The Port as Growth Machine



‘A Deeper Channel Floats All Boats’:

The Port Economy as Urban Growth Engine

David Jaffee

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

University of North Florida

Jacksonville, FL 32224

Ph: 904-620-2215

Email: djaffee@unf.edu

Under review.

Do not quote or cite without permission of the author.

Author Biography

David Jaffee is Professor of Sociology at the University of North Florida. His areas of research and writing include social and economic development, political economy, organizations, and higher education. He is author of two books Levels of Socio-Economic Development Theory (Praeger) and Organizational Theory: Tension and Change (McGraw-Hill). Recent published articles include “Labor and the Geographic Reorganization of Container Shipping in the United States” in Growth and Change and “The General Education Initiative in Hong Kong: Organized Contradictions and Emerging Tensions” in Higher Education.

Abstract

This paper analyzes one particular type of urban growth strategy revolving around the port logistics economy in Jacksonville Florida. Led by the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT), the business community and city officials identified the maritime port as a leading engine of urban and regional growth. This case study will serve to highlight some of the ways in which the growth machine model and associated forms of “boosterism” represent a powerful and compelling framework for understanding urban development as well as the limitations revealed when applied to a development strategy based on distribution and goods-moving – as opposed to production, consumption, and goods-producing – and driven by the forces of globalization and the rise of logistics. More specifically, the demands of this sector for large-scale publicly financed infrastructure and the attendant uncertainties of success due to inter-port competition and the vagaries of commodity flows, pose unique challenges for this development strategy.

The analysis of urban political economy has been shaped heavily by the insights of the growth machine model (Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987) that posits the power and influence of land-based elites in advancing a pro-growth agenda. As urban areas develop plans for economic expansion, and advance particular strategies for local and regional economic development, they are supported by elite coalitions and promoted through the rhetoric of universal economic interest and civic boosterism. This paper analyzes various dynamics of an urban development strategy in the context of the recent growth agenda advanced in support of the Jacksonville (Florida) Port Authority (herein referred to as JAXPORT). This case study will serve to highlight and illuminate some of the ways in which this model and associated forms of “boosterism” (Cronon, 1991; Elfin & Wysong, 1990; Lessof, 2008; Boyle, 1999) represent a powerful and compelling framework for understanding urban development as well as limitations when the urban regional development strategy is tied to the goods-moving port logistics sector requiring public investment in transportation infrastructure (Erie, 2004)

Introduction and Background: Growth Machines and Port Economies

There are two widely used perspectives that have informed the analysis of the process and dynamics of urban economic development initiatives. First is the growth machine model (Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987). The ability of the meta-theme of growth to mobilize and bind local elites is based primarily on the material interests of those who own land and commercial properties, and the prospect that growth will enhance the exchange-value of these assets. These interests contribute to the political mobilization of elites who seek to influence local government on fiscal and regulatory matters related to stimulating growth and land use policy. As a consequence, many other local urban actors and constituencies may also benefit from growth due to the resources that flow from an increasing population, income stream, and tax base. This model includes an equally critical dialectical element fueled by the “countercoalitions” that can emerge as growth infringes upon and threatens both the use values and the potential exchange values of urban spaces and suburban neighborhoods (Logan & Molotch, 1987). The mobilization of countercoalitions can thwart efforts of local elites to impose their land use preferences on the local population.

The second closely related aspect of this model builds upon the growth imperative as a form of civic boosterism that can serve to unify the community, mobilize public opinion, and shape identities of place. In this view, the ability of local elites to advance the growth imperative, and particular associated development projects, requires a range of strategies and tactics that serve both to convince the local population of the goodness of the growth plans as well as shape the larger image of the city and region in a manner that is consonant with the intended development. Boyle (1999, p. 55) has described these “efforts made by local elites to refashion collective emotion and consciousness within cities in order to legitimate political projects that function primarily in their interests” as “Urban Propaganda Projects”. While the term “booster” was originally used to describe land speculators in the American frontier during the nineteenth century (Cronon 1991), today it refers to any type of “promotion of regional economic growth” (Eflin and Wysong, 1990), and associated strategies or tactics (Gold & Ward, 1994). Boosterism has been the subject of studies of Sunbelt regions and cities such as Corpus Christi, Texas (Lessof, 2008), and Tampa, Florida (Eflin and Wysong, 1990) that have attempted to promote redevelopment, a new regional identity, as well as expand the tax base through tourism and particular forms of commerce.

This analysis considers the ways in which the local port economy is supported and promoted not only by the power of local and national economic interests competing for the provision of scarce resources but also through public legitimacy campaigns designed to mobilize public opinion and define the collective identity of the region.

In addition to these more familiar perspectives on urban growth strategy, one must also consider how the particular economic sector that is being promoted – in this case the port economy devoted to commodity transportation and distribution, rather than production or consumption -- shapes the application of the growth machine model and introduce several other factors in the analysis of the local political economy. The “port economy” is defined here as the constellation of economic activities that revolve around the transportation, logistics, and distribution of goods moving through a maritime port.

The growing significance of port economies over the past twenty years can be directly linked to the larger process of globalization and the dispersion of production, or the increasing distance between the point of production and the point of consumption (Bonacich & Wilson, 2009; Dicken, 1998). This is reflected in the well-established and growing literature on global commodity chains, global production networks, and global value chains (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994; Henderson, et al., 2002; Coe, et al., 2004). Under a globalized production system, raw materials are extracted in one place, parts and components may be produced in another, manufacturing may take place in yet another, and final consumption still another. As the geographic space between interdependent activities in a commodity chain increases, transportation and logistics take on an increasingly vital role in the circulation and distribution of commodities. Not only operationally, but also financially, as there is continuous pressure to keep logistics and supply-chain costs as low as possible so that the comparative advantage gained from production in low cost nations is not lost in the transportation and distribution process. For the port economy, the primary focus is on “container logistics” which involves the intermodal movement of containerized finished and semi-finished goods from the nation of origin to the U.S. In this context, U.S. ports, and the urban areas and regions in proximity, serve as the spatial nodes through which global commodity/production chains flow via intermodal transportation to national wholesale and retail markets.

On the one hand, the port, as a node in global production networks, has increased in relevance and significance as a result of the spatial dispersion of production, the growing distance between production and consumption, and the subsequent need for transportation and logistics networks and gateways (Hesse & Rodrigue, 2004, 2006). On the other hand, the port economy itself engenders a spatially concentrated set of interdependent landside distribution activities, usually in urban settings (see Jacobs, Ducruet, & de Langen, 2010). Logistics related services are central to this concentrated activity, described by Bonacich and Wilson (2008:64) as “a special kind of industrial district, one geared to the process of international trade.” Rodrigue, Comtois, and Slack (2009) describe these areas as “freight distribution clusters where an array of distribution activities agglomerate” with the advantages of spatial proximity based on the factors of land, accessibility, infrastructure, planning and regulation, economies of agglomeration, and internal multiplying effects.

Within sociology generally, the greatest attention has been devoted to the processes of commodity production and consumption while there has been relative neglect of distribution and circulation (for notable recent exceptions see the work of Bonacich and Wilson, 2008; Bensman, 2008). Urban sociology has also tended to view cities as points of production and consumption, or centers for the agglomeration of high value services such as finance and information processing. However, the growing prominence of the goods-movement industries necessitates greater attention to cities as “terminals” (Hesse, 2008) or “gateways” (Notteboom & Rodrigue 2005) through which the flow of commodities is coordinated (Erie, 2004). The geographic expansion of the sphere of commodity circulation and distribution, linked logically to the spatial reorganization of production and consumption, points to the role of logistics as a potential growth strategy for cities and regions who seek to develop “logistics clusters” (see Sheffi, 2012).

Because container ship cargo coming from Asia, which makes up the vast majority of goods flooding into the US market, is “discretionary cargo” consisting largely of finished or semi-finished consumer goods, it is not linked or tied to any single geographic location. That is, it could as easily enter the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, though destined for the Midwest and the East coast (aka “landbridge”), instead of New York and New Jersey; similarly, cargo could be routed through the Panama Canal and into Jacksonville Florida or another East coast port to reach the same market. With cargo loaded into standardized shipping containers, and an intermodal truck and rail system capable of moving the containers rapidly throughout the United States, shippers and ocean carriers have a great deal of discretion over the port of call. This transformation in the nature of maritime cargo, and the loosening of the relationship between the port and its local economy and market, serve to intensify port competition which is now driven less by one’s particular geographic location than the port infrastructure, the costs of moving cargo, and the ability of the cargo to seamlessly move through an extended -- inter-organizationally and geographically -- supply chain (Fleming, 1989; Fleming & Baird, 1999; Notteboom, 2004; Jacobs, 2007).

Therefore, the analysis of the port economy as an engine of urban economic development may pose a different set of issues, challenges, and strategies than other forms of development. Accordingly, it may require a theoretical lens that incorporates the emergence and consolidation of neo-liberal styles of urban governance and development policy as well as the global forces that have fueled and reinforced these tendencies. More broadly, it is also likely to conform to the larger shift of sub-national governmental units -- such as cities, states, and counties – competing for and providing capital investment and thus playing less a “managerial” than an “entrepreneurial” role (Harvey, 1989). The former involved regulation, redistribution, and service provision whereas the latter entails neo-liberal supply-side oriented policies designed to attract, facilitate and subsidize capital investment and accumulation. As part of this larger shift toward neo-liberal economic policy at the international, national, and now local levels, recent trends in urban political economy have highlighted the growing significance of particular forms of public investment. Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodrigues (2002) emphasize the importance of large-scale urban development projects (UDP) as part of the new urban policy (NUP). This form of urban governance privileges state-financed development projects driven by private–public partnerships but is restricted in scope to the imperatives of capital accumulation. Similarly, Brenner and Theodore (2002: 369-371) outline the creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and the rule of capital. At the urban/local level the various strategies include new networked forms of local governance involving the establishment of public-private partnerships, the creation of privatized urban infrastructures designed to position cities within supranational capital flows, and the construction of large-scale megaprojects designed to attract investment and reconfigure land-use patterns. These emerging political-economic models of urban development will further inform the interpretation and analysis of the Jacksonville port economy.

The Case of Jacksonville Florida and JAXPORT

We can now place the case of Jacksonville in this larger context. Geographically, Jacksonville is located in the northeast corner of the state of Florida. The Jacksonville metropolitan area has a population of roughly 1.3 million. Downtown Jacksonville lies on the banks of the St. Johns River 18 miles west of where the mouth flows into the Atlantic Ocean. The river serves as the channel for the JAXPORT marine terminals located at several points along its banks.

The Jacksonville Port Authority, also known as JAXPORT, dominates and determines the priorities of the Jacksonville port economy. JAXPORT is a government entity that operates as a private corporation. Local tax revenue is used for its operating expenses. As a “landlord port”, JAXPORT leases its land, terminals, and equipment to private maritime firms and this source of revenue supports expansion and maintenance of physical facilities and infrastructure.

In 2005 JAXPORT operated two major terminals; Talleyrand, located close to downtown Jacksonville, and Blount Island located closer to the mouth of the river. The cargo coming through these terminals was highly diversified among bulk, break-bulk, vehicles, and containers. The primary trade lane for JAXPORT was North-South with the Caribbean and Central and South America, and with the leading trading partner Puerto Rico (which does not qualify as “foreign” trade). The relatively low level of container traffic, coupled with the almost exclusive North-South trade lanes, made JAXPORT a relatively minor player in the U.S. port system.

A critical turning point for the Jacksonville port economy, and the emergence of the port as a major focal point for urban/regional economic development, came in 2005 when JAXPORT retained John C. Martin Associates to conduct a business and strategic analysis of the JAXPORT enterprise (Martin Associates, 2005). Martin Associates is the leading consulting firm for maritime ports in the United States; they conduct strategic plans and economic impact studies for many U.S. port authorities. The strategic plan included a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of the JAXPORT enterprise but, for the present purpose, the most critical component pertains to recommendations for expanding the port operation. The Martin report highlighted emerging opportunities for East coast ports generally and, in this plan, JAXPORT in particular.

At the time of the Martin Associates study (2005) there were three major factors fueling East coast port optimism. First, the high volume of containerized imports flooding into West coast ports, namely Los Angeles and Long Beach, was producing serious congestion problems for shippers and carriers. There were questions over whether the West coast ports could continue to effectively and efficiently absorb the projected increases in Asian imports. Second, the West coast had recently been the site of a costly labor dispute between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the Pacific Maritime Association in 2002 (Hall, 2004). The labor union representing East coast longshore workers – the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) – was regarded as less militant and politically radical than the ILWU (Jaffee, 2010). Therefore, the shipping industry was looking for additional and alternative ports through which to move their cargo. Third, and what would be a factor of growing importance in enhancing the potential role of East coast ports, the Panama Canal was planning to widen and deepen its locks (originally slated for completion in 2014) thus allowing the largest container vessels (known as “Post-Panamax” given their inability to traverse the canal due to width/depth restrictions) to travel directly to East and Gulf coast ports. Together, these developments were interpreted as representing a huge opportunity to capture additional containerized cargo as well as justifying the public and private investments in new and expanded port infrastructure. More specifically, Martin Associates recommended that, in order for Jacksonville to take advantage of these opportunities and move to the upper echelon of East Coast ports (with, for example, New York/New Jersey, Norfolk, or Savannah), it would have to, first and foremost, engage in the East-West Asian trade lanes and move many more containers.

Clearly the most robust growth market with respect to containerized cargo is the Far East…With more shippers looking for diversification from the West Coast ports, other North and South Atlantic ports stand to benefit from the growth. … A long term lease with a carrier or terminal operator would then provide JAXPORT with the critical service to further develop distribution center activity in the Jacksonville region, further stimulating additional Asian carrier service, but also providing jobs to the local and regional economy.

JAXPORT followed closely this recommendation. In 2008, it signed agreements with two of the leading global Asian shipping lines – Mitsui MOL (Japanese) and Hanjin (Korean). In 2010 the first 158-acre container terminal was completed at the Dames Point location (built at a cost of $230 million) and leased by Mitsui MOL (and operated by its TraPac subsidiary). A 90-acre Hanjin container terminal was slated for completion in 2013. Each container terminal was expected to be capable of an annual throughput of 800,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEUs) containers when operating at full throttle. This increase in container traffic, it was promised, would move JAXPORT into the upper tier of U.S. maritime ports.

Growth Coalitions and Generalized Boosterism

It is a central thesis of this paper that the nature of the growth machine and boosterism strategy takes a distinct shape due to the sector of the local economy that is being lauded as the engine of economic development and job growth. In this case it is the port logistics sector linked to trends and patterns of global production and distribution, and requiring large-scale infrastructural investments funded with taxpayer dollars. The significance of these factors will be highlighted below.

We can begin by noting that with the expansion of container terminal infrastructure at JAXPORT, two forms of boosterism related to the Jacksonville port economy began to develop that conform to patterns observed elsewhere. The first form – what I will call “generalized boosterism” – promotes the entire regional economy while emphasizing port logistics as just one of the major sources of dynamism and a major reason why firms would want to invest to invest and locate in Jacksonville. One of the initial pro-growth coalitions promoting the port economy as a regional economic engine was first led by the Cornerstone Regional Development Partnership, later renamed the JAXUSA Partnership, a private nonprofit organization affiliated with the regional chamber of commerce. The partnership includes relationships with development agencies in the seven county region of Northeast Florida. JAXUSA is dedicated to corporate relocation, expansion, and site selection. The generalized language takes the following form (JAXUSA Partnership, 2014):

Affordable, high-quality housing, ample recreational opportunities and, short commute times are just some of the reasons why so many people choose to relocate to Jacksonville each year.

Northeast Florida offers more than sunshine and relaxation. We have a competitive but cooperative business climate, an innovative and entrepreneurial spirit, and a young highly skilled talent base.

Our close-knit community of business leaders promotes the seven-county region and helps other businesses – like yours – relocate to or expand in the region. If you’re ready for an easy-to-access, rapidly growing market, JAXUSA Partnership will find the perfect site for your next venture. Our market is affordable, ideally situated on the East Coast, and ready to welcome new businesses looking to expand in Northeast Florida from other cities and countries.

And, yes, we do have more than 90 miles of beaches, great year-round weather and a quality of life that rivals any region in the U.S.

In their effort to market the region, they include six economic sectors – financial services, health and life sciences, logistics, aviation and aerospace, advanced manufacturing, and information technology. The logistics sector, as a potential magnet for investment and relocation, is placed in the context of the regions “global presence”. The language of boosterism centered on the port logistics sector emphasized the following (JAXUSA Partnership, 2014):

We have an intermodal system that is second-to-none, a well-established Latin American trade lane presence and rapidly expanding Asian and European service.

We are “America’s Logistics Center.” Our transportation infrastructure includes 10 airports, four ports, a strong network of railways and access to major roadways and interstates.

Our deep water port, JAXPORT, has three marine terminals that handle 8 million tons of cargo, including more than 515,000 vehicles, annually. It also supports 65,000 jobs in the region and generates $19 billion in annual economic impact.

Along with such sloganeering associated with generalized boosterism, there was also ”targeted boosterism” involving the more concerted efforts by cities and growth coalitions to construct symbolic representations of place (Shields, 1992) and engage in “place management” (Ashworth & Voogd, 1994) or the social construction of place highlighting particular economic or cultural sectors. This has manifested itself into what is referred to as “urban branding” (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005 M. Kavaratzis and G.J. Ashworth, City branding: an effective assertion of identity or a transitory marketing trick?, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 96 (5) (2005), pp. 506–514. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (17)Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005) based on the larger principles of corporate branding. As part of the promotional campaign to redefine the regions economic strengths and attraction, economic development officials branded Jacksonville as “America’s Logistics Center”, an effort that, like all good branding schemes, includes a distinctive logo (see below). The newly developed branding logo was placed at various strategic locations around Jacksonville. The logo proclaims Jacksonville as America’s Logistics Center despite the fact that there are several other cities and regions in the United States that can more legitimately claim this title.

[pic]

The rhetorical and discursive strategies that are used by those promoting the port economy are equally important. McCann (2002), refers to this as the “cultural politics” involving “a set of discursive and material practices in and through which meanings are defined and struggled over, where social norms and values are naturalized, and by which ‘common sense’ is constructed and contested” (p. 387). In his analysis of economic development in Lexington Kentucky, he demonstrates how cultural politics are intertwined with place management. For Jacksonville this takes on the language of inter-city competition and the use of sports metaphors such as being the “first to get across the finish line” in attracting the post-Panamax container vessels and Asian cargo.

In addition to the symbolic dimensions of boosterism there are also the very real material interests that fuel the growth machine and have a direct stake in the success of JAXPORT. These business interests could be divided into the diffuse and specific. The diffuse interests are represented by the larger pro-growth coalition supporting investment that attracts new residents and expands the demand for real estate driving up property values generally.

Specific forms of support come from those business interests more closely connected to and standing to directly benefit from an expanding port economy. These would include logistics firms broadly defined, those commercial real estate developers that have invested in the construction of warehouse and distribution center facilities, and firms likely to gain contracts from the expansion and modification of the land and coastal infrastructure required for the movement of cargo and goods.

As plans for the two new container terminals were firming up, there was growing speculative investment in commercial real estate. Much of this has been in warehousing and distribution centers where the anticipated containerized goods can be cross-docked, reconsolidated, and value-enhanced for subsequent distribution. One typical example is a 600,000 square foot plus warehouse built by Hillwood Investment Properties, a commercial real estate developer headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas. These speculative investments are shaping land use patterns across the region as well as placing demands on the local transportation system (Hesse & Rodrigue, 2004).

Distinctive Challenges for the Port Economy Growth Strategy

So far we have highlighted a fairly common and predictable pattern of growth machine-style boosterism involving broad coalitions of business interests, represented by regional development entities and firms, supporting potential local and regional sources of economic dynamism. But a development strategy resting on the expansion of a port economy, devoted to distribution, rather than production or consumption, and dependent on global commodity flows, introduces several interrelated factors that contribute to a deviation from the more familiar growth machine pattern described thus far. This poses some unique and greater challenges for both gaining public support and realizing the development objectives (see Erie, 2004). We can consider each factor in turn using the case of Jacksonville/JAXPORT as the illustrative example.

First, a growing and competitive port economy requires what I will term speculative mega-projects that involve huge public sector investment in, and often an extended federal approval process of, large-scale coastal and transportation infrastructure as a presumed necessary, but ultimately insufficient, condition for realizing the economic development objectives; speculative because, in this case, there is no guarantee that “if you build, it they will come.”

The need for a speculative mega-project is prompted by a type of conflict that departs from the more standard tensions faced by the growth machine. In the original formulation of the growth machine model (Logan & Molotch, 1987) there is a Polanyi-like double movement (Polanyi, 1957) that posits the emergence of a socio-political “counter-coalition” to challenge the dominant local elite growth machine when the use value of land and property is threatened by developers. However, in the initial stages of the JAXPORT expansion strategy, there was no opposition, latent or manifest, to the container terminal development plan. JAXPORT was successful in achieving the first stage of the consultant’s recommendations by signing long-term leases with Asian shipping lines and constructing a large and highly visible 158-acre container terminal (with Mitsui/TraPac) at the foot of the widely traveled Dames Point Bridge.

The primary obstacle standing in the way of Jacksonville realizing its aspiration to become “America’s Logistics Center”, or stymying the efforts of the port economy growth coalition, was not created by organized human opposition but rather by the very natural resource that made the port economy possible in the first place – the St. Johns River. More specifically, there were two impediments. First, the existence of strong tidal currents at the point where the St Johns River intersects the Intracoastal Waterway created a nozzle effect that prevented 24-hour-a-day navigational port access for container vessels. Second, and what has proven ultimately more significant, at a current depth of 40 feet, the existing St. Johns River channel did not meet the ideally desired 50 foot depth for the largest post-Panamax vessels that would soon be able to traverse the Panama Canal. The first issue would require a coastal re-engineering project; the second a massive and costly dredging/deepening project – that is, a speculative mega-project.

The role of natural physical conditions in both facilitating and thwarting the aspirations of commerce is nicely articulated by Cronon’s (1991) concept of “second nature”. Developed out of his historical analysis of the role of Chicago in the development of the larger U.S. economy, Cronon highlights how seemingly “natural” advantages are used to promote the city as an attractive location for particular forms of economic activity. As he explains: “A kind of ‘second nature’, designed by people and ‘improved’ toward human ends, gradually emerged atop the original landscape that nature – ‘first nature’ – had created as such an inconvenient jumble. Despite the subtly differing logic that lay behind each, the geography of second nature was in its own way as compelling as the geography of first nature, so boosters and others often forgot the distinction between them. Both seemed quite natural.” (p.56).

In the case of Chicago, much was made of the role of the railroad as Chicagoans “assimilated the railroad to the doctrine of natural advantages, merging first and second nature so that the two became almost indistinguishable” with “first and second nature mingled to form a single world” (p. 72-73). Similarly, for Jacksonville, other “natural” advantages have been be championed that are in fact of the “second nature” variety such as the interstate highways that offer north-south and east-west transit (I-95 and I-10, respectively) as well as the CSX and Norfolk Southern rail systems that link to national markets.

But the most significant as well as challenging “natural” advantage that Jacksonville possesses is the St. Johns River feeding into the Atlantic Ocean. At the most fundamental level, this gives Jacksonville an advantage over other locations that have no such access to global shipping lanes. The port in Jacksonville was originally built and expanded to exploit this physical geographic asset permitting maritime shipping. Since the port’s inception, the river has been continually modified and shaped in order to serve as a commercial conduit. While both the dredging/deepening and Mile Point projects are currently framed as alterations to natural conditions, they are simply the latest phase in the seemingly endless reconfiguration of the physical environment to satisfy the imperatives of commerce.

As it pertains to the St. Johns River, there is a long history of redirecting the flow and shape of the river for business interests and economic development. The river today has little resemblance to its original state before significant human settlement. At one time sections of the St Johns River were so shallow that cattle were able to walk from one bank to the other; hence the early name of the Jacksonville settlement as Cowford. The first dredging and deepening operation was conducted in 1892 bringing the depth to 15 feet. In 1902 the river channel was deepened further to 24 feet and its width expanded to 300 feet from Jacksonville to the mouth at the Atlantic Ocean. In 1924 the channel was deepened again to 30 feet. In 1945 the river was redirected at Dames Point creating the Fulton Cut and forming Blount Island. Three additional dredging projects from 1965 to the present have established the current depth at 40-42 feet.

Thus, as Cronon has noted, “Whatever the advantages of a particular landscape, people seem to always reshape it according to their vision of what it should be…the location with so many ‘advantages’ turned out to have some daunting disadvantages as well” (p.55). For Jacksonville, while the river makes possible the existence of the port, it is now, once again, deemed deficient, in its present form, to satisfy the next phase of maritime commerce involving the scale economy of post-Panamax ships container vessels.

There is a second closely related and distinctive aspect of the port economy development strategy that further reinforces its increasingly speculative status. This is the fact that the need for, approval of, and potential economic benefits accruing from, the necessary megaprojects, are determined by forces largely outside the control of local officials and urban elites. The need of all ports to expand infrastructure and deepen channels is determined by the multinational shipping lines that seek to move greater and greater quantities of containerized cargo with larger and larger vessels, thus reducing transportation costs. The first generation container vessels carried approximately 1000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) containers and required between 20-30 feet of water draft. Today, the largest New Post-Panamax Triple-E vessels can carry up to 18,000 TEUs requiring at least 50 feet of draft. Once a decision has been made locally to respond to the demands of international shippers and carriers for deeper water, the deepening project must then be studied and approved by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and then Congress must also approve and then provide Federal appropriations to fund the project.

Assuming this extended approval and appropriations process is successful, and the project is completed, there remains the question of whether the shippers and carriers will chose to include a particular port in its port rotations. If there was only one port on the East coast, or if the containerized cargo was tied to a specific geographic location, the return on the public investment might be assured. However, there are multiple ports competing with each other for the discretionary cargo that can enter the US consumer market through any port, and move to its final destination through the intermodal transportation system (truck and rail). This generates intense inter-port competition.

Table One lists the largest East Coast ports, by TEU throughput, the depth of their channels currently and, in parentheses, if proposed projects are funded and completed. Almost every port on this list is seeking to expand its terminal infrastructure and deepen its channel in order to become a leading port that can receive the largest container vessels. Some will win and some will lose, and the urban development strategy, and the mega-project on which it is based, could all be for naught.

While most urban development projects are unable to guarantee absolute success and involve some speculative character, it should be particularly clear in this case that the “supply” of port infrastructure – building container terminals and deepening channels -- does not create its own demand. In fact, economists have described the demand for transportation and logistics services as a “derived demand” (Bamford, 2001), meaning that the demand for and use of these services, and associated infrastructure, is determined by the supply and the demand for something else, namely containerized cargo (see Rodrigue, 2006 for an alternative view).

There is one final distinguishing factor worth noting, unlike an urban development strategy that is building a place-based location for production or consumption, the port economy is creating a gateway for the entry and mobility of freight, largely shipping containers (see Cidell 2012; Hesse, 2008), and then the further geographic flow and distribution to final consumer destinations that are potentially far from the port city. This aspect of modern containerized shipping and intermodal transportation has led to the widely cited phenomenon that container terminals entail a geographic concentration of costs but a wide dispersion of benefits (Grobar, 2008; Hall, 2008; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005). The concentrated costs borne by the urban area include the construction of infrastructure (McCalla, 1999), sub-optimal land use patterns (Hesse, 2008), traffic congestion, pollution, and noise (McCalla, Slack, & Comtois, 2001; Hesse, 2006). The dispersed benefits include the income, employment, and revenue derived from warehouses, distribution centers, and wholesale and retail trade that can be located far into the hinterland where the goods and cargo are transported. Again, this poses challenges for those championing the port economy as a local engine of economic growth and prosperity.

Overall, in contrast to the standard growth machine dynamic, it is important to note that the limited and fragmented opposition to the river dredging/deepening had less to do with the intended conversion of a “use value” into an “exchange value”, or the environmental impact of dredging, than the possibility that the financial and environmental costs of the megaproject would not be sufficiently compensated by the promised local benefits; or, to put it in business parlance, that there would be an unacceptable ‘return on investment’. While the river is a public resource that people use for recreational purposes and enjoy for its aesthetic beauty, it’s second (third, fourth, and fifth) nature as a long-standing conduit for commerce makes the proposed dredging/deepening a far less dramatic or threatening development. Instead, the fact that it is public rather than private investment, with a large share coming from an already strained city budget, placed the growth strategy under greater scrutiny.

The centrality of the speculative megaproject, or “large-scale urban development project”, in the Jacksonville economic development narrative supports the more recent theorizing that incorporates the growing dominance of neo-liberal political economic policy and governance (Swyngedouw, et al. 2002; Brenner & Theodore, 2002) that emphasizes public-private partnerships, insertion of the urban economy into global flows of capital and goods, and public investment in megaprojects as a means to reconfigure local land use patterns and attract capital investment.

Infrastructure Boosterism Campaigns and Economic Impact Studies

Promoting an engine for urban and regional growth that also requires massive public investment in infrastructure, extended federal approval and appropriations, and questionable return on investment – as does the port economy – poses challenges for those attempting to galvanize widespread public support. For JAXPORT, the mega-project requirement of deepening the St Johns River channel and obtaining Army Corps approval of the project became the driving objective of the port economy growth coalition.

Throughout the period when the Army Corps was planning, conducting, and completing its study, there were several port boosterism campaigns to garner support locally, and in Washington DC, for the JAXPORT expansion efforts. These campaigns were less about the glorification of an economy based on port logistics than about galvanizing political support for an investment in the dredging/deepening megaproject. The first, in 2010, designed to get the infrastructure projects moving more quickly, was launched by a coalition that included JAXPORT, the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce, and a small number local businesses. They organized a lobbying campaign to pressure the Army Corps and congressional representatives to fund and shorten the timeline for project approval and completion. This campaign developed the slogan “Bring The Noise”. While possibly inspired by the hit song of the same name by Public Enemy, it ironically suggests an open invitation to deliver to Jacksonville what other port communities have learned to regret about a regional economy that depends on shipping and logistics – audio, air, and water pollution complemented with truck-clogged highways (see Matsuoka, Hricko, Gottlieb, & De Lara 2011). However, the stated mission of this campaign, that claimed to have mobilized the community to write 14,000 letters to public officials in support of the port and the funding of the infrastructural projects, is “to mobilize North Florida’s competitive spirit to drive port progress, a stronger economy, and a better quality of life because everyone has a stake in the port’s growth and together we are more than the sum of our parts”. The “title sponsor” of the campaign was England-Thims & Miller Inc. a Jacksonville-based firm specializing in the management of large-scale infrastructure projects. Other sponsors include CSX, a rail and intermodal transportation company; the Northeast Florida Association of Realtors; RS&H, a facilities and infrastructure consulting firm; Degrove Surveyors, Inc., a land and hydrographic surveying consultant; HDR, an architecture, engineering, consulting, construction and related services company; and Taylor Engineering, a coastal engineering firm. In short, this community mobilization effort was led by firms that stood to gain directly from the taxpayer supported dredging/deepening mega-project. Alschuler and Luberoff (2003, pp. 220-223) confirm the point:" Mega-project support coalitions were, with rare exceptions, spearheaded by business enterprises with very direct interests at stake. Nearly all projects conferred disproportionate benefits on specific enterprises and locations, however, and the support coalitions for these tended to be led by companies that stood to be prime beneficiaries.”

The local business press has also served as a major booster of the port economy. In 2009 the editorial board of the Jacksonville Business Journal (JBJ) threw down the gauntlet for Jacksonville’s economic development future. In “Game on for Jacksonville”, the journal argued that Jacksonville had received its “economic development marching orders” and they include, first and foremost, unwavering support for the “half-billion dollar” dredging project to deepen the St. Johns River so that the largest container ships will have access to the two new container terminals. The JBJ also noted that there would need to be significant investment in road and rail infrastructure to move the cargo. Without these two projects, Jacksonville can “watch the ports of Savannah, Charleston, and Norfolk eat our lunch”. The call-to-arms editorial finished with a flourish: “If the Northeast Florida business communities need a rallying point, this is it. All businesses will benefit if Jacksonville becomes a major international East Coast port. Need a slogan? Try this: A deeper St. Johns floats all boats.” It is hard to imagine a bolder claim for the universal benefit of a speculative megaproject.

This salvo, designed to rouse the local business community, represents a familiar strategy in urban economic development. The JBJ returned to the port issue in a January 2010 editorial re-emphasizing the urgency of the situation: “But here’s the problem: If Jacksonville is not ready to receive the large ships from Asia in late 2014 when they start coming through the Panama Canal, it’s almost certain that other East Coast ports — Savannah, Charleston, Norfolk — will receive them with open arms. That’s not good. Jacksonville doesn’t want to have to play catch-up and try to lure those larger ships here after they have established connections at other ports”. (Jacksonville Business Journal, 2010, Jan 29, p.25).

As the Army Corps study and report was nearing completion, and some scattered local opposition to the economic and environmental cost was beginning to form, a second campaign was launched. This one, using the slogan “Deep Water Now”, had a far larger number of sponsors and higher visibility through various media outlets. The lead sponsors are the City of Jacksonville, Jax Chamber of Commerce, and the Civic Council, a non-governmental organization of local and industry elites and opinion leaders. The lead banner of the Deep Water Now website states: “The Port of Jacksonville is a vital component of our region’s economy. Jacksonville’s business and community leaders stand united for a deep water port now.” The webpage includes a list of sixty-six supporters covering the full range of businesses and industries in Jacksonville from the Mayo Clinic to Winn-Dixie supermarkets to the Bank of America.

The Army Corps completed its report in May 2013 and recommended deepening from 40 to 45 feet based on the analysis of net national economic development benefits. The local sponsor, JAXPORT, requested deepening to 47 feet, which is what is referred to as the “locally preferred plan”. The Army Corps adopted the latter plan and the total cost was estimated at $733 million, with the non-Federal local share of this total at $383 million. The big question that hangs over this project is whether the total public taxpayer cost, and particularly the sizable local share, along with the inevitable impact on the health of the St. Johns River, will yield a satisfactory return in economic benefits to the city and region.

For this reason, estimating the costs and benefits of such a project is itself a strategic and political process. Projects that are too costly may fail to generate the necessary public support or may fail to be approved by those charged with decision-making authority. This can give rise to serious distortions in how costs and benefits are calculated and communicated which should not be terribly surprising given that the stakes are high, powerful economic interests are involved, and large sums of money rest in the balance. Under these conditions, an entirely accurate, balanced, and fair assessment of costs and benefits is unlikely to be revealed by the project proponents who are interested, first and foremost, in gaining approval and public support for the project. In the research on public works projects, there is considerable evidence that costs are routinely and systematically underestimated. According to Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2002) statistical analysis of 258 transportation infrastructure projects, cost estimates are not only highly and systematically misleading but the underestimation is best explained by “intentional strategic misrepresentation” (or, as they also put it, “lying”). In fact, Flyvbjerg (2005, p. 18) has developed the following equation that has been used to achieve megaproject approval:

(underestimate costs) + (overestimate revenues) + (undervalued environmental impacts) + (overvalued economic development effects) = PROJECT APPROVAL

As this model suggests, in addition to the underestimation of costs is the overestimation of benefits. This is a common aspect of the growth machine strategy particularly when the desired growth depends on public approval and/or taxpayer dollars.

As it pertains specifically to maritime ports, the same concern exists regarding the accuracy of impact studies. Those who have studied the changing relationship between the port and the city, as a result of containerization and intermodal transport, conclude that “it is easy to exaggerate the existing and potential role of ports in regional economic development” (Gripaios & Gripaios, 1995;see also Grobar, 2008) Others address more directly the methodology in concluding that “although methodologies to determine economic impacts of port activity have been under continuous development and most studies adopt a scientific approach, figures are often exaggerated” (Dooms et al., 2010, p.3). Hall (2004, p. 363-64) provides an even more sweeping statement, “Port impact studies offer very little useful analysis of . . . short-run substitution behavior. . . . Port impact studies also offer very little useful analysis of . . . long-run effects because they assume fixed production techniques, industrial structures, and associated logistics arrangements.”

The most widely claimed benefit, not surprisingly, is jobs. In a period of economic crisis and high unemployment, the promise of job-generating development projects can prove enormously attractive. When proponents claim that an urban development strategy or speculative megaproject will create jobs for the local economy, this often trumps any other considerations or objections related to excessive public costs or environmental consequences. No one wants to be labeled a “job-killer”.

In assessing the jobs claim, and weighing costs and benefits, it is important to consider both the quantity and the quality of employment opportunities. While the Jacksonville community is told, at every opportunity, that “JAXPORT Equals Jobs” there has been very little detailed information about the source of the figures or how they have been calculated. Through its website, and included in their promotional materials, JAXPORT consistently claimed that Jacksonville’s port “generates 65,000 jobs” and “these positions provide an average salary of $43,980, well above the Jacksonville average of $27,215”. This was designed to convince the public that JAXPORT, and its need for a deeper channel, was worth supporting.

These figures are routinely echoed by all advocates of the JAXPORT enterprise – from the executive director of the port to the Jacksonville mayor -- though most are unaware of their origin let alone their accuracy. They are derived from an economic impact study conducted by Martin Associates (2009), the leading consulting firm for the port industry. They were published in a report, placed on the JAXPORT website, quoted by the press, and then passed on as empirically-based facts, and repeated as the pro-port mantra. However, a careful analysis of consultant’s report makes clear that the job figure is inflated by at least half and the average income based on limited data for far fewer than 65,000 workers thus also producing an inflated figure.

For the purposes here, details on the methodological shortcomings and the more accurate figures are less important than the larger tendency by growth coalitions to make grossly exaggerated claims regarding the economic benefits of urban development projects (see Jaffee, 2009 for a critique and re-analysis). This familiar pattern has been reported for other development projects such as convention centers (Sanders, 2002), sports franchises and facilities (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997), and public transportation (Kain, 1990; Pickrell, 1992). What may be more unusual for the port economy strategy is the use of a single consulting firm – Martin Associates -- for almost all US port economic impact studies, and the role this firm has played in selling the port-based growth engine dream, not just to Jacksonville but many other competing port cities.

But despite these efforts, the future viability of the deep-water port logistics growth strategy remains in question. While the dredging/deepening project has been approved at all levels by the Army Corps and has received Congressional authorization, the project has not yet been officially funded by either the Federal government, nor have local or state officials agreed to fund the local share that will total close to $400 million. The City of Jacksonville has formed a Mayor’s Port Task Force (with members handpicked by the Mayor) to study the project and, if viewed favorably, devise a way to support the local financial cost. These meetings, open to the public, represent the only forms of deliberation that might include greater levels of citizen participation and input on this decision. This pattern conforms closely to the neo-liberal model of urban governance as described by Swyngedouw, et al. (2002, p. 566): “There are rarely formalized mechanisms of representation, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify who represents what, who, and how. Finally—and most importantly—participation is rarely statutory, but operates through co-optation and invitation, usually by the key power brokers within the institutions… This process has become the dominant mode of institutional organization and suggests a shift from a system of representative urban government to one of stakeholder urban governance that is centered on newly established institutional arrangements....Public-private partnerships epitomize the ideal of such cooperative and coordinated mode of “pluralistic” governance.”

In addition to the question of whether funds will be appropriated and made available, there is growing awareness that Jacksonville may not be competitive as a major East coast port with or without the river deepening. This is due to the fact that there are other East coast ports (most notably Miami, Savannah, Charleston, Norfolk, and NY/NJ) vying for the same position and the same cargo. Each of these ports is already receiving more cargo than Jacksonville, two (Norfolk and NY/NJ) already have channels of 50 feet, and the port in closest proximity (Savannah, less than 150 miles away) is far ahead of Jacksonville in progress toward channel deepening to 47 feet. There is currently intense competition among East Coast ports for the anticipated increase in cargo associated with the Panama Canal expansion and/or the additional cargo if they are able to accommodate the largest container vessels.

Observers of the maritime port industry are beginning to highlight the obvious and apparent dysfunctional situation of multiple East Coast ports competing and expanding for limited and continuing depressed levels of container cargo. The Journal of Commerce (Tirschwell, 2012) noted the “serious overhang of unused terminal capacity” and the fact that major East Coast ports such as Savannah, Charleston, and New York/New Jersey are all currently operating at less than 60% container capacity. In spite of this, East Coast ports are still projecting $15 billion in infrastructural upgrading over the next ten years and urban/regional elites and business interests are promoting the port economy as the basis for economic development and job creation.

Even the Army Corps, usually a tireless partisan for infrastructure projects and spending, was forced to admit, in the face of a congressional request, that perhaps not every East coast port had to dredge to 50 feet or be able to receive the largest container vessels. In a widely underappreciated and neglected report (2012), the Army Corp makes a distinction between “post-Panamax ready” and “cascade ready” ports. Post-Panamax ready ports would have a depth of 50 feet and accommodate the largest vessels. . Cascade-ready ports would include lower-tier ports and accommodate the re-deployed smaller vessels. As stated in the report summary: “A system vision should extend beyond the major ports to include lower tier ports. A navigation system vision should address the cascade effect and its impact on infrastructure for shallower ports. Analysis of individual ports will determine whether the port will need to accommodate post-Panamax vessels or the cascade effect” (p. xv). Based on the roster of East coast ports listed in Table One, one might imagine that with Miami slated for, and Norfolk and NY/NJ already at, 50 feet, the post-Panamax ready ports could be identified. But the Army Corp was clearly unwilling to identify which ports would play what role in the port hierarchy and, more significantly, the report seems to have had no bearing on the recommendation to dredge/deepen 13 miles of the St. Johns River.

The uncertainty that is a defining feature of the speculative megaproject will persist for the indefinite future. JAXPORT and city officials will now have to lobby Washington to get the cost of the project included in the Federal budget, a method will have to be devised to pay for the local share, and boosters will need to continue to mobilize public support. There is no timetable on when funding decisions will be made. If funding is secured, the project itself will take at least three years to complete. At that time, the global port logistics landscape could have shifted dramatically making the project redundant, unnecessary, or irrelevant. What we are left with is a potential urban development strategy postponed.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to develop an analysis of an evolving urban growth strategy based on the port logistics economy. The focus is on the rise of an economic sector – shipping, goods-moving, and logistics – that has received insufficient attention from urban and economic sociologists. The urban case – Jacksonville Florida and JAXPORT – provides considerable support for the efficacy of the growth machine model of urban elite coalitions supporting economic development initiatives and the associated tactics of boosterism to gain broader community support and counter potential opposition.

First, consistent with original growth machine formulations, the coalition of business interests plays an important role in the promotion of the port. For this particular economic sector, warehousing and distribution centers serve as major claimants on urban land use. The critical role of infrastructural development, as necessary conditions for the realization of the port economy, stimulates the active involvement of coastal engineering firms in the promotional effort as seen most clearly in the “Bring The Noise” campaign. As the process moved forward under the Army Corps study and recommendation, support for the project widened further to include almost all segments of the local and regional business community as exemplified by the endorsement of the “Deep Water Now” campaign.

Second, the boosterism that designates urban and regional places as possessing special physical and geographically unique qualities has been a major part of the JAXPORT campaign, as well as the self-proclaimed branding of the region as “America’s Logistics Center”. The business press – represented most prominently by the Jacksonville Business Journal – has also consistently called for a more aggressive lobbying effort in ensuring that the port’s full potential comes to fruition and that the necessary infrastructural projects get sufficient Federal funding and top priority among dredging projects.

Deviations from growth machine patterns can be attributed to the particular sector chosen as the urban development engine -- the port logistics economy and its connection to global commodity flows as well as dependence on large-scale speculative megaprojects as necessary but insufficient conditions for success. These aspects of the development strategy and challenges conform to recent theorizing that has incorporated globalization and neo-liberal models in urban political economy and have highlighted the growing significance of particular forms of large scale public investment. One approach to analyzing the impact of globalization across nations is the commodity or global value chain model (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994; Henderson, et al., 2002; Coe, et al., 2004) that examines how nations, regions, and their economic organizations insert themselves in the production and distribution chain as a strategy for economic development (Jacobs, et al., 2010). As one segment of the global value chain, logistics activities provide an opportunity for cities and regions to leverage location and infrastructure to create “logistics clusters” (Scheffi, 2011). The Jacksonville case exemplifies this strategy. The basis for this participation hinges on large-scale urban and state-financed development projects driven by private–public partnerships that can situate cities within global capital flows (Swyngedouw, et al., 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002).

One unique and associated aspect of the Jacksonville case, though increasingly common for other port cities and regions, is found in the “natural” impediments to the port economy growth strategy represented by a channel that is too shallow for the desired container ships, and coastal tidal currents that prevent around the clock access to the container terminals. Altering and modifying the “natural” environment and creating a “second nature” for the purposes of commercial interests poses a significant challenge to the growth campaign. It is the effort and cost to alter the natural landscape that serves as the most significant countervailing factor in the realization of the port economy growth engine.

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Table One. TEU Throughput for East Coast Ports

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