GoI for Dummies - GJPI
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Introduction to Iraq:
A summary of Iraq’s government, political groups and personalities
26 December 2008
Prepared by: Sandra Beutler
Edited by: Dr. Murtadha Nasrullah
Government of Iraq Communications
MNF-I CJ9
Strategic Communication
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Section 1 – The Government of Iraq
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During the late 1950s and early 1960s the Iraqi Baath Party was believed to be lacking in popular support and in support among the military. However, through a strong party apparatus and political structure it was able to attain power in 1963. After taking control in a coup in February of 1963, an internal split between Baathist moderates and extremists resulted in a consolidation of power by the latter by the end of 1963 and began the process of pushing the moderates out of the party. In 1968, Baathist general Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr rose to prominence in the party through a non-violent coup and presided over numerous periods of internal Baathist disagreement resulting in periodic party purging. It was not until 1979 that the party strongman Saddam Hussein attained enough influence and strength to topple al-Bakr from his perch; Hussein would rule over Iraq until 2003 when he was deposed by the United States military.
Elections in 2005 produced a permanent constitution and a broad-based, Shi’ite-led government that has been unwilling or unable to take major steps to reduce Sunni popular resentment and is showing significant signs of fragmentation.
The Legislative Branch
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Council of Representatives (CoR) a.k.a. Parliament: The Council of Representatives is the main body of representatives, elected by the people of Iraq in a general election. The CoR is composed of 275 members elected by a direct ballot for four-year terms. Each province contributes a predetermined number of seats to the COR based on registered voters. 230 of the CoR seats are distributed amongst Iraq’s 18 governorates (also called provinces) according to the number of registered voters in each governorate. 45 of these 275 seats are compensatory seats reserved for parties who do not win seats at the governorate level, but who demonstrate a designated “national threshold,” and are intended to provide national representation for small minority groups like Chaldo-Assyrians. The election system is proportional representation (closed list) –voters choose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties or individuals). Voters tend to support parties based on respective sects and regions, not ideological platforms. The CoR passes federal laws, ratifies treaties, approves nominations for state officials and elects the Presidency Council. Presidential nominations require a two thirds vote. The CoR is lead by the Speaker of the Parliament, who is elected by the CoR.[1]
The provincial Council: The Provincial Council is a provincial assembly composed of regional officials for local governance, but not a significant player in national politics. Regional officials are regulated by the same laws as the CoR (Council of representatives). The Government of Iraq is in the process of scheduling municipal elections, which are planned for October 2008. Most of the provincial officials have been appointed.
The Executive Branch
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The Presidency Council: The Presidency Council consists of the president and two vice presidents, appointed by the CoR. All three of Iraq’s major sects must be represented in the Presidency Council. The Presidency Council selects the prime minister (who must be of the majority coalition party in the council at that time). The prime minister selection must then be ratified by a simple majority in the CoR.
The President is largely a figurehead with few powers, save the official appointment of the prime minister and ratifying treaties and laws passed by the CoR. The role of the President has been enlarged by President Talibani, who frequently acts as an interlocutor between groups, particularly in situations that require a diplomatic touch.
The Council of Ministers (a.k.a. Cabinet): The Council of Ministers is comprised of the prime minister and his cabinet. The Ministers are appointed proportionally to the number of seats allocated to each bloc.
Minister nominations are determined by the Prime Minister and confirmed by simple majority by parliament. The cabinet is responsible for overseeing their respective ministries, preparing the budget, signing treaties and appointing state officials. However, the Iraqi Constitution is largely silent on the procedure to replace a minister. Precedent is for the prime minister to replace a minister position with someone from the same sect, though not necessarily the same party. There is disagreement in parliament on whether the Prime Minister can execute this power past his first 40 days in office.
The Prime Minister is the head of the government, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and is responsible for the general policy of the State. The Prime Minister holds most of the executive authority and directs the Council of Ministers.
Section 2 - Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government
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Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): The Kurdish region of northern Iraq has been mostly isolated from the Iraqi central government throughout Iraq’s history, including institutionalized autonomy under Saddam Hussein. Equipped under the Iraqi Constitution with broad autonomy, many Kurds view the KRG as its own de-facto state independent from Iraq. Kurds comprise the ethnic majority, most of whom are Sunni Muslim but secular. The Kurdish region speaks Kurdish, not Arabic.
The KRG has its own federally-recognized government. This government has a Parliament, elected by popular vote, called the Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly. The KRG also has a Cabinet. The KRG has its own Kurdish armed forces, the peshmerga, some divisions of which have been incorporated into the Iraqi Army. The Kurdistan Regional Government also has fully-fledged international ties, including a privileged relationship with the United States. The KRG has enjoyed relative stability and has been able to achieve a more developed economy compared to the less stable parts of Iraq.
Iraqi Kurdistan encompasses three governorates in northern Iraq. The KRG has a constitutionally-recognized authority over the governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and as-Sulaymaniya. Iraqi Kurds have claimed that they also have a majority representation in Diyala, Ninawa and Kirkuk provinces, as well as parts of Salah ad-Din and Wasit, They say this representation grants Kurds a degree of de-facto control in some of these areas while other ethnicities (Arab, Turkmen, and other minorities) counter the claim on the grounds of historical legacy and regional ethnic make-up and majorities. The current presence of Kurds in center and Southern Iraq was orchestrated by the Saddam Hussein regime, in forcing demographic changes in the region during the mid 1970s. Article 140 of the new Iraqi Constitution mandates normalization of the status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. The article specifically called for a census and a referendum, mandated to occur before December 31, 2007, to determine whether Kirkuk and other parts of these governorates are to be part of the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, the central government so far has failed to address legal ambiguities in Article 140 and has failed to set up mechanisms to conduct a the prerequisite census. Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, who is Kurdish, made a statement on May 28, 2008 forecasting that despite the efforts of President Jalal Talabani and the Iraqi Government, it could be nearly impossible to implement Article 140 if the internal and external political pressures aren’t overcome. The referendum has been delayed into 2008.
Section 3 -Major Political Blocs
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Iraqi Accord Front (Tawafuq): Sunni. Led by Adnan al-Dulaimi and Tariq al-Hashimi.
The Iraqi Accord Front is a Sunni Arab coalition that seeks to empower Iraqi Sunnis. The Accord Front is composed of three parties: the General Council for the People of Iraq, led by Adnan al-Dulaimi; the Iraqi Islamic Party, led by Tariq al-Hashimi; and the Iraqi National Dialogue Council, led by Khalaf al-Ulayyan. The Accord Front won 44 seats in December’s election. The Front stresses release of Sunni detainees, a timetable for Coalition troop withdrawal and a purge of Shi’a militia elements from Iraqi Security Forces. They seek relaxation of deBa’athification laws and oppose the execution of certain high-ranking Ba’athist officials. Both Vice President al-Hashimi and Deputy Prime Minister al-Zubai are Accord Front members.
The Front withdrew from al-Maliki’s government in August 2007 to protest sectarianism and described marginalization of Sunnis from the government. All Accord Front Parliamentary members have returned to their seats; save one member, all Accord Front Cabinet Ministers continue to boycott the Cabinet.
Iraqi National List (INL): Shi’a, Sunni and some Christians. Led by Ayad Allawi.
The Iraqi National List is a secular nationalist alliance made up of Sunnis, Shi’as and some Christians. It is led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Allawi’s party, the Iraqi National Accord Party, is joined by Iraq’s Communist Party and a number of smaller parties and independent politicians. The INL wants to build a democratic, secular and modern Iraq. Allawi vehemently resists Iranian influence and interference in Iraq. Most of the List’s energy is spent opposing the government and policies of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Despite a slick advertising campaign, the INL is widely perceived to have performed badly, and continues to lose influence and members. The INL won only 25 seats in Parliament and six seats in the Council of Ministers. One INL Parliament member died, and least four INL Parliament members have left the List.
The Sadr Trend: Shi’a religious party, led by Muqtada al-Sadr.
Sadr Trend is a Shi’a movement with different groups and parties that supplies social services and humanitarian aid to the Shi’a majority in Sadrl City and southern Iraq. The Sadr Trend opposes a federalist system for Iraq and the creation of a regional Shi’ite government covering all nine southern provinces.
Sadr Trend promotes a Shi’a interpretation of Shari’a law and pushes for the withdrawal of Coalition troops from Iraq. Sadrists have argued that federalism should not be applied to the south “while Iraq is still under occupation.” The Trend is vehemently against the Coalition Forces presence and opposes any relaxation of de-Ba’athification. Al-Sadr, formerly a political ally of Prime Minister al-Maliki, instructed his bloc to boycott parliament in April 2007 in an attempt to pressure al-Maliki to draw up a timetable for U.S. troops to leave Iraq. Under the Office of the Martyr al-Sadr, the Sadr trend acts as the political wing of the Mahdi Army, or Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).
Muqtada al-Sadr was the third of four sons born into a prominent clerical family in Najaf. His father’s cousin, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, was a beloved religious leader and seen as the founder of a specific Iraqi Shi’a school of thought which would eventually become the Sadrist movement. Bakr al-Sadr’s school of thought argued that the clergy should actively engage in politics to aid the downtrodden Shiite masses. When he was tortured and killed in 1980 by Saddam Hussein's government, Moqtada's father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, also a grand ayatollah, took his place as the head of the movement and became a chief opponent of Hussein's rule
Sadr quickly rose to prominence in Iraq, working closely with the other Shi'a parties. He gained popularity among Shiite Iraqis by providing social services and humanitarian aid and followed the pattern of Islamic organizations in other countries such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Sadr Trend is alleged to receive money and weapons from Iran, and is often accused of being a proxy for Iranian interests. He directed society into a more radical way of living, and the Trend targeted moderate and liberal women keeping them away from public life. He also established a political religious court to replace the role of state judicial systems.
Since Muqtada al-Sadr began speaking out against the U.S. invasion and formed the Mahdi Army in 2003, the Mahdi Army took part in two major uprisings against the U.S. military in 2004. These worked well to advance Muqtada al-Sadr’s popularity as a resistance figure, but the battles also engendered anger from Iraqis who saw him as a irresponsible. The Mahdi Army later gained a reputation as a militia of killers after Sunni insurgents destroyed the golden-domed Samarra mosque in 2006 and Sadrists retaliated by killing and torturing thousands of Sunnis. Al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army denied the claims. However, their image was further tarnished after a battle in late August 2007 between Sadrists and government forces in the Shiite holy city of Karbala that left dozens dead.
While the Mahdi Army included members of Ba’athist party and Feeda’yee Saddam, Al Sadr opposed any relaxation of de-Ba’athification. He established very strong ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Al Quds Corps in Iran (Military organization). Many members of Mahdi Army at various times have fled Iraq to either Lebanon or Iran.
Part of al-Sadr’s opposition to the presence of Coalition Forces has evolved into protest against the negotiations of the Status of Forces Agreement in 2008 between the U.S. and Iraq. In May 2008, an AFP report stated “Iraqi anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has called for a protest campaign to force Baghdad to abandon a proposed deal that will extend the US troop presence in Iraq beyond 2008.” The Status of Forces Agreement aims to give a legal basis for an American troop presence in Iraq after the mandate of U.N. Security Resolution 1790 expires on December 31, 2008. The AFP quoted a statement released by al-Sadr which said, “After every Friday prayer, everyone must protest and demonstrate until the agreement is cancelled.”
Kurdistan Alliance, KA (a.k.a. Kurdistan Coalition List): Kurdish. Led by Massoud Barzani.
The Kurdistan Alliance (KA) is composed of the two dominant Kurdish parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Smooth cooperation between the allied parties since 2006 has made their technical separation irrelevant at a national level. The KA seeks to represent and advance Kurdish interests, such as greater regional autonomy and greater Kurdish revenue from Iraqi oil sales. The KA is the second largest bloc in the Council of Representatives, with 53 seats, and formed a coalition government with the UIA. The KDP and PUK have been allied since 2006, and together dominate the Kurdish Regional Parliament. Peshmerga—armed Kurdish fighters—from both the PUK and KDP fought alongside Coalition troops to topple Saddam in 2003.
Section 4 -Major Political Blocs (continued)
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United Iraqi Alliance (UIA): Mainly Shi’a. Led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.
The United Iraqi Alliance is a coalition of over 20 political groups, led predominantly by two of the three major Shi’a parties: The Islamic Da’wa Party, led by former Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja’afari and Nouri al-Maliki; the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The UIA also includes an independents faction led by Oil Minister Sharistani as well as a number of independent Shi’a representatives.
The UIA is widely believed to enjoy the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the preeminent Shi’a religious figure in Iraq; however, al-Sistani has made no formal endorsement of the UIA due to his “quietist” philosophy of faith. The UIA is criticized for sectarianism, and suffered the departure of the Fadhila Party from its bloc in March 2007, followed by the departure of the Sadrist Trend in September 2007. As of August, the UIA holds 85 out of 275 seats in the Council of Representatives.
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) is led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and is one of Iraq’s most powerful political parties. It was known as the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI), but in May 2007 they changed their name, dropping “Revolution” to ISCI. Prior to his assassination in August 2003, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim was the leader of SCIRI, and his brother Abdul Aziz al-Hakim promptly took over the leadership after his death. Amar al-Hakim, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s 36-year old son, has been increasingly taken over responsibilities of ISCI during his father’s hospitalizations for lung cancer treatments.
SCIRI was founded in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq war, after leading an Islamist insurgent group, the Islamic Dawa Party was severely weakened by a governmental crackdown following Dawa's unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Government arranged for the formation of SCIRI, which was based in exile in Tehran and under the leadership of Mohammad-Baqir al-Hakim.who was living in Iran at the time, was the son of Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim. He declared, “The primary aim of the council is the overthrow of the Ba'ath Party and the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq.”
SCIRI was designed to be an umbrella organization that would unite the various Iraqi Shia opposition groups, including the Dawa Party and other political parties, under one banner. For this reason, it has been likened to the American-backed Iraqi National Congress.
However, there are crucial ideological differences between SCIRI and al-Dawa. SCIRI supports the idea of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, that Islamic Government must be controlled by the ulema (Islamic scholars). Al-Dawa, on the other hand, follows the position of Iraq's late Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, and al-Dawa co-founder, that government should be controlled by the ummah (Muslim community as a whole).
Despite this ideological disagreement, several of SCIRI's factions came from al-Dawa before the 2003 liberation of Iraq. This historical intersection is significant because al-Dawa was widely viewed as a terrorist group during the Iran-Iraq war. In February 2007, journalists reported that Jamal Jaafar Muhammed, who was elected to the Iraqi parliament in 2005 as part of the SCIRI/Badr faction of the United Iraqi Alliance, was also sentenced to death in Kuwait for planning the al-Dawa bombings of the French and American embassies in that country in 1983.
ISCI favors federalism and advocates the creation of a regional Shi’ite government covering all nine southern governorates. ISCI maintains close ties with Iran and is often accused of receiving Iranian funds. However, after officially changing their name to ISCI in 2007, they also dropped official support for the wilayat al-faqih, that tied them theologically and politically to Iran. ISCI now supports the spiritual leadership of Grand Ayatollah Sistani.
ISCI’s armed wing, the Badr Organization, has been legally integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), but at times is known to use violence to advance ISCI’s political agenda. Badr frequently clashed with al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) for control of the south, and the Sadr Trend in 2007 and 2008 accused the ISF of still being controlled by ISCI and the Badr Corps to eliminate JAM and the Sadrists in Iraq.
Islamic Dawa Party (Hizb al-Dawa al-Islamiya)*
Beginnings of the Dawa Party
The Dawa Party in Iraq emerged after the 1958 Revolution when Abdul Karim Qassim rose to head the military junta and reached out to the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). Qassim allowed the ICP to disseminate propaganda portraying the Shi’a religious establishment as a reactionary obstacle to modernization and economic progress. In response, a group of Shi’a clerics in the city of Najaf (Jamiat al-Ulama) broke with the clerical establishment’s precedent of political acquiescence and organized a campaign to counter the atheist political influence. From this movement emerged Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr whose writings on Islamic history, theory, and political economy presented Islam as a solution to modern problems. Al-Sadr, along with others such as Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, became spiritual leaders for the Dawa Party.
Party Militancy
The Dawa Party ideology was seen as progressive and inclusive, and consequently, also vulnerable to schisms. But the inclusiveness allowed for a predominant non-clerical leadership in the Party, and as an activist organization the Dawa Party became known for its tight discipline and fierce courage. It eventually made it the Baathist regime’s most serious enemy.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Dawa Party was emboldened by the Iranian Shi’a to embark on the path of armed struggle and this was complemented by Baqir al-Sadr issuing a fatwa prohibiting Shi’a from joining the Baath Party. With Iranian assistance, the Dawa Party conducted several attacks against the Iraqi Government and its Western and Arab allies between 1981 and 1996. The Iraqi government seized on the violence to try to cripple the movement and ruled that Dawa Party membership was punishable by death in March 1980. The regime executed 96 party members that first month, including Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Bint Al Huda, and throughout the 1980s, targeted dozens of the Party’s senior leaders/activists in and outside Iraq. By the late 1980s, the Dawa Party armed campaign had gradually fizzled.
Clandestine organization
By the 1990s, the Dawa Party was shifting back to political activism and evolving into a secretive and clandestine organization with offices in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and the European capitals. This party diaspora coalesced into roughly three branches: the Tehran Branch, which was led by the party’s political bureau under Ali al-Adib and was sympathetic to the Iranian velayat al-faqih (“rule of the jurisprudent”); the UK Branch, which was headed by Ibrahim al-Jaafari and maintained contact with secular opposition groups and Western governments; and the Iraq Branch, headed by Abdul Karim al-Anizi and Khudair al-Khuzai where the organization’s laymen exercised more influence and forcibly remained the most secretive and hermetic branch of the Party.
SCIRI connection
Amongst the Dawa Party’s political alliances, it has historically maintained its closest connection with the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Established in 1982 by Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim, son of Grand Ayatollah Mohsin al-Hakim and a leading member of the Dawa Party who had fled to Iran, SCIRI owed its early formation to the Dawa Party leadership. However, the Dawa Party remained independent of the clerical establishment. It also disagreed with implementing velayat al-faqih, and never subordinated itself fully to Iranian leadership .In January 2000, Muhammad Mahdi Asefi was forced to resign as secretary-general of al-Dawa as a result of his attempts to fully subordinate the party to the Iranian leadership Nevertheless, it is said that Iranian leaders have mediated between the Dawa Party and SCIRI when doctrinal and political issues have escalated, and in general the two organizations have cooperated closely.
Dawa Party involvement in Iraq post-Saddam Hussein
From 1992-1995 the Dawa Party was a member for the Iraqi National Congress, which was a collection of Iraqi expatriate groups who opposed the Iraqi regime, but the Dawa Party withdrew citing its opposition to plans for a federal Iraq. The Dawa Party was also initially opposed to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but acquiesced in a purported negotiation where U.S. official, Zalmay Khalilzad, offered Ibrahim al-Jaafari seats on the post-invasion, government re-arrangement committee. Indeed, after Saddam Hussein’s government was toppled, the Dawa Party established itself openly in south and central Iraq, and it reportedly organized the first demonstrations in Nasiriyah against the U.S. presence in Iraq.
The Dawa Party and Nouri al-Maliki’s Premiership*
Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki was elected by the party to the post of Secretary General of the Dawa Party in May 2007, after he had replaced now former premier Ibrahim Al Jaafari. After assuming his post, Maliki surrounded himself with advisors from the Dawa Party senior leadership from the UK Branch, such as Sami al-Askari, Tariq Najim, Sadiq al-Rikabi, and Ghate al-Rikabi, and the Iraqi Branch, such as Yassin al-Majid, Falah al-Sudani, and Adnan al-Asadi.
On June 6, 2008, the Dawa Party announced that Ibrahim al-Jaafari is no longer linked to the Party. Jaafari announced on May 31, 2008 the establishment of the new National Reform Trend, describing that the new trend aims to reject sectarianism and fight militias. Jaafari has also taken a hard line against the US – Iraqi negotiations for a Strategic Framework and Status of Forces Agreement.
NOTE: The United Iraqi Alliance (ISCI and the Da’wa Party) and the Kurdistan Alliance (the KDP and PUK) formed the Four-Party Alliance in August 2007, due to the extent of political interests shared among the parties. It was created in the wake of minister resignations from the ruling coalition.
Section 5 -Minor Political Blocs
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NOTE: The following minor political blocs are not politically significant at a national level.
Iraqi National Congress (a.k.a. National Congress Coalition): Shi’a & Sunni. Led by Ahmad Chalabi.
The Iraqi National Congress is a predominantly Shi’a organization, composed of both Islamic and secular elements, led by Ahmad Chalabi. The INC advocates a democratic, pluralistic, federal government and is a strong advocate for de-Ba’athification laws. The INC was an umbrella opposition group for the purpose of overthrowing Saddam. It was formerly part of the United Iraqi Alliance, but split from the UIA in November of 2005 due to disagreements over the creation of an Islamic state in Iraq. Differences within the INC led to its virtual collapse and it did not win any seats in the last parliamentary election.
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue: Sunni. Led by Saleh al-Mutlak.
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue is an offshoot of the Iraqi Accord Front. The front rejects the Iraqi constitution and seeks the withdrawal of Coalition Forces. The front won 11 seats in the election.
The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU): Kurdish, Islamist. Led by Salah al-Din Muhammad Baha al-Din.
The Kurdish Islamic Union is the only Kurdish Islamist group in Parliament, and an offshoot of the Kurdistan Alliance. The KIU strives to establish an Islamic government which recognizes the rights of Kurds. It enjoys good relations with the PUK and the KDP. The KIU has a record of welfare work for the Kurdish poor and peaceful political campaigning. The group has close ties with the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamist political opposition movement. Founded in 1994, the KIU is led by Salah al-Din Muhammad Baha al-Din. The KIU won 5 seats in the Council of Representatives.
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc: Sunni, secular, close Ba’athist ties. Led by Mishan al-Juburi, who is now on the run (alleged connection with Al-Qaida).
The Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc receives its primary support from former Ba’athists. The bloc seeks to bring back all Ba’ath employees of the former Iraqi Army, police and intelligence services, except for Saddam’s closest friends. It seeks withdrawal of Coalition troops and an end to policies perceived against Sunni Arabs. The party is now basically defunct except for its three seats in parliament.
Section 6—Iraqi Shi’ite Leadership
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Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki: Shi’a. Prime Minister of Iraq since May 2006. Prime Minister al-Maliki is a stalwart of the Da’wa Party. Da’wa is part of the United Iraqi Alliance bloc of the Iraqi Parliament. Al-Maliki pushes a Shi’a agenda, and has recently come under intense scrutiny from US critics for allowing a Shi’a sectarian agenda to dominate Iraqi governance. Al-Maliki has also been criticized for being unable to make progress in terms of national political reconciliation or the passing of key legislation. Al-Maliki is occasionally critical of the Coalition, especially when he views the US as encroaching on Iraqi sovereignty, (e.g. the US stance on immunity for security contracts in the aftermath of the September security contractor scandal.) There have been several calls within Iraq and abroad for al-Maliki to be replaced as prime minister, and his hold on power has frequently appeared tenuous. However, it is likely that he will remain a prime minister since he proved his firm leadership during and after the security operations in Basra, Sadr city and Maysan province.
Muqtada al-Sadr: Radical Shi’a cleric and leader of the Sadr Trend, al-Sadr is an Arab nationalist with major political power. He is the son of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, the highly regarded Shi’ite religious leader and revolutionary assassinated in 1999. Al-Sadr initially created a support base of impoverished, disaffected Shi’a by providing basic needs and security. His militia is the Mahdi Army, which operates in Sadr city, Baghdad and in southern Iraq. Al-Sadr is ideologically opposed to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim (ISCI). Al-Sadr portrays himself as an Iraqi nationalist, strongly opposed to federalism (in contrast to al-Hakim, who is a strong proponent of federalism and closely associated with the concept of “Shiastan” in southern Iraq.)
Al-Sadr’s current strategy in 2007 is to avoid a Coalition crackdown on his militia by lowering his profile and instructing his militia to refrain from activities that could provoke US forces. Al-Sadr ordered his forces, JAM, to stop killing Iraqis, especially ISF. However al-Sadr remains strongly anti-US and has been known to regularly target Coalition Forces. In August, al-Sadr coordinated a massive anti-occupation protest in southern Iraq, and his forces clashed with ISCI/Badr Organization in the holy Shi’a city of Karbala during a period of religious pilgrimage. The clashes resulted in civilian deaths and seriously damaged the Mahdi Army’s image among Iraq’s Shi’a. In response, on August 29 2007, al-Sadr called a halt on all Mahdi activities for six months in order for al-Sadr to gain control of rogue elements.
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim: Shi’a cleric, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) with strong ties to Iran. Al-Hakim is an opponent of al-Sadr due to a family feud and political differences. Al-Hakim is a strong proponent of federalism and “Shiastan” in southern Iraq, which Sadr opposes. Despite ISCI’s strong Islamist values and its close ties to Tehran, al-Hakim has been described as a voice for moderation in Iraq. The Badr Organization, the military wing of the ISCI and controlled by al-Hakim, is generally regarded as more restrained than the Madhi Army. Al-Hakim recently battled lung cancer, and received treatment in Iran. His son Amar al-Hakim took over many ISCI responsibilities and is being groomed to succeed his father.
Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ali al-Sistani: The preeminent Shi’a cleric in Iraq. Al-Sistani abstains from broad political activity due to his Quietist philosophy of faith. Shi’a politicians (and occasionally others) frequently consult with him or his son, seeking approval for their policies. Al-Sistani generally supports Coalition efforts but will not engage in politics except to discourage violence. He uses his influence behind the scenes to reign in Shi’a militia activity. Al-Sistani encourages a unified Shi’a bloc with moderate aims within a unified Iraq. He is largely allied with Coalition goals and can resist Iranian influence. Al-Sistani has approximately 16 million followers.
Iraqi Shi’ite Leadership (continued)
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Dr. Ayad Allawi: Shi’a. Leader of the secular Iraqi National List political bloc, and its main constituent party, the Iraqi National Accord. Allawi is a prominent Iraqi political activist, mainly focusing his criticism on the al-Maliki government and Iranian interference in Iraq. He served as Iraq’s first head of government following the fall of Saddam and was interim prime minister of Iraq prior to the 2006 elections. In August, Allawi announced his desire to return to Iraq and has engaged in a campaign to promote himself as a viable replacement to the current Iraqi government under Prime Minister al-Maliki.
Ibrahim al-Ja’afari: Shi’a. Party leader for the Islamic Da’wa Party. Al-Ja’afari brought al-Da’wa into the United Iraqi Alliance bloc of Shi’ite parties. Al-Ja’afari also served as Iraq’s first post-Saddam interim president and former prime minister of Iraq during the transitional government. He was viewed as a Shi’ite nationalist, though also a unifying figure keen to bring Sunni Arabs into the political process. However, al-Ja’afari became associated with the failure to end the violence in Iraq and improve services and was pressured to step down. Al-Ja’afari has been listed as a possible replacement for Prime Minister al-Maliki.
On June 6, 2008, the Dawa Party announced that Ibrahim al-Jaafari is no longer linked to the Party. Jaafari announced on May 31, 2008 the establishment of the new National Reform Trend, describing that the new trend aims to reject sectarianism and fight militias. Jaafari has also taken a hard line against the US – Iraqi negotiations for a Strategic Framework and Status of Forces Agreement.
Adil Abd al-Mahdi: Shi’a. One of two vice presidents of Iraq and a member of the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council (ISCI) party. Al-Mahdi favors a partial withdrawal of Coalition troops, but holds ties with other U.S.-backed groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. Al-Mahdi has been mentioned as a possible replacement for Prime Minister al-Maliki.
Hussein al-Shahristani: Shi’a. Oil Minister of Iraq. Dr. Al-Shahristani is a former nuclear scientist, imprisoned at Abu Ghraib for 10 years for objecting to Saddam’s nuclear weapons program. He is an independent member of the United Iraqi Alliance, and leads a small faction of UIA independents. Al-Shahristani has been under pressure as the fuel crisis has worsened during his term. He firmly opposes the Kurds’ securing of oil contracts prior to the passage of the national hydrocarbons law.
Section 7 - Iraqi Sunni Leadership
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Sheikh Harith al-Dhari: Sunni. Among the most popular Sunni clerics in Iraq. Al-Dhari is head of the hard-line Muslim Scholars Association, which holds enormous influence over the Sunni Iraqi community. Al-Dhari is a spiritual leader of the Sunni insurgency. He maintains ties to Sunni politicians and militants, in particular the militant group 1920 Revolution Brigade. Al-Dhari is a vehement opponent of al-Maliki and a Shi’a government, and Coalition presence. Al-Dhari recently cut ties with al-Qaeda and began condemning its activities as harmful to Iraq. Nevertheless, he argues that the Sunni insurgency is a legitimate nationalist movement and its tactics are in accordance with Islam. Al-Dhari lives outside Iraq and a warrant was issued by the Iraqi government for his arrest due to inciting violence and sectarian conflict.
Tariq al-Hashimi: Sunni. One of two vice-presidents of Iraq. Al-Hashimi is a leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in Parliament. Al-Hashimi says that most Sunni fighters have nationalist intent and are not jihadists. He opposes the formation of autonomous regions and advocates the distribution of oil revenues based on population, relaxation of de-Ba’athification, release of detainees and a removal of Shi’a militiamen from the Iraqi Security Forces. Al-Hashimi wants to work with the Coalition to reduce al-Sadr’s influence and bring more moderate Sunnis into the government. He seeks a faster stand-up of the Iraqi Security Forces (albeit purged of Shi’a militia members), so that Iraq can assume control of its own security sooner. Three of his siblings were killed by Shi’a death squads.
Adnan al-Dulaimi: Sunni Iraqi Islamist politician. He is the founder of the Iraqi People Council, Al-Dulaimi is used to be a vehement opponent of the al-Maliki/Shi’a government and the Coalition presence. Al-Dulaimi is the leader of the Iraqi Accord Front. Two of his sons Maki and Muthana were held as detainee by the Iraqi Authorities on charges of supporting terrorists.
Section 8 - Iraqi Kurdish Leadership
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Jalal Talabani: Kurdish. President of Iraq and a key diplomatic personality. President Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of two leading Kurdish parties. President Talabani seeks to expand the autonomy of the Kurdish northern region. Talabani cooperates with Shi’ites, the US and former Kurdish rivals to secure the most beneficial situation for Kurds. Talabani maintains close ties with Iran. He has developed heart and other health problems as he is growing elderly. Talabani is viewed as a key interlocutor between the Kurds and Baghdad, as well as between opposing groups in the Iraqi government.
Massoud Barzani: Kurdish. President of the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. President Barzani is the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), former rival of Talabani’s PUK. Barzani cooperates with the PUK locally so that the Kurdish region will remain stable despite violence elsewhere in Iraq. To protect this stability, Barzani has sought a peaceful resolution of the PKK crisis through diplomacy, recognizing that it is an Iraq-Turkey, not Kurd-Turkey, issue. Barzani often uses dramatic rhetoric in statements to the press during crisis situations, so most reports must be taken with a grain of salt.
Barham Salih: Kurdish. Barham Salih is an able Kurdish politician who serves as the deputy prime minister of Iraq with the economic portfolio. Salih is a member of the Kurdistan Alliance bloc of parliament and member of Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party. He has been very effective in securing economic benefits for the Kurds through his duties in Baghdad.
Hoshyar Zebari: The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the KDP Politburo. Zebari has been a leading figure in the Kurdish Democratic Party for ten years. He is viewed as a skillful diplomat, able to pursue Iraqi interests capably on the international stage.
Section 9 - Violent Groups: Militias and Insurgents
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Al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI a.k.a. Tawid al-Jihad: Formerly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; now led by Abu Ayyub al-Masri. AQI has ties to al-Qaeda. It conducts kidnappings and executions throughout Iraq. AQI attacks Iraqi Security Forces and police, Coalition Forces, anti-AQI ‘tribal awakening’ groups and leaders, and Iraqi civilians. It typically employs spectacular explosion attacks, utilizing IEDs, SVBIEDs, VBIEDs, and suicide bombers. AQI attempts to establish the Islamic State of Iraq in areas not controlled by the Coalition.
The Mahdi Army, a.k.a. Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM): The Shi’a militia group of Muqtada al-Sadr that defends Shi’ites, kills Sunnis and operates a shadow government for Iraq’s Shi’a population, Hezbollah-style. Al-Sadr called on JAM to cease killing fellow Iraqis, particularly Sunni civilians and policemen. Al-Sadr’s intentions are unclear. The Mahdi Army clashes with the Badr Corps, struggling to gain control of southern Iraq. The most accepted estimate for the Mahdi Army is 60,000 fighters with three elements: those loyal to al-Sadr, those loyal only to criminal gangs that operate within the organization,
and those loyal to Iran. On August 29 2007, al-Sadr called for a halt of all JAM activities for
6 months.
The Badr Organization: The Shi’ite militia of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The Badr Organization has been accused of having death squads target Sunnis. It was originally trained in Iran to fight Saddam’s regime and currently rivals the Mahdi Army. The Badr Organization enforces conservative behavior in territory it controls. It has been legally incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces and fights insurgents who attacked British forces in the South.
Former Regime Elements (FREs): FREs seek a return to Ba’ath Party control. They are secular in nature and often led by former Ba’ath officials and military commanders. They generally have military and weapons expertise. FREs aid the Sunni religious insurgents with bombs and money to perpetuate instability. They seek to force Coalition troops to withdraw from a weakened Iraq and take over. No estimates are available regarding their numbers.
Salafi Jihadists: Sunni militant insurgent groups, loosely networked. Salafi Jihadists are generally not bona fide members of al-Qaeda, but are sympathetic to al-Qaeda ideology. Salafi Jihadists are foreign fighters with foreign support that target Shi’a civilians and US military. Salafi jihadists are often included in US estimates of AQI fighters.
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK): The PKK is a fringe group of Kurdish guerrillas who claim to represent the Kurdish nation and have waged a decades-long campaign for the establishment of a Kurdish state. The PKK do not target Iraqis or Coalition forces. The PKK killed dozens of Turkish soldiers in October and took eight hostages, resulting in heightened tensions between Turkey and Iraq. It also resulted in particular tensions between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government who was—until recent Turkish pressure—unwilling to take steps to uproot the PKK. The group is hunkered down along the border between Turkey and Iraq. Most of the region’s Kurds condemn the group’s violent tactics.
Ansar al-Sunnah: Kurdish Islamist group led by Mullah Krekar. It is at odds with other Kurdish groups. Ansar al Sunnah is linked to AQI and responsible for over 30 suicide bombings in Iraq.
Section 10 –Recent Security Developments
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Military and civilian casualties have dropped to the lowest level in two years. At the close of 2008, attacks were the lowest in 4 years and military and civilian casualties were decreasing. Security improvements are credited in part to the surge of nearly 30,000 additional U.S. troops sent to Iraq, as well as increased capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, the JAM freeze, and the containment of Sunni insurgents by the Anbar Awakening and Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) groups. Most significantly, a revolt is taking place within Sunni neighborhoods against AQI. Echoing the successful tribal rebellion against AQI in Anbar province, local Sunni insurgents have turned against their former allies, driving AQI out of their strongholds. The change of heart is predominantly due to the fact that AQI threatened Sunni tribal leaders’ political control. Sunni tribes also object to AQI mass killings of Iraqi civilians.
Anbar Salvation Council: Founded in September 2006 by Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. The Anbar Salvation Council is tied to the Anbar Awakening Movement consisting of 41 Coalition-friendly Sunni tribes. Following the assassination of Sheikh Abu Risha on September 13, 2007 (the first day of Ramadan 1428), the Council has been led by his brother, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha. The Anbar Awakening is responsible for stabilizing the Anbar governorate in 2007.
1920 Revolution Brigade: Sunni insurgent group tied to Harith al-Dhari, leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars. The 1920 Brigade previously used bombing, kidnappings and armed attacks against Coalition forces. The group now reportedly has aligned with US forces to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq due to AQI indiscriminate killings of Iraqis. The change of loyalty is recent and its sincerity is unknown.
Mahdi Army cease-fire: On August 29 2007, Muqtada al-Sadr called for a hold on all Mahdi Army activities in southern Iraq after fighting took place between al-Sadr supports and supporters of al-Hakim, causing thousands of Shi’a pilgrims to be caught in the crossfire in Karbala, most recently in March 2008, Iraqi security forces defeated Mahdi army in Basra, Sadr city and in Maysan province,
Turkey-Kurdish tensions: In October, cross border tensions between Iraq and Turkey erupted, stemming from the presence on Iraqi Kurdish soil of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Tensions over the problem with Iraq’s northern border have declined significantly in November as access to Coalition intelligence has given Turkey additional tools to fight the PKK. The KRG has itself embarked on new efforts to stem activity of the PKK operating on Iraqi soil, It seems that both of Iraqi and Turkish governments
Are trying to resolve the issue through political and diplomatic channels, the Turkish
Prime minister is expected to visit Baghdad in July 2009.
Section 11—Recent Political Developments
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While violence levels plunge and Iraqi refugees return in large numbers, there has been little progress in political reconciliation. Internal strife among opposing factions continues and key benchmarks such as de-Ba’athification although it was legislated but not yet implemented, while a law to distribute Iraq’s oil wealth still have not been passed by Parliament. Prime Minister al-Maliki has come under heavy criticism for permitting sectarianism in the GoI, from both Coalition and Iraqi officials, Some leadership in Iraq and the U.S. have called for Prime Minister al-Maliki to step down. However, Prime Minister al-Maliki is likely to remain in office so long as Iraq’s political groups are unable to find a consensus candidate to replace him, the call for changing the PM has been changed since the security operations “Charge of the knights” took place in Basra during March 2008 in addition to similar operations in Sadr city and Maysan province. .
The Sadrist Bloc withdrew from the government in April 2007 and replacements have not been agreed. On August 1, the Sunni Accord Front pulled out its six cabinet ministers, asserting that al-Maliki is not committed to political reconciliation. Some quit the Accord Front rather than leave the government. The Front withdrew its 44 members from parliament for a period of some months, but they have returned to their duties. The Accord Front Cabinet members continue to boycott the government. The Iraqi National List’s cabinet ministers were ordered to boycott al-Maliki’s government by Allawi in August. Three chose to leave the party in order to remain in government, and two began boycotting.
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PM MALIKI SUGGESTS WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE IN SOFA (referenced from Scorpion – 08 JULY08)
During a visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Monday July 07, 2008 Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki suggested establishing a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. The statement, never before made by Maliki’s Shia-led government, comes as Washington strives to assemble a new security agreement before the end of 2008. This Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would replace a U.N. mandate authorizing the presence of troops in Iraq, which is scheduled to expire on December 31.
Though the U.S. government has long opposed setting a timetable for withdrawal – fearing the move would give militant groups an advantage – troop presence in Iraq is a pivotal issue for Iraqis who worry that Iraqi sovereignty will be threatened by prolonged U.S. presence in Iraq. As reported by the Washington Post, Maliki’s statements to Arab Ambassadors in Abu Dhabi mirrored those concerns, and focused on Baghdad’s ability to maintain control over Iraq’s leadership. Maliki insisted that “in all cases, the basis for any agreement will be respect for the full sovereignty of Iraq,” and clarified his position on future negotiations claiming that he intends to “reach an agreement on a memorandum of understanding either for the departure of the forces or a memorandum of understanding to put a timetable on their withdrawal.”
The agreement has also sparked intense disagreement between Iraq’s many political factions, who each demand a different resolution to U.S.-Iraqi negotiations. According to AFP, “Iraqi politicians have not only bristled at the duration of any continuing [defense] pact with the United States, they have also expressed reservations about how many bases Washington should retain, what powers the US military should continue to hold to detain Iraqi civilians, and what immunity US troops should have from US law.” While many Iraqis do “want to see an end to American military presence in their country,” the BBC reports that many “[are] fearful of the consequences for security.” Such intensely polarized perspectives have complicated negotiation proceedings and protracted the establishment of a widely acceptable settlement.
While Reuters reported that U.S. officials in Baghdad had no immediate comments to offer on Maliki’s statement, a U.S. Embassy official, who spoke to the Washington Post on condition of anonymity, downplayed Maliki’s comments, “saying that he was not referring to a fixed timetable, but was speaking more generally to convey opposition to any large and long-term presence of troops or U.S. bases.” According to AFP, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters that the United States had made clear “that we have no long term desires to have forces permanently stationed in Iraq.”
DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL REFORM PROJECT (referenced from Scorpion – Nov, 28, 08)
After ending the discussions over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Iraq and the United States in the Council of Representatives (CoR) and deciding on this past Wednesday Nov 26, 08 as the final date for a vote on the agreement, several Iraqi political blocs submitted a new paper called the “Political Reform Project” and demanded that this project be approved before they give their approval on the SOFA. The Political Reform project included demands such as abolishing the Supreme Criminal Court responsible for trying the high-ranking members of the previous regime, introducing key amendments to the Justice and Accountability law (Debaathification law), balancing ethnic representation in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and releasing all detainees. These political blocs also demanded that the SOFA be subjected to a national referendum after its approval by the CoR. Al-Sumaria TV reported on the Political Reforms Project and quoted Iraqi National List lawmaker Khair Allah al-Basri as he confirmed that the session of the CoR on Wednesday Nov 26, 08 was postponed because of disagreements over the Supreme Criminal Court and the Justice and Accountability law.
The Iraqi Presidency Council was trying to negotiate an accord between the different political blocs. After a very long meeting on the Political Reform Project’s demands, Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi confirmed in a press conference that was reported on al-Iraqiya TV that “we have reached an agreement regarding most of the demands, and only one issue is left. The members of the Iraqi Accord Front (IAF, Tawafoq) demanded some time to discuss this issue during a meeting they will hold later today. We want to reach a national accordance and we have done our best here at the Presidency Council.”
In an attempt by the Iraqi government to meet some of these demands, National Security Aadvisor Mowafaq al-Rubaie confirmed in a TV interview with al-Arabiya TV that the Iraqi government has agreed to conduct a national referendum on the agreement by the end of July 2009. Legislator Redha Jawad Taqi from the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) confirmed this news and added that if the Iraqi people reject the agreement through the referendum, the Iraqi government will have to either cancel the agreement or reopen negotiations on it. The media outlet also quoted the head of the IAF, Ayad al-Samera’ee, as he confirmed that the referendum will take place on the July 30, 2009. He also stressed the importance of the agreement and the need for it to take into account the opinions of the Iraqi people.
The Political Reform Project was presented by the IAF, the Iraqi National List headed by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, and the National Dialogue bloc headed by lawmaker Salih al-Mutliq. Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper interviewed the chief of the Kurdish Alliance in the CoR, Fuad Ma’soum, as he confirmed “the demands of some of the blocs to abolish the Supreme Criminal
Court and the Justice and Accountability law are the main reasons that delayed the vote on the agreement.” Ma’soum added that “the Kurdish Alliance and the UIA will never agree to these two demands, and we are keen that the agreement will have the endorsement of the major political blocs.” The media outlet also interviewed lawmaker Ezzat al-Shahbandar from the Iraqi List who confirmed that “our list will approve the agreement under two conditions: first the approval of the political reform project and this approval should be announced officially, secondly if there is a national referendum regarding the agreement.”
Head of the UIA, Ali al-Adeeb, stressed in a statement that was reported in al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper that his bloc will not approve the Political Reform paper until it is amended but that his bloc can approve holding a national referendum on the agreement. He confirmed that his bloc will wait until the end of the discussions in the Presidency Council over the Political Reform paper before deciding on the Political Reform Project.
Other members of the UIA criticized the Political Reform Project and described it as just another way to blackmail the government. Lawmaker Abbas al-Bayti was quoted in az-Zaman newspaper as saying that “the parties who presented this paper want to put more pressure on the government by insisting that approving these demands and approving the agreement is one package, and they want to revive the previous regime.” Legislator Hadi al-Amiri blamed lawmaker Salih al-Mutliq for the failure of the negotiations on the Political Reform paper, pointing out that “abolishing the Supreme Criminal Court is unconstitutional.”
Several media outlets emphasized that most of the demands mentioned in the Political Reform paper, including the national referendum, were met by the Iraqi government. The only demands that were rejected were abolishing the Supreme Criminal Court and amending the Justice and Accountability law. Most of the members of the UIA and the Kurdish Alliance considered these two demands to be unconstitutional and think that they should be dealt with within the Constitutional Amendments Committee instead of grouping them with the SOFA.
Legislator Omar al-Karbouli from the IAF pointed out in an interview with Dar al-Hayat newspaper that his bloc within the IAF, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) headed by Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, only demanded the inclusion of a national referendum and succeeded in this demand. The Sunni Iraq Conference of the People, headed by Adnan al-Dulaimi, and the National Dialogue Bloc, headed by Salih al-Mutlaq, demanded the abolishment of the Supreme Criminal Court and amendments to the Justice and Accountability law. These were rejected by the other blocs in the CoR.
The 11th hour efforts to attach the Political Reform Project to the SOFA are very similar to the U.S. legislative practice of attaching “riders” to bills. Riders are defined as additional non-germane provisions attached to a bill that would not normally pass on their own as a separate bill. Riders are sometimes used not with the expectation that they will be passed, but rather with the intention to prevent the bill that they are attached to from being passed.
Other blocs rejected the agreement unconditionally. Legislator Falih al-Fayadh from the National Reform Trend, headed by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari, stated that his bloc opposes the agreement in principle and will not participate in any deals. Lawmaker Abd Mutlaq al-Jobori from the Arabic bloc also confirmed that his bloc will not support the agreement regardless of any deals. In a press conference that was reported on Radio Dijla, legislator Basim Shareef from al-Fadheela Islamic Party confirmed that his bloc will vote against the agreement regardless of the negotiations over the Political Reform paper. Shareef stressed that his bloc had different demands regarding the SOFA that have not been met, so his bloc will vote against the agreement.
In a press conference that was reported on Radio SAWA, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed her faith in the ability of the CoR to pass the agreement and downplayed the importance of a national referendum on the agreement. Secretary of State Rice confirmed that “Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and CoR Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani are committed to conducting a vote on the agreement soon.” She also emphasized that “it is a huge achievement to discuss an agreement of this importance publicly and democratically in an Arab country in the heart of the Middle East.”
SOFA RATIFIED BY COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES (referenced from Scorpion – Nov, 28, 08)
On Thursday November 27, 08, CNN International, BBC News, AFP and Reuters reported that Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR), after numerous delays, has voted on and approved the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States.
The agreement, which sets a withdrawal date for American military forces in 2011, is a landmark moment for Iraq’s fledgling democracy. Despite having enough support to obtain the simple majority required to ratify the security agreement, the Shia and Kurdish representatives granted concessions to Sunni lawmakers in order to develop a greater consensus on the deal.
The concessions included complimentary legislation to allow a faster release of Iraqi detainees in U.S. custody, a referendum vote on the agreement one year from now, and other political reforms. The deal itself will now replace a United Nations mandate for the American military presence in Iraq, which was set to expire at the end of this year.
As the Council of Representatives First Deputy Speaker Khalid al-Attiya declared in regards to the acceptance of the Sunni demands, “The wishes of different sections of the Iraqi nation have been executed, and this achievement will turn a new page of Iraq's history and will consecrate its sovereignty” quoted Reuters.
In addition to the SOFA, the Council of Representatives also passed the Strategic Framework Agreement during the brief parliamentary session. Despite the fact that the agreement provides for a withdrawal date in 2011, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh was quoted by Reuters as declaring that, “The withdrawal, theoretically, is completed at the end of December 2011, but we are expectant and hopeful that we could achieve that earlier.” Regardless, President George W. Bush spoke out on the passage of the deal by saying that, “It affirms the growth of Iraq's democracy and increasing ability to secure itself.”
In spite of the deal’s ratification, the Sadrist representatives and followers of anti-American Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr protested that deal to the very end, even as the Council of Representatives was voting on the pact.
The security agreement must now go through Iraq’s three man Presidency Council, consisting of the country’s President and two Vice Presidents, where it can still be overturned if any of its members decides to utilize their veto power. However, CNN International reported that the concessions granted to the Sunnis will likely ensure its passage through the Presidency Council. According to CNN, “The political deal that led to the passage of the security agreement virtually assures its ratification by Iraq's presidency council, which consists of Kurdish President Jalal Talabani, Shiite Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi and Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.”
PRESIDENCY COUNCIL PUTS SOFA INTO FORCE
On Thursday December 4,2008, Iraq’s three-member Presidency Council, which must unanimously approve any legislation from the country’s Council of Representatives (CoR) or it will be sent back to the parliamentary body, has fully ratified the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States.
The agreement sets to establish 2011 as a withdrawal date for U.S. forces in Iraq, and despite the deal being set for a national referendum in one year, this decision by the Presidency Council will put the agreement into effect. Reuters quoted Presidency Council chief of staff Naseer al-Ani, stating, “The Presidency Council has endorsed the security pact with the United States. That means this pact is put into force.”
The security pact, which was reached after nearly a year of intense negotiations, is set to replace a United Nations mandate which legalized the United States military presence in Iraq. This mandate was ready to expire on December 31st, 2008. Under the new deal, American combat forces are required to withdraw from major Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009 and from the country on December 31, 2011.
Reuters quoted White House spokeswoman Dana Perino, “We have a path now to help our troops get home. And we are already bringing troops home. And we're going to be able to continue to do that as long as we solidify the gains that we've made.”
While Iraq’s government still attempts to quiet domestic concerns that the agreement is an infringement upon Iraqi sovereignty, 146,000 U.S. soldiers remain in Iraq, where worries about the agreement and the possibility of security decline due to lack of support still remain.
Despite claims by some groups which stand against the agreement, the basis of the pact is on respect of Iraqi sovereignty as it calls for all military operations conducted by the U.S. in Iraq to first receive Iraqi approval as well as coordination. In fact, the deal will establish a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee consisting of the two countries armed forces to oversee all military operations conducted on Iraqi soil. Additionally, the SOFA prohibits the use of Iraqi soil, water, or airspace by foreign forces to launch attacks or operations against any other nation. America granted Iraq jurisdiction over crimes committed by private contractors and their employees. Finally, the agreement places limitations on the American right to detain Iraqis.
While the country’s most-revered Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has made it clear he holds reservations about the pact and is hesitant to trust the Americans to uphold their end of the bargain, the Iranian Press TV noted that, “followers of [anti-American Shia cleric] Moqtada al-Sadr… rule out any agreement with the United States which they consider an occupying force.”
Nonetheless, in addition to the SOFA, the Presidency Council also approved the Strategic Framework Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq which is set to establish longer-term cultural, economic, and strategic bilateral cooperation between the two nations.
According to CNN International, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker and top commander in Iraq, Raymond Odierno, released a joint statement asserting that “We look forward, under these agreements, to the continued reduction in U.S. forces and the normalization of bilateral relations as two sovereign and co-equal nations. We will undertake initiatives to strengthen our cooperation in the fields of economics, energy, health, the environment, education, culture, and law enforcement. The United States will support Iraq's request to the U.N. Security Council to continue the protection of Iraqi assets.
DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING AL-MASHHADANI'S RESIGNATION
After accepting the resignation on December 23, 08 of the speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, several Iraqi politicians issued statements regarding his replacement and how this resignation affects the political structure of the CoR.
Al-Mashhadani is a member of the National Dialogue Council (NDC) (headed by MP Khalaf al-Alyan), this bloc together with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) (headed by vice president Tariq al-Hashimi) and the People of Iraq Gathering (headed by MP Adnan al-Dulaimi) form the Iraqi Accord Front (IAF, Tawafoq), which generally represents the Iraqi Sunni population. According to ad-Dustour4 newspaper, al-Mashhadani stressed during his resignation speech in front of the CoR that, “he is resigning to meet the interests of the Iraqi people.” He also stipulated that his successor should be from the IAF. Other media outlets quoted some members of the CoR confirming that al-Mashhadani stipulated before his resignation that his successor should not be from the IIP because the IAF party was among the parties demanding his resignation.
The IIP issued a statement praising al-Mashhadani for submitting his resignation and pointed out that his resignation came “to avoid more differences in the political process.” Al-Baghdadia TV5 reported on the statement and added, “The IIP confirms that the IAF will submit its candidate for the speaker’s post to ensure the continuity of the political process.” The chief of the NDC Khalaf al-Alyan condemned what he described as the conspiracy to force al-Mashhadani to resign. According to Dar al-Hayat6 newspaper, he added, “The aim of this conspiracy is the 22nd of July powers and not al-Mashhadani.” The 22nd of July powers is a loose gathering which includes the Sadrists and other small blocs in the CoR which generally oppose the policies of the major powers (such as the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), and the Kurdish alliance).
According to al-Sumaria TV7, several MPs speculated that the CoR may elect senior IIP MP Ayad al-Samera’ee as the next speaker during the 9th of January session. IAF member Abdul Sattar al-Karbouli denied these claims and confirmed in a press release, reported by Radio Dijla8, that the CoR is still discussing the options regarding the replacement, and no candidate has been chosen yet. The media outlet also quoted a CoR source who said that MP Kalaf al-Alyan nominated MP Salih al-Mutlaq or MP Osama al-Najifi to fill the position. Both MPs are Sunnis but they are not from the IAF; they are members of the 22nd of July gathering. The CoR source added that the IIP nominated different MPs as IAF's candidates for the speaker’s post, MPs Ayad al-Samera’ee and Osama al-Tikrity.
The fierce disagreements inside the IAF regarding general policies and the resignation of al-Mashhadani drove the chief of the NDC Khalaf al-Alyan to declare on Wednesday in a press conference, reported by PUK Media9, that his bloc and the independents' bloc has withdrawn from the IAF. He said “The IAF has failed to meet the goals in its platform and certain parties manipulate the decision making inside it.” He added, “The IIP controls all important positions and makes alliances in the name of the front without consulting other members.” The press conference was also attended by former speaker al-Mashhadani, who accused the IIP of conspiring against him because he “rebelled against sectarianism.” Al-Fayahaa TV10 quoted al-Mashhadani saying, “When I applied the political reform project and I saw that no one was listening to me I realized that I couldn't do my job anymore.” According to Radio NAWA11, al-Mashhadani nominated the chief of the Sadrist bloc in the CoR Aqeel Abdul Hussein to be his successor as a speaker of the CoR. He said that “Aqeel is a neutral and patriotic person.” The former speaker also declared that he will form a new political movement to run in the next general elections.
This Page Intentionally Left Bank
Appendix A-- Current Council of Ministers
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The Cabinet was approved by the Assembly on May 20, 2006, but in the wake of boycotting members is unstable. The Sadrist Movement withdrew from the government in April 2007, including Cabinet Ministers, followed by the Iraqi Accord Front Cabinet Ministers in August, 2007. At least 7 members of the Cabinet are boycotting, including all Accord Front-affiliated Sunnis. Prime Minister al-Maliki is in the process of replacing some boycotting ministers. Two ministers have been sworn in (Health, Agriculture). Two more have been proposed (Justice, Communication) but parliament was unable to obtain a quorum to approve the nominations, to date.
Cabinet Ministers:
Position Member Coalition, Party
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki United Iraqi Alliance, Islamic Da’wa Party
Deputy Prime Minister (1st): Barham Salih Kurdistani Alliance, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Deputy Prime Minister (2nd): Rafe Al Eissawi Iraqi Accord Front – Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)
Agriculture Ali al-Bahadli United Iraqi Alliance, Independent, close to Sistani
Communication Farouq Abdul Qader Iraqi Accord Front - Independent
Culture Dr Maher Dalli Al Hadithi Iraqi Accord Front (Adnan al-Dulaimi group)
Defense Abdul Qadir al-Ubaidi al-Mufraji Independent - Iraqi Accord Front (Previously)
Displacement & Migration Abd al-Samad Sultan United Iraqi Alliance - Fayli Kurd
Education Khudayyir al-Khuza’i United Iraqi Alliance – Da’wa Party Iraqi Branch
Electricity Karim Wahid United Iraqi Alliance, Independent
Environment Narmin Uthman (F) Kurdistani Alliance, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Finance Bayan Jabr United Iraqi Alliance, ISCI
Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari Kurdistani Alliance, Kurdistan Democratic Party
Health Dr. Saleh Mahdi al-Hasnawi United Iraqi Alliance, Islamic Da’wa party
Higher Education Dr Abid Dhiab Al Ujayli Iraqi Accord Front - IIP
Housing & Construction Bayan Daza’i (F) Kurdistani Alliance, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Human Rights Wijdan Mikha’il (F) Independent, left INL rather than boycott
Industry & Minerals Fawzi al-Hariri Kurdistani Alliance, Kurdistan Democratic Party
Interior Jawad al-Bolani United Iraqi Alliance, formed a new party
Justice Safa Al Safi (acting) UIA - Independent, close to Sistani
Labor & Social Affairs Mahmud al-Radi United Iraqi Alliance - Badr
Municipalities & Public Works Riyad Ghurayyib United Iraqi Alliance - Badr
Oil Hussayn al-Shahrastani UIA – Independent & close to Sistani
Planning Ali Baban left Accord Front rather than boycott
Science & Technology Ra’id Fahmi Jahid Iraqi Communist Party, left INL
Trade Abd al-Falah al-Sudani United Iraqi Alliance- Da’wa party – Iraq branh
Transportation Amer Abdul Jabar United Iraqi Alliance- Da’wa party-Iraq Branch
Water Resources Abd al-Latif Rashid Kurdistani Alliance - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Youth & Sports Jasim Muhammad Ja’far United Iraqi Alliance – Shiite Turkomen
Ministers of State:
Civil Society Adil al-Asadi United Iraqi Alliance – Islamic Aamal organization
Council of Representatives Affairs Safa al-Safi UIA – Independent 7 close to Sistani
National Security Affairs Shirwan al-Wa’ili United Iraqi Alliance – Da’wa Party, Iraq branch
Governorates Affairs Sa’d Tahir Adb Khalaf al-Hashimi Iraqi Accord Front
Women's Affairs Dr Nawal Al-Samaraei Iraqi Accord Front, Iraqi Islamic Party
National Dialogue Affairs Akram al-Hakim United Iraqi Alliance - ISCI
Foreign Affairs Dr Mohamed Miajid Eidan Iraqi Accord Front, Iraqi National Dialogue Council
Tourism & Antiquities Dr Qahtan Abbas Al-Joubori United Iraqi Alliance - Sadrist Movement
Without portfolio Muhammad Abbas al-Uraybi left INL rather than boycott
Hasan Radi Kazim al-Sari United Iraqi Alliance - Hezbollah
Appendix B—Political Parties Sub-Groups
[pic]
United Iraqi Alliance
Al-Shabak Democratic Grouping
Badr Organization
Centre Grouping Party
Community of Justice
Hezbollah Movement in Iraq
Iraqi Democrats Movement
Islamic Daawa Party
Islamic Daawa Party-Iraq Organization
Islamic Master of the Martyrs Movement
Islamic Union for Iraqi Turkomans
Justice and Equality Grouping
Malhan Al-Mukatir
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
The Free of Iraq
Turkoman Loyalty Movement
Islamic Virtue Party
Al-Sadr Bloc
The National Reform Movement
Kurdistan Alliance
Chaldena Democratic Union Party
Kurdistan Communist Party
Kurdistan Democratic Pary
Kurdistan Islamic Group/Iraq Kurdistan Labour Party
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Turkoman Brotherhood Party
Iraqi National List
Arab Socialist Movement
Central Euphrates Grouping
Democratic al-Qasim Grouping
Independent Iraqi Sheikhs Council
Iraqi Communist Party
Iraqi Independent Democrats Grouping
Iraqi National Accord Movement
Iraqi Republican Grouping
Iraqiyun (Iraqis)
League of Iraqi Turkoman Tribes and Notables
Loyalty to Iraq Grouping
National List
The Free Unity Party
Appendix C—Summary of the 15 December 2005 Council of Representatives of Iraq election results
[pic]
|Alliances and parties |Votes |Percent |Seats |
|United Iraqi Alliance |5,021,137 |41.2% |128 |
|Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan |2,642,172 |21.7% |53 |
|Iraqi Accord Front |1,840,216 |15.1% |44 |
|Iraqi National List |977,325 |8.0% |25 |
|Iraqi National Dialogue Front |499,963 |4.1% |11 |
|Kurdistan Islamic Union |157,688 |1.3% |5 |
|The Upholders of the Message (Al-Risaliyun) |145,028 |1.2% |2 |
|Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc |129,847 |1.1% |3 |
|Turkmen Front |87,993 |0.7% |1 |
|Rafidain List |47,263 |0.4% |1 |
|Mithal al-Alusi List |32,245 |0.3% |1 |
|Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress |21,908 |0.2% |1 |
|National Independent Cadres and Elites |0 |0% |0 |
|Islamic Action Organization In Iraq - Central Command |0 |0% |0 |
|National Democratic Alliance |0 |0% |0 |
|Total (turnout 79.6 %) |12,396,631 | |275 |
Appendix D—Governorate (Province)
[pic]
Anbar: 13
Babil: 10
Baghdad: 1
Basra: 6
Diyala: 3
Dohuk: 15
Irbil: 16
Karbala: 11
Kirkuk: 17
Missan: 5
Muthana: 8
Najaf: 12
Nineveh: 14
Qadissiya: 9
Salahaddin: 2
Sulaymaniya: 18
Theqar: 7
Wassit: 4
-----------------------
[1]Article 62 of the Constitution provides for a “Federation Council,” a second council of size and power to be determined by subsequent law (not passed, to date).
* Source: Abedin, Mahan. (Hezb al-Daawa al-Islamiyya,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 2003.
Official website of Al-Da’wa party.
* Compiled by Dr. Murtadha Nasrullah and Nathan Train, June 6, 2008.
-----------------------
Map of Iraqi Kurdistan
Accord Front leaders Tariq Hashimi and Adnan al-Dulaimi
Ayad Allawi, leader of
The Iraqi National List
Working together: KDP’s
Massoud Barzani (left)
And PUK’s Jalal Talabani
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
INC leader
Ahmad Chalabi
Clashes in Karbala
Abu Ayyub al-Masri,
reported leader of AQI
Muqtada al-Sadr, leader
of the Mahdi Army
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Badr Corp
PKK fighters train in Northern Iraq
Sheihks of Anbar Salvation Council
A Turkish soldier patrols a
road near the Turkey-Iraq
border
An Iraqi woman in Basra walks by posters promoting women’s rights.
Iraqis wave the flag in Karbala
Iraqi Accord Front
Iraqi Islamic Party
General Council for the People of Iraq
Iraqi National Dialogue Council
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue
Kurdistan Islamic Union
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc
Other Coalitions (not discussed above)
Al-Rafidayn National Movement
Democratic Society Movement
Free Officers and Civilians Movement
Future Iraq Grouping
Iraqi National Peace List
Iraqi Nation List
Iraq Pledge Coalition
National Democratic Coalition
Nationalists Grouping
National House of Commons List
Parliament of the Iraqi National Forces
Rally of Independent Iraq’s Capabilities
Sun of Ira List
Iraqi National Congress List
Democratic Iraqi Grouping
Democratic Joint Action Front
First Democratic National Party Independent List
Iraqi Constitutional Movement
Iraqi Constitutional Party
Iraqi National Congress
Tariq Abd-al Karim al Shahd al-Budairi
Turkoman Decision Party
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