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Portfolio ProjectBy Jason E ThigpenA Paper Presented in Partial FulfillmentOf The Requirements OfLEAD 570: LEADERSHIP FOR THE FUTUREDec 2012 Organization and BackgroundThe 100th Force Support Squadron (FSS) is an US Air Force unit within the 100 Air Refueling Wing at Royal Air Force Station Mildenall in the United Kingdom. The 100 FSS is responsible for a wide range of programs on base. One of the two biggest is that they run the military and civilian personnel sections and they control the dining facilities on base. They also control items that are used for base morale like the bowling center, the gym, the enlisted and officer clubs. They also run the Airman Family and Readiness center which supports families of deployed members and they control lodging and lodging maintenance. To say the least the 100 FSS has a very wide range of responsibilities on the base with a lot of moving parts.The ProblemIn July of 2012 the FSS had a change in leadership CITATION Roy12 \l 1033 (Royal Air Force Mildenhall, 2012). There is an Air Force requirement that when there is a change of leadership the new commander has to receive a commander’s safety orientation briefing CITATION Air11 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 2.3, 2011). In this briefing the Wing Safety Office briefs the new squadron commander on the Air Force and federal safety requirements.One of the issues that came up to this commander was that FSS’ safety program was almost nonexistent. The commander was given guidance on things that she needed to get moving forward so that her program could be in compliance. So the first thing that happened was that she appointed a Unit Safety Representative (USR) to be her liaison to the Wing Safety Office CITATION Air111 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 1.5.20.1, 2011). The way a USR is appointed to the Wing Safety Office is by a letter in writing by the squadron commander. Within 30 days of that letter being received by the wing safety office the USR must receive training on the safety program CITATION Air112 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruciton 91-202 para. 2.2, 2011). Some of the things that they are trained on are how to create a job safety training outline, how to document required safety training, how to conduct and document spot inspections, and how to report on and off duty mishaps to the safety office.The problem with FSS is that they never submitted a letter appointing a USR and no one ever received training. The result of that is that no one was briefing the commander at least quarterly on the safety program. That also meant that no one was ensuring that there was a job safety training outline and that mandatory safety training was being documented properly. The 100 FSS was not in compliance with the Air Force requirement or with federal law.One of the ways that they Air Force regulates their overall safety program is that they have the Wing Safety Office conduct formal annual inspections on each the squadrons on base. This year 100 FSS’ inspection came due in November 2012. Annual inspections begin with a formal in brief with the commander, the USR with the Wing Safety Office inspector. This inspection did not start out like that. On the Friday before the inspection was suppose to begin the safety inspector contacted the USR for a time and location of the in brief. The USRs response was, “oh, was I suppose to set that up?” The safety inspector said “yes, had you received the mandatory training you would know all of your responsibilities”. So the safety inspector called the commander’s secretary and set up the in brief for that Monday morning. The inspection was going to be done in conjunction with the base fire inspector who does a fire safety inspection as well. During this in brief the safety inspector started by telling the commander what the squadron will be inspected on and what she could expect from the from the inspector. However, the USR was not present at the briefing. The inspector decided it was time to let the commander know the actual state of 100 FSS’ safety program. He informed the commander that as far as he was concerned, FSS did not have a USR appointed or trained and therefore they would not have any of the proper program items that were to be inspected. The commander was in shock. She could not believe that from July until November not one of her officers or noncommissioned officers had taken responsibility and gotten there program up and running. The commander asked for a week to get someone in place before the inspection. The safety inspector agreed and they set a date and time to begin a week later and the ended the in brief.Once the inspection began it was exactly as the inspector had predicted, there were no safety program items completed. Also in conjunction with the program inspection the safety inspector does a facility walk through. Not only was the safety program in disarray, but the facilities had been neglected and the general housekeeping was creating safety hazards in a lot of the facilities. Once the inspection was completed it was determined that the squadron did not have a safety program and there were 72 facility findings. There are three potential grades you can receive from a safety inspection; complies, complies with comments, does not comply CITATION Air113 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruciton 91-202 para. 3.3.3, 2011). 100 FSS was given the score of does not comply. It is the only squadron on base that has received that score. Strategies Considered for Correcting the ProblemDuring an out brief all the findings were read and explained to the commander. The commander asked the safety inspector for recommendations on how to fix the program. The inspector started with first things first. A USR had to appointed in writing by the commander CITATION Air111 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 1.5.20.1, 2011) to the safety office and that person had to be trained within 30 days CITATION Air112 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruciton 91-202 para. 2.2, 2011). In the training the USR would learn all the things that were required for the program and then they could begin formulating a strategy for correcting the discrepancies. The objective is for 100 FSS to become compliant with Air Force safety regulations and federal Department of Labor laws. The second objective is for the commander to ensure that they are providing a healthful and safe work environment. In order for the squadron to get in compliance with safety rules, they are going to have to learn what the requirements are, so they are going to have to get training and education. In that training and education supervisors and the USR are going to have to learn specific job safety requirements CITATION Air114 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 2.3.3, 2011). Once the education and training is in place, the USRs and supervisors would be able to develop job specific safety training outlines for each work center CITATION Air114 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 2.3.3, 2011). In these outlines there are 16 required items and 18 job specific items that may need to be briefed CITATION Air115 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 Attachment 5, 2011). The Wing Safety Office requires each work center to maintain a continuity binder for safety on a local SharePoint site. This makes it easier to manage the program because not only does the section supervisor have access to their binder, but the squadron USR and the Wing Safety Office for quality assurance and oversight. Once the job safety training outline is complete and posted on the SharePoint site, all the workers have to be trained properly, and it has to be documented CITATION Air116 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 1.5.21.4, 2011). Safety training documentation is not only an Air Force requirement, but it is also a Department of Labor requirement to ensure that workers have been educated on the potential hazards of their work environment and how to mitigate those hazards CITATION OSH12 \l 1033 (OSHA Regulations, 2012). That training must also be located where each supervisor has access to it for quick reference, so it is a local requirement for that documentation to be located on the base SharePoint site as well.The next order of business is for the supervisors to begin doing monthly spot inspections of the sections and to document that on the SharePoint site as well CITATION Air117 \l 1033 (Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 1.5.21.15, 2011). Spot inspections are a good way to discover hazards or processes that need to be corrected in the day to day work duties. Before the inspection, not one single spot inspection had been completed or documented by the supervisors. It showed, FSS had over $20,000 dollars in lost day mishaps over the last years CITATION mis12 \l 1033 (mishap search resuts, 2012). That was the highest mishap cost for the entire base CITATION mis12 \l 1033 (mishap search resuts, 2012).Once these main items are in place, FSS will have a safety program that can be inspectable. The FSS commander was given an out brief on the 5th of December and she was informed then that she had 30 days to answer the findings before the report was forwarded to the 100 Mission Support Group Commander, which is the 100 FSS Commander’s supervisor. However, 100 FSS has 30 days to answer these items, the timeline for correcting these issues should be much faster because of the magnitude of the issue. If there were a mishap that caused a fatality within the 100 FSS without a proper safety training program in place, then the Department of Labor could potentially fine the base for over $1,000,000 not to mention insurance payouts and potential lawsuits being filed for negligence. On 7 December, the 100 FSS did send forward a letter stating who the new USRs would be for the squadron. By 7 Jan 2013, those USRs must be trained. Once those USRs receive training, they will have enough knowledge about the program to begin developing their job safety training guides and begin conducting the required training for all employees. Within three months if the entire program is not developed and up and running, then another meeting with the commander will be necessary.The barriers to the safety program within the 100 FSS are that people do not believe that it is necessary. For the most part, the employees of 100 FSS have a low threat job that does not expose them to many hazards. So for most part supervisors and employees believe that the safety program is extra work that takes away from their normal day to day operations. This culture is not unique to the 100 FSS, it spans a lot of different FSS squadrons Air Force wide. In some cases it is not just the FSS units that have a culture of noncompliance. So the main barrier is the previous culture that existed within the squadron. However this new commander understands the significance and the consequences of a major mishap. So the culture change at the top has happened, now she needs buy in from her section leadership. The change has happened the way it was suppose to, top down. All of the leadership has bought in, but getting the individual worker who does not see the bigger picture to by in will be the challenge. For example, the lodging maintenance workers’ job is to keep the on base hotel rooms working properly. Sometime electrical breakers short out and switch themselves off. It’s up to the maintenance worker to correct the problem and get it working properly. In the past, these maintenance workers would switch it back on and place tape over it so it could not switch itself off again instead of finding out what was causing the tripping of the breaker. This poses a significant safety hazard that could cause any number of outcomes. The biggest potential is for an electrical fire to occur. A fire in a multi-story hotel with customers potentially sleeping could be catastrophic. Educating the maintenance workers to understand that shortcuts can kill will be a major culture shift. Their mentality is to get the job done fast, now they will be shifting their focus to fixing the problem correctly and safely, not fast. It will be a culture change that will take time, but will be necessary for the program to have success.Initially, the leadership approach was to delegate the responsibilities down to a younger airman who they were trying to see if they could handle the responsibilities. Once the commander saw that this approach failed, her next approach was to appoint a young officer as USR to run the program. The current approach requires the new USR meeting with and updating the commander on a weekly basis. This requirement I think is necessary due to the fact that the commander had no idea that nothing was being done with the program over a series of months. This way, she can hold her USR accountable, and she will not be surprised by any facet of the program that is coming along slower than the others.Anticipated Results and Measurements for SuccessThe commander expects that each of the items that were written up in the annual safety report as a discrepancy will be corrected. Once those items are corrected they will be sent up to the Wing Safety Office for closure. The Safety Office will then come back into the unit and conduct a follow up inspection to ensure that the issues has been corrected. The anticipated results are that the report will be answered, the findings will be closed. On a bigger picture scale, 100 FSS will have a working safety program in which all employees are trained on the hazards of their job and the use and maintenance of their personal protective equipment.The measurement of success of this is that all of the open findings against the 100 FSS are corrected and closed out. Because the findings were that they did not have a safety program, correcting that issue and having the Safety Office close the finding would be a huge success for the squadron. Correcting the facility findings will actually take care of themselves once supervisors and employees are trained on the safety program.Another measurement of success has to do with the development of a safety culture. There is no true way to measure something intangible like a culture, but creating a situation where people understand the importance of compliance with mandatory safety regulations would be a big change from the current culture. Once the employees begin to do that then that would also be a huge success for the 100 FSS.Conclusion and Leadership Beyond the ImplementationAs the safety inspector, I had a unique perspective into this problem. In most FSS squadrons in the Air Force, safety inspectors are not welcomed. Maj Dwyer or the 100 FSS not only welcomed us, but wanted our recommendations and used those to implement the needed changes. I was allowed to tell her the truth of how bad the problem was without worrying if she would be offended. I got the sense that she had a lot of yes men around her, and when someone from the outside gave a true account of the actual condition she responded appropriately. This went a long way in building a working relationship with the squadron leadership and the Safety Office to help correct the issues. Beyond this program, once Maj Dwyer let her people know that allowing her to be blindsided just to protect them was not acceptable. Several individuals lost their positions and everyone in the squadron found out that it was ok to tell Maj Dwyer bad news about a program, but there had better be a plan to get the issue corrected. She made everyone aware that making a mistake is not a fireable offense, making a mistake and covering it up would be from that time on. Building that trust between the commander and the squadron is an important step forward to ensuring that something like this does not happen again in the future.Works Cited BIBLIOGRAPHY Air Force Instruciton 91-202 para. 2.2. (2011, August 5). US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.Air Force Instruciton 91-202 para. 3.3.3. (2011, August 5). The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.Air Force Instruction 91-202 Attachment 5. (2011, August 5). The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 1.5.20.1. (2011, August 5). The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 1.5.21.15. (2011, August 5). The US Air Force Mihsap Preventnion Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 1.5.21.4. (2011, August 5). The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 2.3. (2011, August 5). The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.Air Force Instruction 91-202 para. 2.3.3. (2011, August 5). The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program. HQ AFSC/SEG.mishap search resuts. (2012, 8 Dec). Retrieved from Air Force Safety Automated System: Regulations. (2012). Retrieved from Department of Labor: Air Force Mildenhall. (2012, July 12). Retrieved from News: ................
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