Desert Warfare: German Experiences in

Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II

by Major General Alfred Toppe

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

FOREWORD

Analysts continue to assess the data from Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm as a means of improving the military's

to function effi-

ciently in desert terrain. The information gleaned from this effort will enhance

the already considerable

of knowledge on the subject derived from the

historical record. That record, of course, is incomplete, in that much valuable

information was never

and much that was has been lost or forgotten.

When contributions in the latter category are located or rediscovered, they should

he given the dissemination they merit. This is one

of the publication pro-

gram of the Combat Studies Institute.

Such is the purpose of publishing Desert Warfare: German Experiences in

World War II, an abridgment of a two.volume work that first appeared in 1952.

Organized by Major General Alfred Toppe and written with the assistance of

nine German commanders who served in North Africa, the manuscript (trans-

lated by Mr. H. Heitman) represents a collaborative attempt to determine "as

many factors as possible which exerted a determining influence on desert war-

fare." Issues addressed include planning, intelligence,

and operations.

Described and

are the German order of

the major military

engagements in North Afri.ca, and the particular problems of terrain and climate

in desert operations. Not unlike many of the U.S. units

in the war

with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in

the desert only after

arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its

own terms. For this reason alone, as well as for the insights it offers, Desert

Warfare requires the serious consideration of those

for preparing

the U.S. military for any future ronflict in desert terrain.

August 1991

ROGER J. SPILLER PH.D. Director, Combat Studies Institute

CSI Special Studies rover a

of military history

The views ex-

pressed in this CSI publication are those of the author and not necessarily

those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

Editor's note: This Special Study is an excerpt from German Experiences in Desert Warfare During World War If, by Generalmajor Alfred Toppe and 9 others [et al.], 2 vols., 1952. These 2 vols. include 380 pages, 36 sketches, 15 maps, and 85 photographs. The original study was MS. no. P-129 in the Foreign Studies Series of the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe (now found in the National Archives). Mr. H. Heitman edited and translated the origin manuscript, which has been reformatted and edited, in part, by Combat Studies Institute editors.

CONTENTS

Preface ....................................................... vii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Chapter I. Prior Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. Intelligence Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 a. Desert Terrain and Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 b. Scope of the Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 c. Influence of Intelligence on Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 d. Availability and Evaluation of Terrain Intelligence . . . . 3 e. Use of Historical Data for Planning Purposes . . . . . . . . . 4

2. Operational Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 a. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 b. Changes in Troop Organization and Equipment . . . . . . . 7 c. Special Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 d. Acclimatization of the Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 e. Development of Special Equipment ................... 13

3. Logistical Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 a. February-May 1941 ................................ 14 b. June-December 1941 ............................... 15 c. January-June 1942 ................................. 15 d. July 1942-May 1943 ................................ 15

Chapter II. Operations ....................................... 17 4. General Description of the Zone of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 a. Mountain Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 b. Steep Terraces ...................................... 20 5. Order of Battle of Army and Luftwaffe Units ............. 24 6. Reasons for Changes in Organization and Equipment ..... 28 7. Descriptions of the More Important Battles ............... 29 a. 31 March-19 April: The First Counterattack to Reconquer the Cyrenaica ......................... 29 b. May-June 1941: Battle for the Positions on the Border .......................................... 32

iii

c. July-Mid-November: The Siege of Tobruk and Preparations for the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

d. Mid-November 1941-Mid-January 1942: Repelling The British Autumn Offensive and the Retreat to the Gulf of Sirte ............................... 37

e. Mid-January-End of May 1942: The Counteroffensive to Retake the Cyrenaica and the Preparations for the Attack on Tobruk ......... 41

f. Late May-July 1942: The Battle of Tobruk and the Pursuits to El Alamein ....................... 44

g. August-Early November 1942: The Battles Around Alamein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

h. November 1942-January 1943: The German Retreat to the Border Between Libya and Tunisia .......... 50

i. November 1942-March 1943: The Occupation of Tunisia and the Battles Fought in Tunisia ................. 52

j. April-May 1943: The Final Battle in Tunisia ......... 56 Chapter III. Special Factors ................................... 59

8. Dust .................................................. 59 a. Effect on Troops, Weapons, and Equipment ........... 59 b. Effect on Combat Operations ........................ 60 c. Effect on Tactical Measures ......................... 61 d. Effect on Aircraft and Their Crews ................... 63

9. Terrain ................................................ 64 a. Influence on Tactical Measures ...................... 64 b. Influence on the Construction of Field Fortifications and the Use of Weapons ............. 68 c. The Tactical Importance of the Recognition of Vehicle Tracks by Air Observation .............. 71 d. The Use of Vehicle Tracks for Deception of the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 e. The Use of Wheeled and Track Vehicles .............. 71 f. Influence of Desert Terrain on the Development of New Tactical Principles for the Use of M.otorized Units .................................. 72 g. Influence of Rainfall on Mobility in Desert Terrain .... 74

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