Chicago-Kent College of Law | Illinois Institute of Technology



Politics and Human Rights in Kurdistan

Bryan C. Curran

Supervised by:

Professor of Law Henry H. Perritt, Jr.

October 3, 2009

Background.

Numbering over 20 million, the Kurds inhabit the mountainous regions of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Years of cultural, economic, and political oppression within these countries has resulted in increasing Kurdish efforts towards autonomy and international support. In the 7th century the Kurds were conquered by the Arabs, ultimately leading to the Kurdish adoption of Sunni Islam. In the decades following, the Kurds found themselves under the rule of various different regimes, including the Seljuk Turks, the Mongols and finally the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Empire’s rule extended across three continents, having significant influence in Southeastern Europe, Western Asia and North Africa. Lasting from 1299-1922, the Ottoman Empire ruled over the Kurdish people until it was succeeded by the Republic of Turkey in 1922. Following the defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire the Kurds aimed to establish a homeland, but were not provided the land necessary to achieve such a goal. Instead, the Turkish government divided up area controlled by the Ottoman Empire and left the Kurds to disperse throughout Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The increasing populations of Kurds in these countries has not been met with support by the national governments, and the Kurdish lifestyle has come to be characterized as that of unwelcome foreigners. Often being deprived of many basic human rights, the Kurds continue to live under oppressive rule throughout the Middle East and have begun to flee into various countries in Europe.

The increasing developments and human rights movements in Iraqi Kurdistan have provided some hope for the Kurds throughout Turkey, Iran and Syria. This relative prosperity in Iraq has come from decades of internal political conflict and has effectively established a growing sense of Kurdish identity. The question thus remains as to what pathway towards autonomy is most effective for the Kurds. Although international support has come sporadically, a lack of consistent aid has ultimately left the Kurds overmatched in their struggles against the national governments of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. With minimal chance of victory in formal militarized conflict, the Kurds have few options and have resorted to several attempts at large-scale guerilla uprising. These guerilla organizations have been deemed terrorist organization by many countries, including the United States, thus making hope for increased international aid unlikely.

Section I. Political Division and Civil War in Iraqi Kurdistan

The quest for statehood by the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq has been a pathway not of unity and democracy but rather of political turmoil and civil war. The political tension and violence has divided the region of modern-day Kurdistan and stems from a decade long feud between two leaders within a dual-party system. Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), exist within a power struggle, which consistently drives political division within the Kurdistan population. In order to comprehend the division between these two spheres of influence in its entirety, an examination of the differences in both the leaders and their party platforms is crucial. The question remains whether the foundation of the civil unrest is a product of century old sociological differences, or if the division is in fact a product of 20th century political opportunism. Through evaluating the extensive history of conflict between the two parties, clear sociological and ideological disparities are identifiable; however, these aspects are not the main source of contention that has evoked civil war upon the region. The foundation of the division in Iraqi Kurdistan, the division that has brought neighbors within the region to violent conflict, appears to be a product of the political and monetary opportunism of Talabani and Barzani.

Kurdish guerilla commander, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, founded the Kurdistan Democratic Party in August 1946, aspiring to gain recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan by creating a Kurdish national army, later to be referred to as the pesh merga. The region claimed as the territory of the KDP, known today as Iraqi Kurdistan, was throughout WWII divided amongst Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Immediately upon establishing the KDP, Mustafa Barzani, commonly referred to as “the Kurds’ first modern revolutionary”, became a strong adversary of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, orchestrating various rebellions against the Iraqi government.[1] In the early 1930s, prior to the creation of the KDP, Saddam exiled Mustafa Barzani for a large-scale rebellion against the Iraqi government. He returned from exile in 1943 to discover his fellow Kurds starving and living without aid from the government of Baghdad. The state of the neglected Kurdish citizens fueled Mustafa Barzani to create the KDP, demanding that Baghdad create an autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Included under this movement were the demands to recognize Kurdish as an official language within Iraq and to grant Kurds seats within the cabinet in Baghdad.

The Ba’athist coup, a branch of the Arab nationalist movement under Saddam Hussein, took control of Baghdad in 1968 and remained in power until it was dismantled in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam. The Ba’athist party offered to cooperate with the KDP upon its first institution as the Iraqi power. The agreements promised Kurds an official language, guaranteed places in government, land distribution and the return of any Kurds that had been displaced during the rebellions. The arrangements would have served as a means to avoid future conflict in Kurdistan, but the superficiality of Saddam’s promises were soon made clear and as a result, the agreements never materialized. Shortly after, Saddam’s troops defeated Mustafa Barzani, causing him to seek aid from the United States. The United States declined and Mustafa relinquished control of the KDP to his son Masoud Barzani due to health issues that inhibited him from continuing to lead the party. Masoud Barzani was left with not only his father’s legacy of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, but also with his father’s newest enemy and the beginnings of the political turmoil that would divide Kurdistan for decades.

Masoud Barzani’s rival, Jalal Talabani, rose to power out of the shadows of the already prominent KDP. Talabani was raised in Iraqi Kurdistan as an avid enthusiast of General Mustafa Barzani and follower of the KDP. He worked his way through the ranks of the KDP, winning praise from Mustafa Barzani, until his eventual public challenge of Barzani and the KDP in a meeting with Arab nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser. Shortly after the meeting in 1975, Talabani announced his own political campaign under the newly established PUK. Two years later, he declared his party’s guerilla campaign against both Baghdad and the KDP, ultimately setting the stage for the conflict ahead. Despite Talabani’s call for guerilla opposition, the contention between the PUK and KDP remained relatively civil for almost a year and even came close to a resolution. Any signs of cooperation between the two parties quickly diminished and with the first signs of violence in 1978, the division in Iraqi Kurdistan was solidified.

The initial violence between the PUK and KDP that set off the feud between Talabani and Barzani was committed, ironically, by accident during peace negotiations. Jalal Talabani, being a more modern visionary for the Kurdish people, recognized the need to unite the PUK and KDP if they were going to successfully confront Saddam and the growing Iraqi military. In an effort to initiate this union between the two parties, in 1978, Talabani sent two of his commanders to meet with Barzani and begin negotiations for a peace agreement. The two commanders however, were mistakenly ambushed by the KDP pesh merga and publicly executed. This mistake on the part of the KDP troops initiated a chain of violence between the two groups that would not show serious signs of an end until the US invasion of Iraq. The divide between the Kurdish people compounded with the increasing casualties suffered at the hands of fellow Kurds made them vulnerable to attack from outside influences, deeming it next to impossible for either leader to establish any gains for the Kurdish people.[2]

The parties, having already been driven to violent confrontation, needed only to become politically segregated in order for the internal divide in Iraqi Kurdistan to be complete. The political partition in question developed during Kurdistan’s first election in May 1992. The Kurdish region was able to hold elections for a regional government without contention from Saddam under the protection of the US no-fly zone that allowed Kurdistan to function apart from the influence of the Iraqi government. The cause and details of the no-fly zone will be explained shortly. Barzani was considered the clear favorite in the election, as a result of his father’s lingering popularity within Kurdistan. At the time of the election, Barzani also seemed to be dominant in the ongoing violence between the KDP and PUK, making him appear the more logical candidate for peace in the near future. Talabani however, was able to sway a large portion of voters through his charismatic election rallies, speaking aggressively about Kurdish rights. Talabani’s strong conviction about the future of Kurdistan gave him the appearance of a more modern and international leader than the traditional Barzani.[3] It is worth noting that the United States was not in support of the election to promote democracy in Kurdistan at this time due to the Turkish fear of an unstable Iraqi nation.

The election concluded with Barzani receiving 45% of the votes and Talabani finishing with a close 43.6%. Due to the closeness of the results, the KDP and PUK were each granted five of the ten seats in Parliament and a runoff election between Barzani and Talabani was suspended indefinitely in favor of a joint parliament. With each authoritarian figure having a 50% claim to the new Kurdish Parliament, the two spheres of influence became completely divided. Barzani laid claim to the northwest region of Kurdistan, giving the southeast to rival Talabani. Citizens throughout Kurdistan began aligning themselves on either side of the power struggle and the stage for the political division of Kurdistan was set.

Having established the initial causes of the political divide between Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, it is important to examine whether the factors that have continued to fuel the divide for so many years are sociological and ideological or merely the opportunistic nature of both men struggling for sole power of the region. Comparing several sociological aspects of the two leaders and their parties including geography, language and religion, the disparities between the conflicting sides are apparent; however, these differences are not only minor, but have been openly dismissed as core reasons for the Kurdish divide. It has been commonly recorded from outsiders evaluating the political positions of the two leaders that there are very little differences in their ideologies. Looking first at Barzani, it is logical that due to his geographical location in the north, with his capital initially based in Salhuddin and eventually being relocated to the city of Erbil, that the main support for his campaign would come from a coalition of tribes and clans of Kurmanji speakers. Kurmanji is the most commonly spoken version of Kurdish and is considered a ceremonial language of the Kurdish people, spoken by roughly 80% of all Kurds. Barzani’s close connection with the tribal population, combined with the fact that the majority of his government high officials all share his last name, reveals his nature as a more traditional Kurd. In an account of the leader recorded by CIA officials who worked closely with him, his disposition as a rural, traditionalist makes him appear more like a village chief than a regional authority.[4] Barzani and Talabani are also both Sunni Muslims. When looking at the division in Kurdistan, it is important to keep in mind that unlike the rest of Iraq, Sunni and Shi’ite tensions have never played a role in fueling the Kurdish civil war.

The traditional character of Masoud Barzani could not differ more than that of the modern, outgoing Talabani. Based in the south with his capital at the city of Saluymaniya, Talabani’s main support comes from a more urban class of citizens. Most of Talabani’s followers speak Sorani, a Kurdish language spoken by a small minority of Kurds in both Iraq and Iran, where it is recognized as an official language. While Barzani possesses qualities of a small-scale Kurdish leader, Talabani presents himself as a world-class politician. He is able to woe his followers with extravagant speeches of Kurdish rights and a bright future. Other than the fact that the two parties speak different Kurdish languages and are separated geographically, the sociological differences between the two parties are relatively minute. As the division between Talabani and Barzani has become more violent with neither side willing to concede, the separation has become noticeably more geographical with citizens having to choose a side and relocate from their homes. These sociological differences may be enough to distinguish the manner in which each ruler leads his half of the Kurdish region, but they do not appear to be the true catalysts of the violent conflict between the two sides.

With only minor differences between the ideologies of the two parties, they developed very similar political platforms. According to Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament, in the years following the eventual Kurdish cooperation, the platforms of the two parties, removed of their names, were virtually indistinguishable.[5] The two leaders both viewed the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan very favorably, but in the presence of alternative motives, this notion eventually became secondary. Barzani’s desire for autonomy reflected his father’s, Mustafa Barzani, lifelong dream of seeing a Kurdish state stand independently. Masoud Barzani held onto his father’s dream, but as Iraq became more and more of a hostile region, especially after the US invasion, Barzani swayed from the goal of an autonomous Kurdistan in favor of his own prosperity and the prosperity of Kurdistan apart from Iraqi influence. As will be discussed in later sections, it quickly became apparent to Barzani that with the rest of Iraq fighting against itself after the US invasion, it was much easier for Kurdistan to operate under the US protection and prosper, rather than call for its own independence. Talabani was also an avid supporter of the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan, but he often feared that Iraq would be partitioned amongst its ethnic groups and the Iraqi nation would be left in shambles. As the war against Saddam escalated and the United States invaded Iraq, Talabani was quick to recognize and lobby for his role as the future leader of Iraq. With this in mind, his calls for an autonomous Kurdistan quickly became a distant memory.

The views of Barzani and Talabani towards Saddam and their political platforms did have small variations, both of which appeared to be established to solidify their own futures as rulers. These variations however, are primarily products of the Kurdish divide rather than causes. Barzani’s ideology and aspirations as a leader were more near-sighted than that of Talabani, mainly due to the fact that Barzani was lobbying to rule all of Kurdistan, while Talabani was lobbying to one-day rule Iraq. As a result, Barzani spoke of Kurdish prosperity and quality of life, whereas Talabani spoke of human rights, democracy and gender equality in a unified Iraq. These varying political aspirations also influenced the opinion of each leader towards Saddam. Talabani was adamant about the need for Saddam’s removal and used his skill as an international politician to call for outside help, namely from the United States. Barzani’s views towards Saddam, though in agreement with Talabani’s, were also influenced by his alternative motives. Barzani was not against an Iraq without Saddam, but he did not want to stir up trouble with his partner in the oil smuggling business, Saddam. This partnership will soon be explained more thoroughly as a component of political opportunism. As a result of this motive, Barzani was more reluctant to partake in any action against the Iraqi military.[6] Evaluating the ideologies of Barzani and Talabani does reveal numerous differences, but as mentioned previously, many of these ideologies were a product of the divide in Kurdistan and not a cause. It is also important to recognize that while some of these ideologies are not shared by both leaders, they do not outright conflict, which makes them unlikely to fuel any unrest between the leaders. The combination of the sociological and ideological aspects of Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani as leaders does not seem to provide any evidence that these factors are the sources of the political divide in Kurdistan that would eventually lead to civil war. In fact, as will be established through the examination of the long history of violence, the foundation of the division seems to lie in political and monetary opportunism.

The history of Kurdistan and the division between the PUK and KDP have been greatly influenced by numerous opportunistic political actions by Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani. At first glance, these political actions in the power struggle that has come to define Kurdistan seem to be uncharacteristic of a group of people without a defined state. In order to understand how Barzani and Talabani have been able to survive in a position of civil war and make rash political decisions, it is important to understand the establishment of the region of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraq-Iran war lasted from 1980-1988 and signaled the beginning of the Iraqi government’s disregard for the Geneva Convention, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons. The Iraqi government under President Saddam Hussein, used chemical weapons such as mustard gas and nerve gas against the Iranians during the war, and continued use in the later years of the war against Iraqi Kurds. Kurdish guerilla forces had sided with the Iranian offensive against Saddam and as a result, on March 16, 1988 Iraqi forces dropped mustard gas on the Kurdish city of Halabja. Casualties in that attack alone were calculated in the range of 5,000 people and subsequent attacks under Saddam’s “ethnic cleansing” campaign put the death rates up towards 50,000.[7] Following these attacks, the Kurds attempted to rise against Saddam in 1991, begging the US for help. The United States initially declined any assistance and it was not until Saddam’s troops began forcing the Kurds into Turkey and Iran that President George Bush instituted the no-fly zone. The no-fly zone designated a “safe haven” in northern Iraq, the region known today as Iraqi Kurdistan, that prohibited any Iraqi troops from flying over the region. This ultimately protected the Kurds from direct repercussions from the Iraqi government. Although this generally protected the Kurds from another catastrophe like the ethnic cleansing Saddam inflicted on them in 1988, it also provided a window of opportunity for the two spheres within Kurdistan to start jostling for the position of power.

The no-fly zone and the subsequent free reign granted to Barzani and Talabani over the region provided the two Kurdish parties with the liberty to actively pursue political power without direct consequences from the Iraqi government or Saddam. With the violence between the parties under control, Saddam was not willing to enter the region and be forced to face the United States. What ensued from this freedom of political action would serve as the defining factor in the separation within Iraqi Kurdistan. Perhaps the largest point of contention between the two parties, one that has and continues to drive them repeatedly to violence, is the Khabur Bridge, the only route leading into Turkey. As a result of Saddam’s ruthlessness towards neighboring countries and specific ethnic groups in his own country, UN sanctions prohibited the export of oil out of Iraq and into Turkey. As previously mentioned, the illegal oil smuggling business developed as a method of transporting tankers of oil across the Turkish border. Throughout this time period, Barzani and the KDP had control over the Khabur Bridge and therefore also controlled the oil smuggling business. Their control of the bridge and partnership with Saddam signaled revenues for the KDP of upwards of millions of dollars a day. Not only did this make them more prosperous than the PUK, but it also left Talabani with little means to continue to fight the KDP. Controversy over this issue became the focus of the cold war and is still a largely debated issue.[8]

In an attempt to draft a constitution for the joint parliament, a peace agreement was established on July 16, 1994. Included in the agreement were promises of conducting the long postponed runoff election between Barzani and Talabani and sharing the revenue flowing in illegally from the Khabur Bridge. The KDP were clearly unhappy with the peace agreement and it was considered void by December of that year. The following year, the joint parliament was dismantled due to lack of effectiveness. With the parliament destroyed and no one to monitor the actions of the two Kurdish leaders, there was now complete separation between the spheres of influence and each began to make “dishonorable” deals in an attempt to gain the upper hand.

Initial attempts at gaining sole power over Kurdistan came in the form of questionable alliances and seemingly unethical deals that could hardly be argued as being in the best interest of the Kurdish citizens. Both parties began pulling the pesh merga (Kurdistan’s armed forces) in their direction and using the forces for their own gains, often against the opposing party. Consequently, both leaders argued that the other was using the pesh merga selfishly and was compromising the well being of the Kurdish people. Becoming aggravated with Barzani’s inability to commit to plans to unite against Saddam as well as the United States’ wavering interest in the Kurdish cause, in February 1995, Talabani decided to stage an attack on Saddam’s Fifth Corps of Iraqi Army. Talabani knew that it would be difficult for Barzani to sit out of the fight without losing credibility amongst his people. Barzani agreed to help, only to back out at the last minute and leave Talabani to go to battle on his own. The PUK managed to deliver a crushing blow to Saddam’s forces, but lacking sufficient support, they were eventually forced to retreat. The feud between Talabani and Barzani continued to grow in the next two years as they began making deals outside their own regions that not only further divided the two spheres but also extended the Kurds well beyond their military capability.

From 1995-1996 Talabani would go to unthinkable measures by inviting enemy forces into Iraqi Kurdistan simply to tip the balance of power briefly in his direction. In this manner, Talabani had been allowing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to roam freely in his region of Kurdistan, knowing full well that Barzani had been fighting against the PKK in recent years in an effort to win Turkey’s favor. The PKK is a militant organization operating primarily in Turkey and is considered a terrorist organization by the European Union, Turkey, and the United States. The stance of Barzani and Talabani on the PKK will be evaluated in more depth in the sections to come. In 1995, 35,000 Turkish troops entered Kurdistan in pursuit of the rebels from the PKK. This attempt at ruining any of Barzani’s Turkish support was then compounded with Talabani’s alliance with Iran in 1996. Having aligned himself with Iran, Talabani allowed Iranian revolutionary guards to enter Iraqi Kurdistan and attack the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Talabani was giving up his fellow Kurds in exchange for weapons and ammunition from Iran, thus providing the PUK with the means it needed to begin the slaughter of the KDP. Talabani’s unfavorable foreign allegiances would drive Barzani to commit the unthinkable in an effort to regain his political stronghold. With no aid from the United States and no chance against the Iranian backed PUK, Barzani turned to the only outlet he had left and invited Saddam’s troops into the capital city of Erbil to help him fight the PUK. The PUK were no match for Saddam’s army and were forced to flee into Iran and remain there until Saddam’s troops left Kurdistan. Barzani later justified bringing Saddam’s troops into Kurdistan, an action that many condemned as a betrayal of Kurdish unity, by citing the growing Iranian presence in PUK controlled areas.[9] Following Barzani’s brief allegiance with Saddam and the violent divide in Kurdistan reaching new heights, the issue began drawing international attention, namely from the United States.

The United States was not overly concerned with peace in Kurdistan, but it certainly did not want the violence in the region to further attract Saddam’s attention and draw his troops into Kurdistan. If Saddam were to invade Kurdistan and violate the no-fly zone established by the United States, it would require a sort of offensive by the United States military that could have easily been avoided by trying to instill peace in Kurdistan. In an effort to separate Kurdistan even further from the influence of the Iraqi government, the United States extended the no-fly zone to the 33rd parallel just south of Baghdad in conjunction with the destruction of almost all of Iraq’s air defense systems in the south. This action by the United States did not directly instill peace between Barzani and Talabani but served as their initial inclination that as much as they hated each other, there was no way they would ever be able to destroy each other. It was also quickly becoming apparent that they had a grim future if they continued to draw attention from international enemies. As long as the Kurdish parties remained divided, there was little hope that they would ever be able to overthrow Saddam. Talabani reportedly recalled that, “even Churchill cooperated with Stalin”. In October 1996, with the aid of the US Congress, a peace agreement was forged between the two parties. Under the influence of a Peace Monitoring Force (PMF), which offered $3 million and $4 million worth of vehicles, Barzani and Talabani agreed to coexist in a civil manner. This brief hope for peace however, would soon diminish in 1997 as a result of cross-border alliances.[10]

The return to violence in 1997 signaled the institution of a two government system in Iraqi Kurdistan. In 1997, the Turkish Army entered Iraqi Kurdistan with more than 50,000 troops, once again in an effort to combat the rising PKK and further segregate the Kurds within their own country. Barzani, still very much opposed to the PKK, blamed Talabani’s alliance with the military coalition as a source for the Turkish invasion, accusing him of compromising the safety of the Iraqi Kurds. The disagreement brought the two sides to violence and ended any hope of peace between the two spheres. After the Turkish invasion, both parties erected their own government with Barzani in Erbil and Talabani in Sulimaniya. The establishment of two separate governments in the region proved to even further exacerbate the feud between the leaders. It was not the case that each government was controlling their half of the region, but rather both leaders acted under the notion that their government had control over the entire region. The creation of two separate governments sparked more violence and political unrest, drawing the influence of the United States again, eventually leading to peace agreements that created the cooperation between Barzani and Talabani that can be seen today.

In 1998, the United States invited Barzani and Talabani to Washington for negotiations of peace and the Washington Agreement was constructed, serving as the beginning of any long-lasting peace in Kurdistan. The deal, though stopping the shooting between the two sides, did not resolve many of the main political issues. The PUK still accused the KDP of bringing in millions of dollars a day at the Khabur Bridge and the KDP still complained that the PUK was collaborating with the PKK. Despite these political issues that would remain in contention, both parties agreed to stop the violence and more importantly, stop inviting outside influence into the struggle for power in Kurdistan. The peace agreements brought a lot of comfort to civilians, with their only complaints being that many of them were still displaced from their families. With the cooperation between the two leaders and the lack of violence in the region, Kurdistan began to experience economic success that was far greater than that of the rest of Iraq under the Ba’athist regime. With fewer funds being used for military offensives against each other, the KDP and PUK were able to establish prosperity in Kurdistan that was unparalleled by the rest of Iraq. The prosperity in Iraqi Kurdistan was causing families to cross the border into the region everyday in the years leading up to the fall of Saddam’s regime. While the petty disagreements and unwillingness to intermix in Kurdistan continued to exist, the two parties had recognized the need to unite against Saddam’s forces. After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, there was little or no public contention between the parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Close examination of the dual-party system in Iraqi Kurdistan reveals that the political divide in the region is the product not of sociological or ideological differences between the parties, but rather of the 20th century political opportunism of the party leaders. The two spheres of influence in Kurdistan are separated by minor factors such as language, modernity and the future aspirations of the party leaders, but these differences have not been the cause of the extensive civil war in the region. Political tension and the opportunistic nature of Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, through issues such as the Khabur Bridge and the unethical alliances made in favor of gaining the upper hand in the power struggle, are the true foundations of the political divide in Iraqi Kurdistan. Though the region has been brought to peace, these issues will continue to divide the PUK and KDP. The need for aid from the United States in removing Saddam Hussein from power has served as a primary factor in bringing apparent peace between the two leaders. It is important, however, to examine how the division has changed since the US invasion of Iraq and to speculate whether or not the cooperation between Talabani and Barzani will persist after the United States withdraws its troops.

Section II. US Invasion of Iraq and the Future of the Intra-Kurdish Conflict

The peace that was established in Iraqi Kurdistan following decades of civil war has been shaped dramatically by the invasion of the United States into Iraq. Prior to a full-fledged military offensive into Iraq, the United States faced extreme difficulty in obtaining verifiable intelligence from within the region and had to work around growing Iraqi skepticism towards the United States. The eventual US invasion required significant cooperation with Kurdish forces to ensure the continuing peace between the two spheres of influence in Kurdistan. The amity between the two sides that has slowly begun to grow is largely a product of past US intervention and could easily be destroyed in the same manner. Since the US invasion of Iraq, culminating with the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003, the division between Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani has remained civil and the two leaders have refocused their efforts away from each other and towards the well-being of their citizens. The apparent cooperation that has been instilled between the two leaders is likely to hold in favor of spreading democracy, but could quickly diminish if the United States were to withdraw from Iraq prematurely and completely.

The US involvement in Iraq began well before the United States’ military officially invaded the country in 2003. Before a successful military offensive can be organized in a country, the United States government requires thorough intelligence on the region and a full assessment of the threat to American forces. Furthermore, prior to invading Iraq, the United States needed intelligence to establish the platform on which they would enter the war in the Middle East. Before the US claimed any formal involvement in the struggle against Saddam, the CIA needed to recruit field operatives within the Iraqi population to form a foundation of intelligence on which to base future military action. The CIA began sending large-scale teams into Iraq on July 10, 2002 to support the operatives already in the region and to prepare the region for the invasion of the United States’ military forces. These efforts included persuading select Iraqi military divisions to surrender during the invasion, strategizing reconnaissance missions to verify targets during the invasion, and most importantly, uniting the Kurdish pesh merga as the northern front during the US invasion. The CIA’s job of recruiting and gaining reliable information proved to be an extremely difficult task because credible information about the regime’s actions was only revealed to Saddam’s closest advisors. It also became very difficult to gain the trust of recruits due to a growing Iraqi distrust of the United States.

During the early stages of the CIA efforts in Iraq many Iraqis did not believe in the United States as a serious adversary to Saddam’s regime. A combination of faulty impressions and failed US promises led many potential Iraqi informants to believe that the US intentions were not necessarily in the best interest of the Iraqi people. There was widespread belief throughout Iraq in a conspiracy theory claiming that the US was secretly keeping Saddam in power, going so far as to say that Saddam was a paid CIA agent. According to CIA field operative Robert Baer who had been stationed in Iraq beginning in the early 1990s, “The theory dovetailed nicely with the Iraqi belief that dark, unseen forces ran the world and history could be reduced to a series of conspiracies, interconnected by an overarching design known only to a few.”[11] The conspiracy theories that kept many Iraqi informants skeptical of cooperating with the United States accused the United States government of intervening in the Middle East strictly for its own benefit. One theory suggested that the US had struck a secret agreement in 1980 with Saddam encouraging Iraq to attack Iran, thus starting the Iran-Iraq war. The United States was said to have supported such an offensive in favor of keeping Iran from establishing too much international influence. Although there turned out to be some warrant to those claims, the rumors went further to say that when Iraq succeeded in Iran, the US conspired with Kuwait to lure Iraq into invading Kuwait. Such an invasion would ensure that Iraqi forces receive a blow and the balance in the Middle East remained in the favor of the United States.

These conspiracies complicated the CIA’s task of recruitment particularly because many of them offered believable explanations for various occurrences. Some of these included the US army deciding not to pursue Saddam at the end of the Gulf War and instead allowing him to deploy his forces against popular insurrections in Iraq, as well as the US allowing Saddam to smuggle oil through US allies, such as Turkey and Jordan. Perhaps the most notable inaction by the US against Saddam came when Iraqis attempted to assassinate former President George Bush and President Clinton neglected to take formal action against Saddam. The conspiracy theory gained even more momentum in 1993 when the son of a former Iraqi prime minister, Sa’d Salih Jabir, claimed that the US had betrayed a coup against Saddam and even provided him with a list of those involved in the uprising. The reported motivation for the US keeping Saddam in power was that his authority in the Gulf would allow the US to keep peace in the region. Arab Gulf countries were more than willing to cooperate with the United States as long as the intimidating Saddam remained in power. These arguments were very logical and convincing to the people of Iraq, making it difficult to recruit proper intelligence in the region, and potentially delaying the eventual US invasion of Iraq. The claims against the reliability of the United States in an overthrow of Saddam went beyond just speculation that the US was backing Saddam and included failed promises of aid to Iraqis by US officials.

Before the US officially took action and invaded Iraq, the equivocal communication between the CIA and the US government made effective influence in Iraq difficult. Former CIA field operative, Robert Baer, recalls his days on the ground in Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom and explains that what the CIA officers saw in the field and what the US government believed was happening often conflicted.[12] This internal struggle within the US government made it difficult for the US to commit to help any insurgencies within Iraq. This lack of commitment, combined with a few failed promises, made the US appear as an unreliable source of aid for Iraqi visionaries. The State Department was reported to have made promises in the name of the CIA prior to the US invasion that were not only unlikely to be upheld, but also illegal. The promise in question was to fund a $2 million force to make sure Kurdish tensions were eliminated. The promise never materialized for obvious reasons and the US credibility in Kurdistan was greatly threatened. This could have had detrimental implications because it was crucial for the US to remain favorable in the eyes of Kurdistan and keep the Kurds from creating too much civil unrest before the US invaded. If the Kurds became violent and Saddam was forced to invade Kurdistan, it would have made a US offensive much more difficult.[13] The debatably inefficient cooperation between Washington and the CIA field operatives, paired with the growing conspiracy theories in Iraq, may have delayed the US invasion of Iraq, but ultimately were not sufficient to deter the offensive entirely. The United States went on to invade Iraq as planned and its occupation there for years to come had considerable effects on the political division in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The United States officially entered Iraq with the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003. The offensive was a military campaign orchestrated by a multinational force, which was spearheaded by the United States and the United Kingdom. Initial war platforms coming from the United States claimed that Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a looming threat to US national security and the security of US allies. Despite the fact that a United Nations inspection found no WMD in Iraq, the United States proceeded with Operation Iraqi Freedom with intentions of removing Saddam from power and setting up a model of democracy, ultimately in hopes of avoiding any future production of WMD in Iraq. Saddam was conspiring with Al-Qaeda and providing financial support to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, making his capture a high priority for the United States government.[14] The US invasion was also aimed at uniting the spheres of influence in Kurdistan. It was necessary to have peace in Kurdistan to ensure the future stability of the country and to solidify the belief in the eyes of the Iraqi people that the United States was not in fact attempting to keep Saddam in power, as was previously suggested. The United States was also well aware that Saddam’s removal from power would leave room for one of the two powers in Kurdistan to assume the role of President of Iraq. Therefore, peace between Barzani and Talabani was critical so that Iraq would not go to war with Kurdistan as soon as the US invasion was completed.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was a quick and decisive military operation. Although US and British forces met strong opposition, the majority of Iraqi military divisions were too scattered and unprepared to contend with the large conventional forces of their enemies. Much of the Iraqi controlled territory was quickly conceded to the US troops and small-scale opposition led by Iraqi soldiers dressed as civilians characterized the remainder of the invasion. Distinguishing Iraqi military from Iraqi civilians challenged the US and British forces, but the overall efficiency of the offensive proved to be a great success. Much of the success in the invasion can also be attributed to the cooperation of the Kurdish pesh merga on the northern front. The assembly of Kurdish troops not only offered an attack from the north, but also made it next to impossible for Iraqi military divisions to fall back to the north. On April 9, 2003, Baghdad officially fell, ending Saddam’s 24-year rule of the country. The United States took control of the city of Baghdad and tore down the statue of former President Hussein in symbolic fashion. Having achieved a swift victory over Iraqi forces, President George W. Bush visited the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in San Diego, CA on May 1, 2003 to announce the US success in defeating the Iraqi conventional military forces. However, even with his official removal from power, Saddam Hussein remained active in coordinating resistance against US troops until his capture on December 13, 2003 just outside the town of Tikrit.

The US invasion of Iraq had huge implications for Kurdish prosperity and success. Leading up to the fall of Saddam’s regime, Kurdistan prospered as a result of foreign aid being pumped into the region as a means of combating Saddam. The fall of Saddam’s regime could have meant a removal of outside influence and deterioration in Kurdish living conditions. Luckily for the Kurds, after the removal of Saddam in 2003, Iraq became arguably more violent and unstable than it had been in the past, maintaining the need for foreign aid. Sunni and Shi’ite tensions in Baghdad and throughout much of Iraq caused overwhelming civil conflict and the prospect of a new Iraq seemed bleak. As Iraq faltered, however, Kurdistan grew stronger. The Iraqi army was dismantled, making the Kurdish army the second strongest military force in the country behind the United States. The United States strongly favored the Kurds for their help in combating Saddam; therefore, the Kurdish pesh merga was able to raid many of the Iraqi Army’s weapons and ammunition depots, making Kurdish forces even stronger.[15] During the unrest in Iraq, Kurdistan began to build its cities, inaugurated its own parliament, selected a cabinet and ratified a regional constitution. Journalist Quil Lawrence recalls that it did not take long for him and his colleagues to realize that while they were stationed in Iraq to chronicle the destruction of the country, they were in fact witnessing the creation of Kurdistan.[16] Having looked closely at the intricacies of the US invasion and recognized that the US had begun to play a significant role in Iraq, it is crucial to analyze what this has meant for the division in Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdistan, having gained the ability to prosper apart from the remainder of Iraq, was still led by two extremely authoritarian leaders who needed to cooperate to ensure the continued success of Kurdistan.

After the US invasion of Iraq, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani remained in civilized cooperation. Although there were various instances that caused tension between the two sides and even seemed to present probable cause for violence, the two spheres refrained from violence in an effort to ensure continuing US support. The Kurds’ success was very dependent on an American presence in Iraq, and therefore, most political disagreements between the two factions took place without violent conflict. Despite their differences, Talabani and Barzani continued to remain united by their need for American and European economic aid through the Oil-for-Food Programs. The Oil-for-Food Program was established in Iraq in 1995 by the United Nations as a means of aiding Iraqi citizens without providing necessary tools for the Iraqi military to strengthen itself. The program allowed Iraqi oil to be traded on the open market in exchange for food, medicine, and other day-to-day civilian needs. Therefore, if Barzani and Talabani were to return to violence, the UN and EU could not continue the Oil-for-Food Program and willingly provide for those involved in the conflict.

Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom and in the aftermath of the invasion, Barzani and Talabani were faced with many situations in which they had to put their own personal pride aside in favor of continuing a peaceful relationship. Ultimately, the two leaders were able to go to great lengths to ensure the continuing cooperation seen today. The PUK and KDP were initially divided in their attempts to aid the CIA in search of Saddam’s supposed weapons of mass destruction. Each group searched out its own informants to aid the US, but the inefficiency of this method combined with the distrust of many Iraqis towards the US, led the two sides to eventual collaboration in advising information to the CIA. While both Kurdish leaders supported the CIA, Talabani was much more determined in his efforts to help the United States. This is most likely due to Talabani’s hope that the removal of Saddam would lead to his inauguration as Iraq’s future president. Further cooperation between the two factions in Kurdistan was noticeable in their military tactics. The Kurdish efforts on the northern front were crucial to the success of the US offensive and would most likely not have been possible if the Kurdish forces were involved in a power struggle. After the invasion, the two factions continued to show signs of unity, forming a joint military command, with all action being authorized by the Americans. Talabani’s PUK commanded all Kurdish forces in the city of Kirkuk and Barzani’s KDP supervised the pesh merga fighting in and around the city of Mosul. The joint military command with each leader controlling his own section of the region provided a great test of the leaders’ devotion to peace.

The first sings that cooperation between the two factions might falter came when Talabani’s forces gained control of Kirkuk. The PUK was reported to have rolled into the city in a hero’s manner, infuriating the KDP and the United States. The KDP felt slighted because while they were manning their posts in Mosul, the PUK were reaping the benefits of the oil refineries in Kirkuk. These disputes escalated, but never resulted in outright violence and when Saddam’s troops were overrun shortly after, the two Kurdish leaders put the issue aside in the interest of creating an interim government in Baghdad. Saddam’s removal from power led to celebrations in Baghdad and looting and lawlessness quickly overtook the city. An interim government was crucial to ensure that the destruction did not reach monumental levels. On July 13, 2003 an American proconsul appointed a governing council in Baghdad, which included both Barzani and Talabani.

With an interim government in place in Baghdad, speculation came as to who would be the next Iraqi president and furthermore, what Iraqi-Kurdish relations would look like in the future. These questions were quickly answered through yet another sign of unity between the PUK and KDP. In February 2004, Arab suicide bombers killed hundreds of KDP officials in an attack and the Kurdish response was to close off Kurdistan to all Arabs in Iraq. Arabs were rounded up and removed from the KDP capital city of Erbil. This explained what was likely to come of future Iraqi-Kurdish relations with the naming of the new Iraqi president occurring in May 2005. After months of disputes over the level of representation of the Kurds in the Iraqi government, a formal government was established in Baghdad with Talabani as the new president. Although it was Talabani who claimed the role of Iraqi president, Barzani would establish his reign shortly after. In June 2005, Barzani inaugurated the first session of Kurdistan reunified Parliament with himself as the president of the region. It was necessary for the Kurds to wait until the government in Baghdad was solidified with Talabani as the president before they could establish the new Kurdistan Regional Government. Had Talabani’s place in the Iraqi government not been determined, it would have likely brought contention within the Kurdish government with two authoritarian figures struggling for power. Having solidified their new ruling domains, Barzani and Talabani had to decide whether their future was going to be one of continued peace or if they would return to the violent civil war to which they are so accustomed. This decision however, was and continues to be not only in their hands, but also in the hands of the United States government.

Although Iraq can be viewed very much as an unstable country, the presence of the United States forces in the region has upheld a balance between Talabani’s government in Baghdad and Barzani’s government in Kurdistan with little or no violence between them. If the US were to remove its troops entirely from Iraq, there are enough sources of contention between the two governments, namely their leaders, that conflict would likely arise. Since their respective inaugurations as presidents of Iraq and Kurdistan, Talabani and Barzani have made little effort towards a unified Iraq. The tension between the two leaders has not led to violence up to this point, but it appears as if each leader is building their regime for potential violence if the US were to prematurely pull out of Iraq. Barzani’s efforts to establish Kurdistan as a separate entity from Iraq has fueled growing patriotism amongst the Kurds and in September 2006, Barzani ordered that the Iraqi national flag not be flown inside Kurdish Regional Government buildings. Distrust of the Iraqi government flourished throughout the Kurdish community, making claims against Talabani’s leadership decisions. Talabani was said to be using little or no funds to rebuild Halabja, the commemoration site of those lost during Saddam’s ethnic cleansings, but had recently built himself a new mansion in the hills above Sulimaniya.[17] The two leaders, though cooperative with one another under the watchful eye of the United States, appeared to be reestablishing their reign as authoritarian figures. Talabani showed little recognition of the Kurdish needs and Barzani had stacked most of the Kurdish government with his own family members. The two leaders would not openly initiate violence with each other as long as the United States remained in the region, but a withdrawal of US troops would likely provide an opening for violence to start.

There are several main sources of contention between Barzani and Talabani that provide probable cause for violence if the United States were to exit Iraq completely. During the US invasion, the Kurds extended themselves well outside the “safe haven” or no-fly zone established by the United States. Without the protection of US troops, the land the Kurds have moved into without claim would be considered valuable enough to instigate conflict. Talabani and the Iraqi government would not allow their territory to be overtaken by the Kurdish people and would undoubtedly attempt to force the Kurds back into the no-fly zone.

Perhaps one of the most largely debated topics in Iraq and the source for continuous violence in the Middle East is oil rights. The US invasion sidelined most negotiations about oil rights in Iraq, but an end to the US occupation of Iraq would bring the topic of oil rights to the forefront of negotiations between Talabani and Barzani. With the Kurds having moved into the city of Kirkuk, home to a large portion of oil refineries in Iraq, the Iraqi government would certainly go to great lengths to regain control of the city. These economically dominant oil refineries would without question spur violence between the Iraqi and Kurdish forces. With close to 17% of Iraq’s oil revenue coming from Kirkuk alone, control of the city is crucial to the success of both governments and Talabani would certainly not be willing to sit idly and watch Barzani enjoy the spoils of Kirkuk. Along the same lines of economic prosperity, the Kurds were reported to have secured $1.4 billion in leftover funds from the United Nations’ Oil-for-Food Program. This huge sum of capital, with each government having equal claim to it, would be more than enough of a reason for Talabani to initiate violence against the Kurds. These economic and political motivations are significant causes for violence and a disruption of the cooperation that has characterized Barzani and Talabani since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, but it is unlikely that any violence would result as long as the US remains in the region.

The reestablishment of the political division between Barzani and Talabani between two separate governments in Iraq has not come without opposition. Although the two leaders have remained relatively civilized since the US invasion of Iraq, the cooperation has given rise to numerous points of contention. These hotly debated issues have not spurred violence to date, but a potential absence of US influence in Iraq would likely bring all peaceful negotiations to an end. Debates over these economically and politically prominent issues are too important to the success of each government for drastic action to not be taken. An opening for this action would certainly come if the US efforts in Iraq diminished, leaving Iraqi citizens caught in a domestic power struggle between Barzani and Talabani. Having examined the division between Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani and their long-lasting feud in great detail, it is important to look outside the borders of Iraq. Surrounding countries such as Turkey, Iran and Syria have played a substantial role in both the history and politics of Iraqi Kurdistan and its two historic leaders. Analysis of these countries and their impact on the Kurdish people will provide even further insight into the complexity of the political rollercoaster that has come to define Kurdistan.

Section III. Turkish-Kurdish Relations

The dispersal of the Kurds and consequential influence on the politics in Iraqi Kurdistan has spread well beyond the Iraqi borders. The establishment of the Kurdish population in Turkey combined with the onset of the Kurdish human rights movements has largely impacted the political dynamics in both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turkish treatment of the Kurdish population within Turkey has been characterized by brutal destruction of villages and displacement of civilians. With the exception of short periods of benevolence, primarily motivated by Turkey’s desire to join the European Union, Turkey has treated their Kurdish inhabitants as inferior intruders. Furthermore, the formation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has brought extreme activism against the Turkish government and Kurdish citizens alike. The Iraqi Kurds’ views towards the PKK and the Turkish government have split and are parallel to the political division in Iraqi Kurdistan and their willingness to sympathize with Kurds in Turkey is limited by fear of risking Kurdish prosperity in Iraq.

The formation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 followed the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Aiding in this formation, Turkish army officer, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, led the Turkish national movement against the Allies in what came to be known as the Turkish War of Independence. Ataturk’s ability to lead the Turkish military forces to decisive victories against the Allies’ intervention, alongside the establishment of a provisional government in Ankara, signified the founding of the Turkish state. Shortly after Ataturk’s triumph as founder of the Republic of Turkey and his immediate induction as the country’s first president, the Treaty of Lausanne solidified Turkey’s recognition as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty however, did not offer any land rights to the Kurdish population, resulting in their dispersal amongst Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Initial negotiations on land redistribution during the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire called for Kurdish recognition in the autonomous state of Kurdistan. The Allies’ intentions of recognizing the Kurdish state were short-lived as a result of continuing Turkish occupation of the areas in question, thus leaving the Kurds’ without a formal home. Furthering the issue of the slighted Kurds, President Ataturk’s original promises of civil cooperation with the Kurdish inhabitants of Turkey were not kept and Kurdish nationalists quickly began to distrust the Turkish government.

Kurdish-Turkish relations were unstable from the beginning as marked by a series of Kurdish rebellions starting in 1925. The first uprising in 1925, led by Shaykh Ubaydullah, effectively unified the both geographically and ideologically dispersed Kurds under a common distrust of Turkish nationalists. The rebellion lasted several months only to be overcome by the much stronger Turkish military forces. Subsequent Kurdish insurgencies came in the years 1930-1938 under similar motivations, only to end in the loss of lives on both sides and incalculable destruction of civilian villages. The Kurdish uprisings led to minimal gains, but more notably resulted in the dramatic assertion of power by the Turkish government. According to President Ataturk, the Kurdish citizens were unwelcome foreigners; therefore, he refused to tolerate any civil unrest and began to establish his reign over them.

Following the series of rebellions against the Turkish government, Ataturk placed the Kurdish inhabited southeastern region of Turkey under martial law and military occupation. Ataturk’s political influence as a visionary for the Turkish people had a significant impact on his actions towards the Kurdish people. The political and economic reform of his presidency consistently aimed at breaking away from past roles as Muslim inferiors in the Empire system. This resulted in his obsessive desire to rule the Kurdish intruders in the same oppressive manner under which his people had been ruled. The establishment of Turkey as a modernized democratic state was thus overshadowed by Ataturk’s vision and consequently did not become a reality until after his death in 1938. Despite increasing signs of democracy following Ataturk’s death, direct intervention by the Turkish government lasted until the formation of the PKK in 1978 with the Kurdish inhabitants experiencing lasting destruction of villages, massive displacement and distrust of the Turkish nationalists throughout the period.[18] Turkey’s membership into NATO expanded the Turkish military and accordingly strengthened the grip of the Turkish government on the Kurds. These forces were called into action in the coming years with a new party, the PKK, entering into the power struggle of Turkish Kurdistan.

The ongoing tension between the Turkish government and the Kurdish population in Turkey extended beyond military occupation to strict prohibitions against expressions of Kurdish culture. The Turkish government instituted a ban of the use of the Kurdish language and even declared it illegal to refer to the Kurdish population as separate from Turkey. These strict injunctions against Kurdish culture did little to subdue their desire for recognition and even had the unintended effect of fueling a Kurdish national identity as distinct from Turkish national identity. Additionally, changes in the Turkish constitution in 1961 instilled a stronger sense of Kurdish pride and provided the framework on which the PKK would be formed in the late 1970s. The new Turkish constitution was established as a result of a growing movement within Turkish politics that aimed to improve underdevelopment in parts of Turkey, namely the Kurdish southeast. The movement gained enough support to alter the constitution, allowing for greater freedom of political expression. Kurdish culture was permitted in public conversation and the Turkish government no longer viewed the formation of Kurdish media as a “threat to national security.”[19]

These attempts by the Turkish government to spur development in the southeast had unintended consequences, opening the door to a growing sense of Kurdish nationalism. The PKK was established in 1978, serving as a radical movement for Kurdish autonomy and initiating intense guerrilla war in Turkey. The organization’s initial ideology adhered to Marxism, citing the desire for human liberation, but this was later altered in favor of shifting focus towards obtaining national independence. The PKK’s foundation as an anti-colonial movement sought to conquer those who opposed the prospect of future Kurdish independence through guerilla warfare. The PKK’s guerilla warfare tactics of blending into civilian society made them especially dangerous and capable. Whether it was against Kurdish “traitors” who were unwilling to join in the active stance against the Turkish government or the Turkish armed forces themselves, the PKK brought a whirlwind of violence to Turkish-Kurdish relations.[20]

PKK actions against the Turkish government and military forces earned them the title of a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States. However, the violence of the PKK was not only directed towards the Turks since a large portion of the actions targeted fellow Kurds who were accused of standing in the way of a greater Kurdish state. The PKK’s use of fear to unify the remainder of the Kurdish population under their ideals had unforeseen results, allowing the Turkish government in Ankara to divide the Kurdish population and drive them further away from cooperation with the PKK.

In 1985, following violent attacks by the PKK on Kurdish communities, the Turkish government effectively divided the Kurdish population against itself. With little means to combat the attacking PKK, the Kurdish civilians needed an alternative to joining the terrorist organization or risking complete annihilation at its hands. The Turkish government solved this problem by establishing what came to be known as the “village guard system”.[21] This system provided Kurdish civilians with arms and funds to protect their villages from PKK destruction. Guards were hired from strategically selected anti-PKK villages and provided with the supplies necessary to stage a defense, receiving funds from the government through their local chiefs. This system proved very effective for the Turkish government because not only did it employ an ally against the PKK, but it also made the poor Kurdish villages monetarily dependent on the Kurdish government. The funds provided for the guard system made the Kurdish chiefs less violent towards the Turkish government, which was crucial in their cooperation to defend against the PKK. The village guards were not only beneficial to the Turkish government as a means of fighting the PKK without risking defeat to the Turkish military, but also as a way of gaining useful information regarding the PKK’s actions. As was mentioned previously, the ability of the PKK insurgents to blend into Kurdish society combined with the Kurdish language barrier made it extremely difficult for the Turks to intercept PKK intelligence without the help of the village guards.

Despite attempts by the Turkish government to persuade the Kurds in their favor, the majority of the Kurdish civilians in Turkey remained caught between the violent PKK and the combination of the Turkish armed forces and the village guards. Refusing cooperation with the PKK and siding with the Turkish government meant giving up hope of Kurdish autonomy, but the opposite decision meant choosing a life of violent radicalism. The Turkish government and the village guards were brutally violent towards the Kurdish civilians, knowing full well that the civilians would give priority to their needs for protection and funds. The Turkish government became more violent over the years and the PKK was far from a peaceful organization. With neither side presenting an appealing front, many Kurds gave their support to the PKK, opposing the government that had challenged their cultural, political, and economic well being for years. Those that could not choose between the two seemingly unpalatable sides fled Turkey by the thousands.

Although Turkey had aided many Kurdish villages against the PKK, the Turkish treatment of its Kurdish inhabitants remained poor. The Kurdish struggle for human rights began to grow in southeast Turkey, commonly referred to as Turkish Kurdistan, and was given much needed leverage by the Turkish government’s yearning to incorporate Turkey into the western world. Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union beginning in 1959 motivated a temporary improvement in the Turkish treatment towards the Kurds. European popular opinion mostly favored the Kurdish human rights movement, strongly opposing the PKK and the actions of the Turkish government. Turkey was granted an associate membership into the EU in 1963 and signs of increased Turkish-Kurdish relations appeared to be on the forefront of Turkish priorities. Kurdish culture was slowly allowed to spread throughout the region, but legal and cultural rights continued to be neglected.

The period of associate membership lasted until 1987 when the new Turkish president, Turgut Özal, submitted Turkey’s application for official membership into the European Union. The Turkish application did not receive strong support by the majority of European countries, citing several Turkish shortcomings ranging from questionable international relations to the denial of human rights of the Kurdish population. Turkey was formally removed from the membership process in 1997 for failing to show signs of rectifying the human rights issues. The Kurdish human rights struggle did not receive the support it needed and the Kurds continued to live as second-rate citizens in Turkey. Without an admission to the European Union, international pressure towards the Turkish government over the improved treatment of the Kurds did not have the authority to instill significant change.

With the future of the Kurds in Turkey appearing to hold nothing but continued oppression, Turkey was granted a return to EU negotiations in 1999, this time with the backing of the United States. Turkey had gained strong US favor earlier that year by assisting in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the PKK. Öcalan had been operating in Turkey and Syria in the years leading up to his capture, choreographing the violent PKK actions against the Turkish government. He had become a priority of the US government for his terrorist actions against the Turks and Kurds alike. American officials argued that despite Öcalan’s claims to have been fighting for an autonomous Kurdish state, his actions were hindering international efforts by the US and several European countries to improve the human rights issues of the Kurds. The capture of Öcalan came with mixed emotions amongst the Kurds, ranging from celebrations to riots. With Öcalan captured and the US now backing Turkey’s EU efforts, the EU increased pressure on Turkey to grant the Kurds more cultural autonomy and political participation. Turkish reform began to arise on many legal issues regarding the Kurdish population in the southeast.[22] The Turkish efforts to join the European Union meant increased international recognition of the Kurds and provided much needed cultural reform in the region. The Turkish government began minor improvements of the Kurdish condition, but unfortunately these eventually proved not to be significant enough to sway the EU. Turkey’s failed admission into the EU meant that the brief hope for human rights and freedom of cultural identity was gone and the Kurds remained stagnant in their struggle for improvement.

The bleak future of the Kurds at the hands of the Turkish government led many Kurds to flea into Iraq, hoping to enjoy the freedom and prosperity that was quickly becoming synonymous with the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan. The migration of many Kurds across the border resulted in the Turkish government’s attempts to control the Kurdish people on an international level. Such action, however, would require not only a means of continuing to oppress the Kurds, but also a vantage point to hold power over the Iraqis. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers running through Turkey gave the Turkish government control over the water supply in Iraq, serving as a potential source of power for the Turkish government to control both the Kurds in their country and those living within the borders of Iraq. The Turkish government proposed a project entitled the GAP (Guney Dogu Projesi) that claimed to provide inexpensive power and socio-economic development to the poorest regions of Turkey. The GAP was a development project that was scheduled to begin in eight provinces in Turkey with the intentions of building 22 dams and extensive irrigation networks centered in the Turkish Kurdistan region of the Euphrates and Tigris headwaters. The Turkish government propagandized this project, focusing on the lasting problems in the southeast, while neglecting to mention the inherent power that the control of the water supply provided over the Kurds.[23]

Although the project never materialized, the significance of the project exists in the underlying intentions of the Turkish government. Aside from the political implications of the project, if the networks were actually built they would fail to yield the outcomes intended, increasing tensions in the Turkish Kurdistan region. The development scenario behind the project would likely result in Turkish workers obtaining all the newly created jobs, leaving the income disparity in the Kurdish region even larger than it previously had been. Furthermore, the environmental implications of the dams reveal that increased agricultural pollution upstream of the dams would result in a significant decrease in water quality in the Kurdish region.[24] While the publicly claimed intentions of the project would likely not be met and environmental risks would arise, the ability of Turkey to use the dams as a means of monitoring the water supply in the southeast and Iraq prevails as the largest international concern for the project. Turkey assured that it would never use the dams as a means of power, but control of the dams would ultimately give Turkey significant control over the water supply in Iraq and Syria. Turkey has been reported to have used such tactics in the past against Syria for supporting the PKK, making promises to the Turkish government lacking in credibility. The project would also have detrimental consequences to the Kurdish villages within Turkey. The dams would create reservoirs in the southeast, thereby flooding countless Kurdish villages and displacing thousands of Kurdish civilians. The use of such flooding would be an effective way for the Turkish government to not only displace Kurdish communities, but also to further dismantle Kurdish tribal systems in Turkey.

Large portions of the displaced Kurds fleeing Turkey into neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan made the Turkish government, the Turkish Kurds and the PKK highly debated issues amongst the Iraqi Kurdish leaders.[25] The Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani quickly began to align themselves with either the Turkish government or the PKK. Barzani opened channels of communication with the Turkish government, allowing them to seek out and kill the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan after Talabani made clear his alliance with the organization. Talabani allowed the PKK to roam freely throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, leading Turkey to enter Iraqi Kurdistan in 1995 with 35,000 troops in pursuit of the rebels. Talabani’s alleged cooperation with the PKK continued and became a strong point of contention in formulating the Washington Agreement in 1998.

Although Barzani had positioned himself in support of the Turkish government, a stance strongly opposed by Talabani, his allegiance came into question with the beginning of the US invasion into Iraq. In 2003, any support of the Turkish government in Iraqi Kurdistan diminished when Turkey refused to allow the US forces to enter Iraq through the Turkish border. The inability of the Americans to enter Iraq through the northern border with Turkey played a vital role in empowering the Kurdish pesh merga as the northern front in the US offensive. This joint effort between the Iraqi Kurds and the Americans effectively deterred increased large-scale violence between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurds, due to the widespread fear of the US amongst the rebels. The PKK continued sporadic violence with both the Kurds in Iraq and the Turkish government until October 2006 when Barzani and Talabani, through a joint effort, pressured the PKK into a cease-fire with Turkey. The Turkish government refused the cease-fire almost immediately, claiming that they would not negotiate with terrorists. In response, the PKK guerilla leader, Murat Karayilan, announced the PKK’s desire to form a confederation with the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, all based on the system enjoyed by the Kurds in Iraq.[26] The confederation in question was not viewed favorably by either of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Barzani had always been in grave opposition to the PKK, making a joint effort with PKK members unthinkable, and Talabani who had throughout history shown favor to the PPK, sided with the voice of the citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan against a united Kurdish people.

The Iraqi Kurdish opposition to movements toward a joint Kurdistan came not out of animosity towards their fellow Kurds, but rather out of fear of losing the lavish lifestyle they were quickly establishing. The Iraqi Kurds understood that the freedoms they experienced within Iraq, namely their prosperous functioning apart from the Iraqi government, were not shared universally by Kurds in other states. An effort to unite the Kurds that were dispersed throughout Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, and to form an autonomous Kurdish state regardless of the level of success, would undoubtedly not result in the same lifestyle the Kurds were enjoying in Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition, the political and military action that would ensue from the governments of the four countries would be detrimental to the region.

The formation of the PKK within modern day Turkey combined with the repressive nature of the Turkish-Kurdish relations in Turkish Kurdistan have effectively made the region a hotbed for political and cultural opportunism. The ability of the Turkish government to overpower and control the Kurds in their country brought the human rights struggle of the Turkish Kurds to international consciousness. With the Kurds caught between the brutal treatment by the Turkish government against the violent PKK, neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan has been forced to choose sides. The initial split between the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Barzani and Talabani, resulted in military action by both the Turkish government and PKK against the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds alike. This division amongst the Iraqi Kurdish leaders eventually deteriorated, with both leaders siding against the Turkish government and the PKK. While the future of the widely dispersed Kurdish people has been significantly shaped by political and military struggles within Turkey and Iraq, the Kurdish people have called various other countries home, namely Iran and Syria, thus broadening the already intensely debated international issue.

Section IV. Kurdish human rights struggles in Iran and Syria

The high profile political movements for Kurdish rights in Iraq and Turkey have slightly overshadowed those of Iran and Syria, though these countries are home to debatably even greater signs of tyrannical rule over the Kurdish population. The lives of the Iranian and Syrian Kurds have been characterized by political, economic and cultural oppression, stemming from a long history of tension with the respective national government of each country. Extensive Kurdish political movements by both the Iranian and Syrian Kurds have brought international recognition to their struggle, unifying a greater Kurdish identity. These efforts however, have produced minimal results in terms of improved living conditions for the Kurds. The Kurds in Iran and Syria, despite minor aid from the leaders within Iraqi Kurdistan, continue to live under the strict rule of the Iranian and Syrian governments and show limited signs for progress in the future.

Prior to WWI, Iran was divided between Russian and British control, with the Russians controlling the northern region and the British controlling the southern region. The Russian Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 effectively decreased the level of Russian influence in Iran, leaving the country subject to the British imperial rule. The Iranian government slowly began to gain recognition as it strengthened from underneath the rule of the Qajar dynasty that was controlling Iran since 1794. The dynasty began to rise to power as a small scale Islamic movement and eventually grew into a national party defined by monarchical ruling tendencies. The dynasty however, was centered around a small group of Islamic extremists, making it difficult to remain in power after the birth of the Iranian national government. The two ruling powers in Iran, the national government and the Qajar dynasty, were often in opposition, denying the ability to exude authority over the broad Iranian population. The Iranian government began to weaken following WWI, and by the time the dynasty was overthrown in 1925, it had lost all ruling power over its territories as a result of the increasing pro-British actions of the government.[27]

The overthrow of the Qajar dynasty in 1925 by a patriotic uprising of Iranian military forces led by colonel Reza Khan signified a drastic decrease in British influence in Iran. The removal of pro-British politics from the government quelled the growing unrest of the Iranian citizens, making Reza Khan an extremely appealing candidate for the new ruler of Iran. Khan was named the Shah of Iran in 1926, a title historically given to the “king of kings” of Iran, and began his rule as a visionary for the Iranians and a nightmare for the Kurds.

The Iranian Kurds inhabited the region west of Lake Urumiya, popularly referred to as Iranian Kurdistan. The local Kurdish chief, Ismail Agha (Simko), ruled Iranian Kurdistan, leading the Kurds to numerous violent rebellions against the Iranian government throughout the 1920s. Reza Shah saw a bright future for the Iranians, striving for “a secular, westernized society, promoting industrialization and economic self-assurance.”[28] These aspirations for the Iranians, however, did not involve the Iranian Kurds. Simko’s constant attempts to unify the Kurdish chiefs in opposition of the Iranian government segregated the Kurdish people from the remainder of the Iranian population and established the Kurdish people’s unwillingness to assimilate into Iranian society. Consequently, Reza Shah controlled Iranian Kurdistan with brutality and force, increasing the militarization in the region, attacking Kurdish tribes, and resettling nomadic Kurds. The most notably oppressive action towards the Kurds developed with the Iranian government’s assassination of the Kurdish leader, Simko, in 1930. Following the assassination, Reza Shah forced all the remaining Kurdish chiefs into exile and claimed their land as belonging to the Iranian government.

Although Reza Shah limited the British influence in Iran, signs of British power remained noticeable in Iranian politics. In an effort to eliminate this entirely, Reza Shah began opening international relations with Germany prior to WWII, knowing that this would undermine any British efforts to continue influencing the Iranian political system. These actions however, did not meet their intended outcomes and the Iranian government was thus weakened. The government established its permanent headquarters in Tehran, leaving the capital’s previous location, Mashabad, unoccupied and a prime setting for Simko’s successors to establish independence for the Kurdish people. The transition of the Iranian Kurdish political center to Mashabad in 1942 signaled an increased mobilization of the Kurdish people and the formation of several Kurdish political movements. The formation of the Komala (Revolutionary Organization of Kurdish Toilers) and their subsequent call for Jiani Kurdistan (rebirth of Kurdistan) organized an array of Kurdish human rights movements and eventually resulted in the formation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I). The KDP-I was led by Simko’s successor, Qazi Muhammed, and sought to enhance the Kurdish condition through Kurdish cultural, economic, and political development.[29]

The initial success of the KDP-I depended entirely on the support of the Soviets, who had lost control over Iran during the Bolshevik Revolution and were more than willing to support the KDP-I against the Iranian government. Therefore, when the Soviets withdrew their backing in 1946, the Iranian government in Tehran began to reestablish its control over the Kurds. The movement towards an improved Kurdish lifestyle was greatly compromised when the Iranian government began to arrest all known Kurdish military officers and even executed the Kurdish leader, Qazi Muhammed. The brutal oppression of Kurdish culture in Iran resulted in increased Kurdish migration into Iraq. The KDP, having already established a level of success in Iraq, provided protection that the KDP-I failed to offer without Soviet support. Despite these setbacks at the hands of the Iranian government, the KDP-I continued to operate in Iran and organized numerous localized rebellions.

Attempts to regain the Kurdish cultural identity were smothered by the Iranian government were met with extreme opposition by the national military forces. Executions and extreme repression characterized Iranian Kurdistan for decades leading up to the Iran-Iraq war in 1980.[30] The KDP-I, with little chance against the Iranian government, formed an agreement with Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war. This plan backfired however, when the KDP assisted Tehran in overtaking much of the KDP-I in western Iran. This proved crucial following the war, allowing the Iranian government to assume almost complete control over Iranian Kurdistan. The Kurdish condition in Iran has not showed signs of improvement in recent decades, making the future appear bleak for the Iranian Kurds. The growing Sunni-Shi’ite tensions in the Middle East have made the Kurds subject to even further brutality in Iran. The Kurds in Iran are predominantly Sunni, putting them at an extreme disadvantage against the Shi’ite controlled Iranian government. The subsequent tensions resulting from this divide have made the Iranian Kurds appear even farther from future prosperity in Iran.[31]

The Kurds inhabiting Syria have experienced much of the same political, cultural, and economic repression as the Kurds in Iran and Turkey. The majority of the Syrian Kurdish population resides along the border with Turkey in the Kurd-Dagh and Jazira regions. These areas, also referred to as the “Kurdish Mountains”, are home to between one and three million Kurdish inhabitants. The estimates of the Kurdish population in Syria are uncertain due to governmental anti-Kurdish policies and census manipulations throughout Syria.[32] There are also smaller populations of Syrian Kurds throughout many of the major cities, including Aleppo and Damascus.

The history of the human rights struggle amongst Syrian Kurds began in the aftermath of WWI with the establishment of the French Mandate (1920-1946). The French Mandate effectively partitioned the Ottoman Empire in Syria between French and British rule. While British rule in Syria very much resembled the British rule in Iran the French control over part of Syria and modern day Lebanon aimed specifically at diminishing the cultural identity of the Kurdish people. Linguistic and civil rights were immediately banned from society, and out of fear of a unified Kurdish uprising against an established Syrian identity, the French removed all formal Kurdish education from the country.

As was seen throughout most Kurdish inhabited countries, calls for autonomy and civil rights for the Kurds began in 1928, but did not show any signs of support until after WWII when Syria came under complete British control. For almost a decade the Kurdish people began to experience improvements towards cultural freedoms. These luxuries came to an abrupt end however, with the formation of the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP-S) in 1957. This radical movement, seen as an immediate threat to the Syrian government due to the violent nature of the KDP in Iraq, was quickly banned and the Syrian government began to exert its power over the growing Kurdish population.[33]

Continual Kurdish efforts in Syria and Iran to obtain the cultural rights and prosperity that existed in Iraqi Kurdistan had negative consequences in Syria, leading to one of the most dramatic actions against human rights in Kurdish history. The 1961 Kurdish uprising in Iraq combined with the Syrian Kurds’ hopes for a greater Kurdish unification resulted in the Syrian government exerting total control over the Kurds in Syria. With the growing inclination that the Syrian Kurds would soon follow in the violent, rebellious footsteps of the Iraqi Kurds, the Syrian government went to great extremes to segregate the Kurds and remove their cultural, political, and economic rights.

In 1962, the Syrian government conducted a national census, ultimately classifying upwards of 120,000 Kurds in the Kurdish northeastern regions of the country as ajanib, or foreigners.[34] The refusal to grant citizenship to the Kurds and the requirement that each Kurdish individual carry an identification card served to remove rights such as voting privileges, property and business ownership, and even restricted work in most professional jobs. The effects of this policy on the economic status of the Kurds were unthinkable and to this day show little or no signs of improvement. The lack of citizenship made it extremely difficult for Kurds to leave and/or enter Syria, thus separating the Syrian Kurds from any unified cooperation with Kurds throughout the Middle East. The implications of the identification system extended even further to inhibit all future Kurdish cultural development. The estimated 75,000 Kurdish children in Syria were not granted any documentation, making access to education and child services next to impossible. This lack of future human capital of the Syrian Kurds, without an influx of international support, will doom the Syrian Kurds to a continued life of extensive repression.[35] Although negotiations between the Syrian Kurds and the Syrian government have been undertaken since August 2001, the Kurdish expectations of improvement have not been met with serious consideration to this point. The bleak future characterizing the Syrian Kurds has resulted in thousands of individuals risking their lack of citizenship and fleeing into various European countries.

The initial reactions of both Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani and the new Iraqi President Jala Talabani towards the Syrian and Iranian Kurds were unfavorable. Despite the fact that Barzani received substantial aid from Iran throughout the early years of his reign, he pledged to shut the door to Iran in 1996 when Talabani continually allowed Iranian military forces into Iraq to attack the KDP-I. Barzani fought for a unified KDP movement amongst the party’s branches in Iraq, Iran and Syria, making Talabani’s blatant disapproval for the party’s presence in Iraq reason to shut off Iraqi Kurdistan to any Iranian and Syrian military troops. Support for the KDP-I and KDP-S however, did not extend to all Kurdish inhabitants of Iran and Syria. As has been mentioned in previous sections, the Iraqi Kurds understood that their success in Iraq was contingent on forbidding to provide a haven for all Kurds in the Middle East. Serving as a public display of this stance, by 2004 thousands of Iranian and Syrian Kurds entering Iraq found themselves thrown into closely monitored refugee camps. This action by the Iraqi Kurds was fueled both by fear of risking their lifestyle for their fellow Kurds, as well as fear of harboring refugees from the disgruntled neighboring national governments. The pesh merga supervised these camps closely in order to limit Kurdish refugee mobility and divert attention away from any movements towards a Kurdish autonomous region.[36]

Iraqi Kurdish opinion of the Kurds flooding into their region however, has since improved. Barzani and Talabani have recognized the importance of establishing Kurdish education for not only the Kurds in Iraq, but for all Kurds. The Kurdish population in the Middle East has begun to reach a level in which they will undoubtedly have an impact on economic and political issues, making their education crucial to the success of the countries in question. Understanding this growing reality, Iraqi Kurdistan has begun to open its universities to Kurds from both Iran and Syria. The future implications of an increasingly educated Kurdish population are unclear to this point, but will certainly continue to bring the human rights struggle of the Kurds to the forefront of international discussion.

The growing struggles of the Kurdish population in the Middle East leaves both the Kurds themselves and international powers with important decisions to make. In order for the Kurds to successfully overcome the oppression by the governments of Turkey, Iran and Syria, they need to be willing to move towards a greater Kurdish unification and fight for Kurdish autonomy. This however, is also very contingent on the Iraqi Kurds and their willingness to risk their relative comfort for their oppressed brothers. Without a concrete commitment of cooperation by the Iraqi Kurds, any attempts at autonomy will likely fall short. Furthermore, if the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria were to unify, they would require international support in order to achieve ultimate success. Whether this international support will materialize is yet to be seen and the Kurds continue to live the lives of unwelcome foreigners throughout much of the Middle East.

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[1] Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the

Middle East. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

[2] Lawrence, Ibid.

[3] Roston, Aram. The Man Who Pushed America to War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi. (101-113). Public Affairs, 2009.

[4] Roston, Ibid.

[5] Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the

Middle East. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

[6] Baer, Robert. See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism.

New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003.

[7] Baer, Ibid.

[8] Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the

Middle East. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

[9] Gurr, Ted Robert, and Harff, Barbara. Ethnic conflict in world politics. 2nd ed. (35-65). Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2003.

[10] Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the

Middle East. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

[11] Baer, Robert. See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism.

New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003.

[12] Baer, Ibid.

[13] Baer, Ibid.

[14] Boyne, Walter J. Operation Iraqi Freedom; What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why. New York: Forge Books, 2003.

[15] O'Leary, Brendan, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih. Future of Kurdistan in Iraq. Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania, 2005.

[16] Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the

Middle East. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

[17] Lawrence, Ibid.

[18] Dahlman, Carl. "The Political Geography of Kurdistan." Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2002: 271-99.

[19] Kendal, Nezan. A People without a Country: The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire. London, UK: Zed Books, 1993.

[20] Dahlman, Carl. "The Political Geography of Kurdistan." Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2002: 271-99.

[21] Dahlman, Carl. Ibid.

[22] Dahlman, Carl. Ibid.

[23] Tomanbay, Mehmet. “Sharing the Euphrates: Turkey,” Research and Exploration, Special Water

Issue, 52-61, 1993.

[24] Dahlman, Carl. "The Political Geography of Kurdistan." Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2002: 271-99.

[25] Baer, Robert. See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003.

[26] Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

[27] Dahlman, Carl. "The Political Geography of Kurdistan." Eurasian Geography and Economics,

2002: 271-99.

[28] Cleveland, William. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

[29] Roosevelt, Archie. “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” in Gerard Chaliand, ed., A People

Without a Country. London, UK: Zed Books, 1993.

[30] Dahlman, Carl. "The Political Geography of Kurdistan." Eurasian Geography and Economics,

2002: 271-99.

[31] Dahlman, Ibid.

[32] Yildiz, Kerim. The Kurds in Syria The Forgotten People. New York: Pluto, 2006.

[33] Dahlman, Carl. "The Political Geography of Kurdistan." Eurasian Geography and Economics,

2002: 271-99.

[34] Dahlman, Ibid.

[35] Hasanpour, Amir. “The Language Policy of Syria,” Kurdish Times, 1991.

[36] Lawrence, Quil. Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the

Middle East. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

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