, Md, Phd, the Foreign Correspondent For Middle East Times International (Australia), "Abe's Wrong Rush To Militarization," 9-13-2015, Common Dreams, , DOA: 9-13-2015, y2k **NCC Packet 2020More recently, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for a new interpretation of those policies, asking that they allow for “collective self-defense” and for Japan to pursue a more active deterrence policy. Because of what many perceive as a decline in American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan may want to fill the power vacuum left by the US and play a more assertive role in regional security. To that effect, it has reached some military agreements with countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam that are engaged in territorial disputes with China. At the same time, Abe wants to revitalize Japan’s economy and meet increasing social security demands resulting from a worsening demographic situation. According to the Financial Times, in January 2015 Japan had reached a Debt/GDP ratio of 245, placing Japan as the most indebted nation. It is possible that a redefined military force would make Japan more assertive in the international arena while at the same time, through increased military sales, it would receive additional income to help balance its economy. On 2014, the Abe government lifted the ban on arms exports and hosted a trade show on military defense systems. On July 16, Japan’s lower house passed Abe’s security legislation, which potentially allows the use of troops in conflicts outside Japan, and sent it to the upper house. Not everybody agrees with Prime Minister Abe’s new push to militarization. Last June, Seiichiro Murakami, a veteran lawmaker from Mr. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, wept during a press conference while denouncing Abe’s policies. “As a person who was educated under the postwar education system, I believe in the principle of pacifism, the sovereignty of people and respect of basic human rights should be something absolutely cannot be changed,” he said. Rearming Japan carries also the risk of igniting a regional arms race of unpredictable but certainly not good consequences for peace in the region. Given the extreme volatility in the region, Japan would do well to follow the precepts established in Article 9 of its Constitution.Reduced engagement causes remilitarizationLamont Colucci 15, Lamont Colucci is an associate professor of political science at Ripon College and a senior fellow in national security affairs for the American Foreign Policy Council. "Great Power Conflict: Will It Return?," January 2015, World Affairs Journal, , DOA: 9-15-2015, y2k **NCC Packet 2020Unlike the other great powers with which it competes, Japan is hampered by a Constitution that the United States wrote and also depends on America for large areas of its security. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is continuing the evolution away from both of these dependencies by slowly returning Japan to its intrinsic geopolitical imperatives. If Washington signals to Tokyo that it is downsizing its protections, Japan will accelerate its strategic independence. Traditionally, Japan’s grand strategy has been dictated by the need to secure the home islands and neighboring ones; control the strategic avenues to and from Japan for military and economic needs; ensure adequate resources for its economy and markets for its finished goods; and prevent a breakdown of domestic social order. The long rule of the Shogunate, stretching back to the early seventeenth century, was inward-looking, and broken by the imposition of foreign powers, notably the United States in 1854. Japan understood it needed to expand or expire. This thinking, in its extreme form, reached its apex in the 1930s, when Japan started World War II, and was tempered only by the postwar American occupation, followed by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the US security guarantee. Article 9 renounced war and the ability of the Japanese state to possess a military, although this was changed in 1954 to allow a “self-defense force,” which began to resemble a great power military. For decades, Japan was governed by the Yoshida and Fukuda doctrines, which essentially enshrined these pacifist policies. Since 2012, however, the Abe doctrine has introduced an incredible transformation, in which Japan is asserting itself once again as it did prior to World War I. Much has been made of Abe’s 2013 “five principles,” chief among them the protection of universal values, such as freedom, democracy, and basic human rights; the guarantee that free and open seas are governed by laws and rules and welcoming the US “rebalancing” in the region; and the promotion of trade and investment, as well as the flow of goods, capitals, people, and services, through various economic partnership networks. However, the real change is deeper and more important. Also in 2013, the Japanese Cabinet, under Abe’s direction, approved Japan’s first national security strategy, made more possible by the creation of a Japanese National Security Council. In large part a response to China’s aggressive moves in the Pacific over areas such as the Senkaku Islands, the strategy argues that Japan needs to make a more “proactive contribution to peace,” i.e., it needs to contribute more to its military alliance with America despite its pacifist constitution. The strategy amounts to a plan for a five-year military buildup. Spending will increase to $240 billion, an increase of about five percent over the previous five-year plan. The document promises that Japan will respond “calmly and resolutely to the rapid expansion and step-up of China’s maritime and air activities.” It also declares North Korea a “grave and imminent threat.” It calls for the cultivation of “love of country” in Japan, and for “expanding security education” in universities. More controversially, it also promises to review Japan’s self-imposed ban on arms exports. Under the plan, Japan will transform its Self-Defense Forces into a full-fledged military, primarily by investing heavily in advanced war-fighting technology, space weapons, ballistic missile defense, unmanned aerial vehicles, a more mobile ground force, and expanded naval and coastal capabilities.Rearmament: Rearm BadGeneral---1NCJapanese military buildup turns the aff – China would hate itLiff 18 [Adam P. Liff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. He is also an assistant professor of East Asian international relations at Indiana University’s Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, "China and the US Alliance System," Cambridge Core, March 2018, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020In addition, since 2010, tensions over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands 钓 鱼岛 in Chinese), claimed by both countries but administered by Japan, coupled with major security reforms and efforts to tighten the alliance during Abe Shinzo’s second term of office (2012–present), are increasingly salient. Japan under Abe is seen as behaving provocatively on sensitive historical issues and actively pursuing “militarization,” while (allegedly) simultaneously and unabashedly “hyping China threats” (chaozuo Zhongguo weixielun 炒作中国威 胁论) in order to bolster domestic support for these measures.40 Since Japan’s so-called “nationalization” (guoyouhua 国有化) of the islands in September 2012, circumstances have worsened precipitously. In this context, Beijing interprets Tokyo improving its JSDF capabilities and tightening US– Japan security ties as directly threatening China’s territorial sovereignty – an increasingly incendiary flashpoint in Chinese domestic politics under Xi Jinping. One Chinese government analyst castigated Japan’s “unprecedented assertiveness,” blaming Abe for “the most serious [bilateral] confrontation of the past four decades” and accusing him of seeking to “encircle China” by “intervention” in the South China Sea, and “provok[ing] some ASEAN members to confront China.” According to this view, the allies are pursuing “partners globally to contain the rising China [sic].”41General---2NCJapanese Rearmament causes war with SoKo and ChinaBhide 19 [Jonah Bhide is a second year global policy studies masters candidate at the LBJ School where he studies the intersection of US national security and foreign policy. He interned with the US Military Delegation to NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium in the summer of 2019. Jonah graduated from the US Air Force Academy in May 2018 with a BS in Political Science, "Rearming A Forbidden Military: Japan’s Self-Defense Force & Constitutional Revisions – Baines Report," No Publication, 2-15-2019, , DS] **NCC Packet 2020China’s political elite are quite conscious of the implications of constitutional revisions and accompanying buildup. In the past China has been critical of the disparity between law and military action, labeling Japan’s military activities a brutal violation of the pacifist constitution. Revisions would render these criticisms of military expansion irrelevant, but sources of tension would remain. Both Japan and China dispute ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and both share still-raw attitudes regarding the Second World War. And given China’s condemnation of joint and independent UK-Japan freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, Japan’s military activities will continue to be a significant regional tension. It is entirely likely Chinese information operations may target Japanese public opinion to mobilize it against the revisions and other defense policies this year. Similar agitations between South Korea (ROK) and Japan exist, including ownership disputes over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. Military tensions between the ROK recently flared when a ROK destroyer allegedly locked-on to a Japanese P-1 patrol aircraft, resulting in both sides terminating working-level talks to resolve issue. Seoul raised additional claims of Japanese aircraft buzzing (flying less than 150 meters above a vessel) ROK naval vessels, violations Japan has denied. As Japan revises its constitution to reflect its military expansion, higher military operations tempos are likely to increase the frequency of such incidents, which may spill over into other non-military elements of Japan-ROK relationsRemil causes widespread Asian war that goes nuclear and undermines Japan-ROK relations – Abe's recent moves are brink and presence is keyKim and Wong 15 (Jaehyung Kim, Kela Wong, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, "The Evolving Security Challenges and the Geopolitical Necessities of the US Military Bases in Japan and the Republic of Korea" ) **NCC Packet 2020Most visibly, the deteriorated Japan-ROK relations would hamper the efficient cooperation among the US and its allies in coping with security challenges in East Asia (Chanlett-Avery, Manyin, Reinhart, Nelson & Williams, 2015). The region is currently experiencing various shifts of security strategies and partnership: 1) The PRC and ROK framed the Free Trade Agreement and would further expand their rapport beyond economic realm. 2) The DPRK reached out to Russia and Japan and gained economic resources to further develop its military capabilities and strategic posture. 3) Russia, with planned joint military drills, would further encroach into East Asia with military measures. 4) Japan established the détente with Russia and made geostrategic rapprochement with the DPRK. 5) The PRC would continue to strengthen its A2/AD strategy while fostering its regional influence beyond borders and economic measures. Accordingly, current geopolitical environment requires allied approaches towards security based on the multilateral-basis common understanding of the challenges because individual strategies could heighten the uncertainties. However, the task for the US is quite challenging: the antagonism was intrinsically ingrained into the South Korean national identity, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s historical perception rather praised its “pan-Asiatic” efforts during WWII while denying the sole responsibility of wartime aggression (Olsen, 2008).4243 The Abe administration and LDP’s essential problem is that its erroneous perception of wartime history provokes a misguided resentment from the PRC and ROK against the Japanese nation, while invoking domestic controversies as well. Nevertheless, Japan and ROK’s mutual alienation would not only dissipate the existing resources but also complicate and destabilize the security by provoking neighboring countries in East Asia. Thus, the necessities for Japan-ROK rapprochement are dire for the US in countering existing challenges despite fundamental difficulties. Furthermore, although not explicit, the revision of article nine could reorient and develop the SDF posture in ways, and to the extent, in which Japan impairs the current efficacies of the US-Japan alliance and creates conflict direct towards the US national interest. With budget sequestration and increasing security burdens, the US government demanded increased role, or budget, from Japan for regional security (The Department of Defense [DoD], 2014; Vosse, Drifte and Blechinger-Talcott, 2014). Coupled with increasing global threats, the rearmament appeared compelling and inevitable for Japan (Matthews, 2003; Midford, 2011). 44 However, the constitutional revision substantially relates to the historical perception of the wartime context, and Prime Minister Abe’s militarization is fundamentally based upon the jingoistic interpretation of its wartime history. Unlike Japanese general public, the LDP’s wartime historical perspective was built into the benevolent fascist ideology by which the conservative politicians and bureaucrats have argued Japan’s wartime efforts as “inescapable and altruistic holy war” (Dower, 2012, pp. 112-31). The LDP’s victimhood of itself derived from the victor’s justice of the Allies and the world order that drove everyone into a brutality (Dower, 2012, pp. 112-23). Also, the LDP leadership tended to dismiss the public opinion, when differed from its own, in guiding the national development (Midford, 2011). 45Because of this, the elitist LDP leadership, despite the opposition from the public, may develop outcomes that go beyond the reach of the US soft-power, which would easily involve neighboring issues and evolve into a spiral of international conflicts just as the outbreak of the WWI in 1914. Essentially, the Abe administration’s militarization policy would destabilize the regional security and thereby produce complex scenarios for the US because current alliance system does not ensure stable relationship for tomorrow Conclusive Analysis of the Current Capabilities Regarding the comprehensive defense posture, the US still maintains a visible superiority over the PRC, Russia and the DPRK. The PRC’s military is not inherently hostile to the region’s security atmosphere, but its increasing military potential should caution the neighboring countries, particularly Russia and Japan. The PRC’s defensive measures would hardly cause destabilization, unless by miscommunication. Russia’s military modernization has also gradually garnered the growing potential of the Russian military and helped its military expansion towards the Far East. However, despite the lack of overall capacities, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy portended the possibilities of involving offensive measures of conventional weapons and the WMDs in potential conflicts. Additionally, the DPRK’s symmetric and conventional weapons capabilities are great concerns for the ROK’s existence and the security order in East Asia, while concurrently challenging the US national security. Without having to surpass the US military might, the essential threats of the DPRK’s military ultimately come from its offensive nature towards the ROK and the US. The DPRK’s asymmetric weapons that range from nuclear weapons to cyber warfare are therefore threatening to the region’s stability. The highly offensive measures of the DPRK’s SOFs, including the potential invasion of the ROK, are of particular threat. Therefore, the primary concern in the region’s security environment lies in the US commitments to Japan and the ROK. Nevertheless, the evolving strategies in the ROK and Japan complicated the security atmosphere and fractured the US security efforts in East Asia. Initially, the ROK’s strategic hedging towards the PRC in an attempt to mitigate the inter-Korean conflicts shaped the intra-regional relations complex. The ROK’s decision to prioritize diplomatic channels over military development subsequently made both the US and the ROK vulnerable to the dynamic security challenges in the Korean peninsula. Moreover, with corresponding weapons acquisitions, Japan’s militarization policy is intrinsically disposed to destabilize the security status quo in East Asia. Japan’s strategic shift towards Russia and the DPRK actually could give rise to the possibility of triangular strategic ties among the three states. Therefore, most pragmatic concerns for the US national security reside in Japan-ROK bilateral relations. The internal context of Japan and the ROK revealed the misguided representation of each other, which has been ingrained into both societies. However, the security cooperation between Japan and the ROK remains essential to the US security conditions because it not only mitigates regional military miscalculations but also maximizes the allied cooperation to enhance the intra-regional relations. In East Asia, the security environment experiences turbulent currents of evolving strategies and weapons developments. Contrary to conventional opinion, PRC’s comprehensive military developments and the WMDs should not be of significant concern to the US and the region’s security. On the other hand, the shifting strategies of Russia, the DPRK and Japan fundamentally challenged the status quo and invoke concerns for the US. Overall, the DPRK’s aggression could be only visible threat, directed towards the US national security. Nevertheless, except for the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, the US is not subject to a serious security challenge from others, although still liable to the provocations that would arise from shifting strategies and partnership. Conclusion In reconsideration of the US military bases located in the ROK and Japan, the most pressing concerns of the US lie in the security interests in East Asia, an increasingly complex and changing environment. In order to evaluate the options for the region, the US must assess the shifting balance of the East Asian countries and the US stance on emerging issues and possible threats to the security of the US homeland and allies. The rise of the PRC and its increase in political, economic, military, and diplomatic power is concerning to the US due to the PRC’s lack of transparency, but currently does not pose a critical threat to US security and the stability of the region. The PRC’s internally directed goals do not directly provoke a clash of interests between the PRC and the US, and ultimately, the military capabilities of the US remain superior to the PLA’s military growth and advances in the extreme case of confrontation. Russia’s rebalance to Asia has caused a significant shift in the political environment. While Russia's national security objectives and capabilities do not pose an existential threat to the security of the US and its allies in East Asia, Russia's strategic and diplomatic developments in line with the goal to return the country to Soviet era world status has the potential to destabilize the region's security environment. In spite of Russia's military modernization efforts, the country’s military capabilities in East Asia remain inferior to the US military. The DPRK’s nuclear program, asymmetric warfare capabilities, national goals and political rhetoric regarding reunification are the greatest immediate threat to regional stability and security and the US’s security responsibilities to defend the ROK and Japan. The nature of these security threats posed by the DRPK and Russia in the East Asia region require maintenance of a physical US military presence through the military bases, but allow for a reassessment of the military structures in place in the ROK and Japan. In regards to the PRC, the best option to approach the issues in the region is not through intimidation and increasing military power projection in East Asia to counter the growing military capacities, but to encourage dialogue and cooperation with the PRC. To counter the growing threats posed by the DPRK and Russia, the US should build-up allies’ military power and increase cooperation between Japan and the ROK to foster a more collaborative security environmentRearm causes insecurity Yuki Yoshida 13, Yuki Yoshida is a graduate student studying peacebuilding and conflict resolution at the Center for Global Affairs, New York University, "Japan's Militarization Would Threaten Regional Security," 8-8-2013, No Publication, , DOA: 9-16-2015, y2k **NCC Packet 2020Considering that Japan faces imminent threats in East Asia, including territorial disputes with China, Russia, and South Korea, and North Korea's nuclear threat, reinforcing military capability by establishing a national defense force would be rational. Also, Japan should no longer depend fully on the US as a safeguard. That being said, Japan's increase in military capability would most likely exacerbate regional security dilemma. In other words, security for Japan becomes insecurity for neighboring states, which eventually turn into insecurity for all. This could become an arms race among China, North and South Korea, and Russia and increase the cost of potential armed conflict. Additionally, enhancing military power will inevitably lead to increase in domestic taxes, which will create grievance among citizens. Moreover, if even a single Japanese soldier is killed in battlefield, the masses would soon lose confidence in the LDP, and the credibility of the party will be questioned, causing domestic instability. Furthermore, most importantly, the constitution amendment means betrayal of the determination of our grandparents not to repeat war and aspiration for peace. Thus, although amendment of Article 9 would seemingly improve security situation surrounding Japan, it will produces a number of undesirable consequences.Plan’s rearmament is perceived as unilateral Japanese militarization---that undermines stabilityJohn Lee 13 is a fellow at Sydney University's Centre for International Security Studies and a non-resident scholar at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. He was part of the Australian delegation at the Shangri-La Dialogue. "Japan's 'Pacifist' Militarization," 6-6-2013, WSJ, , DOA: 9-13-2015, y2k **NCC Packet 2020All that lies in the future, however. For now, Washington may welcome such talk, since the U.S. has long hoped its allies would take on a greater share of the security burden in Asia. To American ears, there is nothing menacing about Mr. Onodera's statement that Tokyo wants to play an enhanced role in ensuring peace and stability, upholding the norms of democracy, policing freedom of navigation and ensuring rule of law. But other governments in the region will be both intrigued and anxious about an awakening Japan, and Beijing may be downright irate. So Tokyo must work at reassuring its neighbors about its new strategy. For a start, it is critical that Japan receive America's blessing for enhancing its strategic role. Japanese military renewal has to be seen as one part of an integrated strategy of cooperation with Washington, since the U.S. is widely recognized (at least by every major regional player except China) as the primary force for stability in the region. Any perception of a unilateral Japanese bid for greater influence—driven by a dormant but still virulent nationalism—will be resisted by wary Southeast Asian countries. NATO: AffRussia AdvRussia defensiveRussia is not revisionist – they aren’t seeking domination, but responding rationally to US efforts to upset the balance of power Golovics 17 (József Golovics, PhD student, Corvinus University of Budapest, International Relations, Multidisciplinary Doctoral School. “Contemporary Realism in Theory and Practice. The Case of the Ukrainian Crisis,” Polgári Szemle, ) **NCC Packet 2020**Summary This paper analyzes the Ukrainian crisis through the lenses of the contemporary realist schools of the theory of international relations. One the one hand, it is claimed that Russian responses were motivated by the logic of the balance of powers, upset by actions taken by the West. On the other hand, we prove that realism still has significant explanatory power in the context of 21st century. The significance of realist thinking in international relations is unquestionable. Realism has been the predominant theory after the emergence of international relations as an academic discipline, and despite harsh criticism it has considerable relevance in the globalized world of the 21st century (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014:99–112). Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as the sole theory, as several schools of realism exist parallel to one another. Nowadays, and especially after the end of the Cold War, three different schools predominate the realist way of thinking: defensive realism, offensive realism and neo-classical realism. In this paper it is claimed that realism undoubtedly has a significant explanatory power in the field of international relations, however, different schools of realism emphasize different aspects of practical phenomena. As a result, a weakness of one theory can be the strength of the other, but at the end of the day, realism as a bunch of different theories suitable for explaining and interpreting the events of world politics. To prove the above claims, the recent Ukrainian crisis is analyzed. Theorists and analysts interpret this crisis differently. One may claim that Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggressive personality and antidemocratic attitude is responsible for the recent events, while others might blame Western intelligence services for the ouster of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. In this paper, we claim that the outbreak of the military conflict is rooted in the structure of the international system and its features made Russia to act aggressively. To argue for this view, we use the analytical framework of offensive realism. In addition, we also invoke a defensive realist approach (the other significant branch of structural realism) and neo-classical realist ideas to make a comparison with and supplement the offensive realist way of thinking. The paper is structured as follows: the main characteristics of the three schools of contemporary realism are described, then they are applied to the Ukrainian case. Finally, we conclude the main findings of the paper. Contemporary Theories of Realism Although this paper focuses on contemporary realist theories, it is unavoidable to spare some words on their background. Although the description of classical realism – influenced by the Thukydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes – falls beyond the scope of this study, it is worth noting that Morgenthau's classical realism was the predominant school after WWII. Based on a pessimistic view of man, this unit-level approach deduced its findings from human nature. Classical realists claimed that since states are led by people, they also act like people: one state is a wolf to another state and this is the reason why they pursue power.1 Structural realists also view international politics as a dangerous game led by pursuit of power but their approach is quite different. Instead of classical realists' state-level angle, structural realists (also called neo-realists) claim for a systemic approach and deduct their findings from the structure of international system. This tradition – inspired by natural sciences and economic theories of industrial organizations – was started by Waltz's seminal works and has been followed by others in the recent decades (Waltz, 1959; 1979). Nowadays, the Waltzian way of structural realism is often called “defensive realism”, while another notable branch, offensive realism also plays an important role in contemporary structural realist thinking (Mearsheimer, 2013, 77–93). In spite of this, structural realism has often been criticized for not being able to explain new global phenomena of the 21st century. Therefore a new school of thoughts, neo-classical realism has emerged. In certain respects it reaches back to the roots of classical realism to supplement the presumed incompleteness of neo-realism ( Jackson–Sorensen, 2013). In the following subsections the main features of the three latter theories are characterized. Since our further analysis is primarily based on offensive realism, the description begins with its characteristics including the overview of basic properties of structural realism in the broader sense. Then the differentiating attributes of the other two schools are analyzed. Offensive Realism Mearsheimer is considered to be the leading scholar in offensive realism. The description below about the nature of offensive realism is based on his seminal book – The Tragedy of Great Power Politics – and his other works (Mearsheimer, 2001). Offensive realism is built on five bedrock assumptions: 1.) The international system is anarchic. In this respect, anarchy is not equal to chaos but refers to the lack of hierarchy. It means that there is no central authority, “no night watchman” that states could turn to for help in the case of emergency (Mearsheimer, 2010:387). 2.) Realism traditionally focuses on states but offensive realism emphasizes that great powers are the major players of international politics and each of them possesses some offensive military capacity. It implies that “states are potentially dangerous to each other” (Mearsheimer, 2001:30). 3.) “States can never be certain about other states' intentions” (Mearsheimer, 2001:31). This assumption does not refer to the necessity of hostile intentions but emphasizes the danger of uncertainty. 4.) The primary goal of states is survival. They may have further objectives but they cannot seek them without securing their own existence. Therefore, survival is more important than any other motive. 5.) States are rational actors. This assumption does not exclude the possibility of miscalculation but claims that states think strategically and act intentionally and rationally in their best interest (Mearsheimer, 2009:241–256). Mearsheimer emphasizes that none of these assumptions alone implies that states will act aggressively towards each other, but the “marriage” between these five assumptions create a dangerous world. Under these circumstances states are afraid of each other and the only way to secure their own survival is to gain as much power as possible. However, this intensifies the sense of insecurity in other states that also make efforts at acting similarly. In this respect, power is a tool to guarantee survival. In the realist school of international politics, power is usually measured by military capacities, but Mearsheimer claims that military power is based on the socio-economic background of countries. As a result, wealth and the population – as the basis of latent power – also matter. Nevertheless, the pursuit of power leads to security competition – or a security dilemma, in Herzian terms – where “most steps a great power takes to enhance its own security decrease the security of other states” (Mearsheimer, 2013:80). Under these circumstances, the best way for a state to survive is reaching hegemony, in other words, ruling the system. However, Mearsheimer claims that achieving global hegemony is unattainable because of the large bodies of water on the globe. Since offensive realism argues for the primacy of conventional military forces (i.e. nuclear weapons only serve defensive goals), oceans prevent great powers from obtaining and sustaining dominance over distant continents. As a consequence, great powers seek to gain regional hegemony and preempt other states “in other regions from duplicating their feat” (Mearsheimer, 2006:160). Nonetheless, this behavior always generates conflicts between states. The pursuit of regional hegemony affects the interest of neighboring states because it upsets the balance of powers in favour of the emerging great power. According to the theory of offensive realism, the affected states can respond in either of two ways: they may form a balancing coalition against the potential hegemon, or choose a 'buck-passing'2 strategy. In addition, the prevention of the emergence of another regional hegemon (in another region) is also a conflictual process. In as much as the existing regional hegemon wants other regions to be divided it has to contain aspiring hegemons by forming balancing coalition against them. As a consequence, the rise of a great power – which is encoded in the logic of the security competition under anarchy – always leads to conflicts and aggressive strategies. At the end of the day, this is the reason why “international politics is a nasty and dangerous business” and according to Mearsheimer “that is the tragedy of great power politics” (Mearsheimer, 2006:162). Defensive Realism Waltz's theory of international politics (Waltz, 1979) represented the “original” way of structural realist thinking, but after the emergence of Mearsheimer's offensive realism, it has often been labelled as “defensive realism” ( Jackson–Sorensen, 2013; Mearsheimer, 2013). Nowadays, prominent scholars like Posen, Snyder and Van Evera belong to this school of thought. Since offensive realism is built on Waltz's systemlevel approach in many respects, the general features of structural realism are not repeated here. However, the following description provides an overview of those ideas of defensive realism which differ from those of offensive realism. The main debate between the two schools of structural realism concerns the “adequate amount” of power. Contrary to offensive realism, defensive realists do not think that states want as much power as possible (Mearsheimer, 2013). Instead, they are considered to strive only for the appropriate amount of power (Waltz, 1989:39–52) to maintain the existing balance of powers and to prevent the trigger of a counterbalancing coalition against them (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014). Furthermore, defensive realists claim that the costs of conquest often exceed its benefits. In other words, the “balance between offense and defence” – which is an important subject of investigation among defensive realists – favours the defensive strategy on many occasions (Van Evera, 1998:5–43). Therefore, rational actor states prefer the maintenance of balance of powers to acting aggressively towards others. In sum, “defensive realism presents a slightly more optimistic view of international politics” (Taliaferro, 2000:159). Although defensive realists also claim that great powers seek to guarantee their survival in the anarchic structure of international relations, they emphasize that since the pursuit of power can easily backfire, states “temper their appetite for power” (Mearsheimer, 2013:82). Neo-Classical Realism The end of the Cold War basically changed the international system. New phenomena emerged that challenged structural realism too. It also provoked the emergence of a new school of realism: neo-classical realism. Neo-classical realists (e.g. Rose, Schweller, Zakaria) built their theories mostly on Waltz's structural realism, however, they also reached back to the roots of classical realism. Moreover, they were also inspired by liberal approaches that dominated international relations theory at the turn of the millenium ( Jackson–Sorensen, 2013). Neo-classical realists attempt to include additional – individual and domestic factors – in their analysis in order to move beyond the parsimonous assumptions of neo-realism (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014). Although they aknowledge the structural realist argument about the importance of the international anarchy, they claim that the structure of the international system only provides incentives for states but it does not predetermine their behavior. The outcome of foreign policy is influenced by internal characteristics of state and political leadership, as well as by domestic societal actors, like interest groups too (Lobell–Ripsman–Taliaferro, 2009; Rose, 1998:144–172). As Rose claims, this approach has much in common with historical that of institutionalist too. Nonetheless, in this regard, states are not treated as “like units”, and foreign policy becomes an important tool that may help scholars to explain different strategies among nations (Dunne–Schmidt, 2014). The Ukrainian Crisis In 2014, several revolutionary events took place in the Ukraine that provoked the Russian annexation of the Crimea. However, the outbreak of a military crisis was preceded by actions taken by Western countries. In the current section the analytical framework of offensive realism (with further additions) is used to claim that the outbreak of the crisis was encoded in the international structure and the aggressive Russian response was inevitable under the current circumstances. According to the offensive realist arguments, the NATO expansion and the European Union association process are two major factors that must not be neglected in relation to the Ukrainian crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014:1–12). Firstly, the 2008 NATO summit held in Bucharest made an attempt at getting the Ukraine closer to the West. The Summit Declaration stated that “NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO” and “these countries will become members of NATO”.3 Although further virtual steps were not taken for the military incorporation of Ukraine into the Western alliance, the declaration of intent above may be considered as a direct threat from the Russian point of view. The expansion of the European Union had a similar but more direct effects on the conflict. Following the launch of its Eastern Partnership Programme in 2008, the European Union planned to sign an association agreement with the Ukraine, which was declined by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich at the end of 2013. This association would have meant the economic integration of Ukraine in the West. However, this act would have been a hostile action to Russia's interest. Nevertheless, this veto provoked serious protests in the Ukraine that led to the overthrow of President Yanukovich and finally made Russia to respond by military intervention in Ukraine. Anyway, the structural realist (both offensive and defensive realist) interpretation of the events is straightforward: the Ukraine's incorporation into the Western – either economic or military – institutions would have upset the balance of powers, and Russia could not let that happen. The reason why Putin answered aggressively was not of his personal attitude or irrationality but since the structure of international system made him to act so. As Western actions attempted to alter the status quo of the relative power which would reduce Russia's sense of security, the principles of realists' self-help world forced Putin to react by military means. In this respect, Russian military intervention in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine served as a radical step towards the recuperation of the balance of powers. Nevertheless, the explanations given for the Western strategy may differ among – and even within – different realist approaches. The fact that the virtual actor behind the term “West” is not straightforward also complicates interpretation. Although the United States can be considered as a major actor in the conflict, officially it has nothing to do with the European Union's association agreement. Considering the European Union as the main Western actor is also problematic: according to structural realism, states are the only significant players in international politics, moreover, the European Union does not even have an effective common foreign policy. Nonetheless, we ignore these counterarguments and consider that the US (as the leading country of NATO) and the European Union as such were the main actors within the Western alliances. Regarding NATO expansion, a regular offensive realist argument could suggest that the United States – as a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere – wanted to prevent the emergence of another potential regional hegemon. However, Russia cannot be considered as an aspiring hegemon. In spite of Europe's dependence on Russian energy, Russia is not a prosperous country. Although it has remarkable military capacities, their technology is quite old-fashioned and the country's latent power – based on its economic potential – is also weak. Thus as Mearsheimer claims (Mearsheimer, 2014), Russia is a declining power which implies that the United States need not have to make attempts at containing it by expanding NATO's sphere of interest. Accepting the above argument, offensive realists might also claim that a miscalculation or simply mistaken decisions were made both in the US and in the European Union. Such actions are more common if the security of the state is not in danger, as then they can pursue further goals besides survival. In this respect, one might claim that overconfidence about their own security made the US and the European Union to move into Russia's backyard without thinking through the consequences of this act. The Ukraine's Western integration does not fit into the defensive realist theory either. According to them, rational actors temper their appetite for power in order to prevent conflicts. Nonetheless, this did not happen to the West in the case of the Ukrainian crisis, and as a result, instead of maintaining the balance of powers, they upset it. However, neo-classical realism may provide explanations for these strategically wrong actions. They might claim that American and European decision-makers were influenced by domestic factors (e.g. need for vote-maximization in domestic politics; pressure from the proponents of democracy export and from business interest groups etc.). According to this interpretation, constraints on the anarchic international system were ineffective on Western politicians, who subjected their foreign policy to secondary goals (instead of taking care of the balance of powers). Though, neo-classical arguments provide a plausible explanation for the behaviour of Western countries, it may shed new light on Russian strategy too. Namely, domestic factors might have influenced Russian President Putin too. Although the idea about a rough Putin who wants to show strength to his own people, come from the liberal schools of international relations, it might be compatible with neo-classical realism too. Nevertheless, this view cannot overwrite the fact – which is a recognized one in neo-classical realism too – that aggressive response was mainly motivated by the crude logic of balance of power. Conclusions This paper aims to overview the main characteristics of contemporary realist theories and intended to show their applicability in the globalized world of 21st century. As presented in the case study about the Ukrainian crisis, realism has not lost its explanatory power after the Cold War: the world has not changed and international relations are still governed by great power politics. We also showed that different schools of contemporary realism may perform differently in interpreting distinct aspects of international events but at the end of the day, realism as a bunch of several theories is completely able to explain them. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, we claimed that Russian response was primarily motivated by the logic of the balance of powers. Since the West moved into Russia's sphere of interest, Putin was forced to apply his own version of the “Monroe Doctrine” (Mearsheimer, 2014). In this respect, Russia was not driven by “evil intentions”, but by the everlasting logic of great power politics.Russia’s defensive---extra-regional interests are limited and responsive to NATO infractions on their Near Abroad. Russian IR study is held captive by political interests that avoid faulting the West. Hahn 20, an Analyst and Advisory Board Member of the Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group, San Jose, California Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch; and Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor, MonTREP, Monterey, California. Hahn has been a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011-2013) and a Visiting Scholar at both the Hoover Institution and the Kennan Institute. (George M., August 10th, 2020, “All Too Little, All Too Late: On the Open Letter ‘It’s Time to Rethink Our Russia Policy’”, )**NCC Packet 2020**Indeed, in recent decades, Russian policy and its study perhaps more than any other policy or research area has been held captive by domestic politics, rampant careerism, intellectual corruption, and the destructive force of political correctness in American academia, mainstream media, think tank and intelligence analyses. Pervasive enough under the Clinton and Bush administrations, these cancerous cells metastasized into full-blown tumors spreading uncontrollably through the American body politic after the onset of the Barack Obama administration. The resulting nearly universal demand for thought slavery and uniformity has for at least a decade been ubiquitous in the very academia, media, analytical, and government milieu within which the signatories have long circulated. While those who spoke out were being run out of these institutions, very few if any of the signatories spoke out and some were complicit in the poisoning of the American mind.Also, continued foreign policy hubris and arrogance is inferable from the document’s following statement: “Russia complicates, even thwarts, our actions, especially along its extended periphery in Europe and Asia. It has seized territory in Ukraine and Georgia. It challenges our role as a global leader and the world order we helped build. It interferes in our domestic politics to exacerbate divisions and tarnish our democratic reputation.” Lacking in this list of Russian behaviors and the statement as a whole is any kind of?mea culpa—any acknowledgement of Washington’s and Brussels’ even greater responsibility for the sad state of US-Russian and US-Western relations than that of post-Soviet Russia. The American superpower’s enormous advantage in the correlation of power over the politically divided, economically depressed, and geopolitically isolated Russia — not to mention the extraordinary power gap between the entire West and Russia — both today but especially in the formative period of post-Cold War relations in the early to middle 1990s left the onus for the development of sound, just relations on Washington and Brussels. Instead of acting magnanimously, the Cold War victors rubbed wounded Moscow’s nose in new humiliations: NATO expansion, treaty withdrawals, EU expansion, color revolutions, condescending even insulting statements, and a general disdain for Russian interests and security perceptions.It is interesting to ‘mirror-image’ the above list of Russian behaviors, rewriting it as if a Russian wrote it. Each item on the list in such case is even more true, except for outright territorial acquisition: ‘The US and the West complicates, even thwarts, Russian actions, especially along her extended periphery in Europe and Asia. They have seized (geostrategic) territory in Eastern, Northeastern, and Southeastern Europe (Ukraine and Georgia). They challenge Russia’s role as a regional leader and the multipolar order she is trying to build. They interfere in our domestic politics and those of our neighbors and allies to exacerbate divisions and tarnish our?democratic?reputation.’ There is a hint, though not a full deployment, of American rusology’s tradition of referencing only Russian actions among the causes of the poisoning of U.S.-Russian and Western-Russian relations. Thus, America’s agency is deflated, “our foreign-policy arsenal reduced mainly to reactions, sanctions, public shaming and congressional resolutions.”Europe AdvL: Plan leads to EuropeEurope is missing from the international scene now---the plan provides an opportunity for them to emerge as a global leader.Lizza Bomassi & Pierre Vimont 19. *Deputy director of Carnegie Europe. M.Sc., London School of Economics. **Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe. Former executive secretary-general of the European External Action Service. Former French ambassador to the United States and the European Union. "Reimagining a Global Europe". Carnegie Europe. 12-11-2019. **NCC Packet 2020**The resounding—and unsurprising—verdict of the EU’s outside partners is that a strong Europe is missing from the international scene. The overall perception is that the EU’s collective attention has been focused mostly on Europe’s internal issues, leaving little space to concentrate on much else. At the same time, there is a recognition that Europe is genuinely needed—and not just as a counterbalance to the United States. Yet this straightforward assessment is a far cry from any operative conclusion. Having stated a clear demand for more Europe, outside partners are not united on a common vision of what a more assertive EU should look like.This call for more Europe is diverse. For Russia, if the EU aspires to the role of a credible and trustworthy global player, it must show it can move away from its long-held alignment with its U.S. ally and loosen the transatlantic partnership. For China, more Europe means forging a solid resistance to the current U.S. trade policy and greater cooperation on more sensitive areas like cybersecurity or climate change. India seeks a more forceful EU to relaunch an ambitious bilateral partnership, notably in the Indo-Pacific region. Middle Eastern countries rely on the European experience to help manage the transition to genuine free-market economies and more open and democratic societies. As for a greatly polarized United States, where conflicting quarters argue whether it is folding up much of its previous hegemony, the vision of the EU’s future is mostly about holding the fort of Western values while the United States is busy trying to overcome its internal struggles.This multiplicity of aspirations speaks for itself. These desires define an illusory EU that mirrors its outside partners’ interests and represents their perceptions of the union. With the enduring absence of any genuine identity, Europe can easily be filled with the hopes and dreams of its many partners. But this is no substitute for a working agenda.To make the challenge of identifying the EU’s future direction even more intricate, Europeans have patiently shaped a rather different image of their own global role. From the start, Europe based its integration project on the ideological goal of eradicating any of the power impulses that had done so much harm to the continent in two world wars. It then gradually endorsed a set of values and guidelines fit more for a multilateral organization than for a full-fledged geopolitical player.Taking on board the diverse wishes of the outside world requires more than just a rebranding exercise. It needs deep introspection. A mature Europe leaning toward a leadership role must accept that it will face enemies, not just friends, and that it may have to defend hard-core interests, not just generous principles.I/L: Europe solves RussiaEuropean defense integration maintains the regional balance of power and prevents Russia from taking advantage of reductions in US presence.Stephen M. Walt 19. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. "Europe’s Future Is as China’s Enemy". Foreign Policy. 1-22-2019. **NCC Packet 2020**The core strategic challenge facing NATO today is structural: There is no potential hegemon in Europe today, and none is likely to emerge anytime soon. In other words, there is no country that has the combination of population, economic might, and military power that would allow it to take over and govern the continent and mobilize all that potential power. Germany’s population is too small (and is declining and aging), and its armed forces are much too weak. Russia is not the wreck it was in the 1990s, but it is still a pale shadow of the former Soviet Union, and its long-term economic prospects are not bright.Moreover, Russia’s population is currently about 140 million (and is projected to decline as well), while NATO’s European members have a combined population in excess of 500 million. NATO Europe has a combined GDP exceeding $15 trillion; Russia’s is less than $2 trillion. To put it differently, Russia’s economy is smaller than Italy’s. And don’t forget that NATO’s European members spend three to four times more than Russia does on defense every year. They don’t spend it very effectively, of course, but the idea that Europe lacks the wherewithal to defend itself against Russia simply does not stand up to close scrutiny. Need I also mention that France and the United Kingdom also have nuclear weapons?Given all that, it is far from obvious why the United States cannot gradually turn the defense of Europe back over to the Europeans. Faced with such awkward realities, NATO’s die-hard defenders point out that America’s NATO allies have demonstrated their value by fighting with the United States in places like Afghanistan. There is no question that they have sacrificed money and lives in this joint effort, and Americans should be grateful for their contributions. But allied support was never essential: The United States did most of the heavy lifting and could have fought the entire war on its own had it wished. (It is worth remembering that the George W. Bush administration declined European offers to help during the initial toppling of the Taliban because it understood that working with its NATO partners would have impeded the U.S. operation.)M: MultilatEuropean leadership solves multilateralism, democracy, and climate change.Lizza Bomassi & Pierre Vimont 19. *Deputy director of Carnegie Europe. M.Sc., London School of Economics. **Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe. Former executive secretary-general of the European External Action Service. Former French ambassador to the United States and the European Union. "Reimagining a Global Europe". Carnegie Europe. 12-11-2019. **NCC Packet 2020**What does a collective vision of a global Europe look like from the point of view of the demand side? And how can this vision be translated into an operational program? The picture that emerges confirms that the EU must develop a more flexible and nuanced view of responding to global challenges.MultilateralismOutside partners consider the EU the standard-bearer for multilateralism and, as such, a natural ally in this environment. But the verdict on multilateralism in its current form is resounding—even deafening—ambivalence. Many Europeans regard it as an end in itself, whereas for other powers it is at best a means to be employed for any number of competing agendas. Its credibility is repeatedly put to the test when nation-states undermine the collective interest if doing so serves their purpose. In its worst form, multilateralism becomes a screen to hide behind, leading to indecision and inaction.Multilateralism in its current incarnation is seen as antiquated and out of touch with today’s globalized, transactional world. From the trade negotiations between the United States and China to the ongoing talks over the conflicts in Syria or Libya, multilateral organizations appear sidelined, outmaneuvered, and irrelevant—overtaken by events and left to deal with their aftermath. Yet as a tool, multilateralism also reveals its strengths, as illustrated by the EU itself in its long journey toward closer integration. Once clear boundaries and operational lines have been drawn, the EU has shown—with the competencies that the member states have given it—that a multilateral framework can be a force for good. This is nowhere more evident than in the EU’s trade and economic sphere, where Europe’s whole is stronger than the sum of its parts.The lesson here is that Europe needs to update both its internal cohesion and its multilateral doctrine to be considered a credible architect for a revised and more consensual multilateral global order. That order should be based on a vision of common political values that the EU and its outside partners can share equally.DemocracyIt is on democracy, unsurprisingly, that the traditional debate on values is most palpable. Today, the state of democracy and human rights globally is poor. Many see a waning commitment to these values from the traditional bastions of the current democratic world order.Yet this depiction hides a more nuanced picture. While executive-level support for democracy promotion in its more traditional homes has declined, its operational manifestation remains largely intact. Governments still channel a considerable amount of financial assistance toward the technical level in this field. And various democracy initiatives, such as Sweden’s Drive for Democracy, illustrate how individual EU member states have acted as champions of democracy promotion.This has sent a confusing message and led to different responses from different parts of the globe. Some have opted to approach this issue from a utilitarian perspective, either by providing purely technical assistance or by molding democratic models of engagement to the local context. Others perceive the Western democratic model as simply one of many different forms of governance. While Russia and China are not particularly keen for a European—or, for that matter, Western—leadership model, some countries in Asia, like India, and in South America and sub-Saharan Africa find some merit in the EU being involved in democracy promotion.But these countries see such investment as requiring a lighter touch and a deeper consideration of local specificities. It is by sharing Europe’s own experience and adopting what the EU’s outside partners often consider a less patronizing attitude that Europe is recognized as a useful partner. So, while there is space for the EU to lead in this field, it must choose to do so in a much more incisive yet nuanced way.Global TradeThe EU’s outside partners clearly recognize the union as an economic power. Yet a global player this does not make. Being a global leader means that economic strength must be complemented by political and military weight, which the EU is sorely lacking. This has left the EU vulnerable in a world that is increasingly witnessing the weaponization of trade and the resurgence of demagoguery. Countries apply traditional global norms and rules on trade inconsistently—a sort of “do as I say, not as I do” attitude. There is an overall perception that the United States is getting away with a lot of unfair practice because it can.Europe’s behavior is not excused here, either. There has been profound disappointment from some important allies, which have become concerned by China’s growing presence on European soil and the way certain EU member states have responded with open arms to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, a major infrastructure program. This feeling has translated into disenchantment with the failure of the EU’s multilateral framework to live up to its collective vision of sustainability, transparency, and responsible environmental stewardship. It should therefore come as no surprise that Russia and China have begun to toe the line of “no politics, just business” and promote more transaction-led trade.The lesson here is that the EU cannot keep referring to the rule book. Individual member states have shown they can circumvent procedures when it suits their needs. So, the EU will have to get much more creative about playing in this space. Simply relying on one’s strengths and technical competence can lead one to become complacent and overlook the manipulation of existing norms.International SecurityOn security and defense, the key words are strategic relevance. Aside from a handful of EU member states, in terms of hard security, the union still lacks credibility in this field. Efforts in Brussels to shore up Europe’s defense industries and upgrade its operational capabilities are observed not only with interest but also with hardly hidden skepticism. In the eyes of its partners, Europe’s security guarantee remains firmly entrenched in NATO and—by extension—solidly attached to, and dependent on, the U.S. military. That weakens any significant effort toward security autonomy.In this context, and with the United Kingdom due to leave the EU, NATO remains relevant for continental Europe’s collective security. For Europe’s outside partners, it is doubtful that—barring a devastating shock to the system, such as the United States abandoning NATO—France’s vision of a militarily capable and autonomous EU will become a reality for the foreseeable future. The reality is that aside from a few EU countries, on international security, Europeans must operate in a multilateral framework, where there is little room for maneuver. Outside partners lament a perceived European apathy toward the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, from which the United States withdrew in August 2019, and a lackluster European response to the wars in Ukraine and Syria, which have only strengthened this narrative.The EU must continue to pursue cooperation and be resourceful where it can bring real value. Investment in military capabilities and the development of a common strategic doctrine for a future EU security policy must continue—and must increase in preparation for the day when U.S. strategic patience runs out.Climate ChangeOn climate change, the EU scores highly for being determined and showing real leadership in the face of adversity. The good news is that most nation-states recognize that this is not an area where one can go it alone. And while there remain skeptics on the causes of climate change, there is overall recognition that its physical manifestation is affecting all.India is justifiably proud of its admirable track record on climate change; yet it must deal with the reality that over 40 percent of its labor force is employed in agriculture. That is a serious vote bank for any politician. In this context, reconciling cleaner agriculture with industrialization is a political economy problem that trumps long-term growth.China and Middle Eastern countries are eager to cooperate on the technical level, but the technology transfers and capacity building needed to make a more climate-friendly infrastructure operational could have serious economic implications. The Russians recognize the importance of climate change because it is affecting some of their physical infrastructures. But they fear the narrative will be hijacked by overly politicized ideologies.Clearly, the EU cannot tackle climate change on its own, nor can it build a fortress around its effects. The union is simply not influential or rich enough to make the world follow its lead. However, the EU does have enough legitimacy and leverage to give a sense of direction to the climate issue. The overall message for the EU in this context is to persevere: find the areas where it can build support and stick it out. Leadership is sorely lacking in this space, and the EU’s choice to fill that role is primordial.Multilateralism is an impact filter.Mikhail Gorbachev 20. Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Former President of the Soviet Union. "Mikhail Gorbachev: When The Pandemic Is Over, The World Must Come Together". Time. 4-15-2020. **NCC Packet 2020**Yet other global challenges remain and have even become more urgent: poverty and inequality, the degradation of the environment, the depletion of the earth and the oceans, the migration crisis. And now, a grim reminder of another threat: diseases and epidemics that in a global, interconnected world can spread with unprecedented speed.The response to this new challenge cannot be purely national. While it is the national governments that now bear the brunt of making difficult choices, decisions will be have to be made by the entire world community.We have so far failed to develop and implement strategies and goals common to all mankind. Progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, adopted by the U.N. in 2000, has been extremely uneven. We see today that the pandemic and its consequences are hitting the poor particularly hard, thus exacerbating the problem of inequality.What we urgently need now is a rethinking of the entire concept of security. Even after the end of the Cold War, it has been envisioned mostly in military terms. Over the past few years, all we’ve been hearing is talk about weapons, missiles and airstrikes.This year, the world has already been on the brink of clashes that could involve great powers, with serious hostilities in Iran, Iraq and Syria. And though the participants eventually stepped back, it was the same dangerous and reckless policy of brinkmanship.Is it not clear by now that wars and the arms race cannot solve today’s global problems? War is a sign of defeat, a failure of politics.The overriding goal must be human security: providing food, water and a clean environment and caring for people’s health. To achieve it, we need to develop strategies, make preparations, plan and create reserves. But all efforts will fail if governments continue to waste money by fueling the arms race.I’ll never tire of repeating: we need to demilitarize world affairs, international politics and political thinking.To address this at the highest international level, I am calling on world leaders to convene an emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly, to be held as soon as the situation is stabilized. It should be about nothing less than revising the entire global agenda. Specifically, I call upon them to cut military spending by 10% to 15%. This is the least they should do now, as a first step toward a new consciousness, a new civilization.Authoritarianism is on the rise globally and causes great power war.Larry Diamond 19. PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University. “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency,” Kindle Edition**NCC Packet 2020**In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of “democratic erosion.” We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy “is where the world was, not where it is going.” 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the global implosion of democracy led to a catastrophic world war, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of selfdoubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a crucial foundation for world peace and security. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are perched on a global precipice. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the erosion continues, we may well reach a tipping point where democracy goes bankrupt suddenly—plunging the world into depths of oppression and aggression that we have not seen since the end of World War II. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.NATO: NegEurope AnswersEuropean Force FailsEurope wouldn’t be able to establish an independent force – takes years and prompts aggressionEconomist 19 – (“What would happen if America left Europe to fend for itself?” March 14, 2019. )//GK**NCC Packet 2020**A pale shadow Yet the Europeans would immediately face institutional hurdles. Compared with Russia’s top-down system, command and control is hard enough in consensus-bound nato. It would be a bigger challenge for Europeans alone, especially if they did not inherit nato’s command structure. The eu may want to take the lead, but military thinking is not in its dna. Besides, an eu-only alliance would be a pale shadow of nato: after Brexit, non-eu countries will account for fully 80% of nato defence spending. There would be gaps in capabilities, too. How bad these were would depend on the mission, and how many operations were under way at the same time. The European-led interventions in Libya and Mali exposed dependence on America in vital areas such as air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. A detailed look at the sort of scenarios Europe might face would help to identify other gaps, and what it would take to fill them. Bastian Giegerich of the iiss, who is starting to work on such assessments, reckons that realistically the gap-filling could take 15 years or so. That is a long time for places like Poland and the Baltic countries that feel under threat. Fear and mistrust could quickly conspire to make narrow national interests trump efforts to maintain European unity. Hence a second, perhaps likelier, version of what might follow an American withdrawal: Europe Divided. Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute in London imagines a frenzy of activity, a cacophony of summits—and a renationalisation of defence strategies. Lots of countries would seek bilateral deals. In central Europe he would expect an alliance between Poland and Romania to guarantee the eastern border. The Russians and Chinese would not sit idly by, he says, but would play their own games with the Greeks, Hungarians and others. It is these games of mistrust that the American security guarantee has largely helped to avoid. They could all too easily resurface. “Establishing a purely European defence”, warns Michael Rühle, a long-time nato official, “would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially and militarily.”Scaling back Article 5 does not cause EU common defense---deep, structural barriers ensure the only result is a scramble of side-dealsMichael Rühle 16, M.A. Degree in Political Science from the University of Bonn, Former Volkswagen-Fellow at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Daydream Believers”, Berlin Policy Journal, 11/23/2016, **NCC Packet 2020**Alas, such concentration is nowhere in sight. Quite the contrary. Instead of reflection, some have chosen to panic: The vision of a Europe unified on security and defense has suddenly re-emerged. European nations – some of which aren’t even close to the NATO-agreed goal of spending two percent of GDP on defense – are suddenly embracing bold defense schemes that would involve spending far more than they would ever be willing or even able to deliver. But what a scheme it is: A new, defense-minded Europe would finally be able to look after its own backyard. Some observers have even suggested that a stronger Europe could keep an assertive Russia in check. Take that, Donald!Sadly, the old continent is merely shooting from the hip replacement. The reflex of pushing military initiatives in order to jump-start a stagnating European integration process has never worked in the past, and it’s not likely to do so now. If the EU cannot make progress on far simpler issues, it is even less likely to do so in the area of security and defense, where considerations of national sovereignty and status (as well as defense-industrial protectionism) run deep. For decades, most EU aficionados have agreed that security and defense can only ever be among the very final steps of the European integration process. Trying to reverse that sequence in the face of US disengagement will fail, for a variety of reasons.No “Strategic Culture”First, there is no European “strategic culture,” and the prospects of it emerging now remain as dim as ever. Europe remains a conglomerate of nation states of different sizes, cultures, historical experiences and geographic outlooks. “Brexit” and the return of populism are only the most visible signs of the bloc’s limitations: it has never forged a unified vision of the continent’s ultimate shape and future. US leadership in NATO ensured that these differences didn’t matter much when it came to security and defense. Exit the US, however, and these differences will quickly come to the fore. The fear of being left defenseless will not force the Europeans towards more unity on security and defense, but rather to make separate deals with the United States.Second, military realities are conveniently ignored. Europe is capable of smaller-scale military interventions along the continent’s periphery, but even the intervention in Libya in 2011 would not have been possible without the US suppressing Libyan air defenses and supplying the Europeans with ammunition (which they had run out of after just a few days). In theory, Europe could buy everything it needs for such operations. In practice, however, it won’t. The bill for a genuine satellite network, a fleet of transport aircraft, advanced cruise missiles and more would force European nations to at least double their defense budgets. Given the risks and costs of intervening without the US, Europeans will be more hesitant than when they had Uncle Sam on their team.Third, the nuclear dimension remains conspicuously absent in the debate. Many proponents of a stronger European effort in security and defense are making the case for a conventional force strong enough to deter Russia. But they seem to overlook that Russia is a nuclear power and can therefore trump whatever conventional improvements the Europeans might be able to muster. With the United Kingdom “Brexiting”, the EU (unlike NATO) cannot count on London’s nuclear support. France would never let an EU body decide over the “force de frappe.” And EU members Austria and Ireland have championed a global ban on nuclear weapons that is fiercely opposed by the nuclear powers and other NATO members. In short, a European nuclear deterrent is a myth; Europe’s only credible nuclear umbrella remains the one “made in the USA.”Fourth, the debate also ignores the political and legal obstacles that stand in the way of a more unified security and defense. For example, the oft-repeated argument that harmonizing armaments planning and procurement could avoid wasteful duplication is as correct as it is irrelevant. The larger European nations do not plan their defense in such a way; when it comes to key military areas, they don’t want to be dependent upon the agreement of their smaller neighbors. On closer inspection, even seemingly successful examples of “streamlining” are the result of budgetary constraints, not of deliberate planning. And in several EU member states, the national parliaments have a crucial say in the decision to employ military force – a privilege they are not likely to surrender to a collective EU body.Internal fractions and distrust thwart European self-defense --- the plan accelerates disunity and collapse Kluth 19 [Andreas Kluth is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, was previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the Economist, “A European Army? It’ll Never Happen,” Dec 2, 2019, ] **NCC Packet 2020**That dream is as old as the European project. There were plans for a European army in 1952, drawn up by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. This was before postwar Germany was allowed to have soldiers again. West Germany’s parliament ratified the idea, but France’s nixed it, which led to the founding of a West German army in 1955, embedded into NATO. European integration followed an economic rather than a military path.The complications that caused that stillbirth linger. The nations in what is now the European Union still care about their sovereignty, which is expressed above all in the decision to send young soldiers into harm’s way. They also have different interests. The French are busy in their former African colonies. The Poles and Balts feel most threatened by Russia. Germany, caring not a whit about all that, is merrily building itself a second gas pipeline to Russia, circumventing the eastern EU.Member states also have dissonant historical traditions, which make integration into one command hierarchy almost impossible. Postcolonial France considers military action a legitimate tool of foreign policy, and its president has ample powers to direct its army. Germany, still atoning for World War II, disavows military interventionism. Unlike France, it has a “parliamentary army,” which must get explicit approval from the Bundestag to do anything. Would a French president patiently wait for the German legislature before deciding whether to shoot at little green men speaking Russian in an Estonian forest? Would 27 states cede that decision to Brussels?The fundamental problem, as Jan Techau of the German Marshall Fund puts it, is distrust: The French and Germans don’t fully trust each other, the Italians trust neither of them, the Germans don’t even trust themselves, Warsaw distrusts Berlin, Bucharest and Budapest distrust each other, people in the Balkans don’t trust anybody, and so forth.That’s why Macron is seen in central Europe as a neo-Gaullist. When he talks about “strategic autonomy” or “European sovereignty,” he seems mainly to be eager for France, the EU’s only nuclear power after Brexit, to lead Europe, snubbing its nose at the U.S. and accommodating Russia. To advance that vision, he’s sponsored a fledgling alliance called the “European Intervention Initiative,” which is part of neither NATO nor the EU. Needless to say, the EU’s eastern members would much prefer to keep relying on the U.S.All this helps explain why the EU’s new push for a “defense union” is not actually about integrating armies, but about creating a common market for weapons procurement. How very European. Exhibit A is a European Defense Fund, which will have 13 billion euros ($14.3 billion) to plow into weapons research. Exhibit B is a bureaucracy called PESCO, which aims to coordinate building and buying corvettes, helicopters, drones, and the like across the EU.A common defense market is a good idea. But confusing markets with might is exactly the sort of pusillanimity that drives Macron crazy, and amuses Russian President Vladimir Putin. The biggest danger is that it might one day also tempt Putin or his ilk to test the West. They wouldn’t need to launch an all-out strike; a good dose of hybrid warfare might suffice to divide Europe. That, at least, is the upshot of scenario games now being played by think tanks. For the sake of peace, let everyone in the Grove Hotel this week remember what’s at stake.Withdrawal fractures Europe, making collective defense impossibleMichta 19 [Dr Andrew A., Political Scientist and Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Former Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Ph.D. in International Relations from the School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, “Without the US, European Defense Will Fall to Pieces”, The American Interest, Oct 23, 2019, ] **NCC Packet 2020**Since Donald Trump’s election in 2016, there has been a rising chorus among Europe’s politicos that the Continent can no longer rely on the United States for its defense. This narrative had already begun to coalesce during the campaign, when European media interpreted then-candidate Trump’s calls for NATO countries to share more defense costs as the beginning of the end for America’s traditional role as security provider and defender of human rights. Some European commentators even questioned whether, in the event of Trump’s election, the United States might simply walk away from NATO altogether. Others sought to reassure themselves and their increasingly unsettled publics that, while President Trump might indeed be unpredictable, his cabinet would be staffed with consummate professionals who understood the “bigger picture.” So it came as perhaps a bit of a shock when U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, on his first official visit to Europe in February 2017, delivered a stern warning to the other 27 NATO members at a closed meeting in Brussels, telling them that the Allies must either meet their financial pledges on defense or America would “moderate” its commitment to the organization. Since then, the accusations of “Trumpian transactionalism” on defense have only gathered in speed, alongside renewed talk of a “European army,” “European defense,” and finally “strategic autonomy”—the latter presumably implying progressive independence from the United States on security issues.Action followed words. In December 2017, the European Union launched the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with 25 EU members promising to participate in a plan to develop and invest in shared military capability projects. Augmented by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), PESCO was intended to focus on specific projects reportedly to avoid duplication and to enhance their effectiveness. However, critics in the United States charged that PESCO would at best have a marginal impact on European military capabilities, lead to duplication and non-interoperable systems within NATO, and was in reality intended to lock out U.S. defense companies from bidding for European contracts. Washington also conveyed the Trump Administration’s concerns that rules for the EDF would prevent companies based outside the European Union, including U.S. defense contractors, from participating in the projects. In short, though PESCO and the EDF were initially met by the Trump Administration with cautious optimism and seen as potentially positive steps to enhance European defense capabilities, both initiatives soon became synonymous with protectionism and a diversion of Europe’s scarce defense resources in a direction that risked creating competition between the EU and NATO.There was more to come. In November 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army,” an initiative subsequently endorsed by Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, who called for a European army to complement NATO. Soon, and perhaps rather predictably, the idea became muddled by the semantics of the choice between calling it a “European army” or an “army of Europeans;” a year later the conversation had devolved into yet another European debate on “cooperative security” that failed to acknowledge the persistent lack of political will necessary to make the dream a reality. In fact, three years into the “we need to become independent on defense” debate in Europe, there is a real danger that a “common European army” of the sort advocated by some in Europe will do little more than further polarize the EU. Indeed, the assumption that there would be such a thing as “European” (as opposed to national) officers and soldiers is as dubious today as the previous attempts to create similar forces, from the Western European Union (WEU) through the Eurocorps and the Franco-German brigade.The European media and policy elite’s continuing efforts to call into question America’s commitment to Transatlantic defense carries with it a serious risk—one that goes beyond intra-European relations. The anti-Trump sentiment pervasive among European policy elites has increasingly aligned with anti-American strains of European public opinion, to the detriment of the larger relationship. For instance, according to a February 2019 Pew study, between 2013 and 2018, 30 percent more Germans stated that they viewed U.S. influence as a major threat to their country, with increases of 29 percent in France, 25 percent in Spain, 15 percent in the UK, and 12 percent in Italy. Among NATO countries only Poland saw a 5 percent decline. There is a danger that the current round of posturing on European defense will feed into the perception that, while allies refuse to meet their pledges on defense spending (NATO’s 2019 annual report showed that only seven of the 29 allies met the 2 percent target), they nonetheless have the resources to pursue their national defense industrial priorities. The damage to already-strained U.S. relations with key allies in Europe, especially Germany, may become enduring, bolstering the growing chorus in Washington that what Europeans want is to continue to free-ride on defense.The larger problem is that the impasse in the current debate about “European defense” is playing out against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating security environment around Europe (and increasingly also within), while the push for an autonomous European army seems increasingly to be the result of ad hoc politics rather than a sound defense calculus. Amidst the various acronyms and semantic exercises of the past three years, what is missing in Europe today is a keen grasp of history as well as strategic foresight. First, politicians seem to have all but forgotten that the European project was possible to begin with precisely because the United States, through the NATO alliance, provided the overarching security umbrella for the Continent, defusing postwar resentments and assisting in Europe’s reconstruction. It bears remembering that, without America’s commitment to Europe, the Franco-German “grand reconciliation” would have taken much longer to attain, if it were to be achieved at all. And so today, as during the Cold War, it makes sense for European states to speak of “Europe” when it comes to trade and economic policy integration. However, Europe’s security has since 1945 been a direct function of its having been embedded into the Transatlantic system, and this fundamental reality still remains true today. Simply put, there is a great deal of difference between the notion of a protected “common market” linking the economies of likeminded democratic governments, and that of Europe acting as a unitary actor on security and defense.And yet, if a number of governments in Europe believes—as seems increasingly to be the case—that they can establish a “European” defense structure and a “European security architecture,” then the outcome will be a hollowing out of NATO and at the very least a bifurcation of Europe between the countries facing Russia along the eastern flank and the those that during the Cold War constituted Western Europe. (Even here the divergent security optics are likely to pull individual countries in different directions, with countries like France looking south, and others, such as the Scandinavians, focusing on the north.) The endgame will not be a “pan-European” security and defense system but rather a back to the future scenario: a new age of insecurity in Europe, where deep power differentials among states on the Continent will yield a hierarchy of national interests that will quickly decompose a larger sense of European solidarity. The countries in Central Europe, which are deeply invested in the European Union as a pathway to economic modernization, will nonetheless never wager their national survival on a pan-European defense and security architecture, any more than powers in Western European will be able to credibly guarantee that in an extreme situation—without America’s backing—they would be able to bring their societies to the brink of war and beyond to defend the Baltic States, Poland, or Romania.Europe’s political leaders seem to be losing sight of the fact that, notwithstanding their differences with Washington, they do not have a better security option than working closely with the United States and strengthening NATO as the centerpiece of Europe’s security and defense policy. In the current atmosphere, in which criticizing the Trump Administration and questioning the U.S. commitment to its allies has become a mantra for European media, the situation on the ground tells a different story. A case in point: Next year Defender 2020 will be the U.S. Army’s largest exercise in Europe in 25 years, ranging across ten countries and involving 37,000 troops from at least 18 countries, of which 20,000 soldiers will be deployed from the United States to Europe.The impasse in the current debate about European security is driven by a seeming unwillingness in key European capitals to realize the core reality that, without U.S. strategic engagement, a “European security architecture” is a lark. It is time for Europe to stop daydreaming about a “European army” or an “army of Europeans,” or whatever the latest institutional permutation might be. Amidst a period of rapidly growing state-on-state competition, it is high time to focus on the fundamentals. If the common European project is to continue, the United States needs to stay in Europe, and NATO needs to remain the centerpiece of our mutual security and defense.It is worth remembering that, regardless of occasional policy differences, Europe today has no better friend and no stronger ally than the United States of America. This strategic reality should be the starting point of any conversation in Europe’s capitals about the Continent’s security and defense. However, if the current discussion about European defense as autonomous, parallel, or even complementary to NATO continues on its present course, it will cause lasting harm to Transatlantic relations, with the much-vaunted “strategic autonomy” becoming, in an extreme case, a self-fulfilling prophecy and, as such, Europe’s undoing. If NATO becomes dysfunctional, the European project will be reduced to regional groupings, bilateral alignments, or it may fragment altogether.Multilat BadMultilat is outdated, bogged down, and too complex.Ferry 18 Jean Pisani-Ferry, Economics Professor with Sciences Po of Paris and the Hertie School of Governance of Berlin, former campaign director for Emmanuel Macron and Commissioner-General of France Stratégie, the Founding Director of the think tank Bruegel. [Should we give up on global governance? Policy Contribution 17, October 2018, (table 1 omitted)]//BPS**NCC Packet 2020**C. Obsolescence of global rules and institutions Although the previous argument primarily rests on the broad pattern of international trade and finance, the adverse effects of external liberalisation can be compounded by inadequate governance. As far as trade is concerned, two cases in point are, first, inertia in the categorisation of countries, especially the fact that emerging countries, including China, still enjoy developing country status in the WTO; and, second, failures to enforce the adequate protection of intellectual property (an issue on which the EU recently joined the US and filed a complaint at the WTO against Chinese practices; see European Union, 2018). These grievances, and others concerning subsidies or investment, are not new: they were clearly spelled out by policymakers from the Obama administration (see for example, Schwab, 2011, and Wu, 2016). The underlying concern is that the systemic convergence on a market economy template that was expected from participation in the WTO has failed to materialise. The rules and institutions of global trade have brought shallow convergence but not the deeper alignment of economic systems that was hoped for. More generally, existing rules and institutions were conceived for a different world. This is very apparent in the trade field: the GATT/WTO framework dates from what Baldwin (2016) has called the “first unbundling” of production and consumption. They were not designed for the “second unbundling” of knowledge and production that gave rise to the emergence of global value chains. For decades, the implicit assumption behind the structure of trade negotiations has been that nations have well-defined sectoral trade interests: they are either exporters or importers. But in a world of global value chains, they are both importers and exporters of similar products simultaneously. Even if the principles of multilateralism remain valid, important features of the rules and institutions in which they are embedded are increasingly outdated. In the same way, opening to capital movements was supposed to result in net financial flows from savings-rich to savings-poor countries. What has happened instead is a massive increase in gross flows resulting in the interpenetration of financial systems and the coexistence of sizeable external assets and liabilities. The consequence has been the emergence of a global financial cycle (see for example Rey, 2017) and of policy dilemmas that are quite different from those arising in a simple Mundell-Fleming framework, in which interdependence takes place through net inflows and outflows of capital. Developments in the climate field further illustrate the point. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was negotiated under the assumption that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions would continue to originate in the advanced countries. But by the time the Protocol was meant to enter into force, it was clear already that the hypothesis was deeply wrong. The exemption of developing countries from emissions reductions was one of the reasons why the US did not ratify the treaty. The failed Copenhagen agreement of 2009 was an attempt to replicate Kyoto on a global scale, but there was no consensus for such an approach. Rules can be reformed and institutions can adapt. But this is a long and demanding process, especially when it requires unanimity, when participating countries have diverging interests and when changes require ratification by parliaments where there is no majority to support them. Global rules therefore exhibit a strong inertia that often prevents necessary adaptations. Trade rules, amendments to which require unanimity, are a case in point. Institutions are nimbler and can adapt to changing priorities or perspectives on interdependence. The IMF for example has succeeded in adjusting to major changes in the international economic regime and major shifts in the intellectual consensus. But even institutions face limitations to their ability to keep up with underlying transformations. This is one of the reasons why solutions to emerging problems have often been looked for outside the existing multilateral, institution-based governance framework (Table 1). D. The imbalances of global governance A further reason for popular dissatisfaction with global governance is its unbalanced nature. The deeper international integration becomes, the broader the scope of policy its management should cover, and the more acute the tension between the technical requirements of global interdependence and the domestically-rooted legitimacy of public policies. This is most apparent in the field of taxation. International tax optimisation by multinationals has become an issue of significant relevance and it is estimated that 40 percent of their profit is being artificially shifted to low-tax countries – with major consequences for national budgets (T?rsl?v et al, 2018). But the fact that taxation remains at the core of sovereign prerogatives limits the scope and ambition of initiatives conducted at international level. The result, which can be regarded as an illustration of Rodrik’s trilemma, is that global coordination in tax matters falls short of what equity-conscious citizens regard as desirable and, at the same time, exceeds what sovereignty-conscious citizens consider acceptable. The imbalances of global governance are by no means limited to the taxation field. The same can be found in a series of domains, for example biodiversity and the preservation of nature. E. Increased complexity The final obstacle to multilateral solutions has to do with the sheer complexity of the challenges global governance has to tackle. In recent decades channels of international interdependence have both multiplied and diversified. They now link together countries with significantly differing levels of technical, economic or financial development. Because they have developed outside the scope of negotiated rules and established institutions, some of channels of interdependence also escape the reach of international agreements to an unprecedented degree. This is especially, but not only, the case of the internet and the multiple networks that rely on it. The world does not fit anymore the usual representation whereby individual nations trade goods, capital and technology. Even putting aside geopolitical consequences and assuming a shared commitment to openness and multilateral solutions, such complexity is bound to test the limits of existing international governance arrangements.Multilateralism is unsustainable—its successes cause multipolarity that deters future cooperation. Competition solves public goods better. Harlan Grant Cohen 18, UGA law professor, January, “Multilateralism's Life Cycle,” American Journal of International Law, 112.1, 47-66**NCC Packet 2020**This insight suggests a seeming paradox: that the anti-globalist turns described above are a reflection not of multilateralism’s failures, but of its successes. The great multilateral institutions of the post-World War II world—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO, the United Nations, human rights treaties, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—reflected efforts to increase and spread global wealth, stability, and peace (among other goals). And while much work remains to be done, these institutions have in many ways succeeded. Wealth and power are now widely dispersed across the world.13 Human rights remain under serious threat (in some places, more than before14), but institutions have developed tools that can be effective, at least some of the time.15 Success, however, has fundamentally changed the calculus of individual states, and in turn, their views of global goals and multilateral strategies. The success of multilateralism may have made that strategy more difficult over time.16 The success of post-World War II mass multilateralism, this essay argues, has had four profound and intertwined effects on global negotiating dynamics, which together should shift and may be shifting states away from that strategy. The first is true global multipolarity.17 Current global institutions were founded against a backdrop of unipolarity, bipolarity, or even tripolarity. It is fair to ask whether those institutions are mere reflections of earlier power relations that no longer exist, whether existing global institutions are compatible with true multipolarity. Multipolarity highlights a second effect of success: the diminishing value of issue linkages. When one or a few wealthy, powerful states dominate the international order, they can demand much more of others. Previously, in return for access to markets or security, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European Union could demand that other states sign up to rules in which those others states had little to no interest. True multipolarity, though, radically diminishes the force of those linkages. Smaller states no longer “need” the more powerful ones in the same way. They may be powerful or wealthy enough to hold out for better deals. They may have greater relative regional power that offsets losses in dealing with traditional global powers. And, the wider dispersion of power means that the more traditional powers now face competition. No state is essential. This second effect combines with a third—the increased effectiveness of these institutions— to further change global negotiating dynamics. For states with little interest in particular institutions, greater effectiveness means greater cost. If the value of linkages decreases while the costs of membership increase, states may have little incentive to remain. For other states, effectiveness results in real benefits, increasing the value of membership. This though can make it easier for certain states to free-ride on the regime, betting that they can benefit from the global goods the regime produces, even as they seek special benefits at everyone else’s expense. Fourth and finally, multipolarity and success may change what states fundamentally want out of these negotiations, increasing focus on relative as opposed to absolute welfare. In an era of massive wealth and power disparities, all states can focus on the absolute gains of global agreements. Raising the welfare of the poorest serves the interests of the wealthy, and the poorest want only to better their position. Multipolarity, however, changes that dynamic. Studies in behavioral economics have shown that people often care more about relative wealth than absolute. At the international level, the United States worries about its shrinking wealth relative to China or Mexico, questioning trade agreements that, while valuable to the United States, give their rivals too large a share of the growing pie.18 President Trump complains openly about how little other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are paying for their defense.19 China and India, worried about the environment, worry equally that new environmental rules will burden them more than others, hurting their relative global position.20 The events listed above may thus best be described as the growing pains of an increasingly mature, successful, global system. But if multilateralism’s success makes further multilateralism more difficult, those seeking to solve global problems and provide global public goods face a quandary. The last part of this essay thus suggests some ways forward. Again paradoxically, as multilateral institutions deepen, the best strategies to achieve global solutions may be ones that encourage competition rather than foster cooperation. Regional, club, and national strategies may need to pick up where multilateralism leaves offLeadership AnswersHeg D: Data—1NCZero correlation between hegemony and war – retrenchment’s stabilizing and avoids their offense – prefer empirics Fettweis 17 (Christopher J, *Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26:3, 423-451) **NCC Packet 2020**Overall, if either version is correct and global stability is provided by US hegemony, then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or “deep engagement” (to liberals) is clearly a wise choice.75 If, however, US actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace, or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States can retrench without fear of negative consequences. The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to beliefs in hegemonic stability. Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post-Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. The four administrations are reasonable representations of the four ideal types outlined by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross in 1996.76 Under George H. W. Bush, the United States followed the path of “selective engagement,” which is sometimes referred to as “balance-of-power realism”; Bill Clinton’s grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call “cooperative security,” and others call “liberal internationalism”; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strategy that was as close to “primacy” as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, has followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label “neo-isolationism” but its proponents refer to as “strategic restraint.”77 In no case did the various anticipated disorders materialize. As Table 2 demonstrates, armed conflict levels fell steadily, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose. Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while the United States chose uninvolvement. If the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence. Perhaps we should not expect a correlation to show up in this kind of analysis. While US behavior might have varied in the margins during this period, nether its relative advantage over its nearest rivals nor its commitments waivered in any important way. However, it is surely worth noting that if trends opposite to those discussed in the previous two sections had unfolded, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in either US military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.78 If increases in violence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between US power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise have precious little empirical support upon which to build their case. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an established fact, and as such deserves a different kind of examination.Heg D: Decline Doesn’t Cause War—1NCHegemonic decline doesn’t cause war—empiricsMacDonald and Parent 18 Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent. MacDonald is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley University. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. “Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment.” Cornell University Press. 2018. **NCC Packet 2020**Since 2008, there has been vigorous argument about whether the United States is in decline. Some see clear evidence of an erosion of American power. Fareed Zakaria argues that the “distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance.” The National Intelligence Council asserts that one of the most important global trends will be the shift of power “to networks and coalitions in a multipolar world.” Others maintain that reports of America’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. Joseph Nye contends that “describing the twenty-first century as one of American decline is likely to be inaccurate and misleading” Josef Joffe reaches a similar conclusion about the “false prophecy of America’s decline,” noting, “The United States is the default power, the country that occupies center stage because there is nobody else with the requisite power and purpose.” While there are significant disagreements about the character of American decline, there are fewer disagreements about its political consequences. Authors across the political spectrum worry about the repercussions of ebbing U.S. influence. Robert Kagan contends that “if American power declines, this world order will decline with it.” And Robert Lieber declares, “The maintenance of [the United States’] leading role matters greatly. The alternative would…be a more disorderly and dangerous world.” Christopher Layne concurs: “As [its] power wanes over the next decade or so, the United States will find itself increasingly challenged.” Charles Kupchan echoes the point: “U.S. leadership has always faced resistance but the pushback grows in proportion to the diffusion of gloal power.” While their policy recommendations differ, there is broad consensus that if the United States declines, this will usher in a period of greater uncertainty, complexity, and potential danger in world politics. Why do international relations scholars assume that decline will be dangerous? This pessimism is founded in the two main theories of how great powers respond to decline. The first contends that expansion and war are the most likely responses to shifts in power. Declining states find it hard to resist the siren song of preventive war because it holds the greatest hope that they will be able to slow or stop their decline. Rather than waiting until decline has taken its toll, states prefer to confront rising challengers while the balance of military capabilities remains favorable. The second argues that, when decline strikes, great powers stick to the status quo because they struggle with domestic dysfunction. A combination of entrenched interest groups, hidebound bureaucracies, and parochial governing coalitions prevent policymakers from altering course. Paralyzed at home, declining powers cling to untenable commitments despite sharp challengers and spiraling costs. Where domestic dysfunction scholars tend to see status quo policies as imprudent, preventive war theorists tend to see those courses of action as rational, if sometimes regrettable. In this chapter, we challenge the assumptions and logic of both of these theories. We argue that the conditions that produce dysfunctional domestic dynamics or preventive war incentives tend to be rare, and even less common when great powers are in the midst of decline. Decline creates powerful incentives for leaders to overcome domestic intransigence and push through needed reforms. Few states are so vulnerable to capture from domestic interests that they can ignore structural incentives. Decline generates equally powerful incentives for states to adjust constructively within the international order, rather than risk the grave gamble that is preventive war. Seldom are states in the position where the risks of preventive war are manageable, and yet victory will be decisive enough to solve their underlying problems. These critiques find support in the empirical record, where preventive war and political paralysis are infrequent. The true puzzle is not why states struggle to respond to decline, but why retrenchment is the most common response. Heg D: Resilient—1NCUS hegemony is resilient Hunt 17 (Edward Hunt, PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary, “The American Empire Isn’t in Decline,” March 13, )**NCC Packet 2020**The warning signs seem to be everywhere. A resurgent Russia is exerting its power in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. A rising China is extending its reach across its periphery. ISIS has taken control of large parts of Iraq and Syria. Establishment Democrats and Republicans couldn’t even stop Donald Trump from becoming the president of the United States. For the foreign policy establishment in Washington, it all raises a very troubling question: is the United States an empire in decline? Some insist that the answer is yes — that the period of US global dominance that has reigned since the end of the Cold War is coming to an end. As things now stand, “the post–Cold War, unipolar moment has passed,” the National Intelligence Council reported earlier this year. Former CIA officials John E. McLaughlin and Gen. David H. Petraeus made a similar assessment before the House Armed Services Committee this past February. In the years ahead, McLaughlin argued, “the world will be without a hegemonic power — that is, without a country so powerful as to exert dominant influence and advance policy with little reference to others.” Petraeus agreed, saying that the post–Cold War era of “US domination of the world” is ending. Still, there are some reasons to think otherwise. As former US diplomat R. Nicholas Burns recently observed, the United States maintains “alliances in Europe and Asia, and the Russians and Chinese do not.” In addition, the American military has begun to wipe out ISIS, killing more than sixty thousand fighters over the past two and a half years. So do a resurgent Russia, an ascendant China, and the emergence of the Islamic State suggest that US power is ebbing, or are these challenges exaggerated? What do US officials really think about these matters? If we take stock of their public statements as a whole, the foreign policy establishment certainly appears concerned about the latest challenges to US empire, especially the uncertainty that Trump’s election has introduced. But they also remain quite confident in their power to shape the world and steer the United States into a new age of global hegemony. The World’s Superpower Over the past few years, a number of high-level officials have expressed great confidence in the durability of US hegemony. Not only have they insisted that the declinist thesis is wrong, but they have argued that the United States will remain the world’s dominant power well into the future. In May 2016, two former high-level officials laid out the more confident view for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In a statement to the panel, former Secretary of State James Baker said that the United States would continue to lead the international system. Certainly, “much of the rest of the world — countries like China, Brazil and India — are catching up with us,” Baker conceded. “Still, we should remain the world’s preeminent leader for the foreseeable future.” Former National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon agreed. As long as the United States takes the proper precautions, he said, it “will continue to be the world’s leading and most powerful nation for a long time to come.” Donilon also rejected the declinist thesis, calling it a “myth” that should not be taken seriously: “The idea that America is in decline does not stand up to a rigorous analysis of our national balance sheet of strategic assets and liabilities,” Donilon asserted. “The truth is that no nation can match our comprehensive set of enduring strengths.” Other Obama administration officials offered similar views. Last October, for example, Secretary of State John Kerry noted that the United States maintains tremendous economic advantages. “We’re the richest country on the face of the planet,” Kerry said. In fact, the Obama administration made great strides in expanding US economic power across the globe. President Obama, who acknowledged during his final months in office that he had “made it a priority to open up new markets overseas,” boasted that his administration had “increased US exports to the world by more than 40 percent — to record levels.” At the same time, administration officials also pointed to their other great advantage in world affairs: American military power. As Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted in April 2015, “it will take decades — and let me repeat that: decades — for anyone to build the kind of military capability the United States possesses today.” Obama expressed similar sentiments during his farewell tour. The United States possesses “the greatest military in the history of the world,” Obama declared. “Make no mistake,” he continued, “even with the challenges of recent years — and there have been challenges — our allies and adversaries alike understand America’s military remains, by far, the most capable fighting force on the face of the Earth.” In short, contrary to those who warn of waning US hegemony, high-ranking officials insist that the United States remains the most powerful country in the world. “We are, without a doubt, the world’s superpower,” CIA Director John Brennan said this past September. The Challenges Of course, every great power faces challengers. Not even the mighty United States is immune from pushback. As Carter noted last November, the United States faces enemies that are “extremely competitive,” ranging from terrorists to “high-end opponents.” Facing such a broad range of adversaries, foreign policy elites have tried to assess how seriously to treat each, weighing whether current and potential enemies can significantly weaken the United States’ hold over the world. For the most part, they agree on the issue of terrorism. Although American leaders regularly denounce terrorism as the modern world’s greatest plague, most don’t see it as a major challenge. Last November, former State Department official Daniel Serwer warned, “We shouldn’t blow up terrorism into an existential threat. It’s not.” A month later, Obama agreed that ISIS and other groups stand no real chance of defeating the United States. “Today’s terrorists can kill innocent people,” Obama stated, “but they don’t pose an existential threat to our nation.” Instead, officials have grown more concerned about other challenges. Taking a more traditional view of the world, they have largely concluded that rising powers in the international system now pose the most serious threat to US hegemony. Early last year, Carter articulated this basic rationale, describing the latest trends as “a return, in some ways, to great power competition.” Without diminishing the US’s capacity to fight terrorism, he contended that the nation should prepare for new confrontations with Russia and China. These countries, he argued, “are our most stressing competitors, as they’ve both developed and are continuing to advance military systems that threaten our advantages in specific areas.” Throughout Washington, many officials are worried that China will replace the United States as the dominant power in the Pacific. Last June, Brennan delivered this warning: “China is a growing power of great economic, political, and increasingly military influence and presence.” China, he noted, has continued expanding its presence in the South China Sea, an area American officials have identified as a strategically important transit route. “There is a reason for the United States to pay attention to what China is doing on a number of fronts, which we are,” Brennan said. A few months later, two high-level officials put the matter more directly. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Secretary of Defense Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford claimed that the United States and China are now arrayed against each other. Alabama senator Tom Cotton asked, “Gen. Dunford, are we in great-power competition with China?” “We are, senator,” Dunford replied. Carter agreed, saying, “absolutely right.” In early January, Secretary of State John Kerry even suggested that China would eventually surpass the United States as the world’s leading economic power. “We’re the most powerful country on the planet, yes, and we’re the biggest economy in the world, yes,” Kerry stated. “But China will be eventually just by virtue of its size.” Nevertheless, US officials have also expressed certitude about their ability to deal with China. While they may identify China as a great-power competitor that is destined to grow more powerful, they have also argued the US maintains the upper hand in bilateral relations. In July 2016, Vice President Joe Biden provided one example. He recounted that after the Chinese government had tried to create an air defense identification zone over disputed territory in the East China Sea, the United States had asserted its dominance. According to Biden, President Xi had asked him, “What do you expect me to do?” In response, Biden had said, “I don’t expect you to do much, but just so you know, we’re flying B-52s through it. We’re coming.” In other words, Biden told the Chinese president that regardless of any newly declared air rights, the United States would continue to use that area. Since then, officials have only grown more confident in their capacity to manage China. Kerry himself bragged last September that China has not been able to alter the strategic calculus in the South China Sea. “In the South China Sea, we have been able to make it clear, freedom of navigation,” Kerry commented. “We’ve been able to deal with China.” In fact, the United States has maintained the dominant position throughout the entire Asia Pacific area. The United States “is the strongest military and the power of the region and will remain so for a long time,” Carter said last December. Officials in the Trump administration have indicated they may use that military power to confront China. In January, Rex Tillerson said during his confirmation hearing for secretary of state that the US will no longer tolerate China’s attempts to gain control of the South China Sea. “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed,” Tillerson said. In short, US officials are relatively unperturbed by China’s power. Although they still fear that China may one day emerge to challenge American hegemony, they have largely ensured that China will remain a secondary power in the region for the immediate future. Russia: A Closer Look Meanwhile, state officials face another significant challenge to their plans: Russia. Last June, Brennan captured their trepidation in a statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: “Russia is threatening its neighbors and aggressively reasserting itself on the global stage,” he stated. The following month, diplomat Alexander Vershbow provided a more direct assessment, explaining that the United States and Russia are once again competing for influence in Europe. “We now sadly recognize that we’re in a long — what I’d call a long-term strategic competition with Russia,” Vershbow said. Earlier this year, Mattis issued the strongest warning, saying that Russia represented the main hazard to the world order. “I would consider the principal threats to start with Russia,” Mattis said. At the same time, US officials assert that the rivalry with Russia remains largely one-sided. While they see Russia as a competitor, they simultaneously insist that the country has much less power than the United States. In April 2016, US ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute argued that Russia — not the United States — has entered a period of declension. “There’s a sense that, yes, there’s a new, more assertive, maybe even more aggressive Russia,” he explained, “but fundamentally Russia is a state in decline.” A few months later, Defense Department official Elissa Slotkin made a similar argument. The Russians are “acting from a position of weakness,” she stated, before going on to note that the Kremlin faces many constraints. “I think the combination of the economic sanctions after Crimea and Eastern Ukraine plus the low price of oil has really hurt them,” she said. The United States should not “overestimate the competitor,” she continued, suggesting that her predecessors had done just that with the Soviet Union. The Russians “are not unbeatable,” she insisted. “They are not operating from a position of strength.” The highest ranking officials in the Obama administration shared her view. This past October, Secretary of State John Kerry said that very little about Russia scared him. “I don’t sit around quaking about Russia,” Kerry commented. Obama also waved away the notion that Russia posed a serious challenge, even after allegations of election interference surfaced. “The Russians can’t change us or significantly weaken us,” he stated. “They are a smaller country. They are a weaker country.” Essentially, foreign policy elites seem content in the knowledge that while Russia has emerged as a competitor on a variety of issues, it is acting from a position of weakness. As former US ambassador to Russia William Burns noted earlier this year, “I’ve learned that we have a much better hand to play with Mr. Putin than he does with us.”Russia AnswersNo Russia Nuclear WarNo Russia war – they won’t risk itAmy F. Woolf 20, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, received a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1983, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization”, **NCC Packet 2020**One analyst has postulated that Russia may actually raise its nuclear threshold as it bolsters its conventional forces. According to this analyst, “It is difficult to understand why Russia would want to pursue military adventurism that would risk all-out confrontation with a technologically advanced and nuclear-armed adversary like NATO. While opportunistic, and possibly even reckless, the Putin regime does not appear to be suicidal.” 144 As a study from the RAND Corporation noted, Russia has “invested considerable sums in developing and fielding long-range conventional strike weapons since the mid-2000s to provide Russian leadership with a buffer against reaching the nuclear threshold—a set of conventional escalatory options that can achieve strategic effects without resorting to nuclear weapons.”145 Others note, however, that Russia has integrated these “conventional precision weapons and nuclear weapons into a single strategic weapon set,” lending credence to the view that Russia may be prepared to employ, or threaten to employ, nuclear weapons during a regional conflict.Even if, no nuclear escalationViljar Veebel 19. Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. 06/01/2019. “Researching Baltic Security Challenges after the Annexation of Crimea.” Journal on Baltic Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 41–52. **NCC Packet 2020**It should also be noted in this respect that the most recent reports of the RAND Corporation are more modest in their assessments compared with the results of the previous studies. For example, a study by Scott Boston and co-authors entitled ‘Assessing the conventional force imbalance in Europe: Implications for countering Russian local superiority’, argues that based on their analysis, there is no reason to believe that Russian conventional aggression against NATO is likely to take place. However, they also emphasize that steps should be taken to mitigate potential areas of vulnerability in the interest of ensuring a stable security relationship between all NATO members and Russia. The authors conclude that NATO has sufficient resources, personnel, and equipment to enhance conventional deterrence against Russia (Boston et al., 2018).More specifically, most conventional threat scenarios clearly point to the same problematic issue: the possibility that Russia could isolate the Baltic countries from its Western allies by closing the ‘Suwalki gap’ (called also ‘Kaliningrad corridor’), a 110–115 kilometre wide land border between Lithuania and Poland. One of the most comprehensive studies on this matter is a research by Leszek Elak and Zdzislaw Sliwa, ‘The Suwalki Gap – NATO?s fragile hot spot’. The article analyses various characteristics of the Kaliningrad region from the military perspective as well as suggests in a very detailed manner the potential tactics that could be used in military aggressions within the Suwalki gap. Elak and Sliwa conclude that the loss of the land connection between the West and the Baltic countries would allow Russia freedom of action over an extended period of time. Furthermore, they argue that if the terrain is lost, it will require significant efforts to control the area again. The authors stress that the Kaliningrad region is critical for Russia to gain time, which is the third important operational factor supporting other two factors, such as space and force, enabling the desired speed to reach the desired end state (Elak and Sliwa, 2016). This issue is further elaborated, for example, in the articles ‘Kaliningrad: A useless sliver of Russia or the cause of a new Fulda gap?’ by Vaidas Sald?iūnas (2016), ‘Why it would be rational for Russia to escalate in Kaliningrad and Suwalki corridor?’ by Viljar Veebel (2018d), ‘Kaliningrad oblast as the forward anti-access/area denial hub’ by Zdzislaw Sliwa (2018), and others.3 Studies on potential nuclear escalation scenariosThe question whether Russia would use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region has also intrigued many academics and military experts recently. One of the most radical discussions in this field is a blog post by Loren B. Thompson, ‘Why the Baltic states are where nuclear war is most likely to begin’. He argues that the likelihood of nuclear war between Russia and the United States is probably growing and is the reason why it is most likely going to start is a future military confrontation over three Baltic countries. Thompson describes eight reasons why nuclear weapons could potentially be used in future warfighting scenarios with regard to the Baltics and argues that according to the bottom-line scenario, the East–West conflict escalates into the use of nuclear weapons in the Baltic area, and neither side of the conflict understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other. Thompson comes to a somewhat surprising conclusion – at least in the eyes of the Baltic countries – that the United States needs to reassess the situation, suggesting that it would make no sense to tie security of the United States to countries of ‘such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances’ (Thompson, 2016).Potential nuclear conflict escalation scenarios are in more detail discussed in another publication, a NATO playbook entitled ‘Preventing escalation in the Baltics’ by Ulrich Kühn. The author argues that the risk of escalating a wider conflict between Russia and NATO is dangerously high particularly in the case of the Baltic countries because it would be difficult for NATO to defend the region. Kühn suggest three possible escalation scenarios, i.e., deliberate escalation, inadvertent escalation, and accidental escalation. All three scenarios also involve nuclear threats; however, two of the scenarios stop short of actual Russian nuclear-weapon usage (Kühn, 2018). The analysis provides an interesting hypothetical construct for the experts at both the transatlantic and local levels, as it points to many practical issues in regard to the nuclear deterrence from the NATO’s political decision-making process to the role of domestic policies in tackling such a crisis.Conflict escalation scenarios that involve nuclear capabilities are discussed also in other studies. For example, in a study called ‘Reducing the risk of nuclear war in the Nordic/Baltic region’ by Barry Blechman and co-authors, two scenarios of conventional war ending in the exchange of nuclear weapons are constructed (namely, ‘Escalation in Estonia’ and ‘Regional War’). Although the authors emphasize that the scenarios are purely illustrative and the probability of nuclear use is low, they argue that it is useful to reduce these risks even further and suggest two initiatives, such as a strengthening of the Alliance’s conventional military capabilities and particularly the ability to move quickly into the Baltic region, as well as to establish a Baltic nuclear weapons free zone, or at least examining the possibility to do so (for further discussion, see Blechman et at., 2015). Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavi?ius in their article ‘A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia’ point to various alarming signs, e.g., Russia’s large-scale exercises incorporate limited nuclear strike scenarios against NATO as part of Russia’s ‘escalation to de-escalate’ strategy; Russia is expanding the range of its tactical delivery systems, the country’s political rhetoric includes nuclear threats toward the West, and so on. They emphasize that the Alliance’s range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has shrunk considerably and that the Alliance lacks a collective will to call those threats a bluff (Luik and Jermalavi?ius, 2017).A large part of the research in this field more or less considers it likely that Russia could use its nuclear forces in the Baltic region. However, there are also articles that oppose this conviction. For example, Viljar Veebel and Illimar Ploom in ‘The deterrence credibility of NATO and the readiness of the Baltic states to employ the deterrence instruments’ disagree with the idea that the Baltic countries could be under potential nuclear attack, which could in turn evolve to a nuclear war. They argue that although Russia and NATO as potential conflict parties have a striking capability, it would be irrational for both of them to execute a nuclear strike even as a measure of last resort. The authors stress that it is hard to believe that Russia has any rational motivation to use nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries because a large share of the population in the Baltic countries are Russian-speaking. Likewise, in case of a potential conflict, territorial proximity of Russia and the Baltic countries, as well as Russia’s possible further ambition to legitimate the annexation comes into play. The argument of irrationality applies also to the NATO alliance as it would raise a question about morality and escalation should NATO consider using nuclear attack as a preventative measure. In addition, there are several logical gaps in the chain of arguments justifying the use of nuclear weapons against Russia if the latter has fully or partially invaded the Baltic countries. The authors hereby point to the following questions: First, how could the strategic use of nuclear weapons against Russia be believable in a regional conflict? Second, how would it help to solve the conflict which has already started? Third, what would be the possible positive outcome for NATO, having initiated mutually assured destruction with Russia to stop the occupations of Baltics? (Veebel and Ploom, 2018a). ................
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