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Philosophy of Social ScienceSpring 2020Jack Donnelly What is the nature of the (social) sciences – and the knowledge that they produce? Part One (Weeks 1-5) of this course surveys contemporary approaches to understanding the nature of science and scientific knowledge. Part Two (Weeks 6-10) explores more applied topics, focusing on the nature(s) of causation and explanation. Grades will be based on a five-page “discussion paper” (10%) and a take-home final exam (90%). Discussion Papers: The paper may focus on one of the readings for that week, all of them, or some subset. It should not summarize the readings but instead provide some sort of critical analysis, either making an argument or posing a truly fundamental problem. You should distribute it to the class no later than lunchtime on Sunday. Usually, it will provide the starting point for that week’s discussion. Final Exam: A take-home final exam will be distributed in class in the ninth week. Your exam is due June ???. You will be required to answer two questions, one of which deals with a topic of wide applicability across approaches and one of which addresses a particular approach. In the second part in particular there will be considerable flexibility. The most important element of the course, though, is our weekly discussions. You need to read the material carefully before class and be ready to engage it in class. If you do, this difficult material becomes much more accessible – and what initially may have appeared rather abstract emerges as of surprisingly direct applicability to the practice of social science. All the required reading is available on Canvas. In weeks with too much reading, start with the things marked * and then follow your inclinations after that. Prequel: Introduction Before plunging into the substance of the course, an orientation is useful. ReadPatrick Thaddeus Jackson (2011), The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics. Chapter 1-2.And if you want just a bit more of an introduction, readPeter Godfrey-Smith (2003), Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chapter 1.I have also put The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science on Canvas. In addition, you might want to be aware of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science and The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, both of which you can access on-line through Penrose.Part One: The Nature of Science and Scientific Knowledge This part of the course surveys what we might call philosophy of science, since the end of World War II. Weeks 1 and 2 deal with the “classics” of the 1960s and 1970s. Weeks 3 and 4 cover three prominent perspectives in the social sciences today: scientific realism, constructivism, and pragmatism. A. “Classic” (Post-World War II) Philosophies of ScienceWeek 1. Karl Popper: Conjectures, Refutations, and Objective KnowledgeKarl Popper was the best-known and most influential philosopher of science in the last half of the twentieth century. We will focus on his attempt to demarcate science and his methodology of conjectures and refutations, with secondary attention to his idea of a realm of objective knowledge. The preliminary reading for this week summarizes logical positivism, which is the essential background for understanding the context of Popper’s project.Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003), Theory and Reality, ch. 2. Karl Popper (1963), Conjectures and Refutations, ch. 1 and 10 (you can stop at p. 244).Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge, ch. 5 (you can skip the examples on pp. 197-202), ch. 3 §§1-4, ch. 4 §§1-5, Appendix 1 (you can skip §§3, 5, and (all but the first three paragraphs of) §8). (Be sure to read the Appendix.)Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2011), The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, pp. 44-59.Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, ch. 4.Week 2: Grappling with Incommensurability: Kuhn, Lakatos, and FeyerabendThomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions – and the varied reactions to (or inspired by) it – reshaped understandings of science and scientific knowledge, especially in the social sciences. Although the details of Kuhn’s arguments are now of largely historical interest, “literacy” in the field requires knowing it. More importantly, he gave expression to transformative perspectives that continue to shape our understandings of science. This week look at Imré Lakatos’s efforts to preserve Popperian “Critical Rationalism” and Paul Feyerabend’s emphasis on the “anarchical” implications of the incommensurability of scientific theories. And this range of understandings continues to characterize contemporary approaches, as we will see in the following two weeks.Thomas Kuhn (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ch. 1, 2, 6, 9, 10 (you can stop at p. 129), pp. 144-153, ch. 13 and Thomas Kuhn (1969), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., “Postscript-1969.”Imré Lakatos , “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. (Skip the examples in §§3c and 3d, if you must.)Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, ch. 15-19. [Stop reading chapter 16 when you can’t take any more. But be sure to at least start each of the remaining three chapters]Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, ch. 5-7.And, if you find yourself with extra time ;), it would be profitable to read Kuhn, “Reflections on My Critics” and “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research” and Feyerabend, “Consolations for a Specialist,” all in Lakatos and Musgrave. B. Contemporary Approaches to Scientific KnowledgeHaving largely abandoned the Popperian ideas of a purely logical demarcation of science and objective knowledge, contemporary theorists focus their attention on the relative contributions to scientific knowledge of the work of the scientist and the resistance of the world. Is scientific knowledge more like dis-covery of the world? Or is it more like our best guess at a story that seems not inconsistent with “the real world?” Is scientific knowledge in principle “found” or is, inescapably and at its heart, “made?” In scientific knowledge, what is the balance between “the resistance of the world” and “the work of scientists”?Week 3: Scientific Realism Scientific realism holds that science can provide grounds for the reasonable belief that some of our knowledge refers, however imperfectly, to “the world,” more or less “as it (really) is.”Alexander Wendt (1999), Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 47-77, 90-91.Colin Wight (2006), Agents, Structures, and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pp. 14-45.Anjan Chakravarty, 2017. “Scientific Realism.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, ch. 4.Lyons, Timothy D. 2015. “Scientific Realism.” In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Humphreys.Rom Harré (1986), Varieties of Realism, ch. 1-4, 10-12. (Stop reading when you cannot take any more.)]John Searle (1995), The Construction of Social Reality, pp. 23-29, 150-152, 177-189, 219-221.Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, ch. 12.Week 4: Constructing ScienceA variety of contemporary perspectives give greater emphasis to the constructed nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific “constructivism” holds that the knowledge-creating practices of scientists are essential to the substance of scientific knowledge. Pragmatism emphasizes that scientific knowledge is shaped by (and appropriately assessed in terms of its consequences for) the realization of human purposes. Although the constructed nature of science does not reduce our warrant for accepting “scientific knowledge,” it does change the nature of our reliance on that knowledge. *Karin Knorr Cetina (1999), Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge, ch. 1-5, 10. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986), Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, ch. 6 and pp. 281-285.Giere, Ronald N. and Barton Moffatt. 2003. “Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge.” Social studies of science 33 (2):301-310.Carrier, Martin. 2016. “Social Organization of Science.” In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Humphreys. *Jorg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology.’ International Organization 63(4) 2009: 701-731.*Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Of False Promises and Good Bets: A Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building.’ Journal of International Relations and Development 10(1) 2007: 1-15.*Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, ch. 5.William James, Pragmatism, Lectures 2 (‘What Pragmatism Means’) and 6 (‘Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth’) OR ‘The Pragmatic Method’ and ‘Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,’ The Journal of Philosophy 1 (1904): 673-687 and 4 (1907): 141-155. (JSTOR)Hidemi Suganami, ‘Friedrich Kratochwil’s Search for a Theory of International Relations.’ Journal of International Relations and Development 10(1) 2007: 25-39. (Focus on pp. 30-34; skim the rest)Colin Wight, ‘Inside the Epistemological Cave All Bets Are Off.’ Journal of International Relations and Development 10(1) 2007: 40-56.Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Of Communities, Gangs, Historicity and the Problem of Santa Claus: Replies to My Critics.’ Journal of International Relations and Development 10(1) 2007: 57-78.Transition: Levels and Perspectives Week 5: Perspectives on Messy SystemsThis week we look at two efforts to combine “realist” and “pragmatist” perspectives into an account of the nature of science that, although focused on the natural sciences, is especially relevant to the social sciences. William Wimsatt has developed a distinctive approach to the philosophy of science, rooted in the ideas of levels of organization and “messy systems.” Ronald Giere adopts a radical perspectivism that he argues is fundamentally compatible with a foundational assumption of scientific realism. *Markus I. Eronen and Daniel Stephen Brooks. 2018. “Levels of Organization in Biology.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. *Manuel DeLanda (2016), Assemblage Theory, pp. 1-2, 9-24.*William C. Wimsatt, (2007). Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality. Start with the Intro to Part Three (reading at least pp. 160-173). Then give Chapter 10 a serious try. (You should have enough context to make your way successfully through most of it – which is a significant achievement.) Then, if you are up for it, try some combination of Chapters 1-5, 9, 12, 13 and Appendices A, B, C, read in whatever order seems to make sense to you. (Most of the chapters are more or less free-standing.) Chapter 9 is probably most closely related to Chapter 10.*Ronald N. Giere. (2006), Scientific Perspectivism, pp. 17-35, 41-43, 48, 56, 58, Ch. 4 and 5. Ronald N. Giere. (2016) “Feyerabend’s Perspectivism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (137-141). Massimi, Michela and Casey McCoy, eds. 2020. Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects. Part Two: Explanation What are scientific explanations? How are explanations related to causes? To mechanisms? Processes? Theories? Models? This part of the course examines the diversity of scientific explanations and how they provide different kinds of answers to why, what, and how questions. Week 6: Causes and Causal Effects Philosophical accounts of causation have been fraught since David Hume’s attempt to reduce “causation” to an expectation of constant conjunction. We begin with Hume’s classic account and its most sophisticated positivist successor; look at the contemporary continuation of this line of thinking in Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba’s immensely influential Designing Social Inquiry; and then turn to criticisms of the underlying linear statistical vision of causal explanation. Yes, I know that there is too much reading. But the topic, I have concluded, is not worth two weeks. So … §A is both theoretically indispensable and most readily skipped. §B is short, so no point in skipping it. In §C, if you have already had the pleasure of encountering KKV, you may want to focus more on Jackson and Cartwright. If not, you need to get a sense of the very particular character of their understanding of science and causation. §D is crucial. You need to make sure that you have the time to read both Abbott articles carefully. §E is more specialized – essential for the PhD students, maybe not so much for the MA students (especially if you have worked carefully through §§A/B-D). A. Hume and Hempel*Milja Kurki (2008). Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, pp. 33-40, 44-52, 57-59, 66-68 OR David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §IV and Part II of §VII. (More optimally, one would read §§III-VII and skim §§IX, X.) (available online at .) and A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, §§2-4, 14, 15. (available online ).*Carl G. Hempel (2001). “Explanation and Prediction by Covering Laws.” In Carl G Hempel and James H Fetzer (eds.), The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality.Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam. 1958. “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:3-36. B. Alternative Conceptions of Cause*Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, pp. 77-89.Daniel Little (1991). Varieties of Social Explanation, ch. 2.Kurki, Causation in International Relations, pp. 53-57, 149-188, 196-241.Goldthorpe, John H. 2001. “Causation, Statistics, and Sociology.” European Sociological Review 17 (1):1-20.Morgan, Stephen L. and Christopher Winship. 2012. “Bringing Context and Variability Back into Causal Analysis.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science, edited by Harold Kincaid.Cartwright, Nancy. 2004. “Causation: One Word, Many Things.” Philosophy of Science 71 (5):805-819. Reiss, Julian. 2012. “Counterfactuals.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science, edited by Harold Kincaid. Henry E. Brady (2008). “Causation and Explanation in Social Science.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier. §§5, 7, 8. C. KKV and “Causal Inference”*Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994), Designing Social Inquiry, §§1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 3.1-3.4.*Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, ch. 3.*Cartwright, Nancy. 2014. “Causal Inference.” In Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction, edited by N. Cartwright and E. Montuschi.Timothy J. McKeown (1999), “Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,” International Organization 53 (1): 161-190. James Johnson (2006). “Consequences of Positivism: A Pragmatist Assessment.” Comparative Political Studies 39 (2):224-252. Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds. (2010). Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. 2nd ed. Ch. 2 (Collier, Seawright, and Munck), 5 (Rogowski).D. “Transcending General Linear Reality” *Andrew Abbott (1988), “Transcending General Linear Reality,” Sociological Theory 6 (2): 169-186.*Andrew Abbott (1998), “The Causal Devolution,” Sociological Methods and Research 27 (2): 148-181.Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, ch. 8.Henry E. Brady (2008). “Causation and Explanation in Social Science.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier. Section 9. [Yes, I know it is unreadable. But give it a try – at least start each subsection.]E. Regression and Causation*Schrodt, Phillip A. 2014. “The Seven Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political Analysis.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): 287–300.*Achen, Christopher H. 2002. “Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and ART.” Annual Review of Political Science 5:423-450.*Kincaid, Harold. 2012. “Mechanisms, Causal Modeling, and the Limitations of Traditional Multiple Regression.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, edited by Harold Kincaid. Oxford University Press.Seawright, Jason. 2010. “Regression-Based Inference: A Case Study in Failed Causal Assessment.” In Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry.Dunning, Thad. 2010. “Design-Based Inference: Beyond the Pitfalls of Regression Analysis?” In Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry.King, Gary. 1986. “How Not to Lie with Statistics: Avoiding Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science.” American Journal of Political Science 30 (3):666-687.Week 7: MechanismsOne of the biggest changes in the philosophy of science in the last three decades has been a growing attention to sciences other than Physics – especially Biology, where scientists look at different kinds of things and offer different kinds of explanations. This has generated a considerable literature on mechanisms, which are beginning to be addressed more seriously in the social sciences. The New Mechanical Philosophy*Carl Craver and James Tabery. 2019. “Mechanisms in Science.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.*Phyllis McKay Illari and Jon Williamson. 2012. “What is a Mechanism? Thinking about Mechanisms Across the Sciences.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):119-135. *Mario Bunge. 1997. “Mechanism and Explanation.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27 (4):410-465. (This somewhat idisoyncratic, like much of Bunge’s work, but interesting for the link with systems thinking. If it is not your taste, though, move on.)Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver. 2000. “Thinking about Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science 67 (1): 1-25. (This is the classic work in the “new mechanical philosophy”)Craver, Carl F. and Lindley Darden. 2013. In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries across the Life Sciences., chapter 2. William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen. 2005. “Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36:421-441. Glennan, Stuart. 2016. “Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy.” In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Humphreys.Glennan, Stuart and Phyllis Illari. 2017. “Introduction: Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophies.” In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari. Routledge.More on Mechanisms Especially if you are interested in the theory, consider reading*Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Ilari. 2017. “Vareities of Mechanisms.” In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari.* Halina, Marta. 2017. “Mechanistic Explanation and Its Limits.” In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari. (Focus on the limits discussion that begins on p. 217).*Carl F. Craver and William Bechtel. 2007. “Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes.” Biology & Philosophy 22 (4): 547-563. *Lucas J. Matthews and James Tabery. 2017. “Mechanisms and the Metaphysics of Causation.” In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari.Stuart ADDIN EN.REFLIST Glennan. 2017. The New Mechanical Philosophy. Stuart Glennan. 2010. “Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):362-381.Mark Povich and Carl F. Craver. 2017. “Mechanistic Levels, Reduction, and Emrgence.” In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari. Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences*Peter Hedstr?m and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences.” Annual Review of Sociology 36: 49-76. OR Yilkoski, Petri 2017. “Social Mechanisms.” In The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari. *Ylikoski, Petri. 2012. “Micro, Macro, and Mechanisms.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, edited by Harold Kincaid.*Gary Goertz, 2017. Multimethod Research, Causal Mechanisms, and Case Studies: An Integrated Approach, ch. 2.*Beach, Derek and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2019. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. 2nd ed., ch. 2, 3.*Abbott, Andrew. 2007 [1996]. "Mechanisms and Relations." Sociologica 2:1-22. *John Gerring. 2008. “The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking Inside the Box.” British Journal of Political Science 38 (1): 161-179.Peter Hedstr?m and Richard Swedberg. 1998. “Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay.” In Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, edited by Peter Hedstr?m and Richard Swedberg. (This was of historical importance but the discussion has largely passed it by now.) For those interested in mechanisms in other disciplines, see Part IV of The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari.Week 8: Processes A. Processual Ontology* John A. Dupre and Daniel J. Nicholson. 2018. “A Manifesto for a Processual Philosophy of Biology.” In Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology, edited by John Dupré and Daniel J. Nicholson.* Rescher, Nicholas. 1996. Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy, ch. 2. * Pradeu, Thomas. 2018. "Genidentity and Biological Processes." In Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology,*Galton, Antony and Riichiro Mizoguchi. 2009. "The Water Falls but the Waterfall does not Fall: New Perspectives on Objects, Processes and Events." Applied Ontology 4 (2):71-107. (Try to read carefully §§1, 2, 5, 6. It gets very dry around p. 4 (feel free to start skimming here, but picks up again at the waterfall example on p. 17. And then stop when you have had enough. But at least look at §6.)Helin, Jenny, et al. 2014b. "Process is How Process Does." In The Oxford Handbook of Process Philosophy and Organization Studies, edited by Jenny Helin, et al.Meincke, Anne Sophie. 2019. "Autopoiesis, biological autonomy and the process view of life." European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):5.Poli, Roberto. 2017. "Process, Cause, and Emergence." In Introduction to Anticipation Studies, 121-138.Rieppel, Olivier. 2009. "Species as a Process." Acta Biotheoretica 57 (1):33-49.Dupré, John. 2012. Processes of Life: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology.. Odling-Smee, F. John, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman. 2003. Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution.B. Processual Sociology *Demetriou, Chares. 2012. "Processual comparative sociology: building on the approach of Charles Tilly." Sociological Theory 30 (1):51-65. Then select from the following as you interests indicateDépelteau, Fran?ois. 2013. "Comparing Elias and Bourdieu as Relational Thinkers." In Norbert Elias and Social Theory, edited by Fran?ois Dépelteau and Tatiana Savpoia Landini. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.King, Anthony. 2005. "The Habitus Process: A Sociological Conception." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (4):463-468.Lacassagne, Aurélie. 2012. "Cultures of Anarchy as Figurations: Reflections on Wendt, Elias, and the English School." Human Figurations 2 (1). Linklater, Andrew. 2004. "Norbert Elias, the 'Civilizing Process,' and the Sociology of International Relations." International Politics 41 (1):3-35.Linklater, Andrew and Stephen Mennell. 2010. "Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations – And Overview and Assessment." History and Theory 49 (3):384-411.Tilly, Charles. 1995. "To Explain Political Processes." American Journal of Sociology 100 (6):1594-1610. Tilly, Charles. 2001. "Mechanisms in Political Processes." Annual Review of Political Science 4:21-41.Van Krieken, Robert. 2001. "Norbert Ellas and Process Soclology." In Handbook of Social Theory, edited by George Ritzer and Barry Smart. London: Sage Publications.Vandenberghe, Frédéric. 2018. "The Relation as Magical Operator: Overcoming the Divide Between Relational and Processual Sociology." In The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology, edited by Fran?ois Dépelteau.Yu, Jae Eon. 2013. "The Use of Deleuze's Theory of Assemblage for Process-Oriented Methodology." Historical Social Research 38 (2):197-217.Week 9: Process Tracing*Hall, Peter A. 2006. “Systematic Process Analysis: When and How to Use It.” European Management Review 3 (1):24-31. *Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds. 2015. Process Tracing, ch. 1.*Beach, Derek and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2019. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ch 1, 2. (The first 2013 edition is somewhat different, but if that is what you have, read ch. 1 and 2 in that edition as well.)Zaks, Sherry. 2016. “The Logic of Process Tracing: Contributions, Pitfalls and Future Directions.” In Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science, edited by Hans Keman and Jaap J. Woldendorp.David Waldner, “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, Harold Kincaid, ed.Mahoney, James. 2012. "The Logic of Process-Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences." Sociological Methods & Research 41 (4):570-597. Hall, Peter A. 2013. “Tracing the Progress of Process Tracing.” European Political Science 12 (1):20-30. *Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds. 2015. Process Tracing, 3, 5, 9 [skim if any or all of these are not your taste.] AND/OR Beach, Derek and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2019. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. 2nd ed., Ch. 4, 8-10. (If you only have the 2013 edition, read ch. 4, 8.)*Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds. 2015. Process Tracing, Appendix.Mahoney, James. 2016. "Mechanisms, Bayesianism, and Process Tracing." New Political Economy 21 (5):493-499. Fairfield, Tasha and Andrew E. Charman. 2017. “Explicit Bayesian Analysis for Process Tracing: Guidelines, Opportunities, and Caveats.” Political Analysis 25 (3):363-380. * Tannenwald, Nina. 2015. "Process tracing and security studies." Security Studies 24 (2):219-227. * Vanhala, Lisa. 2017. "Process Tracing in the Study of Environmental Politics." Global Environmental Politics 17 (4):88-105. Bengtsson, Bo and Hannu Ruonavaara. 2017. "Comparative Process Tracing: Making Historical Comparison Structured and Focused." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1):44-66. *Zaks, Sherry. 2017. “Relationships Among Rivals (RAR): A Framework for Analyzing Contending Hypotheses in Process Tracing.” Political Analysis 25 (3):344-362. [If this is not your taste, skip it.]Falleti, Tulia G. 2016. "Process Tracing of Extensive and Intensive Processes." New Political Economy 21 (5):455-462.Week 10: Models Giere, Ronald N. 2004. "How Models are Used to Represent Reality." Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2006. "The strategy of model-based science." Biology and philosophy 21 (5):725-740. Morrison, Margaret. 2016. "Models and Theories." In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Humphreys. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Glennan, Stuart. 2005. "Modeling Mechanisms." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):443-464. Craver, Carl F. 2006. "When mechanistic models explain." Synthese 153 (3):355-376. Steel, Daniel. 2011. "Causality, causal models, and social mechanisms." The Sage handbook of the philosophy of social sciences:288-304. Kaplan, D.M. and C.F. Craver, 2011, “The Explanatory Force of Dynamical Models”, Philosophy of Science, 78: 601–627.Gebharter, Alexander and Marie I. Kaiser. 2014. "Causal Graphs and Biological Mechanisms." In Explanation in the Special Sciences – The Case of Biology and History, edited by Marie I. Kaiser.Portides, Demetris. 2014. "Models." In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, edited by Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos. Rohwer, Yasha and Collin Rice. 2016. "How are models and explanations related?" Erkenntnis 81 (5):1127-1148. Bokulich, Alisa. 2011. "How scientific models can explain." Synthese 180 (1):33-45.Humphreys, Paul and Cyrille Imbert. 2013. Models, Simulations, and Representations.Contessa, Gabriele. 2011. "Scientific Models and Representations." In The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science, edited by Steven French and Juha Saattsi.Craver, Carl F. 2016. "The Explanatory Power of Network Models." Philosophy of Science 83 (5):698-709. 10.1086/687856Bailer-Jones, Daniela M. 2009. Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science. Ch. 1.Batterman, R. and C. Rice, 2014, “Minimal Model Explanations,” Philosophy of Science, 81: 349–376. ................
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