JURISPRUDENCE



JURISPRUDENCE II

Topics in Moral, Political, and Legal Theory

(topic for Spring 2009: Objectivity)

Brian Leiter

University of Chicago Law School

Spring 2009, Rm.

T, W, Th 1:30-2:35

Office: Rm. 425

Phone: 773-702-0953

E-mail: bleiter@uchicago.edu

Secretary: Lorrie Wehrs, Rm. 512 (lragland@uchicago.edu)

Phone: 773-702-0303

Required Texts:

Russ Shafer-Landau & Terence Cuneo (eds.), Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology

(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) [hereafter FE]

Course Reader [hereafter CR].

Course Description: The course examines from a philosophical point of view topics and themes that are broadly familiar to lawyers and legal scholars, but which are not always treated with the attention to argumentative detail and the nuances of competing positions that are characteristic of philosophical inquiry. (Philosophy is "thinking in slow motion" as one English philosopher has helpfully put it.) The primary emphasis is on the philosophical treatment of these topics (with some attention to legal examples and problems). For Spring 2009, the primary topic will be the objectivity of ethics and of law. Our main text will be Shafer-Landau & Cuneo (eds.), Foundations of Ethics (Blackwell, 2007), supplemented by a course reader with essays by at least Ronald Dworkin and the instructor. Roughly the first four or five weeks will be devoted to considering arguments for and against moral realism (roughly, the view that there are objective moral truths) and moral anti-realism or skepticism (roughly, the view that there are no objective moral truths). Topics will include the alleged queerness of moral facts; moral disagreement; moral explanations; and select problems about the semantics of moral judgment. The remainder of the quarter will be given over to consideration of the implications of the objectivity of morality to law and adjudication. On Ronald Dworkin s view, the right answer to any legal question turns ultimately on moral considerations and arguments; thus, only if there are objectively right answers to these moral questions, can there be a right answer as a matter of law. The instructor will introduce Dworkin s general view of law and adjudication (this is the one part of the course that will duplicate some material covered in Jurisprudence I), and we will then spend some time examining and evaluating his own account of the objectivity of moral and legal judgment. This course will be philosophically demanding. While Jurisprudence I does not presuppose a background in philosophy, the instructor does not recommend this course to students who have not had some prior study of philosophy.

Course Requirements: (1) A take-home, type-written final exam: one essay (not more than 1750 words), 8 hours to complete exam; (2) Regular attendance.

Office Hours: You are, per institutional custom, welcome to try me whenever I’m around, but I will plan on being available in my office each day after class until about 3:30 for discussion. You are also free to make appointments for other times.

Reading Assignments: The syllabus is aspirational, and will depend on how much class discussion there is of each topic. If time permits, there is plenty of relevant, additional material we can add (I will do so in consultation with the class).

Topic 1: Introducing the Issues

Read Leiter, “Law and Objectivity,” pp. 257-271, in CR.

Topic 2: Moral Skepticism I: The “Queerness” of Moral Facts & Moral Disagreement

Read Introduction to “Moral Error Theories,” pp. 9-11 in FE

Read Mackie, “The Subjectivity of Values,” pp. 13-22 in FE

Read Brink, “Moral Disagreement,” pp. 376-382 in FE

Topic 3: Moral Skepticism II: The Explanatory Impotence of Moral Facts

Read Harman, “Ethics and Observation,” pp. 333-336 in FE

Read Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” pp. 337-340 (stop before II) and section III (“Moral

Explanations”), pp. 345-351 in FE

Read Leiter, “Moral Facts and Best Explanations,” in CR

Topic 4: The Meaning of Moral Language (and more on moral disagreements)

Read Moore, “The Subject-Matter of Ethics,” pp. 465-473 in FE

Read Ayer, “Critique of Ethics and Theology,” pp. 40-46 in FE

Read Stevenson, “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement,” pp. 371-375 in FE

Read Gibbard, “The Reasons of a Living Being,” pp. 71-78 in FE

Topic 5: Moral Realism I: Naturalistic Moral Realism

Read Railton, “Moral Realism,” pp. 186-205 in FE.

Topic 6: Moral Realism II: Non-Naturalist Moral Realism

Read Introduction to “Sensibility Theories,” pp. 132-135 in FE.

Read McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” pp. 137-144 in FE.

Topic 7: Dworkin’s Theory of Law

Read Dworkin “Integrity in Law” from Law’s Empire, pp. 225-263, in CR

Topic 8: Dworkin on Objectivity I

Read Dworkin, “Skepticism about Interpretation,” from Law’s Empire, pp. 76-85, in CR.

Read Dworkin “Integrity in Law,” pp. 263-271 in CR

Topic 9: Dworkin on Objectivity II

Read Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth,” in CR.

Read Leiter, “Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication,” in CR

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