China and the International Order

BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER A RAND Project to Explore U.S. Strategy in a Changing World

China AND THE

International Order

COR PORAT ION

Michael J. Mazarr Timothy R. Heath Astrid Stuth Cevallos

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Preface

This report is part of a larger RAND study on the future of the post? World War II liberal international order. The overall project is examining the theoretical and historical foundations of the order, its current status and prospects, and policy options for the future. This report represents our analysis of China's approach to a multilateral order and draws implications from that analysis for future U.S. policy.

This research was sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the Center director (contact information is provided on the webpage).

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Contents

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Defining the International Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Methodology and Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

CHAPTER TWO

China's Interests and Ambitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 China's Core Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Xi Jinping's Report at the 19th Party Congress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Differing Views of China's Intentions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

CHAPTER THREE

China's Views of International Order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Support for Institutions That Grant China Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Appreciation for Rules-Based, Multilateral Mechanisms.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Contestation of Western Values and U.S. Military Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Criticism of U.S. Exceptionalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Criticism of Military Interventionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

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vi China and the International Order

CHAPTER FOUR

China's Behavior Toward the Order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 China and International Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 China and International Norms.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 China's Compliance with the Order's Rule Sets.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 China's Role in Shared Security Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Emerging Wild Card: The "Long Arm of China's Influence". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 China's Behavior Toward the Postwar International Order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

CHAPTER FIVE

The Future of China's Interaction with the International Order. . . . . . . . 69 Geostrategic Trends and Changes to International Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Growing Chinese Dependence on International Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 How China Seeks to Reform the International Order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Restructuring the Asia-Pacific Region: A Foretaste of the Future?.. . . . . . . . . 84 The Intensifying Competition for Political Influence.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Which Parts of the Order Is China Likely to Challenge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Conclusion: A Modified or Subverted Order?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

CHAPTER SIX

Three Trajectories for China and the International Order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 A Spectrum of Futures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Implications for U.S. Policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Preparing for a Range of Possible Futures.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusions and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Toward a Stable Competition in the Context of a Shared Order. . . . . . . . . . 119 Putting China's Approach to the Postwar Order into Perspective. . . . . . . . . 121 U.S. Strategy Toward China and a Shared Order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Tables

2.1. China's Core Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1. China's Participation in Major International Institutions. . . . . . . 35 4.2. Opposition to International Institutions--China and the

United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.3. States Initiating Militarized Interstate Disputes,

1990?2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4.4. China's Behavior Toward Primary Subcomponents of

Postwar Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 5.1. China's Potential for Changing the International Order.. . . . . . 100 6.1. Alternative Chinese Strategies Toward International

Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

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