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Executive Summary

This report is guided by Mayor Greg Fischer’s charge to the Task Force on Merger 2.0 and focuses on selected aspects of six sectors of Metro government. These are 1) information, data and surveys 2) budget and personnel 3) the Urban Service District 4) police protection 5) fire services and 6) road maintenance. Findings are summarized below.

• Information furnished to the Task Force was seriously flawed and contained erroneous figures on metro workforce and service efficiencies.

• An examination of budget data show a reduction of 242 jobs (3.4 percent of the workforce) between the period of FY 2002-03 (last year before merger) and FY 2011-12 (current year). This reduction was offset by higher personnel costs and by earlier unpublicized, transition costs.

• Metro Louisville is now paying more for fewer employees and this may have a bearing on service performance.

• Data and surveys suffer from a lack of a timeline, especially as they relate to pre-merger and post-merger performance. This results in a static snapshot of a situation rather than a more accurate and dynamic series of pictures.

• Excluding the recent period of national recession when city budgets across the country were reduced, we see no appreciable changes in Louisville’s budget patterns from pre-merger to post-merger periods.

• Re the Urban Service District, we find it lacking in an adequate accounting of expenditures and revenues. The shortcoming has engendered negative effects—both tangibly (performance) and attitudinally (distrust).

• Re the Urban Service District, out of seven metro areas surveyed only Louisville and much smaller Athens (Georgia) do not publicize expenditures and revenues for provided services.

• Re police, the number of sworn police officers has modestly risen since merger while the number of part time employees has declined. At the same time, personnel expenditures for the consolidated department have sharply risen without commensurate improvement in performance.

• Re police, between the pre-merger year of FY 2002-03 and the current fiscal year, per capita personnel expenditures increased by 43 percent. At the same time the incidence of violent and property crime has remained flat or tilted slightly upward.

• Re police, public perceptions of the newly consolidated force leave something to be desired. Barely half the respondents gave Louisville high marks for safety. While a higher proportion of respondents (71 percent) expressed reasonable satisfaction with police performance another 29 percent were less than enthusiastic.

• Re fire protection, judging from partial data this more decentralized service appears to be doing well. When matched against fire services elsewhere, those in Metro Louisville compare favorably in terms of lower per capita expenses and better response time.

• Re fire protection, the favorable numbers are confirmed by attitudinal data with 90 percent of respondents expressing high levels of satisfaction.

• Re roads, the number of employees working on this infrastructure has remained relatively flat. At the same time, personnel expenditures have sharply risen without commensurate improvement in road conditions.

• Re roads, between the pre-merger calendar year of 2002 and the post-merger calendar year of 2010 annual payroll increased by 81.6 percent, while per capita personnel costs increased by 70.6 percent. Albeit, the salaries of road workers are still modest.

• Re roads, evaluative data reveal that maintenance is largely insufficient; 52 percent of the roads are in poor or mediocre condition, while 48 percent are in fair or good condition.

• Re roads, survey data show the public sharing a similarly negative response. Just 37 percent of respondents express reasonable levels of satisfaction, while a quarter of respondents were clearly dissatisfied.

• The report concludes with a series of observations about city-county consolidation and recommendations about how to improve performance.

Preface: Context of Louisville’s Merger

In opening this report it is useful to describe some aspects of Louisville’s merger, particularly the promises made and what has come of them. The campaign for merger was anchored in a set of explicit claims. At the forefront were promises that merger would accelerate economic development by making Louisville competitive with Nashville and Indianapolis; that it would attract capital investment and firms; and, that it would bring more jobs to our city. Another set of promises hinged on greater efficiency by eliminating duplicate services, reducing unnecessary labor costs and creating a “sleek, modern government”. A third claim rested on merger producing greater local democracy by creating a single metropolitan-wide executive, establishing a metro council and stimulating more citizen participation. All this was supposed to allow Louisville to speak with “one voice” and embrace “one vision”.

More than a decade after merger’s adoption we can take stock of the results. Economic development has not accelerated but moved downward. The decline is not just a product of the national recession that began in 2008, but had beset post-merged Louisville while the nation was in the midst of economic growth. During the best of these years post-merged Louisville foundered and in some respects its economic performance was less robust than pre-merged Louisville.[1] As the situation was evolving the Brookings Institution became engaged in helping the city lay out an economic development strategy. Public officials and the local media read its reports and invoked the Brookings name on behalf of merger.

This year the Brookings Institution confirmed what most of us had come to realize. The claims about economic development had fallen apart. A new Brookings study was able to cite just two policies that yielded benefits for Louisville—airport expansion and the University of Louisville’s Metropolitan College, both of which were undertaken for UPS in the 1990s well before merger. Brookings concluded that “merger may have other merits”, or it may not, “but stimulating economic development does not appear to have been one of them.”[2] There is nothing new in the finding that city-county consolidation does not produce economic benefits. A raft of literature exists on the subject; one of which compares pre-merged Louisville to merged Lexington-Fayette and “confirm(s) earlier analyses showing no systematic development improvements from city-county government.”[3]

Promises about merger leading to efficiency and democratic accountability have fared no better. Louisville Metro budget amounts are not significantly different than the combined budgets of Louisville/Jefferson County, modest reductions in total workforce have been offset by increased personnel costs and it has been difficult to identify enhanced service performance. Some of the findings on municipal services are elaborated in this report and also published elsewhere.[4] Last on the list of promises, the notion of merger leading to increased democracy is difficult to measure, but there are some basic indicators. On the one hand voting rates have gone up in Metro Louisville, but these may be a product of national or state politics. On the other hand, local campaign financing (especially for mayor) has substantially risen. Involvement by minority communities has not improved and the recent survey by IQS shows seriously discrepant attitudes between white and African-American residents. Again, the findings on Louisville’s merger are neither novel nor new. Studies of other city-county consolidations confirm that city-county consolidation neither enhances efficiency nor does it lead to greater democratic accountability.[5] We trust we can learn from scientific findings in the field and from our own independently derived results.

An Opportunity Gone but Not Yet Lost

The call to examine Louisville’s merger presents us with an opportunity to find out what is right or wrong with local government. Mayor Greg Fischer’s charge to the Task Force on Merger 2.0 was limited but quite clear and achievable. Basically it called for “examining the delivery of government services” with regard to “Fire/EMS, “Public Safety”, “Transportation/Infrastructure” and “Solid Waste/Recycling”. Among other things, the charge also called for the Task Force to analyze how Metro government can collaborate with “other taxing districts, municipalities and agencies to achieve efficiencies and overall better services”. The charge was issued within the context of Louisville-Jefferson County’s consolidation (merger), voted into law in November of 2000 and put into operation by January of 2003. In a press release Mayor Fischer summarized the Task Force’s goals by stating, “It’s time we take a fresh look at merger, what went well, what hasn’t and what can be improved upon to make sure all citizens are getting the services and response they deserve from city government.”[6]

To do this several fundamental and simple steps needed to be taken. First and foremost a full and candid evaluation needed to be made of specific services. Where possible this should include costs for service relative to its effectiveness. The obvious reason for drawing this linkage is that it is one matter to slash budgets and quite another to do so without compromising service. The connection between costs and effectiveness allows us to ascertain whether savings have truly been exacted without creating shortcomings elsewhere. Second, such an evaluation made sense if the Task Force could compare those services before and after merger. Only then might we know if merger had brought positive results and, if necessary, explore ways to attain promised levels of performance. Third, the Urban Service District (USD) created within the boundaries of pre-merged Louisville would be integral to anything derived from Merger 2.0. This involved an evaluation of the costs and benefits of services within the USD that could be compared with the service package offered in the rest of Metro Louisville. Once achieved, the Task Force could determine if merger had yielded its promised benefits to the “old city” and whether it was worthwhile to extend those benefits to other areas. Besides this, the familiar question about whether the USD is over-paying or underpaying for its services has been a continued source of contention. In a vacuum of information individuals may imagine or distort facts, and this has been a growing concern within the Metro Council. Here, the Task Force had an opportunity to clear the fog of misinformation and allay any source of disquiet. Last, a study involving dozens of individuals and enduring over a period of eight months should produce viable and substantial recommendations—not simply logical suggestions squeezed out of routine management but transformative prescriptions. This report focuses on selective aspects of the Task Force’s agenda, namely 1) information, data and surveys 2) budgets and personnel 3) the Urban Service District 4) police protection 5) fire services and 6) road maintenance. The criteria for evaluating these activities are summarized as:

• Full and accurate data on services to be evaluated (costs plus effectiveness)

• Analyses based on pre-merger and post-merger performance

• Sufficient attention paid to the costs and benefits of services within the Urban Service District (USD)

• An end set of recommendations that are transformative.

Information, Data and Surveys

An earlier memo dealt with efforts to acquire information.[7] The Task Force began its deliberations by seeking basic data, including censuses on the changing demography of the area and studies of service performance. A good deal of census material was furnished by individuals working in the field. By standards of full and accurate information the information was reliable, though it was broadly aimed at background and context rather than anything that could lead to specific policy changes.

Other information provided to the Task Force was more problematic. A report authored by graduate students and a professor at the Indiana University–Bloomington left a good deal to be desired.[8] Among other questionable assertions, the report claimed that merger eliminated nearly 700 positions, mostly through attrition and vacancies.[9] Exactly how this count was derived is not mentioned, though it is misleading (see figures below). Other claims about increased “efficiency” “effective policing” “cost savings” and better relationships for Louisville’s consolidated police department lacked evidence or credible example.[10] One searches in vain for metrics that might justify the report’s conclusions. Granted, the Task Force cannot be weighed down with reams of studies, but there is an abundance of material on this subject, including articles on Louisville. Certainly, a few solid, peer reviewed articles would have gone long way toward properly informing the Task Force about what we might expect from city-county consolidation.

By the terms of the mayor’s charge the Task Force also commissioned a survey of Metro residents. The survey was conducted by phone and administered to 1,092 households within the metro area over a period of seven days.[11] Given the narrow parameters of the Task Force the survey was done with reasonable competence. However, we might note that some essential questions were not asked. These questions relate to our third criterion based on an analysis of pre-merger and post-merger service performance. Very little, if anything, was asked about the relative effects of merger on the services in question. We cannot comment on whether this omission was intentional or not, but it is difficult to imagine a valid survey without tapping into citizens perceptions of pre and post-merger conditions. One would think that the Task Force would need to know how perceptions change over a critical period of time or whether services have improved or deteriorated as a result of merger. Instead of a moving picture over time, the survey produced a static snapshot. Because of this lapse, the reader is left in the dark about the efficiency and effectiveness over time relative to police, fire, EMS, transport, or waste management. These questions might have revealed how merger affected services or answered questions about the relative advantages and disadvantages to the public. The closest reference to pre and post-merger perceptions was a vaguely worded statement that some respondents felt “the police situation had worsened after the merger”.[12]

There are considerable flaws in information provided to the Task Force on other essentials. A document entitled “Merger by Numbers” indicated 9,130 “positions approved” in FY 2002-03 for pre-merged Louisville/Jefferson County and 7,406 in 2010-11 for post-merged Louisville/Jefferson County. These figures lead the Task Force to believe that metro government reduced personnel by 1,724. By contrast, official budget figures for the pre-merged year of FY 2002-03 show the number of personnel to be 7,057 and for FY 2011-2012 the official budget shows the total number of personnel to be 6,815. This amounts to a much smaller reduction.

What accounts for this difference? Upon further examination we find the number of positions listed in “Merger by the Numbers” consists of a category called “other employees”. These “other employees” are seasonal and temporary workers; they are not sworn, not regular full-time and are not entitled to pension or other benefits. The greatest numbers were hired by parks/recreation, the Louisville Zoo and were most likely teenagers who staffed pools, golf courses, ticket booths and the like. At the very least, if those who constructed “Merger by the Numbers” wanted to go “off-budget”, they might have specified a common measure such as “full time equivalent” positions. Besides this, important and essential items are missing from this document, such as the total budget numbers, trend lines, inflation adjustments and cost per employee. The numbers provided herein are readily available and it is unclear why the Task Force was deprived of full and accurate information.

Budgets and Personnel

We should recognize that budgets were an important component of the Task Force’s inquiry. Throughout the course of that inquiry, members often asked about whether Metro government had exacted savings relative to pre-merger and post-merger performance. Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide some answers to these questions.[13] Figure 1 below displays basic information on total budgets, in nominal amounts (actual budget dollars) as well as inflation adjusted amounts (cost of living).[14]

Figure 1

Louisville/Jefferson County Budgets: Fiscal Years 1999-00 to 2011-12

Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets, FY 1999-00 to FY 2011-12

As we see from Figure 1 both nominal and adjusted amounts snake up and down. Soon after merger in FY 2003-04 nominal budgets climbed while the inflation adjusted amounts stayed relatively flat. By FY 2006-07 both nominal and inflation adjusted budgets rose.[15] These might be considered prosperous years or even “normal years” for Metro Louisville and they were reflected in its budgets. By FY 2009-10 the impact of a national recession began and by FY 2010-11 the budget was in a full downward trajectory. The national trend affected almost all cities. Across the country local governments cut their budgets regardless of whether they were consolidated or not.[16] A recent study showed that in 2010 local budget expenditures declined by -4.4 percent and will continue to decline in 2011.[17]

Whatever might be said about Metro Louisville’s performance, it would be difficult to claim that merger saved the new government any money. Taking the last pre-merger year we see that both the nominal ($712 million) and inflation adjusted budgets ($896.6 million) showed a normal trajectory. By comparison, the post-merger budgets, just before the national recession, were higher for nominal amounts ($848.8 million) and about the same for inflation adjusted amounts ($896.3 million). Louisville’s budget did not change because of the nature of its government, but because of the nature of the times.

While budgets are not always subject to local conditions, public employment is more pliable. The obvious reason is that cities have a greater ability to engage in hiring, firing and workforce attrition than an ability to raise revenue or control long term expenditures. We can learn a great deal from understanding trends in Metro’s workforce. Figures 2 and 3 tell us something about numbers of employees and costs per employee. The line graphs run from pre-merged Louisville to Metro government and cover total employment (Figure 2) as well as expenditures per employee (Figure 3).

Figure 2

Louisville/Jefferson County Personnel; Fiscal Years 1999-00 to 2011-12

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Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets

Figure 3

Louisville/Jefferson County Expenditures per Employee: Fiscal Years 1999-00 to 2011-12

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Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets

By FY 1999-2000 Louisville/Jefferson County employed a workforce of 7,177 while in the last fiscal year before merger that number fell to 7,057 (a reduction of 120 individuals or 1.6 percent). By comparison Metro Louisville began FY 2003-04 with 7,045 employees and by the current FY 2011-12 Metro employed 6,815 individuals. Whatever other figures may be bandied about and counted in various ways, these numbers are gleaned from official budgets. Without knowing the unpublicized and offsetting costs of the merger transition, we can report a modest reduction of 242 individuals or 3.4 percent of the workforce from the last year of pre-merged Louisville (FY 2002-03) to the current year.[18]

There is another side to this picture and that concerns the actual expenditures per employee. Obviously, numbers of employees are one factor and the costs of those employees are quite another. As Figure 3 shows, the last pre-merger fiscal year showed nominal costs per employee at $50,838 while the inflation adjusted amount came to $64,177 per worker. By comparison the pre recession fiscal year of 2009-10 showed Metro’s nominal costs per worker at $68,265 and inflation adjusted amounts at $72,195 per worker. We can conclude that before large recessionary cuts occurred the costs per employee were higher for Metro government than for pre-merged government. Once the national recession set in cities throughout the nation reduced costs and Louisville was no exception. The current budget shows both nominal costs and inflation adjusted at $63,246.

What might explain the reasons behind the rise in the costs of existing personnel during many of the merger years? One possible explanation is that merger required salary adjustments across jurisdictions, so that compensation for all employees is equal—referred to as “ratcheting salaries upward”. Another may be that as government grows larger and bureaucracy becomes “taller”, more supervisory staff is needed. Workforce costs then increase at selective services and levels. The results show that merged Louisville found itself with fewer employees while also paying more for each worker. Whether this affected the quality and performance of services is the subject of the sections below.

The Urban Service District (USD)

As we look at performance the Urban Service District or USD is critical. For one it constitutes the densest area within Metro Louisville and as such receives the bulk of typical municipal services. For another, its combination of multiple services can be a useful barometer for determining service efficiencies. This enables us to determine whether those services warrant amalgamation of adjoining areas into the USD or whether other service districts might be used in creative ways (additional service districts, merged service districts or constricted service districts). If we are to extrapolate useful lessons about USD performance, clarity is important. Yet, during its eight years of operation Metro government had not made the necessary information available, much less put it in a systematic form. A special request by Commissioner Owens in April 2011 to the Legislative Reference Committee (LRC) did turn up some partial figures. The LRC was able to track three services—fire, solid waste and street lights. The figures for FY 2010-11 showed costs for these services at $66,159,300 while revenue was put at $66,165,000. By these rough and partial numbers the difference in overpayment for the USD was just $5,700.[19]

The available data for even these limited services are incomplete. Some services provided by the USD to suburban localities are not tracked and not reimbursed. For the Louisville Fire Department these include occasional fire protection outside the city and arson investigations. The USD also occasionally provides some suburbs with waste pickups, debris collection and recycling. There are also instances where the USD provided of street lighting to suburbs, which have not been reimbursed.[20]

Even the limited scope of LRC’s inquiry is insufficient because it does not include road maintenance, parks and recreation and other municipal activities. Ideally and for the sake of accurate analyses, it would be useful to count expenditures/revenues for all USD services and compare those to the rest of Metro Louisville. While we understand the political and other impediments to conducting this kind of examination, we should not be precluded from doing our very best with available data. Louisville’s USD remains an exception in scarcity of available public data. Table 1 displays information about USDs located elsewhere in the nation. Listed in the table are basic categories related to the presence of an urban service district, tax rates and the availability of budgets and expenditures.

Table 1: Urban Service Districts (USDs) in Seven Metro Areas

|City |Urban Services District |Tax rates |USD information available |

|Louisville Metro |Yes |Different |No |

|Lexington |Yes |Different |Urban Services District Fund in |

| | | |city budget |

|Nashville |Yes |Different |Urban Services District Fund in |

| | | |city budget |

|Jacksonville |5 districts |Same in USD1 (old city) and county;|No (not necessary); independent |

| | |different tax rates in 4 |cities have their own budgets |

| | |independent cities | |

|Indianapolis, IN |61 taxing districts |Different |Information provided in |

| | | |“Non-Binding Review Documents” |

|Charlotte, NC |Yes |Different |Separate budgets for city, county |

| | | |and independent towns |

|Athens, GA |No |Same |No |

As can be seen only Louisville and much smaller Athens do not publicize information about their USDs. In Athens/Clark the consolidated area holds just 115,000 residents and differences are not particularly significant. Louisville is entirely different with considerable variation between urbanized, suburban and rural areas. If only by the criterion of equity, citizens in these different areas deserve an accounting of services received and paid for.

There are still other reasons why Metro Louisville should be more transparent on this issue. One of the best variables in accounting for service performance lies in the distinction between different environments and population densities. For example, some municipal services are more efficiently delivered in denser neighborhoods than in sprawled areas. This is particularly true of fire, police and trash pickup. The questions beg for answers namely, at what break points do efficiencies turn into inefficiencies? And, where can a partial mix of services best be employed? Without accurate and full data and without a comparison of information on pre-merger and post-merger performance, it is not possible to make any headway on the costs and effectiveness of the urban service district.

Police Protection

In examining police services we focus again on costs and effectiveness. The costs for delivering a particular service are designated as budget amounts while effectiveness relates to outcomes related to that service. We begin with numbers of personnel and costs as displayed in Table 2 below.

Table 2

Budgets Louisville Police Department: FY 2001-02, FY 2002-03 and FY 2011-12

|Category |FY 2001-02 |FY 2002-03 |FY 2011-12 |

| |(Pre-Merger) |(Pre-Merger) |(Current) |

|Sworn Offices |1,243 |1,243 |1287 |

|Full-Time |402 |362 |226 |

|Permanent Part-Time |153 |137 |71 |

|Personnel Services |$ 97,443,740 |$ 105,519,000 |$ 137,069,900 |

|Personnel Costs Per Capita |$ 54,195 |$ 60,573 |$ 86, 534 |

Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets

Note the number of sworn officers has increased over the years while other employees (full and part time) have decreased. In principle this should bolster police protection, assuming more personnel are now on patrol. At the same time we also see a significant rise in police expenditures over the years. These increases are consistent with our previous findings on the higher costs of Metro government.[21] Thus, in the pre-merger year of FY 2001-02 costs were relatively low at $97.4 million and by the current year show a rise of 41 percent. During the last year before merger personnel expenditures for police came to $105.5 million and by the current period costs had risen 30 percent. The increase is reflected in per capita expenditures which rose from $54,165 in FY 2001-02 to the current year by 60 percent. The increase continued from the pre-merger year of FY 2002-03 onward with a rise of 43 percent. Even after accounting for inflation this is a very substantial increase.[22]

Did this change result in greater effectiveness? The linkage between performance and outcome is imperfect, but some measures are worth considering—among these are crime and clearance rates. Figures 4, 5 and 6 display the incidence and clearance rates for property and violent crime.[23]

Figure 4

Incidence of Property and Violent Crime (Per 1000,000 Population)

in Louisville/Jefferson County: 1997-2009

Source: Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), Federal Bureau of Investigation;

Figure 5

Clearance Rates for Property Crime in Louisville/Jefferson County: 2000-2005

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Source: Crime Analysis Unit/CompStat, Louisville Metro Police Department, Louisville, Kentucky

Figure 6

Clearance Rates for Violent Crime in Louisville/Jefferson County: 2000-2005

Source: Crime Analysis Unit/CompStat, Louisville Metro Police Department, Louisville, Kentucky

As the figures show outcomes are mixed. The incidence of both property and violent crime had risen in the 2000, dipping slightly in 2009 and trending upward again in 2010. At the same time clearance rates have improved.[24] Clearance on all categories of property crime has increased by approximately 10 percent since merger. While this is an improvement, the clearance rates remain at between 20 and 30 percent. Clearance rates on violent crime have markedly improved with the sharpest rise for rape. As can be seen, the pattern of clearance on violent crime jumps up and down, though we do see a ratcheting upward. In sum, we can say that while clearance has improved the incidence of crime has worsened.

The rise in criminal incidence is confirmed by public perceptions. Some critical questions on the IQS survey furnish ready examples. When asked whether Metro Louisville “was a safe place to live” 22.9 percent of respondents could “strongly agree” while 34 percent fell into the next category of agreement. This added up to a bare majority of 56.9 percent of respondents feeling Louisville was safe. As for police performance, 41.4 percent of respondents were strongly satisfied with police performance, while another 29.3 fell into the next category of agreement.[25] This produced 70.7 percent of respondents who felt reasonably satisfied with police. Results for African-American attitudes on the safety of Louisville were roughly comparable with 59.6 percent feeling safe, though the combined categories of satisfaction with police services was lower at just 62.9. [26]

Again, since the IQS survey did not inquire about pre-merger and post-merger performance we are unable to make a comparative assessment. We can however, glean shreds of information from an earlier survey conducted during the mid 1990s. At that time between 70 and 80 percent of pre-merger respondents agreed that Louisville was a safe city. In a follow up question on police performance the earlier survey indicated that 82 percent of pre-merger residents expressed high levels of satisfaction with the police.[27]

The conclusion to be drawn from this imperfect data is that the added expenditures in public safety have not done anything to prevent crime, but Metro has made progress in punishing offenders. Criminal incidence has continued to rise, though clearance rates have improved. Finally, our findings on the missed expectations of Metro’s consolidated police force are consistent with research on the subject. A highly reputed study of Indianapolis’ consolidated police force vis-à-vis independent-smaller police departments was quite clear. It concluded that smaller departments had better response times, better knowledge of the communities they served, and enjoyed a better rapport with citizens than their larger counterpart.[28]

Fire Service

Fire service is often a contentious issue because of the neighborhood loyalty firehouses command. Louisville is no different and its 17 suburban fire districts also evoke strong local support; at the same time public officials see small fire stations as unnecessary and a rightful object of cuts during difficult times. With this consideration in mind the Task Force, through the Mayors Innovation Project, received the assistance of a consulting firm. The upshot arrived in the form of a Technical Assistance Report, devoted largely to fire protection. While the Report emphasized the costs of maintaining numerous fire districts, it made no mention of service effectiveness.[29] This is a serious omission because we are not only dealing with the emotive issue of firehouses, but life, death and property issues—all of which relate to effectiveness of service.

Another difficulty with the Report was its focus on the single case of Nashville/Davidson County. Comparisons with other cities can be useful and are widely used in this document, but the attempt to generalize from a single city does not work well. Metro Louisville and Metro Nashville also have very different political geographies relative to area, demography, number of local jurisdictions and patterns of settlement. Moreover, any assessment should account for variables that affect the propensity for the outbreak of fires. These include the age of buildings, differences in social class, levels of population density and road access—none of which were covered in the Technical Assistance Report. Despite the lack of information, the Report went on to conclude that Louisville spends more on fire protection than Nashville and found “duplication of services” to be the culprit. In a similarly sweeping manner the Report claimed that “fragmented services can delay response time.”[30] The Report’s remedy for these ostensible ills lay in the long term goal of consolidating “most or all of the suburban fire districts into the Louisville Fire Department.”[31]

The Task Force wisely voted to reject this suggestion, though its rationale for doing so is not clear. While the issue was rendered moot, we might also see it as an opportunity to learn larger lessons. Much of the confusion stems from the supposition that smaller, “fragmented” services are necessarily less efficient. Yet much the opposite is true. Labor intensive, face to face services like fire, police or trash pickup demonstrate that smaller can be better. Like small-independent police forces, small-independent fire units may hold more advantages than their larger counterparts.

We provide a glimpse of Louisville’s own fire fighting capacity and its effectiveness relative to other cities. Table 3 offers some descriptive data on how eight cities fare relative to numbers of fire districts, areas served, expenditures and response time.

Table 3

Fire Protection in Eight Cities or Metro Areas

|City |2000 Population |Fire Districts |Stations |

|Full-time Employees |264 |281 | |

| | | |6.4% |

|Annual Payroll |$6,715,140 |$12,193,116 |81.6% |

|Annual Personnel Costs per Employee |$25,436 |$43,392 |70.6% |

Note: Original payroll data of 31-day monthly equivalent values for the month of March was converted to annual figures. This was done to provide clearer comparability with previous assessments.

Source: Government Employment & Payroll, 2002 Census of Governments, , last accessed on November 9, 2011; 2010 Annual Survey of Public Employment and Payroll. ; last accessed on November 9, 2011.

The full time workforce increased by just 20 individuals during this interval.[32] While the pay was modest, the percentage increase for annual salaries was large at more than 81 percent and so too was the annual costs per personnel at more than 70 percent. In proportional terms, it appears that merger significantly boosted workforce costs. The increases far exceeded the rate of inflation and the upward trend is similar to that experienced by the police department.[33]

What then has been the impact of these changes on effectiveness? We can offer some approximate indicators of Louisville’s road condition. Table 5 provides an evaluative account of roadways calculated in percentages and classified as “poor” “mediocre,” “fair,” and “good”.

Table 5

Road Maintenance in Louisville-Jefferson County, 2001-2008

| |Year |Poor |Mediocre |Fair |Good |

|Pre-merger Period |2001 |16 |33 |28 |22 |

| |2002 |17 |40 |17 |26 |

|Post-merger Period |2003 |12 |41 |23 |24 |

| |2004 |12 |41 |25 |22 |

| |2005 |11 |40 |21 |28 |

| |2006 |14 |40 |24 |22 |

| |2007 |14 |37 |21 |29 |

| |2008 |13 |39 |22 |26 |

Source: The Road Information Program (TRIP), Washington, D.C.

With only a few years of pre-merger data to study it is difficult to determine if those two years are an anomaly or an indication of a trend. In the pre-merger year of 2002 we see that 57 percent of the road conditions were classified as “poor” or “mediocre”, while 43 percent were categorized as “fair” or “good”. In the post-merger period 52 percent of the roads were classified as “poor” or “mediocre”, while 48 percent were categorized as “fair” or “good”. Overall, this is not a significant difference. Regardless of merger, road conditions have remained much the same.[34]

The evaluative data on roads is complemented by recent survey data. The IQS survey indicates that only 37.9 percent of respondents believed that roads were in “good” condition.[35] More than a quarter of respondents felt roads were not “good” and more than a third was unenthusiastic about road conditions. Neither did other means of transportation register particularly well. Despite recent efforts to create bicycle lanes, less than half of the respondents gave high marks for paths accommodating cyclists or pedestrian.[36]

Clearly, merger has not given Louisville better costs or better effectiveness. Numbers of personnel doing road work today have remained similar from the last pre-merger year, while evaluative and attitudinal data do not give road conditions high marks.[37] At least by public perception, thoroughfares for cyclists and pedestrians are also in need of improvement. This problem may be a matter of integrating Louisville’s transportation network as much as building or repairing its infrastructure.

Conclusions and Recommendations

We conclude that seeking improvement from merger may be based on a faulty assumption. Borne of the 19th century, consolidation was geared toward a different set of challenges and today lacks the wherewithal to deal with a more complex society. There is little reason to believe that merger has exacted efficiencies elsewhere and indeed much of the evidence is to the contrary. There is then no reason to expect that it will do so in Louisville. This is because city-county consolidation tends toward a top-down, centralized command structure. The contrast between Louisville’s consolidated police force and its more decentralized fire fighting capacity can be instructive. What is needed for Louisville’s improvement is not more but less centralization.

The best of today’s metropolitan governance is based on a bottom-up perspective. Unlike market driven business which measures its performance through profits and loses, government is a non market organization where accountability is lodged in citizen-consumers. The finest arrangements create “feedback loops”, where citizen-consumers are able to communicate with public officials and service providers. From that point onward smaller jurisdictions coordinate activities within a lateral framework of cooperation. Central leadership (mayor and metro council) is best used to steer this dynamic rather than attempt to propel it. Central leadership should also steer policies that foster lateral cooperation (inter-local agreements to share public services, contracting out, joint ventures). Accordingly, our approach is to re-balance the governing system, so that it decentralizes selective aspects of metropolitan governance. A number of steps toward achieving that end are listed below.

• Urban Service District (USD): Make better use of the USD by converting its current board into a Community Service Board (CSB). The CSB would be a visible organization that would elicit citizen input through hearings and public opinion surveys on select municipal services. These hearings should be used to both monitor local performance and coordinate activities between different agencies. The CSB could issue recommendations to the Mayor and Metro Council relative to revenue raising and expenditure. The composition of the CSB would consist of both appointed members and rotating elected members (from the Metro Council). One of the central objectives here is to convert a little known USD board into an active and vibrant citizen oriented body, working to enhance accountability. Another objective is to create healthy linkages between citizens, service agencies and City Hall.

• Community Service Boards (CSBs): Use the newly created CSB for central Louisville as a pilot project for possible extension to other parts of the metropolitan area.[38] CSBs should work to energize metro agencies and enhance accountability as well as coordinate activities between municipalities. Depending upon how well the CSB functions, they could be established in other parts of Metro Louisville. CSBs should also make recommendations on revenue raising and cost efficiencies. Should CSBs prove to be successful, their scope of activities could be extended to making recommendations on land use, environmental and other concerns.

• Information and Data Collection: Engage the University of Louisville’s Urban & Public Affairs (UPA) to gather data and help determine costs and effectiveness of the current USD. UPA also has the capacity to conduct policy evaluation and help monitor service delivery. UPA is a graduate department granting masters degrees in public administration and urban planning as well as a Ph.D. degree with specialties in public policy and urban planning. UPA also includes a Research and State Data Analysis Center with capable professionals and experienced survey researchers. Its graduate students study methods of policy evaluation, techniques of public management and the substantive aspects of land use planning. Its degrees are accredited by the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration as well as by the Planning Accreditation Board. Internships are required as part of its master curricula and this would be an ideal starting point for university/metro government collaboration.[39]

• Police: Employ current data and take triennial surveys on a neighborhood basis to establish a benchmarking process. The metro police department should establish base lines for pre-merger years and compare its own performance to those baselines. In addition to neighborhood surveys two examples of data are mentioned in this report—incidence of crime and clearance rates. Clearly, the rate at which violent and property crimes are occurring should be curtailed and one of the ways in which to measure progress is to benchmark past and current rates against future goals. Clearance rates for the metro police have gotten better, but they should be continually improved. Compared to other metropolitan areas Louisville’s clearance rate for property crime is higher, while clearance rates for violent crime hover at the national average.[40]

• Police: Consider decentralizing police services into smaller areas or neighborhoods. Decentralization should emphasize place-based policing. This approach focuses on hot spots and develops strategies for engaging the public (residents, landlords, business owners and managers). It is also an effective way to bolster community policing. Further to the point, police deployments are better directed to places where crimes are concentrated as opposed to targeting individual offenders. This approach provides a more stable target for police activities and raises fewer ethical/ legal problems.[41] The strategy conforms to geographically based jurisdictions.

• Roads: Employ current data bases and a benchmarking process to improve Metro Louisville’s roads. We see no reason for Metro to rank poorly on road conditions. The best way to change this situation is to evaluate road conditions through a series of indicators, establish benchmarked goals and patiently work each year to bring this surface transportation up to respectable levels.

• Roads: Accelerate all of the following: the conversion of one way streets into two way streets; the construction or widening of sidewalks; the integration of bicycle paths into the road system; and the implementation of existing planning studies.

• Roads: Consider whether workforce increases are necessarily to meet new benchmarked goals for roads and the accelerated pace for re-making streets, sidewalks and bicycle paths.

• A Final Word on Tactical Priorities: Focus on select municipal services that have the potential for generating tangible, rapid and achievable results. The list presented here is by no means exclusive but the most promising candidates appear to be the police, public works (road maintenance) and solid waste disposal. Use base lines and extensive benchmarking to measure performance.

References

Altshuler, Alan William Morrill, Harold Wolman and Faith Mitchell eds. 1999. Governance and Opportunity in Metropolitan America. Washington D.C. . National Academy Press.

Atkins, P. et al. 2011. “Responding to Manufacturing Jobs Loss: What can economic development policy do?” Metro Economy Series. Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings Institution, June 2011 available online at , last accessed on November 1, 2011.

Carr, J, Bae, S and Lu, W. 2006. “City-County Government and Promises of Economic Development: A tale of two cities.” State and Local Government Review 38 (3): 259-69

Hoene, C.W. and Pagano, M.A. 2011. City Fiscal Conditions in 2011. National League of Cities (NLC) Report, September 2011. Available online at , last accessed on November 2011.

IQS Research. 2011. Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study. August 27. Available online at , last accessed on November 1, 2011.

Katirai, M. 2005. “Sprawl, Equity and Fire Department Response Times Across the U.S.” Ph.D. dissertation, School of Urban & Public Affairs University of Louisville.

Legislative Research Commission. 2011. Memorandum: Louisville Urban Services District. April 20.

Martin, L and Schiff, J.H. 2011. "City-County Consolidations: Promise versus performance.” State and Local Government Review 43 (2):167-77

"Mayor Fischer Takes Action to Review and Improve Government Merger", January 6, 2011. Available at

McInnis, R. 2000. The Toronto Amalgamation: Looking back, moving ahead. September 14. Available online at , last accessed on November 2011.

Ostrom, E. 2000. “The Dangers of Self-Evident Truths.” PS: Political Science & Politics March. Available online at , last accessed on November 2011.

Public Works LLC. 2011. Techical Assistance Report for Merger 2.0 Task Force. On behalf of Mayors Innovation Project. August 26, 2011. Available online at , last accessed on November 1, 2011.

Savitch, H.V. Vogel, R.K. and Ye, L. 2010. “Beyond the Rhetoric: Lessons from Louisville’s Consolidation.” The American Review of Public Administration 40 (3): 3-28.

Savitch, H.V., Vogel, R.K and Ye, L. 2009. “Louisville Transformed But Hardly Changed: A Survey of a city before and after merger.” in Phares, D. (ed) Governing Metropolitan Regions in the 21st Century. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 164-84.

School of Public and Environmental Affairs. 2007. Louisville Merger Report. School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University-Bloomington, April 2007.

Seamon, F and Feiock, R. 1995. “Political Participation and City/County Consolidation: Jacksonville-Duval County” International Journal of Public Administration, 18(11) 1741-1752

Urban Services District (USD) Board Approved Budget Fiscal Year 2009-2010.

United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR). Data available online at , last accessed on November 2011.

United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2006. Crime in the United States. Available online at , last accessed on November 2011.

Urban Studies Institute. 1996. Louisville Survey. Urban Studies Institute, University of Louisville, February 13.

Vogel, D. David, G. Brugman, J. Wright, W. and Prather, J. 2011. Operational Review of Louisville Public Works, Louisville, Kentucky. July.

Weisburd, D. 2008. Place-based Policing. Ideas in American Policing Number 9, January 2008 , published by Police Foundation. Available online at , last accessed on November 1, 2011.

About the Report’s Author

H.V. Savitch, Brown and Williamson Distinguished Research Professor, School of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY

Professor Savitch is a former co-editor at the Journal of Urban Affairs and former President of the Urban Section of the American Political Science Association. He has published eleven books or monographs on various aspects of urban development, public policy and regional governance. His co authored volume, Cities in the International Marketplace (Princeton University Press) received the best book award in the urban field by the American Political Science Association and is translated into Spanish as Ciudades en el Mercado Internacional. His most recent work consists of a multi-authored volume, Struggling Giants: City-Region Governance in London, New York, Paris and Tokyo (forthcoming 2012, University of Minnesota Press). His more than 80 articles have appeared in leading journals, collected works and research outlets. Savitch has also published extensively on issues of city-county consolidation and metropolitan reorganization. His articles have appeared in leading, peer reviewed journals as well as book volumes.

Professor Savitch has received numerous awards both in the United States and abroad. He served as a Visiting Scholar at the London School of Economics (United Kingdom) as well as being named a Lady Davis Fellow at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel). He has been the recipient of awards which has allowed him to do extensive research in France for more than 20 years. These research assignments in France include an award by the National Center for Scientific Research (Bordeaux, France) and a Fulbright award at the Maison Mediterranean des Sciences de l’Homme (Aix-en-Provence, France). Most recently Savitch was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Chile, in Santiago.

Savitch has also served as a consultant to former mayor of New York City, David Dinkins, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Mayors’ Urban Summit and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

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[1] Savitch, H.V., Vogel, R.K, and Ye, L., “Beyond the Rhetoric: A Case Study of Louisville’s Consolidation” American Review of Public Administration”, 2005 40 (1) 3-28

[2] Atkins, P et. al. “Responding to Manufacturing Jobs: What Can Economic Development Policy Do?” Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution, June 2011.

[3] See Carr, J, Bae, S, and Lu, W. “City-County Government and Promises of Economic Development: A Tale of Two Cities, State and Local Government Review, 38:3 (2006).

[4] See Savitch, H.V., Vogel, R.K and Ye, L. “Louisville Transformed but Hardly Changed: A Survey of a City Before and After Merger” in Phares, D. (ed) Who Will Govern Metropolitan Regions in the 21st Century, M.E. Sharpe, 2009.

[5] See Altshuler, Morrill, A. Wolman, H and Mitchell F. eds. 1999. Governance and Opportunity in Metropolitan America. Washington D.C. National Academy Press. For a recent synopsis see Martin, L and Schiff, J "City-County Consolidations” State and Local Government Review 43(2):167-177 (2011). Also see, Seamon, F and Feiock, R. “Political Participation and City/County Consolidation: Jacksonville-Duval County” International Journal of Public Administration, 18(11) 1741-1752 (1995)

[6] "Mayor Fischer Takes Action to Review and Improve Government Merger", January 6, 2011. Available at .

[7] See Position Paper: Merger 2.0, April, 2011.

[8] See Louisville Merger Report, Indiana University–Bloomington, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, April 27, 2007.

[9] Ibid. p. 12.

[10] Ibid. p. 13 and 19.

[11] IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY, p. 10.

[12] Ibid. p.19.

[13] For the pre-merged period both Louisville and Jefferson County are included while the post-merged period takes both entities into account by using Metro figures.

[14] The inflation adjusted amounts are based on the Constant Price Index or CPI and measures the average change in the prices of consumer items, the goods and services that people buy for daily living. See Bureau of Labor Statistics at . Note there are various ways to account for inflation with each having its own advantages and disadvantages.

[15] There was however a dip in inflation adjusted amounts in 2007-08.

[16] See Hoene, C.W. and Pagano, M.A. City Fiscal Conditions in 2011, National League of Cities (NLC), September, 2011, Washington D.C.

[17] By comparison with cities in the NLC survey Louisville’s nominal reduction was less at -2.5 percent while its inflation adjusted reduction was similar to other cities at -4.1 percent. Ibid. p. 3.

[18] Transition costs can be substantial. The cost of merging much larger Toronto amounted to $240 million. Se Toronto City Council, “The Toronto Amalgamation: Looking Back, Moving Ahead”, Toronto, Canada, September, 14, 2000.

[19] Undated sheets of revenues and expenditures for the USD did turn up later. For FY 2009-10 the expenditures came to 63,669,000 while revenues were put at $63,680,000. For these rough numbers the excess of revenues over expenditures came to $11,000. See “Urban Services District (USD) Board Approved Budget FY 2009-10”.

[20] Legislative Research Commission, “Memorandum: Louisville Urban Service District”, April 20, 2011.

[21] As is the practice throughout this report pre-merger years include the city of Louisville and Jefferson County.

[22] For the inflation adjusted amount the per capita personnel costs for FY 2001-02 come to $65,700 for a 32.3 percent increase. The inflation adjusted amount for FY 2002-03 comes to $71, 800 for a 21.1 percent increase. The inflation adjustments are based on the Constant Price Index or CPI See Bureau of Labor Statistics at .

[23] The FBI reports that an offense is cleared by arrest when all of the following conditions have been met for at least one person: arrested, charged with the commission of the offense, or turned over to the court for prosecution. In certain situations, elements beyond law enforcement's control prevent the agency from arresting and formally charging the offender. These offenses can be cleared by “exceptional means”. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2006. Crime in the United States at .

[24] The causes of crime are multifaceted and may not necessarily be attributed to poor police performance. By comparison clearance rates touch directly on the police performance because they deal with the apprehension of suspects.

[25] The combined totals are very modest and we might ask why 43 percent of residents do not feel entirely safe in Louisville. Similarly we can ask why 29 percent of residents are not entirely satisfied with police performance. See IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY pp. 107-108.

[26] See IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY pp. 68-69.

[27] See University of Louisville, Urban Studies Institute, “Louisville Survey” 13 February, 1996, Louisville, Kentucky. Because the questions are not entirely comparable we cannot draw precise conclusions. However compared to the later survey by IQS, resident perceptions on safety and performance were more favorable in 1996.

[28] Elinor Ostrom, “The Dangers of Self-Evident Truths” APSANET, .

[29] The Report did list numbers of fire and medical runs, vehicle availability, etc. These are hardly outcomes and do not address outcomes or effectiveness. See, Mayors Innovation Project, Technical Assistance Report for Merger 2.0 Task Force, Public Works, LCC, August 26, 2011.

[30] Ibid. p. 10.

[31] Ibid, p. 10.

[32] Another report poses slightly different figures and arrives at 308 personnel by including administrative workers. See Vogel, et al. Operational Review of Louisville Public Works, July, 2011, Louisville, Kentucky.

[33] Using the Consumer Price Index an annual salary of $25,436.00 in 2002 would be $30,800 in 2010.

[34] A broader study of public works focused on job and agency performance. Rather than using public opinion this study asked selective customers and stakeholders (Metro Council, Ford Motor Company, United Parcel Service, etc) to rate the Public Works Department and it received good to decent grades. Op. cit. 2011

[35] See IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY p. 102

[36] Ibid. 103

[37] The performance study cited above uses a different base year (2006) and perhaps different statistics. It concludes that by 2010 the road workforce had increased by 128 personnel. See Vogel, et al, op. cit. p. 10

[38] Subsequent legislation to the original merger law allowed for the creation of “special taxing districts” to other portions of the county, thereby making a possible extension of the CSB logically desirable and feasible.

[39] The Task Force recommended the University of Louisville’s Department of Political Science for this function. Political Science is a fine department with an excellent faculty. It is mostly an undergraduate department, oriented toward international relations, comparative politics, national government and political theory. For the most part the specialties needed by Metro government are located in Urban and Public Affairs. The Mayor’s Office would do well to consult the Chair of Urban and Public Affairs and the Director of the State Data & Research Center. In the interests of full disclosure this author is a member of UPA and will recues himself from any involvement in such projects.

[40] The following are comparisons of Louisville to the national average for metropolitan counties. For crimes against property: Burglary: Louisville 20%/Nat’l avg. 13%: Larceny: Louisville, 30%/Nat’l avg. 20%: Auto Theft: Louisville 20% /Nat’l avg. 15%. For violent crimes: Homicide: Louisville 67%/Nat’l avg. 65%: Rape: Louisville 98%/Nat’l avg. 45%: Robbery: Louisville 32%/Nat’l avg. 31%: and Assault: Louisville 61%/Nat’l avg. 59%. Source: Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), Federal Bureau of Investigation; .

[41]D. Weisburd, 2008. “Place-Based Policing”, Ideas in American Policing, Number 9, 2008. Police Foundation.

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Nominal Amounts (in millions)

Inflation Adjusted Amounts (2011 in millions)

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