OPEC: What Difference has it Made?

OPEC: What Difference has it Made?

Bassam Fattouh Lavan Mahadeva January 2013

MEP 3

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of

London. Address: 57 Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6FA, United Kingdom; Tel: +44 (0)1865 311377; Fax:

+44 (0)1865 310527; email: bassam.fattouh@. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Address: 57 Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6FA, United Kingdom; Tel:

+44 (0)1865 311377; Fax: +44 (0)1865 310527; email: lavan.mahadeva@.

The contents of this paper are the authors' sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of

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ISBN 978-1-907555-67-1

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Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................1 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................2 2. Brief History of OPEC...........................................................................................................4 3. OPEC Models ........................................................................................................................7

Cheating, Coordination, and Collusion ..................................................................................9 The Role of Saudi Arabia.....................................................................................................12 Collusion and Spare Capacity ..............................................................................................13 Empirical Evidence ..............................................................................................................13 The Signalling Role of OPEC ..............................................................................................15 4. OPEC Investment Strategy ..................................................................................................17 5. OPEC, Rents, and Oil Substitution Policies ........................................................................18 6. Conclusions..........................................................................................................................20 References ................................................................................................................................ 22

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Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of OPEC models and to link this evolution to some key events in the oil market. Our main conclusion is that OPEC's pricing power varies over time. There are many instances in which OPEC can lose the power to limit oil price movements ? either up or down. Such changes in pricing power are brought about by market conditions and can occur both in weak and tight market conditions. Because of OPEC's varying conduct, there is no single model that fits its behaviour and hence analysts have been forced to choose from a wide range of models to explain certain episodes. The empirical literature has not been successful in distinguishing between the various competing models, as these models offer very similar predictions. Keywords: OPEC Models; Oil Prices; Pricing Power; Collusion; Rent Distribution. JEL-Classification: L11; Q30; Q40.

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1. Introduction

Since the 1973 oil price shock, the history,1 behaviour, and pricing power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have all received considerable attention in the academic literature. One view which prevails is that although OPEC has survived for more than 50 years, it has had little effect on either the oil price or oil market dynamics. Rather, for some, the oil price is seen as being determined in a globally competitive market. An alternative view is that OPEC has been successful in cartelizing the oil market and in using its power to raise the oil price above competitive levels by restricting output. On the other hand, there is the view that OPEC pricing power is not constant, and tends to fluctuate depending on the interaction among OPEC members and on oil market conditions.2 The swing in pricing power became very apparent in the events that surrounded the oil price collapse in 1998, which saw the Dubai price, the benchmark for exports to Asia, decline from around $20 per barrel in early November 1997 to less than $12 per barrel in March 1998 and averaging around $10 per barrel in December 1998. At that time, OPEC seemed to have lost its ability to defend oil prices, and many analysts predicted its demise. This view of an ineffective OPEC was, however, reversed only a few months later, and many observers consequently regarded the events of 1998 to have ushered in a new era of cooperation among its members. During March 1998 and March 1999, OPEC embarked on two production cuts in an attempt to put an end to the slide in the oil price. These production cuts were implemented with a high level of cohesiveness among members, contradicting the view that OPEC was not able to collude. By the end of 1999, the Dubai price had risen to $23 per barrel.

The divergent views about OPEC pricing power have resulted in a wide range of OPEC models. These range from classic textbook cartel, to wealth-maximizing monopolist (Pindyck, 1978a), to three-block cartel (Eckbo, 1976), to two-block cartel (Hnyilicza and Pindyck, 1976), to clumsy cartel (Adelman, 1980), to dominant firm (Salant, 1976; Mabro, 1991), to loosely co-operating oligopoly (Griffin, 1985), to residual firm monopolist (Adelman, 1982), to bureaucratic cartel (Smith, 2005), to competitive models (MacAvoy, 1982; Cr?mer and Salehi-Esfahani, 1989, 1991). Many of these models were developed to explain key historical events, and in response to changes in key producers' behaviour. The OPEC price war in 1985?6 resulted in many of the 1970s models ? those that considered

1 For a historical account of OPEC see Skeet (1988), Terzian (1985), Seymour (1980), Parra (2004). 2 See for instance Griffin and Nielson (1994), Geroski et al. (1987), Almoguera et al. (2011).

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