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Reading lists for PHI355 and PHI356Autumn 2014Necessary Beings (Bob Hale)Anselm, Saint Proslogion Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965. Alternative edition Notre Dame Press 1979 [Ch.2]Blackburn, Simon ‘Morals and Modals’ in Graham Mcdonald & Crispin Wright, eds. Fact, Science & Morality: Essays on A.J.Ayer’s Language, Truth & Logic Oxford: Blackwell 1986, pp.119-41; reprinted in Blackburn’sEssays in Quasi-Realism Oxford University Press 1993.Fine, Kit ‘Essence and Modality’ in James Tomberlin, ed. Philosophical Perspectives vol.8 (1994), pp.1-16Fine, Kit ‘Necessity and Non-Existence’ in Fine Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005, pp.321-54Hale, Bob ‘Modality’ in Hale & Wright A Companion to the Philosophy of Language Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1997 [online in library], pp. 487-515Hale, Bob Necessary Beings Oxford, Clarendon Press 2013 [chs.2,5,6,9]Kripke, Saul ‘Identity and Necessity’ in Milton K. Munitz, ed. Identity and Individuation New York University Press, 1971; reprinted in A.W.Moore, ed. Meaning and Reference Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.162-91. Kripke, Saul Naming and Necessity Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1980 [use index – read bits on analytic, a priori, necessary, essential properties, mostly in lectures 1 and 3]Lewis, David On the Plurality of Worlds Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986 [Chs.1,2]Plantinga, Alvin The Nature of Necessity Oxford: Clarendon Press 1974 -- [online in library] [Ch.10]Quine, W.V. ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’, essay 2 in Quine From a Logical Point of View Harvard: Harvard University Press 1953; reprinted by Harper & Row, Inc., New York and Evanston, 1963.‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’ in Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy, vol.14 Amsterdam: North Holland; reprinted in Quine The Ways of Paradox New York: Random House 1956Stalnaker, Robert ‘Possible worlds’ Nous vol.10 (1976) Revised version in StalnakerWays a World Might Be Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003 [online in library]Williamson, Timothy‘Necessary Existents’ in A.O’Hear, ed. Logic, Thought and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp.233-51 Evil of Death (Eric Olson)T. Nagel, 'Death', Nous 4, 1970: 73-80. Reprinted in Nagel, Mortal Questions (CUP 1979), and in J. M. Fischer, ed., The Metaphysics of Death, Stanford University Press 1993.?B. Williams, 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality', in Williams, Problems of the Self, CUP 1973. Reprinted in Fischer.?F. Feldman, Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death', Philosophical Review 100: 205-27. Reprinted in Fischer.?J. McMahan, 'Death and the Value of Life', Ethics 99, 1988: 32-61. Reprinted in Fischer.?K. Draper, 'Disappointment, Sadness, and Death', Philosophical Review 108, 1999: 387-414.?J. D. Velleman, 'Well-Being and Time', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72, 1991: 48-77. Reprinted in Fischer.Nietzsche on Morality (Niall Conolly)Friedrich Nietzsche On the Genealogy of MoralsR. Geuss ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy’ European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1994) pp.275-92Alexander Nehamas Nietzsche: Life as Literature chapter 4 (‘Nature against something that is also nature’)Brian Leiter Nietzsche on Morality ch.s 1, 3, 4 & 5.Disability (Jessica Begon)Barbara Arneil, ‘Disability, Self-Image, and Modern Political Theory’, Political Theory 37:2 (2009), pp.218-242Linda Barclay, ‘Disability, Respect and Justice’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 27:2 (2010), pp.154-171Elizabeth Barnes, ‘Disability and Adaptive Preference’, Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009), pp.1-22Kimberly Brownlee and Adam Cureton (eds.), Disability and Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson (eds.), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) (Chapters 2 and 3). Eva Feder Kittay, ‘At the Margins of Moral Personhood’, Ethics 116:1 (2005), pp.100-131Jeff McMahan, ‘Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 25:1 (1996), pp.3-35Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited (New York: Routledge, 2014)Lorella Terzi, ‘The Social Model of Disability: A Philosophical Critique’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 21:2 (2004), pp.141-157Marx on history (Yonatan Shemmer)Karl Marx, selection on the materialist conception of history in David McLellan (ed), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, OUP, 1977, pp. 129-219Karl Marx, Preface to A Critique of Political EconomyAllen Wood, Karl Marx, Routledge, 1981, Chaps V-VIIIG. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx, CUP, 1985, pp. 235-397Pleasure (George Botterill)Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Pleasure by Leonard Katz (2006) at:, Gilbert 1954: “Pleasure”, Ch. 4 in Dilemmas: The Tarner Lectures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54-67 – ORRyle, Gilbert 1954: “Pleasure”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 28, pp.135-146.Penelhum, Terence 1957: “The Logic of Pleasure”,?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research?17, pp.488-503.?Feldman, Fred 1997: “Two Questions about Pleasure”, reprinted in Feldman, F., 1997,Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 79-105. Originally published in D. Austin ed., Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988, pp. 59-81. Davis, W. 1982: “A Causal Theory of Enjoyment,”?Mind 91:240-56.Helm, Bennett W. 2002: “Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39,1:13-30.Rolls, Edmund T. 2000: “The Orbitofrontal Cortex and Reward”, Cerebral Cortex 40, pp.284-94.Berridge, K. C. 2003b: “Pleasures of the brain”, Brain and Cognition 52, pp.106-128.Kringelbach, M.L. & Berridge, K. C. 2009: “Towards a Functional Neuroanatomy of Pleasure and Happiness”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13, pp.479-87.Grabenhorst, F. and Rolls, E.T. 2011: “Value, Pleasure and Choice in the Ventral Prefrontal Cortex”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15, pp.56-67.Spring 2015The Use of Intuitions in Philosophy (Luca Barlassina)Weinberg, J.M., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. (2001) ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’ in Philosophical Topics 29, 1& 2, pp.429-460 (reprinted in Knobe & Nichols (eds.) Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17-46) [available online]Cullen, S. (2010) ‘Survey-driven romanticism’ in Review of Philosophical Psychology vol.1, 2 [available online] Nagel, J. (2007) ‘Epistemic Intuitions’ in Philosophy Compass vol. 2, 6, pp. 792-819Sosa, E. (2007) ‘Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition’ Philosophical Studies 132, 1, pp. 99–107 (reprinted in Knobe & Nichols (eds.) Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 231-239)Goldman, A. & Pust, J. (1998) ‘Philosophical theory and intuitional evidence’ in DePaul M. R and Ramsey, W. (eds.) Rethinking Intuition, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 179-200 (reprinted in Pathways to Knowledge: Public and Private, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 73-94)Kornblith H. (2006) ‘Appeals to intuition and ambitions of Epistemology’ in S. Hetherington (ed.) Epistemology Futures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 10-25Williamson, T (2009) ‘Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy’ in Philosophical Studies, vol. 145: pp. 431-434Sartre on Bad Faith (Rosanna Keefe and probably others)J-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: part I ch. 1 § V; part I ch. 2 §§ II-III.Gregory McCulloch, Using Sartre, ch. 4.Robert Bernasconi, How To Read Sartre, ch. 4.Gary Cox, Sartre: A Guide for the Perplexed, pp. 96-122.Anthony Manser, ‘A New Look at Bad Faith’, in Sartre: An Investigation of Some Major Themes, edited by Simon Glynn.Robert Solomon, ‘True to Oneself: Sartre’s Bad Faith and Freedom’, in Dark Feelings, Grim Thoughts, by Robert Solomon.Jonathan Webber, ‘Sartre’s Theory of Character’, European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006).Ronald Santoni, Bad Faith, Good, Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre’s Early Philosophy, chs. 1 and 4.Conceptual Schemes (Jessica Leech)Main text:DAVIDSON, D., 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 183-98.Historical background:CARNAP, R., 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.' Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950): 20-40. Reprinted in his Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); and in L. Linsky, ed., Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (Urbana, IL: Illinois University Press, 1952).QUINE, W.V., 'Ontological Relativity', in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, edited by W.V. Quine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Other reading:BAGHRAMIAN, M. 'Why Conceptual Schemes?' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 98 (1998), pp. 287-306CHILD, W., 'On the Dualism of Scheme and Content' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 94 (1994), pp. 53-71DAVIDSON, D. 'The Myth of Subjective' in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3 (OUP: 2001) also in Krausz, M. ed. Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame: 1989)MCGINN, M., 'The Third Dogma of Empiricism', in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 82 (1981 - 1982), pp. 89-101RORTY, R., 'The World Well Lost', in Consequences of Pragmatism, edited by R. Rorty. (Brighton: Harvester, 1982). Reprinted in The Pragmatism Reader, edited by Talisse and Aiken (Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 353-66.Expressivism in metaethics (James Lenman)Pro:Simon Blackburn: Essays in Quasi-Realism, esp. chapters 8 and 9Simon Blackburn: Ruling PassionsAllan Gibbard: Thinking How To LiveJames Lenman: “What is Moral Inquiry?” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 81, 1997. Contra:Michael Smith: The Moral Problem, chapter 2Ralph Wedgwood: The Nature of Normativity, chapter 2Andy Egan: “Expressivism and Fundamental Moral Error” in Australasian Journal of PhilosophyKrister Bykvist and Jonas Olson: “Expressivism and Moral Certitude” in Philosophical Quarterly 59, 2009Mark Schroeder: Being For (NB. This is hard.)Handy SurveysMark van Roojen: “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism” in Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyMark Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics (2010), RoutledgeNeil Sinclair: “Recent Work on Expressivism” in Analysis 69, 2009The Semantic/Pragmatic distinction (Jennifer Saul)Grice, P. 1989. ‘Logic and Conversation’ in Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Carston, R. 1991. ‘Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Theoretic Semantics’ in S. Davis, ed., Pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press.Saul, J. 2002. ‘What is Said and Psychological Reality: Grice's Project and Relevance Theorists’ Criticisms’, Linguistics & Philosophy, 25, 347-372.Bach, K. 2001. ‘You Don’t Say?’ Synthese 128: 15-44.Cappelen, H and E. Lepore. 2004. ‘A Tall Tale in Defense of Insensitive Semantics and Speech Act Pluralism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34, 1 –see also Cappelen, H and E. King, Jeffrey C. and Jason Stanley, 2005. ‘Semantics, Pragmatics and the Role of Semantic Content’, in Zoltan Gendler Szabo, Semantics versus Pragmatics, Oxford University Press: 111-164.Borg, E. 2007. ‘Minimalism versus Contextualism in semantics’, in G. Preyer and G. Peter (eds) Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. 546-571.Practical Reason - Reasons and Desires (Chris Bennett)Thomas Nagel – The possibility of Altruism, ch 5-7 (Princeton University Press, 1970).Bernard Williams – “Internal and external Reasons” (in Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press 1981).Christine Korsgaard – “Skepticism about Practical Reason” (in Journal of Philosophy, Vol 83, no. 1, pp. 5-25).Jay Wallace – “How to argue about Practical Reason” (in Mind, Vol. 99, 365, pp. 355-385).Jonathan Dancy, Jonathan, Practical Reality, ch. 2, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).Derek Parfit – On What Matters pp. 31-73, (Oxford University Press, 2011).David Sobel – “Parfit’s Case Against Subjectivism” (in ed. Shafer-Landau, R. Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 6, Oxford University Press).Ruth Chang - “Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action?” (in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 56-90).The Problem of Mathematical Objects (Bob Hale)Benacerraf, Paul ‘What numbers could not be’ Philosophical Review 1965Benacerraf, Paul ‘Mathematical truth’ Journal of Philosophy 1973Frege, GottlobThe Foundations of Arithmetic Oxford: Blackwell 1959—English translation by J.L.Austin of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Breslau: Koebner 1884Dummett, Michael Frege Philosophy of Language London: Duckworth 1973, ch.14Dummett, Michael Frege Philosophy of Mathematics London: Duckworth 1991, chs.18, 24Dummett, Michael ‘What is mathematics about?’ in Dummett’s The Seas of Language Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993Parsons, Charles Mathematical Thought and its Objects Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008Shapiro, Stewart Thinking about mathematics Oxford: OUP 2000Shapiro, Stewart Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology Oxford: OUP 1997Hellman, Geoffrey Mathematics without Numbers Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989Field, Hartry Science without Numbers. Oxford: Blackwell 1980Field, Hartry Realism, Mathematics, and Modality Oxford: Blackwell 1989Maddy, Penelope Realism in Mathematics Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990Maddy, Penelope Naturalism in Mathematics Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997Fine, Kit ‘Our knowledge of mathematical objects’ in Gendler, T. & Hawthorne, J. eds. Oxford Studies in Epistemology OUP 2005Wright, Crispin Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects Aberdeen University Press 1983Hale, Bob & Wright, CrispinThe Reason’s Proper Study: Essays towards a Neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001Hale, Bob & Wright, Crispin ‘Benacerraf’s dilemma revisited’ European Journal of Philosophy 2002Hale, Bob Abstract Objects Oxford: Blackwell 1987Hale, Bob ‘The problem of mathematical objects’ in Sommaruga, G. ed. Foundational Theories of Classical and Constructive Mathematics Western Ontario Series in philosophy of Science, Springer 2011Emotions (Adriana Clavel)D’Arms, Justin & Jacobson, Daniel (2000) “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 65-90de Sousa, Ronald (2006) “Moral Emotions”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4:109- 126Goldie, Peter (2000) The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 2, pp. 12-28, 51-62Greenspan, Patricia (2004) “Practical Reasoning and Emotion”, in Mele and Rawling (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University PressHelm, Bennett (2010) “Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts”, in Goldie (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 303-324Nussbaum, Martha (2004) “Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance”, in Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling. Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press, 183-199Prinz, Jesse (2004) “Embodied Appraisals”, in Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York: Oxford University PressRobinson, Jenefer (2005) “Emotion as Process”, in Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art. Oxford: Oxford University PressSolomon, Robert (2004) “Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as engagements with the World, in Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling. Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press, 28-43Tappolet, Christine (2011) “Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism’s Prospects”, in Bagnoli (ed.) Morality and the Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 117-134 ................
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