Non-literal Collection Planning Paper Assignment



THE ASSIGNMENT/INSTRUCTIONS: You have already posted a paper on future literal collection for a scenario that you selected. Use the same scenario for this assignment. You are a Collection Strategist recently assigned to support a Crisis Action Team based on your previous experience working on the intelligence problem. As part of your in-brief for your new position the team lead identified one of your tasks is to comply with the community-wide budget cuts to achieve cost savings, which means deemphasizing some programs in your portfolio which includes ELINT, FISINT, IMINT, and MASINT efforts. You must do this while maintaining the capabilities necessary to meet the challenges posed by the current events as described in your scenario. The CAT Director has asked you to provide a short issue paper spelling out the following:? Which non-literal technical collection capabilities are high priority, which are medium and lowest priority, with a justification for these rankings given the current state of the events in the scenario you chose? ? How you would use them to answer the intelligence requirements? ? What are your specific targets? ? What are your alternate strategies if you cannot get the assets you request?Your task is to draft the paper for the Director. Consider all of the collection “INTs” concentrating on the non-literal disciplines in chapters 6 – 16. Your paper should be 4-6 pages double-spaced, plus a cover sheet and List of References in APA complete citation format. LECTURE NOTES: If any part from here until the end, please annotate as (XXXX) and I will quote the Professor’s lesson plan; however, I’d like to keep his notes to a minimum. The course focuses on three major elements: ? Sets the stage about collection as a very large and complex system that produces literal intelligence or human-based communication; and nonliteral or technical intelligence. ? Examines each of the various collection “INTs” that gathers and collects information used to create intelligence. ? The management challenges associated with developing, resourcing and operating collection systems. We will start this course on intelligence collection by watching a scene from the 2012 movie Zero Dark Thirty which is about the Special Operations Seal Team raid on Osama bin Laden’s residence in Pakistan. It shows the helicopter infiltration to bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Locating bin Laden had been a standing intelligence requirement since September 11, 2001. How did they get to this moment? Part of the effort was support from holistic, well-planned, vetted, all-source intelligence collection to include the five intelligence disciplines to be discussed. The mission’s success was the culmination of many years of complex, thorough, and highly advanced intelligence collection, operations and analyses by the Intelligence Community. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) were key in executing an aggressive and innovative intelligence collection plan and strategy. Operation Neptune Spear - Intelligence Timeline 2007 - US intelligence uncovers the name of one of bin Laden's most trusted couriers from years of interrogation of detainees captured by US in Afghanistan. HUMINT was collected from Guantanamo detainees about major Al Qaida players, foot soldiers, couriers and money men. This information was used to produce all source intelligence analysis and cue all-source intelligence collection. The CIA began collecting information on key individuals connected to or providing support to bin Laden. (Source: Minutes and Years: The Bin Ladin Operation, April 2016. CIA, Retrieved from .) 2009 - Intelligence collection identifies the area of Pakistan where a courier and his brother live. By late 2010, further intelligence linked the courier to a compound in Abbottabad, a town in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, about 35 miles north of Islamabad. This information was used to produce all-source intelligence analysis and cue all-source intelligence collection. Satellite phone calls and emails made by the courier were collected by SIGINT. All-source US intelligence collection continued monitoring the compound to ascertain whether bin Laden was located inside. August 2010 - US intelligence sources identified the Abbottabad compound as the home of the courier and his brother, men who have no obvious means of affording a $1 million home. Collection indicated the compound and its main residence had extensive security features unusual for the area: high walls topped with barbed wire, double entry gates, opaque windows, no apparent internet or telephone connections, and all trash that was burned rather than collected. NGA also developed highly detailed models, maps and imagery of the compound. An exact life-size replica of the compound was built for the assault teams to rehearse the operation. A three-dimensional model of the Abbottabad compound was created by collection using imagery and laser-based sensing devices including laser radar, or lidar. September 2010 - The CIA informed President Obama that bin Laden may be living in the Abbottabad compound. Analysts assessed the ‘pattern of life’ of the inhabitants of the compound. A massive all-source US intelligence collection effort continued to focus on the compound and with bin Laden affiliates. February 2011 - The intelligence on the Abbottabad compound, based on collection from human sources, electro-optical, infrared and radar imagery, and intercepted cell phone conversations and emails was considered strong enough to begin operational planning. Multispectrum imagery collection airborne reconnaissance platforms, Digital Globe and GeoEye commercial satellites, and hyperspectral sensors from U.S. space-based satellites provided much needed detail to support operational planning and to cue further multiINT collection. The CIA collected HUMINT by setting up a safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and used a foreign national under cover to gain access to the compound. Technical MASINT collection was used to measure the approximate height of a tall man who repeatedly paced outside the kitchen of the Abbottabad compound. He was believed to be bin-Laden and given the code name Pacer. (Source: Cozine, K. Fall 2013. Journal of Strategic Security, Teaching the Intelligence Process: The Killing of Bin Laden as a Case Study, Retrieved from .) March 14 – April 28, 2011 - President Obama chairs five National Security Council meetings to discuss an operation to raid bin Laden's compound and killing or capturing bin Laden. All-source US intelligence collection continued monitoring the compound. April 29, 2011 - President Obama gives the order to raid bin Laden's compound in Pakistan. May 1, 2011 - President Obama, DCIA Panetta, and JSOC commander Admiral McRaven approve execution of the operation. May 2, 2011 – In the early morning hours, a team of 25 Navy Seals raid the Abbottabad, Pakistan compound. Navigation, communications and imaging satellites operated by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) played an important support role before and during the raid. Persistent surveillance was being conducted by a RQ 170 drone flying thousands of feet above Abbottabad compound before, during, and after the raid. In a 40-minute operation and firefight, Bin Laden was shot and killed. US forces collected numerous items from bin Laden's compound, including 10 hard drives, five computers and more than 100 storage devices, such as disks, DVDs and thumb drives. Source: CNN, November 2017. Death of Osama bin Laden Fast Facts, Retrieved from ). In the weeks following the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, U.S. Intelligence Community analysts sifted through the recovered digital and hard copy materials in search of intelligence information of possible ongoing al-Qaida plots, identities and locations of al-Qaida personnel. On November 1, 2017, the CIA released nearly declassified 470,000 files recovered in the raid. The collected materials indicated that Bin Ladin remained an active leader in al-Qaida, providing strategic, operational, and tactical instructions to the organization. (Source: ODNI, January 2018. Bin Laden’s Bookshelf, Retrieved from ). In a DoD press conference held on May 2, 2011 after the raid, a senior Defense official stated there were multiple sources of intelligence collection that led to the raid and helped shape the final intelligence picture. This supported decision makers and the Special Operations planners. Key information was collected from detainee reporting which provided insights into the bin Laden courier network. There were contributions from other sources and the intelligence support was superb. “The operators who assaulted the compound felt they had all the intelligence they needed, and they were highly confident in their ability to carry out the mission.” (Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), May 2011. Retrieved from DOD Background Briefing on U.S. operations Involving Osama Bin Laden, ). One note on the collection effort, understanding and knowledge of weather, sun and moon settings, and available maps are always strong considerations in an all-source intelligence collection planning and strategy. Finally, all information on this case study was found from open sources. This was an excellent example of Intelligence Community collection with requirements driving the collection of vital information, assessing the collected information, cueing follow-on all-source, and analyzing all sources to produce the compelling intelligence case that led US Special Forces to Abbottabad, Pakistan. It gave some closure to the families that lost loved ones on September 11, 2001. A Taxonomy of Intelligence Sources Collection organizations in large intelligence communities (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States) are of necessity specialized. They are optimized to collect information from one specific class of sources-imagery, radio signals, or human sources. Because of this specialization, collection organizations are often called stovepipes, invoking the metaphor of a tightly controlled channel that has only one function. The metaphor is best not followed too far because the only product that a stovepipe disgorges is smoke. The IC has distinct collection methods using the “INT” (short for intelligence) that define the areas of collection responsibility of large collection organizations such as NGA and NSA. As a result, “INT” names in the US intelligence community are the result of bureaucratic initiatives, not proper INT descriptions. The definitions of each INT follow: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the public. OSINT is drawn from publicly available material and can be inclusive of the other INTs. It is the source of this information that makes it unique. OSINT collection has become increasing relevant with global social media and real time reporting from diverse sources. As with all intelligence disciplines OSINT has its challenges such as the sheer volume of information. OSINT includes: ? The Internet ? Traditional mass media (e.g. television, radio, newspapers, magazines) ? Specialized journals, conference proceedings, and think tank studies ? Photos ? Geospatial information (e.g. maps and commercial imagery products) CIA is responsible for collecting, producing, and promoting open source intelligence through its management of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC). OSC was established on November 1, 2005 and is charged with a unique, Communitywide responsibility. The OSC collection capabilities include translations in over 80 languages; source, trends, and media analyses; specialized video and geospatial services; and rare cultural and subject matter expertise. Individual intelligence agencies and organizations manage their own OSINT collection efforts. Human Intelligence (HUMINT): Intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. The National Clandestine Service (NCS) is the branch of the CIA responsible for the collection of HUMINT. The NCS is charged with strengthening national security and foreign policy objectives through the clandestine collection of HUMINT. Collection methods can take place in a variety of ways, including in-person meetings. Some HUMINT operations can be short, while others take years. Overt HUMINT collection is how a large percentage of human source information is collected, for example by defense attaches. Clandestine collection is done by individuals who are specifically recruited and managed during the collection process. Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT): MASINT is a technical branch of intelligence gathering, which serves to detect, track, identify or describe the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors. MASINT, as a specific and unique discipline, is not well understood by both the IC and user communities. MASINT technologies are both immature and diverse. MASINT can provide specific weapon system identifications, chemical compositions and material content and a potential adversary's ability to employ these weapons. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides central coordination for MASINT collection efforts. Each service, in turn, has a primary command or staff activity to develop requirements and coordinate MASINT effort. The Central MASINT Office (CMO) has the requisite legal authorities to carry out its responsibilities. However, it is not staffed commensurate with those responsibilities, and a fractured organizational structure limits its overall management abilities. For example, the USAF RC-135S Cobra Ball is a measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) collection aircraft. It is deployable and flies Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed missions of national priority to collect optical and electronic data on foreign ballistic targets. The collected data is critical to arms treaty compliance verification, and development of U.S. strategic defense and theater missile defense concepts. The Cobra Ball can track ballistic missile re-entry vehicles and warheads during the final phase of their flight and recently deployed to the Pacific in response to North Korean missile testing. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT): Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar. Images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. GEOINT is a layering of multiple sources, including imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information. No one source can do it all. The final product is the intelligence produced. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the prime producer and functional manager for national and allied GEOINT efforts for the IC. GEOINT consists of: ? Imagery - a likeness of any natural or man-made feature, as well as its location. ? Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) – information derived through interpreting imagery. ? Geospatial Information – information that identifies a natural or constructed feature on Earth by its geographic location and other characteristics. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): SIGINT is derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems. SIGINT provides a vital window for our nation into foreign adversaries' capabilities, actions, and intentions. It comprises either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence. NSA is the lead agency in the IC responsible for the SIGINT mission. This information is frequently in foreign languages and dialects, protected by codes and other security measures, and involves complex technical characteristics. NSA collects and analysis the information, interprets it, and disseminates this intelligence to its consumers and users. SIGINT is collected in a variety of ways depending on the type of signal targeted. NSA collects the raw SIGINT and NSA translators, cryptologists, analysts, and other technical experts turn the raw data into information and data that an all-source analyst can use. SIGINT is divided into three distinct “INTs”: ? Communications intelligence (COMINT) which is the interception of communications between individuals, including telephone conversations, text messages, emails, etc. ? Electronic intelligence (ELINT) which are electronic signals not directly used in communication such as a radar electronic signal. ? Telemetry interception of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT) which are signals detected from weapons under testing and development. The lumping of COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT together as SIGINT is usually defended as being logical because they are commonly intercepted by some type of signal transmitted by the target. But some measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT) and some imagery intelligence (IMINT) sensors rely on a signal transmitted by the target, as well. “SIGINT” is in fact too general a term to use, when in most cases it means COMINT. With the advances in aeronautical and sensor technologies, intelligence collection has been significantly expanded in airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) collection. This has been used to supplement traditional national intelligence collection and is under the operational control of theater commanders. For example, throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, capabilities from various sensors became available at continually lower echelons even as support remained intact to the highest levels within the United States. The taxonomy is based on resource control (“turf”) considerations and, from our standpoint in this course, it is artificial. The taxonomy approach taken here is quite different. Instead of following the U.S. stovepipes, this course tries for a logical breakout that focuses on the nature of the material collected and processed, rather than on the collection means. The next section illustrates this view of collection sources. It divides intelligence collection into two major source types and adds a new form of literal intelligence that has come into prominence: cyber collection. Traditional COMINT, HUMINT, and open source collection are mainly concerned with literal information, that is, of information in a form that humans use for communication. The basic product and the general methods for collecting and analyzing literal information are usually well understood by intelligence analysts and the customers of intelligence. It requires no special exploitation after the processing step (which includes translation) to be understood. It literally speaks for itself. Nonliteral information, in contrast, usually requires special processing and exploitation for analysts to make use of it. It is important to understand the nature and limitations of such processing and exploitation. The rationale for this division is that analysts can challenge the interpretation of COMINT, HUMINT, cyber collection or open source, given access to the original material (and having the requisite language and cultural expertise). But if the processor/exploiter of nonliteral material makes a judgment, it’s difficult to contradict unless you are also an expert in the field. Interpreting a hyperspectral image or an ELINT recording takes special expertise. British author Michael Herman observed that there are two basic types of collection: One produces evidence in the form of observations and measurements of things (nonliteral), and one produces access to human thought processes (literal). (Source: Herman, M.1996. Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 82.) ................
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