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PENNSYLVANIAPUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONHarrisburg, PA 17105-3265Public Meeting held March 20, 2014Commissioners Present:Robert F. Powelson, ChairmanJohn F. Coleman, Jr., Vice ChairmanJames H. CawleyPamela A. WitmerGladys M. BrownApplication of the Department of Transportation of the CommonwealthOf Pennsylvania for the Approval toReplace The Existing Superstructure of theBridge Carrying SR0462 Over the SingleTrack of the Norfolk Southern RailwayCompany (DOT # 517 596) inMountville Borough, Lancaster County;And the allocation of Costs Incident TheretoA-2009-2132946OPINION AND ORDERBY THE COMMISSION:Before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission) for consideration and disposition are the Exceptions (Exceptions) of Columbia Water Company (Columbia or Company) filed on November 6, 2013, to the Recommended Decision (R.D.) of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Joel H. Cheskis, which was issued on October 17, 2013, in the above-captioned proceeding. Replies to Exceptions were filed by the Department of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Department) on November 18, 2013. For the reasons stated below, we will grant in part and deny in part the Exceptions filed by Columbia.I.History of the ProceedingOn September 29, 2009, the Department filed an Application to replace the superstructure of an existing bridge that carries State Route 462 over a single track of the Norfolk Southern Railway Company in the Borough of Mountville, Lancaster County. The Commission approved the Application by Secretarial Letter dated March 5, 2010. In the Secretarial Letter, the Commission ordered non-carrier public utility companies to cooperate with the Department so that their facilities would not interfere with the completion of the project. The Commission further ordered that, upon completion of the project, a hearing would be scheduled to determine any issues regarding allocation of construction costs. On May 8, 2012, Columbia filed a Petition Requesting a Hearing for the Purpose of Allocating Costs Associated with a Rail-Highway Crossing Project (Petition). Columbia’s Petition requested a hearing to determine the allocation of costs of approximately $160,000 that were incurred by the Company as a result of the Department’s project to replace portions of the Mountville Bridge, as well as compensation for a pipe stolen from the construction site. On December 13, 2012, the Commission’s Bureau of Technical Utility Services referred Columbia’s Petition to the Office of Administrative Law Judge for a hearing. A hearing was held on June 10, 2013, for the purpose of admitting into the record pre-served testimony and accompanying exhibits, as well as one Stipulation. The Parties agreed to waive cross-examination of all witnesses. Columbia and the Department filed Main Briefs on July 19, 2013, and Reply Briefs on August 19, 2013. No other Party filed a brief.The record closed on August 19, 2013, with the filing of the Reply Briefs. A Recommended Decision was issued on October 17, 2013, in which the ALJ denied Columbia’s request for reimbursement of its costs as well as compensation for the stolen pipe, and allocated all costs incurred by Columbia, as a result of the bridge replacement, to Columbia. R.D. at 35. As previously noted, on November 6, 2013, Columbia filed Exceptions to the Recommended Decision and the Department filed Replies to Exceptions on November 18, 2013. II.DiscussionA.Legal StandardsAs the proponent of a rule or order, Columbia (the Petitioner in this proceeding), bears the burden of proof pursuant to Section?332(a) of the Public Utility Code (Code). 66 Pa. C.S. § 332(a). To satisfy the burden of proof, Columbia must establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Samuel?J. Lansberry, Inc.?v. Pa. PUC, 578?A.2d 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), alloc. denied, 529 Pa. 654, 602 A.2d 863 (1992). That is, Columbia’s evidence must be more convincing, by even the smallest amount, than that presented by the Department. Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc. v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 45, 70 A.2d 854 (1950). Additionally, this Commission’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. More is required than a mere trace of evidence or a suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to be established. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Pa. PUC, 489 Pa. 109, 413 A.2d 1037 (1980).Upon the presentation by Columbia of evidence sufficient to initially satisfy the burden of proof, the burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut the evidence of Columbia shifts to the Department. If the evidence presented by the Department is of co-equal value or “weight,” the burden of proof has not been satisfied. Columbia now has to provide some additional evidence to rebut that of the Department. Burleson v. Pa. PUC, 443 A.2d 1373 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982), aff’d, 501 Pa. 433, 461 A.2d 1234 (1983). While the burden of going forward with the evidence may shift back and forth during a proceeding, the burden of proof never shifts. The burden of proof always remains on the party seeking affirmative relief from the Commission. Milkie v. Pa. PUC, 768 A.2d 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).Before addressing the Exceptions, we note that any issue or Exception that we do not specifically delineate shall be deemed to have been duly considered and denied without further discussion. The Commission is not required to consider expressly or at length each contention or argument raised by the parties. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Pa. PUC, 625 A.2d 741 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993); also see, generally, University of Pennsylvania v. Pa. PUC, 485 A.2d 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). ALJ Cheskis made fifty Findings of Fact and reached nineteen Conclusions of Law. R.D. at 3-10, 32-35. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are incorporated herein by reference and are adopted without comment unless they are either expressly or by necessary implication rejected or modified by this Opinion and Order.B.Legal PrecedentColumbia has filed five Exceptions to the ALJ’s Recommended Decision and the Department has filed Replies to each Exception. Columbia argues that its cost to replace and relocate its facilities should be borne entirely by the Department based on: the benefits received and losses experienced, the federal funding available, the party responsible for the situation, and the equities involved. Columbia also requests compensation in the amount of $1,000 for the lost salvage value it experienced when its property was stolen from the construction site.Prior to addressing the Exceptions, a review of governing law and precedent, as well as the relevant facts of this case, is instructive. Chapter 27 of the Code governs the Commission’s jurisdiction over railroads and the allocation of costs occasioned by the construction of railroad crossings. More specifically, Section 2704(a) provides that compensation for the cost of construction, relocation, alteration, protection, or abolition of public utility facilities shall be paid by the affected public utility or by the Commonwealth in such proportions as the Commission may determine. 66 Pa. C.S. § 2704(a).When allocating the costs for the construction, relocation, or alteration of a railroad crossing, the Commission is not confined to a fixed formula, but rather must take all relevant factors into consideration. AT&T v. Pa. PUC, 558 Pa. 290, 737 A.2d 201, 209-210 (Pa. 1999) (AT&T). In making a cost allocation determination, the Commission and the courts have considered the benefits received by the utility’s ratepayers, the availability of state and/or federal funding, the placing of costs on the party responsible for the situation, and the equities of the situation. Application of the City of Wilkes-Barre, Docket No. A101606 (Order entered April 9, 1981). Other factors considered have included: who benefits from the project; whether any improvement to the utility’s system occurred, id.; the retrospective and prospective benefits to the utility; the need (if any) for the utility to acquire private rights-of-way as a result of the project; the relative cost of installing new facilities, Re Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 76 Pa. P.U.C. 155 (Kane); the service life of the facilities; and the risk to locate facilities in the public right-of-way, AT&T, 737 A.2d 201. The Commission’s discretion to allocate costs is limited only by the fundamental requirement that its decisions be just and reasonable. In addition, its decisions must be based upon consideration of specific and relevant factors. PECO Energy Co. v. Pa. PUC, 568 Pa. 39, 791 A.2d 1155, 1163 (Pa. 2002) (PECO). In Kane, a gas utility was required to replace and relocate its facilities when the Department replaced a deteriorating railroad crossing bridge, which had reached the end of its useful life. The utility requested that it be reimbursed for its relocation costs, arguing that it had installed its facilities only fourteen years previously, the Department’s project necessitated that it move most of its facilities from the public right-of-way to a private right-of-way, and that it had to expend over $12,000 to replace its facilities versus the less than $2,000 it had spent to install them fourteen years earlier. The Department argued that the utility had enjoyed the benefit of the public right-of-way for many years and should be responsible for its own relocation costs. The Commission in that case ordered the Department to reimburse the utility for 90% of the utility’s costs. In so ordering, the Commission reasoned that (1) the utility had to remove most of its facilities to a private right-of-way and would no longer be receiving the benefit of using a public right-of-way, (2) the project did not result in any improvement in service to the utility’s customers, (3) the facilities that had to be replaced were only fourteen years old, (4) the cost to install the new facilities was over seven times greater than the cost of the previous facilities, (5) the Department’s application and the Commission’s approval necessitated the relocation of the facilities, and (6) the primary beneficiary of the project was the traveling public. Id. In PECO, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a Commission decision to allocate 100% of two utilities’ costs to relocate their facilities to each utility, respectively. In that case, the Commission determined that the utilities were responsible for their own costs because they had received a substantial benefit from the continued location of their facilities in the public right-of-way. The Commission reasoned that this was a substantial benefit as the utilities did not have to acquire private rights-of-way. Furthermore, the Commission in PECO found that federal funds were unavailable to reimburse the utilities and that, although the Department was the moving force or cost-causer behind the project, the Department was not required to wait until the utilities’ facilities had reached the end of their useful lives. Importantly, the Commission also found that, for one utility, its facilities had already expended a significant portion of their service lives before the project began and that the relocation work performed by the utility resulted in improved facilities (i.e., a benefit to the ratepayers). Finally, the Commission determined that its decision was consistent with Commission precedent. PECO at 55-56. In the instant case, Columbia has occupied, since 1937, and continues to occupy, a public right-of-way over a bridge, which traverses a railroad track. The bridge is the only practical way for Columbia’s water line to cross the track. R.D. at 15. In 2005, Columbia replaced its aging pipe and installed on the bridge a new water line at a cost of over $73,000. The Company needed to replace its pipe due to the pipe’s age and customer growth in the area; the pipe was no longer able to adequately serve Columbia’s customers. At that time, the Department was planning to repair the bridge, which was eighty-one years old and in visible disrepair. R.D. at 4-6, 27. In 2010, because the bridge had reached the end of its useful life, the Department initiated a public safety project to replace the superstructure of the bridge. R.D. at 6-7. Neither Columbia’s facilities, nor the Department’s maintenance of the bridge caused the need for the project; the bridge needed to be replaced because of its age. R.D. at 22-24. As a result of the bridge replacement, Columbia’s five-year-old pipe was removed and Columbia was required to replace the pipe at a cost of over $160,000. Had it not needed to be removed, the five-year-old pipe would have had a remaining service life of ninety-five years. The newly installed facilities are substantially the same as the facilities which were removed during the project. R.D. at 4-5. Although federal funding was available for some aspects of the project, federal monies were not available to reimburse Columbia for the replacement of its facilities. R.D. at 8. C. Allocation of costs1.ALJ’s Recommended Decision, Exceptions and RepliesIn his Recommended Decision, the ALJ reviewed the factors previously considered by the Commission in cost allocation disputes between a non-carrier utility and the Department. Specifically, the ALJ looked to the benefit received by the utility’s ratepayers, the availability of state and/or federal funding for the project, the party responsible for the situation, and the equities of this particular situation. R.D. at 12. For ease of understanding, we will describe the ALJ’s decision, the Exceptions and the Replies for each factor separately. Our disposition, however, balances those factors.a.Benefits and Losses(1)ALJ’s Recommended DecisionTurning first to the benefits received by Columbia’s ratepayers, the ALJ found that Columbia, and its ratepayers, had enjoyed, and will continue to enjoy, substantial benefits from having its facilities located in the public right-of-way. The ALJ reasoned that Columbia has not had to pay for private rights-of-way, taxes, fees, or maintenance since 1937 when it first installed its facilities on the bridge and that it will continue to receive these benefits going forward. Id. at 15. (2)Exceptions and RepliesIn its first Exception, Columbia avers that the ALJ erred by relying almost exclusively on perceived benefits to the Company while ignoring its losses, by failing to consider that no benefits from the bridge reconstruction were received by Columbia, and by rejecting Commission precedent. Exc. at 4. Columbia asserts that the ALJ relied almost exclusively on the benefit to Columbia of having its facilities located in the public right-of-way in determining that it should be responsible for 100% of the cost to replace its facilities. Columbia protests that the ALJ found these benefits to be significant despite the record evidence that Columbia only received a possible savings of $150 for not having to obtain a private right-of-way agreement or $13,000 if it had run its line under the railroad tracks. In addition, the Company excepts to the ALJ’s finding that Columbia’s ratepayers have benefited through lower rates by having the water line in the public right-of-way. Columbia states that this is speculation while the cost of replacing five-year-old facilities is a real cost which will be borne by its ratepayers if the Company is not reimbursed. Id. at 5-6. Columbia next asserts that the ALJ failed to consider that no benefits were received by Columbia from having to replace its nearly brand new facilities. Columbia argues that a central focus of the benefits analysis is the benefit that utilities receive in the way of upgraded facilities and that, in a prior case, PECO, supra, a factor considered by the Commission in allocating costs to the utility was that the utility’s facilities had already expended a significant portion of their service lives. Columbia explains that it had spent $73,000 in 2005 to replace its facilities on the bridge, and then incurred costs of $160,780 to replace those same facilities due to the Department’s construction project. According to Columbia, the 2010 facilities were essentially the same as the 2005 facilities, conferring no benefit upon Columbia or its ratepayers. Finally, Columbia argues that the traveling public and the railroad, which now has a greater clearance under the bridge, will benefit from the project. Id. at 6-8. Columbia also avers in its first Exception that the ALJ erred in rejecting the approach taken in Kane, supra. The Company argues that the facts in Kane, a case wherein the Commission ordered the Department to reimburse the utility for 90% of its relocation costs, are similar to the instant case and should be followed. Id. at 8-9. In its Replies, the Department disagrees with Columbia and asserts that it was just and reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that the Company receives significant benefits from use of the public right-of-way. The Department argues that previous Commission decisions support the ALJ’s analysis that Columbia has not been required to purchase a private right-of-way, pay taxes, or provide maintenance, and that without the replacement of the superstructure of the bridge, Columbia’s benefit would eventually lapse with the deterioration of the bridge. The Department further argues that Columbia made the decision to replace its facilities knowing the advanced age of the bridge and that it had to be assumed that Columbia’s business decision was made in the best interest of its ratepayers. R. Exc. at 1-4. b.Federal Funding(1)ALJ’s Recommended DecisionThe ALJ found that Columbia did not demonstrate that the Department was required to seek federal funding for the project, only that federal funding may be available. The ALJ also discussed that the Department had consistently averred that federal funds were not available to reimburse Columbia. Further, the ALJ reasoned that it is only appropriate to determine if federal funding is available to reimburse Columbia if the Commission orders reimbursement for reasons other than the availability of federal funds. R.D. at 20. (2)Exceptions and RepliesIn its second Exception, Columbia avers that the ALJ erred by determining that the lack of availability of federal funding militates against reimbursement of Columbia’s costs. The Company argues that federal funding was only unavailable because the Department failed to apply for it and that, furthermore, the lack of federal funding is not a valid reason to deny reimbursement. Exc. at 11-12. In response, the Department explains that participation of federal funds is governed by federal regulations and that, prior to the use of federal funds, authorization is required by the Federal Highway Administration. Because federal authorization was never granted for utility relocation costs for this project, the Department was prohibited from using federal funds for that purpose. Additionally, the Department argues that it has sole discretion to apply for federal funds and that it defies logic that it would not avail itself of federal funds merely to avoid reimbursing utilities for relocation costs. R. Exc. at 5-6. c.Responsible Party (1)ALJ’s Recommended DecisionNext, the ALJ determined that there was no real “cost-causer” in this situation and that this factor was not relevant to the cost allocation determination in this case. Id. at 24. The ALJ noted that the bridge was 81 years old, had reached the end of its useful life due to normal wear and tear, that the Department was not responsible for the deterioration of the bridge, and that the Department was not required to wait until Columbia’s facilities had reached the end of their useful lives to undertake a public safety project. The ALJ reasoned that just because the Department initiated the project, it did not mean that it was the cost-causer. Id. at 22-23. (2)Exceptions and RepliesIn its third Exception, Columbia argues that the ALJ erred by determining that there was no cost-causer for the deterioration of the bridge. First, Columbia asserts that it is not responsible for the deterioration of the bridge and that this fact was not in question. Exc. at 14-15. Next, the Company argues that the bridge was replaced due to the travelling public and the Department was the cost-causer because it had initiated the project. Columbia states that the bridge was capable of supporting the facilities it installed in 2005 and that the Department would have been in violation of law if it had issued a Bridge Occupancy Permit to Columbia had the bridge been incapable of supporting those facilities. The Company also argues that it reasonably relied upon the Department’s approval when it replaced its facilities in 2005 and that the ALJ’s assertion that Columbia should have known the bridge would need to be replaced should not be given weight by the Commission. Id. at 18. In its Reply, the Department asserts that there is no cost-causer in the present matter. It argues that the Commission has, on numerous occasions, rejected allocating costs upon the Department because it has initiated a safety project, and that it should not be penalized for initiating a highway safety project. Further, the Department argues that Columbia did not demonstrate that the Department failed to maintain the bridge. R. Exc. at 7-8.d.Equities of the Situation(1)ALJ’s Recommended DecisionTurning to the equities of the situation, the ALJ discussed Columbia’s arguments that the Department should reimburse it because its facilities were a mere five years old and it has a statutory right to occupy the public right-of-way. The ALJ found that this factor also supported allocating all costs to Columbia. The ALJ questioned why the Company would install new facilities on a bridge with a service life of 100 years when it was already 81 years old, had heavy scaling, spalls, cracking, and exposed reinforced bars, as well as severely rusted parts. Id. at 24-25. Although noting that the Department was considering reconstructing the bridge before Columbia began work to replace its facilities, the ALJ found that, considering the state of the bridge, Columbia should have inquired about any possible construction projects. The ALJ also noted that Columbia was initially informed, in 2005, by the Department, that there were concerns as to whether the bridge could hold the weight of the proposed pipe; the Department had initially suggested that the Company run its water line under the railroad tracks. The ALJ reasoned that the Department’s initial concern gave notice to Columbia that the bridge was problematic. The ALJ further reasoned that when the Department issues a Bridge Occupancy License, there is language in the license stating that if the bridge is reconstructed, the utility would be responsible for its cost to reconstruct its own facilities; therefore, Columbia was on notice that it could be required to pay to reconstruct the water line. Id. at 27-29.(2)Replies and ExceptionsIn its fourth Exception, Columbia explains that it upgraded its aging facilities in 2005 in order to adequately serve its growing customer base as the existing pipe had become highly tuberculated. It argues that its decision to replace the water line should not be held against it and it should be reimbursed because its facilities were only five year old when replaced. Additionally, the Company excepts to the ALJ’s suggestion that it should have been concerned when the Department advised the Company to consider an alternative route. Columbia argues that, although in 2005 the Department expressed reservations as to whether the existing bridge would be able to support Columbia’s proposed facilities, it did find that it would support them and issued a Bridge Occupancy License. Exc. at 19-20. Columbia next takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that the language of the Bridge Occupancy License, which stated that the Company would have to pay to replace or relocate its own facilities should the right-of-way need to be altered, provided notice to Columbia that it would have to bear the cost to replace its own facilities. The Company argues that the Department’s disclaimer cannot trump a statute and if it were controlling, there would be no reason for reimbursement proceedings before the Commission. Id. at 20-21. The Department asserts that Columbia needed to replace its facilities in 2005 and had no other feasible means of traversing the crossing in the vicinity; but for the bridge, Columbia would not be able to cross the railroad tracks. The Department argues that, although the bridge could support the weight of the facilities installed in 2005, this fact does not mitigate against the fact that the bridge had reached the end of its useful life. Furthermore, the Department avers that Columbia was on notice of the Department’s concerns with the subject bridge. R. Exc. at 9-10. 2.DispositionBalancing the specific and relevant factors described above, we find that the Department is to be allocated 25% of Columbia’s replacement costs and Columbia is to be responsible for the balance. We will direct the Department to file a notice, at this docket number, when this payment has been made. We do not disagree with the ALJ’s conclusion that the second and third Wilkes-Barre factors suggest that Columbia should bear the cost of relocating its facilities because of the Mountville Bridge project. However, we believe that the first and fourth factors require that at least some of the bridge replacement costs be allocated to the Department. When considering these factors – particularly the equities of the situation – it cannot be overlooked that the 2011 main replacement occurred only five years after Columbia’s prior main replacement. Considering water mains such as these should last almost 100 years, replacing one so quickly is undoubtedly a waste of resources and possibly could have been avoided through better coordination between the Department and the utility. With respect to the first Wilkes-Barre factor, while the ALJ is correct that Columbia and its customers receive a significant benefit from locating the company’s facilities on the bridge in the public right-of-way, that is not the end of the analysis. It is also important to note that the bridge replacement did not result in any improved facilities for Columbia or its customers, as the line being replaced was only five years old and was replaced with similar equipment. Therefore, we believe this factor weighs in favor of at least some reimbursement for Columbia. The benefits analysis does not end at a discussion regarding a public versus private right-of-way. Another factor relevant to cost allocation is a consideration of who, aside from the non-carrier utility, benefits from the project. In Kane, the Commission found that the beneficiary of the project was the traveling public, not the utility, and that the project did not result in improved service to the utility’s customers. This weighed in favor of the utility being eligible for reimbursement. In contrast, in PECO, the Commission found that the utility’s ratepayers also benefitted from the project because its facilities had expended most of their service lives and were being improved. This factor was relevant in the determination that the utility should not be reimbursed. Here, Columbia is not the only beneficiary of the improved bridge; the traveling public and the railroad also benefit from this project. Additionally, the bridge replacement did not result in any improved facilities for Columbia or its ratepayers. The water line was only five years old and was replaced with substantially similar equipment. As in Kane, this factor weighs in favor of at least some reimbursement for Columbia. Next, we consider the availability of federal funding. We find that the ALJ did not err in determining that federal funding was not available and that this determination weighed against Columbia receiving reimbursement. The availability of federal funding to reimburse a utility for its relocation costs is governed by federal regulations. The absence of federal funding is a factor weighing against utility reimbursement. PECO, 791 A.2d at 1164; see also, Phila. v. Pa. PUC, 822 A.2d 94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). In the present case, federal funds were limited to the initial phases of the project and were not available for utility relocation expenses. Columbia’s argument appears to be that federal funds would have been available if the Department had applied for them. We agree with the ALJ that Columbia did not present any evidence that the Department was required to apply and if it did, the funds would have certainly been available. We also find persuasive the Department’s statement that it would not have failed to avail itself of available federal funds merely to avoid reimbursing Columbia. The absence of federal funds which could be used for reimbursing the utility, weighs against full reimbursement for Columbia. The Parties have also disagreed as to who created the situation causing Columbia to incur the costs it did. We find that the ALJ did not err in determining there is no cost-causer in this case. The placing of costs on the party responsible for the situation is a factor considered by the Commission in a cost allocation proceeding. Wilkes-Barre, Docket Number A-101606 at 4. The Commonwealth Court and the Commission have declined to impose utility relocation or replacement costs on the Department when the Department is not responsible for the deterioration of the bridge. See, City of Philadelphia v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n., 822 A.2d 94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); In this case, neither the Department’s maintenance of the bridge nor Columbia’s facilities contributed to the need to replace the bridge; the bridge had merely reached the end of its useful life. Columbia argues that the Department is the cost causer and is therefore responsible for the situation because it initiated the project in order to facilitate the traveling public. Columbia also points to the Commission’s determination in Kane where it found, as one factor supporting reimbursement for the utility, that the Department’s application and the Commission’s approval necessitated the relocation of the utility’s facilities. Columbia’s argument misses the relevant inquiry. When determining whether one party or the other is responsible for the situation when a bridge needs to be replaced, the Commission looks for evidence of a contribution of action or inaction by a party necessitating the replacement of the bridge. The Commission has not found that a bridge reaching the end of its useful life is the fault of the Department. A finding that the Department is the cost-causer because it initiated the action, is not the same as finding that it is responsible for the situation. Although in Kane, the Commission did find that that the Department’s application and the Commission’s approval necessitated the relocation of the utility’s facilities, the finding was also an implication that the utility did nothing to cause the need for the bridge replacement. Furthermore, in PECO, even though the Commission found that the Department was the cost-causer because it initiated the project, the Commission did not impose any utility relocation costs on the Department. This particular factor neither weighs for or against reimbursement for Columbia. Regarding the equities of the situation, in its Petition, Columbia arguesd that had it been aware that the Department planned to reconstruct the bridge a few years later, it would have coordinated the main replacement with the Department’s crossing project. We agree that there was a communication breakdown between the two parties in this case, and had each of them been more proactive and conducted reasonable due diligence, the redundancy of constructing two water mains within a such a short time period could have been avoided. The Department issued Columbia a Bridge Occupancy License in 2005, which was the perfect opportunity for the Department to communicate with Columbia that it was intending to replace the Mountville Bridge in the next few years. At the same time, Columbia must have known at the time it installed the new facilities that it would not reap 100% of the useful service life of the main, considering the bridge was already 81 years old and in disrepair at the time. Needless to say, both parties failed to communicate as they should have throughout the course of these projects.Finally, we agree with Columbia that the language contained within the Department’s Bridge Occupancy License did not put Columbia on notice that it would be responsible for all of its own costs should its facilities need to be removed and replaced due to work on the bridge. Nevertheless, we find this argument unpersuasive. The Legislature has given the task of allocating costs between the Department and non-carrier utilities in situations such as this, to the Commission. The Department’s policies and conditions placed on bridge occupancy licenses cannot nullify the Commission’s obligation in this regard. Although this fact does not support allocating costs to Columbia, neither does it support allocating costs to the Department; it is not relevant to a cost allocation determination. For these reasons, we believe it is unreasonable for Columbia to bear 100 percent of the cost?of?both mains.? Instead, a reasonable outcome would be for both parties to share equally the cost of replacing the first water main, since that is the project that could potentially have been avoided.? However, because the cost of the 2005 water main is not at issue here,?we direct that 25% of the approximate $160,000 it cost for the second main replacement be allocated to the Department, with the remainder allocated to Columbia.?Additionally, we encourage the Department and all of the Commonwealth’s utilities to be more proactive in communicating with one another in situations such as this one. With the passage of the recent transportation bill, there will be many Department-initiated construction projects throughout the Commonwealth, many of which will necessitate the relocation of utility lines and mains. We encourage the Department and Pennsylvania utilities to use this case as a learning experience and improve outreach and communication on such projects going forward so that customers are not subjected to the inconvenience and cost of replacing facilities twice.D.Lost Salvage Value 1.ALJ’s Recommended DecisionThe ALJ rejected Columbia’s request for lost salvage value for its stolen property. The ALJ found that this was a request for damages, not an allocation of construction costs, and rejected the claim. Id. at 31. 2.Exceptions and RepliesColumbia excepts to the ALJ’s denial of its request for $1,000 in lost salvage value. Exc. at 22-24. The Company argues that the ALJ’s determination that its request for lost salvage value is akin to damages and not a true construction cost is incorrect. Columbia points to Section 2704 of the Code, observing that it specifically includes compensation for damages for the owners of adjacent property, taken, injured, or destroyed during the construction of a crossing. Id. at 24. In its Replies, the Department argues that, although 66 Pa. C.S. § 2704(a) allows for the compensation of damages sustained by the owners of adjacent property, the statute refers to real property only and Columbia’s request for lost salvage value is akin to a request for damages and not permitted under the Commission’s jurisdiction. 3.DispositionThe record is devoid of any evidence regarding Columbia’s claim for lost salvage value. Columbia merely asserts that, because its property was stolen from the construction site, the Department is liable to it for $1,000. There is no evidence regarding the responsibility for securing the construction site, the responsibility for securing Columbia’s pipe, or what the actual salvage value of the pipe would be. This Exception is denied.III.ConclusionBased upon the foregoing discussion, we shall grant in part and deny in part the Exceptions of Columbia Water Company; THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:That the Exceptions of Columbia Water Company filed on November 6, 2013, are granted, in part, and denied, in part, consistent with this Opinion and Order.That the Recommended Decision of Administrative Law Judge Joel?H. Cheskis, issued on October 17, 2013, is modified, consistent with this Opinion and Order.That the Department of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall reimburse Columbia Water Company a sum of money equal to 25% of the costs incurred by Columbia in furnishing materials and performing work to replace and relocate its facilities pursuant to the Commission’s Order of March 5, 2010 at this docket number. That, within seven (7) days of making the payment described in Ordering Paragraph No. 3 above, the Department of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall file a notice at this docket number, with a copy to all other Parties to this proceeding, that payment has been made as required by this Opinion and Order. That, following receipt of the notice described in Ordering Paragraph No. 4 above, these proceedings shall be marked closed.28981401778000BY THE COMMISSION,Rosemary ChiavettaSecretary(SEAL)ORDER ADOPTED: March 20, 2014 ORDER ENTERED: April 10, 2014 ................
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