China’s Emerging Role in the New Arab World

[Pages:21]Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013

China's Emerging Role in the New Arab World

Mohammad El-Sayed SELIM College of Social Sciences, Kuwait University

Abstract: The Arab Spring has changed the political landscape in the Arab world. The spring which began as genuine grass-root movement designed to create more equitable social projects, was steered by Western powers and local Islamists in different directions with these powers heavily intervening to control and/or weaken Arab states. China has pursued a policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Arab states, and letting the peoples decide their own future. China may have miscalculated when it allowed NATO to interfere in Libya. That intervention had catastrophic consequences for China and Libya. Consequently, China, in collaboration with Russia decided not to repeat the same experience in Syria especially since foreign intervention in this case will be even more catastrophic. China vetoed Security Council draft resolutions calling for regime change in Syria and insisted on letting the Syrians decide peacefully their future course of action. Further, China under the new leadership has suggested for the first time a four-point program to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. The

Dr. Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, Professor of political science, College of Social Sciences, Kuwait University.

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China's Emerging Role in the New Arab World

article argues that the Chinese-Russian approach to the Syrian crisis is bound to have long-term implications for the future of the Arab world. As the signs of the positive contributions of that approach are emerging, China should proceed to reinforce these contributions through a concerted approach to engage with the new regimes in the Arab world, strengthen the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, correct the imbalances of Sino-Arab trade, especially with the countries of the Arab Spring, focus on investing in these countries in labor-intensive industries, putting the four-point proposal on the agenda of ArabIsraeli negotiations, and, most importantly, deal with the question of the Israeli nuclear capabilities and the potential of Israel going to war against Iran, a scenario which will represent a major setback to the Chinese achievements in the region.

Key Words: Arab World; Arab Spring; Four-point Proposal; Islamic Movements; Non-intervention; Multi-polarity; China-Arab States Cooperation Forum

Introduction

The years of the Four Modernizations, heralded a change in China's global strategy from emphasis on revolutionary change towards a policy based on pragmatism and economism (Selim, 1971: 58-83). This change was felt in the Arab world as China focused on supporting peace projects, including support for the newly-created Palestinian Authority, and expanding economic relations. After the end of global bipolarity, China began to pursue a more proactive policy in the Middle East, as it did not subscribe to Western projects for change in that region including the George Bush democracy

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Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013

promotion projects and the Greater Middle East Initiative (Selim, 1994; Selim, 2006: 56-66). In fact, China was the only big power which did not attend the three summits held in 2004 by the big powers to form the international consortium for democracy promotion in the Middle East. China contended that change in the Arab world should emanate from within the region rather than through external pressures.

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, and after consolidating its economic rise, China began to project power in areas far from its territory and close to the Middle East. In this context one understands the naval facilities which China has built in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, and the visits of the Chinese frigate Ma'anshan and supply vessel Qiandaohu to Abu Dhabi in March 2010. However, China's projected power was mostly a soft rather than a hard one. China expanded the teaching of Chinese language and culture in the region, established the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum with all the member states of the League of Arab States, and received around 9,000 students from the region in addition to its traditional policy of sending Chinese students to perfect the Arabic language in its homeland. It also endeavored to support the process of state-building in Palestine and still is the only big power which has an embassy with the Palestinian Authority.

Chinese policy was further reinforced in the aftermath of the "Arab Spring" which began at the end of 2010 in the form of mass revolutions which swept some regimes in the region, especially after it became clear that Western powers have hijacked the Arab Spring and began to employ it for their own interests. The Arab protest movements were mainly home grown. They were not motivated by

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China's Emerging Role in the New Arab World

Western powers as was the case of the Ukrainian and Georgian protests. In fact, these powers tried to secure the ruling Arab regimes. However, once the protest movements began, the US shifted its policy towards containing these movements and employing them to secure its interests. This took the form of striking alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt through which the Americans would secure their control of power and the Brotherhood would make sure that American interests in the Arab world would be maintained. This has resulted in a domestic political course designed to facilitate the Brotherhood's road to power, which created deep divisions in Egypt which are still plaguing the country so far. In the case of Libya, the US intervened militarily to destroy the infrastructure of the state and kill its leader, which resulted in a wave of violence and the fragmentation of the state. Also, Americans intervened in the Yemeni case to secure the rule of President Ali Saleh, who was a close ally of the US in its "global war on terror." This has resulted in a prolonged turmoil in Yemen which has almost wrecked the country. The Syrian reform movements were also turned violent by acquiescing with the supply of arms to the "revolutionaries" by some regional players (Liu, Y., 2012: 107-115).

In all these cases, the US allied itself with the moderate Islamists. However, moderate Islamists brought with them the extremists as well, as can be seen in Egypt and Tunisia today. US support for the Islamists has been accounted for on two grounds, (i) the US wanted to create a Sunni Islamist block against Shiite Iran as a part of the cold war against Iran; and (ii) the US wanted to secure its interests in the Arab world, including the security of Israel by persuading the

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Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013

Islamists to perform that role as a price for their control of power (Harb, 2012: July 26).

American support for the Islamists was not without a price. That price for them was to pursue foreign policies which conform to American interests. In fact, the new Islamist governments are more loyal to the US than the previous regimes. This was not what the revolutionary youth were hoping for when they began their protests. In fact, Prof. Liu Zhongmin, the director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University commented on this development in a commentary published in Arabic in the People's Daily newspaper on February 17, 2012 with a revealing title "what a failure for the efforts of the Arab nation if its destiny was tied to the West". He said, "If the political changes resulted in powers which are allied to the West, bringing its destiny to foreign hands, then what a failure for the efforts of the Arab nation as its renaissance will be a mirage." (Liu, Z., 2012: February 17). Such assessment was quite accurate as the foreign policy pursued by the Islamist governments was pro-American.

The objective of this article is to review China's reaction to these Arab developments, to assess its contribution to political integrity of Arab countries, and to point out to some main issues which China could consider in the future in its quest to create a multi-polar world and maintain the sovereign status of countries of the Arab world, and to reinforce Sino-Arab relations.

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China's Emerging Role in the New Arab World

I. China and the Arab Spring

Like all other powers, China was surprised by the Arab Spring, which was viewed as disturbances or at best "changes" (He, B., 2011: December 9-10), and a development unlikely to bring about democracy to the Arabs, a prediction which turned out later on to be accurate (Rauhala, E., 2011: January 31). But China quickly assessed its impact on its interests in two directions, domestic and external. At the domestic level, China was concerned with the impact of the Arab Spring, which turned out to be an Islamic Spring, on Chinese Muslims, as the new Islamist governments could provide some support to the separatist movements in Xinjiang. At the external level, the main concern was directed towards Chinese investments and trade with the countries of the Arab Spring.

China pursued a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the Arab Spring countries leaving the ultimate outcomes to be decided by the peoples of the region. On January 18, 2012, Wen Jiabao, the then Prime Minister of China, said during his visit to the United Arab Emirates that "Arab countries should be left to decide by themselves their own political destiny, and the people's will must be taken into account in this process." He went on to assure that "the affairs of the region must be decided by its countries and peoples and their aspirations for change must be respected. We believe that the difficulties facing Arab counties will be temporary. We support the countries of the region in choosing an independent path for

On January 30, 2011, the Global Times wrote in its editorial called "Color Revolutions Will Not Bring About Real Democracy," that it is questionable whether the democratic system really works...Democracy is still far away from Tunisia and Egypt."

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Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol.7, No. 4, 2013

development which suits their own national circumstances." (South China Morning Post, 2012: January 19). This statement reflected China's overall policy towards the Arab Spring and the issue of foreign intervention. However, the course of action differed from one case to the other.

In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, there was no initial foreign intervention and the protests quickly subsided with the departure of Ben-Ali and Mubarak. But, the Libyan case dragged on, with the rebels using violence with arms supplied by foreign powers, some of them Arab. In this context, China abstained during the vote on resolution 1973 issued on March 17, 2011 authorizing the establishment of a no- fly zone over Libya. China's abstention paved the road for passing the resolution which was used by NATO to destroy the Libyan infrastructure and contribute to the assassination of Qaddafi. This was executed despite the Chinese declared policy of the peaceful resolution of the conflict. It seems that China interpreted the resolution literally and did not expect Western powers to go that far in expanding its scope, or that China had received assurances that the resolution will be implemented strictly to enforce a no-fly zone. When it became clear that NATO had gone far beyond its mandate and widened the scope of the no fly zone to the level of military intervention in Libya, including the assassination of Qaddafi, China continued to call for the peaceful resolution of the crisis. It also regretted on March 22, 2011 NATO's military strikes in Libya and warned that it had not approved the use of military force against Libya. The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said,

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China's Emerging Role in the New Arab World

"The initial purpose of relevant UNSC resolution is to guarantee the safety of civilians in Libya. We have noted the reports about civilian casualties caused by military strikes against Libya by some countries, and we are highly concerned. We oppose the abuse of force which leads to heavier civilian casualties and a bigger humanitarian disaster." (FMPRC, 2011: March 23).

China, as represented by the spokesman of its Foreign Ministry on May 31, 2011, called for an immediate cease fire, and the peaceful resolution of the crisis, and respecting the choices of the Libyan people with no reference to the military intervention in Libya (Embassy of China in Egypt, 2011: June 1). As it became clear that the rebels were winning, China moved to protect its investments in Libya and at the same time make a final appeal for a peaceful resolution. On July 6, 2011, and as the battles were raging between Qaddafi forces and the rebels around Misrata, Chen Xiaodong, director general of the West Asian and North African Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, met Ali Al-Sawi, the deputy head of the Libyan National Transition Council. Chen pleaded for a quick political solution to the crisis through substantial talks between the parties (Xinhua News, 2011: July 7). As it became clear that the rebels were winning, China pleaded to the new government in Libya to protect its investments in that country and to continue economic cooperation with China (Martina, M. & Buckley, C., 2011: August 23).

China seems to have learned the lesson and applied it in dealing with the Syrian crisis. Accordingly, when the Security Council tried to repeat the same scenario in Syria, not by establishing a fly zone, but by calling for the removal of the Syrian regime, which would mean the

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