Implied Preemption in State and Local Law



77001371600540005431155Implied Preemption in State and Local Law J. Dylan Mooers7900035000Implied Preemption in State and Local Law J. Dylan Mooersright23002311402019760098002019Contents TOC \o "1-3" \h \z \u Background and Research Questions PAGEREF _Toc9280348 \h 2Methodology PAGEREF _Toc9280349 \h 4Summary PAGEREF _Toc9280350 \h 4Literature Review PAGEREF _Toc9280351 \h 5Assumptions and Constraints PAGEREF _Toc9280352 \h 6Analysis & Findings PAGEREF _Toc9280353 \h 7Background PAGEREF _Toc9280354 \h 7Constitutional Background PAGEREF _Toc9280355 \h 8Dillon’s Rule PAGEREF _Toc9280356 \h 10Home Rule PAGEREF _Toc9280357 \h 11Categories of Preemption PAGEREF _Toc9280358 \h 13Express Preemption PAGEREF _Toc9280359 \h 13Implied Preemption PAGEREF _Toc9280360 \h 16Role of Interest Groups PAGEREF _Toc9280361 \h 21Scope of Intrastate Implied Preemption PAGEREF _Toc9280362 \h 23Affected Policy Areas PAGEREF _Toc9280363 \h 24State Limitations on Implied Preemption PAGEREF _Toc9280364 \h 26Constitutional Limitations PAGEREF _Toc9280365 \h 26Judicial Limitations PAGEREF _Toc9280366 \h 38Statutory Langue PAGEREF _Toc9280367 \h 39Conclusion and Recommendations PAGEREF _Toc9280368 \h 41References PAGEREF _Toc9280369 \h 42Background and Research QuestionsIn recent years, the Maryland appellate courts have invoked the doctrine of implied preemption several times to strike down local laws. Such findings are often controversial and have broad implications for the relationship between the state and its local governments. Two recent Maryland cases attracting attention deal with local authorities to regulate zoning for commercial solar farms, and whether or not counties have the authority to regulate pesticide application within their boundaries. The Maryland Court of Appeals is set to hear arguments in the solar zoning case in May, 2019, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals overturned the lower courts on May 2nd, 2019 to find no local preemption in the pesticides case. At present, it is unclear whether the case will be further appealed. On behalf of the Maryland Association of Counties (MACo), I have conducted research into the doctrine of implied preemption as it has been applied in other states, and made recommendations for how local governments and advocacy organizations can curtail the practice through legislative efforts. As the organization representing the interests of the County governments in Maryland, MACo has an interest in better understanding implied preemption, so that it may more effectively advocate for the needs of local governments before the state. Federalism is a cornerstone of the American governance system. Shared authority between the federal and state governments, and between state and local governments, allows voters and policymakers to strike a balance between the efficiencies of centralized, coordinated policy and continuity, and the innovation, flexibility and democratic values of local control over matters of local concern. Shared authority, however, creates conflicts between levels of government over who may regulate a particular policy area, to what extent, and with what tools. For a number of reasons, when legislators at a higher level of government deem it necessary, they take actions to preempt policymakers at lower levels and hold certain authorities for themselves. In other cases, the courts may decide that authority rests with a particular level of government, whether or not the government explicitly asserts preemption in statute. There are two broad categories of preemption: express preemption, where a government says explicitly the areas in which it preempts the lower levels of government from operating, and implied preemption, where a court finds that although not explicitly stated, the actions of a higher government preempt those of lower levels of government. Preemption occurs at the federal-state level, the state-local level, the federal-local level, and in some cases at the local-local level. Implied preemption at the state and local level will be the focus of this paper.To better understand implied preemption and how it might be curtailed, I pursued the following research questions: What is the scope of intrastate implied preemption in the courts? How many courts are using it, how frequently, and in what policy areas? What states have limitations on implied preemption of local laws, what form do these take, and how did they come about?What options are available to organizations seeking to curb implied preemption in state courts?MethodologySummaryFirst, I conducted a literature review to familiarize myself with the underlying concepts of preemption. Starting with the U.S. constitution and federal-state preemption, I gathered sources on the history of preemption and the traditional powers of states and local governments. This provided the context necessary to identify other sources and interest groups with publications on the subject of preemption. The sources discovered in my initial search helped me answer research question 1, and gain a better sense for the breadth of implied preemption findings across the nation. It was also instructive for question 2, although there is no reliable, complete data on how often implied preemption is invoked, and attempting to create one fell outside the scope of this project. However, in an effort to locate as comprehensive as possible in answering questions 1 and 2, I was able to identify case-study states for further inquiry. Through these case studies, I was able to identify strategies used in other states to curtail implied preemption. After gathering information from a wide range of primary and secondary sources, I was able to produce my findings section, and make recommendations for MACo’s consideration. Literature ReviewThe bulk of my research was in the form of a literature review. I began my literature review by conducting searches using the University of Maryland Library, Google Scholar, the Congressional Research Service, Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloomberg Government in order to gain an understanding of general concepts surrounding preemption. I used search terms including “preemption”, “intrastate preemption”, “state and local preemption”. Through this search, I discovered a great deal of academic literature on preemption generally, although the vast majority is concerned either with federal preemption, express preemption or did not distinguish between express and implied preemption, but was instead focused on policy outcomes regardless of the mechanism behind the preempted area. This initial search uncovered think tanks, stakeholder organizations and advocacy groups engaged in the preemption debate. One particularly strong source was the National League of Cities, which releases an annual report on the state of preemption nationwide. Through this report, I was able to determine the breadth of application of implied preemption by eliminating legislative preemption and focusing on judicial rulings. In addition, publications from organizations of state governments were immensely helpful in understanding the arguments in favor or preemption. Such organizations included the National Council of State Legislatures, and the American Legislative Exchange Council. To gain an understanding of the local side of the debate, and to gather case studies and form recommendations, I was aided by publications from primarily progressive-leaning organizations including A Better Balance, an advocacy organization which seeks to encourage and influence progressive policymaking at the local level, the Urban Law Center at Fordham University, and several organizations focused on ending preemption of local public health law.These publications provided a strong base of case references and sample statutory language, which allowed me to sort through cases to find rulings relevant to my discussion of implied preemption. I excluded cases concerned solely with defining the boundaries of express preemptive language, and focused instead on cases where courts found field, conflict or similar types of preemption. In addition, I searched for news articles and related media surrounding the high profile cases I was able to identify, which provided important context and described who the parties and interest groups were in certain cases.After collecting a broad array of cases, statutory and constitutional language, advocacy publications and scholarly articles, I was organized types of preemption, state limitations and potential solutions by theme in order to complete my findings and analysis section.Assumptions and ConstraintsIt is beyond the scope of this paper to locate every example of implied preemption in every state appeals court. Instead, I am limited to cases which have been identified by the media, interest groups, referenced in amicus briefs and case studies, or cited by other scholars. As a result, it is possible I have missed important cases for the purpose of this paper, and it is quite possible I have missed recent developments in cases and legislation referenced in this paper. In addition, organizations that seek to track preemption policies do not always discriminate between the types of preemption, whether express or implied, or between subcategories of implied preemption. Such organizations appear more focused on the policy outcomes and fields of law preempted, rather than the mechanism by which preemption occurred. Due to these constraints, my answers to research questions on the breadth and frequency of application of implied preemption will need to be in relatively general terms. Analysis & FindingsBackgroundPreemption occurs when a higher authority, through either legislation or judicial ruling, makes policy blocking a subordinate government’s authority over a particular policy area, usually supplanting decentralized policies with its own across multiple jurisdictions. Preemption can take several forms, and the details of what a particular government may preempt, and through what means, are rooted in constitutions, statutes and precedent. The contours of preemption law continually shift as federal, state and local governments grapple over deeply political jurisdictional issues. Preemption is of particular concern for states and localities with opposite policy positions to those held by higher levels of government, and state policymakers may view preemption as both a means of strengthening their own authority with respect to localities, and as a means for reigning in governments on the opposite political spectrum over jurisdictions in social policy, environmental policy, and other politically divisive issues. Regardless of political disposition, however, a state government will generally favor more preemption of local laws, and a local government will generally favor less preemption, for the simple reason that government officials, regardless of their title or location within the system, will tend to prefer more authority within their borders than less. Preemption falls under two broad categories: express preemption, when a legislature explicitly bars local regulations through statute, and implied preemption, when, although the statute may not explicitly say that local laws are preempted, courts nonetheless find that through legislating forcefully enough in an area, creating conflicts, or delegating authority to a regulatory agency, the legislature intended to preempt local laws without saying so.Constitutional BackgroundThe U.S. Constitution delegates power to the federal government and to the states, but it silent on the powers of local government. Instead, the Tenth Amendment reserves all powers not given to the federal government to state governments. These powers include establishing or dissolving local governments. This power – the ability to establish or dissolve a local government – is a key structural difference between the federal-state relationship and the state-local relationship. The U.S. Supreme Court codified this in the 1907 case, Hunter v. Pittsburgh, holding that there was no federal constitutional right to any form of local government. The court stated that cities are mere “political subdivisions” of local government, that the state could abolish at will. Though it is wildly unlikely, the New York state government in Albany could dissolve New York City, redraw its boundaries, rename its boroughs and establish entirely new systems of government without any federal remedy for the city. Some advocates for local government, including the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, have argued in courts and passed ordinances asserting a natural right to self-government as the basis for local authority, rather than a constitutional provision. This was briefly accepted by the courts as the Cooley Doctrine, following an 1871 case holding that local self-governance was an absolute right. Since then, such arguments have been largely dismissed and do not figure seriously into the preemption debate. Because local governments lack the constitutional foundation on which the federal and state governments operate, local governments often have to advocate for their authorities in state legislatures and defend them in the courts. Two overarching legal frameworks governing local authorities have emerged as part of this debate - Dillon’s Rule, a highly restrictive framework, and Home Rule, a blanket term for more expansive grants of authorities to local governments. These two frameworks, and how individual states have applied them, inform preemption legislation and litigation at the state and local level. Today, most states employ a hybrid of Dillon’s Rule and Home Rule to govern local authorities.Dillon’s RuleBecause the state holds the power to establish and dissolve local governments, most courts have found that local governments are “creatures of the state”, and as result have no inherent powers outside those granted by the state. Some have gone as far as to hold that local governments are functionally administrative arms of the state government. This is the foundation of Dillon’s Rule, the dominant legal theory on municipal government established by John Forest Dillon in his 1872 Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations. A court applying a Dillon’s Rule test finds that a local government only has the authority to act when: (1) the power is granted in the express words of the statute, private act, or charter creating the municipal corporation; or(2) the power is necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to the powers expressly granted; or(3) the power is one that is neither expressly granted nor fairly implied from the express grants of power but is otherwise implied as essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.Dillon’s Rule was widely adopted by state courts in the late 19th century, and the result was a prohibitively narrow scope for local governments to operate. Under expansive Dillon’s Rule regimes, most challenges to local laws were not based on preemption, but rather that local governments had acted ultra vires, beyond their limited lawmaking powers. The state did not necessarily have to preempt specific local action if localities, by default, lacked the authority to begin with. The highly restrictive nature of Dillon’s Rule lead to state and local governments negotiating broader grants of local authority from the late 19th century through the mid-20th century. However, Judge Dillon’s assertion that localities owe their authorities to the state has endured – even today’s most permissive home rule regimes ultimately had to be granted by state lawmakers and could be revoked by the same means they were granted. Today, 39 states apply Dillon’s Rule to determine the bounds of least some forms of local government authority, and 68% of counties in the U.S. are Dillon’s Rule jurisdictions.Home RuleAs the challenges of local governance became increasingly complex in the 20th century, state legislatures found themselves incapable of effectively addressing the unique challenges faced by the cities and towns within their boundaries. Rules barring states from adopting special laws for different jurisdictions further complicated matters, as states found that policy solutions that fit one city or town did not work for the rest, and strict Dillon’s Rule interpretations prevented local governments from solving their own problems. Over time, the task of governing disparate locales with narrow authority became too much for state legislatures to handle. In response to difficulties in governing and a rise of home rule movements, states began to devolve authorities over issues of local concern to local governments in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, beginning with a landmark 1914 California home rule amendments. Early grants of home rule, while significantly broadening the scope of local policymaking authority, still left the state courts as the final arbiters of what was considered “local” concern. State courts tended to interpret what was considered “local” quite narrowly, seriously limiting the scope of home rule policymaking. The 1950’s and 1960’s brought a second wave of home rule reforms, led by organizations of local governments including the American Municipal Association and the National Municipal League. Both organizations developed model home rule amendments and advocated for a reversal of the old Dillon’s Rule assumption against local authority. Instead, these organizations advocated in favor of constructs under which it was presumed that localities had powers the unless the legislature had explicitly reserved power over a policy area for the state. This second movement resulted in significant expansions of home rule, including a wave of state constitutional amendments and legislation which clarified the authorities of local governments. Well-crafted home rule amendments (from the perspective of local governments) will limit the court’s ability to find preemption by implication, and force state legislatures to expressly limit local authorities if they wish to reserve power for themselves. Today, 37 states grant Home Rule either through charter – which functions essentially as a locally developed constitution, or through “optional” home rule, in which the state allows local governments to select which type of structure to use from a predetermined list, which New Jersey has adopted. Though both forms serve to increase the autonomy of local governments, charter home rule gives local governments greater flexibility to determine the fiscal, functional and structural aspects of its government system. In some states, a home rule jurisdiction asserting authorities in its charter can influence the court’s findings in preemption cases. Categories of PreemptionPreemption takes many forms. In general, state-local preemption follows the model established in the federal courts, though many have adopted nuanced tests and interpretations of these concepts. The following categories and subcategories broadly capture intrastate preemption, and further case studies will discuss noteworthy differences among the states. Express PreemptionExpress Preemption is the simplest form of preemption. It occurs when a state government passes a law that explicitly reserves power for the state in a particular policy area. Express preemption is often highly political, and interest groups are involved in promoting model preemption language throughout the states. For interest groups, express preemption offers a clear path to particular policy outcomes, and preemption bills are often pursued concurrently with litigation asserting implied preemption. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), an organization of conservative state legislators, is at the forefront of many efforts to pass preemption legislation, in policy areas including agriculture, pesticides, minimum wage, rent control, labor agreements, drones, and some food sales. Model preemption language, like the excerpt below from ALEC’s model pesticide preemption act, encourages the spread preemption over particular policy areas across many states. ALEC has been pushing this particular piece of model legislation since 1995: Section 1. {Short Title.} This Act shall be known and may be cited as the State Pesticide Preemption Act.Section 2. {Legislative findings and declarations.} The legislature finds and declares that:(A) The citizens of this state benefit from a system of safe, effective and scientifically sound pesticide regulation.(B) A system of pesticide regulation which is consistent, coordinated, and comports with both Federal and state technical expertise, is essential to the public health, safety and welfare, and that local regulation of pesticides does not materially assist in achieving these benefits.Section 3. {Definition.} The following words and phrases when used in this act shall have the meaning given to them in this section unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.(A) “Pesticide.” The term “pesticide” means (1) any substance or mixture of substance intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, except that the term “pesticide ” shall not include any article that is a “new animal drug” within the meaning of section 321(w) of Title 21 of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), that has been determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services not to be a new animal drug by a regulation establishing conditions of use for the article, or that an animal feed within the meaning of section 321(x) of Title 21 (FIFRA) bearing or containing a new animal drug.Section 4. {State Preemption.} No city, town, county, or other political subdivision of this state shall adopt or continue in effect any ordinance, rule, regulation or statute regarding pesticide sale or use, including without limitation: registration, notification of use, advertising and marketing, distribution, applicator training and certification, storage, transportation, disposal, disclosure of confidential information, or product composition.Section 4. {Severability clause.}Section 5. {Repealer clause.}Section 6. {Effective date.}Implied Preemption Implied Preemption is significantly more complicated than express preemption. it occurs when courts decided that the state intended to preempt local governments in a policy area, even though the legislature did not explicitly say so. Implied preemption is controversial because it removes preemption from the democratic process, because it impacts laws that may have been on the books and uncontroversial for years, and because it is significantly harder to predict or prevent and is less well understood than express preemption. Moreover, though they generally follow the federal preemption model, state courts have adopted nuanced differences in their own implied preemption doctrines, so what works in one state may not work in another. Implied preemption covers two main subcategories: conflict preemption and field preemption.Conflict Preemption Conflict preemption occurs when courts find that state and local laws are incompatible, and that the state law supersedes the local law. Direct Conflict Preemption, also known as impossibility preemption, is relatively easy to identify. If the state and local laws overlap on an identical legal issue and mandate two different things, and compliance with both is impossible, the local law is in direct conflict with the state law and is therefore preempted. Importantly, it is not enough that state and local laws merely overlap on the same legal issue. They must be impossible to comply with simultaneously. For example, a state law setting the maximum speed limit at 65mph, and a local law setting a minimum speed limit of 66mph on the same stretch of road would result in direct conflict preemption, but a lower local speed limit would not.Federal courts have found Indirect Conflict Preemption, a less clear-cut standard, when a law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” The concept may also be referred to as “purposes and objectives” preemption. Courts have found that although both the federal and state law can be complied with, a law so frustrates Congress’ purpose in enacting its law. Indirect Conflict Preemption is analyzed under the umbrella of Field Preemption in many cases. One common, and controversial test applied in conflict preemption cases is whether an ordinance prohibits what a state law permits, or permits what a state law prohibits. Interpreted broadly, this test has been used to strike down local laws on numerous occasions. Prohibit/permit tests are of particular concern, because they allow courts to strike down more stringent local regulations than those imposed by the state, even if the legislature merely intended to set a regulatory floor. Plaintiffs in Kentucky, for example, successfully challenged a Louisville minimum wage law that set a higher wage floor than the state legislature. The court applied a prohibit/permit test and found conflict preemption, based on the fact that the Louisville law prohibited paying less than the local minimum wage, which the state law permitted. New York and Minnesota courts have acknowledged the potential for absurdity in applying this test, and have adopted a prohibit/permit test in which local laws are only preempted if a local law prohibits an act expressly permitted by the state. Field PreemptionField Preemption occurs when a court decides that the state acted forcefully enough in a policy area that it intended to “occupy the field”, leaving no room for additional local regulation. Field preemption is particularly controversial because finding field preemption usually requires courts to speak for the legislature (except for in some cases where lawmakers expressly stated their intent to occupy the field, but, likely due to their clarity, such cases are rarely argued in court). Courts have found various ways to determine a state has occupied a particular field, and the tests involved leave a great deal open to interpretation. In Allied Vending Co. v Bowie, for example, the Maryland courts detailed a seven-part test to determine whether the state had occupied a particular field: Whether local laws existed prior to the enactment of state laws of same subject matterWhether statutes provide for pervasive administrative?regulationsWhether the ordinance regulates an area in which local control has been allowedWhether the state expressly gives concurrent authority in a policy areaWhether the state agency which administers/enforces the law has a recognized legal authority to actWhether?the particular aspect of the field sought to be regulated has been addressed by the state legislatureWhether a 2-tiered regulatory process existing if local laws were not?preempted?would engender “chaos and confusion”In this case, courts found that the Maryland legislature occupied the entire field of tobacco vending machine policy, and therefore preempted Bowie’s ordinance banning them from their jurisdiction. In Washington County v. Perennial Solar, another Maryland case, courts have found that by delegating authority over the issue of solar siting to the Public Service Commission, the legislature occupied the field and local zoning laws are preempted. Courts have frequently found that delegation of a particular policy area to a regulatory agency can be construed as intent to occupy the field, and regulatory decisions can be found to preempt local ordinances in addition to legislation. To simplify the application of field preemption, Alaska’s courts have adopted a default rule that it will only find that the legislature has occupied the field if it explicitly says mon Language in Implied Preemption In addition to advocating for language which makes it explicitly clear that legislation is not intended to preempt local laws, it is equally important that organizations seeking to limit findings of implied preemption monitor statutory language for phrases and language found by the courts to indicate the legislature’s intent to preempt without explicitly saying so. Common examples of these are as follows:Consistent: “Any order or ordinance by any political subdivision shall be consistent with and not more restrictive than state law and regulations”Exceed: “A State or a political subdivision of a State may impose prohibitions or restrictions upon the movement in interstate commerce of . . . plants, biological control organisms, plant pests, noxious weeds, or plant products that are consistent with and do not exceed [federal] regulations or orders”.Exclusive: “The department has exclusive regulatory authority over all hazardous waste generation, transportation, storage, treatment and disposal and other management practices in the state.”Restrictive: “Local laws and ordinances that are inconsistent with, more restrictive than, or exceed the requirements of state law shall not be enacted…” Sole Authority: The Commission shall have sole authority to control and regulate all aspects of hunting, fishing, and boating in all water conservation districts…”Statewide Concern: “The general assembly further declares that the licensing and regulation of massage parlors are matters of statewide concern…”Stringent: “No political subdivision may enact an ordinance . . . unless the ordinance or resolution is the same as or similar to, and no more stringent than, a state statute.”Supersede: “The provisions of this act shall supersede any other statute, municipal ordinance and rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law concerning smoking in an indoor public place or workplace”Uniform: “For the purposes of equitable and uniform regulation and implementation, the Legislature through this chapter is the exclusive regulator of all matters relating to the distribution, marketing, promotion, and sale of tobacco products.”Role of Interest GroupsPreemption does not occur in a vacuum, and interest groups play a major role in shaping the boundaries of state and local control. Understandably, organizations of state and local governments are vocal advocates for protecting or expanding their respective authorities. As discussed previously, the American Legislative Exchange Council, which represents state lawmakers, advocates for more expansive preemption regimes. On the other side of the debate, the National League of Cities and the National Association of Counties advocate for more permissive home rule, opposing preemption in the courts and through legislative efforts. In addition to government entities, industry and interest groups play an active role in crafting preemption legislation, and interest groups are often litigants in cases invoking implied preemption. Interest group motivations, however, are usually less concerned with broader questions of federalism and more concerned with particular policy outcomes. Preemption, whether through lobbying on legislation or through litigating in the courts, is among the many tools interest groups employ to oppose local policies they do not like. For business interests, implications for local sovereignty are secondary to more immediate regulatory outcomes, economic interests and the ease of doing business. Further, by centralizing regulation of a particular policy area in the state, rather than localities, interest groups significantly narrow the playing field, and may be able to more easily exert influence over the regulatory process. It is much simpler to influence, track, and comply with policies created by 50 state governments than the approximately 90,000 sub-state government entities in the United States. Beyond the impact an individual ordinance can cause for a business, those operating statewide or nationwide often have a preference for uniform regulatory regimes, even if they are indifferent between two competing policies. For this reason, businesses may seek preemption of local laws statewide, rather than risk navigating a patchwork of regulations and jurisdictions. Beyond the direct costs associated with, for example, a plastic bag ban in San Francisco, there are additional costs imposed by non-uniformity, including more complicated supply chains and compliance costs. Other notable groups that often seek preemption are public sector unions and criminal defendants. Public unions tend to oppose local regulations when they believe they will weaken their set of benefits from the state. Public sector unions have argued for implied preemption, for example, when localities failed to honor pay raises they considered mandatory statewide, or when localities passed ordinances prohibiting nepotism in public hiring while the state was silent on the issue. Criminal defendants also frequently argue against local authority in states where cities have the ability to pass criminal ordinances. Contrary to business, unions and other interests which also seek to impact preemption policies through legislative efforts, criminal defendants do not intend to be repeat players, and are largely restricted to litigating their claims. Such cases often rely on claims of conflict preemption, or “prohibit-permit” preemption, in which the local law is preempted because it prohibits what state law permits. Others may argue that the state has fully occupied the field of criminal law, leaving no room for localities to legislate.Other outspoken opponents of preemption include A Better Balance, an organization which views preemption as an impediment to local progressive policies, the Urban Law Center at Fordham University, and the Public Health Law Center.Scope of Intrastate Implied PreemptionImplied preemption is applied broadly and asserted frequently in state governments. Every state except for Illinois recognizes some form of implied preemption, and although the law varies significantly by state, most state implied preemption doctrines emulate the model employed by the federal judiciary. Though it is far from an exhaustive list, I have identified twenty three policy areas in which state courts have found preemption by implication, and identified the tests applied in each case.Affected Policy AreasSummary of Preempted Policy AreasPolicy AreaState(s)Type(s) of PreemptionCases(s)FrackingColoradoImplied, conflict, mixed concernCity of Longmont V. Colorado (2016) PesticidesFourteen delegate all authority to state regulatory agenciesImplied, field Cigarette Vending MachinesMaryland, New Jersey, New YorkImplied, Field Allied Vending v. Bowie (1993), CIC Corp. v. East Brunswick Tp. (1993), Vatore, v. Commissioner of Consumer Affairs of the City of New York (1993)Minimum WageKentucky, MissouriImplied, prohibit/permit Kentucky Restaurant Association vs. Louisville (2016), Missouri Hotel & Motel Ass’n v. City of St. LouisAerosol Paint SalesCaliforniaImplied, Prohibit/permitSherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993)Hazardous Waste DisposalMinnesota, IdahoImplied, field, prohibit/permit N. States Power Co. v. City of Granite Falls (1991), Envirosafe Servs. of Idaho, Inc. v. Owyhee County (1987)Fire Protection Codes Georgia, North CarolinaImplied, prohibit/permit, fieldHill v. Tschannen (2003), Greene v. City of Winston-Salem (1975) Solid Waste DisposalAlabamaImplied, prohibit/permitAlabama Disposal Solutions-Landfill, L.L.C. v. Town of Lowndesboro (2002) Traffic Cameras Colorado Mixed concern conflictCity of Commerce City v. State (2002) Gasoline DispensationMissouriImplied, conflictPage Western, Inc. v. Cmty. Fire Prot. Dist (1982) Criminal Jaywalking OrdinancesOregonImpliedState v. Tyler (2000)Power Line SitingRhode Island, GeorgiaImplied, fieldTown of East Greenwich v. Narragansett Electric Co (1994), City of Buford v. Georgia Power Co (2003)Savings and Loan AssociationsWisconsinImplied, FieldAnchor Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Equal Opportunities Comm’n (1984)Cabaret Operating HoursNew YorkImplied, fieldLansdown Entm’t Corp. v. New York City Dep’t of Consumer Affairs (1989)Commercial Use of CoalRhode IslandImplied, FieldRhode Island Cogeneration Assocs. v. City of E. Providence (1990)Application of Sewage SludgeGeorgia, MarylandImplied, fieldFranklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp. (1998), Talbot County v. Skipper (1993)Condominium ConversionsNew JerseyImplied, FieldPlaza Joint Venture v. City of Atlantic City (1980)Public employee compensationColoradoImplied, field, mixed state/local concernDempsey v. City of Denver (1982)Criminal Sodomy LawsKentuckyImplied, FieldPierce v. Commonwealth (1989)Obscenity LawsMichiganImplied, FieldPeople v. Llewellyn (1978)Registered Sex OffendersColoradoImplied, Statewide ConcernCity of Northglenn v. Ibarra (2003)Electrical Contractor PermittingHawaiiImplied, FieldAnamizu v. City & County of Honolulu (1971)Vehicle ForfeitureCaliforniaImplied, FieldO’Connell v. Stockton (2007)Commercial Solar ZoningMarylandImplied, FieldBoard of County Commissioners of Washington County v. Perennial Solar, LLC (2018)State Limitations on Implied PreemptionSeveral states have instituted noteworthy limitations on implied preemption by their courts. These have been achieved through three means. The first, and strongest, are constitutional provisions which limit the courts’ ability to find implied preemption, usually in home rule or express powers sections. Second, some courts have adopted precedent that limits their findings of implied preemption. These actions by individual courts can be powerful in limiting implied preemption, but there is no clear path for policymakers to emulate in other states. The third type of limitation involves preemption protections in individual legislation in the form of “savings” clauses, making it explicitly clear that the state did not intend to preempt local law, where courts might otherwise find implied preemption. While powerful, such language can be difficult to include over the objections of interest groups, and can be repealed at any time. Select example of each type of limitation are as follows:Constitutional LimitationsIllinoisThe 1870 Illinois constitution contained no reference to home rule or the powers of local jurisdictions. As such, local governments were treated as solely creatures of the state and empowered to act only in areas where they had been granted permission by the explicit words of the state legislature. This dynamic would be reversed by the 1970 Illinois constitution, where home rule protections are enshrined in the state’s constitution as a major component of the reforms of the 1970 constitutional convention. Article VII, Section 6 of the new state constitution attempted to protect an ideal local government autonomy, and introduced “home rule” to the state. Previously bound by Dillon’s Rule, the Record of proceedings from the 1970 convention shows that the framers intended to reverse the presumption against local authority in favor of a new presumption in favor of local authority. Article VII, Section 6The Home Rule provisions of the Illinois state constitution include several provisions central to preemption jurisprudence: Section 6(a) confers a broad grant of authority to home rule jurisdictions, 6(g) and 6(h) prescribe areas which constrain home rule jurisdictions, including a provision requiring a three-fifths majority to preempt subjects where the state does not already have regulation or legislation and 6(i) requires the state to specifically limit home rule authorities in areas not spelled out in the constitution, and 6(m) is instructive to courts ruling on preemption cases and other home rule litigation. The “pertaining to” clause in 6(a) has been used by the courts to restrain home rule and find quasi-preemption in certain cases, through the argument that a particular issue or policy area does not pertain to the government and affairs of a municipality.SECTION 6. POWERS OF HOME RULE UNITS (a) A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the county and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are home rule units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units. Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt. (g) The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by the State other than a power or function specified in subsection (l) of this section. (h) The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a taxing power or a power or function specified in subsection (l) of this Section. (i) Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive. (m) Powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberallySection 6 supports a presumption of local authority unless the legislature explicitly acts to preempt or curtail local authorities in prescribed area. The constitutional convention intended to leave no room for implied preemption by state action. In the immediate aftermath of the convention, however, environmental litigation tested the new home rule construct in Illinois. The question of whether the Illinois Environmental Protection Act preempted local jurisdictions from legislating on environmental issues, and of whether the broad authorities under section 6(a) granted home rule authority over environmental matters. Subsequent cases depended on the interpretation of whether an activity fell under a municipality’s “government and affairs”, and findings to the contrary have been used to limit the scope of home rule in Illinois. It remains, however, the strongest prohibition on implied preemption in the country.Early Assertions of State authorities over Home RuleCity of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board The first important test of preemption under the new Illinois constitution came under City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board, in which the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and Pollution Control Board appealed a ruling which prevented them from enforcing the Environmental Protection Act of 1970 against the City of Chicago. Chicago based its arguments on Article VII, Section 6, arguing that since it was a home rule unit, and the disposal of waste was a local function within its home rule powers. Chicago further argued that the state had never explicitly preempted local control over environmental regulation pursuant to Article VII as part of the Environmental Protection Act. The state agencies claimed that the state has exclusive control over environmental protection pursuant to article XI of the state constitution, which states generally that it is the policy of the state to maintain a healthful environment, and establishes an individual right to a healthful environment. The state also argued that the state asserted control over environmental regulation under the Environmental Protection Act.The Illinois Supreme Court unanimously held that Chicago must comply with the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, holding that while the constitution grants concurrent jurisdiction, the state law supersedes local authorities in cases of conflict, and that cities could not legislate their way out of state environmental codes. This reversed a line of previous decisions, which held that provisions within statutes adopted prior to the 1970 constitution became invalid to the extent they created conflicts with home rule powers. The Environmental Protection Act became effective a full year prior to the constitution. If the courts had followed precedent, it would have held in favor of home rule. Carlson v. Village of WorthThe Court begun to reverse its finding that localities held concurrent jurisdiction on environmental issues in Carlson v. City of Worth, a non-home rule municipality. In its ruling, the court declared the conclusion that home rule municipalities held concurrent jurisdiction with the state over environmental matters to be dicta. The case dealt with local landfill regulations and permitting, in which the City of Worth issued its own set of permits for a local landfill operator. After a finding that the City of Worth could not set restrictions on top of the Environmental Protection Act, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency submitted a brief in support of a rehearing, arguing that since the Pollution Control Board had not adopted any standards related to sanitary landfills, localities should be granted concurrent jurisdiction. The court denied the request, finding that such authority belonged exclusively to the state, whether it was prepared for it or not.Hutchcraft Van Service, Inc. vs City of UrbanaIn Hutchcraft, the courts found that, despite the fact that there is no statute explicitly preempting human rights ordinances at the local level, the Illinois Human Rights Act nonetheless occupies the field, and Urbana’s employment discrimination laws were invalid. The court justified dispensing with Section 6 home rule provisions by finding that the subjects of freedom and discrimination do not fall under a municipality’s “government and affairs”, and are not issues of local concern. Village of Dolton ex rel. Winter v. CSX Transportation, Inc.In Dolton, the court found that municipalities do not have authority to regulate obstruction at railroad-highway grade crossings located within its boundaries, despite no express preemption by the legislature. In this case, CSX challenged an ordinance passed by the Village of Dolton which would Similar to Hutchcraft, the court found that obstructions at railroad crossings fell outside of the “government and affairs” of the municipality, and therefore was not a valid exercise of home rule. Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utility Company of IllinoisContrary to the previously discussed cases, Bolingbrook reflects a strong judicial assertion of home rule pursuant to the Illinois constitution. In this case, the Village of Bolingbrook fined Citizens Utility, a water and sewer provider, $100 for each discharge of raw sewage from its lines. Citizens Utility challenged the fines, arguing that the Illinois Public Utility Act preempted the village’s ordinances. The circuit and appellate courts agreed, finding that the Public Utility Act occupied the field, and the comprehensive state regulatory regime was evidence that the state had preempted home rule on the issue. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that Bolingbrook, as a home rule jurisdiction, had the authority to enact the ordinances in question, and that the existence of the Public Utilities Act and state regulatory regime were not sufficient to satisfy Section 6(i) requirements that the state explicitly preempt local ordinances. In the absence of explicit action by the state legislature, the court found that home rule jurisdictions hold concurrent jurisdiction over utilities.New MexicoNew Mexico established Home Rule by constitutional amendment in 1970. The amendment grants home rule to every municipality that adopted a charter following the adoption of the 1970 Home Rule amendment. Under the system, voters must approve a home rule charter, after which a city or incorporated county can exercise all legislative functions not expressly denied by general law or its own charter. Underscoring the intent of this amendment, the drafters included the following: “to provide for maximum local self-government. A liberal construction shall be given to the powers of municipalities.” Under the new constitution, if municipality adopts a Home Rule charter, it may, in general, exercise any power or perform any function not expressly denied by statute or its own charter. Since the advent of home rule in New Mexico, several cities have adopted home rule charters. For example, Los Alamos, Santa Fe and Albuquerque are home rule cities. Curiously, several of the precedent-setting cases in favor of localities involved non-home-rule jurisdictions, and the New Mexico appeals courts have essentially treated home-rule and non-home-rule jurisdictions similarly on the question of implied preemption of local authorities. The court has applied precedent from cases involving non-home-rule counties to those involving home-rule jurisdictions, and reached similar conclusions. Home Rule AmendmentSec. 6. [Municipal home rule.]D. A municipality which adopts a charter may exercise all legislative powers and perform all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter. This grant of powers shall not include the power to enact private or civil laws governing civil relationships except as incident to the exercise of an independent municipal power, nor shall it include the power to provide for a penalty greater than the penalty provided for a petty= misdemeanor. No tax imposed by the governing body of a charter municipality, except a tax authorized by general law, shall become effective until approved by a majority vote in the charter municipality.E. The purpose of this section is to provide for maximum local self-government. A liberal construction shall be given to the powers of municipalities. (As added November 3, 1970.)Attorney General Advisory Opinion:In a 1986 advisory letter to the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division, the New Mexico Attorney General took the position that the New Mexico Oil and Gas Act occupied the field of oil and gas regulation, preempting all local laws by implication, including land use ordinances. This opinion concerned an attempt by Santa Fe County to regulate oil and gas development through zoning ordinances. The Attorney General argued that: "The [OCD] shall have, and is hereby given jurisdiction and authority over all matters relating to the conservation of oil and gas ... .It shall have jurisdiction, authority and control of and over all persons, matters or things necessary or proper to enforce effectively the provisions of this act .... "The Attorney General further argues that Santa Fe County’s zoning ordinance was preempted because it conflicted with the NMGOA by setting higher standards than the state law. The attorney general’s opinion has not specifically been tested by the state courts but is instructive of the arguments presented by the state in favor of preemption.San Pedro Mining Corp V. Board of County Commissioners of Santa Fe CountyIn 1995, the San Pedro Mining Corporation challenged the Santa Fe County Land Use Development Code, because it required permitting for mine operations above and beyond those imposed by state law. The Supreme Court held that the state’s Mining Act did not imply preemption of local land use regulations, reasoning that there was no express preemption in the statute, and that other statutes, such as the New Mexico Pesticide Control Act, clearly articulated an express preemption of local land use laws related to pesticides. The court also found that the Mining Act did not successfully occupy the field of mining, because it did not govern all aspects of mining activity. As a result, the court was persuaded that the Mining Act left room for concurrent jurisdiction because it was silent on matters of local concern, such as traffic noise and effects on property values.Ultimately, the court invalidated Santa Fe County’s ordinance by finding that it conflicted with the Mining Act, but not before rejecting the Mining Corporation’s broader preemption arguments. The result is that because the Mining Act is silent or ambiguous on land use, local municipalities can likely regulate fracking and other extractive industries through land use ordinances, including where fracking may take place, what permits and insurance are necessary, and what noise levels are acceptable. Without regulating fracking as a practice, which is covered by the Mineral Act, home rule municipalities may still exercise substantial control over its implications within their boundaries. Rancho Lobo, Ltd v. DeVargasNew Mexico’s courts expanded upon the ruling in San Pedro in a 2003 case brought by Rancho Lobo, a large ranch which applied for and was granted a permit by the New Mexico State Forestry Division to harvest timber under the New Mexico Forest Conservation Act. Rio Arriba County informed Rancho Lobo that it must apply for a timber harvest permit under a county ordinance in order to clear-cut a section of forest. Rather than apply for the permit, Rancho Lobo challenged the ordinance as being preempted by state law. The ordinance prohibited clear-cutting without a zoning variance, whereas clear cutting was allowed under the Forest Conservation Act. The district court found the statute expressly preempted the county ordinance. The Circuit Court disagreed, finding not only no express preemption, but no field or implied preemption. ColoradoColorado courts have found that local supersedes conflicting state law in issues of local concern, and have adopted a unique “local, mixed, or statewide concern” test in determining whether a local law is preempted, or whether the locality holds concurrent jurisdiction with the state. This test originates from interpretations of the following provision of Colorado’s Home Rule article:“It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to the full exercise of such right.”OregonThe Oregon Supreme Court, due to the unique wording of the Oregon constitution’s home rule amendment, which reads, “The legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and amend their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon ...”, presumes that the state legislature intended to preempt cities in the criminal field of law, but applies the opposite presumption in the civil context.KansasKansas has a complicated constitutional provision that allows cities to exempt themselves from preemption by certain state statutes provided that they do so through a “charter ordinance,” which is more difficult to enact than a non-charter ordinance. The ordinance must be passed by a 2/3 vote of the governing body, including city council members and the mayor. Because the mayor is included in the original vote, the mayor has no veto power. The ordinance must be published once each week for two consecutive weeks in the official city newspaper, and there is a mandatory 60 day period after publication for public comment and referendum petitions. If no petition is filed during this period, the charter ordinance becomes effective on the 61st day after publication. The city clerk must then send the Kansas Secretary of State a copy of all charter ordinances passed by a City. If a valid protest petition is filed by 10% of the number of electors who voted in the last regular city election, then an election must be held and a majority of voters must approve the charter ordinance for it to become effective.Judicial LimitationsNew York & Minnesota New York and Minnesota courts employ a refined prohibit/permit test, which clarifies that state silence on a matter does not necessarily amount to “permission”. These states require that for an ordinance to be invalid, it must prohibit what the statute expressly or specifically permits. This essentially pulls prohibit/permit preemption back under the umbrella of the less controversial doctrine of express preemption. AlaskaAlaska’s courts have adopted a default rule that essentially turns field preemption into a subcategory of express preemption. In a 1974 case dealing with local sewer ordinances, the Alaska Supreme Court forcefully rejected an argument that the state had “occupied the field”, instead holding that “We reaffirm our rejection of the doctrine of state pre-emption by "occupying the field." We will not read into a scheme of statutory provisions any intention to prohibit the exercise of home rule authority in that area of the law. If the legislature wishes to "preempt" an entire field, they must so state.” And this principle has been applied ever since.Statutory LangueIf a constitutional amendment is not possible, the only way to guarantee that courts will not find that a state law will not preempt local laws is to include an explicit non-preemption clause, or a “savings clause”. Implied preemption usually involves an attempt by the local government to regulate in addition to the state’s regulatory regime. As such, drafting strategies aimed at avoiding implied preemption should include language that clarifies that the state merely intended to set a floor for regulation. A savings clause is an explicit statement in a state or federal law that allows lower levels of government to enact stronger protections than those set by a higher level of government. When a savings clause is clearly written, it leaves no question that the legislature intended to allow for stronger local laws. This eliminates the risk a court will find implied preemption in a particular area. Savings clauses are common in public health laws, and the following statutes include such language: New Hampshire, Vermont, and Hawaii tobacco use, Colorado beverage licensing, and Kansas anti discrimination laws, South Carolina Human Affairs legislation, and Arizona paid leave laws. Advocates for such legislation should proceed with caution, however. Some courts have taken a comparative approach to savings language in different statutes in an effort to discern the legislatures intent. This has led courts to argue that inclusion of explicit non-preemptive language in one statute, and the lack thereof in another statute, is evidence that the legislature did intend to preempt local laws in areas where they did not explicitly include savings clauses. There is potential that by making the legislature’s intent clear on one subject and leaving another ambiguous, an attempt to establish new legal precedent or legislative habits could backfire.Model savings clause:Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict the power of any county, city, town, village, or other subdivision of the state to adopt local laws, ordinances, and regulations that are more stringent than this chapter.Arizona Minimum Wage and Paid Sick Time:In 2006 , Arizona voters approved a ballot measure that included language explicitly allowing local governments to establish higher minimum wage laws than the state standard. In 2016, Arizona voters approved a second ballot initiative, raising the state minimum wage and establishing paid sick time rules, which also included the savings clause. Following the two initiatives, the language reads as follows: A county, city, or town may by ordinance regulate minimum wages and benefits within its geographic boundaries but may not provide for a minimum wage lower than that prescribed in this article .. . . This article shall be liberally construed in favor of its purposes and shall not limit the authority of the legislature or any other body to adopt any law or policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental wages or benefits, or that extends such protections to employers or employees not covered by this article.Conclusion and RecommendationsIn conclusion, I have found that some form of the doctrine of implied preemption is applied throughout state court systems with the lone exception of Illinois. However, many states have limited its application in some form or another, primarily through constitutional amendment, judicial precedent, or the adoption of specific non-preemptive or savings language in specific individual pieces of legislation. If MACo seeks to limit findings of implied preemption in the Maryland courts, I would recommend three possible courses of action:Pursue a constitutional amendment with language modeled after the Illinois Home Rule provision, requiring the state to explicitly say that it intends to preempt county governments in a given policy areaIdentify high-priority legislation, and ensure it includes a non-preemptive savings clause prior to passageEducate state lawmakers on the doctrine of implied preemption, and the unintended consequences certain language could have in the courts later on. This could include briefing sessions or updates to the General Assembly’s Legislative Drafting Manual.References BIBLIOGRAPHY n.d. "2017 Census of Governments." U.S. Census Bureau.A Better Balance. 2018. "State Substantive and Procedural Constraints on Local Preemption Legislation."Allied Vending, Inc v. Bowie. 1993. 631 A.2d 77 (Court of Appeals of Maryland).American Legislative Exchange Council. n.d. .—. 2017. State Pesticide Preemption Act. .—. n.d. State Pesticide Preemption Act. of County Commissioners of Washington County v. Perennial Solar, LLC. 2016. 1022 (Maryland Court of Special Appeals).Burkett, Thomas. 2019. Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund. v. Village of Worth. 1975. 62 Ill. 2d 406 (Supreme Court of Illinois).City Attorneys Association of Kansas. 2019. Kansas Home Rule. of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd. 1974. 59 Ill. 2d 484 (Supreme Court of Illinois).n.d. "Constitution of the State of Illinois, Article VII."Diller, Paul. 2017. Illinois Constitutional and Statutory Provisions. LEAP Project. , Paul. 2008. "Intrastate Preemption." Boston University Law Revoew 1114-1153.DIller, Paul. 2017. "State-by-state summaries of Home Rule." Urban Law Center. , John F. 1872. Treatise on the Laws of Municipal Corporations. Chicago: J. Cockcroft.DuPuis, Nicole, Trevor Langan, Christiana McFarland, Angelina Panettieri, and Brooks Rainwater. 2018. City Rights in an Era of Preemption: a State-by-State analysis. National League of Cities.Hines v. Davidowitz. 1941. 312 U.S. 52Hunter V. Pittsburgh . 1907. 264 (U.S. Supreme Court, November 18).Hutchcraft Van Service v. Urbana Human Relations Commission. 1982. 04 Ill. App. 3d 817 (4th Illinois District Court).Hygh, Angela. 2018. "Home-Rule Municipalities and Public Lands: Disposal of Public Lands as a Matter of Local Concern." Denver Law Review. Jefferson v. State. 1974. P.2d 37 (Alaska Supreme Court).KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5(b), . n.d.Kentucky Restaurant Association v. Louisville. 2016. 2015-SC-000371-TG (Supreme Court of Kentucky).Knapp, Les. 2018. Court of Special Appeals Hears Montgomery County Preemption Case. September 14. .—. 2018. Solar Siting Preemption Case Now Precedent. November 2019. of California Cities. 2016. "History of Municipal Home Rule." Solutions Support Center. 2018. "Repealing Preemption and Advancing Non-Preemption Language in State Law: Examples."McBain, Howard Lee. 1916. "The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government. I. The Extent of Its Application by American Courts." Columbia Law Review 190-216.National Association of Counties. 2017. NACo County Explorer. July. League of Cities. 2019. Cities 101 -- Delegation of Power . . "New Mexico Constitution, Article X, Section 6 ."New Mexico Legislature. 2016. "Piecemeal Amendment of the Constitution of New Mexico Since 1911." December.New Mexico Municipal League. n.d. "Handbook for Municipal Clerks." 2016. OR. CONST. art. XI, § 2. n.d.Police Officers Association v. Souix City. 1993. 495 N.W.2d 687 (Supreme Court of Iowa).Porter, Matthew. 2017. State Preemption Law. Washington, DC: Beyond Pesticides.2010. "Preemption by Any Other Name." National Policy & Legal Analysis Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity.Preemption Watch. n.d. "Savings Clause: ExpressProtection Against Preemption."Richardson, Jesse J., Megan Zimmerman Gough, and Robert Puentes. 2003. "A Discussion Paper Prepared for the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy." January. , Alex. 2013. "On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New Mexico." University of New Mexico School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, November 26: 255-317.Schragger, Richard. 2017. State Preemption of Local Laws: Preliminary Review of Substantive Areas. LEAP Project.State v. Tyler, 7 P.3d 624, 627 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). n.d.Sykes, Jay B. 2018. Banking Law: An Overview of Federal Preemption in the Dual Banking System. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. , Kenneth. 1968. "Municipal Home Rule in the United States." William & Mary Law Review 10 (2): 269-314. of Bolingbrook v. CITIZENS UTIL. COMPANY OF ILLINOIS. 1994. 632 N.E.2d 1000 (Supreme Court of Illinois).Village of Dolton ex rel. Winter v. CSX Transportation, Inc. 1990. 196 Ill. App. 3d 564 (Appellate Court of Illinois). ................
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