Contemporary Political Philosophy: Constructivism and ...



Contemporary Political Philosophy: Constructivism & Critical Theory

Optional course, Philosophy MA and Social and Political Thought MA

Spring Term 2008 Tutor: Gordon Finlayson

Seminar: room and time Tuesday Russell Building 13, 12-14 p.m.

Course Outline and Reading List

The term ‘Kantian constructivism’ was introduced by John Rawls to describe a procedure for deriving moral, legal and political standards from the bare idea of what it is to be a person or a rational agent. Versions of this strategy, with or without the name ‘constructivism’, can be discovered not only in Rawls’s derivation of his principles of justice from choices made in an original position, and in Kant’s moral philosophy, but also in O’Neill, Habermas, Scanlon and other recent political and legal philosophers. The course will examine the structure and cogency of various political constructivist arguments.

Week Topic

2. Kant’s Ethics & Kant’s Theory of Right

3. Rawls I: A Theory of Justice

4. Rawls II: Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory

5. Sandel’s Communitarian Critique

6. Rawls II: Political Liberalism

7. Habermas’s Discourse Ethics

8. The Feminist Critique of Moral Theory

9. Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms

10 The Habermas-Rawls dispute.

General reading

Finlayson J.G (2005). Habermas: A Very Short Introduction

Wolff, J. (1996) An Introduction to Political Philosophy

Knowles, D. (1998) Political Philosophy

Mullhall S. and Swift A., (1992) Liberals and Communitarians,

Christman, J. (2002) Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction

Constructivism in contemporary political philosophy:

McKinnon, C. (2002) Liberalism and the Defence of Political Constructivism

Roberts, P. (2005) Political Constructivism

# = essential reading for seminar

A: Primary Texts B: Secondary texts C: Further Reading

* = recommended

+ = good introductory reading

1. Kant’s Ethics & Kant’s Theory of Right

Kant is far and away the most important historical figure for central figure for contemporary political constructivism, and most constructivists combine their views with a particular interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy and philosophy of right. In this session we will concentrate on his argument for the second formula of the basic moral imperative, the categorical imperative: that we should treat others as ends rather than means, and on a close reading of the key parts of his philosophy of right, or philosophy of law.

A: # Kant, I. [1785] Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals trans. M. Gregor, 1998 or ed. L. Denis 2005, or as Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. L.W. Beck, 1959, or as The Moral Law, trans. H.J. Paton, 1948, part 2, Prussian Academy pagination pp. 426-448 and (the argument that every rational agent must treat every other as an end in him/herself)

# Kant, I. [1793] “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’” in Immanuel Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, CUP, Cambridge 1970 pp. 61-92.

# Kant, I. [1797] The Metaphysics of Morals trans. M. Gregor, 1991 (recommended translation), Doctrine of Right: ‘Introduction to Doctrine of Right’ and §1-9, 36, 41-49, 49 remark A, 52, 62, Conclusion. (Some of this material can be found in Hans Reiss ed. pp.131-143

B: Kersting, W. (1992) ‘Politics, freedom and order: Kant’s political philosophy’ in P. Guyer ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant

Wood, A. (1999) Kant’s Ethical Thought, chapter on Kant’s political philosophy

O.Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, ch. 9.

Pippin, R.B. (1985) ‘On the moral foundations of Kant’s Rechtslehre’ in R. Kennington ed. The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, reprinted in Pippin’s Idealism as Modernism.

Seminar Questions:

Why, according to Kant, should we treat others as ends rather than mere means?

What is it, according to Kant, to treat someone as an end in themselves?

What does Kant mean by Right (Recht)?

Is his principle of Right based on the categorical imperative, and if so how?

What is ultimate justification for law in Kant?

How does Kant propose to unite individual morally autonomous individuals in a political community?

How according to Kant do individual, society, state relate to each other?

What according to Kant is the aim of political society?

C:

Introductions to Kant’s ethics:

Schneewind, J.B. (1992) ‘Autonomy, obligation and virtue: an overview of Kant’s moral philosophy’, in P. Guyer ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant

Korsgaard, C. (1998) ‘Introduction’ to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. M. Gregor

Walker, R.C.S. (1998) Kant: Kant and the Moral Law, The Great Philosophers (a very short book)

Guyer, P. (1998) ‘Introduction’ to Guyer, P. ed. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays

Introductions to Kant’s political and legal philosophy:

Reiss, H. (1970) ‘Introduction’ to Reiss ed. Kant’s Political Writings, secs. 4-6

Riley, P. (1986) ‘The “elements” of Kant’s political philosophy’, Political Theory 14:4

Sullivan, R.J. (1989) Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, chs. 16-17

Kersting, W. (1992) ‘Politics, freedom and order: Kant’s political philosophy’ in P. Guyer ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant

On the foundations of the principle of right:

Riley, P. (1982) Will and Political Legitimacy, ch. on Kant

Taylor, C. (1984) ‘Kant’s theory of freedom’ in Z.A. Pelczynski and J. Gray eds. Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, reprinted in Taylor’s Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers Volume 2, 1985

Mulholland, L.A. (1989) Kant’s System of Rights

Flikschuh, K. (2000) Kant and Modern Political Philosophy

2. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice

John Rawls’s argues that a social structure is just if it conforms to the two ‘principles of justice’ that people would choose if they had to choose between different possible principles to govern their society from an ‘original position’ that is behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. from a position in which they did not anything about their personal characteristics or abilities.

A: #Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, or 2nd ed. 1999, secs. §1-4, 8, 11, 40, 60 & 68.

B: Höffe, O.“Is Rawls' Theory of Justice Really Kantian?” Ratio 1984. pp. 103 -124

Cohen, G.A. “If You’re an egalitarian How come you’re so rich?” Harvard University Press (2000) chs. 9 & 10.

Seminar Questions:

What does Rawls mean by saying that persons are free and equal?

How does he think the original position models this conception of the person?

What role does the original position play in A Theory?

What does Rawls mean by Justice?

How Kantian is this theory?

What are the implications of his theory, if any, for the personal behaviour of individuals?

3. Rawls: Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory

Rawls went on to develop the idea that the original position procedure is a way of modelling a Kantian conception of persons as free and equal, so that ultimately the principles of justice are ‘constructed’ from this conception of a person. He also said that this conception of the person is not necessarily a true one, just one that is part of an ‘overlapping consensus’ that members of modern democratic societies share for political purposes. Here we will focus on the idea of constructivism in Rawls’s theory.

Seminar Reading.

A: # Rawls, J. (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’ (The Dewey Lectures), Journal of Philosophy 77:9, reprinted in Rawls’s Collected Papers, lecture 3, which is revised as lecture 3, ‘Political constructivism’ in Rawls’s Political Liberalism 1993.

Available on-line @ Stable URL:



B: # O’Neill, O. (2002) ‘Constructivism in Rawls and Kant’, in S. Freeman ed. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Argues that Rawls is essentially communitarian)

“O’Neill, O. “Constructivism in Ethics” (1998). In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Available on-line @

Korsgaard, C. REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY MORAL PHILOSOPHY. Available on-line @

Seminar Questions:

What is constructivist about Rawls’s Justice as Fairness?

What is thus constructed, and what is it constructed out of?

Are all the elements of the construct also constructed, or are there some simples?

What is the point of constructivism?

Who is the opponent of the constructivist? What philosophical position is it designed to refute?

C: Further Reading.

Constructivism in general

See also the short articles on Social Contructivism and Constructivism in Mathematics in

On Rawls’s constructivism:

+ Arneson, R.J. (1989) ‘Introduction’ to symposium on Rawlsian theory of justice, Ethics 99

Brink D. O. (1987) ‘Rawlsian constructivism in moral theory, Canadian Journal of

Philosophy 17

Rawls and Kant:

Krasnoff, L. (1999) ‘How Kantian is constructivism?’, Kant-Studien 90:4

Doppelt, G. (1988) ‘Rawls’ Kantian ideal and the viability of modern liberalism’, Inquiry 31

Rawls, J. (1989) ‘Themes in Kant’s moral philosophy’, in E. Förster ed. Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, reprinted in Rawls’s Collected Papers

Rawls, J. (2000) Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, section on Kant

Gillroy, J.M. (2000) ‘Making public choices: Kant’s “justice from autonomy” as an alternative to Rawls’ “justice as fairness”‘, Kant-Studien 91:1

4. The Communitarian Critique of Rawls.

Michael Sandel argues that the concept of the self as a purely rational chooser on which Rawls relies is unrealistic since every individual is in fact already steeped in the values of their particular society. This critique applies implicitly to the whole constructivist tradition. John Gray asserts that the very idea of human beings as free agents fundamentally distinct from other animals is simply a long-standing illusion of Western religion and philosophy.

Seminar Reading:

A: #Sandel, M.J. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. 1988, introduction, chs. 1-3, conclusion

#Sandel, M.J. (The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 1984), pp. 81-96 Available online @ Stable URL:

Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice, preface, ch. 1

B: Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls, ch. 2 ‘Sandel and the conception of the person’ [m]

+ Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P. (1990) Rawls, ch. 7

+ Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. (1992) Liberals and Communitarians: An Introduction, 2nd ed. 1996, Introduction, chs. 5,6

#Gray, J. (2002) Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals, Granta, pp. 37-52

Seminar Questions:

What are Sandel’s chief Objections to Rawls’s Theory of Justice?

What does Sandel mean by the unencumbered Self?

Where, if anywhere, do his criticisms bite?

Can political constructivism provide a basis for justifying a legal order if it is based on a conception of the self that is (a) produced or (b) reinforced by that same order?

How should a political constructivist respond to Sandel’s critique of Rawls?

5. Rawls’s Political Liberalism

Seminar Reading:

A: # Rawls, J. (1985) ‘Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14. Available on-line @ Stable URL:

Revised as lecture 1, secs. 1-5 of Rawls’s Political Liberalism 1993.

# Rawls, J. Political Liberalism Lecture 3 “Political Constructivism” §1-4

# Rawls, J. Political Liberalism Lecture 4 “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” §1-5

# Rawls, J. Political Liberalism Lecture 6 “The Idea of Public Reason” §1-4

B: +Kymlicka, W. (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy¸ 2nd ed., ch. 6 sec. 7 ‘Political liberalism’

Seminar Questions:

What does Rawls mean by calling this conception of justice a ‘political’ one?

What is a comprehensive doctrine?

Why is justice for Rawls not a comprehensive doctrine?

What is an overlapping consensus?

What are public and non-public reasons?

What are ‘pro-tanto’, ‘full’, and ‘public justification’?

What is the duty of civility? Who owes it to whom?

C: Further Reading:

Raz, J. Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 3-46. Available on-line @ Stable URL: .

Reprinted in Raz, J. Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford, 1194 ch. 4.

6. Habermas’s Discourse Ethics

Seminar Reading.

A: #Habermas, J. 1992. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: Politypp 57-70 & 76-94.

Habermas, J. 1993. Justification and Application. Cambridge: Polity pp. 1-16.

B: Rehg, W. Insight and Solidarity, University of California Press, 1994, ch. 3.

#McMahon, C. ‘Discourse and Morality’, Ethics 110/3, (2000) pp. 514-36

Available online @ Stable URL:

C: Finlayson, J. G. Habermas: A Very Short Introduction, OUP 2005.

Heath, J. Communicative Action and Rational Choice, MIT Press, 2000.

7. The Feminist Critique of Moral Theory.

Seminar Reading:

A: Either: Benhabib, S. (1987) ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory’ in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (eds.) (1987).

Benhabib S. and Cornell D. (eds.) (1987). Feminism as Critique. Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late-Capitalist Societies. London, Polity Press.

Or: Benhabib, S. (1992) ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory’ in S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. London, Routledge, 1992.

B: Finlayson, J. G. “Women and the Standpoint of Concrete Others: The Critique of Discourse Ethics and Feminist Social Criticism.” Pdf -file Available on course webpage.

Blum, L. (1998). ‘Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory’, Ethics 98: 472-491.

C: Further Reading:

Gilligan (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press

- (1986). ‘Remapping the Moral Domain’, in T. Heller, M. Sosna, and D. Wellbury (eds.), Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought. Stanford California, Stanford University Press.

Meehan, J. (2000). ‘Feminism and Habermas’s Discourse Ethics’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 26/3: 39-52

- (1998) ‘Communicative ethics’ in Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young (eds.), A Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Oxford, Blackwell.

- (1995) (ed.) Feminists Read Habermas. London, Routledge.

Okin, S. (1989). Justice, Gender and the Family. New York, Basic Books.

- (1989a). ‘Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice.’ Ethics 99/2: 229-49.

8. Habermas’s, Between Facts and Norms

A: #Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 81-4, 99-131, 447-463.

#Habermas, J. [1998] 'Three Normative Models of Democracy' in The Inclusion of the Other

Cambridge, Polity.

B: Habermas, J. [1992] 'Life Forms, Morality and the Task of the Philosopher' in Autonomy and Solidarity, ed. P. Dews. London, Verso, pp. 187-211.

Joshua Cohen, ‘Reflections on Habermas on Democracy’ Ratio Juris 12/4, 1999 (385-416)

C: Further Reading

O'Neill , O. (1994) 'Practical reason and possible community: a reply to Jean-Marc Ferry', Ratio Juris 7:3

Peters, B. (1994) 'On reconstructive legal and political theory, Philosophy and Social Criticism 20:4

Baynes, K. (1995) 'Democracy and the "Rechtsstaat": Habermas's "Faktizität und Geltung"', in S.K. White ed. The Cambridge Companion to Habermas

Scheuerman, W. E. (1998) 'Between radicalism and resignation: democratic theory in Habermas's Between Facts and Norms' in P. Dews ed. Habermas: A Critical Reader

Olson, K. (2003) 'Do rights have a formal basis? Habermas' legal theory and the normative foundations of the law', Journal of Political Philosophy 11:3

Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism? Ratio Juris 17 (1), 27–51,

Rummens, S. (2006) Debate: The co-originality of private and public autonomy in deliberative democracy', Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (4), 469-481

9. The Habermas-Rawls dispute.

A: Habermas, J. 1995. ‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism’, The Journal of Philosophy XCII(3): 109-131. Available on-line @ Stable URL:

Rawls, J. ‘Reply to Habermas’, The Journal of Philosophy XCII(3): 132-80. Available on-line @ Stable URL:

(Reprinted in Rawls, J. 2005. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 372-435.)

B: McMahon, C. 2002. ‘Why There is No Issue Between Habermas and Rawls’, The Journal of Philosophy, XCIX (3): 111-129. Stable URL:

Finlayson. ‘The Habermas-Rawls Dispute Redivivus’ Politics and Ethics Review 3/1, 144-162.

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