The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles - history.army.mil

[Pages:89]The

1968 Tet Offensive Battles

of

Quang Tri City and Hue

U.S. Army Center of Military History 103 Third Avenue, Building 35, Collins Hall

Fort McNair, D.C. 20319-5058

The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles

of Quang Tri City and Hue

by Erik Villard

Contents

Page Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The 1st Cavalry Division Moves North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The Assault on Quang Tri City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Enter the Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Target: Hue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A City Besieged: 31 January?1 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Thon La Chu: 2?10 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 The Fight for the Triangle and the Citadel: 2?10 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 West of Hue: 11?20 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Stalemate in the Citadel: 11?20 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 The Final Push: 20?25 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Maps 1. I Corps Tactical Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The Battle of Quang Tri City: Original Allied Situation, 31 January 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. The Battle of Quang Tri City: Enemy Attack, 31 January 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4. The Battle of Quang Tri City: 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div Counterattack, 31 January 1968 . . . . 20 5. The Battle of Hue: Enemy Attack, 30?31 January 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 6. The Battle of Hue: Friendly Situation, 31 January?2 February 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7. The Battle of Hue: Friendly Situation, 2?10 February 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 8. The Battle of Hue: Enemy Situation, 11?20 February 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9. The Battle of Hue: Friendly Situation, 11?20 February 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10. The Battle of Hue: Friendly Situation, 21?25 February 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Illustrations Quang Tri City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Hue Citadel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Illustrations courtesy of the following: p. 9, Jim Singer; p. 26, Department of the Army files.

Foreword

This monograph focuses on the battles of Quang Tri City and Hue that took place during the 1968 Tet offensive. The offensive itself, an all-out effort by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces to overrun the major cities of South Vietnam, marked the turning point of the Vietnam War. Although the attacks were costly failures in military terms, they set the United States on a path of disengagement from the war that ultimately led to the fall of Saigon some seven years later.

The battles for the two northernmost provincial capitals in South Vietnam, Quang Tri City and Hue, are particularly worth examining because the enemy regarded them as key objectives, second only to Saigon, the national capital. To a large extent, the success or failure of the offensive depended on what happened there. The battles tell us much about how the enemy prepared for the offensive, why he achieved a high degree of surprise and initial success, and why his attacks ultimately failed. The battle for Quang Tri City, a textbook example of a vertical envelopment, resulted in a quick allied victory. The fight for Hue turned into a slow, grinding campaign of attrition that lasted nearly a month before the enemy was finally defeated. Together, they offer instruction on the strengths and limitations of airmobile warfare and a primer on urban fighting in a counterinsurgency environment, subjects that continue to be a major Army interest throughout the world.

Since this monograph is an extract from a larger work in progress, we would like to hear from you: your comments, favorable or critical, and your recommendations about additional approaches or sources to consider. The Vietnam War continues to be our country's most controversial war, and the lessons from that largely unconventional conflict continue to inform our approach to the demands of the Global War on Terror today. Please send all comments to Erik.Villard@hqda.army.mil.

Washington, D.C. 9 September 2008

Jeffrey J. Clarke Chief of Military History U.S. Army Center of Military History

The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue

In early 1968, General William C. Westmoreland saw signs of hope and progress in a stubborn war that was approaching its third year of combat. The allied military machine had never been stronger. As commander of the joint headquarters known as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Westmoreland had nearly half a million American soldiers, marines, airmen, sailors, and coast guardsmen under his command, along with nearly 60,000 combat troops from South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, collectively known as the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). The South Vietnamese government fielded another 685,000 military personnel, about half of whom were soldiers in its regular army. In addition to the most modern and sophisticated army in the world, Westmoreland had the might of the U.S. Seventh Air Force stationed in South Vietnam, Thailand, and Guam at his disposal and could draw on assets from the powerful and carrier-rich U.S. Seventh Fleet on station in the South China Sea. Given that strength, the general believed that with enough time-- perhaps a year or two--he could reduce the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese armed forces in the country to a point where only a small number of American troops would be needed to protect South Vietnam.1

Although the enemy remained a formidable threat, fielding some 280,000 full- and part-time fighters operating in units as large as a division, Westmoreland believed that the allies had finally won the upper hand and were now steadily eroding the Communist fighting strength and political underground. He and his commanders would accelerate the effort to block enemy infiltration through Laos and Cambodia. They would also increase the number of operations designed to hinder the enemy's access to rice and other resources in the South that were needed to prolong the war. The allies would continue their systematic destruction of Communist base areas inside South Vietnam, further depleting the enemy's stores and eliminating locations used to rest and restore Communist forces. As a consequence, MACV projections for 1968 predicated that the pacification effort would make significant gains. Westmoreland looked forward to the coming year with a cautious but determined sense of optimism.2

1 Headquarters, United States Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), "Command History, 1968" (Saigon, Vietnam: Military History Branch, Office of the Secretary, MACV, 1969), p. 224, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C. (hereinafter cited as MACV History, date). 2 Combined Campaign Plan 1968, AB 143, MACV, 11 Nov 67, pp. 13?14, A-2, copy in CMH.

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