Open Evidence Archive | National Debate Coaches Association
Korea Aff - 7 Week
Plan – 1ac 5
***Korean War ADV 5
Korean War Adv – 1ac 6
Economy Impact – 2ac 15
Economy Extensions 16
CBW Impact – 1ac/2ac 17
North Korea Will Use CBWs 19
Smallpox / Anthrax Impacts 20
U.S. Doesn’t Have Defenses Against CBWs 21
N. Korean Instability = CBW Transfer to Terrorists 22
U.S.-China War Impact – 2ac 23
U.S.-China War Extensions 24
War Now – 2ac 26
War Now – 1ac/2ac 28
Most Probable – 1ac/2ac 29
Will Go Nuclear – 2ac 30
Korean War => WMD Use 31
Escalation Possible 33
Miscalculation Possible 34
Accidental War Possible 36
Brinkmanship => Miscalc & Escalation 37
Kim Jong-il is Irrational 38
U.S. Presence => Belligerence 39
U.S. Presence => Miscalc and Escalation *** 40
U.S. Presence => Escalation 41
Withdrawal Prevents U.S. Draw In 42
A2: North’s Military is Weak 43
Withdrawal => Chinese Influence in Korea 44
Chinese Involvement Solves *** 46
China Key to Reform and Denuclearization 49
A2: China Won’t Pressure North Korea 50
Chinese Action => Soft Power 51
Expanded Soft Power Key to China’s Leadership 52
A2: China Won’t Use Soft Power / Influence 53
A2: China Uses Soft Power to Undermine U.S. Heg 54
***Reunification Adv 55
Reunification Inevitable 56
Withdrawal => Re-unification 57
Withdrawal => Chinese Involvement in Reunification 58
Withdrawal => Reduced Chinese Control 59
Chinese Control of Reunified Korea Bad 60
***Succession ADV 61
Succession Adv – 1ac 62
Succession = Conflicts 70
Succession = More Belligerence 71
Regime on Brink of Collapse 73
Regime Collapse is Inevitable 74
Succession Will be Unstable 76
A2: Next Leader Will Change Policies 77
Failed Succession => Civil War 78
Regime Collapse => U.S.-China War 79
Regime Collapse => Econ Collapse, Terrorism & Miscalc 80
***REGIONALISM ADV 80
Regionalism Adv – 1ac 81
Regionalism => Post Withdrawal Stability 86
Regionalism Necessary / U.S. Not Sustainable 87
Withdrawal => Regionalism 88
Withdrawal => Regional Balance of Power 90
Withdrawal => Japan Regional Stabilization 91
Withdrawal => ROK Regional Stabilization 92
Withdrawal => ROK Conventional Modernization 94
A2: Asian Regionalism Now 95
***CHINA Adv 95
China Adv – 1ac 96
China Rise Inevitable – U.S. Policy Key 101
China’s Course Undetermined – U.S. Policy Key 102
China’s Rise => Threat 103
A2: Chinese Containment Turns 106
***SOUTH Korean Modernization Adv 107
South Korean Modernization Adv – 1ac 108
Withdrawal => Sustainable ROK Military Force 110
Withdrawal => Empirical ROK Modernization 111
ROK Can Develop Its Military 112
***Withdrawal INEVITABLE 112
Anti-Americanism Now 113
ROK Supports Withdrawal 117
***Overstretch / War on Terror ADV 117
Withdrawal => Resources for WOT *** 118
Withdrawal => Resources for WOT 119
Plan Solves Overstretch 120
Troops Will be Redeployed 121
Troops Will be Redeployed to Afghanistan 122
A2: Troops Will be Relocated to Japan 124
***SOLVENCY 124
Phased Withdrawal Solvency 125
Withdrawal Ground Forces Solvency 126
Withdrawal All but 3-5k Ground Forces 127
Reducing Presence Stops Pressure to Disengage 128
Withdrawal => Offshore Balancing 129
Withdrawal => Equal Relationship with S. Korea 130
Withdrawal => End of Mutual Defense Treaty 131
Withdrawal => Prioritize Diplomacy 132
***DISAD Answers 132
A2: N. Korean Invasion – 2ac 133
A2: N. Korean Invasion – ROK Can Defend Itself 134
A2: N. Korean Invasion – ROK Will Buildup 136
A2: N. Korean Invasion – DPRK Military Declining 137
A2: N. Korean Invasion – South will Win 138
A2: N. Korean Invasion – Deter with Other Means 139
A2: Deterrence – 2ac 140
A2: Deterrence – U.S. Heg / Influence Declining 142
A2: Deterrence – W/drawal Won’t Hurt Influence / Heg 144
A2: Deterrence – Ground Forces Not Key 146
A2: Deterrence – Residual Forces are Enough 147
A2: Deterrence – Air Force / Navy Solves 148
A2: Deterrence – Transition to Stryker Force Best 152
A2: Deterrence – Navy Solves 153
A2: Deterrence – China Ans 154
A2: Deterrence – Terrorism Ans 155
A2: Troops Key to Deter China / Taiwan 156
A2: Troops Key to Deter India 158
A2: Troops Key to Deter Other Conflicts 159
A2: Troops Key to Deter Other Asian Conflicts 160
A2: Troops Key to Solve Local Conflicts / Civil Wars 161
A2: Troops Key to Solve Diseases / Piracy / Terrorism 162
A2: Troops Key to Reunification 163
A2: Troops Key to Economy 164
A2: ROK Forces Key to Iraq / War on Terror 165
A2: ROK Prolif – 2ac 166
A2: U.S.-ROK Relations – 2ac 168
A2: Relations / Prolif – Cultural & Economic Ties Sustain Relations 170
A2: Japan Prolif – No Link 171
A2: Japan Prolif – Regional Prolif Better than U.S. Draw In 172
A2: Japan Prolif – No Impact 173
A2: Japan Prolif – Technical Barriers 174
A2: Japan Prolif – Can’t Test / Deploy Weapons 175
A2: Japan Prolif – Political & Econ Relations Sustain Deterrence 176
A2: Japan Prolif – Shift in Attitude Now 177
A2: U.S.-ROK Alliance DA – Burdensharing Turn 178
A2: U.S.-ROK Trade / Investment DA 179
A2: ROK Investment DA 181
A2: ROK Defense Spending DA 183
A2: Reverse Defense Spending (Revenue Recycling) DA 185
A2: Spending DA 186
A2: Obama Good – Public Support Turn 187
A2: Obama Good – Congress & Pentagon Supports 188
A2: Obama Bad – Withdrawal Will Crush Political Capital 189
A2: Obama Bad – Doesn’t Support Plan 190
***Counterplan ANSWERS 190
A2: CP – Conditions (Short) 191
A2: CP – Conditions (Long) 192
A2: CP – Conditions on NK – Kim Jong-il DA 2ac 193
A2: CP – Conditions on NK – Won’t Solve 194
A2: CP – Condition on NK Denuclearization 195
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation 199
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Coop => SK Derailment 207
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Coop – Chinese Influence NB Ans 208
A2: CP – Consult South Korea – Regionalism Good Turn 209
A2: CP – Consult Russia 210
A2: CP – Russian Engagement / Security Guarantee 211
A2: CP – Exclude Air Forces 212
A2: CP – Immediate Withdrawal 213
A2: CP – Sanction North Korea 214
A2: CP – Remove Sanctions on North Korea 215
A2: CP – Engagement – Can’t Solve Nuclearization 216
A2: CP – Engagement / Sign “X” Agreement With N. Korea 218
A2: CP – Regime Change 219
A2: CP – Pressure / Attack North Korea 220
A2: CP – Attack NK – Laundry List 2ac 221
A2: CP – Attack NK – ROK won’t Support 222
A2: CP – Attack NK – Economy Turn 223
A2: CP – Attack NK – Hegemony Turn 224
A2: CP – Attack NK – Causes Retaliation 225
A2: CP – Attack NK – Undermines Relations With China & Japan 226
A2: CP – Attack NK – Undermines Relations With ROK 227
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Won’t Solve 228
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to NB 229
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to Deterrence 230
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to ROK Relations 231
A2: CP – Realignment / SQ Solves 232
Plan – 1ac
The United States federal government should implement a phased withdrawal of its ground troops in the Republic of Korea.
***Korean War ADV
KOREAN WAR ADV – 1AC
Advantage _____ is Korean War
The sinking of the South Korea’s ship makes conflict inevitable – retaliation will spark an escalatory war and failure to respond will only cause more North Korean provocations.
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,” , JMP)
It has been weeks since the South Korean ship Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea near the disputed boundary between South and North Korea. As yet the cause is unknown--some government critics suspect a cover-up--but after raising the wreck South Korean officials said the explosion appeared to be external. Which implicates Pyongyang.
If the cause was a mine, a North-South confrontation still could be avoided. The mine might have been left over from the Korean War. Or if of more modern vintage it could have broken loose from its moorings.
If a torpedo was used, however, the threat of conflict rises. The Republic of Korea could not easily ignore a North Korean submarine stalking and sinking one of its vessels.
Seoul has promised "a firm response," though, argues Han Sung-joo, a former ROK foreign minister and U.S. ambassador, "that doesn't mean a military reaction or an eye-for-eye response." In fact, the South did not retaliate after earlier provocations, such as the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner and assassination attempt against former president Chun Doo-hwan which killed 16 ROK officials.
A military reprisal then could have triggered a full-scale war. Responding in kind this time also could spark a dangerous escalatory spiral with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
However, Seoul has spent the last decade attempting to pacify the DPRK, providing aid, allowing investment, and hosting summits. To do nothing would seem to be abject appeasement, undermining ROK credibility and encouraging the North to act even more recklessly in the future. If the word "firm" has any meaning, the South Korean government would have to do more than protest.
Still, the decision, though difficult, shouldn't concern the U.S. The South has gone from an authoritarian economic wreck to a democratic economic powerhouse. With a vastly bigger and more sophisticated economy, larger population, and greater access to international markets and support than the North, Seoul long has been able to defend itself. Pyongyang retains a numerical military edge, but its weapons are old, troops are undertrained, and industrial base is shrinking.
Thus, the South should be able to decide on the action that best advances its security. However, Seoul long chose to emphasize economic development over military preparedness. As a result, the ROK remains dependent on America.
Some 27,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in the South. The U.S. retains formal command of all forces, American and South Korean, during a war. Seoul expects substantial U.S. air and naval support and ground reinforcement in the event of war.
Which means that ROK retaliation against the DPRK would draw the U.S. into any conflict. So Washington cannot help but pressure South Korean decision-makers to act in accord with American as well as ROK interests. In fact, that's what happened in 1983, when the U.S. insisted that Seoul not retaliate militarily after the bombing attack on President Chun.
The current situation also means that the destiny of America is essentially controlled by the North's Kim Jong-il. Ordering an attack on a South Korean ship could end up forcing Washington to go to war. Although the bilateral U.S.-South Korean defense treaty does not make American intervention automatic, it is unimaginable that an American administration would stand aside in a conflict.
This is a ludicrous position for both the U.S. and South Korea, six decades after Washington saved a far weaker ROK from a North Korean invasion in the midst of the Cold War. Neither country is well-served by Seoul's continuing defense dependency on America.
Unfortunately, the policy incongruities only are likely to worsen. The ROK desires to wield increasing influence beyond its own shores. While relying on American military forces to defend its homeland, the South Korean government is crafting its navy for more distant contingencies and deploying ground personnel in the Middle East and Central Asia. Yet Seoul found that when the enemy struck at home, assuming the Cheonan was sunk by the North, the South Korean military was ill-prepared to defend its own personnel.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
The status quo is fundamentally different than the past – the chance of a major miscalculation and global escalation is possible now in five different ways
Sanger, 10 (5/28/10, David E. Sanger, NY Times, “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War,”
, JMP)
USUALLY, there is a familiar cycle to Korea crises.
Like a street gang showing off its power to run amok in a well-heeled neighborhood, the North Koreans launch a missile over Japan or set off a nuclear test or stage an attack — as strong evidence indicates they did in March, when a South Korean warship was torpedoed. Expressions of outrage follow. So do vows that this time, the North Koreans will pay a steep price.
In time, though, the United States and North Korea’s neighbors — China, Japan, South Korea and Russia — remind one another that they have nothing to gain from a prolonged confrontation, much less a war. Gradually, sanctions get watered down. Negotiations reconvene. Soon the North hints it can be enticed or bribed into giving up a slice of its nuclear program. Eventually, the cycle repeats.
The White House betting is that the latest crisis, stemming from the March attack, will also abate without much escalation. But there is more than a tinge of doubt. The big risk, as always, is what happens if the North Koreans make a major miscalculation. (It wouldn’t be their first. Sixty years ago, Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Il-sung, thought the West wouldn’t fight when he invaded the South. The result was the Korean War.)
What’s more, the dynamic does feel different from recent crises. The South has a hardline government whose first instinct was to cut off aid to the North, not offer it new bribes. At the same time, the North is going through a murky, ill-understood succession crisis.
And President Obama has made it clear he intends to break the old cycle. “We’re out of the inducements game,” one senior administration official, who would not discuss internal policy discussions on the record, said last week. “For 15 years at least, the North Koreans have been in the extortion business, and the U.S. has largely played along. That’s over.”
That may change the North’s behavior, but it could backfire. “There’s an argument that in these circumstances, the North Koreans may perceive that their best strategy is to escalate,” says Joel Wit, a former State Department official who now runs a Web site that follows North Korean diplomacy.
The encouraging thought is the history of cooler heads prevailing in every crisis since the Korean War. There was no retaliation after a 1968 raid on South Korea’s presidential palace; or when the North seized the American spy ship Pueblo days later; or in 1983 when much of the South Korean cabinet was killed in a bomb explosion in Rangoon, Burma; or in 1987 when a South Korean airliner was blown up by North Korean agents, killing all 115 people on board.
So what if this time is different? Here are five situations in which good sense might not prevail.
An Incident at Sea
Ever since an armistice ended the Korean War, the two sides have argued over — and from time to time skirmished over — the precise location of the “Northern Limit Line,” which divides their territorial waters. That was where the naval patrol ship Cheonan was sunk in March. So first on the Obama administration’s list of concerns is another incident at sea that might turn into a prolonged firefight. Any heavy engagement could draw in the United States, South Korea’s chief ally, which is responsible for taking command if a major conflict breaks out.
What worries some officials is the chance of an intelligence failure in which the West misreads North Korea’s willingness and ability to escalate. The failure would not be unprecedented. Until a five-nation investigation concluded that the Cheonan had been torpedoed, South Korea and its allies did not think the North’s mini-submarine fleet was powerful enough to sink a fully armed South Korean warship.
Shelling the DMZ
American and South Korean war planners still work each day to refine how they would react if North Korea’s 1.2 million-man army poured over the Demilitarized Zone, 1950s-style. Few really expect that to happen — the South Koreans build and sell expensive condos between Seoul and the DMZ — but that doesn’t mean the planning is unjustified.
In one retaliatory measure last week, South Korea threatened to resume propaganda broadcasts from loudspeakers at the DMZ. In past years, such blaring denunciations, of Kim Jong-il’s economic failures, were heard only by North Korean guards and the wildlife that now occupies the no-man’s land. Still, the threat was enough to drive the North’s leadership to threaten to shell the loudspeakers. That, in turn, could lead to tit-for-tat exchanges of fire, and to a threat from the North to fire on Seoul, which is within easy reach of mortars. If that happened, thousands could die in frenzied flight from the city, and investors in South Korea’s economy would almost certainly panic.
American officials believe the South is now rethinking the wisdom of turning on the loudspeakers.
A Power Struggle or Coup
Ask American intelligence analysts what could escalate this or a future crisis, and they name a 27-year-old Kim Jong-un, the youngest of Kim Jong-il’s three sons, and the father’s choice to succeed him. Little is known about him, but his main qualifications for the job may be that he is considered less corrupt or despised than his two older brothers.
[CONTINUED]
Korean War Adv – 1ac
[CONTINUED]
One senior American intelligence official described the succession crisis this way: “We can’t think of a bigger nightmare than a third generation of the Kim family” running the country with an iron hand, throwing opponents into the country’s gulags, and mismanaging an economy that leaves millions starving.
It is possible that on the issue of succession, many in the North Korean elite, including in the military, agree with the American intelligence official. According to some reports, they view Kim Jong-un as untested, and perhaps unworthy.
“We’re seeing considerable signs of stress inside the North Korean system,” another official reported.
And that raises the possibility of more provocations — and potential miscalculations — ahead.
One line of analysis is that the younger Kim has to put a few notches in his belt by ordering some attacks on the South, the way his father once built up a little credibility. Another possibility is that internal fighting over the succession could bring wide-scale violence inside North Korea, tempting outside powers to intervene to stop the bloodshed.
Curiously, when Kim Jong-il took the train to China a few weeks ago, his heir apparent did not travel with him. Some experts read that as a sign that the Kim dynasty might fear a coup if both were out of the country — or that it might not be wise to put father and son on the same track at the same time, because accidents do happen.
An Internal Collapse
America’s most enduring North Korea strategy isn’t a strategy at all; it’s a prayer for the country’s collapse. Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy hoped for it. Dick Cheney tried to speed it.
The regime has survived them all.
But could the North collapse in the midst of the power struggle? Sure.
And that is the one scenario that most terrifies the Chinese. It also explains why they keep pumping money into a neighbor they can barely stand.
For China, a collapse would mean a flood of millions of hungry refugees (who couldn’t flee south; there they are blocked by the minefield of the DMZ); it would also mean the possibility of having South Korea’s military, and its American allies, nervously contending with the Chinese over who would occupy the territory of a fallen regime in order to stabilize the territory. China is deeply interested in North Korea’s minerals; the South Koreans may be as interested in North Korea’s small nuclear arsenal.
A Nuclear Provocation
With tensions high, American spy satellites are looking for evidence that the North Koreans are getting ready to test another nuclear weapon — just as they did in 2006 and 2009 — or shoot off some more long-range missiles. It is a sure way to grab headlines and rattle the neighborhood. In the past, such tests have ratcheted up tension, and could do so again. But they are not the Obama administration’s biggest worry. As one of Mr. Obama’s top aides said months ago, there is reason to hope that the North will shoot off “a nuclear test every week,” since they are thought to have enough fuel for only eight to twelve.
Far more worrisome would be a decision by Pyongyang to export its nuclear technology and a failure by Americans to notice.
For years, American intelligence agencies missed evidence that the North was building a reactor in the Syrian desert, near the Iraq border. The Israelis found it, and wiped it out in an air attack in 2007. Now, the search is on to find out if other countries are buying up North Korean technology or, worse yet, bomb fuel. (There are worries about Myanmar.)
In short, the biggest worry is that North Korea could decide that teaching others how to build nuclear weapons would be the fastest, stealthiest way to defy a new American president who has declared that stopping proliferation is Job No. 1.
It is unclear whether the American intelligence community would pick up the signals that it missed in Syria. And if it did, a crisis might not be contained in the Korean Peninsula; it could spread to the Middle East or Southeast Asia, or wherever else North Korea found its customers.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
U.S. presence makes provocations inevitable and guarantees our draw in
Bandow, 10 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/3/10, Doug, “Taming Pyongyang,” , JMP)
Suspicions continue to mount that North Korea torpedoed the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette which sank more than a month ago in the Yellow Sea to the west of the Korean peninsula. Policy makers in both Seoul and Washington are pondering how to respond. The potential, even if small, of renewed conflict on the peninsula demonstrates that today’s status quo is unsatisfactory for all of the North’s neighbors.
The Korean War ended in an armistice nearly six decades ago. No peace treaty was ever signed; over the years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea committed numerous acts of war, most dramatically attempting to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Burma and seizing the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo. Conflict was avoided because the United States, long the senior partner to the Republic of Korea in their military alliance, refused to risk igniting a new conflict.
In recent years the DPRK’s conduct has remained predictably belligerent but constrained: fiery threats, diplomatic walk-outs, policy reversals, and unreasonable demands have mixed with occasional cooperative gestures as Washington and Seoul attempted to dissuade the North from developing nuclear weapons.
North Korean relations recently have been in a down cycle. Pyongyang has walked out of the long-running Six Party talks and failed in its attempt to engage Washington. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy,” which essentially entailed shipping money and tourists north irrespective of the DPRK’s conduct, causing North Korea to downgrade economic and diplomatic contacts and even recently confiscate South Korean investments. Japan’s relations with the North remain stalled over the lack of accounting over the kidnapping of Japanese citizens years ago.
Still, for at least two decades Pyongyang had eschewed military action. Shots were fired between South and North Korean ships last November near the disputed boundary in the Yellow Sea, but no harm was done. Brinkmanship was the DPRK’s standard diplomatic strategy. Triggering a new war was not. Why the North would sink a South Korean vessel is a matter of speculation. More critical is the response. Now what?
The issue is most pressing in Seoul. South Korean officials say the investigation continues as they seek definitive evidence that a torpedo sunk the Cheonan. The tragedy would be no less if the cause was a mine, but the latter could be dismissed as an unfortunate occurrence rather than deliberate attack.
If the sinking was intentional, however, the ROK must respond. To do nothing would reward the North and encourage additional irresponsible action. President Lee Myung-bak has said: “I’m very committed to responding in a firm manner if need be.”
One South Korean diplomat suggested to me that the South will seek Security Council condemnation of the DPRK. This is in line with President Lee’s promise “to cooperate with the international community in taking necessary measures when the results are out.” But even if Seoul won Chinese support for a UN resolution, the ROK would have to take bilateral measures. That certainly would end investment and aid, likely would prevent negotiations and possibly would entail military retaliation.
The result not only would mean a serious and prolonged worsening of bilateral relations and increase in bilateral tensions, but could end any chance—admittedly today very slim—of reversing North Korean nuclear development. Moreover, a military strike would entail a chance of war. Tit-for-tat retaliation might spiral out of control. The potential consequences are horrifying.
The ROK nevertheless might be willing to take the risk. Not Washington. The United States is cooperating in the investigation and reportedly urging the Lee government to wait for proof before acting. But even if the DPRK is culpable, the last thing the Obama administration wants is another war. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last month: “I hope that there is no talk of war, there is no action or miscalculation that could provoke a response that might lead to conflict.” From America’s standpoint, avoiding a potentially bloody war on the Korean peninsula while heavily involved in Afghanistan and still tied down in Iraq is far more important than South Korean concerns over justice and credibility.
The People’s Republic of China also would be a big loser in any war: refugees would and conflict could spill over the Yalu. The North Korean state likely would disappear, leaving a united Korea allied with America and hosting U.S. troops near China’s border. Beijing’s international reputation would suffer as its policy of aiding the North was fully and dramatically discredited.
Japan would be less vulnerable to the consequences of war but could be the target of North Korean attempts to strike out. Undoubtedly, Tokyo also would be asked to contribute to the peninsula’s reconstruction.
Of course, North Korea and its people would suffer the most. The former would cease to exist. That would be an international good, but millions of North Koreans likely would die or otherwise suffer along the way. War would be a tragic end to decades of hardship and isolation.
What to do? Seoul needs some degree of certainty before acting. So long as the sinking might have been caused by a mine, the ROK cannot act decisively.
If a torpedo attack is the most likely cause, however, winning Security Council backing would be a useful step. Then finding the right level of response, including possibly closing the Kaesong industrial park in the North or targeting a North Korean vessel for destruction, would be necessary. If it chooses the latter, the ROK would need Washington’s backing and China’s understanding. Finally, a lot of people in several countries would have to cross their fingers and say some prayers.
In any case, the six-party talks would seem kaput. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the Obama administration remained committed to the negotiations despite the sinking, stating that “I wouldn’t necessarily link those directly.” Yet the likelihood that Pyongyang would yield its nuclear weapons while sinking South Korean vessels seems vanishingly small. Even a minimal possibility of a negotiated settlement should be pursued, but at some point the effort simply looks foolish.
That’s the short-term. Two longer-term issues require attention, however the current controversy is resolved. First, the United States and ROK must reconsider their alliance relationship. Even on the issue of defending against the DPRK their interests differ: Seoul must satiate an angry public desiring vengeance as well as preserve its credibility in confronting the North. America must avoid another war at most any cost.
Given the South’s level of development, it makes no sense for its defense decisions to be subject to Washington’s veto. Nor does it make any sense for the United States to risk being drawn into a war as a result of acts between other nations. These bilateral differences are only likely to grow, especially if the relationship between America and China grows more contentious.
Then South Korea could find itself risking involvement in Washington’s war. Also involved is the ROK’s self-respect. In two years the U.S. plans on devolving operational control of the combined forces to South Korea. Yet some South Koreans fear their nation won’t be ready to lead its own defense. That Washington took military command in underdeveloped, impoverished South Korea in 1950 is understandable. To argue that America must continue doing so in 2010 is bizarre.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
The U.S. response to bolster deterrence will just increase provocations and make miscalculation more likely
Armstrong, 10 – Professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University.. (Charles, 5/26/10, CNN, “The Korean War never ended” )
On the other hand, there is a real danger of this war of words escalating into a shooting war. With well over a million Korean troops facing each other across the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South, along with 29,000 U.S. troops in the South, and North Korea now armed with nuclear weapons, the consequences of a renewed Korean War would be catastrophic for the Korean peninsula and the entire Northeast Asia region. The Cheonan incident has reinforced U.S.-South Korean and U.S.-Japanese cooperation in deterring the North. But deterrence can look like provocation from the other side, and in such a tense and volatile environment, a slight miscalculation can lead to disaster. Anger and outrage may be understandable, but cooler heads must prevail. Millions of lives are at stake. Rather than lead to deepening confrontation, this tragedy may be an opportunity to re-engage North Korea in talks to scale back and ultimately eliminate its nuclear program, and to promote security and economic cooperation with its neighbors. North Korea has never admitted to acts of terrorism in the past, and we cannot expect it to acknowledge responsibility and apologize for the sinking of the Cheonan as a precondition for such talks. Instead, the international community should take advantage of Kim Jong Il's stated willingness to return to multilateral negotiations, suspended since 2008, as a way of reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. It is time to end the Korean War, not start it anew.
North Korea might decide that it has nothing to lose in the status quo – making more miscalculations likely
Righter, 10 – Worked for the Far Eastern Economic Review and Newsweek in Asia, as development and diplomatic correspondent of The Sunday Times. (Rosemary, 5/25/10, Times Online, “It’s risky, but this time North Korea must pay” )
It is the lack of obvious motive for this unprovoked attack that has most rattled nerves. The order almost certainly came direct from the ailing “Dear Leader”, who was later seen promoting the military unit that carried out the attack. But if Kim’s purpose was to impress the North’s immiserated citizenry by giving the South a bloody nose, it sits ill with Pyongyang’s official denial of all responsibility. If it was pique, as seems more likely, at the South’s near-destruction last year of a North Korean warship that had violated the tense maritime boundary, so destructive and unlawful a riposte is disturbingly suggestive of a regime that, reckoning it has nothing to lose, could make still greater miscalculations in the future. The sunshine policy was designed to ensure that North Korea never quite reached this danger point.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
Also, North Korean aggression and nuclearization will cause intentional, miscalculated, or accidental nuclear conflict – even a limited nuclear war causes rapid cooling and ozone disruption, collapses the economy, and spills over to other hot spots
Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 – *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND ** Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” )
The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection.
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community.
At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.
But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view:
That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4
These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
Withdrawing ground troops solves – stops North Korea from probing U.S. weakness to draw our forces into a wider conflict. Air and naval installations will maintain power projection capabilities.
Stanton, 10 – U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea from 98-02 and practicing attorney in Washington, D.C. (4/12/10, Joshua, The New Ledger, “It's Time for the U.S. Army to Leave Korea,” , JMP)
Proceeding against the advice of my cardiologist, I must concede that for once, Ron Paul is actually on to something. The ground component of U.S. Forces Korea, which costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars a year to maintain, is an equally unaffordable political liability on the South Korean street. We should withdraw it. Every Saturday night off-post brawl is a headline in the muck-raking Korean press, for which the American soldier is inevitably blamed, and for which angry mobs perpetually demand renegotiations of the Status of Force Agreement to give Korea’s not-even-remotely-fair judicial system more jurisdiction over American soldiers.
The South Korean people do not appreciate the security our soldiers provide. The way some of them treat our soldiers ought to be a national scandal. Many off-post businesses don’t even let Americans through their front doors. The degree of anti-Americanism in South Korea is sufficient to be a significant force protection issue in the event of hostilities.
South Korea does not have our back. South Korea made much of the fact that it sent 3,000 soldiers to Iraq, where they sat behind concrete barriers in a secure Kurdish area of Iraq, protected by peshmerga, making no military contribution and taking no combat casualties. Their contribution to the effort in Afghanistan has been negligible, which is more than can be said of their contribution to the Taliban (previous President Roh Moo Hyun reportedly paid them a ransom of up to $20 million in 2007 to free South Korean hostages who took it upon themselves to charter a shiny new bus to bring Christianity to Kandahar). South Korea has been an equally unsteady ally against China.
The American security blanket has fostered a state of national adolescence by the South Korean public. Too many of them (some polls suggest most) see America as a barrier to reunification with their ethnic kindred in the North. Maybe nothing short of a North Korean attack on the South can encourage more sober thinking by South Koreans about their own security, but I suspect a greater sense of self-reliance and even vulnerability might.
During my service in Korea, as U.S. taxpayers subsidized South Korea’s defense, South Korea subsidized Kim Jong Il’s potential offense with billions of dollars in hard currency that sustained the very threat against which we were ostensibly helping to defend. South Korea never made North Korea’s disarmament a condition of this aid. Instead, that aid effectively undermined U.S. and U.N. sanctions meant to force North Korea to disarm. What does South Korea have to show for this colossal outlay now.
Because South Korea, now one the world’s wealthiest nations, expects up to 600,000 American soldiers to arrive protect it from any security contingency, successive South Korean governments actually cut their nation’s defense rather than modernizing it and building an effective independent defense. Consequently, South Korea still has a 1970-vintage force structure, designed around a 1970-vintage threat, equipped with 1970-vintage weapons.
This is partly the legacy of ten years of leftist administrations, but it’s also the legacy of military welfare that allowed South Korea to defer upgrading its equipment, building a professional volunteer army, and organizing an effective reserve force to deal with security contingencies. Worst of all, South Korea diverted billions of dollars that should have been spent on modernizing its military into regime-sustaining aid to Kim Jong Il, to be used, as far as anyone knows, for nukes, missiles, artillery, and pretty much everything but infant formula. To this day, South Korea continues to resist accepting operational control over its own forces in the event of war.
The U.S. Army presence in Korea is an anachronism, defending against the extinct threat of a conventional North Korean invasion. The far greater danger is that if Kim Jong Il assesses our current president as weak, he will choose more limited or less conventional means to strike at our soldiers and their families. Given the reported presence of Taliban operatives in Seoul, he might even plausibly deny responsibility for an attack.
Thus, while I don’t go so far as to accept the Princess Bride Doctrine (”never get involved in a land war in Asia”), I do not believe it is wise for us to have our forces within easy artillery range of Kim Jong Il, such that he may freely choose the time, place, and manner of our involvement
I offer two qualifications here. First, this is not to suggest that we unilaterally abrogate the alliance with South Korea. Our air and naval installations in Korea provide useful power-projection capability and are far more secure, ironically, than our many scattered and isolated Army posts.
I can imagine any number of contingencies for which we’d want to have the ability to move people and supplies into South Korea in a hurry.
Second, this is not to suggest that Ron Paul is not an anti-Semitic crypto-racist advocate of a thoughtlessly escapist foreign policy, and broadly speaking, an imbecile. This is just one occasion in which he inadvertently, in the fashion of a stopped clock, aligns with the correct result.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
U.S. presence is useless to deter North Korea – withdrawal will motivate South Korea and China to stabilize and de-nuclearize the peninsula
Erickson, 10 – Executive Director of (5/6/10, Stephen, “End the Cold War in Korea: Bring American Troops Home Before it’s Too Late,” , JMP)
On the night of March 26 the South Korean 1,200-ton warship Cheonan patrolled the boundary waters between North and South Korea. At 10:45 an explosion near the bow rocked the vessel and sank the Cheonan, taking the lives of 46 crew members with it. Although the investigation is still ongoing, the South Korean Defense Minister has declared that a torpedo is the likeliest source of the blast. North Korea appears to have destroyed the South Korean warship.
Normally such an unprovoked attack would start a war, but the Korean peninsula is not a normal place. The Koreans, with their strong sense of nationalism, remain divided along the 38th parallel, with a 2.5 mile “demilitarized zone” between them. Meanwhile approximately 28,000 US troops still help guard the border. An armistice formally ended hostilities in Korea in 1953, but officially the war never ended. No peace treaty was ever signed. One year ago, the North formally and ominously withdrew from the armistice.
North Korea, a tiny country with the world’s 4th largest standing army, is the most militarized society in the world. It has a standing army of 1.2 million soldiers, and a peasant militia with as many as 4 million reserves. Some 13,000 artillery pieces, dug into the hills within range of the South Korean capital of Seoul, are poised to obliterate the South’s most important city upon “The Dear Leader’s” command. Some estimates suggest that as many as one million South Koreans could die under such an assault. Then there’s the matter of North Korea’s several nuclear weapons.
South Korea, officially the “Republic of Korea,” has about half as many soldiers as the North, but they are better trained and far better equipped. South Korea is wealthy and technologically advanced. North Korea has half the population and 1/30th the economy of the South. While the rulers of the North live lavishly, famine killed a million people in the 1990s, and the United Nation’s World Food Program is worried that this year may witness the worst food shortages since then. Starving people can be dangerous people. Historically North Korea uses its military, its only strength, as leverage to obtain outside assistance.
South Korea today might well be able to ultimately defend itself against the North, but the bloodshed would be horrific. A key factor in any future conflict is Seoul’s location so near the North. Experts suggest (See “Is Kim Jong-il Planning to Occupy Seoul?” ) that a recently revised North Korean military strategy consists of swiftly taking Seoul and holding the city’s millions of people as hostages.
All of this begs a couple of important questions. How many more South Korean ships can be torpedoed before the South retaliates, surely starting a larger war? And, what are 28,000 American troops doing in the middle of this Korean powder keg? As the sinking of the Cheonan clearly indicates, the sparks are already flying.
The permanent US military deployment in South Korea is a Cold War anachronism. There is absolutely no reason that a nation as advanced and prosperous as South Korea cannot defend itself from its pathetically backward northern brothers and sisters. A well-known night-time satellite image taken from space shows a brilliant South and a North languishing in the Dark Ages.
The US presence creates political dysfunction while it minimally protects South Korea. US soldiers on South Korean soil breed resentment. Thousands of nationalist South Korean students regularly take to the streets to protest the Americans soldiers in their country and to call for unification between North and South.
South Korean and US government policies are often awkwardly out of step with each other, with America often having the far more hawkish posture, as it did during the W. Bush years. American security guarantees have perhaps sometimes led the government of the South to engage in policies of inappropriate appeasement toward the North.
The threat of South Korea investing in nuclear weapons to counter the North might, for example, finally persuade China to put sufficient pressure of North Korea. A South Korea determined to match North Korean nuclear weapons development might paradoxically further the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
Most crucially, from an American point of view, the US Army is stretched too thin to play much of a role in protecting South Korea. As things stand, American soldiers are little more than targets for North Korean artillery and missiles. A defense of Seoul, its re-conquest, and forcible regime change in the North are all beyond US military capabilities at this time, given its commitments elsewhere. US participation on the ground in a new Korean War would also stress the US federal budget beyond the breaking point.
The United States never properly created a new foreign and defense policy when the Cold War ended. Instead, it has generally maintained its Cold War military posture, with bases and commitments strewn throughout the globe, even as new challenges since 911 have called American forces to new missions. The US military presence in Korea is a Cold War artifact that needs to be brought home before it’s too late.
Korean War Adv – 1ac
A phased withdrawal prevents U.S. draw in – regional security efforts can effectively resolve Korea crises
Carpenter, 09 – vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen, CATO Handbook for Congress, 7th Edition, “54. East Asian Security Commitments,” , JMP)
South Korea
The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) is a cold war anachronism. Washington should have weaned Seoul from the U.S. security bottle years ago. When the security treaty went into effect in 1954, South Korea was a war-ravaged hulk that confronted not only a heavily armed North Korea, but a North Korea strongly backed by both Moscow and Beijing. Under those circumstances, it would have been virtually impossible for South Korea to provide for its own defense. Washington had just waged a bloody war to prevent a communist conquest of the country, and given the cold war context, U.S. leaders regarded the Korean Peninsula as a crucial theater in the effort to contain the power of the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, they deemed it necessary to keep the ROK as a security client. Most South Koreans were extremely grateful for the U.S. protection.
Those circumstances bear no resemblance to the situation in the 21st century. Today, South Korea has twice the population and an economy 40 times larger than that of its communist nemesis. The ROK is an economic powerhouse with the world’s 13th-largest economy, and South Korean firms are competitive in a host of high-tech industries. Meanwhile, North Korea is one of the world’s economic basket cases, and there have even been major episodes of famine in that pathetic country. Moscow and Beijing have major economic ties with the ROK and regard North Korea as an embarrassment. They have no interest whatever in backing another bid by Pyongyang to forcibly reunify the peninsula.
Under those conditions, South Korea should certainly be able to defend itself. Yet instead of building military forces sufficient to protect its security, Seoul remains heavily dependent on the United States for key aspects of its defense. Despite its proximity to North Korea, the ROK spends a paltry 2.77 percent of its gross domestic product on the military—less than does the United States, half a world away and located in a peaceful region. There is simply no justification for continuing that free ride.
Equally unpleasant is the growing lack of gratitude on the part of many South Koreans for the exertions the United States has made over the decades on behalf of their security. Public opinion polls show that younger South Koreans regard the United States as a more serious threat than North Korea. Indeed, many South Koreans now believe that Washington is the principal obstacle to better relations with North Korea and to eventual political reunification. The current government of President Lee Myungbak may be less overtly anti-American than that of his predecessor, but that sentiment has scarcely diminished among the general population.
The ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis illustrates the drawbacks associated with Washington’s insistence on micromanaging the security affairs of East Asia. In a normal international system, the East Asian frontline states would be taking the lead in formulating policies to deal with North Korea instead of expecting the United States to negotiate directly with Pyongyang and produce an agreement acceptable to them all. They would decide what risks they were willing to incur to compel Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program—or in the alternative, whether they were prepared to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea.
That is not to say that the United States has no interests at stake regarding North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Washington understandably wants to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons—in East Asia and elsewhere. There is also legitimate concern that North Korea might eventually become a nuclear arms peddler, supplying bombs to other anti-American regimes— and perhaps even to terrorist organizations. Pyongyang’s apparent assistance to Syria regarding nuclear technology highlighted the proliferation problem.
Nevertheless, the danger a nuclear-armed North Korea could pose to the United States is more remote and theoretical than the danger to North Korea’s neighbors. Their risk exposure is inherent—imposed by the realities of geography. Even if North Korea acquired only a few nuclear warheads and only modestly increased the range of its current delivery systems, it would pose a plausible threat to the security of South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia.
Conversely, America’s risk exposure is largely discretionary. The principal reason Washington is obsessed with the North Korean problem is the presence of more than 27,000 U.S. troops in South Korea. Because of those forces, America has put itself, quite literally, on the frontlines of a potentially explosive crisis.
That approach is precisely the opposite of the course Washington ought to adopt. The new administration should immediately begin to reduce America’s risk exposure by ordering a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Washington should also indicate to the East Asian powers that they bear primary responsibility for dealing with the problem of North Korea’s nuclear program, since they have the most at stake.
It is time, indeed it is long past time, to insist that South Korea manage its own security affairs. The United States has drawn down its military forces stationed in that country from approximately 37,000 to 27,000 over the past six years. Washington should implement a complete withdrawal within the next three years and terminate the misnamed mutual security treaty. That commitment was designed for an entirely different era. There is no need and very little benefit today for keeping South Korea as a security client.
Economy Impact – 2ac
Even a small war between the two countries would kill the US economy
10 (5/24/10 Mike Davis is the author. Blog. )
Once again, as a result this time of North Korea being fingered for sinking a South Korean Navy vessel, the Cheonan, even the remote possibility of a war on the Korean peninsula of Northeast Asia should be creating a lot more concern than it has in the United States.
The concern, raised pointedly not quite a year ago by North Korea’s relentless saber-rattling with rockets and nukes, should not be just among diplomats, military strategists and the White House—but rather by American consumers and the dealers and importers of products made in South Korea.
Yes, there should be a universal worry because the Korean peninsula conceivably could again become a meat-grinder of casualties for young American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines the way it did exactly 60 years ago. Now the U. S. has only 28,000 troops in Korea and is heavily committed – critics say over committed – in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Even if short lasting, a shooting war in Korea would be devastating to the U. S. consumer economy, including the “big box” retailers like Wal-Mart and Best Buy. As I punch in the letters forming this article, they are appearing on a flat screen monitor made by Samsung, a South Korean conglomerate. Samsung also made the cell phone in my shirt pocket, and the TV in the family room. My wife’s cell phone, like mine from Verizon Wireless, is manufactured by LG, another Republic of Korea electronics maker, once part of the Hyundai Group.
Hyundai is arguably the most successful new car company in the American market in the last two decades. In the first four months of this year, the leading Korean automotive company group (including Kia) retailed 262,264 cars and trucks here, of which the vast majority were imported. That made it the seventh largest vehicle seller in the U. S. market, remarkable for a company that a decade ago was marginal, kept in business by give-away warranties and credit offered to low-rated buyers turned down elsewhere.
GM also has a stake in South Korea with its Chevrolet Aveo sub-compact supplied by Daewoo.
The corporate headquarters of these Korean companies are located in Seoul, the world’s second largest city in population (nearly 21 million) after Tokyo. Seoul, unfortunately, is within spitting distance, so to speak, of the DMZ border established by the 1953 UN-negotiated truce between democratic, uber-capitalist South Korea and hard-line Marxist dictatorship-ruled North Korea.
You could not fire a rifle from the North into South Korea’s capital of Seoul, but long-range artillery, probably, and rockets for sure. According to Time magazine, the North has 13,000 artillery tubes zeroed in on Seoul, and 10 Million South Koreans live within 30 miles of the DMZ. The major port of Inchon is right next door to Seoul.
Another Korean War, regardless of outcome, would be a disaster for South Korea’s economy and the many customers worldwide of that economy. So the South Korean government likely will be very restrained in its response to the sinking of its ship.
A nut case rules North Korea – Kim Jong II, who last year declared his 27-year-old youngest son as heir apparent. Even worse is that the self-styled Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) military is naturally very powerful and seemingly equally irresponsible, as demonstrated by its evident torpedoing of the South Korean ship in March. I do not have to repeat all the DPRK’s nuclear and ICBM threats that the mainstream media have been feasting on for years. (See: U.S. Implicates North Korean Leader in Attack – Ken Zino)
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), on the other hand, may be more nervous about instability in the DPRK than anyone in South Korea, Russia or the U.S. When I was on an educational mission sponsored by the U. S. State and Defense Departments to the PRC four years ago, our group heard from top Chinese officials that they fear war on the Korean peninsula could be touched off by mistake, especially a power-play within North Korea.
What most Americans do not realize is that China believes a domestic blow-up in the DPRK would migrate to the PRC, if for no other reason than hordes of refugees crossing the long border between the two Asian countries.
So in the matter of a resumption of the Korean war, the Chinese are perhaps our best friends, whereas the last time around in 1950 their “volunteer army” swarmed over our General McArthur’s forces like hungry fleas over a dog. Fortunately, North Korea knows that if China cuts the umbilical cord of supply, they cannot go to war against anybody, even their own people.
There’s another report being circulated that the smaller South Korean armed forces could nevertheless defeat an invasion by the North because of better health, better training, modern weapons and the fact they’ve got something worth defending besides the abstract comfort of freedom. This is probably wishful thinking if for no other reason than the size and proximity of North Korean forces.
Still, mistakes can happen.
The problem is, even with brief hostilities, there would be hell to pay in the American economy. Thousands of Hyundai, Kia, Chevrolet, Samsung and LG merchants, to name only a few, would soon find themselves without new products to sell or parts to repair them. And I get the impression from talking to one of the major Korean companies that there is no contingency plan should there be a war. They are too busy cashing in on America’s thirst for their products.
So America’s stake in peaceful relations on the Korean peninsula is a lot closer to home than you might think.
Impact is a nuclear World War 3
O’Donnell, 09 (2/26/09, Sean, “Will this recession lead to World War III?” , JMP)
Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history.
One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war.
After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II.
With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse.
Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself.
Economy Extensions
North Korean attack will crush the East Asian economy
Reuters, 10 (2/1/10, Jon Herskovitz, “FACTBOX-Five political risks to watch in South Korea,” , JMP)
North Korea has indicated it is ready to resume dormant nuclear talks, perhaps in the first few months of this year. The move could decrease tension in North Asia, which accounts for one-sixth of the global economy. But the mercurial North, which conducted its second nuclear test last May, could quickly change its accommodative tone if it feels its calls for aid and better global standing are not met. [ID:nTOE5BA005]
The greatest risk to regional economies would be military conflict -- North Korea could lob tens of thousands of artillery rounds into the Seoul region which is home to about half of South Korea's population, and fire hundreds of missiles at major cities in South Korea and Japan. Such an attack might take less than an hour but would do severe economic damage. It would also mean suicide for the North's leaders who would be hit by a U.S.-led counter-attack. Another key risk is that the sudden implosion of the North Korean regime leads to a difficult reunification process that undermines the South Korean economy. [ID:nSP522703]
Key to the global economy
Xinhua, 09 (4/18/09, “East Asia playing bigger role in global economy, Bush says,” , JMP)
BOAO, Hainan, April 18 (Xinhua) -- Former U.S. President George. W. Bush said Saturday that East Asia is playing a bigger role in global economy, and the world economic center has moved from Atlantic to Asia Pacific.
The Asia Pacific takes up 55 percent of the global economy, and it is of vital interest to stay "heavily engaged" with the countries in the region, he said at a banquet speech held during the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) annual conference 2009.
Korean conflict will wreck Asian economic growth
Pei, 09 – Prof of Government and the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College (July/August 2009, Minxin, Foreign Policy, “Think Again: Asia's Rise,” , JMP)
"Asia's Rise Is Unstoppable."
Don't bet on it. Asia's recent track record might seem to guarantee its economic superpower status. Goldman Sachs, for instance, expects that China will surpass the United States in economic output in 2027 and India will catch up by 2050.
Given Asia's relatively low per capita income, its growth rate will indeed outpace the West's for the foreseeable future. But the region faces enormous demographic hurdles in the decades ahead. More than 20 percent of Asians will be elderly by 2050. Aging is a principal cause of Japan's stagnation. China's elderly population will soar in the middle of the next decade. Its savings rate will fall while healthcare and pension costs explode. India is a lone exception to these trends-any one of which could help stall the region's growth.
Environmental and natural resource constraints could also prove crippling. Pollution is worsening Asia's shortage of fresh water while air pollution exacts a terrible toll on health (it kills almost 400,000 people each year in China alone). Without revolutionary advances in alternative energy, Asia could face a severe energy crunch. Climate change could devastate the region's agriculture.
The current economic crisis, moreover, will lead to huge overcapacity as Western demand evaporates. Asian companies, facing anemic consumer demand at home, will not be able to sell their products in the region. The Asian export-dependent model of development will either disappear or cease to be a viable engine of growth.
Political instability could also throw Asia's economic locomotive off course. State collapse in Pakistan or a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula could wreak havoc. Rising inequality and endemic corruption in China could fuel social unrest and cause its economic growth to sputter. And if a democratic breakthrough somehow forces the Communist Party from power, China is most likely to enter a lengthy period of unstable transition, with a weak central government and mediocre economic performance.
CBW Impact – 1ac/2ac
Conventional weaknesses will force North Korea to resort to CBW use – either deliberate, accidental or unathorized
ICG, 09 (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” , JMP)
This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports published simultaneously assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and what the policy response of the international community should be to its recent nuclear and missile testing.[1]
North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles pose serious risks to security. Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities are the greatest threat, but it also possesses a large stockpile of chemical weapons and is suspected of maintaining a biological weapons program. The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) had been underway since August 2003 with the objective of ending the North’s nuclear ambitions, before Pyongyang announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but there is no direct mechanism for dealing with its chemical weapons and possible biological weapons. The North Korean leadership is very unlikely to surrender its WMD unless there is significant change in the political and security environments.
The Six-Party Talks produced a “Statement of Principles” in September 2005 that included a commitment to establish a permanent peace mechanism in North East Asia, but the structure and nature of such a cooperative security arrangement is subject to interpretation, negotiation and implementation. Views among the parties differ, and no permanent peace can be established unless North Korea abandons all its WMD programs. The diplomatic tasks are daunting, and diplomacy could fail. If North Korea refuses to engage in arms control and to rid itself of WMD, the international community must be prepared to deal with a wide range of threats, including those posed by Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities.
Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons (CW) arsenal are imprecise, but the consensus is that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons, including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). The stockpile does not appear to be increasing but is already sufficient to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea. The North’s CW can be delivered with long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels.
North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining against those of its potential foes, so the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities for its national security objectives. This strategy poses a significant danger because it risks deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents.
North Korean bioweapon use would spread globally within six weeks – greater risk that nuclear weapons
Levy, 07 (6-8-07, Janet Ellen, The American Thinking, “The Threat of Bioweapons,” , JMP)
Immediately following 9-11, an anthrax attack originating from letters containing anthrax spores infected 22 people, killing five. After almost six years, the case has not been solved.
Intelligence analysts and academics report that North Korea has developed anthrax, plague, and botulism toxin and conducted extensive research on smallpox, typhoid and cholera.
A world-renowned bioweapons expert has confirmed that Syria has weapons grade smallpox resistant to all current vaccines developed under the cover of legitimate veterinary research on camelpox, a very closely related virus. The researcher further reports that Syria is suspected of testing the pathogen on prison populations and possibly in the Sudan.
Although there are close to 50 organisms that could be used offensively, rogue nations have concentrated their bioweapons development efforts on smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulinum, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers. With the exception of smallpox, which is exclusively a human host disease, all of the other pathogens lend themselves to animal testing as they are zoonotic, or can be transmitted to humans by other species.
Biological weapons are among the most dangerous in the world today and can be engineered and disseminated to achieve a more deadly result than a nuclear attack. Whereas the explosion of a nuclear bomb would cause massive death in a specific location, a biological attack with smallpox could infect multitudes of people across the globe. With incubation periods of up to 17 days, human disseminators could unwittingly cause widespread exposure before diagnosable symptoms indicate an infection and appropriate quarantine procedures are in place.
Unlike any other type of weapon, bioweapons such as smallpox can replicate and infect a chain of people over an indeterminate amount of time from a single undetectable point of release. According to science writer and author of The Hot Zone, Richard Preston, "If you took a gram of smallpox, which is highly contagious and lethal, and for which there's no vaccine available globally now, and released it in the air and created about a hundred cases, the chances are excellent that the virus would go global in six weeks as people moved from city to city......the death toll could easily hit the hundreds of millions.....in scale, that's like a nuclear war."[1]
More so than chemical and nuclear research, bioweapons development programs lend themselves to stealth development. They are difficult to detect, can be conducted alongside legimate research on countermeasures, sheltered in animal research facilities within sophisticated pharmaceutical corporations, disguised as part of routine medical university studies, or be a component of dual use technology development. Detection is primarily through available intelligence information and location-specific biosensors that test for the presence of pathogens.
Biological weapons have many appealing qualities for warfare and their effects can be engineered and customized from a boutique of possibilities. Offensive pathogens are inexpensive compared to conventional weapons and small quantities can produce disproportionate damage. They have unlimited lethal potential as carriers and can continue to infect more people over time. Bioweapons are easy to dispense through a variety of delivery systems from a missile, an aerosol or a food product. They can be placed into a state of dormancy to be activated at a later stage allowing for ease of storage. Pathogens are not immediately detectable or identifiable due to varying incubation periods and can be rapidly deployed, activated and impossible to trace. The technology to develop biological agents is widely available for legitimate purposes and large quantities can be developed within days.
CBW Impact – 1ac/2ac
Impact is extinction
Ochs 02 – MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park [Richard, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Jun 9, ]
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.
North Korea Will Use CBWs
North Korea will use chemical weapons to neutralize an allied ground response
Global Security, 05 (4/28/05, “Chemical Weapons Program,” , JMP)
Chemical Weapons Program
In 1954 the Soviet Union and China transferred certain special technologies as well as chemical agents and means of protection against them captured from the Japanese and Kuomintang during World War II to the Korean People's Army [KPA]. The next five years were marked by the swift development of the DPRK chemical industry. Despite the fact that the country possessed considerable deposits of natural raw materials, it proved to be a rather difficult task to create domestic capacities for producing chemical weapons. In 1964 the DPRK concluded a contract with Japan for deliveries of agricultural chemicals. Under their guise, components came into the country initially for synthesis of tabun and mustard gas, and a later chlorine and phosphorus-containing organic compounds were imported.
North Korea’s chemical warfare program is believed to be mature and includes the capability, since 1989, to indigenously produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents as well as a variety of different filled munitions systems. North Korea is believed to possess a sizable stockpile of chemical weapons, which could be employed in offensive military operations against the South. North Korea has also devoted considerable scarce resources to defensive measures aimed at protecting its civilian population and military forces from the effects of chemical weapons. Such measures include extensive training in the use of protective masks, suits, detectors, and decontamination systems. Though these measures are ostensibly focused on a perceived threat from U.S. and South Korean forces, they could also support the offensive use of chemical weapons by the North during combat. North Korea has yet to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is not expected to do so in the near-term, due to intrusive inspection and verification requirements mandated by the agreement.
North Korea maintains a number of facilities involved in producing or storing chemical precursors, agents, and weapons. North Korea has at least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents; however, the production rate and types of munitions are uncertain. Presumably, sarin, tabun, phosgene, adamsite, prussic acid and a family of mustard gases, comprising the basis of KPA chemical weapons, are produced here. North Korea has the capability to produce nerve gas, blood agents, and the mustard-gas family of chemical weapons.
Estimates of North Korea's total stockpile vary by more than an order of magnitude. In the assessment of US intelligence services, their reserves, accommodated in perhaps half a dozen major storage sites and as many as 170 mountain tunnels, are at least 180 to 250 tons, with some estimates of chemical stockpiles run as high as 2,500-5,000 tons.
In May 1996 ROK Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha reported to the National Assembly that it was estimated that North Korea possessed approximately 5,000 tons of biological and chemical weapons. Estimates of the number of DPRK production, research, and storage facilities have remained stable over the last decade, with the ROK government estimating current peacetime annual production capability (if not actual production) at 4,500 tons, with the likelihood of a surge capacity to 12,000 tons in wartime. This estimate of actual production is consistent with the estimates for the total stockpile of several thousand tons.
Annual production level for chemical weapons probably varied considerably during the 1990s due to natural disasters and economic restrictions. According to one estimate [Planning for a Peaceful Korea, pages 95-96], on average the North may have produced about 8,000 tons of agent per year. Due to a high level of impurities in the agent stock produced, the North probably dedicated approximately half of production to replacement of deteriorating stockpiles. Of the rest, 30 percent goes towards building the KPA’s stockpiles, 10 percent for training, 5 percent for research, and 5 percent is wastage. Under emergency conditions, the North may be capable of producing up to 20,000 tons of chemical agents a year. According to this estimate, the North is capable of producing a wide variety of chemical agents including: adamsite (DM), chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard-family (H or HD), phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA), and V-agents (VM and VX). For operational and technical reasons, the DPRK is thought to have concentrated on mustard, phosgene, sarin, and the V-agents. During the past 1990s the North may have begun production of binary agents. These agents provide greater safety of handling in transit and longer period of stability in storage.
North Korea is capable of producing and employing chemical weapons that virtually all the fire support systems in its inventory could deliver, including most of its artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers (including those mounted on CHAHO-type boats), and mortars. Some bombs the Air Force employs also could deliver chemical agents, as could the FROG or the SCUD missile.
Chemicals could increase the impact of a surprise attack. If the North should use this option, it would have an advantage over forward-deployed South Korean and US forces. Nonpersistent chemical agents also could be used to break through defensive lines or hinder a South Korean counterattack's momentum. Persistent chemical agents could be used against fixed targets in the rear areas, such as command and control elements, major lines of communications, or logistic depots. Not only do these weapons enhance North Korea's offensive capabilities, but this chemical capability could deter South Korea or the United States from using chemicals during hostilities. In any attack on the South, Pyongyang could use chemical weapons to attack forces deployed near the DMZ, suppress allied airpower, and isolate the peninsula from strategic reinforcement.
The Korean Peninsula provides an example of how chemical weapons can be employed on the battlefield. But one must consider North Korean CW use in the context of conventional operations. A North Korean offensive against South Korea will consist of three phases. The objective of the first phase is to breach the DMZ and destroy forward Combined Forces Command (CFC) defenders. In the second phase, North Korean Forces will attempt to isolate Seoul and consolidate their gains. The third phase is to be the pursuit and destruction of remaining CFC Forces and the occupation of the peninsula.
At the onset of hostilities, North Korean Forces will seek to suppress Allied counter air operations. Scud-B and -C Missiles, with persistent Nerve Agent in the warheads, would be launched against airbases such as Kimpo, Osan and Taegu. Command, control, and communications centers, and logistics depots are also likely chemical targets.
In the artillery preparation, the North would attack ROK defenses in the corridors with a mix of conventional high-explosive and non-persistent chemical strikes. North Korean 122mm and 240mm multiple rocket launchers are particularly effective for delivering Hydrogen Cyanide and Sarin. The CFC defenders will be forced into protective gear, hindering weapons sighting, maneuver, and communications. But the contamination will dissipate by the time North Korean Forces reach the defenses.
As defenses in the corridors are breached, fires will shift to deeper targets. Long range artillery such as the 170mm Koksan Gun, and Frog-7 Rockets could place persistent Nerve and Blister Agents on C3, logistics, and reserves. Contamination of key points along lateral and rear area lines of communication will disrupt resupply and reinforcement. Persistent agents may be employed to protect the flank of advancing North Korean Forces. North Korean Forces may establish a defense to consolidate gains, await additional resources, or repel Combined Forces Command counterattacks. In the defense, chemical mines may be emplaced in protective minefields. Artillery and air delivered persistent agents would deny the Allied Forces the use of terrain, canalize Allied Forces into kill zones and disrupt the momentum of the attack by forcing soldiers to take protective measures. For soldiers in protective gear, unit performance is degraded.
North Korean military units conduct regular NBC defensive training exercises in preparation for operations in a chemical environment. North Korea has chemical defense units at all levels of its force structure. These units are equipped with decontamination and detection equipment. North Korean military personnel have access to individual protective masks and protective suits.
Since 1990, Pyongyang has placed high priority on military and civilian chemical defense readiness. It has mandated operational training in chemical environments as an integral part of armed forces training and is trying to equip all military forces, including reserves, with full protective gear. In addition, the leadership has required broad segments of the population to engage periodically in simulated chemical warfare drills. Pyongyang has emphasized building and installing collective protection equipment at military production and civilian alternate wartime relocation sites, directing that the entire population be issued protective masks.
Smallpox / Anthrax Impacts
North Korea can carry out 13 kinds of biological attack
Parry, 09 (10/6/09, Richard Lloyd Parry, The Times, “North Korea can unleash 13 types of biological agent, South Korea says,” , JMP)
North Korea’s armed forces are capable of carrying out 13 kinds of viral and bacterial attack, the South Korean Government said yesterday in one of the most detailed assessments of the dictatorship’s biological weapons arsenal.
In a submission to the South Korean National Assembly, the Defence Minister also said that the North had 5,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, believed to include mustard gas, phosgene and sarin. Among its biological agents are cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, typhoid fever and dysentery.
Despite the alarming assessment, Kim Tae Young also said that his country’s armed forces had the capacity pre-emptively to destroy about a hundred sites connected to the North’s nuclear programme in the event of an imminent attack.
“We have a complete list of them,” Mr Kim said, adding that the North Korean military may not have achieved the technological breakthroughs necessary to attach nuclear warheads to a missile delivery system or launch them from a bomber.
“It is not clear whether North Korea has nuclear arms,” he said. “But we have sufficient information on the locations where items related to the nuclear programme are stored and where the delivery means are placed.”
It is known that North Korea’s 1.2 million-man armed forces possess significant chemical and biological weapons, but the details announced yesterday emphasise the hardline approach to its neighbour taken by the South Korean Government under the President, Lee Myung Bak.
Accidental or unauthorized CBW use is possible
ICG, 09 (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” , JMP)
Diplomatic efforts to eliminate North Korean WMD and ballistic missiles must continue, but the international community must be prepared for multiple contingencies including:
*a deliberate, accidental or unauthorised chemical or biological attack or incident;
*a chemical weapons accident in North Korea;
*an accidental release of biological agents in North Korea;
*the North’s use of CW following an intentional or inadvertent military clash and escalation;
*North Korean use of biological or chemical weapons in a preventive war against South Korea;
*the transfer of chemical or biological weapons, precursors, materials and technologies to other states or non-state actors; and
*arms races.
There are a number of international institutions for dealing with the North Korean chemical and biological weapons programs. However, they may not be sufficient for addressing all issues, and new regional instruments may be necessary. Regional efforts could increase opportunities for cooperation through issue linkage and confidence-building aimed at the establishment of a collective peace and security regime. For example, the region could initiate processes for missile disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space; the elimination of chemical weapons; conventional arms control; and non-traditional security cooperation in the realms of energy security, food security and public health.
Smallpox and anthrax are the most deadly – have been weaponized
Levy, 07 (6-8-07, Janet Ellen, The American Thinking, “The Threat of Bioweapons,” , JMP)
Due to their virulence, ease of dissemination and detection difficulties, bioweapons experts and the Department of Homeland Security assert that smallpox and anthrax are the most worrisome biothreats to national security. Both have been weaponized which means they can be produced in a particle size that is releasable in the air and can be easily inhaled into the respiratory system. Both smallpox and anthrax are extremely deadly and present unique forensic, environmental, logistical and public health care delivery challenges.
U.S. Doesn’t Have Defenses Against CBWs
U.S. doesn’t have an effective defense against bioweapons
Levy, 07 (6-8-07, Janet Ellen, The American Thinking, “The Threat of Bioweapons,” , JMP)
The testimony before Congress in April of 2006 of Tara O'Toole, M.D., M.P.H., Director and CEO of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center sums up the current situation vis a vis biothreats. "The U.S. does not yet have a coherent biodefense strategy, nor do we have a strategy for countermeasure research, development, and production that takes account of the full spectrum of possible bioweapons agents, including engineered threats."[3] Dr. O'Toole went on to explain the urgency for national security of developing and stockpiling countermeasures against high-priority threats such as anthrax, smallpox, plague and others. In the long term, she criticized the futility of chasing countermeasures for specific pathogens due to the multitude of pathogens that are potentially weaponizable. What is needed according to Dr. O'Toole is the "ability to rapidly design, develop and produce new countermeasures from a standing start - in weeks, if not days."[4] This will occur with technological improvements, wider sharing and accessibility of data, streamlined clinical testing and regulatory review and through public-private partnerships.
Even with the BioWatch, BioSense and BioShield projects, still in their infancy, current measures fall far short of this broad, well thought out approach. The two proposed Congressional bills are a step forward. But the United States remains almost as ill prepared today to cope with a bioweapons attack as it proved itself to be shortly after 9/11. We must begin to remedy this now.
N. Korean Instability = CBW Transfer to Terrorists
North Korean instability risks transfer of CBWs to terrorists
ICG, 09 (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” , JMP)
The proliferation of North Korean WMD materials or technology would endanger global security and non-proliferation regimes. An international norm against chemical and biological weapons has emerged, but a few nations and terrorist groups still seek to acquire them. Most states can produce chemical weapons on their own if they choose to, but North Korea could provide materials or technology for integrating CW munitions with delivery systems to shorten developmental and deployment timelines. The North’s biotechnology capability is rudimentary, but any biological agents or BW technology in its possession would be highly valued. North Korean entities, with or without government authorisation, could be tempted to sell biological weapons or agents, believing the detection risk to be low. The likelihood of such a transfer would increase if the country were to become unstable or collapse.
The North’s economy urgently needs reform, but the regime’s failure to adopt changes leaves weapons and weapons technology as its vital source of foreign exchange. Abandonment of CW and BW and integration into the global economy will require compliance with international export control rules and norms, as well as significant aid.
Current international mechanisms won’t be able to secure North Korean WMD if the state collapses
ICG, 09 (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” , JMP)
of 2008 have raised concerns about succession problems. In a struggle for power or a coup d’état, the use or transfer of North Korean WMD would be unlikely but cannot be ruled out. In the case of state collapse, WMD and related materials would have to be secured as quickly as possible. This would require considerable planning and resources, but current international mechanisms would probably be inadequate in a sudden crisis. Diplomatic efforts should focus on the nuclear issue now, but preliminary efforts should also be made to address Pyongyang’s chemical weapons and possible biological weapons. Understanding the motivations of North Korean leaders is essential to structuring a diplomatic solution for the elimination of their WMD, and if diplomacy fails, a clear assessment of capabilities and intentions will be imperative to counter the threats.
U.S.-China War Impact – 2ac
War will result in CBW use and draw in both the U.S. and China and push Taiwan to declare independence
Watcher, 10 (5/27/10, Paul Watcher, writer for aol. )
(May 27) -- Tensions continue to mount on the Korean peninsula in the wake of an international investigation that concluded a North Korean submarine was responsible for sinking a South Korean navy ship in April, killing 46 sailors. In the latest chess moves, Seoul staged a big anti-submarine drill, which Pyongyang responded to by saying it will no longer honor an agreement meant to avoid accidental naval clashes between the two nations.
As the crisis escalates, an unsettling question comes into focus: What would war on the Korean peninsula look like some 50-odd years after the armistice that brought the Korean War to an end?
A North Korean Attack: Though war would be catastrophic for both countries, South Korea would suffer the most in the first days of a full-scale conflict. Its capital of Seoul lies just 50 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) -- as big a misnomer as you will find, since the area is one of the most heavily militarized areas on the planet. On this de facto border, North Korea has amassed about 13,000 artillery pieces, rockets, missiles and other ordnance that can reach Seoul in a matter of minutes. Seoul, a city of 1 million, could be flattened; also at risk are the 28,500 American troops stationed in the country. Additionally, North Korea could release its dams and flood much of the South, writes Christopher Hitchens. There's also its 1.2 million-member army to consider. And were North Korea to deploy nuclear and chemical weapons, the devastation would be much much worse.
South Korea's Response: South Korea is far from defenseless, however. It has a standing army of more than 500,000 and nearly 10 times that in trained reservists. It has twice the population of the North and is a First-World economic power with huge industrial capacity, while North Korea is an economic backwater where much of the population is malnourished. In any protracted conflict, these would be huge advantages. What's more, the DMZ is heavily mined, and the border area is hilly (even mountainous along the East Coast) and offers natural defensive positions.
International Actors: Alliances haven't changed much in 50 years. The U.S. backs South Korea, while China supports the North. Neither country would likely remain neutral in a Korean war, but it's unclear how involved they would be -- unless North Korea employed nuclear weapons, which would almost certainly trigger an immediate U.S. response. Since 1978, the U.S. has pledged to protect South Korea from a nuclear threat from the North. "Under the extended nuclear deterrence pledge, the U.S. military would use some of its tactical nuclear weapons, such as B-61 nuclear bombs carried by B-2/52 bombers and F-15E, F-16 and F/A-18 fighters, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from nuclear-powered submarines, to strike North Korea's nuclear facilities in retaliation for any such attack on the South," military experts told The Korea Times. China will not support North Korean nuclear aggression, though it's unlikely to sit by idly if American and South Korean forces take over the North. Meanwhile, the main U.S. tensions with China will remain over Taiwan, which could exacerbate if Taiwan used the distraction of a Korean conflict to declare independence.
The Aftermath: Were full-scale war to break out, the endgame likely would be the end of North Korea's dictatorship; the U.S. would not settle for a peace that left Kim Jong-il in power. But what would you do with his brainwashed subjects, whose leader has done everything he can to block their access to the modern outside world? Hitchens, again:This reintegration project would be much more difficult than the one following the reunification of Germany, where Soviet control in the East, however draconian, never approached the cult state that is North Korea. Whatever military challenges war would bring would be dwarfed by these postwar social challenges.
U.S.-China War Extensions
US presence increases the possibility of a Sino-US conflict
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 132)DR
Further, the United States markedly reduces the likelihood of its own involvement in war if it leaves populous and prosperous allies with the responsibility of developing adequate deterrent forces. Should conflict develop between America and China, for instance, it likely would grow out of a dispute between Beijing and a U.S. ally. Yet why should such a conflict warrant American involvement in war? No longer is there a global hegemonic struggle turning local disputes into a cause for global war, and Washington's friends can deploy powerful defensive forces. Wortzel worries about rivalries among China, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas: "Three of the five nations have nuclear weapons, and, in the case of North Korea, seem willing to use them."62 Why would Washington want to be in the middle ofsuch rivalries if no vital American interests were at stake? It is precisely the sort of conflict to be sedulously avoided.
U.S.-China War Extensions
Miscalculation war over Taiwan is a large possibility with US presence in East Asia. military intervention by the US would escalate.
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 156-158)DR
Moreover, there is always the possibility of a miscalculation by a power that is objectively weaker than the incumbent hegemon— especially if an emotional issue like the status of Taiwan is a catalyst. Washington should not be complacent with its current advantages and assume that they will last forever. Instead, it should begin to adjust its policies to deal with the day when China may become a serious challenger. For all of these reasons, the smothering strategy that the United States has pursued since the end of World War II appears to be unsustainable. Indeed, even attempting to preserve it may pose serious dangers to America.
THE DOWNSIDE TO POLICING EAST ASIA
America’s dominant position in East Asia has contributed to the region’s stability, but the policy also entails mounting costs and risks. The financial burden alone is substantial. Yet there is scant evidence that Washington’s security commitments give the United States significant leverage in securing access to important East Asian markets. The difficulties encountered in attempting to open the Japanese market have been discussed at length in the American news media, but the problem is not confined to Japan. Even South Korea, a much smaller client heavily dependent on its alliance with the United States and on the U.S. troop presence, has been surprisingly recalcitrant and exclusionary. The office of the U.S. Trade Representative has been critical of South Korean practices. An April 2003 report noted, “The combination of relatively high tariffs and value-added taxes continues to render a variety of [U.S.] products uncompetitive in Korea... Korea maintains standards and conformity assessment procedures” that “appear to have a disproportionate impact on imports.” Moreover, “U.S. exporters cite Korea’s non-transparent and burdensome labeling requirements as barriers to entry.” 26 The evidence is, at the very least, ambiguous on whether Washington’s security policy in East Asia is effectively promoting its economic interests. 27
The tensions between China and Taiwan in late 1995 and early 1996, and again in the lead-up to Taiwan’s presidential election in the spring of 2000, illustrated that the policy has a disturbing drawback in terms of risk. And President Bush has increased America’s risk exposure. He startled people on both sides of the Pacific in April 2001 when he seemingly ended Washington’s longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan. Previously, U.S. leaders had indicated that the United States would regard the use of force by the People’s Republic against Taiwan as a serious breach of the peace and might— depending on the circumstances— intervene militarily. That posture did little more than reiterate the vague provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. 28
In a series of television interviews on April 25, Bush appeared to discard all nuances and caveats. When asked by ABC News reporter Charles Gibson if the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan, the president replied, “Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that.” Would the United States respond “with the full force of the American military?” Gibson pressed. “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself,” Bush replied. 29
Although the president and his advisors scrambled to provide various “clarifying” comments in the following hours and days, their efforts did little to allay the suspicions of an angry China. And Bush likely spoke the undiplomatic truth. In all probability the United States would try to come to Taiwan’s aid militarily in the event of an attack by China. Such are the obligations of East Asia’s hegemon.
Not only could the United States find itself entangled in a perilous military confrontation with China over Taiwan, it might have to wage the ensuing struggle virtually alone. Taiwan would undoubtedly contribute to its own defense, but the reaction in various East Asian capitals to Beijing’s menacing behavior toward Taiwan in both 1996 and 2000 indicated that assistance from Washington’s other “friends” would be problematic, at best.
Indeed, virtually all East Asian governments made a concerted effort to distance their policies from that of the United States when the Clinton administration dispatched two aircraft carriers to the western Pacific to demonstrate concern about the rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. South Korea and the Philippines both stressed that their “mutual” defense treaties with the United States did not cover contingencies in the strait. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Australia contented themselves with the banal response of urging restraint on all sides, conspicuously declining to endorse Washington’s moves. Indeed, they echoed Beijing’s position that Taiwan is merely a renegade province. Even Japan, the principal U.S. ally in the region, merely expressed “understanding” of the naval deployment. 30 Indeed the lack of allied support is not confined to the Taiwan issue. It also was evident in April 2001 when a Chinese jet collided with a U.S. spy plane that was conducting surveillance from international airspace. The collision forced the U.S. plane to land on China’s Hainan Island, where authorities held the crew for nearly two weeks, until Washington conveyed a carefully worded expression of regret for the incident, and kept the plane. During this period of acute tension, what was the response of America’s East Asian allies?
Vocal support for the U.S. position was notably absent. Even Washington’s treaty allies in the region— Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines— declined to say that a U.S. apology to Beijing was unwarranted. Only Singapore’s elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew unequivocally supported the U.S. position.
Japan’s tepid, ambiguous stance epitomized the reaction of America’s socalled friends and allies. Kauzuhiko Koshikawa, a spokesman for Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, stated: “We strongly hope this case will be settled in an appropriate and acceptable manner.” 31 Beijing could take as much comfort as Washington from such a comment.
Such responses underscore an important point: China’s neighbors have no incentive to antagonize that rising power by backing the United States in disputes that do not seem vital to— or even relevant to— their interests. We can expect such discreet neutrality in most, if not all, future confrontations between the United States and the People’s Republic. Beijing has fostered the tendency toward neutrality through astute diplomacy that has lessened its abrasive image among its neighbors in the region while quietly underscoring its economic importance to the economies of those nations. 32
That lack of support suggests that Washington’s encouragement of dependency on the part of the noncommunist East Asian countries has created a most unhealthy situation. Those nations seek the best of both worlds: they want the United States to protect them from Chinese aggression or intimidation, if that problem should become acute, but they do not want to incur Beijing’s wrath (or even jeopardize their commerce with China) by allying themselves with a hard-line U.S. policy. That may be a good, albeit cynical, strategy for them, but it puts the United States in a precarious position. If China does make a bid for regional hegemony at some point, there is literally no power other than the United States positioned to block that bid. That is a blueprint for a U.S.–Chinese confrontation in which China’s neighbors conveniently remain on the sidelines.
War Now – 2ac
Even if escalation is not likely now high tensions uniquely risk miscalculation as a result of poor communication
AFP, 10 (5/27/10, Agence France Presse, “Koreas On Collision Course, Big Powers Must Step In: Experts”, )
Daniel Pinkston, Seoul-based analyst with the International Crisis Group, said the situation is "pretty serious but I still think the likelihood of escalation into a full-scale war is low".
He expects the chill to last for months or years. And there was always the possibility of "misperception or miscalculation" along the world's most heavily fortified border -- especially now that communication links have been cut.
"If either side believed the other was preparing some military attack, then they might feel compelled to strike first," Pinkston said.
The trigger for any clash could come if and when the South switches on the loudspeakers it is now reinstalling to broadcast propaganda across the border, six years after they went silent.
Yang said the North is "very likely" to carry out its threat to open fire on the speakers since it sees propaganda as a serious threat to the regime.
"Information from the South can shock the North's soldiers and people by divulging a whopping gap in living conditions between the two Koreas, and the private life of leader Kim Jong-Il," Yang said.
More North Korean attacks are coming
VOA News, 10 (5/31/10, “Admiral Mullen: North Korea May Attack Again,”
, JMP)
WASHINGTON - The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff says he is worried North Korea may follow up the deadly attack on a South Korean warship with a second provocative act.
Admiral Michael Mullen said in a U.S. television interview Sunday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il tends not to stop after a single move.
The North Korea issue is expected to be on the agenda of further talks between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who will meet in Tokyo on Monday.
On Saturday, Mr. Wen and Mr. Hatoyama attended a summit with South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak on the South Korean resort island of Jeju.
As the summit ended, Mr. Wen said there is an urgent need to avoid conflict between the two Koreas following the torpedo attack that sank South Korea’s Cheonan warship in March, killing 46 sailors.
But he did not join Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Lee in blaming the incident on North Korea and calling for U.N. Security Council action against Pyongyang.
China is North Korea’s only major ally and has been reluctant to do anything that could destabilize the impoverished neighboring state.
After Sunday’s summit, the Japanese prime minister said Japan, China and South Korea have a “common view” that the sinking of the Cheonan is a serious problem for peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
An international investigation accuses North Korea of firing the torpedo that sank the Cheonan. Pyongyang denies the allegation.
North Korea staged a mass rally in Pyongyang Sunday in which thousands of people raised their fists in support of the government in its dispute with South Korea.
South Korea won’t back down – ensures escalation
AFP, 10 (6/5/09, “S.Korea to re-enact naval battle amid tensions,”
, JMP)
A multinational investigation concluded last month that a North Korean submarine torpedoed the Cheonan corvette in the Yellow Sea on March 26, killing 46 sailors.
North Korea denies involvement and says reprisals announced by the South could trigger war.
The South is seeking United Nations condemnation of its communist neighbour. On Monday it presented the findings of the investigation to Security Council members.
The council warned both sides against any actions that could escalate regional tension.
In Seoul, South Korea's navy chief promised stern retaliation for any new naval provocation by the North.
"If North Korean troops stage a provocation again, we must turn the site of the provocation into their grave," Admiral Kim Sung-Chan told naval personnel at a ceremony marking the 11th anniversary of a deadly maritime clash.
In the clash along the Yellow Sea border, the first naval battle since the Korean War, a North Korean boat with an estimated 20 sailors aboard was sunk.
North Korea will initiate an all out war
GSN, 10 (6/4/10, Global Security Newswire, “War Possible at Any Time, North Korea Says,”
, JMP)
A high-ranking North Korean diplomat said Wednesday that tensions on the Korean Peninsula are so high that "all-out war" could break out at any time, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, June 3).
"The present situation of the Korean Peninsula is so grave that a war may break out any moment," Ri Jang Gon, deputy envoy to the United Nations in Geneva, told the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament.
South Korea accused the North late last month of attacking and sinking one of its warships on March 26, an action that killed 46 sailors. Pyongyang has denied any involvement in the incident, refuting the findings issued by a multinational probe of the incident.
Ri blamed the present state of tensions on South Korea and the United States and said a retaliatory military strike or additional U.N. Security Council sanctions in response to the sinking of the Cheonan would lead Pyongyang to take "tough measures including all-out war." Pyongyang has repeatedly used that language as a threat aimed at staving off punishment for the incident.
War Now – 2ac
North Korea’s declining economy makes more attacks inevitable
Reuters, 10 (3/17/10, Jon Herskovitz, “North Korea may turn more menacing but options limited,”
, JMP)
ANOTHER NUCLEAR TEST?
North Korea, which Kim's family established 60 years ago, is even poorer since he took power in 1994. It is reeling under the loss of international aid and the impact of U.N. sanctions.
A currency reform debacle last year caused rare civil unrest, showing cracks in Kim's leadership though his grip on power looks unchallenged -- for now.
His mounting economic problems mean he will fall far short of honoring his heavily promoted promise to make North Korea a "strong and prosperous state" by 2012, and may undermine his efforts to win support from senior cadres to back his youngest son as successor to the family dynasty.
"The failure of this (2012) campaign, and it can only fail, is only going to make the regime more likely to resort to diversionary military spectacles of some sort," said B.R. Myers, an expert on the North's ideology at Dongseo University.
Moves could include a third nuclear test, which would put the North slightly closer to having a working atom bomb.
But Kim would still lack the capability to effectively use it as a weapon -- his Soviet-era bombers are no match for regional air forces, and he is far from being able to miniaturize a nuclear device so it can be mounted on a missile.
Another possible provocation would be restarting all of the Yongbyon nuclear plant, source of bomb-grade plutonium, that was being taken apart under six-country disarmament discussions.
Park Hyeong-jung, a specialist at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the North could try to show off its uranium enrichment program, which provides a second path for producing bomb-grade fissile material.
And it may try to upgrade its mid-range missiles, which are designed to hit targets in Japan and U.S. military bases in Guam.
Kim's regime will also hope to sell more weapons to states like Iran, something U.S. officials cite as a major worry.
"Its motivation to survive could lead it to engage in more dangerous proliferation activities when other sources of foreign exchange are no longer available," the nongovernmental International Crisis Group said in a report this week.
War Now – 1ac/2ac
North Korea is on the verge of attack now – risks miscalculation and conflict with WMD use
MacLeod, 1o (Calum, Correspondent for USA Today, 6/1/10, “A Sunken Ship, and Talk of War”, )
The report and demands for sanctions have prompted threats of war from the North, which denies sinking the Cheonan and maintains a massive army along most of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the North and South.
On Sunday, North Korea mobilized 100,000 people in Pyongyang for a rally with signs that read, "Beat up the reactionary traitor Lee Myung Bak" and "Stop and destroy provocations by the bellicose South Koreans and the U.S. mavericks," according to The Chosun Ilbo newspaper.
North Korea might not be done.
Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, says a provocative act might come soon if tensions do not ease.
Koreans have long lived with the nightmarish possibility of a devastating war, but the likelihood of conflict increases when all communications are cut off as they are now, says Daniel Pinkston, a regional analyst based in Seoul for the International Crisis Group, a think tank.
If war does break out, "there could be casualties like we've never seen," Pinkston says, as the North will "get off a lot of artillery" before being stopped, and there is the potential that chemical and even nuclear weapons could be used.
Yet for now, "people are going about their business and discount the possibilities," Pinkston says. "It may be denial, as the possibility is too horrible to imagine."
Even among relatives of the Cheonan dead, there are clear limits to any hopes of revenge.
"I've never hated the North Koreans in my life, but I do now, and we should do everything we can to show how strong we are," says Lee Jung Guk, whose brother-in-law, Chief Petty Officer Choi Jung Hwan, died on the Cheonan. "But I'm not talking about direct military attacks, as that would just create other families like us who have lost family members." Instead, Lee wants Seoul to force Pyongyang to admit guilt, reveal who fired the torpedo and apologize to the world. South Koreans show no stomach for a fight, complains Park, who runs the activist group Fighters for Free North Korea from a small office in Seoul. One key reason for his anger with the North, he says: The so-called Peoples' Paradise can't feed its people.
"So many people are dying from hunger," Park says. "Twenty years ago, people would go to jail for picking up leaflets like mine, but now everyone is busy looking for food, and no one gets in trouble for leaflets anymore."
Such appeals casting Kim's regime as evil don't seem to resonate with many South Koreans, especially younger ones.
"We must be softer towards North Korea; we shouldn't push them to the edge," says Oh Seul Gi, a biology student, meeting her boyfriend, Lee Hyun Min, clad in his military uniform, at a Seoul train station Sunday. "Before he went into the army, I never thought about war or North Korea, as I was too busy with my life," says Oh, 23. "Instead of strong action, I want flexibility." Unlike in the isolated, impoverished North, there are many non-political diversions for South Koreans, one of Asia's most successful economies. "I pay more attention to soccer than North Korea," telephone salesman Park Sang Kil says.
'Things could definitely escalate'
The fallout from the Cheonan episode continues as South Koreans head to the polls on Wednesday to vote for almost 4,000 mayors, governors and local government representatives.
Like U.S. midterm elections, such votes often bring losses for the incumbent administration. Lee Myung Bak's ruling Grand National Party is likely to do well, according to local media polls, which indicate that North Korea is an issue of rising concern.
The building tension with the North has not dominated the elections. In Seoul, the streets resound with trucks broadcasting messages from rival political parties. "Seoul will have the purest tap water in the world," city Mayor Oh Se Hoon told cheering supporters near a subway station.
Retiree Park Byung Ku, watching the rally, says the mayor's environmental record -- and his party's tough response to the North -- will earn his vote.
"I don't think North Korea will ever change, unless Kim Jong Il disappears," says Park, 65. "I want our government to push a response strong enough to stop the North making such attacks again."
At the nearby Noryangjin fish market, stall owner Ko Yang Lin, 56, is fatalistic about the crisis.
"I don't care about war, I'm happy to die as I'm too tired to live!" says Ko, who works daily from 2 a.m. to 6 p.m. Ko says she is angry at the North but high taxes are more of a concern.
"I'm losing money now as all kinds of taxes have risen. ... The government always wants more taxes from small businesses like mine," she says.
All South Koreans know "the danger of war is worse for us as (we) have a lot more to lose economically and socially," says Lee Shin Wha, a professor of political science at Korea University. Lee worries her fellow citizens suffer a "security inertia," she says.
"After 9/11 in the USA, there were many diverse views, but when it comes to security, Americans are united." In Korea, "the government must encourage a "more security-alert mentality," Lee says.
Recent polls indicate people are thinking harder more about the North. A poll by Gallup Korea published in The Chosun Ilbo said 60% of respondents supported sanctions against the North. In Washington, analysts say that the current situation escalating into an all-out war is unlikely, but the situation remains tense and could become more dangerous.
"The chances of it escalating into a full-scale war are still fairly low, though we're at a level of tension we haven't seen in decades," says Abraham Denmark, an Asia-Pacific expert at the Center for a New American Security.
"It's not preposterous. Things could definitely escalate."
The situation can get a "whole lot worse before it could get better," says Victor Cha, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington
Cha says North Korea's decision to cut off a naval hotline with South Korea leaves the opportunity for miscalculation on both sides. The lack of communication comes as the U.S. Navy and South Korean navy prepare for a joint military exercise.
"We're in this clear cycle now without any clear exit ramps. The danger about conventional provocations is that the DMZ and the balance of forces are on hair-trigger alert on both sides," says Cha, who adds that he worries North Korea may attempt another strike against South Korea. "There's an action-reaction cycle that in some ways is more dangerous than the possibility of a conventional war."
Such a war could devastate both sides quickly. North Korea and South Korea boast two of the largest and most well-equipped militaries in the world, says Joseph Bermudez Jr., a senior defense analyst for the Jane's Information Group.
About 70% of North Korea's 1.2 million servicemembers are stationed near the DMZ, and the South Korean capital, Seoul, and its sprawling suburbs are vulnerable to North Korean artillery, Bermudez says. South Korea has 680,000 servicemembers backed by 28,500 U.S. troops, but it is outnumbered by the North's troops and vast advantage in rocket launchers, tanks and artillery. Bermudez says North Korea could not stand up to the firepower of a U.S.-backed South Korea but could do great damage. Then there is China, a wild card in the dispute that has been the North's main benefactor and protector for the past two decades. It was hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops flooding onto the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War that maintained the division of the country between a western-backed South and a communist North.
Most Probable – 1ac/2ac
Korean War is the most likely scenario – tensions are high and all-out war is possible
Powell 10 (5/26/10 Bill Powell works for Time Magizine. “War on the Korean Peninsula: Thinking the Unthinkable.” )
"A symphony of death." That's the chilling phrase that Kurt Campbell, who is now Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Obama Administration, once used to describe the likely outcome of any military encounter on the Korean peninsula between the U.S., its ally South Korea and their mutual enemy across the 38th parallel in the North. The possibility of war breaking out once again in Korea is so unthinkable that a lot of people in various military establishments — the Pentagon, South Korea's armed forces and China's People's Liberation Army — actually spend a lot of time thinking about it. The truce between North and South has lasted for 57 years, but a peace treaty has never been signed, and now, in the wake of the North's attack on a South Korean naval vessel — and the South's formal accusation that the Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo — tensions are at their highest level since 1994, when North Korea threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire."
Seoul has already made it clear that it will not seek military retaliation, and Washington and Beijing have said all the right things about trying to ensure that "cooler heads" prevail, as China's State Councilor, Dai Bingguo, said in talks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Beijing on Tuesday. But all concerned parties understand that at a moment of high tension, the possibility of hot war breaking out is not negligible. (See TIME's photo-essay "The Iconography of Kim Jong Il.")
How might a shooting war start? Defense analysts and military sources in Seoul and Washington agree that an outright, all-out attack by either side is unlikely. Even a nuclear armed North, a Seoul-based defense analyst says, "would not risk an all-out war because it would be the end of the regime. Period, full stop." But there are ways in which smaller skirmishes could break out, and if they aren't contained, they could conceivably lead to disaster. Here are three that are uppermost in defense planners' minds:
The West Sea Redux
The site of the crisis — what Koreans call the West Sea (the Yellow Sea to everyone else) — remains the most obvious danger zone. Prior to the March 26 sinking of the Cheonan, there had been three separate naval clashes in the past decade along the so-called Northern Limit Line. The NLL is the de facto boundary that was drawn in 1953 by the head of U.N. forces at the end of the Korean War. Some say the North has never recognized it; others claim that it implicitly did in a 1992 non-aggression pact signed with the South. With the sinking of the Cheonan — an obvious violation of the 1953 armistice — the West Sea is obviously the most sensitive flash point. After the sinking, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak said that North Korean commercial ships — including fishing vessels that hunt for blue crab in the summer months in the South's waters — could no longer venture below the NLL. Pyongyang responded by saying that, likewise, no ships from the South would be welcome north of the NLL. That means all sea-borne traffic from both sides needs to steer clear of the de facto border, lest "they get blown out of the water," says a Western diplomat in Seoul. "That by definition, under these circumstances, is a fraught situation, given that both sides are on a hair trigger now." (See pictures of the rise of Kim Jong Il.)
Loudspeakers at the DMZ
To much of the rest of the post–Cold War world, the idea seems slightly farcical: setting up big speakers on the southern side of the demilitarized zone and broadcasting — loudly — news and anti–North Korean propaganda across the border. To some it conjures up images straight out of Monty Python and the Holy Grail ("I fart in your general direction. Your mother was a hamster and your father smelt of elderberries"). But it's no joke. Cheong Seong-chang, senior fellow at the Sejong Institute, a think tank in Seoul, believes that South Korea's plan to restart these broadcasts will likely infuriate North Korea. "Their military is already in a high state of emotion," Cheong says. And indeed, North Korea has already said publicly that it will shoot at any speakers broadcasting from the southern side of the DMZ. The defense analyst in Seoul says that if Pyongyang were to follow through, it would be "a serious act of aggression, and South Korea must counter it."
Tit for Tat Getting Out of Hand
Shots fired across the DMZ at a time of such tension is a potential disaster waiting to happen. A senior U.S. diplomat concedes that these sorts of incidents "are not at all unlikely to occur" over the next weeks and months. "The key is not letting them escalate. Our side understands acutely the dangers of things getting out of hand." Complicating the situation is that, according to a former senior military official in Seoul, the South Korean government will in all likelihood respond in kind to any future military attack from the North. "We will not do anything in response to the Cheonan [militarily], but I do not expect that that would be the case in any future incidents," says the former official. (See pictures of North Koreans at the polls.)
The question is, Does North Korea know that, and if not, how to communciate the message? There is no hot line between Seoul and Pyongyang, and North Korea announced on Wednesday that it was shutting down a phone line run by the Red Cross in Panmunjom, the so-called truce village set up by the 1953 armistice. The danger here is obvious. The only open lines of communication are two that are affiliated with the train links between the Koreas (including a route to the Kaesong Industrial Zone, which the North has threatened to close). The only way now to get a message to the North about what the South will not tolerate going forward may be via the Chinese. Conveniently, China's Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, will head to Seoul on Friday for talks with Lee. North Korea will dominate that discussion. Let's hope they figure out how to keep Pyongyang in the loop.
Will Go Nuclear – 2ac
Tensions are so high any accident could trigger nuclear war despite technical shortcomings by North Korea
Ford, 10 (Peter, 6/16/10, CS Monitor, “North Korea brandishes threats as UN debates Cheonan sinking” )
If rhetoric could kill, the Korean Peninsula would have been strewn with corpses Wednesday, felled by fresh verbal volleys from Pyongyang warning of nuclear war. As it was, South Korea’s military dismissed the outburst as “routine rhetoric.” But tensions between the two Koreas are dangerously high at the moment. So high, said North Korea’s main newspaper Rodong Sinmun in a commentary, that “a minor accidental incident could trigger an all-out war and develop into a nuclear war.” The warning followed a veiled threat by North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations, Sin Son-ho, that if the UN Security Council reprimands Pyongyang for sinking a South Korean warship last March, “follow-up measures will be carried out by our military forces.” North Korea denies having anything to do with the sinking of the Cheonan and the death of 46 seamen aboard. An international inquiry blamed Pyongyang for the attack, and Seoul has taken the issue to the Security Council. China, wielding a veto, will almost certainly protect its ally from any resolution imposing new sanctions on the hermit regime. But even a nonbinding statement by the Council condemning North Korea for the Cheonan tragedy would trigger military “follow-up,” Mr. Sin threatened on Tuesday. Tensions peak Such rhetoric has indeed become almost mundane in the crisis that has rumbled on for years over North Korea’s nuclear program. And analysts do not believe Pyongyang has the technical capability to use a nuclear bomb on the battlefield. Nor does anyone expect Seoul to start a hot war that would send its economy into a tailspin. But in the current atmosphere of tension it is not hard to envisage how the situation might get out of hand. One flash point is South Korea’s announcement that it will resume anti-North broadcasts from loudspeakers ranged along the heavily armed border. North Korea has said its soldiers will shoot at any loudspeakers carrying propaganda from the South. And the South Korean defense minister has warned repeatedly that his men will return any fire with overwhelming intensity. It is not surprising, perhaps, that while closing its ears to the rhetoric, South Korea’s military is keeping its eyes open. “We are maintaining our vigilance,” an officer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was reported as saying on Wednesday.
Causes nuclear attack on the U.S.
Layne, 06 – professor of government at Texas A & M University (Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 169)
Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, a non-great power war on the Korean Peninsula-even if nuclear weapons were not involved-would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.
And it turns regional conflicts into global ones
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
Alliance advocates are searching for a new raison d'être for a Cold War relic. As much as the United States might prefer to maintain its current dominance of every continent on earth, it cannot realistically expect its influence to persist forever. There no longer is a global hegemonic struggle turning local disputes into a cause for global war. So the United States should be able to devolve upon its populous and prosperous allies the responsibility of developing adequate deterrent forces necessary to guarantee their own security.
War risks nuclear use
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
Although the 1953 Armistice Agreement brought an end to combat operations, the threat of war is still real and alive today on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK has never renounced its goal of reunifying Korea under the Kim family’s control, and never deviated from its strategy of doing so by military means.6 Therefore, the nightmarish scenario of a surprise attack by the North in an attempt to settle the Korean issue by force cannot be dismissed. Worse yet, if such an attack takes place, it will almost certainly include the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons.7
Korean War => WMD Use
War ensures millions of deaths and WMD use
Goodspeed, 10 – Award winning report for The National Post (Peter, 6/26/10, The National Post, “Kim's rain of terror; If war starts, North Korea could shower South Korea with 8,500 high-explosive shells every minute” l/n)
Yet, after 57 years of an uneasy armistice, if another war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, Seoul will be obliterated and millions will die.
After participating in a computer-simulated Korean war game in 2003, three years before North Korea exploded its first nuclear bomb, Kurt Campbell, the current U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, described the early days of any new Korean conflict as "a horrific symphony of death."
"We will win the war," he said. "But it will not be an easy war to fight."
Ever since the first Korean War ground to a halt in 1953, with a cease-fire instead of a peace treaty, soldiers on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have been planning and preparing to resume fighting. As a result, decades of war games, military exercises and analytical reports have produced a nightmarish picture of what a Second Korean War will look like.
During a 1994 diplomatic crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, South Korea's Defence Minister, Lee Yang Ho, said one computer simulation of a potential war projected a million dead, including thousands of U.S. troops.
The Pentagon estimates that without warning and without moving a single artillery piece, North Korea can now fire 500,000 artillery rounds an hour into South Korea for several hours without interruption.
Almost all its artillery is protected in hardened bunkers dug into the mountains along the DMZ, which are nearly impossible to destroy, even with sophisticated, satellite-guided precision weapons.
A North Korean attack could include chemical and biological weapons as well as high explosives.
In 2006, South Korea's Ministry of Defence estimated North Korea possessed 2,500 to 5,000 metric tonnes of biological agents, including anthrax, smallpox, cholera and plague.
South Korean civil defence planners predict 50 North Korean missiles carrying nerve gas could kill up to 38% of Seoul's inhabitants--more than eight million people.
Since October 2006, North Korea has had nuclear weapons. It is rushing to perfect its long-range missile technology so it can threaten the continental United States in the hope of deterring or defeating a possible U.S. attack.
Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defence Information, estimates, "A single 15-kiloton plutonium bomb exploded by North Korea about one quarter mile above Seoul would almost certainly kill 150,000, severely injure another 80,000 and inflict significant injuries to another 200,000 city-dwellers."
North Korean society is designed for war and little else. One of the world's poorest nations, with only 22 million people, it has the world's third-largest army and fifth-biggest armed forces. It spends about 30% of its gross domestic product on defence and 40% of its people belong to a military or paramilitary formation.
Pyongyang's military doctrine still calls for the overthrow of the South Korean government and the imposition of a communist system across the Korean peninsula. As a result, 70% of North Korea's military manpower is stationed in offensive positions within 100 kilometres of the DMZ.
If North Korea did decide to attack or felt provoked or threatened by U.S. or South Korean actions, its military plans call for a blitzkrieg-style assault across the DMZ.
"A surprise attack on South Korea is possible at any time without a prior redeployment of its units. A war could explode after a warning of only a few hours or days, not weeks," said John Pike of ,a research group devoted to defence issues. North Korea would first unleash a devastating barrage of artillery and rocket fire on U.S. and South Korean positions. Then its troops would pour across the border in a combined infantry and armoured assault. Because of the peninsula's mountainous terrain, this could duplicate the original Korean War, with armies advancing down the Kaesong-Munsan, Kumwa, and Chorwon corridors.
An alternative assault, suggested by John Collins, a retired U.S. Army colonel and former military specialist with the U.S. Congressional Research Service, could see North Korea explode a nuclear weapon in one of its undiscovered invasion tunnels beneath the DMZ.
South Korea has already discovered four such tunnels -- each large enough to accommodate the secret transfer of up to 10,000 soldiers an hour into South Korea. There may be 15 similar but still undiscovered tunnels under the DMZ.
North Korea might also try to disrupt U.S. reinforcement plans by trying to explode a nuclear device on board a ship or in a truck in the port of Pusan.
"The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of allied defences either before South Korea can fully mobilize its national power or before significant reinforcement from the United States can arrive and be deployed," explained Mr. Pike.
In any invasion, North Korea will have three strategic objectives: to penetrate defences along the DMZ; to seize and hold Seoul; and to control the peninsula before the United States can rush in reinforcements.
As part of an assault, it will launch ballistic missile attacks against high-level military command posts, seaports, air bases and communications and transportation centres.
Its army of 120,000 special force commandoes, the largest in the world, would also slip behind enemy lines to assassinate political leaders and sabotage sensitive targets.
Some analysts have speculated North Korea might preface an invasion by releasing massive walls of water from its dams above the DMZ.
[CONTINUED]
Korean War => WMD Use
[CONTINUED]
According to ,troops in South Korea will need to withstand a North Korean assault for up to 15 days, then hold the invaders to a standstill for another two to three weeks more before reinforcements arrive and mobilize for a counterattack that is designed to destroy North Korea's military and its dictatorship. A U. S.-South Korean counterattack will rely on a "shock and awe" use of air power never seen before in history. North Korea's geriatric air defences will be overwhelmed in a U.S. air assault that involves stealth aircraft with precision-guided bombs, tactical aircraft from air craft carrier battle groups and a storm of cruise missiles launched from submarines and surface fleets off the coast.
"North Korea is now probably the most watched country in the world by U.S. surveillance assets," said Stephen Baker, a retired U.S. rear admiral who studied Korean war scenarios for Washington's Center for Defence Information.
Every North Korean gun and tank emplacement along the DMZ, ammunition and supply depot, bridge and crossroad, resupply and reinforcement route, air field, naval facility, commando base, headquarters, command post, munitions factory, power station and important government building is on a target list.
"This strike would be devastatingly lethal and very intense," Adm. Baker said. "The goal would be to very quickly take away North Korea's will to fight and to stagger and isolate remaining [North Korean] formations, rendering them incapable of resisting."
James Woolsey, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Thomas McInerney, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general, recently estimated the United States could stage 4,000 attack sorties a day against North Korea. That compares to just 800 sorties a day at the height of the "shock and awe" phase of the Iraq War.
Escalation Possible
Recent disputes are the worst in 60 years – major escalation is possible
AFP, 10 - (5/27/10, Agence France Presse, “Koreas On Collision Course, Big Powers Must Step In: Experts”, )
Limited clashes between North and South Korea are possible in their worst standoff since 1953 but their superpower patrons are likely to pull them back from fullscale military conflict, analysts say.
Tensions have risen sharply since a multinational investigation concluded last week that a North Korean submarine fired a heavy torpedo to sink the South Korean corvette that sank on March 26 with the loss of 46 lives.
In response to the investigators' report the South has cut trade, banned the North's cargo ships from its waters and begun a diplomatic drive to seek United Nations Security Council punishment.
The nuclear-armed communist North furiously denies it was involved in the sinking of the Cheonan and says the conservative Seoul government is waging a smear campaign as a pretext for aggression.
It has cut ties with the South and says the situation is akin to war.
"This is the worst situation we've had since the (1950-53) Korean War," said Yang Moo-Jin, of Seoul's University of North Korean Studies. "Military conflict cannot be completely ruled out."
The two Koreas appear to be on a collision course and to have "neither the will nor a strategy to exit from this very extremely difficult phase," he told AFP, saying the crisis could be ended only by the United States and China.
Yang expects the North to rachet up tensions by shutting down a Seoul-funded industrial complex or by shows of military strength near the disputed sea border.
If the Security Council imposes sanctions, in addition to those already imposed for nuclear and missile tests, the North might test an intercontinental missile and conduct a third nuclear explosion.
Kim Yong-Hyun, a North Korea expert at Seoul's Dongguk University, said limited warfare was possible -- but not a full-scale conflict since China and the US could put on the brakes.
"We have to take the threat of further escalation very seriously," Peter Beck, a North Korea specialist at Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center, told AFP.
"Maybe things have to get worse before they get better. Given the tough stance that Seoul, with Washington's support, has taken, Beijing's role is more and more critical to pull the parties back from the edge."
North and South Korea may get closer to collision before efforts are made to avoid one, Beck said.
North Korean miscalculation is probable – can’t contain the crisis
BMI, 10 (5/25/10, Business Monitor International, Risk Watchdog, “Korea: If You Want Peace, Prepare For War – Part XXVIII”
)
One of the most oft-repeated axioms of Asian geopolitics is that there won’t be a new war on the Korean Peninsula because neither North and South Korea nor their principal backers (China and the US) want it to happen. The South and the US will not attack the North because that would lead to a devastating war, with Pyongyang killing tens (perhaps hundreds) of thousands of people in the South and possibly even Japan – even without the use of nukes. Meanwhile, the North will not attack the South because the combined power of Seoul and Washington would eventually overwhelm Pyongyang, bringing down the regime of Kim Jong Il. So goes the conventional wisdom. What If We’re All Wrong? While I still believe that a new Korean War is unlikely, I am becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of a limited armed conflict caused by miscalculation – an idea I adumbrated in Business Monitor Online on June 3 2009. Call this a half-way house between war and peace. Here’s the crux of my concern. South Korea is adopting a series of punitive measures against the North to punish Pyongyang for sinking its warship Cheonan on March 26 – which is to be expected, of course, given the gravity of the situation. Among these is a more aggressive military posture, such as anti-submarine drills with the US, a more active role in intercepting North Korean ships suspected of carrying nuclear and missile material, and forbidding Northern ships from transiting through the Jeju channel off the South’s south coast. Seoul is also restarting propaganda broadcasts to the North at their joint border, and Pyongyang is threatening to attack the loudspeakers that are used for these purposes. May The Best Korea Win Essentially, these measures will increase the chances of Northern and Southern ships clashing again. Now imagine a situation where the two navies start shooting each other in the West Sea. In order to ensure victory, the North then starts using its land-based coastal defences. The South then counter-attacks these artillery and missile placements, thus escalating the conflict from a sea battle to a ground conflict. Pyongyang then retaliates using its extensive artillery against parts of South Korea (or even parts of Seoul). Both sides then move to war footing, and neither can be sure how far the other is willing to go. By this stage, I’d expect both the US and China to be furiously talking to South Korea and North Korea respectively to contain the crisis, but what if the military chain of command breaks down, especially in the North? What if Northern commanders refuse orders to stand down? This would be a possibility if Kim Jong Il becomes incapacitated. Things could easily spin out of control. The overall result could be a limited war in which hundreds are killed without fundamentally changing the status quo, other than to preclude any rapid improvement in inter-Korean relations. Even without a full-scale war, the ‘limited war’ scenario would be enough to rattle investors and significantly increase South Korea’s risk profile. Meanwhile, don’t be too surprised if Pyongyang carries out another nuclear test this year to demonstrate its displeasure.
Miscalculation Possible
Risk of miscalculation is high –one false move and millions could die in Seoul before the North could be stopped
Cornwell, 10 (5/28/10, Rupert, Independent Extra, “The Great Unknown; The Friday Essay the World’s Last Stalinist Regime Is On the Brink of Conflict Once Again. What Is it that North Korea Hopes to Achieve by Such Posturing? We Just Can’t Know, Argues Rupert Cornwell,” )
Yesterday, the North ratcheted up the tension another notch by announcing it was scrapping an agreement designed to prevent accidental naval clashes, at the very moment South Korean warships were starting exercises close to long-disputed territorial waters.
One misstep in this choreography of threat could lead to calamity. North Korea has the world's fourth-largest standing army, at least half of it dug into position within 50 miles of the border. North Korean heavy artillery could unleash a barrage that would devastate Seoul, home to 10 million people and just 35 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone that divides the two countries. In other words, the North could launch a surprise land attack at any moment, without giveaway troop movements beforehand. Almost certainly, they would make deep inroads into the South, where they would run into some of the 28,000 US troops stationed in South Korea as an explicit guarantee that the US would enter any such conflict.
This isn't idle war-gaming. Exactly 60 years ago next month, the North did invade, overrunning Seoul and starting the Korean War, in which at least two million died. The difference now, of course, is that North Korea is a nuclear state. Since 2006, it has carried out two nuclear tests, and may possess up to eight warheads. And just for good measure, after the second test, in May 2009, Pyongyang announced it no longer considered itself bound by the armistice that concluded the 1950-53 conflict.
Miscalculation Possible
The Cheonan sinking proves the propensity for Kim Jong il to miscalculate
Belfer, 10 – (6/2/10, Michael A., director of the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Metropolitan University Prague and editor-in-chief of the Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, The Prague Post, “Betting big”, )
There are a number of possible explanations for the sinking of a South Korean warship, all of them point to miscalculations by Kim Jong Il The premeditated murder of 46 South Korean sailors aboard the Cheonan warship March 26 has peaked tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Had the Cheonan sunk without a loss of life, perhaps the behavior of North Korea, its Machiavellian leadership and their Chinese crutch would have been shrugged off as another bizarre footnote in the history of an archaic reclusive state. However, since the sinking resulted in high casualties, it is important to explore possible motivations for the attack to gauge whether this crisis will continue escalating, and, if so, how far.
So, why did North Korea shatter nearly a decade of reconciliation efforts with South Korea and gamble with regional stability and the lives of millions of people? On reflection, four possible sets of objectives are evident that may have convinced North Korea that the time was optimal to conduct a relatively small operation and profit from post-attack political fluctuations.
The first possible objective is rooted in North Korea's domestic politics and the preservation of Kim Jong Il's ruling clique. Kim may have been looking to dispel rumors that his health had deteriorated beyond the capacity to govern. The Cheonan attack and the well-coordinated post-attack media blitz showed that Kim maintains control over the junta. In ordering a physical attack against South Korea and then standing up to international pressure, Kim was in fact saying, "I am the leader of North Korea, and there is no alternative until I choose a successor."
It is also important to remember that North Korea suffers from an acute "legitimacy gap" in that Kim rules without public consent and the country has few channels for public dialogue. Knowing that many civilians have also been anticipating post-Kim life, the Cheonan's sinking may have been used to create a rally-around-the-flag effect - in this case, the flag symbolized by Kim himself. In doing so, the regime was attempting to divert attention away from more pressing issues, like looming economic catastrophe.
The second potential objective was economic. If this was the actual rationale, then the international community is experiencing dà ja vu, since North Korea has often raised tensions to extort financial concessions in exchange for a return to the status quo. The Cheonan's sinking may have been ordered because reactions have become predictable: a stiffening of rhetoric, military brinkmanship followed by a tidal wave of diplomatic activity seeking de-escalation. During periods of de-escalation, North Korea typically requests (and receives) huge civilian aid packages, such as food and medical aid. Such an economic price tag is, for many, acceptable since it does not directly contribute to the North Korean military-industrial complex. However, this indirect support releases significant resources and affords North Korea the ability to continue to spend some 25 percent of its GDP on military procurements without having to ensure that its people are fed.
The all-too-familiar pattern of crisis (initiation followed by escalation and an international involvement for crisis de-escalation) is visible, and, given the timing of the Cheonan attack, Kim's price for peace is likely to be the extension of the United Nation's food aid, which is due to expire June 30. North Korea requires international support to feed its population, especially since its currency revaluation in December 2009 further undermined the won (KPW), resulting in increased poverty, blackouts and economic stagnation. However, murdering South Korean sailors for economic concessions is a grotesque act that has convinced many to redouble efforts to destabilize Kim's regime. If economic objectives prompted the Cheonan attack, North Korea miscalculated the willingness of the international community to open de-escalation negotiations and is now poised to lose more than it could have hoped to gain through extortion.
A third possible motivation of the attack may be understood within the nuclear proliferation context as a way of disrupting Russo-American nuclear relations prior to ratification of the START II Treaty, which sets in motion a general framework for nuclear reductions. It should be remembered that hours before U.S. President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague speech, where he presented plans for nuclear disarmament, North Korea tested long-range delivery systems, overshadowing Obama's plans and making clear that his vision of a nuclear weapons-free world was a pipedream when it came to dealing with the erratic North Koreans. Over the past two years, following the launch of the so-called Medvedev Initiative and Obama's famed reset in Russo-American relations, North Korea has become increasingly estranged from Russia and regards START as a means of deciding who may or may not possess nuclear weapons. If the attack occurred in this context, North Korea properly foresaw U.S. reactions, but failed to adequately anticipate Russia's, which has made it abundantly clear (by action) that it would rather do business with the West than politics with North Korea.
Accidental War Possible
Accidental War possible
, 10 (5/24/10, Mike Davis is the author. Blog. )
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), on the other hand, may be more nervous about instability in the DPRK than anyone in South Korea, Russia or the U.S. When I was on an educational mission sponsored by the U. S. State and Defense Departments to the PRC four years ago, our group heard from top Chinese officials that they fear war on the Korean peninsula could be touched off by mistake, especially a power-play within North Korea.
What most Americans do not realize is that China believes a domestic blow-up in the DPRK would migrate to the PRC, if for no other reason than hordes of refugees crossing the long border between the two Asian countries.
So in the matter of a resumption of the Korean war, the Chinese are perhaps our best friends, whereas the last time around in 1950 their “volunteer army” swarmed over our General McArthur’s forces like hungry fleas over a dog. Fortunately, North Korea knows that if China cuts the umbilical cord of supply, they cannot go to war against anybody, even their own people.
There’s another report being circulated that the smaller South Korean armed forces could nevertheless defeat an invasion by the North because of better health, better training, modern weapons and the fact they’ve got something worth defending besides the abstract comfort of freedom. This is probably wishful thinking if for no other reason than the size and proximity of North Korean forces.
Still, mistakes can happen.
The problem is, even with brief hostilities, there would be hell to pay in the American economy. Thousands of Hyundai, Kia, Chevrolet, Samsung and LG merchants, to name only a few, would soon find themselves without new products to sell or parts to repair them. And I get the impression from talking to one of the major Korean companies that there is no contingency plan should there be a war. They are too busy cashing in on America’s thirst for their products.
So America’s stake in peaceful relations on the Korean peninsula is a lot closer to home than you might think.
Brinkmanship => Miscalc & Escalation
Brinkmanship risks miscalculation and escalation
The Age, 10 (6/18/10, The Age, “Korean brinkmanship risks disaster” l/n)
IT WAS a proud day for North Korea when its soccer team took on Brazil at the World Cup. Yet the North Korean public could not share the moment, and not only because the reclusive regime does not permit live broadcasts. After the sinking of a South Korean warship on March 26, the Seoul broadcaster that holds World Cup rights for the whole peninsula denied North Korea televised feeds, which it provided four years ago - although the North has aired pirated replays. The United Nations Security Council is deliberating on a response to the attack on the Cheonan, with the loss of 46 sailors, and tensions haven't been higher in decades. Long gone are the hopes of 2000, when North and South Korean athletes marched under one flag in the Sydney Olympics. Today, any miscalculation by either side could trigger full-scale conflict. Many nations would have treated the sinking of their warship as an act of war. South Korea has shown great restraint since an inquiry by foreign experts, including Australians, found last month that a North Korean torpedo sank the Cheonan, despite Pyongyang's denials. Seoul knows the risks of war: Kim Jong-il has the world's fourth-largest standing army - and has tested a nuclear device - and his heavy artillery along the border could flatten the capital. Pyongyang's UN ambassador warned on Tuesday that any censure would be the end of diplomacy: "follow-up measures will be carried out by our military forces". Despite public anger at the sinking, the final nail in the coffin of the "sunshine" policy of engagement, a sense of Korean kinship endures. Events have bolstered approval for President Lee Myung-bak's tougher approach, including sanctions, but few wish to sever all ties. What should be clear to all is that the status quo is unsustainable; events can spin out of control at any time. The key player is China as a permanent Security Council member and patron of North Korea, which is hugely dependent on Chinese fuel and food imports. Beijing lodged a diplomatic protest against another act of hostility when North Korean border guards shot dead three Chinese nationals two weeks ago. That reportedly resulted in an apology and compensation. If China aspires to be seen as a responsible global leader it must now use its influence to pull North Korea into line and get it to accept the censure it deserves. It is also up to Beijing to push Pyongyang into talks that offer the only chance to finally end this Cold War conflict. North Korea's nuclear program and the brinkmanship of its regular provocations are simply too dangerous to tolerate.
Kim Jong-il is Irrational
Kim’s stroke will make him think irrationally
MacKinnon, 10 (6/22/10 Mark MacKinnon, “On the Korean peninsula, the quiet of the DMZ masks new danger,” )
“One of the most serious questions about the Cheonan is why in the hell did they do it?” said Andrei Lankov, a North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul. “North Korea has started doing things it would never do in the past. By sinking the Cheonan, they didn’t gain anything.”
With the flow of information from Pyongyang tightly controlled by the regime, those on the outside are left to speculate about this new behaviour, with most tracing its origins to a stroke Mr. Kim is believed to have suffered in September of 2008. Previously, Mr. Kim was viewed in Seoul as a wily risk-taker, someone prone to provocative acts, but with what appeared to be a clear objective, often to get aid from the outside world or the attention of the White House.
That no longer seems to be the case. Before the Cheonan sinking and rhetoric since then threatening to turn Seoul into a “sea of flame,” North Korea watchers were left scratching their heads by the decision last year to detonate a second nuclear device – an act that again angered even Pyongyang’s few friends while proving nothing about its capabilities that hadn’t been demonstrated in a 2006 test.
In the same category was a decision late last year to dramatically revalue the country’s currency, an act that destroyed the meagre savings of many North Koreans and led to rare public protests inside the country. “Strokes don’t improve your analytical abilities,” Prof. Lankov said.
Prof. Lankov’s interpretation of recent events is shared by some Western diplomats, as well as a key North Korean defector who is one of the few people outside Pyongyang who can claim to know the dictator personally.
“Kim Jong-il is a god and king in North Korea, and god is sick,” said Kim Duk-hong, one of only two members of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea to have ever successfully defected.
Mr. Kim, who now lives in Seoul under heavy police protection, said the North Korean dictator’s apparent illness is particularly dangerous because the country’s entire political structure is built around what he called the “deification” of the leader.
But while the Dear Leader’s new unpredictability may trouble North Korea’s neighbours and the region, Mr. Kim said his incapacitation or death could also bring about a collapse of the totalitarian system. “This is the most difficult moment in North Korean history,” he said. “The leader is severely sick and cannot think rationally. Economically, people know they can’t rely on their leaders, and their trust and belief in socialism is already destroyed.”
Suicidal miscalculation is still possible
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 (6/4/10, " Starving and desperate, North Koreans have nothing left to lose ", )
This week North Korea's deputy ambassador in Geneva, Ri Jang-gon, brazenly promised ''tough measures including all-out war'' over moves to sanction his country over the sinking of a South Korean warship. And yet behind North Korea's bombastic threats, its handful of semi-functional nuclear weapons and its cartoon dictator, there is a cowering, depleted, shattered nation that can barely concentrate beyond the next meal. ''They are exhausted,'' says a diplomat who left Pyongyang last week after meeting military officers there. ''They are absolutely not prepared for war.'' But that, he adds, does not exclude the possibility of suicidal miscalculation. North Korea remains opaque and its politics impenetrable. But its people are no longer hermetically sealed from the outside world. Outsiders know something of life inside because so many traders and refugees are getting out. ''Refugees'' are relabelled as ''defectors'' when they make it as far as South Korea by buying a forged passport or scuttling through China to a third country, such as Mongolia or Thailand, to gain asylum at a South Korean embassy. Once in Seoul, Wilson Im tapped into Chinese broker networks to send money back to his brothers and arrange phone calls with relatives who would journey to a village within range of Chinese mobile phone towers. Since the 1990s the economy has stabilised and adjusted, but not recovered. Lights do not go on, water taps do not flow, wages are not paid, factories do not operate. ''There was a car factory, but people stripped all the parts from the machinery and sold them on the black market,'' says Im, recalling the cannibalisation of industry in his home town in South Pyongan province. ''The bauxite mine didn't often operate because the diamond drill heads were frequently stolen … I heard many of the mine materials were sold in China.'' Barbara Demick, in her new book based on interviews with defectors, Nothing To Envy, Ordinary Lives In North Korea, writes how survival is directly related to an individual's capacity to evade or ignore the country's totalitarian strictures. The armies of secret police are as arbitrary and brutally active as they ever were but can no longer compel the same Orwellian conformity. Faced with the choice of possible jail or certain starvation, North Koreans have broken down stifling restrictions on travel, trade and initiative. Survivors learnt to cook the inner bark from pine trees, tend their own private vegetable gardens and peddle goods and food in street markets or on the black market. They learnt to beg, steal, prostitute, bribe and wade across the icy Tumen and Yalu rivers in their thousands into China. Chinese villagers along the northern border told the Herald of North Koreans plundering their livestock, tools and any other objects not nailed down. They told of women crossing the river to trade backpacks full of soy bean paste for luxuries like nail clippers, shoes and rice. Wilson Im survived his adolescent years in South Pyongan by scavenging aluminium pots, pans and cutlery, of which his bauxite-rich neighbourhood had relative plenty. He would pack them in his school bag, and stow away on south-bound trains to trade for rice on the flatter and more fertile fields closer to Pyongyang. Lately the regime has been battling to reimpose its tight-fisted control by restricting street markets and launching a campaign against imported Chinese goods. It has slowed the refugee traffic to a trickle by increasing patrols. Refugee activists in China told the Herald they had grown reluctant to help arrivals because they could no longer tell a genuine refugee from a North Korean secret agent who had starved themselves to infiltrate their networks. North Korea presents itself as a nation of brainwashed robots. But its citizens cannot help but contrast their current misery with the world they hear about from returned refugees and traders, or with the relative abundance of the 1980s. ''The people are well aware of their relative and absolute deprivation,'' says Peter Hayes, a frequent visitor to North Korea who runs the non-profit Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. Kim Jong-il's utopian fantasies are not as convincing as they used to be. Even soldiers, about one in five of the working-age population, and who chew up a quarter of the country's GDP, are often stunted and incapable of focusing on much beyond their own survival. Wilson Im remembers the moment when his illusions came tumbling down: when his brother first returned from China. ''I thought, 'Aahh … even beggars live better than I do in my home town.'''
U.S. Presence => Belligerence
U.S. presence actively facilitates belligerence
Bandow, 08 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (6/9/2008, Doug, “Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance,” , JMP)
Still, does an American presence dampen geopolitical rivalries and arms races? Washington’s role as de facto security guarantor might discourage allied states from doing more for their own defense, but that is a dubious benefit since the belief that the United States will intervene encourages countries to be more belligerent in any disputes with other nations. Moreover, America’s presence virtually forces Beijing to upgrade its military, lest it remain permanently vulnerable to foreign coercion. That is the worst dynamic possible—weakening friendly nations and keeping them permanently dependent on Washington, while convincing China that only a sustained military buildup will enable it to deter U.S. intervention.
U.S. Presence => Miscalc and Escalation ***
U.S. troops risk starting a war through miscalculation – will escalate to a ground war that requires a draft
Hornberger, 09 – founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation (6/16/09, Jacob G., “Pull Out of Korea (and Everywhere Else)” , JMP)
Notwithstanding its occupations of two nations — Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Empire is at it again, fulfilling its role as the world’s international policeman, this time with respect to North Korea. Americans should hope that things don’t get out of control because if they do, there is little doubt that if war were to unexpectedly and suddenly break out in Korea tens of thousands of young men and possibly young women would be drafted to fight and die in such a war.
Imagine the following scenario: North Korea warships begin intercepting American cargo ships, hailing them, and then requesting to board them to inspect their cargo.
Wouldn’t the response of most Americans be: What business does the North Korean government have interfering with the free movement of American vessels?
Well, that’s precisely what U.S. warships are going to be doing with North Korean vessels, thanks to a new UN Security Council resolution that has been enacted at the request of U.S. officials.
Fortunately, U.S. officials backed off from forcibly boarding Korean ships, an act that the North Korean government announced would be considered an act of war, which it would be. Nonetheless, when U.S. warships are approaching Korean vessels and requesting to board such vessels, there is always the risk of miscalculation, especially when one is dealing with an erratic and bizarre regime like that which rules North Korea.
The real issue is: Why does the U.S. government still have 25,000 American troops in South Korea, especially since that the Korean War ended more than 50 years ago? Why shouldn’t the South Koreans bear the responsibility for defending their own nation from attack? Why should Americans be forced to fight to fight and die in foreign war thousands of miles away from American shores?
Those 25,000 U.S. troops in South Korea serve one function — a tripwire that will guarantee U.S. involvement in such a war. Thousands of those troops would undoubtedly be killed in a sudden invasion by North Korea. Don’t forget that Seoul, South Korea, is only 25 miles from the North Korean border. Once thousands of U.S. troops are killed, the United States would be fully committed to the war.
That would mean another land war in Asia, a very nasty one. It would mean a military draft. Lots of body bags coming home. Soaring taxes, enormous tax surcharges, massive debt, and soaring inflation. More centralization of power for Washington, especially for the military and the military-industrial complex. Massive infringements on civil liberties.
What greater recipe for big government and loss of liberty than a confluence of the “war on terrorism” and the “war on communism”? What better opportunity for the full application of the enemy-combatant doctrine for American citizens here at home?
It’s best to treat the North Korean regime as a scuba diver treats strange and bizarre creatures in the sea — by simply leaving it alone. Unfortunately, that’s not what the U.S. Empire doing. Instead it’s instead poking and provoking the North Korean regime, increasing the possibility of a miscalculation whose consequences would be disastrous for America.
Americans would be wise to dismantle the U.S. Empire, bring all overseas troops home from everywhere, and discharge them, and end the U.S. government’s self-assumed role as the world’s international policeman, before the empire plunges our nation into bigger messes than it already has.
U.S. Presence => Escalation
Presence guarantees escalation – sucking the U.S. into conflict
Bandow, 06 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, “The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore,” , JMP)
A promise to defend also increases the risk of involvement in a conflict that no longer matters much for U.S. security. The ROK was important symbolically during the Cold War; today any conflict involving it would be a humanitarian tragedy but would have no significant security implications. The troop presence ensures that any war will involve America; even the the latest U.S.-ROK maneuvers raised tensions with the North. Today Washington has to worry about far more pressing conflicts, especially Afghanistan, Iraq, and the continuing fight against al-Qaeda.
Moreover, it is the defense guarantee for and force deployment in South Korea that make the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea America’s problem. Absent those ties, the latest machinations of the North’s exotic dictator, Kim Jong-il, would more amuse than frighten. Even Pyongyang’s nuclear program would primarily be an issue for North Korea’s neighbors.
The U.S. possesses the most powerful military on earth, including the most advanced nuclear force. Thus, the DPRK could not use nuclear weapons against America without inviting a devastating retaliation. And all evidence suggests that Kim Jong-il wants his virgins today rather than in paradise.
Withdrawal prevents U.S. involvement in regional nuclear conflicts
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Further, the United States markedly reduces the likelihood of its own involvement in war if it leaves to populous and prosperous allies the responsibility of building up adequate deterrent forces. Should conflict come with the PRC, it likely would grow out of a dispute between Beijing and an American ally, something to be avoided now that there is no longer a global hegemonic struggle and Washington’s friends can deploy powerful defensive forces. The Heritage Foundation’s Larry Wortzel worries about rivalries among China, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas. “Three of the five nations have nuclear weapons,” he says, “and, in the case of North Korea, seem willing to use them.”112 But why on earth would Washington want to be in the middle of such rivalries if no substantial American interests are at stake? It is precisely the sort of conflict to be avoided.
Withdrawal Prevents U.S. Draw In
Withdrawal is necessary to prevent U.S. entanglement in Korean conflicts – there is no need to show resolve when our interests aren’t at stake
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (5/24/10, Doug, “Avoiding Pyongyang,” , JMP)
After an investigation of nearly two months, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has concluded that North Korea torpedoed the Cheonan, a corvette that sank in the Yellow Sea in late March. Today, Seoul is going to the United Nations Security Council.
South Korea must respond to the attack. But no strategy is free of danger. And the ROK’s military alliance with America makes it more difficult for both nations to act in their respective interests.
The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a malign international actor since its formation six decades ago. Kim Il-sung initiated full-scale war in 1950; over the years the regime has engaged in a variety of military and terrorist attacks on both South Korean and American targets.
However, since the downing of a ROK airliner in 1987, Pyongyang has been on better behavior. Brinkmanship has remained the North’s chief negotiating tactic, but the DPRK has avoided committing any blatant acts of war.
Why sink a South Korean ship? It could be an unauthorized military action intended to prevent resumption of negotiations over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. It could be an attempt by Kim Jong-il to demonstrate that North Korea can strike with impunity. It could be a concession by him to the military as Kim attempts to install his young son as his successor. In any case, the attack poses a significant challenge to South Korea. But not to America.
It should be obvious that there is little the DPRK can do to harm the United States. The North lost any significant relevance to American security with the end of the Cold War. Without a link to a potentially aggressive Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, a virulently revolutionary China), Pyongyang became an irrelevant backwater.
Even the North’s nuclear program poses no direct threat to the United States. Nothing suggests that Kim is suicidal: he wants his virgins today, not in the afterlife. So he would never strike at America, risking retaliatory annihilation. The prospect of proliferation is worrisome, but again, Kim likely understands the enormous risks he would take selling materials to non-state actors that might target the United States.
Washington is stuck in the center of Korean affairs today only because of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which provides a security guarantee to South Korea with no corresponding benefit to America. Without the alliance, there would be no U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula, within range of North Korean attack, and no American promise to intervene in any war that might result from a provocation by Pyongyang or retaliation by the South.
The sinking of the Cheonan was an outrage, but it was an outrage against the ROK. It should not be an issue of great concern to America, which normally would offer diplomatic backing but not military support to a democratic friend.
Yet American analysts have been producing articles and studies carrying such titles as “America Must Show Resolve over North Korea” and “U.S. Must Respond Firmly to North Korean Naval Attack.”
The question is: why? No American forces were attacked. None are likely to be targeted. The U.S. military already is very busy, especially in Afghanistan. There’s no reason for Washington to risk war over an assault on another state, especially one well able to defend itself.
Were the ROK still a helpless economic wreck, one could concoct an argument for American aid. But the South vastly outranges the DPRK on every measure of national power. The ongoing debate about whether Seoul is ready to take over operational control (“OPCON”) of its own forces along with any U.S. troops during a war is symptomatic of the extreme dependency in which South Korea finds itself. For the ROK to cower fearfully before Pyongyang is roughly the equivalent of the U.S. running to Brussels to request European troops to deter a Mexican attack.
At least the alliance provides an obvious benefit to Seoul: a source of military reinforcement from the global superpower. Still, the South finds its decision-making, even on the question of its national survival, affected and directed by American policy makers half a world away. Virtually every American, from think-tank analyst to Obama administration staffer, has called on South Korea to exercise “restraint.” They say the ROK’s response should be “measured.” They urge Seoul to be “cautious.” And so on.
That makes sense from America’s standpoint. Indeed, the Obama administration has reason to be making much stronger representations privately. It would be folly for the United States to get into a war over the sinking of the Cheonan.
It doesn’t matter that the act was criminal; it doesn’t matter that the deaths have greatly pained South Koreans; it doesn’t matter that Seoul might calculate the costs and benefits of a tough response differently.
Washington’s top priority is avoiding another war, one that likely would be costly, brutal, and bloody—and of no conceivable benefit to America. Obviously, South Koreans have an even greater incentive to avoid war, since their nation would be the principal battleground. However, they might decide that to exhibit weakness in the face of the North’s provocation would make the chance of war even greater in the future. If Pyongyang believes that it can sink a South Korean ship without consequence, what might the Kim regime do next?
Yet Seoul finds its future being decided at least in part in Washington, where America’s, not South Korea’s, interests understandably are treated as paramount. The devastated land that emerged from the Korean War had no choice but to place its security in America’s hands. But the ROK today? In the short-term the U.S. and South Korea are tied together militarily. Their responses to the sinking of the Cheonan will reflect that relationship.
However, both sides should use this crisis to rethink an alliance that has outgrown its original security justification. There is much on which both nations should work together in the future, including military operations where both countries have interests at stake. Such cooperation is not advanced by today’s antiquated alliance.
Neither the ROK nor the United States is well-served by a relationship where South Korea’s fate is decided in Washington. Especially more than a half century after the end of the Korean War and two decades after the end of the Cold War. It’s time to turn South Korea’s defense over to the South Korean people.
A2: North’s Military is Weak
Miscalculation is still possible despite North Korea’s weak military
Garnaut, 10 – (6/5/10, John, The Age, “Behind North Korea Bluster is People Fight for Survival”,
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But behind North Korea's threats, its handful of semi-functional nuclear weapons and its cartoon dictator, there is a cowering, depleted, shattered nation that can barely concentrate beyond the next meal.
"They are exhausted," says a diplomat who left Pyongyang last week after meeting military officers there. "They are absolutely not prepared for war."
But that, he adds, does not exclude the possibility of suicidal miscalculation.
North Korea remains opaque, its politics impenetrable, but no longer hermetically sealed from the outside world. Traders and refugees are getting out and even arranging phone calls to relatives within range of Chinese mobile phone towers.
Withdrawal => Chinese Influence in Korea
Withdrawal motivates China to boost its influence in Korea and won’t undermine ties with South Korea
Bandow, 06 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (Winter 2006, Doug, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, “Enlisting China to Stop a Nuclear North Korea,” Vol. XVIII, No. 4, , JMP)
Geopolitical Guarantee
Thus, while proposing that China confront its ally, Washington should offer a geopolitical guarantee of sorts, indicating that it does not intend to take unfair advantage of Beijing’s willingness to help. That is, the Bush administration should allay any Chinese concerns that America would bolster its regional influence at the PRC’s expense.
Washington should promise to recognize a new North Korean government and help integrate it into the international community so long as it returned to the Six-Party Talks and negotiated an end to its nuclear program. (In the event that Beijing successfully engineered a regime change, the new government likely would follow the PRC’s lead in this regard.)
The United States also should promise to withdraw its troops from and end its security treaty with a unified Korea. In this way, a newly reunified Korea would not become an advanced American military power on China’s border.
In fact, the forces should be withdrawn today, since the South is well able to defend itself from North Korea and ROK and American geopolitical objectives have been steadily diverging. Indeed, South Korea has indicated that it will not allow the United States to use its forces in the region without Seoul’s consent, turning America’s ROK presence into an advanced based to nowhere. As Ted Galen Carpenter puts it, pulling out “simply involves relinquishing a waning strategic asset in return for something important.”26
Washington still would retain extensive cultural and economic ties with the ROK. (The latter should be strengthened through the free trade agreement currently being negotiated between the two nations.) Moreover, a united Korea would retain a significant incentive to cooperate politically with America—in particular, to help balance the influence of China and Japan. But Washington should make clear that the U.S.-ROK relationship would not be directed against the PRC.
No one knows if it will be possible to peacefully halt the North’s nuclear program. But if it is, Beijing, not America, is the key player. The United States, in concert with South Korea and Tokyo, should encourage Chinese participation and, if possible, leadership, in the campaign to defang and ultimately replace Kim Jong Il. The PRC might be hesitant to join such an effort, but it will be more likely to do so if Washington abandons direct confrontation with North Korea in favor of an indirect strategy to undermine the North’s ruling elite, backed by a promise to refrain from taking geopolitical advantage of Beijing’s assistance. There is no guarantee that this strategy would succeed, of course. But the so-called “international community” is running out of options.
Withdrawal => Chinese Influence in Korea
A commitment to withdrawal forces will motivate China to intervene to prevent North Korea nuclearization
Bandow, 06 – vice president of policy for Citizen Outreach and member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy (10/10/06, Doug, “Defang North Korea: Let Beijing Take the Lead,” , JMP)
"The proclaimed actions taken by North Korea are unacceptable," said President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the North's apparent nuclear test. But the president and his aides have been saying much the same thing for five years. There is a big difference between Washington viewing the act as unacceptable and making it unacceptable. In particular, what thinks Beijing?
After all, in the opinion of the Bush Administration, almost everything done by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over the last five years has been unacceptable. But no matter: Pyongyang forged ahead with its nuclear plans. Now, it seems, North Korea has officially joined the eight other nuclear weapons states.
For all the furor generated by North Korea's announcement, nothing has really changed. It has long been assumed that the DPRK possessed enough plutonium to make as many as a dozen bombs and was weapons-capable. Many steps likely remain before Pyongyang actually creates a deliverable weapon. In any deal, the North's substantial nuclear infrastructure would have to be dismantled, whether or not Kim Jong-il's regime had conducted a test. With his latest gambit, Kim merely has confirmed everyone's suspicions.
Still, disarming North Korea today seems an even more daunting task than persuading Pyongyong not to trek down the nuclear road. The increasingly vivid vision of a potential weapon is likely to whet Kim's appetite for more. Every fearful complaint and unrealized threat voiced abroad merely encourage Kim to move ahead. For he and his nation are important internationally only because of the nuclear weapons program. And only a nuclear arsenal can truly ensure against an attempt at regime change by the Republic of Korea, United States, or, less plausibly, Japan, or even China.
In fact, unless the Bush Administration is prepared to trigger the Second Korean War, Washington can do little: the only justification for a military strike would be an imminent military threat, but none exists. Moreover, there are no diplomatic relations to break, no economic ties to sever.
There's only pushing for "an immediate response by the United Nations Security Council," in the president's words. America's UN ambassador, John Bolton, has called for "a strong response," not just "a piece of paper." Washington has proposed banning luxury and military trade, inspecting North Korean cargoes, and freezing assets connected to weapons sales. But these steps will be possible only with the acquiescence of the People's Republic of China and Russia. The latter has little at stake, other than stored resentment over recent U.S. policy. However, even Moscow might be reluctant to sanction a de facto blockade, technically an act of war.
The PRC has long stood in the breach for North Korea. Although no longer as close to the DPRK as during the Cold War, Beijing supplies North Korea with food and oil. China advocated bilateral discussions between Washington and the North. Beijing steered previous Security Council meetings away from sanctions, softened the Security Council resolution adopted after the July missile tests, criticized Australia and Japan for imposing their own economic restrictions last month, and weakened the statement issued by the Security Council last week to dissuade the North from initiating a test.
Still, China's patience does not appear to be inexhaustible. The PRC long has been dissatisfied with its client's behavior. China has pushed Pyongyang to attend the six-party talks and criticized North Korean belligerence. At Washington's request Beijing recently sanctioned a North Korean bank in Macao for apparent money laundering. In July Beijing publicly warned the North against its multiple missile tests.
Last week China's UN ambassador stated that no one would "protect" Pyongyang "for bad behavior." At Sunday's summit between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the two nations said they were "deeply concerned" about the DPRK's prospective nuclear test, which "would be a great threat and would be unacceptable." For once the PRC finds itself in the same position as America: under pressure to actually make Pyongyang's actions seem unacceptable to Pyongyang.
However, Beijing long has feared a North Korean implosion more than a North Korean nuke: the former threatens chaos, conflict, refugees, and, perhaps most importantly, a united Korea allied with the United States on China's border. The PRC's reluctance to apply the sort of pressure that might actually work was evident when the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared itself "firmly against" any military action and called for a "peaceful resolution through consultation and dialogue," the DPRK's return to the six-party talks, and a "cool-headed" international response to the test.
How to persuade the PRC to act? The U.S. needs to convince China that the consequences of not acting might be worse: nuclear proliferation spreading to South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. That possibility has received increasing attention in the wake of Pyongyang's Sunday test. Washington need not threaten to arm its allies, but simply suggest that it might let events proceed naturally, refusing to thwart such a progression. China worries about Japan's increasing nationalistic assertiveness. The PRC is particularly concerned about independence-minded forces on Taiwan, which would like nothing more than to acquire a nuclear deterrent. A growing North Korean nuclear arsenal might be the trigger for a proliferation explosion.
Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute suggests encouraging a reluctant Beijing to cooperate by promising to withdraw U.S. forces and security guarantee to South Korea. Doing so would have the additional benefit of turning a nuclear North Korea into a regional rather than an American problem, and therefore make it more subject to a regional solution. Since American personnel are not needed to defend South Korea, but act as nuclear hostages for the North, U.S. disengagement was appropriate long ago.
Still, sanctions might fail even with Chinese support. Beijing provides about 70 percent of North Korea's oil as well as substantial amounts of food and other goods, but Kim Jong-il has demonstrated that he is willing to put his people through enormous pain and even mass starvation. Shen Dingli of Shanghai's Fudan University observes: "The DPRK considers its national interests to be greater than its relations with China." And Kim Jong-il might rationally, though unfortunately, believe that protecting those national interests requires possession of nuclear weapons.
An administration that long has exalted unilateral action and denigrated international cooperation finds itself in an uncomfortable position: abject failure. Alas, it remains inclined towards bluster. Last week Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, opined: "We are not going to live with a nuclear Noth Korea, we are not going to accept it." However, the problem of North Korea has grown immeasurably worse in the more than five years that George W. Bush has been in office.
The best hope, as oft has been said, is a package of sticks and carrots. The former would be a coordinated program of economic pressure: international limits on international trade; South Korean restrictions on investment, commerce, and even humanitarian aid; Japanese termination of financial transfers from its ethnic Korean community; and Chinese reductions in food and fuel assistance. Combined with penalties would be a promise of full-scale international engagement, including recognition by Washington and trade with America, should the North return to international talks and agree to a verifiable process of denuclearization.
No one knows if it is still possible to peacefully halt the North's nuclear program. But if it is, Beijing—not America—is the key player. The United States should encourage Chinese participation and, if possible, leadership, in the campaign to defang Kim Jong-il.
Withdrawal will force China to step up and confront North Korea
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
What About North Korea’s Nukes?
The US-South Korean relationship would be in trouble even had Washington and North Korea maintained the fiction that all was well with the Agreed Framework, since the alliance no longer serves its original purpose. And preventing the North from developing nuclear weapons offers no substitute. Absent a US plan to invade the North, something that seems unlikely even from the Bush Administration, the American presence performs no useful role.
In fact, the current deployment leaves US forces as nuclear hostages if the North marries an effective atomic bomb to a means of delivery. Moreover, the troop tripwire makes North Korea America’s problem. Removing it, argues Adam Garfinkle, editor of the National Interest, “would force China and the other parties to the problem to face reality.”21
Chinese Involvement Solves ***
China’s involvement solves and boosts its soft power succession crisis
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/6/10, Doug, “An Unstable Rogue,” , JMP)
In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. After his government downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the South’s defense minister now says a mine or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted Seoul’s aging corvette.
The Republic of Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing his intention to “look into the case in a calm manner.” But the possibility that Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political upheaval.
All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear.
Moreover, Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion.
The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior.
Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States.
Now we are no longer sure.
Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real.
Such an outcome would be in no one’s interest, including that of China. So far the People’s Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea.
There are several reasons for China’s stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Korea’s economic stability or the two nations’ political relationship. Washington doesn’t like that judgment. However, changing the PRC’s policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help.
Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijing’s insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else?
South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite China’s preference for avoiding controversy, the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the North’s nuclear policies or ruling elites.
Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires.
Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it’s impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.
And the Yellow Sea incident highlights other dangers: it may have been an act of brinkmanship too violent by half or an act of military disobedience designed to sink any prospect of negotiations. Either of these could lead the worst of all outcomes on the peninsula—full-scale war. Then the PRC would face the worst case in virtually every dimension: the end of North Korea, a united ROK allied with Washington on China’s border, mass refugee flows over the Yalu, and conflict, including possibly radiation, spilling over Chinese territory.
None of these is necessarily likely. But all are possible and must be compared by Beijing to the price of confronting the Kim regime. Doing something starts to look like a much better option than standing behind the DPRK, hoping that everything works out.
Admittedly, now might not seem to be the best time to engage China, given the strains in the U.S.-PRC relationship. However, Beijing is unlikely to reconsider its policy unless it believes doing so is in its interest. Irrespective of the state of bilateral U.S.-China relations, the PRC will have to be persuaded to change course.
The South also has a critical role to play in engaging China. The two nations’ economic ties continue to expand. But Beijing also desires to expand its political role while diminishing U.S. influence: that is unlikely to happen so long as South Korea feels threatened by the North and uncertain about China’s willingness to develop a more equal relationship between the two Koreas. Pressing Pyongyang more strongly would provide evidence of the PRC’s commitment to play a more constructive regional role.
Japan, too, should challenge China over the issue. The new government in Tokyo is committed to improving Japan’s relationship with Beijing. As part of that dialogue, Tokyo should point to the dangers posed by North Korean misbehavior to surrounding nations.
Moreover, the potential of military conflict on the peninsula and attacks on Japan have caused greater interest in Japan for adopting a more aggressive foreign policy backed by a larger military. The PRC opposes this new course; resolving the multiple problems of North Korea would be the most effective way to quiet Japanese geopolitical fears.
We must hope that the Yellow Sea sinking was a tragedy rather than a provocation. But even if the former, the incident should remind everyone that the Korean peninsula remains a military tinderbox. It would only take one accident or mistake to trigger full-scale war.
The country that could do the most to reduce the chance of conflict is China. Beijing increasingly expects political influence commensurate with its growing economic strength. Dealing with North Korea provides the PRC with an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of its commitment to peace and stability.
Chinese Involvement Solves ***
Chinese involvement is key to stable succession process in North Korea – prevents conflict, refugee flood and WMD prolif
Kim, 10 (5/14/10, Sam, Yonhap News Agency, “Leadership change in N. Korea should be exploited by neighbors: scholar,” , JMP)
SEOUL, May 14 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States should seize on an apparent leadership succession in North Korea as a chance to bring about fundamental changes in its recalcitrant behavior, a leading U.S. scholar said Friday.
"We should have great skepticism about the current North Korean leadership," Richard Haass, president of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, said in a forum in Seoul, calling on Seoul and Washington to "embrace and urge a real policy change in North Korea through this process of leadership evolution."
U.S. and South Korean officials say North Korea is undergoing a power transfer from leader Kim Jong-il to his third son, Jong-un, about whom little is known. If successful, the move would make the North the only communist country in the world to engineer a back-to-back hereditary power transition.
Haass said China has "more influence on Pyongyang than it admits" and that the apparent succession "opens up possibilities for China supporting leadership change in North Korea particularly when the current leadership period comes to an end."
"The only prospect for a meaningful and substantive political change in North Korea's behavior would come as a result of the efforts of its neighbor, China." he said.
China is North Korea's last remaining major ideological ally. Trade between the neighboring countries accounts for a lion's share of North Korea's transactions, and their leaders last week agreed in Beijing to bolster exchanges on multifarious levels.
The meeting between Kim Jong-il and Hu Jintao, however, raised concerns that China's expanding relationship with North Korea may hamstring international pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize.
Haass, whose New York-based organization is considered one of the most influential American think tanks, said denuclearization remains an important goal but will remain a distant one without China re-examining its relationship with North Korea.
South Korea and the United States should "influence China to rethink its behavior, rethink its relationship with North Korea," he said. "We can highlight the risks to China for continuing with the status quo."
He cited the "the risk of conflict on the (Korean) peninsula, the risk of refugee flows, the risk of chaotic collapse, the risk of further spread of weapons of mass destruction."
Chinese cooperation key to the success of any policy toward North Korea – has significant influence
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
China Factor
It is hard to imagine a resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis without Chinese cooperation. It was China that convinced North Korea to participate in multilateral talks in spite of North Korea’s insistence on bilateral talks with the United States. China has played a crucial role as a host country for the Six-Party Talks. China has maintained a very clear position on the North Korean nuclear program: North Korean nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated, and the North Korean nuclear crisis should be resolved by peaceful means. China, however, does not want the North Korean system to sustain too much pressure and become unstable. Thus, China claims that it does not have as much influence over North Korea as the United States thinks, and it opposes putting pressure on North Korea.
North Korea has depended on China for energy, food, and daily commodities, which are essential to the North Korean economy. As the tension between Washington and Pyongyang continues over the North Korean nuclear program, the relationship between China and North Korea is becoming more consolidated. In recent years, China has increased its investment in North Korean factories, enterprises, and natural resources. China is the biggest trading partner of North Korea, accounting for 39 percent of North Korea’s total trade in 2005.23
Although some people argue that the consolidated economic relationship between China and North Korea has contributed to North Korean economic reform, others suspect that the increased Chinese economic presence in North Korea may make the North Korean economy too dependent on China. This makes neighboring countries nervous and has a negative impact on regional security cooperation. In South Korea, some worry that North Korea may fall under Chinese control, and may even be incorporated as a province of China. This concern often develops into a policy of large-scale economic assistance and investment to North Korea. The United States, which considers China a strategic rival, is concerned that the increasing Chinese economic presence in North Korea may weaken its leverage with Pyongyang. Japan, which was formerly North Korea’s major trading partner and donor of humanitarian aid, is also concerned about its declining influence over North Korea, and has become eager to make a breakthrough.
Given the amount of trade and aid from China and its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, any policies towards North Korea – from economic and diplomatic sanctions to military options – do not have much prospect for success without Chinese cooperation.
Chinese Involvement Solves ***
Only a greater role by China can prevent a number of conflicts from breaking out and escalating – including one between the U.S. and China
Bandow, 10 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Ragan (5/25/10, Doug, The Daily Caller, “Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia,” , JMP)
While the U.S. remains involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, East Asia contains the seeds of potentially bigger conflicts. China holds the key to maintaining regional peace.
For instance, the Republic of Korea is imposing economic sanctions on North Korea after the latter sank a South Korean naval vessel. A military response could set off a retaliatory spiral leading to war. With 27,000 troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, Washington could not easily stay out of any conflict.
Less obvious but potentially more serious is the future status of Taiwan. The People's Republic of China insists that the island, separated from the mainland by Japanese occupation and civil war, return to Beijing's authority. The Taiwanese people are never likely to support control by the PRC.
Although China-Taiwan relations have improved with a new government in Taipei, Beijing may grow impatient as its power increases and be tempted to substitute coercion for negotiation. However, Washington has implicitly guaranteed Taipei's security, which could lead to a serious military confrontation between the U.S. and China.
How to maintain the peace in East Asia? Washington must engage the PRC on both issues.
America's relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not.
China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly.
As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S.
In return, Washington should welcome China into the global leadership circle if its rise remains peaceful and responsible. American analysts have expressed concern about a Chinese military build-up intended to prevent U.S. intervention along the PRC's border. But the U.S. cannot expect other states to accept American dominance forever. Any American attempt to contain Beijing is likely to spark — predictably — a hostile response from China.
Instead, Washington policymakers should prepare for a world in which reciprocity replaces diktat. The U.S. could encourage Chinese responsibility by adopting policies that highlight the importance of the PRC's role in promoting regional peace and stability. Such an approach is most needed to deal with the Korean peninsula and Taiwan.
For instance, Beijing could play a critical role in restraining and ultimately transforming the North. So far the PRC has declined to apply significant pressure on its long-time ally. In fact, North Korea's Kim Jong-il recently visited China, presumably in pursuit of additional economic aid and investment.
His quid pro quo might have been a professed willingness to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks. But few analysts believe there is much chance of a nuclear deal whether or not these negotiations proceed — and almost certainly no chance unless the PRC is prepared to get tough with the North, including threatening to cut off generous food and energy shipments.
To encourage Beijing, Washington should suggest that China would share the nightmare if an unstable North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal. The North's nuclear program would yield concern even in the best of cases. But the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea is no best case.
The regime started a war in 1950 and engaged in terrorism into the 1980s. Pyongyang has cheerfully sold weapons to all comers. Worse, today it appears to be in the midst of an uncertain leadership transition. If North Korean forces sank the South Korean vessel, then either Kim Jong-il is ready to risk war or has lost control of the military, which is ready to risk war.
The Obama administration should indicate to the PRC that Washington will face sustained pressure to take military action against the North — which obviously would not be in Beijing's interest. Should the DPRK amass a nuclear arsenal, the U.S. would have no more desire than China to be in the middle of a messy geopolitical confrontation, especially one that could go nuclear.
Thus, Washington would not be inclined to block decisions by the ROK and Japan to create countervailing nuclear arsenals. Just as the prospect of a North Korean bomb worries the U.S., the possibility of a Japanese nuclear capacity would unsettle the PRC.
Should China take the tough, even risky (from its standpoint) steps necessary to moderate or transform Pyongyang, Washington should promise to reciprocate. The DPRK poses the greatest threat to regional peace and security. Eliminate it, and eliminate the principal justification for a U.S. military presence in East Asia. Most obvious would be a promise not to maintain American bases or troops in the Korean peninsula, whether united or divided. Pulling back units from Japan would also be warranted.
The issue of Taiwan requires Chinese forbearance rather than action. A Chinese commitment to peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status would eliminate the geopolitical dispute most likely to set America and Beijing at military odds.
The PRC already has triumphed on the international stage since most nations, and all major countries, recognize China over Taiwan. Winning formal control over Taipei would offer Beijing symbolic rather than practical benefits.
Moreover, China's economy has surpassed that of Taiwan and today benefits enormously from Taiwanese investment. The growing economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait also diminishes the importance of Taipei's de facto political independence.
The two peoples if not the two states are growing increasingly interrelated. The lack of political control over 23 million people may pose a nationalistic affront to the PRC, but it is one Beijing should bear to promote its larger objective of attaining global leadership.
In contrast, using military force — whether intimidation, blockade, or invasion — against the island would generate costs far out of proportion to any possible gains in terms of prestige. A hostile regional and Western response would be inevitable.
China's neighbors certainly would see the PRC's rise as anything but peaceful. Any coercive act would be a powerful impetus for Japan to create a larger military and adopt a more aggressive foreign policy.
The greatest risk would be a confrontation with the U.S. Economic retaliation would be certain and military intervention possible. Given the length and strength of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, no American administration could easily stand by if the PRC used force against Taipei.
Chinese aggression also would validate the warnings of American hawks, who are pressing for ever higher military outlays despite America's dearth of serious adversaries. Even Europe would see Beijing as a threatening actor, rather as major European powers came to view Wilhelmine Germany, and likely would retaliate economically.
Washington should press the PRC to take two simple steps: renounce the use of force to resolve Taiwan's status and remove missiles now targeting the island. In return, Taiwan should indicate that it will not ally with any party or allow other powers to use bases against the PRC. The U.S. should explain that it has no intention of intervening militarily against China, maintaining a military alliance with Taiwan, or using military facilities on the island. Washington also should pull back other military units stationed nearby, such as the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa.
Demonstrating its pacific intent would enable the PRC to defuse proposals to revamp America's alliances with South Korea and Japan to deal with other contingencies — meaning China. Although Beijing's rise has been steady, its continued rise will be smoother if achieved in cooperation with its neighbors and without hostility from them or America. The PRC's own actions will be the most important factor in determining other nations' reactions.
It is often said that Americans live in a dangerous world. We do. But shoe and underwear bombers do not match the threat posed by nation states armed with nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, carrier groups, and armored divisions.
While the future is uncertain, it is difficult to imagine the U.S. at war with Russia, India, or any significant power other than China. Thankfully, conflict with the latter also remains unlikely.
But the mere possibility of a future military confrontation reinforces the importance of the world's two most important nations working to defuse potential conflicts. Which means cooperating on North Korea and Taiwan. Doing so successfully would go a long way to make the 21st century one of peace and stability.
China Key to Reform and Denuclearization
Engagement is doomed to fail – only China can induce reform in the North Korea regime and solve nuclearization
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (7/1/09, Doug, “The China Card,”
, JMP)
North Korea appears to have moved from intermittent to constant provocation. The only nation with real influence in Pyongyang is China. South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak visited Washington two weeks ago but a solution is no closer. American diplomacy should focus on encouraging Beijing to do its utmost to “solve” the problem of the North’s criminal regime.
The challenge posed by the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is obvious to all. Probably the most murderous government on earth, Kim Jong-il’s regime has presided over the death by famine of at least a half million people. His regime’s brutality is both tragic and legendary. While impoverishing his people, he has maintained an oversize military, including an active nuclear-weapons program. And he has created a unique marriage of communism and monarchy, apparently designating his youngest son, now called the “brilliant comrade,” to be his successor, just as he succeeded his father, Kim Il-sung. Although evil, he is not suicidal. Kim Jong-il enjoys his virgins in this life rather than desiring them in the next one. Nevertheless, eliminating his regime would be an obvious humanitarian and security plus.
Unfortunately, no easy solution presents itself. Kim’s latest confrontational tactics do not prevent a negotiated settlement—U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth has emphasized the administration’s desire to engage Pyongyang—but the likelihood of diplomacy resulting in a demilitarized peninsula grows ever smaller. Even if the DPRK proves willing to halt any new nuclear activities, it is very unlikely to turn over existing nuclear materials. And while Washington should continue to pursue both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the process may yield little other than frustration. Tighter sanctions also offer but a forlorn hope. Amid reports that the North is planning a new nuclear test, the UN Security Council voted to tighten sanctions. America’s UN ambassador, Susan Rice, said the measure provided a “strong, very credible, very appropriate response.” But it in fact offered little in the way of increased enforcement. North Korea already is the world’s most isolated state. Moreover, the regime has never let the suffering of its people affect its policies. A government which allowed a half million people to starve is not likely to be moved by increased hardship for those who remain alive.
Only Beijing has the clout necessary to influence the DPRK. The former provides the bulk of the North’s food, fuel and consumer goods; trade between the two nations has been rising. Severing that lifeline could bring the North Korean economy to a standstill. However, so far the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has demurred. Indeed, before passage of the latest Security Council resolution the PRC called for an “appropriate and balanced” measure and emphasized “calmness and restraint.” Even now, China’s government appears to fear a North Korean collapse more than a North Korean nuclear weapon.
The last option is war—either a limited strike on Pyongyang’s atomic bases or a more general attack. Washington obviously could destroy nuclear facilities above ground and perhaps underground. Whether doing so would permanently block the North’s nuclear efforts and eliminate its existing atomic capabilities are less clear.
Moreover, an attack probably would result in war. The Kim regime likely would see a strike as the first step in an attempt at coercive regime change. Moreover, to do nothing would wreck its credibility at home and stature abroad. While it is not likely to foolishly start a losing war, the DPRK government isn’t likely to passively accept a conflict begun by the United States. Although the North would lose any conflict, it could cause massive damage to the South, whose capital, Seoul, lies close to the Demilitarized Zone and thus within range of both artillery and Scud missiles. Other possible consequences include the dispersion of nuclear debris and creation of mass refugee flows.
So is a North Korean nuclear arsenal inevitable? Maybe not. The China card has yet to be played.
Cynicism about Beijing’s role in the North Korean crisis abounds. Some analysts believe that the PRC can do little to move Pyongyang, which has steered an independent course for decades. Others accuse China of consciously orchestrating the North’s destabilizing course. And the mainstream view is that the PRC is unwilling to risk its relationship with Pyongyang or accept the costs of the regime’s potential collapse. Indeed, Beijing has treated North Korean refugees, who face prison and even death when repatriated, with unconscionable brutality.
However, Washington might be able to change China’s calculus. It’s certainly worth attempting to do so. The PRC could cut off aid and commerce. Beijing also might be able to undertake covert action to transform the North Korean system.
Some analysts would risk the U.S.-China relationship in an attempt to pressure Beijing to pressure the DPRK. For instance, former–Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph advocates imposing unspecified costs on Beijing if it fails to comply. However, much more than just trade is at stake with America’s relationship with China. And the PRC is unlikely to bend in response to public pressure.
Beijing’s concern over the economic consequences of a North Korean collapse is understandable but should not be conclusive. With a population of more than 1.3 billion people and a GDP of $4.2 trillion ($7.8 trillion by purchasing-power parity), the PRC is capable of absorbing all of the North’s 23 million people if necessary. But it isn’t necessary.
First, the United States should indicate that it is willing to share the cost of caring for any refugees who end up over the border in China (or Chinese humanitarian activities in the North in the aftermath of a collapse). The price would be small compared to the cost of North Korea’s current regime. And over the long-term a stable, reform-oriented government in the North or a reunified peninsula would offer Beijing obvious economic benefits. The PRC already trades more with South Korea than does the United States. It likely would enjoy a similar advantage in a more prosperous North Korea.
Second, the Republic of Korea, with a nearly $900 billion GDP, should join Washington in making such an offer. The cost of German reunification caused Seoul to hope for at least a modest North Korean economic revival before reunification on the peninsula. However, Pyongyang’s increasingly provocative behavior suggests that the price of immediate reunification would be smaller than that of a war or arms race.
Third, the United States should enlist Japan, with the world’s second largest GDP of $4.8 trillion, in this effort. Nearly one million ethnic Koreans live in Japan, with the majority hailing from the North. Tokyo could pledge its financial support, as well as indicate its willingness to accept the return of the one hundred thousand ethnic Koreans who emigrated to the DPRK during the 1960s along with their estimated two hundred thousand family members. In return, a new regime in Pyongyang might be more willing to satisfy Japan’s demands for an accounting of its citizens kidnapped over the years.
Fourth, the Korean Diaspora could offer its private support. There are more than two million Korean-Americans, more than two hundred thousand ethnic Koreans in both Canada and Russia, about one hundred twenty-five thousand in Australia, and tens of thousands each in countries throughout Asia and Europe. All could assist in the event of a messy end to the Kim regime.
Fifth, the Obama administration should promise the PRC that the United States would not take geopolitical advantage of Chinese intervention. Thus, Korean reunification would not result in American troops on China’s border. Instead, U.S. forces would come home. They aren’t needed even today to defend the South. And they certainly wouldn’t be required if the DPRK disappeared.
Sixth, Washington should point to the risk of further proliferation throughout East Asia. A nuclear North Korea is more a problem for its neighbors than for America. China should not assume that the United States would or could forever restrain the ROK and Japan from responding in kind if they found themselves facing a hostile, nuclear-armed North. Nor is it in the interest of America to remain in the middle of such an unstable geopolitical mix. In short, Beijing would share the nightmare of a nuclear DPRK.
Finally, the United States, backed by leading Asian and European states, should point out that Chinese leadership in resolving the problem of North Korea would enhance the PRC’s international reputation. China has emphasized its determination to “rise” peacefully; there would be no better evidence of its good intentions or leadership potential than helping to rid the world of the brutal, threatening regime in Pyongyang.
Of course, the success of Chinese intervention would not be guaranteed. But all other options have less likelihood of success. Neither banking on the goodwill of Kim Jong-il nor triggering a second Korean War is a hopeful strategy. It’s time for the Obama administration to play the China card.
A2: China Won’t Pressure North Korea
They won’t now because they fear it will lead to collapse with U.S. presence there – plan solves
Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyun-kyung, “China’s double standard on N. Korea,”
, JMP)
In a report titled, "Shades of Red: China's Debate over North Korea," the International Crisis Group said that China was angered by the North Korean bellicose acts last year and tried to reprimand Pyongyang, but "in a controlled way that would protect Chinese interests."
Beijing prioritizes stability over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and it is deeply worried over a possible U.S. military presence north of the Military Demarcation Line in case social unrest in the North leads to a precipitous reunification of the two Koreas.
"China negotiated for over two weeks to ensure that UNSC Resolution 1874 was strong enough to satisfy the United States and its allies yet sufficiently restrained in its effects to mitigate any damage to the North Korean regime," the group said.
Professor Quinones observed China will try to avoid doing anything that would alter its current balanced policies toward both Koreas.
"Punishing North Korea over the Cheonan incident would undermine this balance," he said.
Chinese Action => Soft Power
Chinese action solves war and cements it international leadership
National Times, 10 (6/16/10, “Korean brinkmanship risks disaster” )
The key player is China as a permanent Security Council member and patron of North Korea, which is hugely dependent on Chinese fuel and food imports. Beijing lodged a diplomatic protest against another act of hostility when North Korean border guards shot dead three Chinese nationals two weeks ago. That reportedly resulted in an apology and compensation. If China aspires to be seen as a responsible global leader it must now use its influence to pull North Korea into line and get it to accept the censure it deserves.
It is also up to Beijing to push Pyongyang into talks that offer the only chance to finally end this Cold War conflict. North Korea's nuclear program and the brinkmanship of its regular provocations are simply too dangerous to tolerate.
Boosts Chinese soft power
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (7/1/09, Doug, “The China Card,”
, JMP)
Finally, the United States, backed by leading Asian and European states, should point out that Chinese leadership in resolving the problem of North Korea would enhance the PRC’s international reputation. China has emphasized its determination to “rise” peacefully; there would be no better evidence of its good intentions or leadership potential than helping to rid the world of the brutal, threatening regime in Pyongyang.
Denuclearization is key to China’s regional leadership
Pollack 9 - Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (10/23/2009, Jonathan, YaleGlobal Online, “China’s North Korea Conundrum: How to Balance a Three Legged Stool”, ) MGM
But Hu Jintao and other senior Chinese leaders are intent on pursuing renewed nuclear diplomacy. Hu’s reputation and international stature are directly linked to the multilateral efforts to inhibit and ultimately reverse nuclear weapons development in the North, with China serving as host, convener, and facilitator of the Six Party Talks. An explicit admission of the failure of multilateral talks would be a severe blow to Hu’s prestige, and also a major challenge to China’s regional strategies.
Expanded Soft Power Key to China’s Leadership
Expanding soft power is key to overall Chinese international leadership
Glaser & Murphy 09 - *senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND** Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies (March 09, Bonnie S. and Melissa E., “Soft power with Chinese Characteristics” )
In short, there appears to be consensus among Chinese intellectuals and the leadership on the imperative to build China’s soft power, which begs the question: To what ends? For those who believe that soft power is something that can be deliberately cultivated, its development is seen as necessary to build China’s comprehensive national power, to rebalance China’s growing hard power, and to refute the China-threat theory. They believe soft power can secure a stable and peaceful international environment and facilitate the acceptance of China’s rise internationally. It can also defend and advance Chinese interests: “China has to substantially increase its soft power in order to play an active role in international competition.”83 The debate on soft power in China now revolves around the question of what comes next: After China determines its core socialist value system, should China actively promote its values as an alternative to Western values? Can socialism with Chinese characteristics combined with capitalism serve as a development model for developing nations? There is also interest around the world in the relationship between U.S. and Chinese soft power: Is the relationship zero-sum, so that an expected increase of U.S. soft power under President Barack Obama will result in a decline in Chinese soft-power appeal?
A2: China Won’t Use Soft Power / Influence
China will use influence despite regional suspicions
China Daily, 10 (4/10/10, “Trust in Peaceful Rise,” Lexis)
A major research institute in China has painted a gloomy picture of the situation the country is facing from its surrounding areas: Asia-Pacific countries harbor suspicion against and are worried over China's rising influence.
According to a blue paper released earlier this week by the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, such unfavorable sentiments have not only resulted in over estimation of China's influence in international affairs, but also led to misjudgment of China's non-hegemonic foreign policy. Worse, some countries have suggested that other big powers should check China's influence in the region.
Misunderstanding of China's foreign policy and the resultant miscommunication may have helped these unfavorable sentiments grow.
China has long upheld an independent foreign policy of peace. To build a favorable external environment for its development, China has always been committed to developing good neighborly and friendly relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Recent years have seen it actively participating in regional and world affairs. This is a natural result of the growth of its national strength.
As the world's largest developing country with a dynamic economy, China fully understands the important role it could play in maintaining regional and world peace and stability. Thus it is fully justified in safeguarding its core interests in the international arena. Sometimes, China's stance may differ from those of others. Some in the international arena have, therefore, wrongly accused China as being tough, a charge that Chinese leaders have refuted repeatedly.
China has demonstrated tolerance and magnanimity toward different schools of thoughts that have led to the misjudgment of its rise. It will make even greater diplomatic efforts to build a peripheral environment of long-term peace and stability.
A2: China Uses Soft Power to Undermine U.S. Heg
China isn’t likely to promote socialism in developing countries to challenge U.S. hegemony
Glaser & Murphy 09 - *senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND** Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies (March 09, Bonnie S. and Melissa E., “Soft power with Chinese Characteristics” )
China’s emerging power and its future impact on international stability are among the most
intensely debated topics in international relations. Much attention has been paid to analyzing
China’s “hard power,” which refers to the ability to use military and economic means to coerce
or induce another nation to carry out a policy or course of action. In recent years, China’s “soft
power”—the ability to get what a country wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments1—
has also become the focus of considerable research. Concerns have been raised regarding
the expansion of China’s soft-power influence around the world and its implications for the United
States.2 The view that China’s “charm offensive” is part of a grand strategy aimed at challenging the
world’s remaining superpower has resonated with many.3
Those who espouse this view attempted to examine Chinese influence in various parts of the
world, but they neglected to investigate Chinese thinking about soft power and its role in Chinese
foreign policy. In recent months, some scholars have begun to fill this gap in the literature by
examining China’s internal discourse on soft power.4 This paper seeks to contribute to this intellectual
effort by offering insight into the evolution of the debate on soft power in China, particularly
why the Chinese leadership has embraced the mainstream intellectual view that culture is the
“core” resource of a state’s soft power. We also examine how Chinese scholars have moved beyond
Joseph Nye’s original theoretical framework to develop what can be termed “soft power with Chinese
characteristics,” notably considering the domestic and foreign policy aspects of soft-power
development as an organic whole. The paper concludes that, despite intense intellectual debate
and leadership interest, China has yet to develop a comprehensive, coherent, national soft-power
strategy although there are disparate policies toward this end.
China’s soft-power policy emphasizes culture and is largely ad hoc and primarily reactive,
aiming to combat the perception internationally that China poses a threat. As China expands
its national power and assumes a bigger role on the international stage, it is possible that Beijing
will promote Chinese socialist values as an alternative to Western values and seek to promote the
China development model assertively. Today, however, these policies are advocated by only a minority
of Chinese scholars and have not been embraced by the Chinese leadership, which remains
largely cautious and risk averse.
Chinese soft power won’t challenge the U.S.
Glaser & Murphy 09 - *senior fellow with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies AND** Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies (March 09, Bonnie S. and Melissa E., “Soft power with Chinese Characteristics” )
Mainstream scholars also continue to hold the view that China’s development model should
not be propagated abroad because doing so would fuel further fears about China’s rise. According
to one leading intellectual, “Our economic model has provided soft power but the government
hesitates to use it out of concern that it will increase the China-threat theory.92 Following the
guidance of taoguang yanghui, these experts argue that China’s soft power should remain defensive
and reactive—primarily aimed at allaying fears about China’s rise, improving China’s image,
and clearing up misunderstandings about its intentions.93 Chinese officials in particular seek to
avoid being seen as challenging the United States by setting up an alternative set of values to guide
international society. According to one senior official, “China has never been expansionist and has
not pushed a development model on others. This is a very important point. China will never try to
export a development model.”94
A minority view asserts that the China model can and should be exported. University of International
Relations professor Zhang Mingqian argues that China’s experience provides “a successful
‘development model’ of socialist market economy for the international community, thereby making
China an alternative ‘model’ for others to choose or follow.”95 Fang Changping believes that in
order to achieve its soft-power objectives, China should push for international acceptance of its
development model.96 According to one scholar, “today people feel more confident and feel they
can discuss Chinese power, both hard and soft. What can China contribute to the world, people
ask?”97 In the wake of the financial crisis, scholars are also beginning to question the infallibility of
the U.S. model and believe that the China model has something to offer.98 These views support a
more proactive soft-power policy.
A2: China Uses Soft Power to Undermine U.S. Heg
China’s soft power is growing but is ultimately harmless to the US – we need to cooperate over security issues.
McGiffert, 10 – fellow in the CSIS International Security Program (March 09, “Conclusion,” )
China has placed special emphasis on the soft-power aspects of its foreign engagement, playing both to regional audiences and to a broader global gallery to whom it seeks to portray itself as a nonthreatening and responsible international power. China’s rapidly expanding engagement in the developing world in particular has provoked a range of reactions around the world. In developing regions, many hold high hopes for what China can bring to the table in trade, investment, and alternative development partnerships; others are unnerved by what China’s seemingly insatiable demand for energy, resources, and export markets will mean for fledgling economies, weak governments, and disenfranchised populations. Ultimately, the challenge for developing nations will be whether their governments and their people can harness external engagement—China’s and other key players’ as well—to their eventual national benefit. In the West, China’s mix of economic engagement and soft power has spurred some fears that Western influence in developing regions will thereby be diminished and that investments in governance, transparency, and accountability will be undermined, particularly in states rich in natural resources but whose governments often lack legitimacy or national vision. Many Americans in particular are concerned about losing strategic influence to China. Yet, the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, cochaired by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, concluded:
China’s [perceived] soft power is likely to continue to grow, but this does not necessarily mean that Washington and Beijing are on a collision course, fighting for global influence. First, a number of factors ultimately will limit China’s soft power, including its own domestic political, socioeconomic and environmental challenges. Second, there are a number of critical areas of mutual interest between the United States and China on which the two powers can work together—and in some cases already are. Energy security and environmental stewardship top that list, along with transnational issues such as public health and nonproliferation. . . . [G} lobal leadership does not have to be a zero-sum game. China can only become preeminent if the United States continues to allow its own powers of attraction to atrophy.
We do not yet know how China’s soft-power strategy will play out. Nevertheless the United States can learn from aspects of China’s soft-power engagement, and the United States has reserves of soft power that it has underused in recent years.
Now is an opportune time for the United States and others to proactively engage China on areas of common interest, to strengthen regional capacities to manage the intensifying competition that China and others bring, and to preemptively work to mitigate potential areas of disagreement.
China won’t challenge the US for leadership – economic growth is their primary objective
CRS, 08 (A study prepared by the Congressional Research service for the U.S. Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, April, 08, “China’s foreign policy and ‘soft power’ in South America, Asia, and Africa” )
In energy sources alone, for example, China became a net importer in 1995—it became a net importer of oil in 1993—and its energy demands are expected to continue increasing at an annual rate of 4–5 percent through at least 2015, compared to an annual rate of about 1 percent in industrialized countries.10 China steadily and successfully has sought trade agreements, oil and gas contracts, scientific and technological cooperation, and de-facto multilateral security arrangements with countries both around its periphery and around the world. In all three of the regions discussed in this memo where China is most active, access to energy resources and raw commodities to fuel China’s domestic growth plays a dominant role in Beijing’s activities. China has oil and gas exploration contracts with Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba; oil contracts and pipeline deals are a major part of China’s activities in its relations with Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and China’s oil exploration interests extend to Burma, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Imports of crude oil constitute the bulk of China’s imports from African states.
In pursuit of sustainable economic development, China also is seen to have placed a priority in keeping stable and relatively tension- free relations with its primary export market, the United States. Some analysts suggest that this priority is behind Beijing’s decision in 2003 to tone down its anti-U.S. rhetoric and criticism and instead to emphasize China’s ‘‘peaceful rise’’ on the world stage.11 According to this view, Beijing calculates that even the appearance of a more overt pursuit of its regional and global interests could prompt the United States to strengthen its alliances and form other groupings to counterbalance and deter China’s international outreach. Such a development could fetter China’s economic growth.
***Reunification Adv
Reunification Inevitable
Korean unification is inevitable – it’s a question of what the US does to prepare for it. This will decide the WOT and the global economy
Parker 03 – U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
Recently, top aides to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the United States should consider reducing its military presence in Korea—without abandoning its responsibility to protect a close ally. They argue that with the tremendous capabilities provided by modern technology, coupled with a much more powerful South Korea military, an opportunity exists to drawdown forces.1 According to many, Korean unification is no longer a question of “if”, but simply “when”. 2 Once it occurs, there will be demands from both sides of the Pacific for reduction, or complete withdrawal, of US forces from Korea. Although North Korea’s public admission of a nuclear weapon program3 causes immediate concern, the greater issue may be whether a unified Korea maintains a nuclear weapon capability—or, whether Japan heads in that direction.
While a unified Korea eliminates the long standing conflict on the peninsula, it will still be surrounded by several powerful neighbors, all of which happen to be critical partners in the global economy. Also, in the WOT the United States requires the assistance of many allies and friends for basing, transit through sovereign territory, and resource commitment in places far from America.
Korean unification is inevitable – 2010 is the beginning of the process
Parker 03 – U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
There are many theories concerning the timing and method of Korean unification. They run from one end of the scale, a final war between North and South to the opposite end, a peaceful merging. Most experts agree, however, that the timing is probably in a window from 2010 to 2025 and that the turbulent process will take many years at tremendous cost.27 Plans already exist to deal with the full-scale war scenario and require significant U.S. military presence. Therefore, this paper will assume a more peaceful transition to unification—which implies a more difficult argument for continued U.S. military presence. Any scenario will be based on North Korea absorbed by South Korea, which will have severe implications on existing United States-Korean security command relationships.28 Also, Korean unification in the next two or three decades will bring significant changes to their military, economy, and relationships with other regional powers.
Withdrawal => Re-unification
Withdrawal is crucial to national independence – key to re-unification and peace between North and South Korea
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 7 (9/15/07, "North Korea: US withdrawal from South leads to ‘national independence’", lexis)
Noting that national independence is the basic principle and stand which should be adhered to in the struggle for solving problems of the nation and carving out its destiny, the article goes on: Strict adherence to the principle and stand of national independence makes it possible to properly settle the problems of the nation and successfully carve out its destiny.
The history of the Korean nation teaches a bitter lesson that a nation can survive and achieve development and prosperity only when it protects independence.
The Korean nation had been subject to the miserable colonial slavery, deprived of the country by outsiders.
The South Korean people are drawing the same bitter lesson from having experienced all sorts of national humiliation and disgrace under the foreign military occupation that came on the heels of the Japanese imperialists' colonial rule.
Adherence to the principle of national independence is a lifeline in accomplishing the cause of the country's reunification, the greatest task of the nation.
The Korean nation greeted the June 15 era of reunification in which the dynamic movement for national reconciliation, cooperation and independent reunification is under way under the banner of national independence, the banner of "By our nation itself." This reality clearly proves that the road of national independence is the only way for the Korean nation to follow.
It presents itself as the most important matter in the Koreans' struggle to firmly adhere to the stand of attaching importance to the nation.
It is impossible for the Koreans to achieve the national independence and the country's reunification and live in peace as long as the US forces are allowed to resort to all sorts of arbitrary practices and infringe upon the dignity, sovereignty and interests of the Korean nation. All the Koreans are called upon to wage a fiercer struggle to drive the US forces out of South Korea, bearing deep in mind that the withdrawal of the US forces guarantees the national independence and the survival of the Korean nation.
Withdrawal => Chinese Involvement in Reunification
U.S. withdrawal key to responsible Chinese involvement in reunification
Nguyen, 09 (10/13/09, Peter Van, Upiasa, “U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification”. )
Sydney, Australia — The United States and South Korea recently agreed on a contingency plan in case the North Korean government collapses. The plan includes joint military operations to control the influx of refugees and to secure the North’s nuclear weapons. It also outlines the reunification of the two Koreas under a liberal and democratic leadership, with the cooperation of China. The United States believes that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region.
Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each other’s territories, which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale war.
For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged.
Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps China’s ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, China’s growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. The question is, will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat.
The United States may not withdraw its troops, as that would leave a strategic vacuum. It would risk losing influence over Korea to China, whose economy is touted to race ahead of that of the United States.
Although complete U.S. withdrawal would be ideal, an alternative would be to allow China to set up bases in the northern part of Korea, similar to Kyrgyzstan allowing Russia and China to set up bases to ease their concerns over the U.S. military presence.
This would have its challenges, however, and might increase the chances of military confrontation. But regardless of the implications and consequences, the United States will hesitate to remove its bases. China would probably ask for a U.S. troop withdrawal as a precondition to the reunification of the two Korea’s under a liberal and democratic government.
Withdrawal => Reduced Chinese Control
Accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops linked with transfer of operational control in 2012 strengthens U.S.-ROK alliance and decrease China’s influence
Coghlan 08 – U.S. Colonel (David Coghlan, “Prospects From Korean Reunification,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008, )
Better engagement will also be required toward South Korea, where Washington should strive to improve its image, ideally at the expense of China’s influence. In the short term, this means listening to South Korean concerns and addressing them in a timely and decisive manner. Particular areas that should be resolved are the emotional “rub” points that fuel anti-American feelings. One such area is the tension over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Seoul that many South Koreans believe treats them unfairly. By amending the agreement and paying rent for the bases the United States occupies,95 Washington could start to repair its somewhat tarnished image. On a related issue, Washington could propose an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula (that could be linked to the already agreed to decision to transfer the operational control of ROK forces to Seoul in April 2012).96 Such measures may, although not great in the larger picture, remove some of the irritants in the U.S.-ROK relationship.
Chinese Control of Reunified Korea Bad
A unified Korea under Chinese control causes Japanese rearmament and reduces U.S. power projection into Northeast Asia
Parker 03 – U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
Once conflict on the Korean peninsula is over, there will be a large outcry from Congress and the American people to “bring the troops home”. The final decision, of course, will rest with the administration at that time, but much can be done to lay the groundwork for a changed U.S. military presence in a unified Korea. First, consider a future Northeast Asia with no U.S. presence in Korea, or Japan. Korea would have to reassure Japan of its nuclear-free intentions to prevent proliferation. Concern in both countries that the U.S. may not maintain its protective nuclear umbrella could have the same effect. Also, without U.S. presence to underscore U.S. resolve, Korea may look to China as a guarantor of their security concerns. The threat of a unified Korea under China’s umbrella could cause rearmament in Japan.49 Regardless of these effects, the U.S. will have a smaller voice in regional affairs—particularly in regard to economic issues—and little ability to rapidly project forces into, or through, the Northeast Asian region. The question should not be whether or not the U.S. maintains a military presence in a unified Korea, but rather the form that it takes. A modified U.S. presence in both Korea and Japan should be addressed in terms of basing, forces/capabilities, and command relationships.
The US must proactively change the alliance with South Korea to prevent Chinese intervention and the formation of two competing blocs
Coghlan 08 – U.S. Colonel (David Coghlan, “Prospects From Korean Reunification,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008, )
Of the four reunification scenarios, given current trends only war will deliver to Washington any real likelihood of a dominant position on the unified peninsula. The other three options, especially should China choose to unilaterally intervene in the North, are far more likely to result in a Korea tilted toward Beijing. Time is also in China’s favor: the further into the future the reunification occurs, the stronger the Chinese position is likely to be, while conversely, the relative U.S. strength in the region is likely to decline over time. Therefore the prognosis for U.S. long-term interests on the peninsula (and by extension the region) is not particularly rosy. If events stay true to their current course, a dramatic change to the Northeast Asian strategic landscape is likely with the rise of China, possibly resulting in a “U.S.–led maritime bloc with Japan as a critical partner . . . balanced against a China-led continental bloc that could include Russia and possibly unified Korea.”88 If the United States wishes to regain the initiative and delay or even reverse such an outcome, Washington must become far more proactive and implement a range of measures to prove to South Korea that the United States is a better long-term alliance option than China.
Chinese Control of Reunified Korea Bad
China is dedicated to keeping North Korea propped up and will intervene in North Korea to implement its form of re-unification. South Korea is shifting to China as the regional hegemon.
Coghlan, 08 – U.S. Colonel (David Coghlan, “Prospects From Korean Reunification,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008, )
CHINA: GAINING THE UPPER HAND
To China, North Korea serves as a strategic buffer against the U.S. ROK alliance. As such, Beijing is committed to the indefinite existence of North Korea and, despite outward support for the peace process, has little interest in reunification.67 Reunification by war would be a worst case outcome for China. The result of such a conflict would most likely be a unified peninsula aligned to the United States, with the possibility of increased Japanese influence in the region. At the same time, Beijing would have to deal with an expected influx of North Korean refugees68 and the immediate redirection of South Korean investment from China into the reconstruction of the North.69 It comes as no surprise, then, that China remains committed to indefinite status quo on the peninsula, that reunification is in the (remote) future, and to be achieved as President Jiang Zemin has noted, through “dialogues and negotiations, and [China] will, as always continue to work actively for the maintenance of peace and stability on the Peninsula.”70 To achieve this, Beijing will have to continue to prop up Pyongyang, and although the cost of ensuring the status quo will be significant, it will be far less than the realization of China’s worst case reunification scenario. 9
Such an approach reflects Beijing’s broader policy objectives that seek a multipolar world where it gains prominence and influence, ideally as the power and authority of the United States wane.71 Within the Korean region, it can be assumed that “an unstated goal of Chinese Diplomacy is to separate South Korea from the U.S.-Japan bloc and draw Seoul closer to China.”72 To achieve this, Beijing is pursuing a two-Korea policy in which it seeks to maintain a balance in its relations with Pyongyang and Seoul.73 In the case of North Korea, China underwrites retention of the status quo through economic and other aid. In the South, political and economic relations have expanded rapidly and successfully: bilateral trade consistently grows at an annual rate of around 20 percent,74 and China has recently surpassed the United States to become Korea’s number one trading partner and the primary destination for outgoing Korean investment. Successfully pursuing such policies facilitates the retention of North Korea as a buffer, solidifies a growing financial interdependency with the South, and, in doing so China presents itself to Seoul as a nascent strategic alternative to the U.S. hegemon.75 The change in South Korean public opinion discussed earlier suggests such a shift may be underway.
If the retention of the status quo on the peninsula suits Beijing for the indefinite future, will China ever facilitate or support reunification? Due to the many variables involved, Beijing may have little choice. In the long term, Beijing may be faced with the possibility of a nationalistic and unified Korea allied to the United States with the unwanted prospect of “another noncompliant power (like Vietnam) on its . . . flank with a competing ideological and social system.”76 To further complicate such an outcome, a unified and emboldened Korea may pursue latent historical territorial claims against China.77
If China considers such a scenario unacceptable to its interests or if the price of underwriting North Korea becomes too much, Beijing may decide to act to protect its interests78 and secure its influence on the peninsula. If China decided to unilaterally intervene in North Korea and was successful, Beijing would maintain its strategic buffer, control the status quo between the North and South, and be in a position to allow reunification on its terms. In doing so, China would put itself in an extremely strong position to shape the future of not only Korea but also the wider strategic landscape. Triggers for such an intervention could include: “if a teetering North Korea signals a readiness to tilt toward Beijing in exchange for enhanced economic and political support”79 to stave off imminent collapse; to prevent a North Korean initiated war; and to prevent or stop internal North Korean instability that may escalate to wider conflict.80 Once the DPRK was under effective control, Beijing would have two broad options: introduce Chinese economic (and other) reforms to preserve North Korea as a permanent strategic buffer; or work toward eventual reunification in cooperation with Seoul, but on Beijing’s terms. Although by no means likely, the possibility of such an intervention cannot be discounted and with suggestions that “many Chinese analysts argue that North Korea has become more of a liability than an asset to China, and that regime change there would suit China’s interests,”81 a further deterioration in Pyongyang-Beijing relations may prompt China to consider such an option.
***Succession ADV
SUCCESSION ADV – 1AC
Advantage _____ is Succession Politics
A massive power struggle is underway in North Korea – warring factions will facilitate several avenues for conflict
Bandow, 6/9 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (6/9/10, Doug, The Daily Caller, “Confronting North Korea: Who’s in charge?”, JMP)
We see through a glass darkly, said the Apostle Paul, and that is certainly the case when it comes to North Korea. Power appears to be shifting as the Supreme People’s Assembly meets in Pyongyang.
The premier has been replaced. Three other ministers were replaced. Six vice premiers were added. And Kim’s brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek, was elevated to the vice chairmanship of the National Defense Commission, the true fount of power in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
All of these moves were orchestrated by “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il, whose power has never seemed in doubt. The switch in prime ministers may reflect an attempt to boost the economy after a botched currency exchange last fall. One of the other ministerial changes covers foodstuffs—amid rumors of worsening food shortages.
But Chang’s move may be the most important, since he is seen as Kim’s closest ally who managed the affairs of state when Kim was recovering from a stroke. Chang also has been tasked with helping to manage the anointment of Kim’s 28-year-old son, Kim Jong-un, as the latter’s successor.
Adding mystery to the latest moves were three other recent leadership changes. In April a top party official was said to have died of a heart attack. In May a member of the NDC was said to have retired because of his age, 80, even though plenty of other aging officials hold top positions. And last week a senior official in the Korean Worker’s Party—a rival of Chang’s who also was reportedly entrusted with smoothing the transfer of power—was said to have died in a car accident.
All plausible explanations. But all equally plausible covers for a power struggle.
There never would be a good time for instability in North Korea. The heavily armed regime continues with its nuclear program. It has been pulling back in its modest economic liberalization of recent years. In April the DPRK apparently sank the Cheonan, a South Korean warship, the North’s first deadly act of war in more than two decades.
Since then the Republic of Korea has cut economic ties and barred Pyongyang’s ships from South Korean waters. The North reciprocated by closing, or at least saying that it intended to close, the Kaesong industrial park, in which ROK companies employ North Korean workers.
Hostile rhetoric has filled the air, but no one really wants war. Although the DPRK has made brinkmanship its principal negotiating strategy, Pyongyang knows that it would lose any conflict. Even when it comes to whatever nuclear capability Kim Jong-il has developed—miniaturizing weapons and developing delivery systems are not easy—deterrence works. He and his cohorts want their virgins (and liquor) in this life, not the next.
The Cheonan’s sinking, while not likely to lead to war, does provide several important geopolitical lessons.
First, there may be serious, potentially destabilizing internal regime conflicts which are currently hidden. Theories abound about the sinking of the Cheonan, including rogue military act to block better relations with the West and officially sanctioned policy to win military support for Kim Jong-un’s succession. The recently announced personnel shifts only deepen the mystery.
Second, the ROK’s military, despite supposedly possessing maritime superiority, must focus more on national defense. Seoul has been grandly thinking of an increased regional and even global military role. But when the North can use a midget-sub, as one theory runs, to sink a South Korean ship in South Korean waters, the Lee government must focus on its most important responsibility, safeguarding the nation.
Third, the U.S.-ROK alliance has outlived its usefulness. The South is well-able to defend itself, with some 40 times the DPRK’s GDP and twice the DPRK’s population. There’s no reason for Washington, which faces a deficit of $1.6 trillion this year, to borrow money for the privilege of defending South Korea, which is well able to spend much more on its military if circumstances require.
Fourth, there’s no reason to expect a “soft landing” in the North. The existing regime has demonstrated enormous resilience, both in surviving crisis and in resisting change. However, it took Kim Il-sung, who won control with Soviet aid at the North’s founding in 1949, decades to transfer power to his son, Kim Jong-il. The latter is in ill health and probably doesn’t have nearly as much time to orchestrate a similar transfer. The result could be a messy power struggle on Kim’s death, with, in addition to Kim Jong-un, two other sons, a brother-in-law, a younger half-brother, past and present wives, various illegitimate children, and any number of officials who have been waiting years, even decades, for their chance to gain control.
Finally, the key to solving the “North Korean problem” is China. Shortly after the sinking of the Cheonan Kim Jong-il scurried off to the PRC, apparently with his chosen son in tow. Today Beijing provides the DPRK with the bulk of its food and energy. Until now the Chinese leadership has believed that pushing Kim too hard risked the stability of the peninsula. But if Kim is willing to commit an act of war against the South, his regime is the real source of dangerous regional instability. The PRC would be serving its own interest if it acted to neuter Pyongyang.
It’s hard to believe, but the situation in North Korea could get worse. Imagine a weak collective leadership after Kim’s death dissolving into warring factions as competing officials looked to their favorite Kim relative or army general. Imagine burgeoning civil strife, growing public hardship, and mass refugee flows. Or violence flowing across the Yalu River to the north and demilitarized zone to the south.
Washington’s best policy would be to step back from this geopolitical miasma. Any map demonstrates which countries have the most at stake in a stable Korean peninsula: South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. It is time for them to take the lead. America could help as they search for a solution. But North Korea truly is their problem far more than Washington’s problem.
Succession Adv – 1ac
Succession politics makes provocations more likely and dangerous and crushes the chance of effective engagement to rollback North Korea’s nuclear program
Bandow, 09 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (7/29/09, Doug, “Kim’s Heir,”
, JMP)
President George W. Bush famously said that he “loathed” North Korea’s Kim Jong-il. Yet the United States might come to miss the brutal dictator, with his abundant gut and bouffant hair. Resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis through diplomacy was never going to be easy; with an impending leadership change in Pyongyang, diplomatic solutions are likely to become near impossible.
Reports suggest that Kim Jong-il may have pancreatic cancer; some analysts predict he could die within the year. Since the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established in 1948, only two men have held supreme power: Kim Il-sung, who died at age eighty-two in 1994, and his son, Kim Jong-il. The monarchical succession from the former to the latter faced opposition at home and in China, the DPRK’s closest ally, but Kim Jong-il’s rise to power was carefully orchestrated by his father in a process that took more than two decades. Who now will take the throne?
North Korea has evolved into the modern equivalent of the Ottoman Empire. “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung was married twice and had many other relationships. Kim Jong-il apparently has had four wives or long-term mistresses. The result has been several children from different spouses as well as a number of illegitimate children.
Family members have played a significant role in the regime. Kim Jong-il faced political competition from his uncle, Kim Yong-ju, who eventually was sidelined by Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-il also pushed aside his younger half-brother, Kim Pyong-il, who since 1979 has been posted as ambassador to several European nations, keeping him out of domestic North Korean politics. When the elder Kim died in July 1994, Kim Jong-il appeared to face little opposition to taking control.
Until Kim Jong-il fell ill, he appeared to give little thought to his succession. However, STRATFOR’s Roger Baker believes that Kim “has a very strong fear that after he dies, if the country changes direction, that his family may be on the receiving end of vigilantism or punished or killed.” That’s plausible, though Kim may simply desire to cement his legacy by choosing someone who would have little choice but to venerate Kim’s rule. Observes Atsuhito Isozaki of Tokyo’s Keio University: “Since Kim had a stroke last year, North Korea appears to be in a hurry in naming his successor.” Earlier this year Kim apparently designated twenty-six year-old Kim Jong-un, his youngest son, as his heir.
Reports indicate that Kim Jong-un was recently shifted from his position at the Korean Workers’ Party to the National Defense Commission (NDC). Party and military officials have been tasked with promoting the younger Kim, jokingly referred to by some observers as “Cute Leader”; he is being called “Brilliant Comrade” and “Commander Kim” by the North’s media. Open Radio for North Korea reports that diplomats and military leaders have been informed of his new status and promotional efforts have been launched, including party and military propaganda campaigns.
Reports are circulating that the succession may be confirmed at an upcoming party conference in October of this year or next. Another theory is that the process may be formalized in 2012, the centenary of the birth of Kim Il-sung.
Kim Jong-un is a virtual unknown outside of North Korea. Only one photo of him exists, taken when he attended the International School in Bern, Switzerland. During his two years there he apparently demonstrated some proficiency in English, French, and German, enjoyed skiing and watching Hollywood action movies, and favored the National Basketball Association. Classmates say he showed no political interest, though he was only in his mid-teens then.
However, unless Kim Jong-il survives and rules for at least several years, the younger Kim is unlikely to have an easy a time claiming his political inheritance in a culture that typically reveres age—and in which potential rivals are many. The regime number two appears to be the elder Kim’s brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek, who disappeared in a purge a few years ago but recently reemerged. Kim Jong-il recently named Jang to the NDC.
Jang is only four years younger than Kim and his independent authority is hard to assess. Jang, backed by the NDC’s O Kuk-ryol and Kim Yong-chun, is thought to have been tasked to act as Kim Jong-un’s principal mentor. However, he might not be satisfied playing a secondary role in the event of Kim Jong-il’s death.
Many other senior officials have been waiting for years and even decades to take charge. Their loyalty to Kim Jong-il might not survive his death. Especially since there are more than a few Kim family members available to front for competing factions.
For instance, Kim Jong-il’s oldest son is thirty-eight year-old Kim Jong-nam, who apparently fell into disgrace after he was discovered traveling on a forged passport while attempting to enter Japan in order to visit Tokyo Disneyland. He now lives in Macau. Although he seems out of the power equation and in a television interview voiced his support for Kim Jong-un, reports recently surfaced that his supporters were being purged and that Kim Jong-un’s aides organized an assassination plot, busted by China. (If true, this would seem to mimic the Ottoman practice of new sultans eradicating male family members who could challenge their ascension.)
Kim Jong-un has an older brother, Kim Jong-chol. Their mother, Ko Yong-hui, is said to have been Kim Jong-il’s favorite wife. Before she died of cancer in 2004 she reportedly was promoting both sons as potential heirs. The twenty-eight year-old Kim Jong-chol is supposedly sickly and viewed as effeminate by his father. Nevertheless, he apparently runs the Party Leadership Department, traditionally a critical position. However, some of the department’s functions apparently have been transferred to Jang. Although Kim Jong-chol has formally pledged to support his younger brother, that could change and the former could be used by a competing faction.
Kim Jong-il’s current wife/mistress, Kim Ok, and her relatives, though currently unimportant politically, also conceivably could play a role in providing a family connection in any ensuing power struggle. So could Kim Pyong-il, Kim Jong-il’s half-brother who is currently serving as the DPRK’s ambassador to Poland. More distant family members are not likely to dominate the North’s political future, but still might play a role in any factional struggle.
How this international soap opera will turn out is anyone’s guess. But it could have a significant impact on Pyongyang’s relations with the rest of the world—and not for the better.
Given the horrors perpetuated by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, it is hard to imagine the situation getting worse in the DPRK. However, overt factionalism, a brutal power struggle, and political instability would add an incendiary element to peninsula affairs. Observes Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence: “Any time you have a combination of this behavior of doing provocative things in order to excite a response—plus succession questions—you have a potentially dangerous mixture.”
At the very least, an insecure leader, weak collective rule, and/or a de facto military government all likely would make North Korean concessions on the nuclear issue even less likely. A new, more responsible and forward-looking regime—one that recognized real international influence requires significant reform—might eventually emerge. However, counting on that result would let hope trump experience.
The United States should continue diplomatic efforts, both bilateral and multilateral. Moreover, Washington should intensify its efforts to engage China in a concerted campaign to pressure Pyongyang and/or seek to effect regime change. At the same time, however, policy makers must realistically assess the future. The United States and North Korea’s neighbors had better prepare for the possibility of an even more unsettled and dangerous future.
Succession Adv – 1ac
Kim Jong Un needs to score some political victories to ensure a stable succession process – right now he is using military provocations to try and win support of the military
Lee, 10 (5/27/10, Jean H., writer for the Associated Press, The Associated Press, “Analysis: Attack May Be Tied to NKorean Succession”, )
Young, inexperienced and virtually unknown even at home, Kim Jong Un needs at least a few political victories under his belt if he is to succeed his father as leader of communist North Korea.
The sinking of a South Korean warship may well have provided Kim Jong Il's 20-something son and rumored heir with a victory that would bolster his support within the communist country's military, a million-man force in need of a boost after a November sea battle left one North Korean sailor dead.
North Korea has vehemently denied involvement in the torpedo attack that sank the Cheonan near the Koreas' sea border in March, killing 46 sailors in one of the boldest attacks on the South since the Korean War of the 1950s.
The timing might seem inexplicable: After a year of intransigence, North Korea seemed willing and ready to return to nuclear disarmament talks.
But North Korea has never seen violence and negotiation as incompatible, and domestic issues a succession movement and military discontent may be more urgent than foreign policy.
North Korea's leaders tightly control information and thrive on myths and lies. However, they cannot hide that the nation is in turmoil, struggling to build its shattered economy and to feed its 24 million people. The number of defectors is rising, and the encroachment of the outside world, through videos and films smuggled from China, has shown citizens what lies beyond the so-called Hermit Kingdom's borders.
Kim Jong Il, now 68, is ailing. North Korea has never confirmed that he suffered a stroke in 2008, but his sudden weight loss last year and the persistent paralysis that has left him with a slight limp was visible during his rare trip to China last month.
None of his three sons has had the benefit of the more than a decade of grooming Kim had by the time he took over after his father Kim Il Sung's death in 1994, and the regime says it is determined to usher in a "stronger, prosperous" era in 2012, the centenary of the patriarch's birth.
Any change in leadership has the potential to be traumatic and tumultuous. A bold attack would be a quick way to muster support and favor in a country where one in 20 citizens is in the military.
North Korea has attacked the South a number of times, despite the 1953 truce that ended the devastating Korean War. South Korea has never retaliated militarily, mindful of the toll another war would have on the Korean peninsula.
The North's deadliest attack was a bomb smuggled aboard a Korean Air flight, which was decimated over the Andaman Sea in 1987, killing 115 people on board.
A North Korean agent captured in connection with that plot said the mastermind was Kim Jong Il, then a few years shy of taking over as leader.
Pyongyang has never admitted to any of the post-truce attacks and may have counted on little proof being uncovered when it sent a submarine loaded with a torpedo into the choppy Yellow Sea on March 26.
But the distinctively North Korean script scrawled on the inside of a torpedo fragment found during the investigation, among other evidence, was a damning fingerprint.
The Cheonan was a symbolic target: The 1,200-ton frigate was involved in a 1999 skirmish between the two Koreas that the South claims killed as many as 30 North Koreans.
North Korea disputes the western sea border drawn by U.N. at the close of the Korean War, and those waters have been the site of two other bloody battles since 1999: a firefight in 2002 that killed six South Koreans, and a clash just last November that Seoul says killed a North Korean sailor.
The North Korean navy was ripe for revenge. And defectors say it may have needed a boost, since even relatively well-fed military leaders in a regime built around a "military-first" policy had been going hungry in recent years.
Not long after the November skirmish, the regime enacted sweeping currency reforms. North Koreans were ordered to exchange a limited amount of bills for a new currency, and to turn the rest over to the government a move that effectively wiped out any personal savings.
The reforms were a disaster. There were reports of riots and unrest previously a rarity in totalitarian North Korea. If it was a move to showcase the young, Swiss-educated son's economic acumen, it was a miscalculation.
The submarine attack, however, was a stealth move. North Korea's outdated arsenal cannot match South Korea's state-of-the-art systems, but the slow-moving sub somehow went undetected by Seoul's sophisticated radars.
Regardless of who ordered the attack, credit for it may have been circulated among top military commanders to build support for the fledging heir apparent, already reportedly dubbed the "Brilliant Comrade."
To the broader public, the North characterizes blame for the attack as a smear campaign instigated by the South.
And that suits the regime's purposes just fine. There's nothing like a mortal enemy to rally the masses in North Korea, a reclusive state built on the philosophy of "juche," or self-reliance.
Washington and Seoul are leading the effort to haul Pyongyang back before the U.N. Security Council for more sanctions or, at the very least, censure. Even that may play right into the Brilliant Comrade's political plans.
In the past, the North has used its position as the bad boy of the nuclear world to behave even more badly. Missile tests in 2006 were followed by a nuclear test, its first. And last year, Security Council condemnation was followed just a month later by the regime's second atomic test.
International criticism could provide the North with the opening to carry out a third test that would move the regime closer to its goal of perfecting an atomic bomb small enough to mount on a long-range missile. It would be another accomplishment for North Koreans to celebrate, and another achievement for the son to claim.
It remains to be seen if and when Kim Jong Il will present his youngest son, a figure so enigmatic that his birthday, age and even his face remain a mystery, to the public as his heir-apparent.
The annual gathering of North Korea's rubber-stamp parliament came and went in April without any sign of either the elder Kim, known as the Dear Leader, or the Brilliant Comrade. A rare extraordinary session has been scheduled for June 7.
If the precocious prodigal son did indeed plot the attack that plunged inter-Korean relations to their lowest point in a decade and sent world leaders into a huddle on how to avert war, he may finally have a reason to make his political debut.
Succession Adv – 1ac
Even if the succession process goes smoothly, regime collapse is still inevitable which will destabilize the region
Meyers, 10 – professor at Dongseo University in South Korea (3/26/10, B.R. Meyers, “ North Korea on the Edge; If the regime collapses, will the rest of the world be ready?” )
As for tensions with the south, they rose again Friday with the sinking of a South Korean naval ship near a disputed maritime border with North Korea, although it wasn't immediately clear what had caused the sinking or if North Korean vessels were involved.
The latest incident comes days after a conference in which some experts described the Kim dictatorship as being in the first stage of collapse. Americans should be paying attention: If North Korea decides to go out in a blaze of nuclear glory—and its current penchant for kamikaze rhetoric suggests it might—the enormous number of casualties would likely include many of the U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. But even a less-apocalyptic form of collapse could destabilize the entire region. Those South Korean experts might be wrong in their predictions, but the regime seems increasingly unlikely to last out the decade, even if the planned hand-off of power to the Dear Leader's son Kim Jong Eun goes off without a hitch.
The economy is only part of the problem. North Koreans endured far worse deprivation during the 1990s famine without flagging in their support for the regime. This brings us back to that wall poster, and to the regime's real crisis, which is more ideological in nature than economic.
The information cordon that once encircled North Korea is in tatters. Police in the northern provinces try in vain to crack down on the use of Chinese cellphones; citizens circumvent tracking devices by making brief calls from mountains and forests—sometimes to defectors as far away as the U.S. In provinces along the demilitarized zone, many citizens watch South Korean television. Even in Pyongyang, people listen to BBC or Voice of America radio, or view online news surreptitiously at companies with Internet access.
What the masses are learning is incompatible with their decades-old sense of a sacred racial mission. They have known since the 1990s that their living standard is much lower than South Korea's. The gap was explained away with reference to the sacrifices needed to build up the military. What the North Koreans are only now realizing, however—and this is more important—is that their brethren in the "Yankee colony" have no desire to live under Kim Jong Il. In 2007, after all, they elected the pro-American candidate to the South Korean presidency. Why, then, should the northerners go on sacrificing in order to liberate people who don't want to be liberated? Unable to answer this question, the regime in desperation has resorted to the most reckless propaganda campaign in its history.
This "strong and prosperous country" campaign is nothing less than an effort to persuade the masses that economic life will change drastically by 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Great Leader Kim Il Sung, the father of Kim Jong Il. The official media have dubbed 2010 a "year of radical transformation" that will "open the gate to a thriving nation without fail in 2012." On TV news shows, uniformed students smile into just-delivered computers, and housewives tearfully thank the Leader for new apartments. The media predict even greater triumphs "without fail" for next year. The Juche calendar—which starts with Kim Il Sung's birth year of 1912, from one and not zero—numbers 2011 as year 100, and thus hugely significant.
Yet while posters show soldiers and workers arm in arm, refugees describe a sharp rise in public resentment of an army that often steals from farms and factories to feed itself. Refugees are just as credible when they report of a severe fertilizer shortage. The party has responded by demanding that apartment blocks deliver ever more human waste. Alas, the residents don't eat enough to meet the demand.
Such misery prevailed in the mid-1990s too, but at least then the regime admitted an economic crisis, even as it mostly blamed the Yankees. Now it talks of a country transforming itself from one year to the next. No dictatorship can afford to lie so stupidly to its people, or to raise public expectations that will be dashed in a matter of months.
Unlike the East Germany of old, North Korea lacks the high walls, incorruptible border guards and surveillance technology needed to keep an entire populace in lockdown. Reports of demonstrations against the currency reform may have been exaggerated, but the belated decision to increase the amount of exchangeable currency shows there must have been unrest of some sort. It also indicates that the regime lacks the will to crush it in Tiananmen-style fashion. Kim Jong Il must either find new ways to inspire his people or watch ever more of them cross into China.
But this isn't the only domestic crisis facing the Dear Leader. An increasingly infirm 68 years old (69 according to some outside experts), he is already way behind schedule in preparing his son's takeover. It was hard enough for the masses to accept the last hereditary succession in 1994; the official media must still hammer home the message that the Dear Leader was his father's only choice for the post. It will be infinitely harder to install Kim Jong Eun, who even now could walk down a Pyongyang street without being recognized. So the succession process will have to start in earnest by 2012, just as the "strong and prosperous country" campaign is falling on its face.
How will the regime try to survive this looming "perfect storm" of ideological crises? Likely by seeking to ratchet up some diversionary tension with the outside world. Making this especially probable is the nascent glorification of Kim Jong Eun as a general in his father's image. He thus needs a perceived military triumph of his own. (Kim Jong Il came to power in 1994 as the hero whose show of nuclear resolve had brought Jimmy Carter on a surrender mission to Pyongyang.) Last year's nuclear and ballistic provocations have set the bar higher for the regime, perhaps too high. This is the problem with deriving national pride almost exclusively from a nuclear program: The saber can only be rattled, and rattling gets old.
Whether the leadership opts for a bigger military provocation, and pushes its luck too far, or just tries to muddle through, with an inexorable decline of public support, the outlook for the country's survival has never been bleaker. Regime change? Out of the question. The Kim clan is inextricable with North Korean identity. A homegrown Gorbachev would find it impossible to shift focus from the military to the economy. Why should people toil under the North Korean flag in the hope of attaining a lifestyle that South Koreans enjoyed a quarter-century ago? Why not unify at once, and live in the system that has already proved itself?
[CONTINUED]
Succession Adv – 1ac
[CONTINUED]
In view of all this, one can only hope that the region's main powers are making more serious and thorough preparations for a North Korean regime collapse than they have so far let on. The effort to downplay the relevant contingency planning is of course understandable. It is hard enough for the Americans to get North Korea back to nuclear arms talks without admitting that they are readying for its demise. (Kim Jong Il can't have forgotten that Washington once promised him light-water reactors in the confidence that he wouldn't be around long enough to get them.)
As for the South Korean government, it doesn't want to frighten its own people, who seem reluctant even to discuss the possibility of German-style unification. Leaks about official contingency plans—refugee camps safely removed from Seoul, for example—seem intended to reassure everyone that unification will proceed almost imperceptibly slowly. The Chinese, for their part, have no choice but to deny that the thought of regime collapse in Pyongyang has even crossed their mind.
And yet if Western press reports are any indication, it is Beijing's future role that most troubles American planners. In 2007, a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the U.S. Institute of Peace warned that "if the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability.'' The possibility has Seoul worried too.
In reading about these contingency plans, one senses a general optimism that North Korea will not go down fighting. Here, too, as so often in the world's dealings with Pyongyang, there is a strong tendency to extrapolate from late Cold War history—to presume that these "hardline Stalinists" will be rational enough not to do anything suicidal. But this has never been a Stalinist state. The orthodox worldview is a paranoid, race-based nationalism with intellectual roots in fascist Japan.
Related
Downed South Korea Ship Spurs Questions
Since the East Bloc crumbled away in the early 1990s, North Korea has shown its true ideological colors ever more clearly. Last year it even deleted the word communism from the national constitution, elevating "military first" socialism to the country's guiding principle instead. At the same time it has made ever more extensive use of kamikaze terms and slogans ("Let us become human bombs in defense of the leader") taken almost verbatim from Pacific War propaganda. The official media routinely mock the leaders of the old East Bloc for giving up "without firing a shot," and vow that "there can be no world without [North] Korea."
The possibility of a violent, potentially apocalyptic regime collapse in North Korea within the decade is one that all countries with an interest in the region should keep in mind. They should also be more conscious of the internal ideological contradictions that make the country's long-term survival impossible. If North Korea must collapse anyway, it makes no sense for China to prolong things; the leadership will only go out with a bigger bang when the day finally comes. As for Americans, we should focus our contingency planning on a worst-case nuclear scenario instead of fretting about Beijing's role on a post-Kim peninsula. A Chinese occupation of North Korea should be the least of our worries.
Succession Adv – 1ac
U.S. presence and continued Chinese intransigence on North Korea risks superpower conflict
Emmott, 10 – Independent writer and consultant on international affairs and former editor of The Economist (5/31/10, Bill, The Sunday Times, “China’s stance on North Korea could lead to war,” , JMP)
Try this quiz. You lead a rising economic superpower, with ambitions for global political power. You have pledged to pursue a “peaceful rise” and to work through the United Nations wherever possible to maintain international stability. Out of the blue, your unruly neighbour, an ally and quasi-dependant for the past 60 years, torpedoes a warship of its own neighbour, killing 46 sailors, and then, when accused of this crime, threatens all-out war. What do you do?
Virtually nothing, is China’s answer so far, for that is the superpower and the neighbour is North Korea. Officially, Chinese leaders are still “reviewing the evidence” presented by an international team that was asked by South Korea to investigate the sinking in March of the Cheonan, evidence that has convinced virtually everyone else that a North Korean torpedo was to blame.
A faraway country of which we know little, is what many are tempted to say of Kim Jong Il’s northeast Asian enclave, paraphrasing Neville Chamberlain’s notorious line about Czechoslovakia in 1938. The North Koreans have a long history of outrageous behaviour, from killing most of the South Korean Cabinet on a visit to Rangoon in 1983, to living off counterfeiting and cigarette-smuggling, to firing missiles over Japan, to testing nuclear weapons twice in the past four years. Recently, in negotiations they have mostly proved to have been after something, and have scuttled back into their “Hermit Kingdom” when they got it.
That is why much of the attention given to the Cheonan sinking and the threats of war since March has been devoted to working out what the North Koreans might be up to. Are they after something again, is a succession battle under way, or was the sinking just a mistake? Beyond a few flutters in the stock markets, especially in Asia, much of the world has carried on worrying more about the euro and BP’s oil spill than a new Korean war, despite 2010 being the 60th anniversary of the start of the old one.
It is time to worry rather more, by focusing instead on China and its policy towards North Korea. For what China’s reaction should tell us is that China’s interests in the Korean Peninsula are different from those of the West, of South Korea or of Japan. And in that divergence of interest lies danger: it makes North Korea the likeliest flashpoint for a potential conflict between China and America.
On other issues, the Chinese leadership is widely lauded for its fast and effective decision making — on bulldozing old city centres, for example, or building motorways and power stations, or giving aid to African governments in return for mining rights. Far better than those fusty old democracies, mutter the admirers. So why, we should all be asking, are they so slow to make up their minds about North Korea and its acts and threats of war?
The official line is that China is concerned about stability in North Korea and fears a huge influx of refugees across its long border with that country if Mr Kim’s regime should collapse. A further line, peddled more quietly by Chinese officials, is that China doesn’t really have much influence over those strange, unpredictable Koreans. So all it can do is take part in the six-party talks over North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, an on-off exercise that gathers together America, China, Japan, Russia and the two Koreas, urge everyone to show restraint, and hope for the best.
This line, always pretty thin, is looking ever thinner. The idea that Chinese security forces would not be capable of crowd control in the border region beggars belief. Dealing with refugees might be awkward, and even costly, but as a reason for tolerating military adventurism it is simply not credible. Nor is the notion of Chinese impotence: most of North Korea’s trade is with China, most of its oil supply comes from there, and virtually the only foreign companies in North Korea are Chinese. It would be pretty easy for China to “keep its boot on Kim’s neck”, as Americans like to say these days.
So why doesn’t it? The answer, surely, must be that China prefers to keep North Korea the way it is. Strategically, it provides a buffer against Japan and averts the prospect of a troublesome and eventually powerful unified Korea in the future. This has been the case ever since Mao Zedong sent in Chinese troops to rescue the North during the Korean War of 1950-53. This preference would not matter much as long as the North Korean regime looked basically stable and was a danger principally to its own people. But this is no longer the case.
Imagine what could happen when Kim Jong Il dies — which, being 68 and unhealthy, he might suddenly do. Suppose there is a struggle over the succession, one that could turn bloody, given that North Korea is said to be the world’s most militarised society. America, well aware that North Korea has about half a dozen nuclear warheads, will feel an urgent need to send troops in to seize nuclear materials. South Korea will, like Helmut Kohl in 1989, feel an urgent, historic need to ignore the huge costs and push for unification: the North is family, after all.
And China? My guess is that it would send its troops to the border, and probably across it, “in the interests of stability”, but actually to keep North Korea independent and under Chinese tutelage. The stage would thus be set for the first 21st-century confrontation between two superpowers.
This is one of the biggest risks facing the world. To reduce it, China needs to be engaged in open dialogue about North Korea, its behaviour and, above all, its future. It may not be seemly to discuss what to do when a regime collapses, especially one of an ally, but that is increasingly necessary in the case of the Kim dynasty.
Communication between the Chinese and American militaries remains patchy, with efforts to set up hotlines and the like slow to come to fruition. The chances of a misunderstanding in a moment of tension are high. Communication between the political leaderships is better, if still very stilted. The Cheonan sinking could be the last chance to force China to face up to the fact that its North Korean dependant is not just embarrassing but dangerous, to force it to discuss the future of the Korean Peninsula, to force it to join the 21st century rather than staying stuck in the 1950s. Unless that happens, next time it could really be war.
Succession Adv – 1ac
The plan solves by motivating China and South Korea to effectively influence the leadership transition
Bandow, 08 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (9/15/08, Doug, “Dear Leader Goes South,” , JMP)
Two men have ruled the northern half of the Korean peninsula for sixty-three years. “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung was installed by the Soviets after the peninsula was divided by the victorious powers at the end of World War II. He gradually moved his son, Kim Jong-il, into a central leadership role, and the “Dear Leader” took over after his father’s death in July 1994. But Kim Jong-il has gone missing amid rumors of illness, incapacity, or death. What comes next if the Dear Leader does not reemerge?
North Korea offers a rare example of monarchical communism. The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has the usual attributes of a communist dictatorship: dominant Korean Workers Party, secondary state institutions, and an oversized military. But the DPRK offers a unique twist—amidst a hierarchy filled with anti-Japanese guerrillas, party apparatchiks, and bemedaled generals is an extended family whose members slip in and out of power. At times North Korean politics has the makings of an Ottoman soap opera, with competing wives and families.
Kim Jong-il pushed aside an uncle and younger step-brother in his rise to power. He has three sons by two different wives (whether de jure or de facto no one knows for sure) and a son-in-law. His brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek, disappeared in a purge a few years ago but recently reemerged. Suspected illegitimate children wield political power and make economic deals.
But if Kim is out, the family reign seems over. The Great Leader went to great effort to empower his eldest son. Jong-il first received public mention as the unnamed “party center,” allowing him to shape the communist hierarchy. But Jong-il’s oldest son is in disgrace. His second son is a couple weeks short of his twenty-seventh birthday. The youngest may be the most promising, but Korean culture venerates age and seniority. None of the sons have taken obvious, let alone important, political roles. Jang ranks second in the party hierarchy, but his influence absent Kim Jong-il is hard to assess.
Top officials outside of Kim’s family are closely tied to the two rulers, but are unlikely to offer more than transitional leadership. Number two and de facto head of state Kim Yong-nam (no relation) is nearly eighty-one. The top military leader Jo Myong-rok is Kim’s number two on the National Defense Commission but also is over eighty-two. A better bet might be another, younger general, O Kuk-ryol.
Of course, all speculation will prove irrelevant if Kim reemerges, hail and hearty. But he hasn’t been seen for a month and there is no logical reason for him to miss the North’s sixtith anniversary celebrations. While the political soap opera is entertaining, it could have deadly consequences.
Analysts have long speculated on whether Kim was serious about negotiating away his country’s nuclear program and if he had sufficient authority to impose a pacific policy on the military. The nuclear negotiations recently stalled, with Pyongyang growing more belligerent after Washington refused to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist states. Whether this reflects a routine turn in DPRK negotiating strategy, an increase in military influence, or a problem with Kim Jong-il’s health no one knows.
It’s tempting to believe that things can’t get worse in North Korea, where an unpredictable, brutal personal dictatorship has left the common people to suffer through mass immiseration and starvation. However, by all accounts Kim is intelligent and understands the challenges facing his nation. And it is conceivable, even if not likely, that he has been convinced of the economic and political benefits to be gained from nuclear disarmament.
But if not Kim, then who? Assume his family maintains its hold over power—that might mean continuation of the status quo, though not necessarily. A collective leadership might exercise caution towards the outside world, but that likely would doom the nuclear deal as well as further rapprochement with South Korea. Military dominance could yield a responsible moderate determined to create a more prosperous and less isolated DPRK, but hard-line rule seems far more likely. Think Burma, for instance.
The most frightening scenario would be a violent power struggle and even national collapse. Then the best case would be mass refugee flows to South Korea and China. The worst case would be factional conflict spilling over North Korea’s borders, possibly attracting intervention by the South and China. Japan and Russia also would be vitally concerned in the outcome even if they remained aloof from any fighting.
There’s not much Washington can do as East Asia waits with collective bated breath for confirmation of Kim’s fate. But even if he is alive and well today, a transition will eventually come. And nervous—indeed, panicked—uncertainty is likely to return. Indeed, should the international geopolitical environment worsen, with, say, increased tensions between China and the United States as Beijing’s regional influence grows, a North Korean succession crisis could be even more destabilizing.
The best American strategy would be to get out of the way. Without a cold war raging, South Korea is of little security concern to America. With the ROK enjoying 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea, the South can defend itself. Pull back America’s remaining troops, and Washington could leave dealing with an uncertain leadership transition in Pyongyang to others in the region, most importantly South Korea and China.
Succession Adv – 1ac
Chinese involvement is key to stabilize Korea – prevents violent collapse, military response by South Korea, North Korea nuclearization and allied proliferation
Bandow, 10 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/3/10, Doug, “Taming Pyongyang,” , JMP)
Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer.
Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees.
The PRC has said little about the Cheonan incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an “unfortunate incident.” Beijing’s ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to peace and stability.
The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But even if peace survives, today’s badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord, even without Chinese pressure. There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North’s impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing.
And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North’s ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals.
Beijing should take the lead in forging a new, active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. In fact, a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan’s sinking.
Although few people expect the Koreas to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.
Succession = Conflicts
Succession crisis risks even more conflicts
Foster-Carter 10 – senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, and a freelance consultant, writer and broadcaster on Korean affairs. (6/18/10, Aidan Foster-Carter, “A North Korean leadership car crash” ttp://atimes/Korea/LF18Dg01.html)
Succession is the Achilles' heel of dictatorships, for obvious reasons. In extreme cases, such as North Korea, even contemplating the mortality of the leader is seen as lese-majeste, as if this somehow threatens the quasi-monarch's vaunted omnipotence and implicit immortality.
Yet such an ostrich attitude only makes matters worse. There aren't many certainties about North Korea, but the fact that Kim Jong-il will die is one of them. The only issues are when and how he dies, and what will come after him. The latter needs planning for, right now.
But that is a messy business, which may explain why the Dear Leader has put it off for so long. Designating a successor means passing over others who bridle at the choice. Even having nominal rules, such as male primogeniture in many traditional monarchies, may not stop rival claimants from plotting against the chosen dauphin. Succession is a can of worms, and some may turn.
In that context, I do wonder about Kim Jong-il's daughter, Kim Sol-song, by repute a bright economist. How must she feel at being ruled out by her sex - some revolution! - leaving the field to her three half-brothers, none of them self-evidently top-drawer leadership material?
All this is tricky enough right now. When the Dear Leader finally dies, it will get far worse. Kim Jong-il is a micro-manager, so simply for North Korea to go on functioning will require his immediate replacement at the center of the intricate web of control he has constructed.
But it will not be business as usual for long. As after Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the dictator's death and the vacuum it creates will loosen the crippling constraints of power and terror, at least momentarily. Conflicts hitherto suppressed will burst forth. These are of at least three kinds, which in practice will overlap: personality, policy and the role of outside powers.
Leading North Korea is a poisoned chalice, yet Kim's three sons and others will fight for it - if only for fear of the consequences of losing. Eldest son Kim Jong-nam, now out of the loop in Macau, is said to have been the target of two murder plots already. Think the Borgias.
As for policy, some in Pyongyang realize the present course is a road to nowhere. Reformers like ex-premier Pak Pong-ju - if still with us; he is unmentioned since his sacking in 2007 - surely know North Korea needs to embrace the market and make its peace with the world. So far the hawks rule the roost, but once Kim is gone the doves may fight back.
Then there are the neighbors. If Korean history is any guide, rivals for the throne will seek support from nearby powers. Kim Jong-nam, whose measured if few words suggest a keen mind behind his dire dress sense, is rumored to be China's choice. Beijing yearns for a nice pliant client in Pyongyang, one who would do the sensible thing and stop causing trouble.
Succession = More Belligerence
Succession Politics mean more disturbances will come
Cha, et. al, 10 – Professor Victor Cha, professor at Georgetown University; Co-author, “Nuclear North Korea” (5/31/10, Neal Conan, radio host for NPR, Flatow, NPR, “Tensions Build Between North and South Korea”,
)
Prof. CHA: That's right. That's what most experts believe, that they are in the process of some sort of transition. The North Korean leader, as you mentioned, is not healthy. And it looks like he has three sons, and the third of his sons, the youngest one, who is only in his late 20s, looks to be the one that's been anointed as the successor. So this - if it were to be successfully carried out, would be the third dynastic succession in North Korea. Something in terms of where we are in international relations and on politics is really quite anachronistic. And, yet, because of the nature of the regime, it derives its legitimacy from continuing the family line of succession, ruling over basically an impoverished and mismanaged country.
CONAN: And in the past, during succession, the new ruler took, well, provocative measures to prove to the military and to others, hey, I'm tough, I can stand up to our enemies.
Succession = More Belligerence
North Korean belligerence is facilitated by succession politics
Sang-Hun, 10 – (5/28/10, Choe, The New York Times, “Succession Concerns Drive North Korea, Experts Say,” )
SEOUL, South Korea -- Over the years, South Korean officials and analysts have grown accustomed to the North Koreans' habit of stirring up trouble, whether through missile launchings or nuclear tests. And when faced with international censure, the North lashes out with threats of retaliation and even war. Typically, it is an attention-getting tactic, the South Koreans say, used to win diplomatic and economic concessions.
But this time the motivation may be different.
Experts on North Korea say that its latest act of belligerence -- the sinking of a South Korean ship in March, one of the worst military provocations since the end of the Korean War in 1953 -- reflects a new force at play: the efforts of the North's leader, Kim Jong-il, to establish his 27-year-old son as a legitimate heir to carry on the family dynasty.
''His succession to power is the factor that links all other factors when we try to explain why the North is doing what it does these days,'' said Choi Jin-wook, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification, the Seoul government's top research organization on North Korea. ''Without it, no explanation is complete or convincing.''
On the surface, the North's ever-intensifying policy of confrontation can appear self-defeating. But, officials and analysts here say, it is all part of Mr. Kim's effort to groom Kim Jong-un, the youngest of his three known sons, as his successor. According to this line of thinking, the sinking of the South Korean ship was intended to create an atmosphere of crisis that would serve Mr. Kim's purposes, both by rallying public support and winning the crucial backing of the military.
''Kim Jong-il needs to create a warlike atmosphere at home to push through with the succession of power to his son,'' said Cheon Seong-whun, another senior analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification. ''To do that, he needs tensions and an external enemy.''
Mr. Kim himself was carefully groomed for years to succeed his father, Kim Il-sung, who died in 1994. In the years he was consolidating his power base, Kim Jong-il was credited with masterminding a 1968 commando attack on the South Korean presidential palace in Seoul and the 1976 ax killings of two American military officers at the border, said Baek Seung-joo, a North Korea specialist at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
Also in 1968, North Korea captured an American naval intelligence ship, the Pueblo, holding 82 hostages for nearly a year, while its commandos attacked remote South Korean villages and clashed with the South Korean military for two months.
But this latest succession has been thrust upon the Kims prematurely, after Kim Jong-il's reported stroke in 2008 and subsequent health problems. Although Mr. Kim, 68, was healthy enough to visit China this month, questions persist over how long he can remain in power.
The next step for Kim Jong-un is to make his official public debut, but that has been complicated by his lack of major achievements, analysts said.
The elder Mr. Kim ''wants to speed up his military-first policy and nuclear program and wants to consolidate the succession process before his health condition becomes worse,'' a high-ranking South Korean government official told a group of foreign correspondents in Seoul on Friday. ''His third son is also rushing because as a member of the new generation, he wants to prove himself to be very strong and able to control the military leadership. In order to do so, he wants to show to the North Korean leadership that he has achieved some major military outcomes, particularly targeted against South Korea.''
Of course, the succession issue is not the only problem facing Kim Jong-il. His trademark policy of building a ''strong and prosperous nation'' was called into question when his navy lost a humiliating skirmish against the South last November. His government's recent attempt to arrest inflation and eliminate black markets through a drastic revaluation of the North Korean currency set off more inflation and a wave of popular discontent that extended beyond the capital, Pyongyang.
Meanwhile, South Korea refused to offer economic incentives until the North gave up its nuclear weapons program.
With the succession issue and the rising internal and external pressures, it is not surprising that Mr. Kim would ratchet up confrontation with the South and its allies, said Mr. Cheon, the analyst. North Korea's propaganda machine uses international condemnation to strengthen internal solidarity, he said.
North Korea is now telling its people that the United States and South Korea fabricated the sinking of the South's ship as a version of the ''Gulf of Tonkin incident,'' a battle that Washington vastly overstated to justify expanding the Vietnam War. Huge outdoor rallies are being mobilized in the North, according to North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, a Web site run by defectors from the North, which cited sources inside North Korea.
Last week, using a radio network that reaches every North Korean home, Gen. O Kuk-ryol, a top officer, delivered Mr. Kim's order to the military and reserve forces to be ready for combat, said the defectors' Web site.
But Mr. Kim's most concerted efforts seem to be directed at the military, the critical power base for his son. Despite United Nations sanctions that ban exports of luxury goods to the North, Mr. Kim is believed to have smuggled in fancy foreign cars for loyal generals, and in April 100 senior officers received promotions.
Ha Tae-keung, who runs Open Radio for North Korea, a Web site based in Seoul that collects news from informants inside the North, said that Mr. Kim's tactics seemed to be succeeding. ''I think the son is firmly in place,'' he said. ''He was in charge in Pyongyang when his father and his top aides were all in China.''
Regime on Brink of Collapse
Regime is on the brink of collapse
The Chosen Ilbo, 10 (3/26/10, “USFK Chief Warns of Instability in N.Korea”
)
U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Walter Sharp has warned of sudden regime collapse in North Korea and called for urgent preparation for such an eventuality. Sharp was speaking at a subcommittee hearing of the U.S. House Appropriations Committee on Wednesday. "We would also be mindful of the potential for instability in North Korea," he said. "Combined with the country's disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable." South Korea and the U.S. are ready for any kind of contingency, he said, including local skirmishes, humanitarian support operations, and even the elimination of the North's weapons of mass destruction. Commenting on the North's nuclear program, he said that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's strategic goal is to survive and maintain the regime, and that his pursuit of the nuclear weapons program is the key part in this strategy. The North's nuclear program is now believed to have extracted enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons, Sharp added. Sharp again dismissed the option of delaying the handover of full control of South Korean troops to Seoul. He said the roadmap for the transition of operational control is "on track as planned and we are working hard to ensure that all conditions will be met" for a smooth transition in 2012. Meanwhile, Adm. Robert Willard, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, commented on South Korea's participation in the U.S. missile defense system at the same House subcommittee hearing. Willard said Seoul has already developed its own missile defense system and it is up to the country to decide whether to expand it.
Regime Collapse is Inevitable
It is a question of when not if the regime will collapse
Glaser, 10 – Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum. Bonnie, 5/26/10, “Is North Korea on the Verge of Collapse?” ()
Despite the posturing of his regime, there are signs that Kim Jong-Il's hold on North Korea may be slipping and international community must be ready. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is considered an international pariah in most nations, but he was welcomed with open arms in China May 3-7. The visit underscored North Korea’s isolation: Kim’s last foreign visit in 2006 was also to China. Despite approving tough United Nations sanctions after Pyongyang’s second nuclear test, Beijing continues to provide energy and food assistance to the North that remains indispensible for the regime’s survival. Yet, even with China’s help, there are growing signs of economic and political volatility in the DPRK and the risks of instability—including regime collapse — cannot be ruled out. In late 2009, the North’s leadership revalued the nation’s currency, causing severe inflation and popular unrest. The regime then barred foreign currency and closed markets, eliminating vital sources of food and other necessities. Kim suffered a stroke in 2008, but it remains to be seen whether plans to transfer power to his youngest and least experienced son can be carried out smoothly. It cannot be excluded that the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan is an outcome of internal succession politics — a move by a faction seeking to gain power, or even by the leadership itself, seeking to maintain a grip on the military during the transition. It is premature to predict near-term regime collapse in North Korea, but it is not too early for major regional parties to plan for the effects of instability, potentially including massive refugee flows and unsecure nuclear weapons, materials, facilities, and knowhow that could be smuggled out of the North and into the hands of the highest bidder. Responses to instability could include decisions by China, South Korea and the US to dispatch troops into North Korea to restore order and to locate and secure weapons of mass destruction facilities. Absent advance coordination, these forces could come into conflict with each other. Despite the obvious risks, the US has been unable to establish multilateral cooperation on a coordinated contingency response plan. Bilateral planning has been stepped up with South Korea under the Lee Myung-bak administration, but China remains unwilling to discuss instability response with the US or the ROK. Why is Beijing loath to reveal its likely plans in the event of North Korean instability? First, China harbors deep suspicions about US and ROK intentions, fearing that the allies may use instability in the North as a pretext to carry out South Korea-led reunification and to station US troops close to China’s border. Second, Beijing worries that instability response coordination with the US and South Korea would sour relations with Pyongyang. Finally, China may be seeking to preserve the “strategic ambiguity” of its response in order to deter all sides, including Pyongyang, from taking actions that would destabilize regional security. Beijing is not alone in its hesitancy. Seoul has long been reluctant to coordinate contingency plans with any nation besides the US, worrying that increased transparency may open the door to great-power meddling. The ROK is particularly anxious about China, which it believes might obstruct efforts to reunify the Korean Peninsula under democratic and free market principles. The US cannot afford to let great power politics stand in the way of planning an effective response to North Korean instability; the risks are simply too great. Instead, it should seek to create favorable conditions for the primary parties, namely itself, South Korea, and China, to discuss likely responses to North Korean instability, while keeping its ally Japan informed. All three governments should be prepared to offer reassurances to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation in the event of instability in North Korea. For example, the US could assure that it would work with the United Nations; would coordinate with China to secure WMD facilities, materials, and expertise; and would not station troops north of the 38th parallel after stabilization and reconstruction operations are completed. At the same time, the allies should seek assurances from Beijing that it would not intervene in North Korea’s domestic political situation to prop up a failing regime and would not obstruct ROK reunification efforts. Moreover, all three nations should agree that their armies would not engage each other in the North, and that no nation would exploit instability in the DPRK as an excuse to threaten any other state. Despite forecasts of North Korea’s collapse since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, the country is still intact. But the risk of North Korean instability remains real. Every day that Kim Jong-il’s health continues to deteriorate without clear succession arrangements makes political instability after his death or debilitation all the more likely. And, every day that the regime continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles or to pursue destabilizing actions makes the effects of instability all the more dangerous.
Regime Collapse is Inevitable
Retaining nuclear weapons won’t save the regime – other factors are making collapse more likely
Pei, 10 – Professor of government at Claremont McKenna and senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Minxin, 5/12/10, The Diplomat, “Get Ready for DPRK Collapse”
)
Judging by recent developments inside North Korea, however, clinging on to its nukes may not actually help prolong Kim Jong-il’s regime. The country’s unfolding economic catastrophe has clearly taken a toll on the regime’s legitimacy and durability—only the most desperate governments in history have resorted to outright confiscation of its people’s money. Seasoned analysts have also reported rising popular resentment against Pyongyang. Thanks to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and other efforts to weaken Kim Jong-il’s regime, North Korea has failed to blackmail the international community into supplying more economic assistance. More importantly, the Kim Jong-il regime, which has become a classic family dictatorship, is about to face its most difficult test of survival: succession. Stricken by a stroke not too long ago, Kim Jong-il is in frail health and his hold on power is certain to weaken. He appears desperate to install his 27-year old son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor. Unfortunately for the Kim dynasty, this process is likely to end in failure. A review of transfers of power in modern family dictatorships (excluding traditional monarchies) shows that the chances of a successful succession from the first-generation dictator to his son are roughly one in four, and no grandson of a first-generation dictator has ever succeeded in taking over a regime and consolidating his power. Of course, the Kim dynasty may set a precedent. But given the worsening economy, the inexperience of the putative successor and the unknown reliability of the Korean military and security forces in the event of Kim Jong-il’s death, the rest of East Asia should be prepared for a scenario of rapid collapse in North Korea. What is most worrying about a possible North Korean collapse is that the key players in the region are not talking to each other, even informally, about such an eventuality. It’s almost certain that these powers—China, the United States, Japan, South Korea and, possibly, Russia—have all drawn up their own contingency plans for Pyongyang’s quick collapse. However, they’ve done nothing to explore a collective response to what is without doubt a geopolitical game-changer.
Succession Will be Unstable
North Korean succession will be unstable – multiple indicators
Klingner, 10 – Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. (Bruce, 4/7/10, Heritage Foundation, “Leadership Change in North Korea—What it means for the U.S.” )
There were also some indications that the planned Jong-eun succession had run into trouble, including suggestions that Jong-eun had overstepped his authority. A party official told a defector organization that Jong-eun had incurred his father's wrath by "forcibly removing devoted officials and causing factionalism by planting his own forces."[14]
Regime Triggers Civil Unrest. In late 2009, North Korea launched another attack on underground free-market activity. In November, Pyongyang declared a 100-to-1 downward revaluation of the won, the North Korean currency, with strict limits on the amount of cash that could be exchanged for foreign currencies. Each household was allowed a single week to exchange a maximum of 100,000 won (approximately $200), wiping out life savings overnight.
In December, Pyongyang banned the use of any foreign currency. The regime warned that use or possession of foreign currency would entail severe punishment. Businesses could withdraw foreign currency from banks only with government permission. In January 2010, North Korea announced it would close down all unofficial markets in major cities, to be replaced by farmers markets that would be allowed to operate only once every 10 days. The government also mandated operating rules for the farmers markets, as well as a list of items that could be sold.
These moves were billed as inflation controls but in reality were an aggressive attempt to reassert state control of the economy, stamp out unofficial market activity, and ferret out those who had profited from the underground economy. Since the mid-1990s, the government had turned a blind eye to entrepreneurial black markets, allowing them to flourish and enabling the North Korean public to augment the failed government food distribution system. Though allowing such activity, the regime saw it as a threat and periodically cracked down on free-market activity. In 2004, the regime initiated a campaign to rescind its minimal economic liberalization reforms of 2002 and re-enforce socialist economic policies.
The crackdown on free-market activity in 2009 led to runaway inflation, a return of food shortages, and some civilian protests and riots. The result "has been a literal disintegration of the market, as traders, intimidated by the changing rules of the game, withheld supply, reportedly forcing some citizens to resort to barter."[15]
The regime was able to reassert control after the disturbances. However, the public protests forced it into a rare policy retreat. Pyongyang raised the original draconian limits on the amount of won that could be exchanged for foreign currency. The regime also backtracked on the market restrictions and rescinded the ban on foreign currency.
A diplomat in Beijing reported that "North Korean officials are busy blaming each other for the failed currency reform" and that "North Korea hoped to stabilize prices through the currency reform and then credit the achievement to Kim Jong-il's third son and heir apparent Jong-eun to consolidate his grip on power."[16] When the ploy became an obvious failure, Pyongyang fired Pak Nam-gi, the Korean Workers Party Director of Finance, as a scapegoat.
The extent of the policy debacle is revealed by North Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong-il's rare apology to a meeting of village chiefs and party officials. During the hour-long apology, Kim reportedly stated, "I sincerely apologize for having caused great pain to the people by recklessly enforcing the latest currency reform without making sufficient preparations or considering the circumstances."[17]
A2: Next Leader Will Change Policies
Kim Jong-il’s replacement is likely to be even more hardline
Klingner, 10 – Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. (Bruce, 4/7/10, Heritage Foundation, “Leadership Change in North Korea—What it means for the U.S.” )
After Kim Jong-il is replaced, the new leader is likely to continue the same policies. Due to Kim's cult of personality, the next leader would have less of a power base and would be more reliant on support from senior party and military leaders who are overwhelmingly nationalist and resistant to change. He would have to base his own legitimacy on maintaining the legacy of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il by continuing their nationalist and military-based policies.
The next leader may well pursue a policy that is even more hard-line than Kim Jong-il's. To secure his hold on power, he may have to instigate a crisis in order to generate a "rally around the flag effect." Propaganda would highlight the supposed need for increased vigilance against attempts by outside powers to take advantage of North Korea's weakness during a leadership transition. There would be calls to heighten the country's defenses against the U.S. and South Korea and increase rather than abandon Pyongyang's nuclear weapons arsenal. Such a tumultuous time, the government would argue, would negate any potential for implementing any economic or political reform that could risk regime instability. The new leader would attempt to reassure the senior leadership that his policies do not pose a risk to regime stability and, by extension, their livelihoods and lives.
Failed Succession => Civil War
Failed succession collapses regime and triggers civil war and instability
Klingner, 10 – Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. (Bruce, 4/7/10, Heritage Foundation, “Leadership Change in North Korea—What it means for the U.S.” )
Failed Succession. Even if the regime succeeds in its initial transfer of power, fault lines could appear within the elite over time. Challengers to an announced successor would not become evident until after Kim Jong-il's death. The new leadership would endeavor to maintain regime cohesion, domestic stability, and influence over foreign nations, but even an initially successful succession could deteriorate into a power struggle and leadership vacuum.
Any challenge to a declared succession would come from other members of the elite. There is little chance for bottom-up change from a massive popular uprising. The populace is heavily indoctrinated and cowed by pervasive government monitoring and savage security services.
Unlike in Communist Eastern Europe, there are no alternative power bases in North Korea. There are no organized opposition parties or dissident movements. Nor are there any charismatic alternative leaders, such as Poland's Lech Walesa or Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel, since in North Korea, any perceived challengers to the order are eliminated. North Korea also has no history of democracy or alternatives to the Kim dictatorship.
A failed succession could result either in collapse of the regime while the North Korean government remained functional or in collapse of the entire state. The succession could degenerate into rivals calling on military units for support, leading to armed clashes. Low-probability but high-impact scenarios would be a power vacuum; civil war among warring factions; or internal unrest extensive enough that it leads Beijing or Seoul to intervene, particularly if concern over control of North Korea's nuclear weapons arises. North Korea's neighbors might fear that the instability could create an "explosion" (aggressive actions toward South Korea or Japan) or an "implosion" (regime collapse).
Regime Collapse => U.S.-China War
Collapse risks both Chinese and U.S. intervention that risks war between the superpowers.
Klingner, 10 – Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. (Bruce, 4/7/10, Heritage Foundation, “Leadership Change in North Korea—What it means for the U.S.” )
During the early stages of a North Korean leadership crisis, China would try to contain the situation by prolonging the status quo and opposing any foreign intervention, including through its position on the U.N. Security Council. Beijing would take steps to ameliorate a humanitarian crisis in North Korea in order to reduce the likelihood of refugee flow, preventing any spillover effect into China's northeast provinces.
Beijing would prefer that any humanitarian assistance be provided to refugees while they remain in North Korea. The Chinese military could establish a control zone, either in China or, potentially, even in North Korea. The latter would provoke strong criticism from the U.S. and South Korea and, counter to Chinese interests, provide a pretext for U.S. and South Korean intervention.
Beijing's calculation of factors that would precipitate its own intervention remains a mystery. China understands that the North Korean government and populace would not welcome Chinese intervention, given historical animosities. Beijing would therefore have to balance its intervention in order to secure an unstable country on its border with the realization that a Chinese military presence could not be permanent.
However, Beijing would intervene directly if it deemed the situation to be out of control and saw itself forced to restore stability and political order. U.S. experts' discussions with Chinese academics indicate that Beijing has contingency plans for three military intervention missions in North Korea:
* Humanitarian missions (refugee aid or natural disaster response);
* Peacekeeping or "order keeping" missions such as serving as civil police; and
* "Environmental control" to clean up nuclear contamination resulting from a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities near the Chinese border or to secure loose North Korean nuclear weapons or fissile material.[25]
Beijing might prefer that any Chinese military intervention be done with U.N. authorization, but it is not known whether it would provide troops to a multilateral peacekeeping operation or demand sole authority over a zone of responsibility along its border with North Korea. South Korea would fear the latter option as legitimizing Chinese sovereignty over part of North Korea and hindering eventual Korean unification.[26] Chinese intervention would likely be undertaken to stabilize the situation and restore a sovereign North Korean state in order to prevent Korean reunification.
If a North Korean collapse was inevitable, Beijing would want to ensure a seat at the negotiating table so that its concerns are addressed. Even if there were no chance of restoring North Korea, the Chinese would insist that an expanded South Korea would have to provide guarantees (e.g., no U.S. forces north of the 38th parallel) in order to get Chinese troops to leave the Korean Peninsula.
During a North Korean succession crisis, China, the U.S., and South Korea may also find themselves at odds over whether to seize North Korean nuclear weapons and, if so, which country should send its military. U.S. officials have affirmed that potential clashes between Chinese forces and U.S. or South Korean forces during a North Korean crisis are a "worst case scenario that brings the worst case fears."[27]
Regime Collapse => Econ Collapse, Terrorism & Miscalc
Regime collapse probable, and leads to terrorism, economic collapse, disaster, and miscalculation
Klingner, 10 – Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. (Bruce, 4/7/10, Heritage Foundation, “Leadership Change in North Korea—What it means for the U.S.” )
Yet there is another North Korean threat for which Washington must prepare: instability in the country's leadership. The planned succession from the ailing Kim Jong-il to his third son faces many challenges and may not be successful. Because the young son lacks the gravitas of his father, there is the potential for a power struggle among challengers within the senior party and military leadership.
The issue of succession is especially worrisome in view of recent indications that deteriorating economic conditions, exacerbated by the tightening noose of international sanctions, and rising civil unrest in response to draconian attacks against free-market activity could create a tinderbox of instability.
If the situation became so dire as to bring about the collapse of the regime, it could lead to North Korea's loss of control over its nuclear weapons, greater risk of rogue elements selling weapons of mass destruction to other rogue governments and terrorist groups, fighting among competing factions, economic turmoil, and humanitarian disaster. Under such circumstances, China or South Korea might feel compelled to send troops into North Korea to stabilize the country, raising the potential for miscalculation and armed confrontation.
Moreover, even a smooth leadership transition would put diplomatic efforts to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons on hold. It is unlikely that Pyongyang would trade away its nuclear weapons when it feels weakened by leadership transition.
The North Korean regime has shown remarkable resilience over the past 15 years, belying repeated predictions of its imminent demise. However, there is now a growing sense that a combination of stresses is pushing Pyongyang closer to the tipping point. Like storm clouds on the horizon, the implications of leadership transition are significant and unpredictable.
***REGIONALISM ADV
REGIONALISM ADV – 1AC
Advantage _____ is Regionalism
U.S. alliance relationships are unsustainable – Asian powers should develop a regional security strategy that does not rely on the U.S. – solves WMD terrorism, tame China, prevents Sino-Japan conflict, Japan imperialism, solve resource conflicts and stop major power domination
Francis, 06 – former Australian Ambassador to Croatia and fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University from 05-06 (Fall 2006, Neil, Harvard International Review, “For an East Asian Union: Rethinking Asia's Cold War Alliances,” , JMP)
At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States established bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific intended to contain Soviet and Chinese communist expansion in the region. US security strategy now focuses largely on combating terrorism and denying weapons of mass destruction to so-called rogue states. It is a strategy that cannot be implemented with geographic mutual defense treaties formed to address conventional military threats. Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that it is prepared to pursue its global security interests unilaterally, even at the risk of its political relations with traditional alliance partners. What happened over Iraq between the United States and its European allies could equally happen between the United States and its Asian allies over Taiwan or North Korea with serious consequences for the interests of countries in that region. East Asian powers need to develop a collective security strategy for the region that does not rely on the United States’ participation. Prudence suggests that East Asian countries need to take the opportunity offered by the recently inaugurated East Asian Summit (EAS) to begin the process of developing an East Asian community as the first step toward the realization of an East Asian Union. This will occur only if led by a strong, proactive Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
China is now the world’s second-largest economy, almost two-thirds as large as the United States in terms of domestic purchasing power. In 2005 China overtook Japan to become the world’s third-largest exporter of goods and services. In 2004 it was the third-largest trading partner with ASEAN; the second largest with Japan, Australia, and India; and the largest with the Republic of Korea. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has estimated that in 2004, in purchasing power parity dollar terms, China’s military expenditure was US$161.1 billion, the second highest in the world. The Pentagon has estimated that in 2005 China’s military expenditure was two to three times larger than its official figure of US$29.9 billion.
China’s growing economic and military strength along with the United States’ preoccupation with its new security agenda has made some East Asian countries increasingly apprehensive. Particularly since September 11, bilateral military alliances have become less relevant to US security interests, and the United States will likely reduce its military presence in the East Asian region. Parts of Asia believe that Chinese hegemonic aspirations for East Asia could emerge if the United States were to disengage from the region. Fear of China and the possibility that it harbors hegemonic aspirations were among the factors that led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. Engaging China in an East Asian union in the future would ensure it will pay a high price in loss of trade and investment if it acts against the interests of the union’s other members.
Prospects for an East Asian Community
In December 2005 ASEAN hosted an inaugural East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The summit involved the 10 ASEAN countries; the ASEAN+3 countries of China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. The summit declaration of December 14, 2005, described the meeting as a forum for “dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.” The declaration also noted that the summit could “play a significant role in community building in this region.”
ASEAN would work “in partnership with the other participants of the East Asian Summit,” but ASEAN was to retain leadership, preventing control of East Asian community building by either the ASEAN+3 countries, which China could dominate, or the 16 EAS countries, which some felt could steer the EAS toward what would be an unwelcome “Western” agenda.
It remains to be seen whether an East Asian community can emerge under ASEAN leadership. ASEAN is an association: it is not a strong regional institution with common interests and objectives. It reflects the diversity of its membership, which has traditionally preferred an unstructured organization, a consensus approach to decision making, and avoidance of controversial issues or intervention in the affairs of its members.
The ASEAN Way under Challenge
ASEAN’s ways, however, may be changing. Since the late 1990s ASEAN’s non-intervention principle has come under challenge. In 1997 ASEAN was faced with an Asian economic crisis triggered by currency speculators and in 1997 to 1998 with a regional pollution haze problem caused by illegal land-clearance fires in Indonesia. ASEAN’s ineffectiveness in these crises brought internal scrutiny to bear on ASEAN’s policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, since 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers have discussed these and other transnational problems—illegal migration, terrorism, and the drug trade—that call for collective responses. They have also considered allowing ASEAN to oversee electoral and governance processes within member states.
In 1999 a number of ASEAN countries defied the long-standing ASEAN position that East Timor was an internal matter for Indonesia and sent peace-keeping forces to the island to help quell the violence instigated there by anti-independence militia backed by Indonesian armed forces. In 2005 ASEAN placed public pressure on the government of Myanmar to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit Myanmar and assess what progress had been made in human rights and democratization. With the aid of the United States and European Union, ASEAN also persuaded Myanmar to relinquish its role as ASEAN chair. ASEAN’s actions in the 1990s suggest increased sensitivity to the negative effects of individual member nations on the organization’s international standing as well as the beginning of openness toward intervention in the domestic affairs of its members.
Toward Realization
At its December 2005 summit, ASEAN agreed to institute an ASEAN Charter by 2020 to provide what Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi has called a “mini-constitution,” a document that will establish an institutional framework for ASEAN as well as a legal identity recognized by the United Nations. The older members—Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—want ASEAN to become something more than an association. Institutionally strong and mostly democratic, they might more readily welcome a rules-governed organization similar to the European Union. Others with institutionally weak, authoritarian governments, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, are wary of placing their domestic policies under greater international scrutiny and favor the status quo. If the former nations prevail it will augur well for the realization of an East Asian community with the potential to evolve into an East Asian Union.
An East Asian community composed of the 16 EAS participants would represent more than 60 percent of the world’s population and possess a combined GDP greater than the European Union. It could provide significantly increased trade benefits to its members, help dampen Sino-Japanese rivalry, ease the present tensions in the region over Japan’s Pacific War, encourage more cooperative attitudes toward the issue of natural resource exploitation in East Asia, promote engagement over containment, and prevent domination of the region by any major power. The determining factor will be ASEAN’s ability to provide the leadership necessary to create a strong, independent East Asian Union.
Regionalism Adv – 1ac
Regionalism is currently halfhearted – only a clear sign of U.S. withdrawal can motivate sustainable regional security cooperation
Carpenter and Bandow 4 - * Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 160-161)DR
The security treaties with the United States and the U.S. troop presence allow the diversion of financial resources to domestic priorities. And relying on the United States for security avoids painful debates about what kind of policy those countries need to pursue. The U.S. security blanket is entirely too comfortable for Washington’s clients. Without a decisive move by the United States to take away that security blanket by a certain date, changes in the security posture of South Korea and Japan will be very slow to occur. Second, the United States should encourage the various nations of East Asia to take greater responsibility for the security and stability of their region. In limited and at times hesitant ways that process is taking place even without U.S. encouragement. ASEAN has begun to address security issues, most notably taking an interest in the disorders in Indonesia that threatened to spiral out of control in the late 1990s and that continue to pose a problem. Australia assumed a leadership role in helping to resolve the East Timor crisis. It was revealing that Canberra became more proactive after the United States declined to send peacekeeping troops or otherwise become deeply involved in that situation. 37 According to the conventional wisdom that U.S. leadership is imperative lest allies and client states despair and fail to deal with regional security problems, Australia’s actions suggest just the opposite. When countries in a region facing a security problem cannot offload that problem onto the United States, they take action to contain a crisis and defend their own interests.
More recently, Australia has developed a more defined and robust regional strategy. In a June 2003 speech, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that Australia would not necessarily turn to the United Nations before acting in crises that could affect its security. Instead, Canberra was prepared to join— and sometimes even lead— coalitions of the willing to address urgent regional challenges. Downer spoke as Australia prepared to send 2,000 police officers and supporting military personnel to the Solomon Islands, which had experienced such an epidemic of violence and corruption that it verged on being a failed state. Earlier, Prime Minister John Howard had told Australian lawmakers that having failed states in its neighborhood threatened Australia’s interests, because such states could become havens for criminals and political extremists. 38 Perhaps most revealing, the Australian government plans to double its defense spending over the next three years with the intent of becoming a much more serious military player. 39
Third, Washington should indicate to Tokyo that it no longer objects to Japan’s assuming a more active political and military posture in East Asia. Quite the contrary, U.S. officials ought to adopt the position that, as the principal indigenous great power, Japan will be expected to help stabilize East Asia, contribute to the resolution of disputes, and contain disruptive or expansionist threats that might emerge. Washington also should use its diplomatic influence to encourage political and security cooperation between Japan and its neighbors, but U.S. policymakers must not let East Asian apprehension about a more assertive Japan dictate American policy and keep the United States in its role as regional policeman. It is reasonable to explore with Tokyo avenues of cooperation in those areas where there is a sufficient convergence of interests. That cooperation should not, however, take the form of a new alliance. Proposals to reform and strengthen the alliance are unwise. 40 They will perpetuate Japan’s unhealthy dependence on the United States even as they arouse China’s suspicions of a U.S.–Japanese attempt to contain the People’s Republic. An ongoing security dialogue and occasional joint military exercises would be more appropriate than a formal alliance for East Asia’s security needs in the twenty-first century. Elaborate, formal treaty commitments are a bad idea in general. They are excessively rigid and can lock the United States into commitments that may make sense under one set of conditions but become ill-advised or even counterproductive when conditions change. Beyond that general objection, a U.S.–Japanese alliance would be likely to create special problems in the future. Such an alliance would provide tangible evidence to those in the People’s Republic who contend that Washington is intent on adopting a containment policy directed against China. 41 The United States should retain the ability to work with Japan and other powers if Beijing’s ambitions threaten to lead to Chinese dominance of the region, but Washington must be wary of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. An informal security relationship with Japan would preserve the flexibility to block China’s hegemony, if that danger emerges, without needlessly antagonizing Beijing. America still can have a potent power projection capability with a reduced military presence based in Guam and other U.S. territories in the central and west-central Pacific.
Regionalism Adv – 1ac
Specially, withdrawal will reduce Korea’s veto of multilateral security mechanisms – yielding a peace system on the peninsula that prevents great power war
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Korea’s Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia
The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6
From Korea’s perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements.
Second, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the European Union. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. The high concentration of superpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because an outbreak of great-power conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if not the world. Therefore, Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism that increases transparency among global powers and functions as a confidence-building measure.
Third, voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the United States has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts. Some Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in 1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. A multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the security concern of Korea when the United States either voluntarily or involuntarily defects from its commitment to Korea.
Fourth, multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is necessary to establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula and ultimately unify Korea. Many Korean people doubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. Korea wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral security cooperation mechanism.
Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea’s external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making exclusive ties with the United States may be a high-risk investment in a past hegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a high-risk investment in an uncertain future. In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea.
A multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia appeals to Korea, so if voice and loyalty in the U.S.-Korea relationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay more attention to multilateral regional options. Moreover, if the U.S. capability and credibility in delivering its security promises to alliance partners are questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, particularly when such an option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.-Korea alliance.
Regionalism Adv – 1ac
Accelerating U.S. withdrawal is key to catalyze a multipolar balance of power in the region and pave the way for an off-shore balancing strategy.
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
Can the U.S. live with the risk of an unstable Korean Peninsula? The obvious answer is “no.” It is clear that a stable Korean peninsula is more beneficial to the United States. Clearly North Korea is a major player to determining whether the Korean Peninsula remains stable. One would argue as long as the current regime of Kim Jung Il remains in power and continue to pursue WMD (i.e. Nuclear weapons) there will be a permanent unstable scenario in the region.62 On the other hand, as long as the United States remains in the region and continues to be forward deployed in South Korea, that the U.S. is contributing to such instability in the region.
According to Revere, if there is an unstable region (Korean Peninsula), the U.S. goals become harder to achieve.63 Should an unstable Korean Peninsula exist, this could possibly lead to conflicts in the region, most obvious between the Koreas; promote unhealthy economic competition in the region, whereas more developed nations (Japan, China) do not provide any form of economic assistance to the Koreas; and more dangerously a weapons/arms race (maybe to include more nuclear weapons in the region) to maintain a power balance. In order to strengthen regional stability, the U.S. would need to succeed in countering terrorism, enhancing economic prosperity, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy, and addressing transnational issues.64 At what cost and risks is the U.S. willing to accept in order to achieve stability in the region?
Conclusion
The United States cannot live with the risks involved in an unstable region. The Korean Peninsula and the East-Asia Pacific region are home to many of the economic giants worldwide. Additionally, with the rising cost of economic commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. must rethink alternatives to bring stability in the East-Asia Pacific region more specifically, the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. must continue to pursue peace and stability using all elements of national power certainly using less emphasis on a military solution. Additionally, the U.S. must selectively engage the Koreas to bring stability to the Korean Peninsula by pursuing a combined strategy of isolationism and off-shore balancing. Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic solutions take time. Perhaps by using other countries particularly in the region would be beneficial to the United States but also to the other countries as well. Strategic positioning of U.S. troops not only around the Korean Peninsula but throughout the world is the key to pursuing the National Objectives.
By pursuing a stable Korean Peninsula without heavy U.S. involvement is beneficial both internationally and economically. Accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. troops, could lead to a multi-polar balance of power in the region.65 Obviously, this would require a significant change in foreign policy and power position in the region; it would certainly cause other nations to reconsider their national security strategy.
All in all, in a speech given by James A. Kelley, stated that “Regional stability remains our overarching strategic goal and provides the underpinnings for achievement of other key goals and objectives.”66 Finally, as stated in the 2006 QDR, “Victory can only be achieved through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power.” 67 Perhaps by completely withdrawing all U.S. troops from South Korea could potentially lead to one of these successes and bring stabilization to the region without heavy U.S. involvement. It is possible by taking the “let them work it out” (the Koreas) approach would certainly be advantageous to the U.S. The time is now for the Eagle to head home.
Regionalism Adv – 1ac
Strengthening the East Asian regional security architecture key to solve terrorism, territorial disputes, disease, environmental degradation, and maritime security
Nanto, 08 – Specialist in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Services (1/4, “East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy,” sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf)
A stronger regional security organization in East Asia could play a role in quelling terrorism by violent extremists. Since terrorism is a transnational problem, the United States relies on international cooperation to counter it. Without close multilateral cooperation, there are simply too many nooks and crannies for violent extremists to exploit.101 Currently, most of that cooperation is bilateral or between the United States and its traditional allies. While the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, for example, have addressed the issue of terrorism, neither has conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises as has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Neither organization as a group, moreover, has joined U.S. initiatives aimed at North Korean nuclear weapons (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative).
Meanwhile, tensions continue across the Taiwan Strait, and disputes over territory and drilling rights have flared up between China and Japan and between Japan and South Korea. (For the United States, there is a growing possibility of nationalist territorial conflicts between two or more U.S. allies.102) The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved; North Korea has conducted tests of ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapon; and the oppressive military rule in Burma/Myanmar continues. Added to these concerns are several regional issues: diseases (such as avian flu, SARS, and AIDS), environmental degradation, disaster mitigation and prevention, high seas piracy, and weapons proliferation. Memories of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis still haunt policy makers in Asian countries.
These are some of the major U.S. interests and issues as the United States proceeds with its policy toward a regional architecture in East Asia. Since this policy is aimed at the long-term structure of East Asian nations, it can be separated, somewhat, from current pressing problems. A metric by which any architecture can be evaluated, however, is how well it contributes to a resolution of problems as they now exist or will exist in the future.
Territorial disputes draw in great powers --- causes World War 3
Waldron, 97 – professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College and an associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard (March 1997, Arthur, Commentary, “How Not to Deal with China,” EBSCO)
MAKING THESE flash-points all the more volatile has been a dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of China's weapons acquisitions. An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese build-up has intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current build-up is part and parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward repression and irredentism.
Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia. The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-feared SS-N-22 cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and submarines--and considering nuclear options.
The sort of unintended escalation which started two world wars could arise from any of the conflicts around China's periphery. It nearly did so in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of intimidation, fired ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Straits. It could arise from a Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation, particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979, and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction of Hanoi. It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China. Chains of alliance or interest, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself, could easily draw in neighboring states--Russia, or India, or Japan--or the United States.
Regionalism => Post Withdrawal Stability
Regionalism ensures stability after U.S. withdrawal
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 141-142)DR
Broader regional cooperation also is possible. Although an East Asian NATO is not in the offing, organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with its Post Ministerial Conference, Regional Forum, and Free Trade Area; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference; and East AsiaJl Economic Caucus (EAEC) all offer foundations for serious regional cooperation on issues ranging from economics to security. Perhaps most important, they provide an opportunity for Japan to gradually expand its role within a regional framework. Just as NATO and the European Community helped channel German power and ameliorate regional concern over Berlin’s influence, so alliances and associations in East Asia could help promote regional stability in the absence of U.S. military forces.
Multilateral arrangement will mitigate the impact from withdrawal
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Third, voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the United States has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts. Some Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in 1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. A multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the security concern of Korea when the United States either voluntarily or involuntarily defects from its commitment to Korea.
Regionalism Necessary / U.S. Not Sustainable
U.S. military presence is unsustainable – East Asian countries should develop their own mechanisms to ensure stability
Niu, 10 – Ph.D. in IR, director for Latin America Studies and the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. (3/3/10, Haibin, “Regionalism in East Asia and ASEAN-China Relations”. )
The weak actors are normally not interested in the balance of power, which is a power game played by big powers. In the context of the balance of power, it may seem that smaller East Asian countries may choose to safeguard their security by joining one bandwagon or the other. This "bandwagon strategy", however, could erode their autonomy to some extent. Hence, in order to be a more active and independent force in regional affairs, relatively weaker countries are in favour of multilateral arrangements and regional regimes to seek common security. The ASEAN approach represents such a preference.
In order to maintain regional stability, the balance of power is not a good choice either. The transition of power is often accompanied by instability or even wars. While the military presence of the US plays a key role in maintaining stability in East Asia, it is uncertain whether the US can keep its military superiority and to assure East Asia's peace in the long run. East Asian countries should develop their own mechanisms to maintain regional peace. From its foundation in 1967, ASEAN has witnessed a process of enlargement of membership and its functions. As the embodiment of mutual co-operation in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has become the hub of confidence-building activities and constructive diplomacy in the region (Almonte, 1997-98). Under the initiatives of ASEAN, efforts were made to co-operate with Japan, South Korea and China. At the same time, the US maintains close ties with East Asia and exerts an influence on regional affairs through bilateral or multilateral means. A common conclusion that may be drawn from these four perspectives is that countries in or outside East Asia might be or are able to contribute to the emergence of regionalism. How to reconcile the divergent interests of these countries in promoting regional co-operation has been a persistent challenge for East Asian countries.
Withdrawal => Regionalism
Regionalism only functional system– withdrawal will encourage stable regional defense modernization
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 145-146)DR
The North Korean nuclear crisis underscores the gravity of the security burdens and risks the United States continues to bear in Northeast Asia. In a normal international system, the nations that would be most concerned about a possible North Korean nuclear-weapons capability would be Pyongyang’s immediate neighbors: South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. They also logically would take the lead in formulating policies to deal with the crisis. But thanks to more than a half century of U.S. smothering behavior, there is nothing normal about the situation in Northeast Asia. Japan and South Korea continue to rely heavily on the United States for their defense needs, and, given the ingrained pattern of dependence, they look to Washington to resolve the looming problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Even China and Russia expect the United States, as the principal military power in the region, to assume the lead role in that frustrating and probably unrewarding mission. If it were not for the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and the more than 40,000 stationed in Japan, the United States could afford to view the prospect of a nuclear North Korea with relative detachment. It would be an unpleasant development, to be sure, but except for the possibility of Pyongyang’s exporting of nuclear technology to rogue states or terrorist organizations, the existence of such an arsenal would not pose a dire threat to America’s security interests. U.S. officials regard troop deployments in East Asia as crucial military assets that help to stabilize the region and underscore America’s power and dominant position.
But if Pyongyang cannot be dissuaded from building a nuclear arsenal— and one dare not be optimistic on that score— those troops are no longer assets. They are nuclear hostages. There is no need to expose American military personnel to such risks. During the early decades of the Cold War, there was a respectable rationale for keeping troops in the region and giving security guarantees to Japan and South Korea. Washington understandably wanted to keep both countries out of the orbit of a rapaciously expansionist Soviet Union or a hostile and volatile China. For many years Japan and South Korea also were too weak to provide for their own defense. Today’s security environment bears no resemblance to that earlier era. The Soviet Union has been replaced by a weak, noncommunist Russia. China’s relations with the United States, although tense at times, are dramatically better than they were when America made its security commitments to Northeast Asia. Moreover, China is not even an orthodox communist state any longer, much less the kind of virulently revolutionary state that it was under Mao Zedong. Today China and Russia are both conventional great powers. While such powers may prove difficult to deal with from time to time, they do not pose malignantly expansionist threats to the peace of the region or to America’s security. Equally important, Japan and South Korea are vastly more capable than they were when they became Washington’s security dependents. South Korea now has twice the population of North Korea and an economy some 40 times as large. If Seoul spent even a respectable amount on defense, it could easily outpace its decrepit communist neighbor. But it chooses to spend a smaller percentage of its gross domestic product on the military than does the United States— even though North Korea is on its border, not America’s. True, political leaders in the ROK are now talking about increases in military spending, but those proposals are still woefully deficient. Japan’s timidity on security matters is even more indefensible. Despite the decade-long recession that has plagued its economy, Japan still has the second largest economy in the world. It also has a population six times larger than North Korea’s. It is troubling to see a country with those characteristics— one of the world’s great powers— rely on another country to resolve a security issue that so clearly impinges on Japan’s vital interests. Washington should begin to reduce its security risks in Northeast Asia. It is time— indeed, it is well past time— to tell Japan and South Korea that they must provide for their own defense and take responsibility for dealing with security problems in their region. The continuing reliance of those two countries 147 on the United States is not healthy for them— and it certainly is not healthy for America. Japan and South Korea, together with China and Russia, should bear the burden of dealing with a dangerous and unpredictable North Korea.
Withdrawal => Regionalism
Only withdrawal can motivate regional cooperation and prevent U.S. involvement in conflict
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
The growing North Korean nuclear crisis— in which saber rattling has turned into a provocative spiral marked by threats of war— only makes an American withdrawal more necessary. In designing U.S. policy it is important to remember which nation is the superpower and which is the impoverished wreck. The Weekly Standard fears “living in a world in which our very existence is contingent on the whims of unstable tyrants.”124 Yet it is the regime in Pyongyang whose survival is tenuous. America is threatened primarily because America insists on remaining next door to an unstable regime desperately seeking legitimacy.
Deterring a nuclear North Korea is an important goal, but that goal is best achieved by placing responsibility on other regional parties.125 In short, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from East Asia will reduce the dangers to American citizens while returning responsibility for regional stability to the ROK and its neighbors. Only by withdrawing can America force other states to act.
Only withdrawal will motivate greater regional cooperation over Korea
Bandow, 08 – fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (9/25/08, Doug, Asia Times, “A reason to bring US troops home,” , JMP)
North Korea's nuclear program obviously remains a concern, but America's conventional deployments offer no help in that regard. And Washington's 26,000 troops on the peninsula provide the North with plenty of nuclear hostages. Bring them home and the United States could make Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions a regional rather than an American issue.
Friendly nations will do a lot more to protect themselves if they can't rely on America to bail them out. For South Korea, with roughly 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, to remain vulnerable to a North attack is frankly ludicrous. There is no principle of geography on the Korean Peninsula that dictates the southern country will always have fewer tanks than the northern one. It's a matter of South Korean policy. And that's fine - if Seoul isn't relying on the United States to make up the gap.
Withdrawal => Regional Balance of Power
U.S. presence discourages a regional balance of power system that can effectively contain conflicts.
Bandow, 08 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (6/9/2008, Doug, “Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance,” , JMP)
Still, does an American presence dampen geopolitical rivalries and arms races? Washington’s role as de facto security guarantor might discourage allied states from doing more for their own defense, but that is a dubious benefit since the belief that the United States will intervene encourages countries to be more belligerent in any disputes with other nations. Moreover, America’s presence virtually forces Beijing to upgrade its military, lest it remain permanently vulnerable to foreign coercion. That is the worst dynamic possible—weakening friendly nations and keeping them permanently dependent on Washington, while convincing China that only a sustained military buildup will enable it to deter U.S. intervention.
America’s interests would be best served by the development of a regional balance of power, in which friendly nations act to protect their own interests and constrain the PRC. In 1950 the ROK would have been swallowed had the United States not intervened. In the early succeeding years South Korea could not have defended itself. But those days are long over.
So it is with other countries in the region. Japan is the second-ranking economic power on earth. Australia has taken an active military role in Southeast Asia and the south Pacific. Vietnam has developed a friendly relationship with the United States. India’s political influence and military forces now reach into Southeast Asia. All of this makes for a more-complicated world, but also almost certainly a safer one for America.
Yet Washington is locked in the past. We are told that U.S. troops must remain in South Korea to defend that nation from ever-diminishing threats, threats which the ROK is capable of handling. As the world changes, so should American security commitments and military deployments. Much of Washington’s global security structure is outdated. Nowhere is that more obvious than on the Korean peninsula. The only way to create a “twenty-first century strategic alliance” with the South is to end today’s outmoded twentieth-century alliance.
Withdrawal will force regional countries to maintain a balance of power and stability in Korea
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
Certainly, a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in the region would certainly bring regional fallout, causing other nations in the region to rethink their national security strategy. Along with the parties directly involved in the peninsula, China and Japan will also need to rethink their own grand strategies in the region to maintain a balance of power and to maintain stability in the Korean Peninsula.
Withdrawal => Japan Regional Stabilization
Withdrawal will push Japan to develop its military capabilities and help stabilize the region
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
Japan
There is no doubt that Japanese-U.S. alliance plays a major role in U.S. security strategy in Asia.40 Should the U.S. withdraw from South Korea, they will most likely do the following:
· Seek to become a normal nation with full military capabilities
· Seek to become a stronger player in the Asia-Pacific region
· Seek to have stronger U.S. presence (troops in Japan)
The first objective of Japan’s security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan’s alliance partner, and with the international community.41 To this end, Japan will support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan- U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.
Although it is not written in their National Defense Program, Japan must seriously consider seeking a normal military to bring stability in the region. As with China, since there is no clear hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region, bringing a normal military to Japan will balance out the powers in the region should the U.S. completely withdraws troops from South Korea. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has been restructuring its force to take a stronger role in the world arena.42 Perhaps, in order for Japan to seek normalcy in their military as well as their nations it must first admit to their war atrocities from the past. This admission, albeit a huge step to re-defining their military, will finally tell the world that today’s Japan is not the same Japan from the past.
Japan would use their new military to become a stronger player in the region. For example, Japan’s self-defense force would re-designated their navy with different missions and tasks. This new navy could provide forward presence to key areas in the region. Their navy could participate in joint exercises to include but not limited to South Korea, China and Australia. Again, the assumption is the new military’s focus and objectives are not like the past.
Another strategy Japan could use to further the balance of powers to the region is to pursue a stronger U.S. presence in Japan. Since the strategy of U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, where will the U.S. place these troops? Japan could allow more U.S. troop presence on Japanese soil to maintain a power balance in the region. Although this may not be favorable to the Japanese, a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea could be used as leverage to allow more troops to be based and or repositioned in Japan.
Withdrawal => ROK Regional Stabilization
Withdrawal will push South Korea to develop a self-reliant defense posture – allowing it to be a regional power balancer
Colonel Stevens, 06 (3/15/06, Colonel Wayne Stevens, “Is U.S. Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” , JMP)
Republic of Korea’s Movement toward a Self-Reliant Defense Posture
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has formally stated that he believes the ROK must do more and not leave its national security to the U.S.92 According to President Roh, the ROK military has substantial capability to defend itself and is seeking to assume greater responsibility for defending the ROK against the North. “The ROK spent $16.4 billion last year on defense—roughly nine times North Korea’s outlay – and ranks eleventh in the world in total defense expenditures.”93 Although President Roh advocates achieving a fully self-reliant defense posture, he also makes it clear that the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue “its role of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia”.94 General Burwell Bell stated in response to Congressional questioning that ROK forces are already becoming more self-reliant as evident by the fact that the entire Demilitarized Zone is guarded by ROK forces.95 Additionally, Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institute; and Peter Brooks, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs and Director at The Heritage Foundation, testified before the House Committee on Armed Services about the strategic implications of U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea. Both men basically agreed with reducing the number of troops on the peninsula and letting the ROK assume greater responsibility for their self-defense. O’Hanlon believes the people of South Korea want to make more of the decisions about how to deal with the DPRK and how the U.S. deals with military base issues.96 Mr. Brookes argues that reducing U.S. forces on the peninsula will give President Roh an opportunity to make good on his promise of taking on more responsibility for his country’s national security.97
Republic of Korea’s Role as a Power Balancer in the Region
President Roh announced that he wants the ROK to play a role as a power balancer within the region98 and Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung carried that same message in his comments during the installation of the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Minister Yoon expressed the need for Korea to reduce its dependence on allies for security. 99 The ROK can enhance its potential toward becoming a power balancer within Northeast Asia by boosting the country’s defense capabilities, conducting military exchanges with China, and expanding Seoul’s military cooperation with other countries.100
Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, argues for the ROK becoming a power balancer, because “there appears to be a consensus in the international community that a multilateral solution to the issues of the North Korean nuclear threat and economic rehabilitation is preferable.”101 Others, however, may argue that there already is a multilateral forum known as the “Six-Party Talks.” President Roh’s “Power Balancer Policy” has come under attack from Representative Park Jin of the opposition, Grand National Party, because he believes the policy will strengthen ties with China, distance Seoul from the U.S., and possibly place regional security at risk.102
The plan will spur South Korea to engage in diplomacy through multilateral channels – reinvigorating these is key to prevent great power conflicts
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
Regional Challenge
Compared with the task of building the ROK's deterrent capability vis-à-vis the DPRK, it would be much more difficult to replace the insurance provided by the ROK-U.S. alliance. The ROK came to re-appreciate the value of this insurance in the wake of its historical controversies with China and Japan over Koguryo (11) and Yasukuni Shrine in recent years. Maintaining a strong bilateral alliance with the U.S. and developing good relations with former adversaries in Northeast Asia has been the central tenet of the ROK's foreign policy since the late 1980s, and the end of the ROK-U.S. alliance would require that the ROK engage in proactive diplomacy through both bilateral and multilateral channels.
In particular, the ROK should promote multilateral cooperation in Asia that includes the U.S. In fact, while a bilateral alliance can provide a useful hedge against a third power, a multilateral arrangement can offer a more fundamental solution by addressing the security dilemma. With the balance of power shifting in Asia due to end of the Cold War and the rise of China, regional multilateralism under this U.S.-in-Asia approach provides a means of constraining great powers and preventing continental-maritime confrontation in Asia. If great powers agree to be bound by a multilateral cooperation arrangement, thanks in part to facilitation by middle powers in the region, it can be an effective means of securing a lasting peace. China's proactive multilateral diplomacy since the late 1990s (e.g., Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN plus 3) has been putting pressure on the U.S. to reassess its multilateral policy in Asia, and this competitive dynamic between the two powers may lead to the creation of multilateral arrangements that include the U.S as well as China. In fact, a Six-Party security cooperation arrangement in Northeast Asia may become the precursor to this new trend in Asia. In the current context, the U.S. is assumed to maintain interest in the Korean peninsula even after the termination of its alliance relationship with the ROK.
Withdrawal => ROK Regional Stabilization
U.S. withdrawal will encourage South Korea’s participation in regional, multilateral forums
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
This paper proposes that Korea will opt for a multilateral regional choice under two conditions: (1) The United States does not (or cannot) respond to the voices of Korea, particularly in times of economic and security crises; and (2) The regional arrangements are already being formed. As the two conditions slowly come to fruition, Korea may mix regional initiatives and bilateral loyalties, and domestic politics in Korea will naturally reflect struggles between regionalists (or risk-reducers) and inertia-driven Americanists. In other words, Korea will reluctantly opt for multilateral regional arrangements that still include the United States in them. But as the two conditions mature, the voices of regionalists may become more influential. If Korea feels it can play a leading role in East Asia and believes that the region can provide economic and security safety nets, Korea will support regional alternatives to U.S.-Korea bilateral relations.
Withdrawal => ROK Conventional Modernization
Withdrawal will spur South Korea to boost its conventional forces to deter North Korea
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
South Korea
Should the U.S. withdraw completely from South Korea, South Korea will most likely do the following:
· Aggressively pursue resolution in the Sunshine Policy to improve relationships with North Korea.
· Seek to build up their military and arsenal
· Seek support from China and Russia to unify a nuclear free Korea
According to their Participatory Defense Policy of 2003, South Korea, presented a vision of peace and prosperity in the region.43 South Korea continues to recognize that the threat from North Korea is real and even more real since North Korea’s attempt to obtain and produce nuclear weapons.44 Additionally, South Korea recognizes that “stability on the Korean Peninsula is crucial to its own economic well-being.” China and Russia are key players to the success of stability on the Korean Peninsula.45
South Korea should continue to engage dialogue with North Korea using the Sunshine Policy. With this dialogue, other nations could assist and monitor the situation. Should the Sunshine Policy be successful, it would bring a sense of pride and accomplishment of unifying the Korea without any outside intervention by the U.S., China or even Russia. While pursuing the Sunshine Policy, South Korea should seek to increase their military forces, build up their weapons arsenal, and give a sense of “defense” for their country. This buildup could potentially harm the Sunshine Policy however; it will give them the sense of security. As Park stated:
After his inauguration in February 2003, South Korean President Roh initiated a more proactive South Korean role in inter-Korean relationship-this is in direct contrast to Washington’s policy and its refusal to negotiate with Pyongyang.46
Could this mean the U.S. current policy of containment is interfering with the unification (of Korea) and stability of the Korean Peninsula? Perhaps by withdrawing troops could further South Korea relationship with North Korea and therefore bring stability to the region.
In order to bring a balance of power in the region, South Korea would aggressively seek to build their military and perhaps produce a more capable arsenal to defeat any North Korean aggression. This build up of conventional weapons and arms would benefit South Korea tremendously. However, this arms race certainly has second and third order effects. One effect would lead to an arms race in the region among the Koreas, causing further instability. Should South Korea seek to acquire nuclear weapons to counter North Korea, would most definitely bring instability to the region.
South Korea would not have to “go it alone”. The U.S. does not necessarily have to be heavily involved with the unification of the Koreas. South Korea could leverage other nations in the region such as China and Japan to assist either a unified Korea or merely to bring stability in the region. Finally, according to Bellows, South Korea should pursue an omni-directional comprehensive security agreement with Japan, Russia, and even China.47 South Korea’s location is essential to China and Japan. If there is an agreement made between Japan, Russia and China, this would contribute to the sense of power balance in the region.
A2: Asian Regionalism Now
South Korea can’t push for multilateral organizations until it has relative independence from the U.S.
Synder 9 – Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Senior Associate, International Relations (Scott, “China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security”, pg. 190) MGM
Although the South Korean National Security Council worked hard to justify Roh's "balancer" theory as not being directed at weakening the US—South Korean alliance, the justification shows a strong belief that South Korea's national interests are most effectively pursued through a policy stance that assumes greater independent action, with less regard for the United States. President Roh clearly desires to maintain good relations with the United States, but he has expressed concern about how South Korea can assert itself within the context of the alliance to take a more independent role where the national interest might demand it, or how South Korea can mitigate the perceived negative effects of US policy trends on the Korean peninsula. In an interview with a progressive website, Roh stated,
One of the biggest pending issues for both the ROK and the United States is ultimately the strategic planning for Northeast Asia. If the strategic planning for Northeast Asia is based on the premise of a confrontational order, in short, if the United States regards a future confrontational front between the United States and Japan and China and Russia as a premise and manages its strategy accordingly, tension will always prevail in Northeast Asia and an unfortunate incident could take place under some circumstances. . . . We cannot play a balancing role in this if we unilaterally rely on the United States. We can play a positive role in formulating the order in Northeast Asia only when we have relative independence from the United States. Another important point in this process is that such a strategy cannot work properly unless the people also share the same perception.15
U.S. pullout will accelerate the move
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Third, China’s own soft power is gradually increasing in the region as it positions itself as a responsible stakeholder by participating in global governance with other industrialized countries. The size of the Chinese economy attracts many countries in the world, let alone countries in the region. If China’s soft power continues to grow, and U.S. soft (and hard) power continues to decline, an Asian regional identity is likely to emerge. Similarly, if the United States decides to pull out of Asia, moves toward Asian regionalism would accelerate. In the meantime, regional multilateral security arrangements might remain as the most reliable and probable alternative, and there is no reason why Korea will not take that option seriously.
***CHINA Adv
China Adv – 1ac
Advantage _____ is China
The plan eases the transition to a more multipolar world – trying to cling to the status quo makes hegemonic decline and conflict with China inevitable
Bandow, 09 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (1/12/09, Doug,
“First Among Equals,” , JMP)
It’s the job of military planners to plot future contingencies, which is why the U.S. Joint Forces Command looked ahead in its newly published Joint Operating Environment 2008. Despite obvious foreign threats, America’s destiny continues to remain largely in its own hands. No other country could draft such a report with such a perspective.
The Europeans, constrained by the European Union and their memories of World War II, must cast a wary eye towards Russia and have little military means to influence events much beyond Africa. For all of its pretensions of power, Moscow is economically dependent on Europe and fearful of an expanding China; Russia’s military revival consists of the ability to beat up small neighbors on its border.
Countries like Australia, South Korea and Japan are not without resources, but they are able to influence their regions, no more. Brazil is likely to become the dominant player in South America, but global clout is far away. India and China are emerging powers, but remain well behind Russia and especially the United States. Every other nation would have to start its operational analysis with America, which alone possesses the ability to intervene decisively in every region.
The main challenge facing the United States will be becoming more like other nations. That is, over time other states will grow economically relative to America. That will allow them to improve and expand their militaries. Washington will long remain first among equals, the most powerful single global player. But eventually it will no longer be able to impose its will on any nation in any circumstance.
That doesn’t mean the United States will be threatened. Other countries won’t be able to defeat America or force it to terms. But the outcomes of ever more international controversies will become less certain. Other governments will be more willing in more instances to say no to Washington. Especially China.
Much will change in the coming years, but as the JOE 2008 observes,
The Sino-American relationship represents one of the great strategic question marks of the next twenty-five years. Regardless of the outcome—cooperative or coercive, or both—China will become increasingly important in the considerations and strategic perceptions of joint force commanders.
What kind of a power is Beijing likely to become? Chinese policymakers emphasize that they plan a “peaceful rise,” but their ambitions loom large. Argues JOE 2008, while the People’s Republic of China doesn’t “emphasize the future strictly in military terms,” the Chinese do calculate “that eventually their growing strength will allow them to dominate Asia and the Western Pacific.” More ominously, argues the Joint Forces Command, “The Chinese are working hard to ensure that if there is a military confrontation with the United States sometime in the future, they will be ready.”
Yet this assessment is far less threatening than it sounds. The PRC is not capable (nor close to being capable) of threatening vital U.S. interests—conquering American territory, threatening our liberties and constitutional system, cutting off U.S. trade with the rest of the world, dominating Eurasia and turning that rich resource base against America. After all, the United States has the world’s most sophisticated and powerful nuclear arsenal; China’s intercontinental delivery capabilities are quite limited. America has eleven carrier groups while Beijing has none. Washington is allied with most every other industrialized state and a gaggle of the PRC’s neighbors. China is surrounded by nations with which it has been at war in recent decades: Russia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and India.
Indeed, today Beijing must concentrate on defending itself. In pointing to the PRC’s investment in submarines, the JOE 2008 acknowledges: “The emphasis on nuclear submarines and an increasingly global Navy in particular, underlines worries that the U.S. Navy possesses the ability to shut down China’s energy imports of oil—80% of which go through the straits of Malacca.” The Chinese government is focused on preventing American intervention against it in its own neighborhood, not on contesting U.S. dominance elsewhere in the world, let alone in North America.
Washington almost certainly will be unable to thwart Beijing, at least at acceptable cost. China needs spend only a fraction of America’s military outlays to develop a deterrent capability—nuclear sufficiency to forestall nuclear coercion, submarine and missile forces to sink U.S. carriers, and anti-satellite and cyber-warfare weapons to blind and disrupt American forces. Washington could ill afford to intervene in East Asia against the PRC so equipped.
Such a military is well within China’s reach. Notes JOE 2008: “by conservative calculations it is easily possible that by the 2030s China could modernize its military to reach a level of approximately one quarter of current U.S. capabilities without any significant impact on its economy.” Thus, absent the unlikely economic and social collapse of China, in not too many years Beijing will able to enforce its “no” to America.
Washington must reconsider its response. U.S. taxpayers already spend as much as everyone else on earth on the military. It’s a needless burden, since promiscuous intervention overseas does not make Americans safer. To maintain today’s overwhelming edge over progressively more powerful militaries in China, Russia, India and other states would require disproportionately larger military outlays in the United States. It’s a game Washington cannot win.
A better alternative would be to more carefully delineate vital interests, while treating lesser issues as matters for diplomacy rather than military action. Equally important, the American government should inform its allies that their security is in the first instance their responsibility. Washington should act as an offshore balancer to prevent domination of Eurasia by a hostile hegemon. But the United States should not attempt to coercively micro-manage regional relations.
Stepping back today would reduce pressure on Beijing to engage in a sustained arms buildup to limit U.S. intervention in the future. If the PRC nevertheless moved forward, its neighbors could take note and respond accordingly. Encouraging China to keep its rise peaceful is in everyone’s interest.
Despite the many challenges facing U.S. policy, America retains an extraordinarily advantageous position in today’s global order. Eventually, the United States is likely to fall to merely first among many—the globe’s leading state, but no longer the hyper- or unipower, as America has been called. The sooner Washington begins preparing for this new role, the smoother will be the transition.
China Adv – 1ac
Withdrawal solves accidental war with China, stops friction with Japan and yields a nuclear free peninsula
Garfinkle, 03 – taught American foreign policy and Middle East politics at the University of Pennsylvania and is editor of The National Interest (1/27/03, Adam, National Review, “Checking Kim,” , JMP)
NO NORMAL DIPLOMACY
The U.S. finds itself in an unenviable situation: one in which it has no military options, yet normal diplomacy is futile. Diplomacy of the sort being pressed upon the U.S. by South Korea amounts to paying North Koreans for acting temporarily less scary until the next occasion for extortion. I have argued that the only way to solve the problem is to transcend it: to think not like a diplomat, who is paid to manage, but like a statesman, who is paid to transform basic circumstances. I proposed last October that the major powers — the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China — unite to condition aid to North Korea in such a way as ultimately to undermine North Korean sovereignty. This proposal stood at least a chance of getting at the real source of the problem, which is the nature of the North Korean regime; and it could provide benefits to all the major powers that they could not otherwise achieve for themselves. I also acknowledged its drawbacks: that North Korea would not easily allow itself to be managed into oblivion and might lash out (which might happen anyway); and that the degree of cooperation we required, especially from China, might not be forthcoming.
China has in fact proved recalcitrant, but not irremediably so. Indeed, the Chinese seem to appreciate the gravity of the present situation, and may still be prepared to cooperate with the U.S. if we persist in our efforts. The reason is that the Chinese may ultimately put their own national interest above habit. The key Chinese interest is that Korea not be nuclearized, because that presupposes a nuclear Japan. China also prefers, however, for perfectly understandable Realpolitik reasons, that Korea not be unified. China has been a free rider on U.S. policy and power for years to achieve both of these interests, and has never been forced to choose between the two. Now that choice is looming: China's reliance on U.S. policy to prevent the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula is proving ill-founded. Meanwhile, as a result of North Korean proliferation, the U.S. has an interest in bringing about a unified non-nuclear Korea in which some redefined U.S. military presence underwrites the peninsula's non-nuclear status. If forced to choose between a) a nuclear North Korea and b) a unified Korea under Seoul's aegis whose non-nuclear status is underwritten by the U.S., China would be slightly crazy not to choose the latter. But it will not so choose until the choice becomes inevitable.
A secondary Chinese interest, often cited, is Beijing's fear of chaos on its border. But unless one assumes that North Korea can be reformed successfully, a proposition for which there is no evidence, waiting will only make things worse from the Chinese perspective. The more time the North Korean regime has both to fail and to build nuclear weapons, the more likely its eventual collapse will be maximally calamitous. China's policy today amounts to propping up an influence-resistant and disaster-prone regime — seething with refugees ready to pour across the Chinese border by the hundreds of thousands. Concert with the U.S., Japan, and Russia, on the other hand, would give China far more influence over what may happen in North Korea , and help to manage it. If the Chinese leadership sees its choices for what they really are, why would it choose a course of minimal influence and maximum ultimate peril?
SENDING OUT FOR CHINESE
And so we come to thoughts the administration may or may not have allowed itself to think, about how the U.S. can achieve the cooperation it needs to solve the North Korean problem. In other words, how can we bring other powers, particularly China, to the point of serious decisions that will lead them to join with the United States?
Charles Krauthammer recently suggested using the "Japan card" for this purpose — in other words, telling the Chinese that their failure to help us isolate North Korea would make the U.S. receptive to Japanese nuclear-weapons development. The U.S. need not say a word to Beijing about this, however; the Chinese understand the stakes better than we do. Besides, we have a far more dramatic option — the explanation of which requires a brief preface.
It made sense for the U.S. to risk war on the Korean peninsula between 1953 and the end of the Cold War, for Korea was bound up in a larger struggle. We could not opt out of any major theater in that struggle without the risk of losing all. But it no longer makes sense to run such risks. What larger stakes since 1991 have justified the costs and dangers of keeping 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, the overburdening of the U.S.-South Korean relationship, and the tensions caused to the U.S.-Japanese alliance? None that is readily apparent in the cold light of U.S. interests.
The division of Korea puts U.S. interests at risk more than it does those of any other major regional power (we have troops there; we — not China or Russia or Japan — face directly a nuclearizing adversary), and for the sake of the lowest stakes. Think about what the U.S. might suffer if war broke out in Korea, and about what we would gain from its not breaking out. We would suffer thousands of dead GIs, the probable ascription of responsibility for the razing of Seoul (and maybe Tokyo), and maybe accidental conflict with China. What do we gain from the status quo? Perpetual diplomatic heartburn with Japan and others, and the privilege of fruitlessly negotiating with Pyongyang.
In short, the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the balance of risks and rewards in U.S. Korea policy, and should have led us to adjust our stance. But U.S. policymakers conducted business as usual, only responding to North Korean threats and never themselves taking the lead to solve the underlying problem. We should have managed the transition to South Korea's responsibility for its own security, while at the same time joining with other regional powers to limit North Korea's trouble-making potential. Had we started early enough, before North Korea had nukes, we would have had far more robust military options to enforce a muscular diplomacy than we do today.
Better late than never, however; we still need to rethink the Korea problem down to its roots. When we do, we immediately see our other option: Announce our intention to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Korea. Lots of South Koreans would be delighted. More important, such an announcement would force China and the other parties to the problem to face reality.
South Koreans, having to defend themselves, will either see the illusions of their own policy or suffer the consequences of maintaining it. But it's their country, and, frankly, their potential misfortune no longer matters to us as much as it did during the Cold War.
If North Korea becomes a six-or-more-weapon nuclear power, we will be far away, with deterrence reasonably intact, and with a decent if imperfect ability to prevent North Korea from exporting fissile materials and missiles. China, however, cannot relocate. If we profess an intention to leave, Beijing will then have to choose between a nuclear North Korea and Japan (and maybe South Korea, too) on its doorstep, or joining with the U.S. and others to manage the containment, and ultimately the withering away, of the North Korean state. Until it is faced with such a choice, Beijing will temporize and try to fob off the problem on Washington, hoping as before to free-ride on us for an outcome that benefits China more than it benefits the U.S. That's reality, and the Chinese need to face it. We can help them do so.
China Adv – 1ac
Conflict with China will escalate to global nuclear war
Hunkovic, 09 – American Military University [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict
Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, ]
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.
China Adv – 1ac
Withdrawal solves accidental war with China, stops friction with Japan and yields a nuclear free peninsula
Garfinkle, 03 – taught American foreign policy and Middle East politics at the University of Pennsylvania and is editor of The National Interest (1/27/03, Adam, National Review, “Checking Kim,” , JMP)
NO NORMAL DIPLOMACY
The U.S. finds itself in an unenviable situation: one in which it has no military options, yet normal diplomacy is futile. Diplomacy of the sort being pressed upon the U.S. by South Korea amounts to paying North Koreans for acting temporarily less scary until the next occasion for extortion. I have argued that the only way to solve the problem is to transcend it: to think not like a diplomat, who is paid to manage, but like a statesman, who is paid to transform basic circumstances. I proposed last October that the major powers — the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China — unite to condition aid to North Korea in such a way as ultimately to undermine North Korean sovereignty. This proposal stood at least a chance of getting at the real source of the problem, which is the nature of the North Korean regime; and it could provide benefits to all the major powers that they could not otherwise achieve for themselves. I also acknowledged its drawbacks: that North Korea would not easily allow itself to be managed into oblivion and might lash out (which might happen anyway); and that the degree of cooperation we required, especially from China, might not be forthcoming.
China has in fact proved recalcitrant, but not irremediably so. Indeed, the Chinese seem to appreciate the gravity of the present situation, and may still be prepared to cooperate with the U.S. if we persist in our efforts. The reason is that the Chinese may ultimately put their own national interest above habit. The key Chinese interest is that Korea not be nuclearized, because that presupposes a nuclear Japan. China also prefers, however, for perfectly understandable Realpolitik reasons, that Korea not be unified. China has been a free rider on U.S. policy and power for years to achieve both of these interests, and has never been forced to choose between the two. Now that choice is looming: China's reliance on U.S. policy to prevent the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula is proving ill-founded. Meanwhile, as a result of North Korean proliferation, the U.S. has an interest in bringing about a unified non-nuclear Korea in which some redefined U.S. military presence underwrites the peninsula's non-nuclear status. If forced to choose between a) a nuclear North Korea and b) a unified Korea under Seoul's aegis whose non-nuclear status is underwritten by the U.S., China would be slightly crazy not to choose the latter. But it will not so choose until the choice becomes inevitable.
A secondary Chinese interest, often cited, is Beijing's fear of chaos on its border. But unless one assumes that North Korea can be reformed successfully, a proposition for which there is no evidence, waiting will only make things worse from the Chinese perspective. The more time the North Korean regime has both to fail and to build nuclear weapons, the more likely its eventual collapse will be maximally calamitous. China's policy today amounts to propping up an influence-resistant and disaster-prone regime — seething with refugees ready to pour across the Chinese border by the hundreds of thousands. Concert with the U.S., Japan, and Russia, on the other hand, would give China far more influence over what may happen in North Korea , and help to manage it. If the Chinese leadership sees its choices for what they really are, why would it choose a course of minimal influence and maximum ultimate peril?
SENDING OUT FOR CHINESE
And so we come to thoughts the administration may or may not have allowed itself to think, about how the U.S. can achieve the cooperation it needs to solve the North Korean problem. In other words, how can we bring other powers, particularly China, to the point of serious decisions that will lead them to join with the United States?
Charles Krauthammer recently suggested using the "Japan card" for this purpose — in other words, telling the Chinese that their failure to help us isolate North Korea would make the U.S. receptive to Japanese nuclear-weapons development. The U.S. need not say a word to Beijing about this, however; the Chinese understand the stakes better than we do. Besides, we have a far more dramatic option — the explanation of which requires a brief preface.
It made sense for the U.S. to risk war on the Korean peninsula between 1953 and the end of the Cold War, for Korea was bound up in a larger struggle. We could not opt out of any major theater in that struggle without the risk of losing all. But it no longer makes sense to run such risks. What larger stakes since 1991 have justified the costs and dangers of keeping 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, the overburdening of the U.S.-South Korean relationship, and the tensions caused to the U.S.-Japanese alliance? None that is readily apparent in the cold light of U.S. interests.
The division of Korea puts U.S. interests at risk more than it does those of any other major regional power (we have troops there; we — not China or Russia or Japan — face directly a nuclearizing adversary), and for the sake of the lowest stakes. Think about what the U.S. might suffer if war broke out in Korea, and about what we would gain from its not breaking out. We would suffer thousands of dead GIs, the probable ascription of responsibility for the razing of Seoul (and maybe Tokyo), and maybe accidental conflict with China. What do we gain from the status quo? Perpetual diplomatic heartburn with Japan and others, and the privilege of fruitlessly negotiating with Pyongyang.
In short, the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the balance of risks and rewards in U.S. Korea policy, and should have led us to adjust our stance. But U.S. policymakers conducted business as usual, only responding to North Korean threats and never themselves taking the lead to solve the underlying problem. We should have managed the transition to South Korea's responsibility for its own security, while at the same time joining with other regional powers to limit North Korea's trouble-making potential. Had we started early enough, before North Korea had nukes, we would have had far more robust military options to enforce a muscular diplomacy than we do today.
Better late than never, however; we still need to rethink the Korea problem down to its roots. When we do, we immediately see our other option: Announce our intention to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Korea. Lots of South Koreans would be delighted. More important, such an announcement would force China and the other parties to the problem to face reality.
South Koreans, having to defend themselves, will either see the illusions of their own policy or suffer the consequences of maintaining it. But it's their country, and, frankly, their potential misfortune no longer matters to us as much as it did during the Cold War.
If North Korea becomes a six-or-more-weapon nuclear power, we will be far away, with deterrence reasonably intact, and with a decent if imperfect ability to prevent North Korea from exporting fissile materials and missiles. China, however, cannot relocate. If we profess an intention to leave, Beijing will then have to choose between a nuclear North Korea and Japan (and maybe South Korea, too) on its doorstep, or joining with the U.S. and others to manage the containment, and ultimately the withering away, of the North Korean state. Until it is faced with such a choice, Beijing will temporize and try to fob off the problem on Washington, hoping as before to free-ride on us for an outcome that benefits China more than it benefits the U.S. That's reality, and the Chinese need to face it. We can help them do so.
China Adv – 1ac
Motivating Beijing to take a greater regional role ensures its peaceful rise
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (2/24/09, Doug, “Balancing Beijing,” EBSCO, JMP)
So Washington should exhibit humility about its ability to force change. As Secretary Clinton observed, “We have to continue to press them. But our pressing on those issues can’t interfere” with cooperation on other issues. Ultimately a positive relationship with Beijing is more likely to lead to a more liberal China. The result is not foreordained, but as always engagement offers the better bet. The United States shouldn’t hesitate to promote its ideals, but it must recognize its limits in enforcing them.
Washington also should look on benignly as the PRC expands its commercial and diplomatic ties around the world. Even a sober military analyst like Tom Ricks of the Washington Post recently warned: “I am not sure what China is up to in Africa. But I have the nagging thought that we will figure it out in 15 years and be sorry.”
Yet the United States and Soviet Union spent most of the cold war sparring for influence in the Third World to little meaningful effect. Money was spent and lives were lost, but in the end it didn’t much matter who was numero uno in Vientiane, Kinshasa, Luanda or Managua. It matters even less today. As my Cato colleague Ben Friedman puts it, “There is little that China can do in Africa to make it stronger or to damage U.S. interests.” If Beijing wishes to invest heavily in places with little geopolitical heft, why should the United States object?
Even more important, Washington needs to back away from any kind of arms race with the PRC. The latest Pentagon Joint Operating Environment 2008 ominously declared that while Beijing doesn’t “emphasize the future strictly in military terms,” the Chinese do calculate “that eventually their growing strength will allow them to dominate Asia and the Western Pacific.” The annual Pentagon assessment of PRC military spending appears to show Beijing’s conscious effort to build a force capable of deterring American intervention against China in East Asia. As a result, Aaron Friedberg, until recently Vice President Cheney’s chief foreign-policy adviser, worries that the balance of power “is beginning to shift in way that, under the wrong set of circumstances, could increase the risk of miscalculation and conflict.”
Yet the question is, what balance of power? Beijing poses no threat to America’s homeland or even Pacific possessions and will not do so for decades, if ever. The United States possesses a far stronger military to start—eleven carrier groups to none, for instance—spends five or more times as much as the PRC on defense (excluding the costs of Afghanistan and Iraq) and is allied with most important industrial states in Asia and Europe. There is no Chinese threat or potential threat to America.
At issue is relative influence in East Asia and the security of Washington’s friends in that region. Yet the PRC so far has been assertive rather than aggressive and those nations, particularly Japan and South Korea, could do much more individually and collectively for regional security. Washington should not hesitate to sell arms to friendly states, including Taiwan, despite Chinese protests, but should leave them with responsibility for their own defense. Of course, a policy of continued restraint by Beijing will make it far easier for the United States to back away.
In any case, there is little that Washington can do, at least at acceptable cost, to maintain U.S. dominance along China’s borders, as the PRC—whose economy already ranks number two or three, depending on the measure, in the world—continues to grow. Washington would have to devote an ever larger amount of resources to the military, in the midst of economic crisis, to ensure its ability to overcome far more limited Chinese capabilities. Even then, Beijing is unlikely to forever accept U.S. hegemony. Confrontation if not conflict would be likely.
The better option would be to temper America’s geopolitical pretensions and accept a more influential PRC in its own region. China will grow in power, irrespective of Washington’s wishes. America’s chief objective should be to ensure that this rise is peaceful, as Beijing has promised.
U.S.-China diplomatic relations passed the thirty-year mark last fall. The relationship has survived great challenges and is likely to face even greater ones in the future. But despite inevitable differences between the two nations, much depends upon strengthening their ties. The twenty-first century will turn out far differently—and positively—if America and the PRC prove willing to accommodate each other’s economic and geopolitical ambitions.
China Rise Inevitable – U.S. Policy Key
US dominance will inevitably collapse – how it treats China will determine the course of its rise
Ikenberry, 08 – professor of International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb 2008, John G., Vol. 87, Issue 1 Foreign Affairs, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Proquest
The "unipolar moment" will eventually pass. U.S. dominance will eventually end. U.S. grand strategy, accordingly, should be driven by one key question: What kind of international order would the United States like to see in place when it is less powerful?
This might be called the neo-Rawlsian question of the current era. The political philosopher John Rawls argued that political institutions should be conceived behind a "veil of ignorance" -- that is, the architects should design institutions as if they do not know precisely where they will be within a socioeconomic system. The result would be a system that safeguards a person's interests regardless of whether he is rich or poor, weak or strong. The United States needs to take that approach to its leadership of the international order today. It must put in place institutions and fortify rules that will safeguard its interests regardless of where exactly in the hierarchy it is or how exactly power is distributed in 10, 50, or 100 years.
Fortunately, such an order is in place already. The task now is to make it so expansive and so institutionalized that China has no choice but to become a full-fledged member of it. The United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted over the last century, rules and institutions that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future. The United States' global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century.
China’s rise is inevitable – the US response determines whether it will be a danger
Ikenberry, 08 – professor of International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb 2008, John G., Vol. 87, Issue 1 Foreign Affairs, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Proquest)
As it faces an ascendant China, the United States should remember that its leadership of the Western order allows it to shape the environment in which China will make critical strategic choices. If it wants to preserve this leadership, Washington must work to strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that order -- making it even easier to join and harder to overturn. U.S. grand strategy should be built around the motto "The road to the East runs through the West." It must sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible, giving China greater incentives for integration than for opposition and increasing the chances that the system will survive even after U.S. relative power has declined.
The United States' "unipolar moment" will inevitably end. If the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph.
Aggression toward China is misguided – China’s rise is inevitable
Ikenberry, 08 – professor of International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb 2008, John G., Vol. 87, Issue 1 Foreign Affairs, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Proquest)
Seen in this light, the rise of China need not lead to a volcanic struggle with the United States over global rules and leadership. The Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States. But that will only happen if the United States sets about strengthening the existing order. Today, with Washington preoccupied with terrorism and war in the Middle East, rebuilding Western rules and institutions might to some seem to be of only marginal relevance. Many Bush administration officials have been outright hostile to the multilateral, rule-based system that the United States has shaped and led. Such hostility is foolish and dangerous. China will become powerful: it is already on the rise, and the United States' most powerful strategic weapon is the ability to decide what sort of international order will be in place to receive it.
China’s Course Undetermined – U.S. Policy Key
China’s path to power is undecided – if the US contains China their rise would stop being peaceful.
Ming, 06 – Professor of Political Science, teaching at the Graduate Center and the College of Staten Island (Xia, 2/18/06, “’China Threat’ or ‘Peaceful Rise of China’?” )
"China's rise" can be seen as a quintessentially political process—through which the ruling Communist Party has sought to shore up its legitimacy after the Cultural Revolution irreversibly changed the nation and caused three crises of ideological belief, faith in the CPC, and confidence in the future. As the Party realized that the performance-based legitimacy was the only hope for prolonging its rule, economic development became the highest politics. Consequentially, the success of economic development would have to cause political implications—the external ones are carefully monitored and evaluated by China's neighbors and the only superpower of the world—the United States.
A four-part television series and interactive Web site by The Times, The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the ZDF network of Germany.
Will China become a threat to the United States, Japan, and surrounding countries? The reason for American concern mainly arises from its hegemonic status in the world politics and the ideological incompatibility of China with the Western value system. China's stunning economic growth has convinced the West that it is just a matter of time until China becomes a world superpower. But its ideological orientation makes China a revolutionary power that is threatening both to the United States' status and global structure. Three different logics have been constructed to substantiate the "China threat" thesis. First, ideological and cultural factors make China a threat. For neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration, the mere factor that China still sticks to communism makes view it adversely. Samuel Huntington has added a cultural factor: in the clash of civilizations, the "unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian civilizations" is the most fundamental threat to the West. For people using this logic, the sensible response from the U.S. is, in the short run, a containment policy, and confrontation is possible if needed; in the long run, the promotion of a peaceful transformation within China. Second, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors. For many realists, even China has shed off its ideological straitjacket, as a great power in size (territory, population, and economy), China has to pursue its own interest and respect. Nationalism may still drive China into a course of clash with the United States, if the latter refuses to accommodate or share the leadership with China as a rising power. Some scholars fear that democracy can unleash strong nationalism and popular nationalism can make China even more aggressive toward the United States. Third, the collapse of China. Opposed to the previous two perspectives, some people are concerned that if China suffers a Soviet-style sudden-death syndrome and spins out of control, it can create an even worse scenario. The sheer size of the population makes refuge problem, the failed state and the followed crises (warlordism, civil war, crime, proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc) impossible for the world to deal with. Due to these three different considerations, the United States often oscillates from demonization to romaticization of China, from containment to engagement. The U.S.-China relationship has shifted from conflict, to confrontation, to competition and back to conflict, but so rarely features with cooperation. One American China specialist characterizes the bilateral relationship as "the sweet-and-sour Sino-American relationship."
The Japanese have a different set of reasons to feel upset by China's rise. Although Japan has been culturally indebted to China since the Tang dynasty, somehow Japan has developed a strong Oedipus complex toward China—namely to commit patricide against its cultural patron. In the past century, China suffered several severe acts of aggression at the hands of the Japanese. The mutual animosity between these two countries has been strong. The Japanese deep involvement in Taiwan, its stubborn refusal to offer unequivocal apologies to the Asian neighboring countries over its aggressions, and American military alliance with Japan all have been irksome to the Chinese. The construction of Chinese nationalism by mainly relying on anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese turned Japan into an easy target. To some degree, the Chinese leadership has tried to release the popular anger against the regime by directing it either to the local tyrants or to the international bullies (U.S. and Japan are two natural candidates). Now Japan and China still have not developed any framework to resolve their territorial disputes and their relationship has reached a low point. The Chinese often suspect that U.S. and Japan are the originators of a variety of "China threat" arguments.
In addition to the ideological threat, many other neighboring countries have more stakes in China's new move. For Southeast Asian nations, the presence of a sizeable and extremely rich Chinese ethnic group and their increasing dependency upon China's economy for growth forced them to be very careful in handling their relationship with China. With a continental size (China has almost two times the territorial and population sizes of all other Asian Pacific countries combined), China consumes a tremendous amount of foreign direct investment and pops out huge volume of exports; other countries feel the competition from China. At this moment, no government in the Asian Pacific region has adopted a clear anti-China policy; but sporadic anti-Chinese riots have occurred in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines; and strong resentment against the Northern economic and cultural invasion has surfaced in Myanmar (former Burma), Thailand, Vietnam, and other countries. Even Singapore—the self-proclaimed third Chinese territory in addition to China and Taiwan—was upset by China's strong hand in 2004 after Lee Hsien Loong, the soon-to-be-inaugurated Prime Minister of Singapore, visited Taiwan.
The combination of stunning economic growth and unpredictable political governance causes deep concerns about China among the nations in the world. The Chinese leadership has realized the urgency to calm down these concerns and to build a supportive international environment for its ascendancy. To make its rise less a threat, the Chinese government has sponsored many PR events, such as exhibitions in foreign countries, promoting Chinese language programs, and so on. But most importantly, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao put forward the thesis of "China's peaceful rise" in his speech to a Harvard University audience in December 2003. Under this thesis, there are several points: First, China's development depends upon and in return will contribute to the world peace; second, China will resort to peaceful means for development; third, China's development will rely more on its own resources and market; fourth, China is prepared for a long-term process of hard work, even several generations, for economic prosperity. Finally, even as China has achieved its economic development, it will not seek hegemony in the world or come out as a threat to any country.
Under the guiding principle of "China's peaceful rise," the Chinese government has conducted actively diplomacy at four (at least) different levels: (1) Creating strategic partnerships with the second-tier powers. China has signed strategic partnership treaties with the EU, Russia and India to strengthen their relationships as well as to balance the American power. (2) Promoting "good neighbor policy" in the Asian Pacific region. By increasing trade with the Asian-Pacific region and also let these countries enjoy trade surplus with China, China has positioned as an important trading partner with these countries. Besides, China has entered into various mechanisms of regional cooperation with these countries. During the 1997 Asian financial crises, that China refrained from devaluing its currency and helped stabilize the regional economy by mobilizing its foreign currency reserve won positive reactions from this region and the U.S. (3) Seeking cooperation and avoiding confrontation with the U.S. The Chinese side basically has sent to Washington a clear message that China is a conservative power and has no intention to upset the status quo—namely the U.S. as the sole superpower in the world. (4) Neglecting Japan. As China has successfully managed relationships with the sole superpower, the second-tier strategic partners, and neighboring countries, China is able to afford to ignore Japan and occasionally show some toughness.
For the past five years, the Chinese leadership has been cautious and successful in managing the internal nationalism and American unilateralism, to some degree, thanks to the anti-terror war. Now some signs have indicated that the honeymoon between the U.S. and China in the aftermath of Sept.11 attack and anti-terrorism coalition has arrived at its end. If the United States shifts its policy to a hard-line toward China, the cyclical turbulence in the Sino-American relationship may soon resurface. This might jeopardize China's plan of a peaceful rise. At the micro-level, the U.S. seems to have been more provocative toward China, the latter has been more on defensive; but if we look at the Sino-U.S. relationship from the macro-level, it seems that China can take back initiative if it can remove the thorn of communist ideology and authoritarianism, because the Americans tend to believe that under the doctrine of democratic peace, democratic countries do not fight war against each other. Therefore, to create long-term internal and external stability, the CPC has to learn how to play the card of democracy. Does this amount to ask a leopard to change its spots?
China’s Rise => Threat
Chinese rise poses a threat – the military believes that it needs to use hard power to defend its objectives.
Fish, 10 (3/29/10, Isaac Stone, Newsweek, “China’s Call to Arms for ‘Peaceful Rise,’” Lexis)
As China prepares to become the world's second-largest economy in 2010, its leaders are struggling to express a convincing and satisfying ideology that assuages international fears about the country's global intentions. Having taken note of how Soviet overextension and belligerence led to the U.S.S.R.'s downfall--and how the perceived arrogance of American hegemony has alienated many of Washington's key allies--Beijing has been peddling a theory called "Peaceful Rise." It goes like this: China's rise won't shake the rest of the world, unlike the ascent of the great empires that preceded it. China will "only focus on its core interests" (Taiwan and Tibet, for example), say party spokesmen; China "wouldn't invade anyone in 10,000 years."
But leaving aside historical truths--including those from China's own past--about whether great powers can dominate without conflict, certain members of China's military are publicly starting to itch for a more assertive role in international affairs. The latest hawkish call to arms is from Ling Mingfu, a senior colonel and professor at China's National Defense University, whose new book, The China Dream, argues that the country must aim for long-term military dominance so that America does not try to neutralize its power.
The book, though not official policy, is a discrete "line of thinking within the People's Liberation Army," says Roy Kamphausen, an expert on U.S.-China defense relations at the National Bureau of Asian Research. While Liu doesn't directly challenge Beijing's Peaceful Rise mantra, he stresses that America--an old hand at deflating ambitious rivals like Japan and the U.S.S.R.--will inevitably attempt to contain China. As such, Liu calls for boosting China's preventive military capacity to dissuade the U.S. from declaring war on the Middle Kingdom. "If you want peace, prepare for war," Liu says, citing the Roman author Vegetius. "China must use military strength to defend and safeguard that its strategic objectives and strategic course is not stopped."
Despite this call to arms, Liu insists that China's rise will still be conflict-free--and, because China has a "superior culture," it will be welcomed with open arms by the rest of the world. Of course, China's influence abroad has already stirred up controversy, both from international organizations who decry its willingness to deal with rogue governments, to local communities in Africa and the Middle East, which are protesting against the importation of Chinese workers to staff infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, Liu and other hawks claim that China will practice "leadership without coercion [and will] exercise its power differently from its Great Power predecessors," according to Andrew S. Erickson, associate professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College. It's true that ever since its disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979, China has restrained itself from military actions against other countries. But whether a rising China will result in global harmony remains far from certain.
China’s threat will grow – younger people are more distrustful of the US
Hanson & Shearer 09 – researchers for the Lowry Institute (12/2/09, Fergus and Andrew, “Tomorrow’s China offers scope for hope as well as cause for concern,” Lexis)
China's rise poses particular challenges because of its rapid military modernisation, mercantilist policies, authoritarian political system and secretive strategic culture. Not surprisingly, a deep fault line of mistrust runs across the Pacific Ocean. This is reflected in opinion polls in the US and Australia. In a CNN poll last year, 51 per cent of Americans said they considered China a military threat. And a Lowy Institute poll this year found 40 per cent of Australians see China's development as a world power as a critical threat to Australia's vital interests, and 41 per cent consider it likely China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years.
Worryingly, younger and better-educated Chinese seem more nationalistic and more insecure than their elders on some topics. The generation that has come of age since Deng Xiaoping opened up China to the outside world in 1978 may be expected to be more comfortable with the West. But almost two-thirds of 18 to 24-year-olds say the US poses a threat compared with about one-third of those 55 or older.
China’s Rise => Threat
China’s rise is a threat – growing military and economic capabilities directly challenge the US
Hawkins, 04 – Senior fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council (11/22/04, William R., “The Rising Threat from China: Seeing is Believing,” )
The scariest ride I have ever had was not at any amusement park. It was the ride I took recently through Shanghai, China from Hongqiao international airport to the Bund area along the Huangpu river front. It was just after dark, and this mammoth city was lit up in an awe-inspiring display the likes of which I had not seen even in Beijing. Shanghai has a skyline that puts New York or Chicago to shame, but then Shanghai has a larger population than New York and Chicago combined. Mile after mile of new high rise office buildings, many boosting the names of the world’s major corporations, stun the viewer with their proclamation of wealth and power. Unlike the boxy concrete and steel designs I had seen in Tokyo, the Shanghai skyline is marked by some of the most beautiful urban architecture I had ever seen.
And that was before I saw Pudong, the new economic area on the other side of the river. I took a boat tour down the river to get a better look at this new economic zone for Shanghai development. It is already crammed with office towers and factories along the route to the new Pudong international airport. One impressive complex is the new Krupp steel plant. Another is the Jinmao Tower, the third tallest building in the world. It is an impressive 88-story office complex, but even more noteworthy was the forest of other towers around it. Over half of the high-rise buildings in the Shanghai-Pudong area have been completed in the last five years, and the new structures are much more massive than those that existed before. With the grandiose designs inherent in the development of this area, China is clearly sending a message to the world that it playing for keeps.
American security concerns have been focused on terrorism and the Middle East. This is understandable. Muslim terrorists are plotting more American deaths and must be combated. Yet, terrorism is the weapon of the weak. It cannot change the global balance of power. And Islamic fundamentalism is a backward looking doctrine of social and economic stagnation.
It is the rise of China that poses the greatest challenge to America’s position in the world. Endowing an empire of 1.3 billion people with modern industry, technology, and capital gives the authoritarian central government in Beijing immense resources with which to support its ambitions. And what is driving China is the impassioned spirit of nationalism and the limitless energy of capitalism. This combination will rock the world.
Military threats always loom largest in the public mind, and China is creating such a danger. My visits to Beijing and Shanghai were preludes to the real reason for my trip, which was to attend the 5th Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai. This event is held every two years. It has two purposes: to showcase China’s advancements and to attract American and other Western companies who want to sell technology and systems to Beijing.
China’s space program was highlighted, from the capsule astronaut Yang Liwei used to orbit the Earth in 2003 to animated projections of how China plans to land on the Moon and exploit its resources. Most of the displays, however, were devoted to Chinese fighters, remotely piloted (unmanned) military aircraft, helicopter gunships, and missiles of all types.
It was clear from the displays that there is no segregation of civilian from military aviation activities. The Chinese aerospace industry is run by the state. Its largest agency is Aviation Industries of China I (AVIC I), whose displays featured, side by side, a variety of civilian airliners and numerous military projects for fighters, bombers, military transports, trainers, and reconnaissance aircraft. Its sister organization, AVIC II, which was split off in 1999 to create competition and improve management, concentrates more on business jets, helicopters, and missiles. One display featured a row of cruise and air-to-air missiles under a large poster of a corporate jet, again showing the guiding Chinese principle of “Jun-min jiehe,” which translates as “combine the military and the civil.”
This principle was very evident as I strolled through the two halls devoted to American and Western firms trying to sell high-tech products to China. These firms are only supposed to be engaged on the civilian side of Chinese development. But that line cannot be drawn, and it is doubtful those marketing their wares in this booming market care.
Italian Deputy Minister of Defense Salvator Cicu was on hand for the signing of a co-production agreement between Agusta Westland and AVIC II for a new helicopter project. Italy, along with France and Germany, have been pressing the European Union to lift is arms embargo on China. But this embargo has long been undermined by the sale of dual use equipment and technology to Beijing. Helicopters are a prime example. Why else would a defense official be celebrating an allegedly civilian project?
One display showed two identical remotely piloted helicopters. One was configured for crop dusting, the other for military reconnaissance. It didn’t take much imagination to consider what the crop duster might also be used for if armed with chemical or biological weapons.
American companies have been just as guilty as European in helping China improve its capabilities. Boeing had a large mural at its booth touting not only how many airliners it had sold to China, but also how much production work it had outsourced to Chinese industry, how many Chinese engineers and technical workers it had trained, and how much it was investing in Chinese research facilities.
It may not come to a military showdown. The economic changes may be so large, that America will simply back down if there is a major confrontation. It is really the economic changes that determine what resources governments can mobilize to advance or protect national interests. Wars, when they occur, test whether the changes have been sufficient to reorder how the world is run and whose decisions matter.
[CONTINUED]
China’s Rise => Threat
[CONTINUED]
In Shanghai, I stayed at the Broadway Mansions hotel in the Bund. The Bund is the area where the European powers had their offices when they ran China’s affairs. The British were the most powerful of the imperialist powers and the Broadway Mansions was built by a British businessman in the 1930s when England was still considered the leading global superpower.
Today, Britain no longer holds that position in the world hierarchy or in Chinese affairs. In 1999, there was no serious thought given in London to holding on to Hong Kong. This beautiful city of free and prosperous people was handed over to the Beijing dictatorship without a whimper. The balance of power had obviously changed from what it had been in 1842 when England first laid claim to Hong Kong, or 1945 when London reclaimed the city after it had been captured by Japan at the outbreak of World War II..
The British were on the winning side of both world wars. Indeed, England has not lost a major war since the Duke of Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. But they still declined as their economy fell out from under their empire. And the danger to us, as the British example should make clear, is that we have embraced the same classical liberal economic notions about “free trade” and the neglect of international economic strategy that had their origins in 19th century British thought.
Economic strategy is at the top of Beijing’s agenda: the core of its pursuit of “comprehensive national power.” Zhuhai, like Pudong, is a designated economic development zone. It has a new international airport, about 25 miles from the port city. There is an 8-lane superhighway running from the city to the airport, mainly through farm land with very little traffic. But there are massive housing projects built (and being built) for the expected future workforce. Near the city, new factories line the highway. A friend of mine who had been to the 4th Aviation Expo noted that where there had been a single line of factories two years ago, the plants are now 2-4 deep along the road.
The first challenge China poses is economic. It goes beyond the lop-sided trade imbalance which is menacing American domestic industry and the value of the dollar as the international medium of exchange. The longer term threat is from the vast new wealth and array of modern capabilities that will be available to a regime whose strategic ambitions clash with those of the United States.
Washington must concentrate its attention on enlarging and sustaining its own economic capabilities – industrial, technological, financial, to ensure that its stays generations ahead of China. This will take more effort than was needed to defeat the Soviet Union, as Chinese capitalism is a much more vigorous contender than was Russian communism. But safeguarding America’s preeminence is just as imperative, regardless of the nature of the threat.
A2: Chinese Containment Turns
China will inevitably grow in power – the only danger is if the US decides to contain it
Ateba, 02 – PhD candidate at Peking University’s school of International Studies (Bertrand, “Is the rise of China a security threat?” )
By many standards, China is already a great power. Its vast landmass, large population, wealth of natural resources, large industrial base, and strategic location give it the raw materials from which national power has traditionally been constructed. China possesses a large standing army, armed with nuclear weapons, whose projection capabilities will probably increase in the years ahead. In a cultural sense, there is a greater China that includes the powerful overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania. Economically, there is a greater China that includes Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Greater China is implicitly acknowledged by China's smaller neighbors. While these states will like the US to remain engaged in the affairs of the region as a counterbalance to China, they have chosen to treat China as it is perceived: the most important modernizing phenomenon in East Asia. Although it is not a global superpower, China has great influence outside Asia. Primarily through participation in the international arms market. As a large developing country, China can claim common identity with much of the third world 8, and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Peking is guaranteed a place in deliberations of major international issues, as well as a veto over the Council's decisions. China's quest to become a great China has its roots in poverty, insecurity and disunity.
The greater China described above, is not the China that is threatening regional and global peace. In the contrary, it is a China that is aware of its responsibility to bring its contribution in shaping a free, stable and equal New World. China does not seek regional domination. What China wants is recognition as an important power with regional interests to protect and the capability to influence international politics. In a multipolar world that is increasingly being shaped by interdependent forces and multilateral institutions, the objective of international politics must be to establish lasting conditions of common security for all countries, rather than to promote one country's or bloc's security at the expense of another's. China's rise to power is an irreversible process and as noted by a former US Secretary of State, "no force could hold back the rise of a new power" (KISSINGER, 1996). No matter how the United States treats China, it can never stop the more and more important role of the country in future international affairs. When will the US and its allies understand that containing and blocking Chinese power increase the risk of war? The more China will feel excluded from the shaping of the international order, greater is the risk of the collapse of such an order if China decides to act as a " spoiler ". There are issues over which China will never offer any room for concessions and will never rule out the use of military force to assert its interests. China will continue to mould the People's Liberation Army into a highly effective force capable of making its presence felt in the surrounding region if need be.
According to the theory of power transition, as long as a challenger of an existing international order, remains outside that dominant international order, and has hopes of overturning it or taking over its leadership through combat, such a nation is a serious threat to world peace. It is the powerful and dissatisfied nations that start world wars. China has already put forth its own ideas about a new international order. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are proposed as its " foundation ". The continuing refusal of the West to integrate these principles in the new international order is not a very good option. The United States and other countries such as Japan need to accept China's insistence on equality and respect for sovereignty, which underlie its claims to senior status in the post-cold war Asia Pacific order. It is imperative for China, the United States and Japan to establish a security relationship of mutual trust and stability.
As demonstrated in the past, such a relationship serves the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. When the Japan and US joined forces in the confrontation with China, the region witnessed two large-scale wars in Korea and Indochina. When the United States and Japan opted to cooperate with China, however, peace and prosperity dawned, which eventually nourished an economic miracle: the rise of East Asia. A constructive and cooperative relationship among the three nations, therefore is a public asset contributing to the region's stability and prosperity. For the sake of peace, the West should let China rise and fulfill its secular ambition to stand on its own feet and win the respect that its growing power entitles it.
A2: Chinese Containment Turns
A weak China is a much greater threat – a collapse will lead to drug trafficking and pollution
Ateba, 02 – PhD candidate at Peking University’s school of International Studies (Bertrand, “Is the rise of China a security threat?” )
It is my conviction that a disintegrating China poses the greatest risk to regional and global security. China is still in the middle of a long modernization process. The success of this process still depend on forces of global and regional economic integration and on foreign assistance. China's prosperity is actually very fragile, as there are a lot of internal problems that need cooperation and assistance from foreign countries. China's booming economy upon which the legitimacy and stability of the central government increasingly rest, relies on close economic, managerial, and technological connections to the outside world, especially to the US and Asia. Continued high economic growth rates and contacts with the outside world are essential to the success of China's military modernization effort, which stands at the center of its comprehensive strategy for coping with the post-cold war security environment and will likely have major implications for Asia's future peace and stability. The economic reforms underway, have created a long list of actually or potentially destabilizing conditions within China. These include the decentralization of economic decision-making power to the provinces and lower levels, exacerbating long-standing central-local tensions over revenue sharing and local nationalism; the unequal development of China's regions, with resulting large income, technology, and growth gaps; social problems brought on or enlarged by contradictions between central planning and the market, such as double-digit inflation and unemployed urban workers in debt-ridden state-run enterprises; large-scale environmental problems ; and increasing corruption, crime, and social disorder. Ultimately if not immediately, all these problems have broad political implications for the stability of China's party-state system.
Beijing's fears over social unrest stalled attempts at deepening economic reforms during most of 1999. The leadership is on the horns of a dilemma. It must slow down any economic reform that radically worsens unemployment. Yet if it slows down economic growth the leadership may be destroying one of the pillars of its own legitimacy. Any degree of fragmentation or instability in China caused by economic difficulties will affect the region. It is in the interests of China's neighbors to provide the capital and expertise as well as lend any cooperation they can as China finally begins to tackle its fundamental economic challenges. In the long term, China's entry into the WTO will serve as a catalyst for state own enterprises (SOE) reform by forcing China's SOEs to speed up reform for their survival in market competition. In the short term, however, WTO entry may be more harmful than helpful in that many SOEs will be unable to compete against high quality foreign products. This will likely result in additional bankruptcies and even more unemployment. China has made significant contributions to regional security by playing a positive role in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, preventing regional nuclear proliferation, and establishing confidence-building measures. China could also have major negative effects on the security of the region through massive migration, a rise in drug trafficking and increased pollution. The degree of domestic stability or instability is directly linked with these negative factors. If China's SOEs reform does not succeed, further workers will be laid off, regionalism (in China) would rise, and separatist movements in some areas would escalate. Thus the success or failure of SOE reform is an important factor in affecting the domestic stability and Asian-Pacific security. Because China faces so many internal problems and many nations in the Asia-Pacific region and in the West have experience in managing similar problems, there is ample opportunity for other countries to share their expertise with China. Such cooperation may create an atmosphere that could be extended to more sensitive realms of security as nuclear non-proliferation and border disputes. Some possible suggestions for cooperation with China on SOE reform include: increased foreign investment in SOEs as allowed by new regulations; sharing modern management techniques to establish SOEs along corporate lines; and assistance in the establishment of a new social security net in China.
Those analysts who really worry about regional and global order that a greater China is supposed to upset should rather think about how to help the Chinese communist government to keep control over the country by reinforcing its legitimacy, deterring separatist activities, controlling China's borders and raising the standards of living of a huge population. A threat from a powerful China is less worrying than a threat from a weak and disintegrating one.
Chinese decline leads to insecurity in Asia – better for the West to support Chinese power
Ateba, 02 – PhD candidate at Peking University’s school of International Studies (Bertrand, “Is the rise of China a security threat?” )
A China with weakening central authority, unable to control its borders or its economy and possibly beset by civil war, presents the greatest insecurity to the rest of Asia. In that case, huge problems of out-migration, security of investments, and ethnic-nationalist border wars would have to be anticipated, the Asia-Pacific region will have to deal with refugees and displaced people. To avoid this sad scenario to turn into reality, the international community and especially China's neighbors have great interest in helping China to get stronger and powerful. The rise of China is not a threat, but its disintegration or the attempt by the international community to block its rise or keep it down, will bring nothing but disorder and instability.
***SOUTH Korean Modernization Adv
SOUTH KOREAN MODERNIZATION ADV – 1AC
Advantage _____ is South Korean Defense
Plan prompts South Korean conventional force modernization which allows it to deter Chinese aggression
Bandow, 09 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (6/16/09, Doug, “A Tattered Umbrella,” , JMP)
South Korea’s foreign minister reports that Washington plans to guarantee his nation’s defense against a nuclear-armed North Korea in writing. The promise reportedly will be formalized when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits the United States this week. It’s a bad idea. Washington should be shedding defense responsibilities, not increasing them.
More than a half century after the Korean War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) remains surprisingly dependent on America. It’s as if the United States was cowering before the Mexican military, begging its friends in Europe for help. In fact, the ROK requires no assistance to defend itself from conventional attack.
The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has a strong numerical military advantage over the South: about 1.1 million personnel under arms, compared to fewer than seven hundred thousand for Seoul. Pyongyang also has impressive numbers of other weapons, including more than four thousand tanks and roughly eighteen thousand artillery pieces.
However, most of the North’s equipment is decades old, a generation or two behind even that of the long-gone Soviet Union. Training is minimal and many of the DPRK’s military personnel perform construction and similar tasks. The Korean peninsula’s rugged geography favors defense. Putting thousands of antiquated tanks backed by hundreds of thousands of malnourished soldiers on the move south would create a human “turkey shoot” of epic proportions.
Anyway, the ROK’s numerical inferiority is a matter of choice, not an immutable artifact of geography. In its early years the South’s resources were sharply limited. But today, South Korea is thought to have upwards of forty times the North’s GDP. Seoul also possesses a substantial industrial base, sports high-tech expertise and enjoys a sterling international credit rating. The ROK’s population is twice that of the North. South Korea could spend more than the equivalent of North Korea’s entire economy on defense if the former wished. But it hasn’t wished to do so, preferring to rely on Washington instead.
The time for subsidizing wealthy allies has long passed. The financial crisis makes it imperative that the United States return to such nations responsibility for their own defense. Undoubtedly an American withdrawal would result in a far-reaching debate among South Koreans over how much they felt threatened by the North and how much they believed necessary to spend in response. But that is precisely the debate they should have had years ago. The prospect of a nuclear North Korea obviously is more frightening than even one with ample numbers of artillery pieces targeting the city of Seoul. But there is little reason to believe that the North has any deliverable weapons at this point.
Given present course, that time is likely, but not certain, to come. However, South Korea has time to prepare. Rather than relying on America for its protection, Seoul should invest in missile defense and enhance its air-defense capabilities. The South also should consider creating a conventional deterrent: the ability to respond to a nuclear strike by eliminating the Kim regime. That means developing potent offensive missile and air attack capabilities. (Japan, despite its quasi-pacifist constitution, should do the same.)
Such forces would help fulfill a second function: deter an aggressive China, if Beijing ever changed its policy from the oft-repeated “peaceful rise” to a more belligerent stance. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has much to gain from stability in East Asia and has worked to assure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions. However, the future is unknowable. The best way for Beijing’s neighbors to ensure China’s rise is peaceful is to maintain armed forces sufficient to deter the PRC from considering military action.
Such a “dual use” capability would benefit the United States as well. The objective would not be a high-profile attempt at containment, but a low-profile capacity for deterrence, relieving Washington of any need to intervene. Most important, America should not reflexively extend its “nuclear umbrella” in response to the future possibility of a nuclear North Korea. Doing so would inevitably deepen American involvement in regional controversies, potentially turning every local dispute into an international crisis.
Chinese aggression against Taiwan will escalate and go nuclear
Adams, 09 – reporter for global post and newsweek on China and Taiwan (3/31/09, Jonathon, Global Post, “The dragon sharpens its claws,” )
TAIPEI — It's the stuff of dark sci-fi scenarios; the war that nobody wants.
But the most recent Pentagon report on China's military power — released last week — shows how high the stakes have become, in the unlikely event the United States and China ever do come to blows.
China has the world's fastest-growing military. It is building state-of-the art fighter jets, destroyers, and anti-ship missiles worth billions of dollars. It's just confirmed it will build an aircraft carrier.
And according to the Pentagon, it's now fielding a new nuclear force able to "inflict significant damage on most large American cities."
Most disturbing, Chinese military officials have publicly threatened to use that capability against the United States — in a conflict over Taiwan.
"China doesn't just threaten war, it threatens nuclear war," said John Tkacik, a China expert and former U.S. diplomat, at a forum in Taipei last weekend. "This is the kind of thing that rattles cages in the U.S."
For now, Taiwan is the only plausible cause of military conflict between the world's superpower and the rising Asian giant.
South Korean Modernization Adv – 1ac
Extinction
Cheong, 2000 – East Asia Correspondent
(Ching Cheong, The Straits Times, “No one gains in war over Taiwan,” 6-25-2000, Lexis-Nexis Universe)
A cross-strait conflict, even at the lowest end of the intensity scale, will suffice to truncate, if not to reverse, the steep GNP growth trends of the past few years.
Other than the quantifiable losses from disrupted trade flows, there is also the longer-term damage to consider.
For example, it took Taiwan almost three decades to establish itself as the third largest producer of information technology (IT) products in the world. It is now the island's single largest foreign exchange earner.
The Sept 21 earthquake last year demonstrated the risk involved in Taiwan's dependence on the IT industry.
A few days of power blackouts disrupted chip-manufacturing operations on the island, which in turn sent prices of these components soaring worldwide.
Not surprisingly, a scramble followed for alternative sources of supply.
A blockade lasting three months will devastate the industry in Taiwan.
Similarly, it has taken China more than two decades to establish itself as the second largest recipient of private direct investment.
In recent years, such investment has amounted to more than 20 per cent of China's total capital formation.
A capital outflow will follow if there is trouble across the strait.
Other than China and Taiwan, Japan's economy is likely to be hurt too if the blockade disrupts its "life-line" -the sea lane through which flows its supplies of oil and other commodities.
Though no physical loss will be incurred, the blockade will force up prices across the board as Japan is so dependent on this sea lane.
The Asean region stands to gain in the short run.
Those with strong IT industries, like Singapore and Malaysia, will carve a big slice from what was previously Taiwan's share.
Similarly, as investment flees China, the Asean countries might be able to intercept this flow and benefit thereby.
Politically, the blockade is likely to provoke Sino-phobia in the region.
Japan's rightwing forces will seize this golden opportunity to demand a revision of the post-war Constitution prohibiting its rearmament.
Asean countries having territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea will beef up their defence budgets.
Ethnic Chinese population in these countries may have to contend with increased suspicion or worse as Sino-phobia rises.
The US stands to gain. So long as its stays on the sidelines, it does not lose the Chinese market. At the same time its defence industry gains as countries in the region start stocking up on arms in anticipation of trouble.
DESTROYING THE TAIWAN MILITARY
THE medium intensity scenario postulates a situation in which Beijing wages a war against Taiwan.
The objective here is to obliterate its military capability which is seen as underpinning its independence movement.
The outcome: Taiwan is brought to its knees but only after widespread death and destruction have been inflicted on the island and the coastal provinces of China.
In this scenario, the US while feeling obliged to support Taiwan militarily is not party to a full-scale war with China.
Washington's primary concern would be to keep it to a "limited war" to prevent hostilities from spinning out of control. Limited though it may be, the war will set back the economies of China and Taiwan by at least two to three decades.
All the short-term gains enjoyed by the Asean countries in the low-intensity scenario will be nullified as the conflict intensifies.
In this medium-intensity scenario, no one gains.
Politically, all countries are forced to take sides.
This decision is particularly hard to make in those countries having a sizeable ethnic-Chinese population.
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable.
Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war.
Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation.
In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.
If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire.
And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order.
With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq.
In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.
Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war?
According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat.
In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons.
If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons.
The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option.
A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons.
Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it.
He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.
Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.
There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Withdrawal => Sustainable ROK Military Force
Plan solves free riding, creating a sustainable military force in ROK
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 102) DR
In any case, the existing personnel and materiel imbalance is not inevitable, some irrunurable aspect of geography on the Korean peninsula. Rather, it results from past ROK free-riding. Seoul's failure to invest heavily in defense today to close the gap reflects current free-riding. The South can do so only because it relies on the U.S. presence as a supplemental deterrent to North Korean aggression. That the relationship is beneficial to the ROK is obvious. T hat it is in America's interest is not.
Withdrawal => Empirical ROK Modernization
Previous U.S. troop withdrawals have reduced tensions and increased the capabilities of the ROK armed forces
Davino 04 – Director for Manpower, Personnel, and Administration of the United States Pacific Command (Michael F. Davino, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” Strategy Research Project, 3/15/04, )
IMPACT OF PREVIOUS U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS IN KOREA ON REGIONAL STABILITY
As a result of the ever-changing balance of forces and various strategic or political considerations, from time to time the U. S. has adjusted its force level in Korea, usually in a downward direction. In fact, at one point in the late 1970’s, President Jimmy Carter announced that U.S. ground combat troops would be totally withdrawn. This decision was subsequently reversed. In addition to President Carter’s attempt at total disengagement, there have been three significant reductions to U.S. troop levels in Korea. Although these partial withdrawals have caused friction with the ROK government, they have not destabilized the Korean Peninsula or the Northeast Asia region. For the most part, tensions have been reduced in the periods that followed troop reductions. Past significant reductions include:
▪ By 1955, reducing the U.S. forces from three corps controlling a total of seven divisions to a single corps of two U.S. infantry divisions.23
▪ Withdrawing one of the two remaining infantry divisions in 1971 as part of the Nixon Doctrine, under which the U.S. would no longer provide large ground forces to help its Asian allies maintain their freedom.24
▪ President Carter’s initiative for a total withdrawal that resulted in a reduction of about 3,000 troops before it was cancelled.25
▪ The Nunn-Warner Amendment to the 1989 Defense Appropriation Bill, which called for a three phased reduction of about 7,000 troops.26 After about 2,000 troops were withdrawn, this reduction was placed on hold indefinitely because of the 1994 crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear program.27
Of the four troop reductions made after the armistice, a period of reduced tensions, or at least a relatively stable level of tension has followed three.28 In the latest case, the increase in tension was the result of the U.S. discovery of how far the four-decade North Korean nuclear weapons development program had progressed. The withdrawals have also been followed by a major increase in the capabilities of the ROK armed forces, usually planned as part of the withdrawal.
ROK Can Develop Its Military
Strong economy allows ROK to develop its military
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 113)DR
Economic growth also improves a country's ability to make war material. As the South's economy took off, the Pentagon acknowledged that the ROK’s aircraft, transportation system, and military-industrial capability were superior to those in the DPRK.. Along with the military-industrial capability came development of an indigenous arms industry. A nation that in the 1970s did not even make its own rifles was producing, a decade later, virtually all of its conventional arms, including F-5 fighters, helicopters, rocket launchers, self- propelled howitzers, M48 and T88 tanks, armored personnel frigates, Hawk and Honest John missiles, and more. 59 Said the ROK's Ministry of National Defense, "South Korea can claim an increasing edge over the North, '" military science and technology, backed by the rapid growth of its aerospace, automobile, communication and electronic industries.” And that was more than a decade ago. Since then South Korea has begun a serious space program, launching a three-stage liquid-fueled rocket, produced at home, in late 2002; the ROK stated that it hoped to launch a satellite in another two years. Seoul also has unveiled plans for a blue-water navy—one apparently directed at Japan and China more than North Korea. Indeed, in January, 2004 the conservative newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that Seoul was developing plans for several nuclear-power submarines to confront “powerful neighbors.” Observed one American military analyst: “as the perceived threat from the NKPA [North Korean People’s Army] has diminished, the ROK military has looked ahead and attempted to develop military capabilities to reduce its dependence on the United States and to meet future security challenges.”
South Korea has the technology to militarize.
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 116) DR
President Roh Moo-hyun has pledged to increase military spending, returning to the 3.2 percent (up from today's 2.7 percent) of GDP spent before the 1997 economic crisis. His government has proposed a series of qualitative improvements and force restructuring as well as enhanced research and development.83 The ROK also is deploying 111 U.S.-made missiles with a 301l kilometer range, meaning they can strike most anywhere in North Korea. The program foresees a 42 percent increase in defense investment and reinstates work on AWACS surveillance aircraft, refueling aircraft, and Patriot missiles Alas, although long overdue, the plan merely moves outlays back to pre 1997 levels. Moreover, the proposal has generated opposition on a variety ." grounds, including the argument that the South already could defeat till DPRK and mat a collective defense strategy (i.e .• continuing to rely 011 The United States is a better approach.84 One magazine article argued that such a budgetary incrc.ase "is nearly inconceivable" given "the sluggish economy, ,and the growing need for more welfare expenditures."
It is just a question of will – ROK has the means
Carpenter and Bandow 4 - * Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 118)DR
That would be a major burden, but hardly unreasonable for a wealthy country threatened by an aggressive and well-armed neighbor. Indeed, no one in the ROK says the country would be helpless without America's presence. Rather, they complain about the added expense. The South simply has refused to do more. That Seoul does not want to up its spending is understandable. But that reluctance is no reason for the United States to maintain troops in the ROK. In fact, when presented in the past with an obvious need to do more, South Korea has responded. Between 1954 and 1955 the United States withdrew six infantry divisions-China was simultaneously reducing its force presence in the North. Seoul added five infantry divisions.
Similar has been South Korea's reaction to later reductions in America's commitment: the Nixon cutbacks, Carter withdrawal program, and conflict with America over human rights all convinced Seoul, observes Asian expert Ralph Clough, "that South Korea must move quickly to become less dependent on the United States for its defense."98 The Korean government itself admits as much.
***Withdrawal INEVITABLE
ANTI-AMERICANISM NOW
ROK Anti-Americanism has been rampant for decades – recent film proves that its still high
Park ’09 (August, 09, Seong Won, “The Present and Future of Americanization in South Korea.” )
Until the 1970s, there was no pubic anti-Americanism movement in Korea (Kim, 1994; Lee, 2004). But, in 1980, a military government's massacre marked the beginning of widespread anti-Americanism. After a military dictator Park Jung-Hee was assassinated by one of his men in 1979, another general, Chun Doo-Hwan, occupied political power in 1980 and killed thousands of innocent civilians in Gwang-Joo city, southern part of Korea, because those civilians protested against Chun's regime. At that time, university students were the counterforce of Chun's regime and raised the political question: why did the US not stop the brutal military government from killing people? Besides the fact that the US did not do anything other than looking on as spectator, one year after the massacre, Reagan's government officially invited President Chun to the US and promised more economic supports to Chun's government.
Thus, students interpreted US action as US supporting the Korean dictatorship. This recognition led university students, religious groups, and leftist-intellectuals to take part in anti-American movements. Anti-Americanism meant democracy, independence from the US, and decolonization of neo-colonialism for Korean dissidents Lee, 2004). In addition, from the 1980s the US pressured Korea to open agricultural markets to the US. This pressure angered people in rural areas and pushed them to become political dissidents who fought against Korean dictatorships and US economic imperialism. Moreover, the US invasion of Iraq in 1991 awakened Korean civilians to recognize that US militarism was excessive. Like adding fuel to this antiAmericanism, two schoolgirls were accidentally killed by a US military truck on June 2002. As a result, Korean grassroots groups have acknowledged that US military imperialism threatens not only Korean peace but also world peace. The girls' deaths were accidental, but, coupled with the timing of the American invasion of Iraq, led Koreans to reconsider American militarism as a threat to peace as opposed to a preserver of peace. Those who remained a mere spectator of the American invasion to Iraq opened their eyes to see realities of the Iraq war committed by the US government, and some Korean non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attempted to organize a peace movement as a reflection of a culture that could resist Americanism. In short, anti-Americanism in Korea is involved in processes of political democracy opposed to military dictatorship, fostering a rise of new nationalism in reaction to US imperialism, and support for food sovereignty fighting US pressures to open agricultural markets.
Anti-Americanism Now
ROK Anti-Americanism high – multiple reasons
Kim AND Hur ’09 – @ the Center for International Studies, Inha University (December 2009. Yongho Kim and Jaeyoung Hur. “Framing Anti-Americanism and the Media inSouth Korea: TV vs Newspaper”, ]
Recently, many anti-American Koreans held American-influenced thinkers accountable for the Korean financial crisis of 1997. The anti-American thinkers argued that the American-influenced thinkers have influenced the social system, especially economic structures. Ha-Joon Chang and Jang-Seop Shin (2004) argue in their book, Restructuring Korea Inc., that the Korean financial crisis resulted from American-influenced intellectuals' neo-liberalism. According to Chang and Shin, American-influenced intellectuals studied in the US from the 1980s to 1990s and then spread US neo-liberalism in Korea. For example, during the period from 1987 to 1995, among PhD economists in the US, 10% were Koreans. Most of them returned to Korea and spread neo-liberalism to Korean society. As a result, during 1990 to 1997 Korean government deregulated and gave companies and individuals economic initiatives and freedom. Chang (2008) argues that neo-liberalism driven by the Korean government in the mid-1990s was "partly due to American pressure, but also because, after three decades of its economic 'miracle', [South Korea] had become too full of itself." South Korea decided to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996 and "act like a rich country when it really wasn't one" (p.208). Consequently, the Korean government was unable to prevent the financial crisis in 1997. Anti-Americanism is moving to cultural areas and trying to embrace socialism. For example, a movie called My lover is Far from Here (2008), depicts Vietnamese communists as friends of Koreans. In the movie, some Korean singers went to the battle fields of Vietnam to entertain Korean troops, but were caught by North Vietnamese soldiers and forced to live in a prisoner of war camp. As time went by, those Korean hostages realized that communists had something in common in terms of humanitarian aspects. The Korean movie critic Sung-Ryul Kang (2008) pointed out that this movie attempts to place both anti-communists and communists share a common Asian identity. Finally, Kang concludes that this movie suggests that South Korea should make an effort to be more independent from the US. Considering that over one million people watched this movie, the current public discussions about anti-Americanism reflect "Korea's complicated position in the global, neocolonial world, especially its regional position in Asia" (Kim, 2001, p.622). In this sense, one can understand that Koreans really need new ways for overcoming the complicated position. Constructing frames to analyze anti-Americanism requires a reflection on various aspects of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism may be defined as collective actions and statements to “protest against, criticize, or negatively sanction” the USA and its citizens. Anti-Americanism is expressed in several patterns: cultural criticism toward American culture, political and economic resentment against US policies, and ideological rejection of American values and materialistic manifestations of the American lifestyle. Some consider the issue-oriented aspect of anti-Americanism that emphasizes policy disagreement with the USA while others spotlight the instrumental aspect of anti-Americanism in which governments deliberately manipulate anti-American sentiment for eliciting domestic support. There is also an ideological definition of anti-Americanism that is rooted in Marxist or Islamic fundamentalist antagonism toward the USA and American culture. In other occasions, anti-Americanism is also regarded as resentment of US foreign policy as characterized by imperialism, disappointment toward disparity between American wealth and Third World poverty and as a form of xenophobia. It is also indicated as a negative response toward the triumph English over all other languages in the era of globalization; and toward American use of force in a foreign country as instigated by anti-war popular culture such as anti-war songs and movies produced in the USA. In South Korea, anti-Americanism emerged as a response to the alleged American involvement in the redeployment of South Korean troops for uppressing the Kwangju uprising in 1980. In May 1980, the US military command in South Korea allegedly acquiesced to release South Korean troops from US operation control for redeployment in Kwangju and these troops killed hundreds of anti-government protesters. This changed the perception of the USA from the brotherhood alliance partner to the doublefaced interferer who supported an authoritarian military general who oppressed democracy in South Korea. Another source of anti-Americanism is economic pressure to open
[CONTINUED]
Anti-Americanism Now
[CONTINUED]
up South Korean markets for US beef and grain. As soon as South Korea achieved a trade surplus with the USA in the mid-1980s, Washington demanded greater market access for US agricultural product and capital goods. In particular, opening the rice market provoked nationalist sentiment because it was “perceived as an assault on Korea’s pride.” 18 The rise of anti-Americanism is also related to the change in demographic structure in South Korea. As the Korean-war-generation is aging and the democraticmovement-generation has emerged as the leading group of the society, the USA is perceived more and more as the supporter of authoritarian regime and thus, as a hindrance toward democratization and, at the same time, less and less as the alliance partner who fought in the Korean War. Although anti-Americanism had been a franchise of student activists and progressive leaders since the 1980s, for most citizens, the US–South Korean alliance had been a forbidden subject of not spelling out unequal and asymmetric aspects. In accordance, the media had tended to zoom in on violence in their coverage of anti-American protests, highlighting physical fights with the police, Molotov cocktails, destruction of public facilities and illegal infiltration into US facilities. These behaviors may be interpreted as threats to “mainstream society” with stable majority opinions and interests. The same thing was true in the American media’s coverage of anti-Vietnam-War protests in which Viet Cong flags and communist elements were intentionally highlighted and exaggerated. As democratization went on in the early 1990s, the conservatives gradually lost control of public agenda setting over anti-Americanism. Democratization opened a way for the public to step into the discussion on security affairs mostly on relations with North Korea and the USA. As various civil movement organizations registered their own views over security issues including US–South Korean relations, anti-American complaints bridged political standpoints and ideological gaps between civil movement organizations in South Korea. The public began to express community grievances and anger toward the US troops in cases of GI crimes and environmental pollution around US bases and their firing field. In particular, the South Korean public reacted very sensitively toward sexual crimes toward female victims like in the case of the brutal murder of Yun Geumi who became the symbol of South Korea’s “powerlessness and victimization by the United States.” 22
Anti-Americanism Now
Anti-Americanism high – the Media
Young-jin ’10 – Staff Reporter @ Korea Times (6/28/10, Kim Young-jin “Media impact on relations between ROK, US growing” )
The governments of the United States and South Korea should increase their awareness of the media’s role in shaping their alliance, at a time when cooperation between the countries appears set to forge new ground, experts said Monday in Seoul. At a forum organized by the Asia Foundation, participants discussed the importance of the American and Korean public being educated on the alliance and the media’s role in disseminating related information. The assessment came after Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama reinforced their relationship Saturday by delaying the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to Seoul by three years until Dec. 1, 2015. A better understanding could help diffuse tension when thorny issues arise between the countries, Alyson Slack, a research associate at Washington, D.C.-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the forum. A precedent for such tension was the fallout from the 2002 accident in which two Korean girls were killed by a USFK military vehicle, which ignited anti-American protests and flag burnings. Slack said that the American public’s reaction to the events was made worse by a lack of knowledge about Korea. “Their limited understanding of the historical context of the outrage, and their limited awareness of the benefits to be derived from the alliance opened the door for a magnified negative impact on the public perception of Korea,” she said. Positive views on the partnership will be vital in the coming years as the country tackles its huge budget deficits, Slack said. At such times, the experts said, foreign military installations such as the United States Forces in Korea can become “a quick target” in efforts to slash spending. She said that in recent years the number of newspaper articles on the U.S.-Korea alliance have fallen, making way for more economic and trade coverage on Korea. Shin Gi-wook, director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, suggested U.S. policymakers pay more attention to the messages from Korean news outlets, which he says are closely entwined with national identity. Shin cited the tank incident and the massive 2008 protests against U.S. beef imports as examples of how the media here can mobilize the public, which, in turn, can affect U.S. policy. Both experts noted the role of the Internet in the political scene here, as both the 2002 and 2008 protests, as well as the campaign of the late former President Roh Moo-hyun, were assisted by such resources. Slack added, however, that the lack of alliance-related coverage in the United States could have positive implications as well. “This indicates interest on the part of Americans in Korea’s rise as an economic power,” she said, citing Seoul’s “Green Growth” initiative and its hosting of the G-20 in November as areas of interest. “ All this presents prospects for broader convergence socially. It can’t be a bad thing that Americans are interested in South Korea beyond the lens of its alliance with the U.S.”
ROK Supports Withdrawal
South Korean public want US withdrawal– Empirically proven
Snyder, 08 – Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Senior Associate, International Relations. (5/1/08, Scott, “Future of ROK‐U.S. Relations: U.S. Approach” Presentation 2, Peace in the Korean Peninsula and the Security Environment in Northeast Asia)
Periodic outbursts of anti‐American sentiment in South Korea accompanied a rise in Korean national feeling surrounding the 2002 World Cup hosted in Seoul and Tokyo. The upswing in national pride from the World Cup provided kindling for a nationwide series of protests following the deaths in June of 2002 of two schoolgirls in a traffic accident involving a U.S. armored transport vehicle on a road north of Seoul. The acquittal of two American privates in a USFK trial held in November of 2002‐‐only one month before South Korea’s presidential elections‐‐catalyzed peaceful nationwide open air‐candlelight demonstrations against the verdict, which was widely seen in South Korea as a betrayal of justice and as a symbol of American military impunity and arrogance. The demonstrations became a focal point of the South Korean presidential election, which was won by the “anti‐American,” progressive candidate Roh Moo‐hyun.
The relationship with the United States became contested in South Korean society as a result of the emergence of new political forces that oppose the alliance relationship with the United States and feel that it is time to reduce South Korean over‐dependence on the United States for its security. South Korean political terms of debate have cast the alliance with the United States in opposition to improved inter‐Korean relations. The opposition party has criticized the Roh administration for weakening relations with the United States by unduly favoring progress in inter‐Korean relations, while the ruling party has criticized conservatives for being too beholden to the United States at the expense of reconciliation with North Korea.
***Overstretch / War on Terror ADV
WITHDRAWAL => RESOURCES FOR WOT ***
Withdrawal is essential to resolve anti-American feelings and free up military personnel for the war on terror – Navy and Air Force can still aid South Korea if it is attacked
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
Neither Richard Halloran’s diplomatic options nor the blatantly militant pre-emption options should be entertained. There is a more viable option: a unilateral withdraw of United States ground forces from South Korea. The current administration’s commitment to the global war on terrorism, with subsequent military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, has caused considerable strain on the United States Military’s finite resources. Service components, scrambling to meet the increased operational tempo of the current environment, have yet to realize the implications on retention and sustaining a quality force.
Withdrawal of forces from South Korea would enable the United States to realize an infrastructure cost savings while continuing to meet the guidance in the National Security Strategy and regional policy objectives that are inherent in forward basing of troops. It will also make available more forces for the administration’s global war on terrorism. Additionally, the removal of American forces from South Korea would alleviate political unrest associated with the increasing anti-American sentiment among South Koreans.
Moving the headquarters from Seoul to the south will do little to stem the tide of growing anti-American sentiment. The source of anti-American feelings resides with the large amount of ground forces that operate and train on Korean soil, not the location of the headquarters.
Since South Korea has a large standing ground force, the presence of United States ground forces in South Korea is militarily inconsequential. The real threat from North Korea is their policy to develop nuclear weapons. U.S. ground forces are unnecessary to deter or defend against nuclear weapons. Additionally, the presence of US forces on South Korean soil is a major source of anti-American sentiment among the Korean population. This hostility cause political unrest on the peninsula. United States’ diplomatic efforts to end the North Korean nuclear weapon crisis are at odds with the South Korean diplomatic policy. The divergent views of the North Korean threat and diplomatic policies to alleviate it are causing friction between South Korea and the United States. To maintain our influence in South Korea, the U.S. needs to narrow the gap between our divergent perceptions.
Due to the degradation of North Korean conventional forces and in light of the recent North Korean policy of developing nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that North Korea would launch a conventional attack on South Korea. However, in the unlikely event of such an attack, South Korea with assistance from the U.S. Navy and Air Force, could defeat the attack. North Korea’s policy to develop nuclear weapons is similar to the massive retaliation strategy of the 1950s Eisenhower administrations. Both governments want to portray credible military strength to attain national interests at the lowest possible cost.
The Eisenhower Administration’s policy wanted to decrease taxes and military spending in order to build a stronger U.S. economy. Reliance on a strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons was much cheaper than maintaining large conventional forces. Unfortunately, as later events were to prove, this strategy resulted in the U.S. forces being unable to influence any struggle, short of a thermo-nuclear exchange, concerning a national interest. North Korea’s policy is to gain concessions from U.S. and other regional powers to meet the objective of regime survival. Like the Eisenhower Administration, North Korea is pursuing a policy of relying on nuclear weapons to meet the nation’s policy objectives because it is cheaper than maintaining a large standing army. This policy is probably contributing to the degradation of their conventional forces capability.
Withdrawal is necessary to free up financial resources to sustain the war on terror
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
If the policy remains the same (keeping troops in South Korea) there are associated economical and financial risks. The rising cost in support of the Global War on Terror is placing a burden on the U.S. economy. According to the CRS Report for Congress, the estimated cost of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (assuming gradual withdrawal) between FY2006 and FY2010 could total approximately $570 billion by the end of 2010.22 There are two options to help ease the financial cost. One option would be to “do nothing” and continue to support the GWOT without any fiscal worries. Another option would be to rethink other strategies that would help ease the current burden. Simply put, it is not feasible to sustain a permanent U.S. force in South Korea while supporting the current war on terror. Additionally, keeping troops in the region could result in personnel backlash. There are a number of Asians which view the presence of troops as “foreigners with weapons on home turf”. In fact, there is evidence that there is already a growing dissention of American presence in South Korea. According to Moon, “It is the growth of civil society that has opened the floodgates of dissatisfaction with the American presence in Korea”23 Simply put, the longer the U.S. remains in South Korea, could lead to dissention among the Koreans that would eventually lead to future backlash towards current National Security Policy.
Withdrawal => Resources for WOT
Withdrawal will not undermine readiness of alliance defense – frees up troops execute the war on terror and eliminated anti-American sentiment in South Korea
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
CONCLUSION
In the foreseeable future the United States will continue to view the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula as a vital national security interest and integral to sustaining global commerce. Withdrawal of United States ground forces from South Korea will not degrade the military readiness of the alliance defense. On the contrary, it will eliminate one of the major sources of growing anti-Americanism among the South Korean population. Moreover, United States can utilize ground forces that are re-deployed from the peninsula in the Global War on terrorism, and save the associated costs of forward based troops. For South Korea, with strong United States support, to take the lead in the defense of their nation is an idea whose time has come.
In conclusion, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea would be a win-win alternative. We gain economic and military resources while maintaining our objectives in northeast Asia and garnering positive public opinion, and South Koreans step out of our shadow and join the first rank of nations as a fully functioning democratic nation in charge of its own national defense.
Plan Solves Overstretch
Withdrawal solves overstretch
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 111) DR
In fact, it is well past time for South Korea to become "somewhat more self-reliant." With large numbers of U.S. troops tied up in a violent occupation of Iraq, fighting resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan, pursuing terrorists elsewhere around the globe, and prepared to handle any number of unexpected international contingencies, why should Washington commit substantial manpower, materiel, and now even more money to Korea? American policymakers remain stuck in the world of a half century ago.
Solves overstretch and war on terror
Henriksen, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Thomas H., “Time to Leave South Korea”, Hoover Policy Review, 3, )
Despite escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula in recent months, it is time to start the pullback of the 14,000 American troops stationed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and the GIs garrisoned in the nearby capital rather than waiting a year. Implementing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s plans for repositioning U.S. forces from the DMZ and their central Seoul base will better align Washington’s decades-old obligations with newfound perils on the peninsula and beyond. The United States can honor its commitment to defend South Korea from another northern invasion by our formidable land and carrier-based airpower. This military reconfiguration in South Korea should be part of an overhaul of American post–Cold War strategy.
There are two time warps on the Korean peninsula. There is the familiar one north of the DMZ with a communist regime that resembles Josef Stalin’s Soviet Russia of the 1930s, with prison camps, starvation, oppression, and propaganda campaigns against the United States.
The other, less acknowledged, time warp is south of the DMZ. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, U.S. forces have been frozen in defensive positions against another North Korean assault. Currently, there are a total of 37,000 U.S. forces in all of South Korea. Their mission is static, and their training and equipment make them unfit for new fast-paced operations. Moreover, North Korea’s heavy-duty conventional artillery and self-proclaimed nuclear weapons make this force more hostage than defender.
South Korea’s 600,000 troops ought to assume the primary role in defending their own country, relieving U.S. troops for security operations in liberated Iraq or for swift-response roles in the campaign against terror, for example. American forces are stretched thin around the globe in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Japan, Germany, and now the Philippines and Kyrgyzstan. A rebalancing of American power should have taken place after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the world enjoyed a brief respite from major threats.
The current volatile international environment is no excuse not to undertake such a review now—for it is actually during times of war, hot or cold, that conditions compel change. Halcyon eras, like the 1990s, breed complacency. The U.S. military and geopolitical framework underwent profound changes in World War II and again with the onset of the Cold War. The war on terror necessitates carefully executed adjustments but so, too, does a world vastly altered by the end of the Soviet confrontation. North Korea is no longer Moscow’s proxy.
Troops Will be Redeployed
Past reductions prove that troops will be redeployed to other regions
IPS, 04 (11/5/04, "SOUTH KOREA: WHEN U.S. CUTS TROOPS, TIES WITH SEOUL WILL CHANGE", lexis, JMP)
This transition, experts say, is the main challenge for the five-decades-long alliance between the United States and South Korea at a time when the security environment in North-east Asia is changing.
The Cold War is presumably over and the United States has removed many of its overseas forces in Asia in the last decade. In 1992, the Philippines ended the lease of the U.S. largest overseas, although the United States still has 47,000 troops in Japan these days.
Today too, South Koreans no longer see North Korea - whose nuclear programme remains a great concern for North-east Asia - as that big a threat. The South and North Korean leaders met in a landmark summit in 2000, and there has been growing anti-U.S. sentiment and hostility to hosting U.S. forces.
These changes are also linked to Washington's decision to withdraw 12,500 of the 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea by 2008, as part of worldwide realignments to allow easy deployment overseas. Some troops stationed in South Korea have been moved to Iraq.
Troops Will be Redeployed to Afghanistan
Withdrawal of ground forces will save money and free up troops for Afghanistan
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
RECOMMENDATIONS
WITHDRAW U.S. GROUND FORCES FROM SOUTH KOREA
Considering the capability of the ROK Military and the recent disparate demands on the United States military, the time is ripe to withdraw ground forces from South Korea. This course of action will enable the military to apply more resources toward the global war on terrorism. Furthermore, there will be inherent cost savings by withdrawing ground forces from South Korea. The American force structure currently in Korea could be deployed elsewhere (Afghanistan, Iraq, or Bosnia). Withdrawal of forces would eliminate the infrastructure cost of maintaining hundreds of individual camps required to forward base U.S. ground forces. Furthermore, the removal of U.S. ground forces would halt the progress of anti-American sentiment among the South Korean population.
Past Obama statements prove
Korea Times, 09 (11/20/09, Jung Sung-ki, “Obama Hints at Rotating Troops in South Korea to Afghanistan,” , JMP)
U.S. President Barack Obama hinted that American troops stationed in South Korea could be deployed to Afghanistan.
The remark was made Thursday when he spoke to thousands of U.S. troops here on the final day of his weeklong Asia tour. It came on the heels of the Oct. 22 comment by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Pentagon could temporarily deploy U.S. service members in Korea to the Middle East in coming years.
Mullen referred to the soon-to-be-implemented longer, family-accompanied tours by U.S. troops in South Korea as a base for the idea.
``Many of you served in Iraq … others among you served in Afghanistan,'' Obama told 1,500 U.S. forces at Osan Airbase in Gyeonggi Province. ``Others among you will be deployed yet again.''
Pundits say the comment by Obama can be construed as emphasizing ``strategic flexibility'' for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) since the U.S. government is struggling to handle Afghan issues amid surging death tolls and withdrawals of non-U.S. troops from the terrorism-stricken Central Asian nation.
Troops Will Be Redeployed to Afghanistan
Troops will be redirected to Afghanistan
Yonhap News Agency, 9. (10/28/09, BBC, “US not to reduce troops in South Korea, Pentagon spokesman says” l/n).
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 (Yonhap) - The United States Tuesday reconfirmed its commitment to maintain the number of US troops in South Korea amid concerns that Washington is considering redeploying its forces in Korea to conflict regions. "At last week's SCM, Secretary Gates reiterated his firm commitment to maintaining troop levels on the peninsula, and as a sign of that commitment he is moving forward with normalizing tours to South Korea so that our forces and their families will live and work there," Geoff Morrell, Pentagon spokesman, told Yonhap News Agency. Gates was in Seoul last week to attend the annual Security Consultative Meeting. Concerns erupted in South Korea when Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told US soldiers at Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul Thursday [ 22 October] that discussions are under way about rotating US troops in South Korea, although he said, "I certainly wouldn't expect this to happen in the near future." About 28,500 US troops are stationed in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korea, which remains technically at war with the allies since the cease-fire that ended the 1950-53 Korean conflict. One theory is that the Barack Obama administration may reduce its ground troops in South Korea for possible redeployment abroad after Seoul reassumes full command of its troops as scheduled in April 2012. That would allow the US to focus on building air and naval forces on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea got back peacetime control of its forces in 1994. The timing coincides with the completion of facilities for the dependents of the majority of the 28,500 American troops in South Korea, which may facilitate three-year tours, up from the current one year. "Certainly, that's something that we are looking very specifically at," Mullen said. "And, in fact, there have been forces that were here that went to Iraq very early. And we're in discussion. No decisions with respect to that right now." Earlier this year, a US Apache attack helicopter battalion assigned to Korea was sent to Afghanistan to reinforce American forces struggling in the war-torn Central Asian state. The battalion's redeployment triggered concerns in South Korea that the Obama administration may follow up on the flexible troop deployment drawn up by the previous George W. Bush administration to make its easier for US troops in the Korean Peninsula to be mobilized to war zones. The South Korean Defence Ministry said Monday that it has never discussed a possible US troop reduction in Korea and that the US government has reconfirmed its pledge to maintain the number of US troops in South Korea at the current level. "The concern that gets raised with respect to rotating forces out of here is that it lessens the commitment to the alliance and the Republic of Korea," said Mullen, but he added, "There are regional challenges that we have here, and actually they are global challenges, so there is no answer to that question yet." Some analysts see Mullen's remarks as pressure on South Korea to send troops back to Afghanistan, a move the Seoul government is still considering. In a joint news conference with South Korean Defence Minister Kim Tae-young in Seoul Thursday, Gates said that South Koreans themselves will make any decision on troop deployments or any other form of aid to Afghanistan. In a speech at Yongsan Garrison a day earlier, however, Gates touched on the sensitive issue in a bit more aggressively. "The United States and the Republic of Korea are invariably bound by the same mutual interest in peace and stability around the world, bringing new resonance to the words 'We go together,'" Gates said. "We encourage the Republic of Korea's political leaders to make an investment in defence appropriate to Korea's emerging role as a contributor to global security and commensurate with the threat you face on the peninsula." Taking note of South Korea's troop dispatches to Vietnam a nd Iraq, Gates said, "I see a different dynamic and logic to Korea's international military role today. In the past, deployments were considered something that Korea was doing for the United States. Going forward, Korea's international military contributions should be seen as what they are: something that is done to benefit your own security and vital national interests." Some analysts said Gates was trying to pave the way for Obama to raise the issue when he meets with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak [Yi Myo'ng-pak] in Seoul in mid-November. Obama is being pressured by the US military to dispatch 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan, where the Taleban insurgency is gaining power, despite the presence of about 68,000 American troops. Some fear Afghanistan might turn out to be another quagmire like Vietnam. South Korea withdrew more than 200 military medics and engineers from Afghanistan in 2007 after 23 South Korean Christian missionaries were held captive. Two of them were killed and the rest released after the Seoul government pledged to withdraw the troops by the end of that year. South Korea, which currently maintains scores of medical civilians at a US base in Afghanistan, had plans to increase the number to 85 by year's end. On Monday [ 26 October], South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan [Yu Myo'ng-hwan] said that increased aid to Afghanistan by South Korea is linked to the stable deployment of US troops in the Korean Peninsula. Yu also revealed a new plan, under discussion among government agencies, to send a 130-strong Provincial Reconstruction Team accompanied by 300 troops to protect the civilian medics and engineers.
A2: Troops Will be Relocated to Japan
Troops won’t be redeployed to Japan
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
The relocation of ground forces to Japan is not likely. First it would be a hard sell to Japan given the ongoing difficulties with U.S. ground forces in Okinawa. Second, it could send the wrong signal to Korea who remains wary of Japanese intentions. Third, the U.S. Congress and public will likely clamour to “bring the troops home.” Guam remains a possibility, but it doesn’t satisfy the third objection. Other possibilities exist, but the important point is that the U.S. retains the capability to rapidly respond to a crisis. Prepositioning brigade sets of equipment, either on the peninsula or immediately off shore, provides this capability. This approach reinforces stated U.S. interests in Korea, serves as a deterrence, provides a timely response, and satisfies objections to the continued presence of U.S. ground troops. After two years and upon completion of the U.S. ground troop withdrawal, the U.S. Air Force wings could be withdrawn from the peninsula. Aside from the forces in Japan, Guam, and Thailand and forces apportioned to the theater Combatant Commander, these wings are key to the current U.S. defense of the peninsula. Certainly they represent the teeth of U.S. combat capability immediately available at the onset of hostilities. Under the Air Force expeditionary force concept, the expected capability is a two wings force in the objective area within 24 hours. Still, I believe withdrawing these wings completely from the region would be drastic in terms of signaling our intentions and retaining a credible presence in the region. The U.S. should pursue an agreement with Japan to relocate these forces to Japan. Admittedly this is course of action has its challenges, primarily due to the objections previously discussed. However, I think the objections could be overcome by trading off the return of ground forces for retaining the air assets in theater and through skillful negotiations with the Korean and Japanese governments. Again, to reduce turmoil and help alleviate objections, the transition should be conducted incrementally over a span of two or more years.
***SOLVENCY
Phased Withdrawal Solvency
Phase out would encourage a technologically advanced South Korea to modernize its military.
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s
Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 139-140)DR
Washington should decide on a rough phase-out period of, say, four years-with the exact timetable subject to negotiation-after which all U.S. forces would be withdrawn from the peninsula and the Mutual Defense Treaty would be canceled. Washington should initiate early consultations with the ROK to fashion a smooth disengagement process and to enable Seoul to begin its force buildup, adding manpower, purchasing equipment, and enhancing domestic production. Indeed, Seoul should be encouraged to make the formal public announcement, at which time it should publicly challenge Pyongyang to demonstrate the sincerity of its past peace proposals by pulling its troops back from their aggressive posture and engaging in meaningful arms control negotiations.
U.S. infantry units, which the South could replace most easily, should be pulled out quickly. In fact, once the administration moves them, effectively eliminating the tripwire intended to make American military involvement automatic, they will have only a small role in the ROK’s defense: South Korean forces would beat the brunt of any assault, American air and naval units should e withdrawn next and somewhat more slowly. Although some analysts favor continuing to provide air and naval cover after withdrawing the ground units, doing so would not be cheap; is the existence of these formations, as well as those intended for potential reinforcement, nor their deployment in Korea, that is expensive. Moreover, there is no reason why Seoul, which currently possesses a technologically superior, if outnumbered, air force and navy, could not quickly develop adequate air and naval support, especially by purchasing U.S. equipment. As Makoto Momoi, a professor at Japan's National Defense College, observed years ago, the primary military contribution of America's forces has been firepower, and Washington can effectively "transfer" much of it to the South.
Withdrawal Ground Forces Solvency
The U.S. should withdraw ground troops from Korea leaving behind naval and air force units to ensure regional security and increased flexibility
Kim 99 - Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security (Sung-Han Kim, “Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Developing a Research Agenda,” The University of California at San Diego, 5/26-27/99, .)
Another alternative is for the United States to withdraw its ground troops from Korea leaving behind only naval and air force units in a unified Korea. This may well be an approach by which Washington would retain its existing role of ensuring regional security while at the same time enjoying increased flexibility. Seen from the standpoint of the United States, this option is compatible with the policy of ensuring safe passage in the Pacific, while avoiding possible criticism of infringing upon the sovereignty of Korea that may be raised over a continued presence of U.S. ground troops in Korea, in addition to checking the emergence of hegemonic activity in the region.
Withdrawal All but 3-5k Ground Forces
The U.S. should withdraw all ground troops except maintain around 3,000-5,000 soldiers – this dampens possible hegemonic struggles, negates North Korean nuclear plans, and maintains the security alliance
Kim 99 - Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security (Sung-Han Kim, “Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Developing a Research Agenda,” The University of California at San Diego, 5/26-27/99, .)
A third option is to maintain a minimum number of U.S. ground troops, perhaps around 3,000 to 5,000, along with naval and air forces, in a unified Korea. This alternative seems to be the most desirable in reality. The presence of U.S. ground troops, no matter how small their number, would bolster the Korea-U.S. alliance as a regional alliance. In this manner, the United States would be able to dampen a possible hegemonic struggle between China and Japan and negate the urgency of a unified Korea to go nuclear, which would be a major source of instability in Northeast Asia. From the standpoint of Korea, too, Seoul should contemplate how much it would really help Korea's national interests to possess, in an effort to appease public sentiments, nuclear arms that are likely to fuel regional instability in Northeast Asia.
The stationing of U.S. ground troops could be limited to the southern region of the Korean peninsula far from the Chinese border, as a gesture of good faith to Beijing. During his visit to South Korea in March 1997, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said that the United States would continue to station its military in Korea even after unification if the Korean people so desired. Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell also told a Congressional hearing that "The United States is thinking of maintaining a strong security alliance with Korea in the interests of regional security even after threat from North Korea disappears."
To translate this third option into action, one condition should be satisfied. The shared feeling that the United States made a considerable "contribution" to the process of Korean unification should be promoted among the Korean people. Otherwise, even the symbolic presence of U.S. ground forces will be subject to public opposition. However, there should be no major problem if the two countries redefine the focus of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and undertake detailed preparations for these and other possibilities.
Reducing Presence Stops Pressure to Disengage
Reducing presence before pressure for disengagement is crucial to defuse opposition and efficiency
Gilbert 04 – Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army (David Gilbert. “Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?” 5/3/04, )
OPTION THREE: REDUCING THE MILITARY FOOTPRINT; LESS IS BETTER FOR KOREA
“Lower the U.S. military profile. Before opposition to the U.S. military presence reaches serious proportions and leads to significant pressures for disengagement, the United States should defuse this opposition by lowering the U.S. military profile in South Korea and offering to make changes in the size, character and location of U.S. deployments.”26 This option in and of itself is not enough to end the current crisis. In fact this option may best be seen as a negotiable condition to either of the first two options. This option is not a recent revelation either. Robert Rich published a case study in June 1982, “Withdrawal of U.S. Ground Forces from Korea, A Case Study in National Security Decision Making.”27 Recently, General Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told attendees at the Council on U.S. - Korean Security Studies, that our footprint in Korea has served us well for the past 50 years; however, in light of current technologies and the military capabilities demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is an opportunity to be more efficient.28
A hasty withdrawal that is not conducted on U.S. terms will hurt U.S. regional influence
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
Within five years after reunification, all U.S. forces would be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula. The anticipated end state is that all U.S. ground forces relocate to CONUS with a brigade sets of prepositioned equipment in theater and the U.S. Air Force wings relocate to Japan or else Guam or Thailand. This timeline assumes a stable post reunification environment and a permissive political situation that allows a gradual withdrawal. Unfortunately, failure to plan and start early preparation for a withdrawal, combined with the domestic and regional pressures previously mentioned, may result in a rather hasty removal of U.S. forces. A hasty withdrawal that is not conduct on U.S. terms would undoubtedly impair U.S. influence in the region and jeopardize national interests.
Withdrawal => Offshore Balancing
Withdrawal will allow adoption of an off-shore balancing strategy and reduce perception of U.S. over handedness
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
Another alternative to the grand strategy is using a combined strategy of isolationism and off-shore balancing. Isolationism primary objective is to keep the United States out of most wars.31 This strategy dates back as far as 1789 and more prevalent in 1796 when President George Washington advocated isolationism.32 Isolationism is using as little of the military as possible to shape the international environment. Many believe that whatever happens outside the borders of the United States, do not pose any threat to the country, that waging war is costly and the risk outweigh the benefits. 33 Many who believe in off-shore balancing as a strategy assume the U.S. would have sufficient time to organize, attack, and destroy any threat. Additionally, another key assumption is that a military withdrawal from overseas would not endanger America’s security. 34 Simply put, by withdrawing all U.S. troops in South Korea and perhaps re-positioning them (i.e. other countries, using sea base) would be beneficial to the U.S. because it would reduce U.S. presence on foreign soil and take away the stereotype that the U.S. is heavily involved in every aspect of the international community.
U.S. can decide on its level of regional engagement after withdrawal
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Of course, it would be better for future relations to present a U.S. withdrawal as a result of changing geopolitical circumstances rather than an expression of national pique. A precipitous withdrawal conducted under a cloud of suspicion and recriminations could further divide Korean society and create additional animus toward the United States.90 In contrast, Ed Olsen of the Naval Postgraduate School advocates creating “a realistic timetable, perhaps two to three years, for modifying the U.S.-ROK alliance in ways that induce far more bilateral equality and reciprocity in the forms of defense burdensharing and policy decision-making.”91 Over the longer term the United States would decide on the degree of its involvement in the region, with options ranging from “deep engagement or entanglement” to “far more limited roles such as an offshore balancer.”92 Olsen favors the latter option, complete with the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces.93 A firm deadline for troop withdrawal is critical.
Withdrawal => Equal Relationship with S. Korea
True equality in alliance is impossible with continued presence – U.S. will demand control
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
Wrapping Up the Alliance
IT SHOULD come as no surprise that the majority of South Koreans, who most obviously benefit from their defense free-ride, oppose proposals for America to withdraw its troops and end its security guarantee. However, there are good reasons for South Koreans to be dissatisfied with the current relationship. The price of the American guarantee is turning decisions about South Korea's defense over to Washington. For many decades, this was not a grave concern for South Koreans, especially when it appeared that war with the North was inevitable if the United States left the peninsula. Today, however, peace on the Korean Peninsula is possible apart from the Mutual Defense Treaty. Far more important, South Koreans are finding that they are much more risk averse than the United States--as represented by both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations--in terms of engaging in military adventures in the region.
Moreover, objections from South Korea might not sway the United States from its chosen course. Attitudes toward the North now diverge widely. The reasons are complex, but many South Koreans, in particular younger people, view North Koreans more as long-lost brothers than long-time enemies. Hostility toward America also has risen, as the older generation, which remembers the United States fondly for having intervened to prevent North Korean conquest in 1950, passes on. In contrast, young people are more likely to think of Washington's support for assorted military dictators. Finally, with Seoul barely 25 miles from the North Korean border, ROK leaders and citizens alike are acutely aware of their vulnerability in any conflict, even though the allies would ultimately prevail. South Koreans could not have been reassured when, in early 2004, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN) contended that the United States should "not rule out any options, including--as a last resort--the use of force" to deal with North Korea or other regional threats. Even blunter was Senator John McCain's (R-AZ) statement: "While they may risk their populations, the United States will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people. And spare us the usual lectures about American unilateralism. We would prefer the company of North Korea's neighbors, but we will make do without it if we must." So long as American forces are based in the South, Washington will seek to dominate and control the alliance. Real equality is simply impossible.
Only a withdrawal of troops can restore equality in relations with South Korea and prevent an inevitable backlash
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
So poisonous had become the U.S.-ROK bilateral atmosphere that many Koreans suspected Washington of arranging the nuclear crisis to boost defeated opposition candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s candidacy. The seizure of the North Korean vessel carrying Scuds for Yemen similarly was seen as an attempt to manipulate South Korean voters by diverting attention from last year’s accident involving U.S. servicemen and two Korean girls.72 The idea of encouraging the North to restart its nuclear program in order to influence the election in the South is obviously absurd, yet some Americans did demand that the Bush administration intervene to try to elect Lee.73
Roh Moo-hyun emerged victorious despite Washington’s preference for his chief competitor. A decade ago, as an opposition lawyer who fought military rule, Roh had called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.74 Roh ran on an explicit peace platform that sharply diverged from U.S. policy. He owes his narrow election victory to rising popular antagonism toward the United States. That antagonism is particularly tied to the presence of American troops.75
Of course, as happens so often after a divisive election, Roh has tried to moderate his position. When visiting the U.S. military headquarters after the vote, he conceded that there were “some voices of anti-Americanism in Korea,” but he went on to state that “the number of those voices is small, and the chances of their leading public opinion is even smaller.”76 Indeed, he went so far as to say that the alliance “was precious, is now still precious and will continue to be important in the future.”77
But those statements contradict Roh’s professed intentions. Roh complains that changes in U.S. troop levels in Korea “have been determined by the United States based on its strategic consideration, without South Korea’s consent.” 78 Accordingly, Roh has reportedly ordered the ROK military to prepare for a reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces.79 He explained in one speech: “Although we don’t know if it might take 10, 20 or 30 years, someone has to consider an independent defense. Senior military officials have to prepare a plan for a special emergency situation when the U.S. Army moves away.”80
Washington has responded with a series of “reforms” that are mere Band-Aids. In addition to entertaining modest changes to the SOFA, the Bush administration is reportedly considering shrinking the number of American installations in South Korea from 41 to 25 over the next decade, but that is too little change over too long a period. Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s suggestion that U.S. forces be pulled back from the DMZ would do nothing to transform relations; instead, such a move would reveal the limited utility of American forces. American forces are a tripwire placed in harm’s way to ensure that the full force of the United States would be engaged in the event of an incursion by North Korean forces into the ROK. But a tripwire in, say, Pusan is a tripwire with no value.
Half measures do not address the basic problem of unnecessary military dependence. Generational change alone ensures rising opposition to America’s continued presence. The population with first-hand knowledge of American assistance during the Korean War is being progressively superseded by those who view the United States solely as an occupying force on the peninsula. Accordingly, friction between Korean civilians and American forces will continue.
Given the fundamental flaws in the security relationship, the election of Roh Moohyun simply accelerated an inevitable reevaluation of the alliance.
Withdrawal => End of Mutual Defense Treaty
Troop withdrawal will undermine core elements of the Mutual Defense Treaty
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
1. ROK-U.S. Alliance: Its Beginning and End
Since the end of the Korean War, an asymmetric alliance in which the client sacrifices part of its autonomy in exchange for the security provided by the patron has defined the relationship between the ROK (Republic of Korea, or South Korea) and the U.S.(1) On July 14, 1950, less than 20 days after the DPRK (Democratic Republic of Korea, or North Korea) had started the Korean War, Syngman Rhee placed the ROK's military forces under the operational command of Douglas MacArthur in his capacity as commander-in-chief (CINC) of the United Nations Command. The 1953 ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty essentially retained this military command arrangement. A former CINC characterized this arrangement as "the most remarkable concession of sovereignty in the entire world."(2) However, an alternative or complementary interpretation of this arrangement is also possible: By making the defense of the ROK a shared responsibility between the ROK and the United States, the ROK was able to stick itself to the United States "like the Tar Baby to Brer Rabbit."(3)
In fact, the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty contains both of these elements. Article III of the treaty stipulates: "Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories under their respective administrative control…would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Although this "mutual aid" provision is subject to constitutional processes and limited in geographical scope to territories under respective administrative control in the Pacific area,(4) it is quite broad and effectively makes the defense of the ROK a shared responsibility between the two allies. Concerned about entrapment, especially in view of Syngman Rhee's professed desire to reunify the peninsula by force if necessary, the U.S. Senate gave consent to the ratification of the treaty subject to the understanding that "neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party…" At the same time, the Treaty provides broad concessions to the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK, as stipulated in Article IV: "The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement."
Also, the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty makes clear that the "mutual aid" provision and the stationing of U.S. forces in the ROK are part of the same package. In principle, the "mutual aid" provision in alliance treaties can be separated from the stationing of forces. In other words, treaty allies can agree on "mutual aid" without having the military of one party stationed in the territory of the other. Conversely, a country can lease a military base to another country without agreeing on an effective "mutual aid" provision. In the ROK-U.S. context, however, these two elements are closely linked. The "mutual aid" provision in the treaty is likely to become far less credible in the absence of forward-deployed U.S. forces in the ROK. The stationing of U.S. forces in the ROK, in turn, is much easier to justify when its primary mission is perceived to be the defense of the ROK.
Withdrawal => Prioritize Diplomacy
Withdrawal will cause the U.S to prioritize diplomacy
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
IMPROVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA
To lighten the impact of removing ground forces the U.S. may have to make certain concessions to South Korea. One concession would be for the U.S. take a softer diplomatic approach to North Korea. The U.S. can appease the South by removing North Korea from the terrorist nation list. This strategy will not interfere with our policy objectives or damage the administration politically and will improve the South Korean population’s public opinion of U.S. foreign policy. 25 Furthermore the Bush administration should consider rewriting the National Security Strategy as a less provocative document and eliminate the pre-emptive strike option. This removes any justification by North Korea for pursuing weapons of mass destruction.
***DISAD Answers
A2: N. KOREAN INVASION – 2AC
Troops aren’t key to deter North Korea – previous withdrawals didn’t cause conflict
Cucullu, 05 – former Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and Vietnam vet (10/27/05, Gordon, “Korean Troop Withdrawal,” , JMP)
Removal of American GIs from South Korea has been a hot-button issue for years. When Jimmy Carter won the presidency in 1976 one of his campaign promises was to remove all ground troops from Korea. In reaction Korean leader Park Chung Hee published an op-ed piece postulating that arbitrary removal of the American tripwire would likely precipitate a renewed Korean War with unacceptably high costs in casualties and resources. But that was then, this is now.
North Korea is an acknowledged dangerous foe. It has massed artillery poised to rain steel down on Seoul and forward-deployed American units. It fields a 1.2 million man army with massive reserves. Aircraft, logistical support, armor units, and special operations infantry units have been deployed into protected attack positions for years. We know about the missiles, the nucs-bugs-and-gas WMD that Kim Jong Il possesses and seems willing to use on military and civilian targets. But we also know that the hedonistic Kim regime has one foot in the economic grave and the other on a banana peel.
Without massive infusion of foreign assistance and revenue gained from illegal operations such as counterfeiting, narcotics, slave labor, and sale of weapons systems to other rogue states, it is likely that an economic implosion would have flushed his regime away. Thirty years ago analysts calculated that North Korea had upwards of 90 days supplies for a full-scale war. Given the economic disintegration of North Korea since 1994, it would be surprising if the North could mount an all-out war for more than 14-21 days. Nevertheless, in any conflict the North Korean wild card is the horrific damage it could inflict on the civilian population of Seoul even without using WMD.
That said, it is critical to recognize that the power balance has shifted on the peninsula, dramatically enough to require a reevaluation of America's roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, the South Korean military is as strong as it has ever been in manpower, equipment, and training. With its booming economy South Korean outspends the North in actual dollars while committing a significantly smaller percentage of its GNP to defense. It has approximately 600,000 regulars backed by large reserves and modern equipment. In a fight the South Korean military ought to be able to defend the country with air and naval augmentation from America and allies. At some point ground forces might need to be committed to the fight too, but the decades-long tripwire rationale for continued forward deployed American units seems to have faded.
In fact, without undue provocative response from North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, America has already extricated a brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division, relocating it in Fort Carson, CO after a combat tour in Iraq. Other units are slated to follow over time, bringing the level of US troops to fewer than 30,000, the lowest since wartime. Concomitantly a major redeployment in theater is underway as facilities and units move southward, out of range of the most immediate North Korean artillery and missile threat.
If American military deterrence is less vital now than it was several decades previously, the issue becomes primarily political. Is continue presence of American ground forces vital to the interests of the US? Of South Korea? The short answers are yes, and yes again, but not necessary at present levels or configurations. The methodology can be worked out to suit both nations, but there are still issues – some rational, others quite emotional – that will influence decision makers.
Troops in Japan can be used to respond to a Korean crisis
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
The current administration has suggested a troop reduction as well as a troop reassignment in the region. In this day and age of new technology, why subject U.S. troops in the Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) when there are U.S. troops present in Japan as well as Okinawa that can respond to any Korean crisis? The military strategy whether to reduce the number of troops or re-assign their location (in Korea) has been an issue amongst the strategists and theorists. In fact, there is only a marginal difference if troops were present in South Korea or in other areas such as Japan (if North Korea attacked)…the U.S. would still prevail.17 To date, the National Security Strategy still calls for troop presence overseas to promote, deter, and defend allies
Withdrawal won’t signal appeasement to the North
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
However, even the hawkish Robyn Lim, a professor of international politics at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan, dismisses the argument that a U.S. withdrawal would be interpreted as a strategic reversal. Lim argues: “Some might think that such a policy would play into the hands of Pyongyang’s Dear Leader, Kim Jong Il. But keeping U.S. forces in South Korea against the wishes of the government in Seoul would also further Pyongyang’s agenda.”105 Richard V. Allen, national security adviser to President Ronald Reagan, argues that the South “can plan to assume eventual responsibility for its own frontline defense” and that doing so would “be neither destabilizing nor provocative.”106
A2: N. Korean Invasion – ROK Can Defend Itself
South Korea can defend itself – troops not key to deterrence
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
Ending the U.S.-Korean Alliance
WHY SHOULD the United States maintain troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK)? What American interests are being served by the alliance? Officials in both capitals maintain that the alliance remains as relevant as ever. The two governments insist that the "fundamental goal is to enhance deterrence and security on the Korean Peninsula."
But Washington's Cold War security concern for the ROK has disappeared. Even if the security of South Korea remained vital to the United States--and it does not--America's treaty and troops aren't necessary to achieve that end. The South has dramatically outstripped North Korea on virtually every measure of national power and can stand on its own.
South Korean President Roh Moohyun told graduates of the Korean Air Force Academy in March: "We have sufficient power to defend ourselves. We have nurtured mighty national armed forces that absolutely no one can challenge." Within a decade, he added, "we should be able to develop our military into one with full command of operations." The ROK spent $16.4 billion last year on defense--roughly nine times North Korea's outlay--and ranks eleventh in the world in total defense expenditures. His government is increasing military spending, up about 8.6 percent this year over 2003, to create a "self-reliant defense that could help bring peace and unification to the Korean peninsula."
South Korea can defend itself
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 101-102) DR
But once that transformation was under way, it was time to increase the ROK's defense burden and decrease America's responsibility. That never happened. Shocked outrage greeted President Jimmy Carter's proposal to remove most U.S. troops, and that proposal eventually died. Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, reaffirmed the one-way U .S. commitment. Year after year of record economic growth did nothing to change American policy under presidents George H. W Bush and Bill Clinton. Only pressure from the war 0n terrorism has prompted President George W Bush to reconfigure, and perhaps finally reduce, Washington's force presence. 50mh Korea is one of America's most obvious security free-riders. The ROK vastly outstrips its northern antagonist, possessing about 40 times the GDP, enjoying a vast technological edge, and sporting a large economic presence around the globe. The Soutl1 also has twice the population of the DPRK, is friendly with every major international and regional power, in contrast to the erratic North, and long ago won the diplomatic contest throughout the Third World.
A2: N. Korean Invasion – ROK Can Defend Itself
South Korea would wreck the DPRK – multiple reasons
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 111-112)DR
The Asian economic crisis of 1997 notwithstanding, another decade of growth bas turned the ROK into a global economic power. Although the country suffered a recession early in 2003, exports jumped an astounding 19.6 percent that year, and the South is expected to enjoy growth of 5 to 6 percent in 2004:18 With a GOP running $545 billion in 2001, South Korea has the fourth largest economy in Asia, the twelfth largest in the world. Its per capita G O P exceeds mat of Russia (its total GDP runs about two-thirds of that of Russia), once the feared ally of its bitter enemy. Better policies should accelerate the South's growth. Seoul unnecessarily prolonged its economic agony after (he 1997 crash by resisting many of the resisting many of the liberalizing steps necessary to reduce the expensive and counterproductive privileges enjoyed by entrenched business elites.49 The country would do better today with further reforms, particularly rationalizing a banking system that continues to provide economic preferences for well-connected business leaders and cutting off subsidies to influential firms. Pyongyang has been left far behind in the economic contest. The North, which during the 1960s is thought to have had a higher per capita GOP (although a smaller (total GDP) than did the ROK, began to fall behind at an accelerating rate during the 1970s. It has since become an economic wreck, whose economy was estimated to have shrunk by half between 1993 and 19% alone; its subsequent "recovery" is thought to have pushed per capita GOP 111 about $700, roughly 40 percent of the 1990 level, which suggests a total GDP of about $ 16 billion.51 Another GDP estimate runs about $17 billion, , although no calculation is easy with such an isolated and antiquated economy. Food production is down 60 percent over the last 15 years. Much of the country is enveloped in darkness because of electricity shortages much of the time. Life expectancy fell 10 percent during the 1990s; during the same decade hundreds of thousands, and perhaps as many as 2 million, people starved to death. Nearly 6 in 10 North Koreans are thought to be malnourished. Although the DPRK has avoided a repeat of the worst famine of the mid-1990s, it still cannot feed itself and has been reduced to begging for millions of tons of food aid. Perhaps the best comparison of the two economies comes through purchasing power equivalents rather than exchange rate calculations. Estimates for the South and North respectively in 2002 ran $941.5 billion versus $22.26 billion for CDP; $19,600 versus $1,000 for per capita GOP; and 6.3 percent versus 1 percent real annual growth.55 Although there seems to have been evidence of limited improvement in the DPRK economy in recent years, continuing famine and grotesque inefficiencies lead to warnings of inevitable collapse collapse. With the RO K's economic growth has come abundant resources, industrialization, high-technology production, and access to international l capital markets. Thus, the longer a war, the greater the South's advantage: as its Ministry of National Defense puts it, "South Korea has a comfortable edge over North Korea in terms of war sustainability."57
U.S. troops aren’t key – South can defend itself
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Bringing Home the Troops
For years it was hard to find an American analyst who did not recoil in horror at the suggestion that American forces be brought home from Korea. Even now the Bush Administration has been supplementing US forces in Asia. But a growing number of commentators, including some resolute hawks, now say that the United States shouldn’t stay if it isn’t wanted.14 And even if America is wanted, so what? Another nation’s desire for US aid is no reason to provide it. The United States should do so only if doing so advances American national interests.
What vital US interest is being served by the continued stationing of US forces in Korea? America’s presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK from military adventurism, but that does not mean US forces are necessary to do so.15 As noted earlier, the South can stand on its own. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported simply: “Without US help, South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North.”16
Replacing the American tripwire would be expensive for Seoul. But as one of the globe’s wealthiest nations, South Korea is eminently capable of doing so—and has studied the possibility of doing so as recently as last year. The ROK has matured as a country and should face the consequences of its own decisions and its own defense requirements.
A2: N. Korean Invasion – ROK Will Buildup
South Korea will develop long-range attack and intelligence-imaging capabilities
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Of course, replacing the American tripwire might be an expensive proposition for South Korea. If Seoul chose to confront the North’s military, it would have to beef up existing force structure and invest in areas, such as long-range attack and intelligence-imaging capabilities, now dominated by Washington. But as one of the globe’s wealthiest nations South Korea is eminently capable of providing for its own defense—and the government studied the possibility of doing so as recently as last year.98
A2: N. Korean Invasion – DPRK Military Declining
Economic troubles are causing decline in morale and defections from the military
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
As economic difficulties continued over a prolonged period of time, social morale declined, and loyalty to the regime was weakened. Not only the hungry have defected; even privileged members of the core group have fled from North Korea during the last decade. These include Hwang Jang-Yup, secretary of the KWP’s Central Committee, and Chang Sung-Kil, ambassador to Egypt and son of Oh Kuk-Ryul, minister of the KWP’s Department of Operations.
A political study organized by the party has become superficial and loose. Self-criticism, which once served as frightening means of control and punishment, is no longer taken seriously. As the social control mechanism gets weaker, social deviations like assault, theft, and even prostitution are increasing. Juche ideology does not serve as a governing ideology any more in any substantial sense, although it is still alive. North Korea introduced such political slogans as “Red Flag Philosophy,” “Strong and Prosperous Nation,” and “Military-First Policy,” but none of these were able to function as a substitute ideology.
Economic troubles has prevented North Korean military modernization
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
ECONOMIC FACTORS
North Korea sustains a credible 1.2 million-man army, a small, but adequate navy, and an air force capable of causing serious damage to the South Korean capital. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union there has been little modernization of their fielded forces. The lack of modernization is mainly due to their dismal economy.
North Korea is a centrally planned, isolated economy facing desperate economic conditions. As a result of years of under-investment in industry and spare parts shortages in their industrial sector, North Korean capital stock is almost beyond recovery. The nation is enduring its ninth year of food shortages due to a lack of arable land, failures in collective farming, weather related problems, and chronic shortages in fertilizer and fuel. Massive international humanitarian assistance has kept the North Korean population from wide-spread starvation although poor living conditions and malnutrition exist. The regime’s large scale military spending prevents adequate resources being invested into industrial improvements and civilian welfare.6
A2: N. Korean Invasion – South will Win
Even under the worst case scenarios South Korea will still prevail
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
What if Seoul prefers not to make such investments? Of course, South Korea could underestimate the threat and fail to bolster its forces; the North might miscalculate and believe that it could win a blitzkrieg campaign even with its antiquated military. The result under this highly unlikely scenario would be an awful war, but there is little doubt that the ROK would ultimately prevail in such a conflict.99
A2: N. Korean Invasion – Deter with Other Means
U.S. uses diplomatic and economic instruments to help deter North Korea
Colonel Stevens, 06 (3/15/06, Colonel Wayne Stevens, “Is U.S. Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?” , JMP)
The events of September 11, 2001 brought about changes in the structuring of U.S. military security within the ROK but not in the overall strategic defense objectives of the U.S. For example, the U.S. continues to serve as a deterrent against DPRK aggression and a stabilizing factor not only for the Korean peninsula but for the region of Northeast Asia as well.22 Understandably the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with the Global War on Terrorism and other U.S. security commitments in Korea and Europe required the repositioning of military forces to help reduce the operational tempo placed on other units. The Second Infantry Division deployed a brigade combat team to Iraq that had been helping to deter North Korean aggression. However, other instruments of power were in place to demonstrate America’s commitment to the ROK. The U.S. has employed diplomatic and economic instruments of power in addition to military power to deter DPRK aggression. Hopefully, the combined efforts of the instruments of power will create a lasting peace that will eventually lead to unification of the two Koreas. Some may argue that since 9/11 the ROK is less important to the U.S.23 A more accurate assessment however would be that despite the global attention being focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. still views its commitment to the ROK as essential. The U.S. is particularly concerned about DPRK’s nuclear weapons program and the possibility of DPRK proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea will continue to draw a watchful eye from the U.S. for several reasons: (1) DPRK is viewed as a security threat due to their large military forces and WMD capabilities; (2) if DPRK collapsed it would create a humanitarian disaster rife with hunger and huge number of refugees; and (3) DPRK poses a proliferation threat with regard to WMD to both state and non-state actors.24
A2: Deterrence – 2ac
Troops in South Korea not key to U.S. heg
Bandow, 06 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, “The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore,” , JMP)
More broadly, U.S. Troops are said to cement U.S. influence or prevent a regional arms race. However, there’s no evidence that the garrison in the South adds anything to the influence that comes naturally from being the globe’s sole superpower. Nor has America’s force presence stopped the People’s Republic of China from upgrading its military; better that front-line allied states take responsibility for their region’s security rather than rely on Washington.
Air Force and Navy presence preserve deterrence
Feffer, 04 –contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (6/23/04, John, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” , JMP)
U.S. deterrent capacity, meanwhile, now resides in firepower based largely outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, both based in Japan. As it did fifty years ago, U.S. airpower can reduce North Korea to rubble. North Korean leaders recognize that any attack they might launch across the DMZ would thus be suicidal. The presence of the remaining 25,000 U.S. troops does not alter this calculus.
Troops have already been reduced – U.S. doesn’t see them as key to deterrence
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces south--essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years--and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South.
U.S. will still preserve deterrence through long-range strike capabilities
Espiritu, 06 – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” , JMP)
Even though we are already reducing the number of U.S. troops in the region, one alternative to the current policy is to accelerate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in the region. resident Bush announced a major restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War.27 This restructuring essentially decreases the U.S. military footprint on foreign soil to allow better flexibility for the military of the challenges of the 21st century. A plan to withdraw as well as to reduce troops over the next 10 years will give “our service members more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career.” 28 A more aggressive alternative to the current policy would be to completely withdraw all U.S. troops in the region.
There are certain risks involved if U.S. troops completely withdraw in the Korean Peninsula. One risk of complete withdrawal would result in an immediate power struggle in the region. Nations such as China, Japan, and even South Korea will certainly have to rethink their own National Security policy therefore contributing to regional fallout. Any rapidly changing relationship between North and South Korea will more than likely lead to a regional power struggle among the United States, China, Japan, and even Russia. 29 This strategy seems feasible because the U.S. will “improve our ability to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened long-range strike capabilities, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access arrangements. 30
A2: Deterrence – 2ac
Turn – Korean crisis is crushing U.S. global credibility and creating tensions with allies
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Given the risks of war and problems with sanctions, negotiations are the obvious place to start. The United States could offer security guarantees, political recognition, and economic aid in exchange for the verifiable termination of the North’s nuclear and missile programs. Some analysts would add demobilization and withdrawal of conventional units from their advanced positions to the agenda. A few even want to include human rights guarantees.
Given the stakes, South Korea and the other neighboring states are likely to insist on being involved in shaping policy. Involving them is in America’s interest. Argues Shi Yinhong, a professor at China’s People’s University, it “is highly doubtful” that Washington alone can end the North’s nuclear ambitions—peacefully, anyway.29
But the United States cannot take the support of regional states for granted. For instance, China could play the most important role in dissuading the North from its nuclear course. Yet so far Beijing has been disinclined to solve what is seen as primarily America’s problem. China lacks the North’s full trust and is suspicious of Washington’s willingness to assert its power globally. Concludes analyst Stephen Richter: “The North Korean crisis is helping to chip away at US credibility in the world, and it is even leading to tensions between the United States and its allies in Asia, such as South Korea and Japan. All that suits China just fine.”30
The key to enlisting China (and Russia) is to convince them that doing so would help them. One tactic would be to tell them “that by failing to support us they put their relations with us at risk,” writes Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations.31 That might or might not work, but only at great cost, given the many other issues also at stake in those relationships. It would be better to point out the adverse consequences to them, as well as to America, if Pyongyang does not desist.
Withdrawal increases deterrence and prevents U.S. draw in
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 120-121)DR
More important is the military risk of US security ties. Although the American commitment helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United States will be involved if hostilities should occur again. Indeed, the presence of 37,000 American soldiers is to make intervention automatic. Moreover, protecting the South discourages it from enhancing its own military, which reduces deterrence. Although the risks of war ate modest, the consequences would be horrific. The concentration of military power in Korea was unparalleled elsewhere in the world even during the Cold War; roughly 1.5 million troops face each other across a I 55-mile border, in contrast to only 2 million soldiers along the entire 4,600-mile Sino-Soviet border when those two nations were involved in serious border skirmishes. Presumably the toll would not match that of the first Korean War, in which America's technological lead was not so great, the South was far less prepared to defend itself, and China intervened on the DPRK's side. However, credible estimates of casualties run 1 to 2 million.
And the possible acquisition by North Korea of atomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially; should a conflict come, the American troops would become nuclear hostages. The U.S. troop presence also may encourage risk-taking by both Koreas. Pyongyang could see a need [0 preempt an attempt by the United States at preventive war; a more hawkish South Korean government, feeling secure in America's protection, might challenge the North.I09 (However, Seoul's proximity to the border, and thus increased vulnerability to attack, seemingly counteracts the impact of the latter possibility, at least on the governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.)
There obviously are times when the United States must go to war. But now is not the time, and the Korean peninsula is not the place. As argued in [he next chapter, there are no vital American interests at stake warranting such costs and risks. The mere fact that the United States fought in Korea 50 years ago does not mean it should prepare to do so again; the best way to honor the sacrifice of so many soldiers in the last war is to ensure that no Americans would be forced to fight and die in a similar future conflict. This is not to say that Washington has no interests at stake in the peninsula-the cultural, economic, family, and political ties between the United States and the ROK are real-but they do not warrant a security guarantee and troop presence. In any case, Washington no longer needs to provide a military commitment to secure its interests. South Korea is now fully capable of defending itself.
A2: Deterrence – U.S. Heg / Influence Declining
Obama is gutting U.S. hegemony in Asia
Blumenthal, 09 – resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, “The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,” , JMP)
When George W. Bush was president, critics of his Asia policy liked to say that America was "getting its derriere kicked" by China. By this the critics meant that the war in Iraq was a big distraction and that the United States was not attending enough Asian multilateral conferences, where it could demonstrate its "soft power."
While this case against the Bush administration was never wholly convincing, it did contain a kernel of truth. Beijing did gain regional influence at Washington's expense under Mr. Bush's watch. But Beijing did so not through kinder and gentler diplomacy alone; rather, China grew its military at a rapid clip and the region took note.
If President Bush somewhat neglected this troubling turn in Asia's balance of power, President Barack Obama is doing his predecessor one better. His administration's recent announcement to cut defense programs puts America's long-standing military superiority in the Pacific at risk. If left standing, these cuts--heavily targeted on high-technology weapons systems and "power-projection" platforms essential to preserving that superiority--might mean that America doesn't have much of a derriere left in Asia at all.
Obama defense cuts are gutting U.S. hegemony in Asia
Blumenthal, 09 – resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, “The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,” , JMP)
The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea or China. Rather, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region. It has a strong interest in avoiding even the perception of American retrenchment. That would be a recipe for a spiraling arms race among the region's great powers. It is no accident that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia, all capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, have not yet taken that road. They have been confident in the American security umbrella. If current trends continue, are we sure those states would not reconsider the wisdom of that policy?
That is why the Obama administration's defense cuts are so detrimental to American strategy. The day after North Korea's long-range missile test, the U.S. announced deep cuts to missile defense and satellite programs. The Airborne Laser program that Mr. Obama axed is not only the most promising and immediate method for intercepting ballistic missiles in the "boost" phase--that is, shortly after launch--but also the first significant use of directed energy as a weapon, a technology that may prove to be yet another revolutionary change in warfare sparked by American ingenuity.
There is a broad consensus among missile defense experts that to effectively defend ourselves and allies against the lethality of Chinese and North Korean missiles we need a multilayered defensive capability. A missile defense system must attempt to shoot down missiles at all points on its trajectory. The Obama administration has just undermined that capability.
Budget cuts will prevent the U.S. from defending Asian allies
Blumenthal, 09 – resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, “The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,” , JMP)
Make no mistake, starved of resources regional commanders will be forced to give up important missions, from humanitarian relief and security cooperation in Southeast Asia to deterring aggression and defending allies in North Asia. The consequences of eroding military capability are easy to understand. Less fighter aircraft means more risk of adversary aggression, a smaller navy means an eroding capability to keep the seas safe for trade, fewer cargo planes means less humanitarian missions that buy us goodwill. It is fashionable these days to divide power into the "hard" and "soft" categories. In reality, the successful exercise of power is and always has been a careful calibration of diplomacy with the force to back it up. An erosion of the latter will render the former hollow.
Obama’s defense budget will gut credible military presence in Asia
Blumenthal, 09 – resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, “The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,” , JMP)
In announcing his defense cuts, Mr. Gates stated that he was making "a virtue of necessity," conceding that the Obama plan was an exercise in budget cutting to pay for favored domestic programs. Mr. Gates promises that he will explain his judgments about "balancing risks" sometime soon, but a risk assessment is no substitute for a strategy. American strategy in Asia has been remarkably successful since World War II. Through a set of alliances and partnerships and a strong military presence we have provided the security cocoon within which nations could prosper rather than compete. If Mr. Obama wants to continue along this path, his defense plan will not give him the means.
A2: Deterrence – U.S. Heg / Influence Declining
N/U – F22 cuts will gut U.S. military superiority
Blumenthal, 09 – resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, “The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,” , JMP)
There are further implications for Asia in the Obama defense cuts: The decision to end production of the stealthy F-22s will preclude developing an export variant for Japan to reinforce its own ability to deter North Korean and Chinese mischief.
And, with the increased sophistication of the Chinese air defense system, only the highly maneuverable, supersonic and stealthy F-22 can assure American dominance of the skies, historically the cornerstone of U.S. military superiority. Military officers in the Pacific privately say that the Department of Defense's decision to cap its F-22 arsenal at 187 planes is sufficient only if every aircraft is available in a crisis. But that is an unrealistic assumption. It is far more likely that the Pacific air force will have to take much greater risks with far fewer F-22s should it be involved in a conflict. Plans to delay funding for a next generation, long-range bomber likewise decrease our deterrent in a part of the world where flight times from fixed bases are long.
N/U – Navy budget prevents deterrence of China
Blumenthal, 09 – resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, “The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,” , JMP)
Also missing from the defense budget is any increase in the naval fleet. The Navy set a goal of a 313-ship fleet only a few years ago, up from around 280 today (roughly half of the total at the end of the Cold War), yet the Obama plan falls well short of that number. We now have less ships in our fleet that at any time since World War I.
The consequences are stark. Given the expanse of the Pacific and surrounding seas, the number of maritime vessels we have matters. With a smaller fleet America's ability to track the Chinese deployment of submarines throughout the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean will erode. As if to demonstrate the coming challenges to America's fleet, last month Chinese warships harassed an American surveillance vessel operating in international waters around the South China Sea. The U.S. Navy had to send an armed escort to complete its surveillance mission.
Growing Chinese dominance of Pacific waterways will inevitably become a factor in America's strategic calculus in the region. Chinese military attack boats and ballistic missile submarines that carry the means for nuclear attack cannot be easily dismissed if the U.S. is to maintain its status as keeper of the peace in the Pacific. The Chinese are looking to deny us access to the region, and we're doing little to stop them.
A2: Deterrence – W/drawal Won’t Hurt Influence / Heg
Permanent military presence isn’t key to U.S. influence in Asia – we can employ other means to sustain our interests
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
However, the U.S. can continue to prepare and shape the Asian strategic environment without a permanent military presence in Korea. First, the U.S. has a range of strategic options and can employ other instruments of power to effectively engage the region. The U.S. can pursue diplomatic initiatives to normalize relations with China, and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations among the regional actors. The challenge for U.S. foreign policy is to maintain a critical balance between competing interests among the regional powers in East Asia. The U.S. already provides stability to the region and is well positioned for this role. Strong ties to both Japan and South Korea and improved relations with China and Russia logically casts the U.S. in a mediating role. As the world leader in information, technology, and advanced medical procedures, the U.S. has the most leverage with China and other countries in the region. The U.S. can employ its economic strength to increase trade and mutual prosperity which will eventually lead to economic interdependence and greater cooperation in the region.
Withdrawal won’t undermine U.S. influence in the region
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 131-132)DR
Nor is it clear how unexplained regional instability as opposed to widespread conflict, would harm the global economy. Only if the nations throughout East Asia essentially collapsed would there be substantial harm to America and other countries, and, again it is hard to build a plausible scenario leading to such a result. Moreover, subsidizing the defense of populous and prosperous allies involves a substantial redistribution of wealth from Americans to, in this case, Koreans. Their economy may gain from that process; not so ours, which bears the added military burden. The end of America's defense commitment to the ROK would not terminate U.S. influence in the region. With the world's largest and most productive economy and dominant culture, a stable constitutional system and attractive entrepreneurial environment, and the globe's most powerful military, America would remain influential. A willingness to station an infantry division that has little practical to do in Northeast Asia is unlikely to augment Washington's authority.
Military presence not key to hegemony
Bandow 98 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance (Doug Bandow, “America’s Obsolete Korean Commitment”, Orbis, 42(4), Fall, Ebsco)
However, America’s enemies in those conflicts have either vanished or imploded. The Empire of the Rising Sun has been replaced by a pacifist democracy, China is dramatically different from the Maoist one that went to war in 1950, North Korea itself is an economic wreck, and Vietnam longs for American investment and trade. More important, the global conflicts that caused the United States to intervene in those wars have vanished. Today, notes Robert Scalapino, the most serious threat “lies within, not outside” the various Asian nations.29
Such internal problems are less susceptible to solution through use of U.S. military power. Moreover, it is hard to see what hegemonic threats might arise out of these more nebulous difficulties. The mere existence of conflicts-a score currently rage from Africa to the Balkans to Southeast Asia to the Transcaucasus-does not require American action. Even the possible necessity of future U.S. intervention in a worst case scenario does not require maintenance of an antiquated strategy of forward deployment. The Pentagon opines that it does not view “responsibility sharing as a substitute for American leadership or for our overseas United States military presence,” but an overseas military presence is not necessary for the exercise of leadership.30
A2: Deterrence – W/drawal Won’t Hurt Influence / Heg
Troop withdrawal wouldn’t cause loss of US deterrence capability or credibility
Bandow 98 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance (Doug Bandow, “America’s Obsolete Korean Commitment”, Orbis, 42(4), Fall, Ebsco)
Seoul might object to a U.S. attempt to improve relations with the North, but America should not allow its policy to be held hostage by Seoul. Finally, Washington should use the prospect of an American troop withdrawal-something long demanded by Pyongyang-to challenge the North to respond in kind by demobilizing some troops and withdrawing others from their advanced positions along the Demilitarized Zone. The alternative to serious arms reductions would be an ROK military build-up and an arms race that the North could not afford. This program would not oblige the United States to disturb its other security relations in the region, nor would devolving defense responsibility onto the ROK itself prevent the basing of American aircraft, bases, fleets, and troops elsewhere in the region, such as Japan. Neighboring states might be displeased by the US. decision, but they would have to recognize its logic. Over the long term there would be no serious American loss of “credibility,” the all-purpose criticism of any proposed change in the status quo. Credibility is only lost when expectations are not met, but expectations can be changed. Japan, in particular, would have little choice but to accept the American decision, since it would presumably prefer to preserve its own relationship with Washington irrespective of the state of American ties with Seoul. U.S. defense commitments in East Asia survived the loss of Cambodia and Vietnam, earlier partial withdrawals from Korea, and departure from the Philippines. They would survive a pull-out from Korea.
A2: Deterrence – Ground Forces Not Key
U.S. ground forces are not needed to defend South Korea – withdrawal allows U.S. to defend itself against WMD and missile prolif
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
THE REAL THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA
What is the real threat from North Korea? During congressional testimony in March 2001, General Thomas Schwartz, then U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Korea, reported that the North Korean military threat was growing. He based his report on the size of North Korea’s forces, weaponry, and large number of exercises conducted in 2000. However, experts in both South Korea and the United States disputed General Schwartz’s testimony on several points. The critics argued that North Korean conventional military capabilities had eroded since the early 1990s due to the obsolescence of offensive weaponry like tanks and strike aircraft, as well as to deficiencies in logistics/supplies and food shortages among even North Korean front-line troops on the DMZ. Also specified was the decline in the physical and mental capabilities of North Korean draftees after a decade of malnutrition. Finally, the absence of major field exercises from 1994 to 2000 was cited.11
Since then, the military leadership in Korea has reassessed the threat from North Korea. General Leon LaPorte, current Commander of all United States forces in Republic of Korea, addressed the threat posed by North Korea in a recent interview on ABC-TV. During the interview he talked about the capability of the South Korea/ United States military in comparison to the capability of the North Korea military. LaPorte stated that “The Republic of Korea and the United States have tremendous military capabilities, far exceeding those of North Korea. The Republic of Korea (ROK) military is a very well-trained, well-led and disciplined force. They have a significant number of ground forces.” LaPorte told the interviewer that North Korea’s navy and air force are “minuscule compared to the ROK and U.S. Navy and Air Force.” In discussing North Korea’s capability he said the North Korean military is “an aging military, with older Soviet equipment and they have not been able to make the investment.” 12
When considering North Korean conventional threat versus ROK military capabilities that include a large ground force, one must ask, what is the military purpose of American ground forces forward deployed to South Korea? What more could the 37,000 United States forces contribute to a ground campaign conducted by 650,000-strong ROK force? Pundits reiterate that the United States’ major military contribution to South Korea in the event of hostilities will be in the form of naval and air forces, not ground forces.
Andrew Krepenevich, noted scholar and expert in foreign relations, approaches the issue in a more strategic context. In an article he wrote concerning America as a global power, he makes several predictions. He states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology will likely demand an increasing share of United States defense resources for homeland defense. He maintains that this will leave less military capability available for forward presence. He argues that our policy should encourage allies to assume a larger role in providing ground forces for peacekeeping, urban control operations and regional conflicts. In the case of South Korea, this would not entail an increase of resources on the part of U.S. allies. “South Korea should be capable of effectively defending itself without major United States ground reinforcements.”13
A2: Deterrence – Residual Forces are Enough
Even a skeletal crew of U.S. military personnel would continue to deter adventurism and act as a suitable tripwire
Sung-Jun 08 (Chung Sung-Jun, “South Korea: Imperatives of a U.S. Presence,” Stratfor, 7/17/08, )
In the long run, USFK will be a skeletal remnant of its former self, dropping dramatically not only from its Cold War level of 40,000 to 50,000 troops but significantly below its currently articulated goal of 24,500 troops by 2012.
Regardless of troop levels, U.S. forces do not remain in South Korea because the peninsula offers some strategic advantage. In any conflict with China or Japan, the last place the United States wants ground troops is on the Korean Peninsula. For one thing, the United States has no intention of ever engaging China on the ground in its own neighborhood. Moreover, the peninsula is literally surrounded by China and Japan, which would make South Korea eminently vulnerable in a larger regional conflict and difficult to supply and sustain if China or Japan opposed it militarily. Instead, U.S. troops are there as a “trip-wire” force to deter any such conflict in the first place and especially to prevent South Korea from becoming an attractive target of opportunity.
Ultimately, the peninsula’s artificial divide may become a thing of the past. North-South integration is already well under way. Though the exact nature and timing of reunification remain difficult to envision, a unified Korean Peninsula is unmistakably on the long-range 10-to-25-year horizon. And although a politically unified peninsula would be far more geographically coherent and defensible, Korea will remain overshadowed by the military and economic might of China and Japan. It will continue to try to retain a meaningful U.S. military presence on its territory to discourage adventurism by Beijing and Tokyo, and it will continue to leverage the most advanced U.S. military technology it can get its hands on.
Meanwhile, Washington will continue to face its own geopolitical imperative in the region, which — with the Korean Peninsula in the middle — remains without a coherent center. Under no circumstances can the United States allow China or Japan to absorb Korea. Such an event could radically reshape not just regional dynamics but global dynamics, and it would shift the balance of power in a way that would be difficult to undo. Even a skeleton crew of U.S. military personnel would continue to serve the purposes of Washington and even a unified Korean government — a small price indeed, considering the stakes.
A2: Deterrence – Air Force / Navy Solves
Naval and marine forces can contribute substantially to the defense of Korea without having a large presence in the country
Davino 04 – Director for Manpower, Personnel, and Administration of the United States Pacific Command (Michael F. Davino, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” Strategy Research Project, 3/15/04, )
U.S. Navy and Marine forces in Korea are relatively small and are focused on reinforcing the existing U.S. forces on the peninsula. These services can make a substantial contribution to the defense of Korea without having a large permanent presence in the country. Naval forces currently home-ported in Japan and Marine Corps units in Okinawa are well positioned to rapidly respond to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula as well as elsewhere in the Northeast Asia region. The Marines should continue to rotate forces to conduct exercises regularly in Korea. In the event that it eventually becomes impossible or undesirable to continue to maintain the current, relatively large Marine ground force in Okinawa, the U.S. could consider stationing a Marine ground combat element in the Pohang area. The Marines currently maintain an austere expeditionary camp on the southeastern Korean coast that can probably be expanded.
Air and Naval forces should be the main defense – solves the tripwire effect
Davino 04 – Director for Manpower, Personnel, and Administration of the United States Pacific Command (Michael F. Davino, “Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?” Strategy Research Project, 3/15/04, )
In the future, the U.S. support to the defense of the ROK should be mainly provided in the form of air and maritime power as previously advocated in the Nixon doctrine. Heavy U.S. ground forces would deploy and fall in on pre-positioned as a last resort, rather than being forward deployed as a tripwire. The U.S. Air Force currently stations two fighter wings in Korea, one at Osan Air Base south of Seoul and another at Kunsan Air Base along the southwest coast.80 The Air Force should continue to maintain these forces at a high state of readiness, fully focus them on the Korean Theater of Operations and modernize them as required. The current Air Force structure can probably support dedicating these two wings solely to Korea better than can the Army, with its limited structure and current commitments, dedicate two maneuver brigades solely to Korea.
Air and naval forces can provide a supporting role as ROK takes over ground duties
Roehrig, 08 – Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terence Roehrig, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Presence in Korea: Implications for Korean Security and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Academic Paper Series, )
In the end, the United States will continue to provide important air and naval assets in a supporting role while ROK troops assume the lead on the ground.37 The relocation of U.S. forces has also been an important part of efforts to reduce the U.S. footprint in South Korea. Many U.S. bases, particularly the headquarters located in Yongsan, occupy prime real estate, and these moves will help make the U.S. presence on the peninsula more tolerable for the ROK public. Many younger Koreans have a perception of the U.S.–ROK alliance different from their elders.38 In testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Deputy Under-secretary of Defense Richard P. Lawless stated:
A younger generation of Koreans seeks a different relationship with the United States, a relationship that is perceived to be more equal. This is not to say that this generation is anti-American or calling for an end to the alliance, but it is not bound by memories of the war and of American sacrifices and is therefore much more assertive of its desires and its concerns than perhaps previous generations have been.39
A2: Deterrence – Air Force / Navy Solves
Air and sea power sustain U.S. hegemony in Asia
Saunders 07 – Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies (Phillip C. Saunders. “The United States and East Asia after Iraq', Survival, 49:1, 141 – 152, March 2007, )
Mitigating factors
The negative consequences of US involvement in Iraq have been mitigated by widespread support among Asian elites for a continuing US role in maintaining a stable security environment in Asia and the fact that US military commitments in Iraq have had only a limited impact on the US military position in Asia. Although repeated deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have strained the US Army and Marines, the US military position in Asia rests primarily upon air and sea power. The ongoing transformation of the US military, realignment of US military bases and redeployment of forces, and efforts to transform alliances with Japan and South Korea have arguably increased the US ability to project air and naval power in Asia in recent years.
The US ability to play its traditional role in stabilising the Asia-Pacific rests upon the twin pillars of regional support for the US security role and US military capabilities. Asian leaders and elites support a robust US security presence in Asia based primarily on self-interest: they want the United States to play an active role in Asia to help stabilise the region and to ensure their national security in an uncertain strategic environment.10 Changes in the regional security environment over the last decade have reinforced support for the US presence. China's rising power and expanding regional influence are a major cause. China's assertive behaviour toward Taiwan and aggressive pursuit of territorial claims in the South China Sea in the mid-1990s stoked regional anxiety about a 'China threat'. Chinese leaders realised their actions were stimulating adverse regional reactions, and moderated their policies by embracing multilateralism and adopting a policy of military restraint (while simultaneously beginning annual double-digit increases in the defense budget). Beijing's efforts to reassure its neighbours of its benign intentions have helped persuade many Asian elites that China's rise presents more of an opportunity than a threat. Nevertheless, concerns about how a strong China will behave in the future and the existence of regional flashpoints in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula lead most Asian leaders to want the United States to remain engaged in the region.
This has produced continued support for the US military presence in Asia. The Clinton and Bush administrations both made significant efforts to revitalise military alliances to make them more politically sustainable and more relevant to post-Cold War security challenges. These efforts have been most successful in the case of the US-Japan alliance. Increasing concerns about China and North Korea have strengthened Japanese domestic support for the alliance. The US-Japan alliance has broadened its focus to include global and regional security challenges beyond the defence of Japan, joint development of ballistic missile defences and efforts to improve military cooperation for future contingencies. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces have also taken on new roles and missions inside and outside the alliance, including the deployment of forces to aid in Iraqi reconstruction and the provision of logistics support for US operations in Afghanistan.
North Korea plays a more ambiguous role in the US alliance with South Korea, partly because Seoul and Washington have different views about the nature of the North Korean threat and the best way to deal with Pyongyang. The United States is most concerned about North Korea's potential to proliferate nuclear weapons or material and has focused on pressuring the North; South Korea worries most about the economic consequences of a North Korean collapse and favours a strategy of engaging Pyongyang to change its behaviour. However, South Korean officials still want a continued US military presence on the peninsula to deter possible North Korean military actions. Although South Korean leaders and analysts are reluctant to identify China as a potential future threat in public, many privately feel that a security alliance with the United States will be important after unification to help Korea to maintain its sovereignty. The United States has also upgraded its alliances with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines and expanded security cooperation with key Asian countries such as Indonesia and Singapore.
Asian countries also seek assistance from the United States to deal with non-traditional security issues such as counter-terrorism and humanitarian relief operations. The operations of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia pose a threat both to the United States and to local governments. A series of terrorist bombings in Indonesia and ongoing insurgencies in the Philippines and southern Thailand highlight the serious nature of the threat. Although most counter- terrorism cooperation takes place quietly, the United States has deployed military advisors to the Philippines to assist in operations against insurgent groups with ties to terrorist organisations. Threats posed by piracy and possible terrorist attacks against port facilities have been another area of international cooperation. The rapid US humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake in October 2005 illustrated the unrivaled US military capability to quickly move troops and supplies within Asia.
The US military presence in Asia rests heavily on air and sea power, including both forces based in the region and those able to rapidly deploy in the event of military contingencies. As the US military role in Iraq has evolved from defeat of Saddam Hussein's conventional armed forces to counter-insurgency, the mix of forces needed for military missions in Iraq has shifted away from the air and naval assets needed for Asian contingencies. Counter-insurgency places a premium on ground troops and capabilities such as tactical intelligence, public affairs, military police, special operations, foreign area expertise, and civil engineering, which are found primarily in the army and marines. US air and naval forces are playing an important role in supplying and supporting ground forces, but this requires a relatively modest commitment of aircraft and ships. Few strike aircraft and naval combatants have been shifted from the Asia-Pacific theatre. Conversely, the demand for ground troops in Iraq (and to a lesser degree Afghanistan) has caused the United States to move forces from other theatres, deploy national guard and reserve forces, and even use some air force and navy troops in non-traditional roles to reduce the burden on army and marine units.
The impact of Iraq deployments on US ground forces based in Asia and units assigned to deploy to Asia in the event of a major regional conflict would be felt most strongly if the US military had to conduct extended combat operations in a conflict over Taiwan or Korea. US commitments in Iraq may have given China and North Korea more latitude for political initiatives due to a perceived US reluctance to be drawn into a second major conflict.11 However, there is no evidence that China or North Korea see an opportunity to launch a conventional attack to achieve territorial goals while US ground forces are tied down in Iraq. US strategy emphasises rapid response to an attack in Asia via air and naval power rather than with large numbers of ground troops. The significant US advantage in air and naval capabilities makes China or North Korea unlikely to initiate a crisis that might escalate to war. Moreover, the US ability to tolerate military casualties in Iraq that now total more than 3,000 dead and 20,000 wounded has likely undercut the view of some Chinese analysts that US casualty aversion would make intervention in a Taiwan conflict impossible.12
Recent and planned efforts in US military transformation and force realignment include shifting an additional aircraft carrier to the Pacific fleet, moving attack submarines to bases in Guam, and upgrading Anderson Air Force Base in Guam to support B-1 and B-2 bomber operations.13 Realignment of US forces based in Japan and South Korea is intended to improve the political sustainability of US alliances by removing perennial sore points such as the Marine air station in Futenma (near populated areas of Okinawa) and the US base at Yongsan (in the middle of downtown Seoul). Some US forces in Japan will shift to bases in Guam; others will be co-located at bases with Japanese forces. More broadly, transformation is intended to improve the US ability to flow forces from one theatre to another in response to unexpected contingencies. At present, this involves moving forces out of Asia, but it should also improve the US ability to respond to a future military contingency in Asia. The United States has also used exercises to demonstrate its ability to rapidly deploy combat assets; the June 2006 Valiant Shield exercise demonstrated the US ability to surge three aircraft carriers to the western Pacific.14
A2: Deterrence – Air Force / Navy Solves
Despite withdrawal of ground troops air and naval support will still deter
Niksch, 10 – Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is the Senior Adviser for East Asia with the PRS (3/24, Larry, “The Opcon Military Command Issue Amidst a Changing Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula”, )
To the contrary, the Pentagon and the U.S. Army foresee such a changing role for U.S. ground forces in South Korea. President Obama and U.S. commanders spoke in 2009 of the possibility of the remaining U.S. ground combat units in South Korea being deployed to Afghanistan or other active theaters of combat under a doctrine of strategic flexibility. General Bell, the U.S. Commander in Korea until 2009, stated several times that the future U.S. defense role in Korea would be primarily an air and sea role and that the primary U.S. response to any North Korean attack on South Korea would be the deployment of a huge “air armada” against North Korea. In no way does this change U.S. military role signal a lessening of the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea. In fact, U.S. air combat strength in South Korea and around the Korean peninsula has been built up steadily since 2003; the critics ignore this fact as well as the continuing formidable U.S. Navy’s air and missile assets in Northeast Asia.
Threat of Navy and Air force counterattack will still deter North Korea
Niksch, 10 – Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is the Senior Adviser for East Asia with the PRS (3/24, Larry, “The Opcon Military Command Issue Amidst a Changing Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula”, )
The second contention of the critics is part of a long-standing problem in both South Korea and the United States: exaggerating the North Korean military threat to South Korea. The critics’ emphasize Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons, missiles, and artillery on the demilitarized zone (DMZ), so-called asymmetric forces. However, I do not think that a case can be made that these asymmetric capabilities compensate North Korea for the substantial deterioration of its conventional military forces since the early 1990s—which went largely unacknowledged until the middle 2000s. North Korea’s conventional forces always have been Pyongyang’s main instrument for achieving its supreme political-strategic objective on the Korean peninsula—toppling the South Korean Government and achieving political dominance over the South Korea. Pyongyang could seek militarily to realize this supreme political-strategic objective only through a second massive invasion of South Korea that at least would capture Seoul and inflict debilitating damage on South Korean and U.S. military forces. In the 1980s, the Pentagon conducted numerous “war games” focused on whether R.O.K. and U.S. forces could repel a North Korean invasion and keep the North Korean army out of Seoul (I participated in several of these). Today, North Korean conventional forces have no capability or sustainability to attack across the DMZ with any hope of seizing and/or holding territory, including Seoul. Their weaponry is obsolete mostly vintage 1960s. Fuel supplies are marginal and do not allow for sustained military training; the North Korean air force is largely grounded because of lack of fuel. Food supplies for North Korean rank and file forces are marginal even in peacetime. Food requirements for an army at war grow considerably above peacetime requirements. For North Korea, this would mean immediate, debilitating food shortages for the civilian population that always lives on the margin of malnutrition and starvation. The bulk of North Korean rank and file soldiers are physically weak and undoubtedly mentally deficient as the products of years of malnutrition. Neither China nor Russia would support a North Korean attack on South Korea with a re-supply of weaponry. The U.S. Air Force and Navy’s counter-attack on North Korea would be massive and militarily debilitating within a few days. North Korea’s ability to sustain an invasion of South Korea no doubt would deteriorate within a very few days, probably less than a week.
Kim Jong-il is well aware of the weaknesses. His asymmetric forces can neither seize territory, including Seoul, nor inflict debilitating damage on U.S. and South Korean forces. The Pentagon today recognizes the diminution of the North Korean military threat to South Korea in its decisions to move the U.S. Second Division off the DMZ and allow approximately 40,000 family members of U.S. servicemen to live in South Korea. As we speak, the first group of family members is moving into housing in Seoul’s northern suburbs, close to the DMZ. Moreover, the United States and South Korea have several potential steps that could increase deterrence in the eyes of the North Koreans. It seems to me that one would be for the U.S. and South Korean air forces to exercise F-16s regularly off South Korea’s west coast, signaling North Korea that if it ignites a major military clash on the northern limit line, its forces would face a massive retaliation from the air. A second would be a decision by the United States to station a squadron of heavy bombers on Guam, as was done until the early 1990s. During the 1980s, North Korea issued the strongest denouncements of U.S. B-52 bomber exercises near the Korean peninsula. I then concluded that the B-52s on Guam constituted the strongest element of U.S. deterrence of North Korea. President Obama and President Lee agreed in 2009 to begin U.S.-R.O.K. discussions of enhanced deterrence. Those discussions need to begin and examine the potential steps, including my ideas, that would increase deterrence.
A2: Deterrence – Air Force / Navy Solves
U.S. is strengthening naval, air power, and introducing RMA weapons to sustain its military posture in the ROK
Ohkushi, 04 – Lieutenant General ASDF Ret, Member of Research Committee DRC, graduate of the National Defense Academy (Yasuo, 7/1/04, “USFK Realignment and South Korea’s Self-Reliant Defense”. )
2. Moves of U.S.- South Korea Security Relations
The U.S. and the ROK are groping for a new alliance posture based on the changing security environment. It is discussed toward the direction that the role of the U.S.-South Korea alliance should be expanded not only for the security of Korean peninsula but also for the regional stability. While the ROK army will increase its responsibility for the defense of the nation against the threat of North Korea, the USFK will extend its role to the regional stability and a global emergency in addition to the defense of ROK by means of high mobility and strike power. The reorganization and relocation of the USFK has a shade of meaning as a part of the review of the U.S. military strategy, transformation, modernization, and disposition of the overseas deployment forces in a global scale. Contrarily, the ROK expressed the distrust of the US defense commitment and requested to reconsider the reduction and movement of the 2nd ID at a critical time when tensions are being further heightened by the North Korean nuclear issue. As the U.S. side, there is no idea of pushing it now, because it will cause the loss of military balance of South- North. However the U.S. seeks to apply her military transformation concept in a global scale, with a high priority on the military strategy of the USFK that confronts the high war potential in the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the U.S. is planning to reinforce its war capabilities by strengthening of naval and air power and introducing RMA high-tech weapons, and also requests the ROK to takeover the USFK’s duty and to strengthen its military posture.
Remaining U.S. air capabilities are sufficient to deter conflicts and they can be relocated to Japan after reunification
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
Of greater significance is U.S. air forces on the peninsula. Currently, two wings occupying two separate air bases in South Korea represents a significant counterbalance to a sudden North Korean attack. While the air wings provide the U.S. with a great capability to counter the current threat, it is doubtful they will remain there after unification. It is possible to relocate additional air assets to Japan. Japan has factions that oppose U.S. military presence, though the greatest opposition is in Okinawa. The Japanese mainland is the most suitable location for relocating the wings. Other options include Guam, Thailand, and Hawaii or reliance on increased USN carrier presence to provide airpower as required. Again, cooperative defense exercises will permit U.S. air forces to periodically conduct flight operations out of bases on the Korean peninsula to maintain a visible presence once withdrawn. Given the flexibility, range, and firepower of U.S. airpower, it is more important to maintain the wings as opposed to ground forces in the region.
A2: Deterrence – Transition to Stryker Force Best
A transition from larger, heavy and permanent forces to Stryker forces allows increased flexibility and prevents the drawing in of U.S. forces into any potential military forces
Sung-Jun 08 (Chung Sung-Jun, “South Korea: Imperatives of a U.S. Presence,” Stratfor, 7/17/08, )
As for Washington’s motivations, one cannot but notice that with 28,500 U.S. troops still stationed on the peninsula, the Pentagon has more troops committed to South Korea than to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. That is undoubtedly a commitment no longer commensurate with either the threat or the likelihood of war. But while the scale, scope and structure of USFK are in some ways symptoms of a certain institutional inertia, USFK is there to stay.
The Pentagon is plenty short of troops as it is, and its long-range vision does not include the large, heavy and permanent forces of the Cold War. (Though this is the type of presence Seoul prefers; entrenched, less-mobile forces lock the United States into any potential military situation with South Korea’s neighbors, and they cannot be whisked away on a mission elsewhere with which Seoul does not want to be associated.)
This could mean moving away from the main battle tanks of heavy armored units to lighter, more transportable Stryker vehicles. In addition, like Japan, South Korea will likely become an increasingly heavy partner in ballistic missile defense — attractive to Seoul because of Pyongyang’s and Beijing’s missiles and attractive to the United States because it is another forward base that helps keep America’s adversaries an ocean away.
A2: Deterrence – Navy Solves
U.S. will rely predominately on naval presence after post unification troop withdrawal
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
Summary and Implications
The U.S. has a vital role in shaping and maintaining the security environment in Asia Pacific both now and after Korea reunifies. After reunification, the U.S. will continue to have national strategic interests in the region and will maintain a viable military presence to protect those interests. However, the absence of a looming threat from North Korea combined with pressure from regional actors as well as domestic pressure in both the U.S. and Korea, withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula appears inevitable. Increased U.S. naval presence in and around the peninsula, U.S. forces in Japan, Thailand ,and Guam, and prepositioned equipment will constitute the bulk of future U.S. presence in the region. The U.S. must develop a more creative and capable strategy of protecting its vital interests and achieving its national objectives. This strategy includes a heavier reliance on the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power. Since regional powers have placed great emphasis on economic growth and sustainment, the U.S. can assist and encourage cooperation toward achieving these mutual goals. Historical and cultural animosities between China, Japan, and Korea provide significant challenges to maintaining a delicate balance. However, as the world leader in military and economic might, technologies, and information, the U.S. is uniquely positioned to engage these nations and mediate between competing interests. As the countries of Asia Pacific open their markets to trade and become more economically interdependent, they will share a mutual interest in regional security. Collective security and economic forums like WTO, ARF, and CSCAP will institutionalize multilateral security cooperation in the region. Comprehensive engagement to include a continued U.S. military presence combined with regional collective security and economic cooperation will provide regional stability to Asia Pacific and ensure the future of a unified Korea.
Finally, this study has significant implications for strategic planners. Strengthened diplomatic ties, increased economic cooperation and military stationing alternatives take time. Efforts to shape the strategic environment must begin now and continue with uninterrupted determination. Once reunification occurs events will move rapidly, as they did in Europe, and the opportunity to significantly shape events is lost or determined in a way contrary to U.S. interests.
A2: Deterrence – China Ans
Withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea to Japan maintains U.S.-ROK alliance while acting as a spoiler to Chinese aspirations
Coghlan 08 – U.S. Colonel (David Coghlan, “Prospects From Korean Reunification,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008, )
In the longer term, the United States should be more proactive in discussing with Seoul future adjustments to the U.S.-ROK alliance. A passive approach is unlikely to work, especially if current anti-American feeling and proclivity toward China continue to gain further momentum. In a unified peninsula, without the threat of a belligerent and unpredictable North Korea, the justification for the retention of U.S. troops on the peninsula will be slender. A likely outcome of this may be the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the retailoring of the U.S. presence in Japan97 that would respect Seoul’s sovereignty while still providing nearby forces to act as a spoiler to any Chinese regional aspirations.
A2: Deterrence – Terrorism Ans
Withdrawal stops North Korean terror attacks
Meyer, 09 – former U.S. Marine Corps officer who participated in military exercises in Korea (6/18/09, Carlton, “The Pentagon’s Favorite Demon,” , JMP)
If South Koreans do not want to defend their nation, why should Americans? The United States should not play a major role in Korea, lest America becomes involved in a military conflict. The American people have as much at stake in Korea as the people of Brazil. The best way to defend America from potential North Korean terror attacks is to stop provoking their leaders with demands and threats. If Asian nations can’t resolve their differences and armed conflict erupts, the United States can buy manufactured goods elsewhere.
Promptly withdrawing American troops from Korea is the best option for peace, and may lead to Korean unification. This would save the United States billions of dollars a year and remove American troops and their families from a potential war zone. Americans should recall the logic of President Lyndon Johnson who said in 1964: “We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing themselves.”
Troops in South Korea aren’t key to the war on terror or to prevent hostile rivals
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (1/25/10, Doug, American Spectator, “Letting Go,” , JMP)
America's security priorities are broader — fighting terrorism and confronting potential hostile global hegemonic powers. But the first doesn't require large military forces and the second doesn't currently exist. Nor will bilateral military cooperation over such issues be easy.
South Korea is not threatened by Islamic terrorism and Seoul has little interest in the difficult task of creating a friendly government in Kabul. The South plans to dispatch 350 soldiers to Afghanistan, but for the purpose of buttressing U.S. support for continuing the alliance.
The plan is controversial in South Korea and of little practical value to America. In fact, it would be better if the ROK devoted its full resources to raising, equipping, and training adequate forces for action on the Korean peninsula. Seoul can do far more to defend itself than remake Afghanistan. The latter mission is a diversion.
Although willing to make a gesture regarding Afghanistan, the South is unlikely to cooperate with the U.S. against China, a Washington priority. South Korea doesn't want to become a permanent enemy of the colossus next door in service of America's broader geopolitical interests. It is one thing for Seoul to seek U.S. aid in the unlikely event of attempted Chinese coercion of the South; it is quite another for South Korea to join Washington in a war to defend, say, Taiwan.
US military not needed to fight terrorism– it’s not worth the cost
Friedman and Preble, 10 – Fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute AND director of foreign policy studies (6/14/10, Benjamin AND Christopher, Los Angeles Times, “Who are we defending?; The U.S. should be content to be the big kid on the block that mostly looks out for itself.” l/n).
Nor can terrorism justify a huge military. Most of our military spending goes to conventional forces adept at destroying well-armed enemies. Terrorists are lightly armed and mostly hidden. The trick is finding them, not killing or capturing them once they are found. Counterinsurgency enthusiasts claim that we can only be safe from terrorists by using ground forces to rebuild the states where they operate. But we have learned the hard way that theory badly overestimates our ability to organize other nations' politics. Even if we could master that imperial art, it would not be worth the cost. By avoiding the occupation of failing states and shedding commitments to defend healthy ones, we could plan for far fewer wars, allowing cuts in force structure, manpower, procurement spending and operational costs. The resulting force would be more elite, less strained and far less expensive. Even if the commission calls for cutting defense commitments, the Obama administration has shown little interest in following such recommendations. When the Japanese government recently asked us to remove our Marines from Okinawa after 65 years, for example, the administration hectored Tokyo into letting us keep our base rather than wishing the Japanese well and bringing the troops home. Instead of looking to shed missions, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently advocated maintaining current funding levels while cutting overhead costs by a few billion to fund frontline forces. Good idea, except that it won't offset the rapidly rising cost of the military's personnel, healthcare and operational spending. The likely result will be that these accounts will continue to take funds needed for manpower and force structure, leaving a shrinking force overburdened even in peacetime. Our deficit problem is an opportunity to surrender the pretension that we are the world's indispensable nation, preventing instability, shaping the international system and guiding history. We should be content to settle for being the big kid on the block that looks out for itself and occasionally helps friends in a bad spot. That approach would take advantage of the security we have, and save money we don't.
A2: Troops Key to Deter China / Taiwan
South Korea won’t permit troops to be used for other regional contingencies – including China
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,” , JMP)
At the same time, with the threat of a North Korean invasion dramatically diminished--whether or not Pyongyang was responsible for the ship sinking--Washington looks increasingly at other "dual uses" of American forces stationed in the peninsula. However, Seoul is unlikely to assent if the U.S. tries to turn the ROK into an advanced base in a regional conflict, particularly against China. Indeed, the South Korean government would be foolish beyond measure if it allowed Washington to turn the South into a military adversary of the ROK's increasingly powerful neighbor, a nation with a long memory.
South Korea won’t let troops be used to deter China – especially on Taiwan
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
The Chinese Conundrum
THE ONE important case where the American presence more credibly could retain relevance is the People's Republic of China. But it is not obvious that the United States should implement a plan to "contain" Beijing, or that the ROK should join such a system.
China may soon marry the world's largest population with its biggest economy, assuming it continues to enjoy strong economic growth. It is a potential superpower, the most obvious peer competitor to America in the not too distant future. Nothing is certain, of course; China remains relatively poor, faces ethnic and separatist issues, and suffers an uncertain political future. Nevertheless, its economic influence is already surpassing that of America in East Asia. In 2003, China overtook the United States as the biggest trading partner of South Korea; in 2004, China became Japan's biggest trading partner. By the close of 2005, China is poised to become the dominant trader with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
China's rising "soft power" is having an impact on Korean attitudes. A recent poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that 49 percent of South Koreans viewed China favorably, compared to 47 percent negatively. Significantly, those in their forties and younger chose friendship with China over America.
The future course of Chinese-U.S. relations is uncertain, as disputes over human rights, non-proliferation and Taiwan remain far from resolution. It is by no means inevitable that Beijing will emerge as an antagonist--and we should be very careful to avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nonetheless, Taiwan poses the most worrisome flashpoint. Despite the assumptions of some analysts that a pragmatic leadership in Beijing would not risk its economic gains by taking military action against Taipei, nationalist sentiments are powerful throughout the Chinese population and even the Chinese diaspora. It would be foolish to underestimate China's determination to reclaim its "breakaway province", evidenced by the very public initiation of anti-secession legislation aimed at Taiwan.
Given that, as CIA Director Porter Goss recently testified, "Beijing's military modernization and military buildup could tilt the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait", the United States is interested in credible deterrence. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested what amounted to a strategy of containment before setting out on her March trip to Asia. She observed: "There are several ways to deal with [China's build-up]. Perhaps the most important is to recognize the United States has very strong alliances in the region that bring stability to the region at a time when the Chinese role is changing."
For this contingency, a reformed U.S.-Korean alliance might benefit Washington. And the Bush Administration almost certainly is going to raise the issue. After all, Washington has been pressing America's other friends to carefully consider what they would do if war comes to the Taiwan Strait. But the response has been mixed.
Singapore Prime Minster Lee Hsein Loong returned from a visit to Taiwan in August 2004 warning Taiwan against any move toward independence and raising serious doubts that his nation would actively back Washington in a confrontation with China. Australia, along with Great Britain America's strongest backer in Iraq, also has stepped back from U.S. support for Taiwan. Last fall, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned Washington not to take Australian support for granted. And Canberra was no more willing to back America in the aftermath of Beijing's approval of its anti-secession law. China pointedly suggested that Australia ensure that its military relationship with the United States not encompass the Taiwan question. Downer responded that while Canberra would have to consult with America in the event of a conflict, "that is a very different thing from saying that we would make a decision to go to war."
Only Japan, in the midst of worsening relations with China and an obvious rethink of its relatively pacifist military stance in the face of North Korean saber-rattling, seems inclined to back the United States in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In recent security guidelines, Tokyo took the unprecedented step of calling Taiwan a mutual security concern. Tokyo might well flinch if war approached, but so far the Koizumi government has proved to be increasingly tough with both China and North Korea.
Japan's stance has raised expectations regarding South Korea. What would the ROK do? No official decision has been taken, but news reports suggest substantial opposition within the government to expanding the alliance's reach, especially involving a conflict between China and Taiwan. The Korea Herald editorialized on March 11 that unlike Japan, "Korea will certainly wish to avoid being drawn into" a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan.
To join the United States against China would turn Seoul into an implacable enemy of its permanent neighbor, one that possesses a long memory and almost certainly will eventually become the region's dominant power, irrespective of Washington's policies. This is why Korean analysts Woosang Kim and Taeho Kim have argued, "China's growing influence over and interdependence with South Korea amid the continuing rivalry between the U.S. and China could well make untenable the proposition that both countries can jointly cooperate to resolve a plateful of concrete policy issues and longer-term questions on the peninsula."
Thus, Seoul faces a difficult decision. Several years ago, participants in a conference on U.S.-South Korean relations observed that "South Korea's balancing act between its alliance with the United States and its cooperation with China could well turn out to be the most prominent security challenge in the 21st century." More recently, some analysts suggest that the ROK's choice is a more fundamental one, essentially between China and the United States. Reporting on a recent conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, Richard Halloran of the Washington Times wrote: "South Korea is fast approaching a critical decision whether to try to revive its troubled alliance with the United States or dissolve their joint security treaty, expel American forces from the peninsula and seek an alliance with China."
This may be an overstatement, but Seoul need not expel American troops to have them leave. In early March, President Roh declared, "I clearly state that the U.S. forces in Korea should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without our consent." He added, "Our people will not get entangled in regional disputes against our will in the future." However reasonable that might be for South Korea, if America's troops in the South are not needed to defend the ROK and Seoul is unwilling to allow America to use those forces for any other security purposes, why should the United States keep any military units there?
A2: Troops Key to Deter China / Taiwan
South Korea won’t allow alliance to be used to target China
Bandow, 08 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (6/9/2008, Doug, “Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance,” , JMP)
Some analysts on both sides of the Pacific contend that the alliance is necessary to respond to North Korean nuclear developments. However, absent the U.S. military presence—which provides a convenient target for Pyongyang—the prospect of a DPRK bomb would be a regional rather than an American problem. Washington still would have an interest in encouraging a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, but withdrawing the troops would increase American flexibility. Supporters of the status quo also advocate giving the bilateral relationship a new purpose. After the Gates meeting, the two countries issued a press release which “expressed a shared perception of the need for stronger cooperation in order to develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a 21st Century Strategic Alliance and agreed to exert a joint effort for the creative development of the ROK-U.S. relationship.”
Which means precisely what? Some Americans view South Korea as a key member of an anti-China alliance. But while the ROK might enjoy being protected from Beijing in the extraordinarily unlikely event of Chinese aggression, the South has no interest in joining with an American crusade against the PRC. Indeed, the ROK’s ties with Beijing continue to grow. Two-way trade between China and South Korea runs $145 billion, more than between the U.S. and the South. Popular South Korean attitudes towards the People’s Republic of China vary—recent thuggish behavior by Chinese students towards demonstrators protesting repression in Tibet was ill-received in the South, for instance. But it is hard to find a resident of the ROK enthused about confronting the PRC. Indeed, more young people fear the U.S. than either China or the DPRK. Moreover, in May South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited Beijing, where he and Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that they had “agreed to upgrade ties from a partnership of comprehensive cooperation to a future-oriented strategic partnership.”
The most likely scenario for conflict between the United States and China involves Taiwan. However, the prospect that Seoul will turn itself into a permanent enemy of a likely superpower with a long memory to help defend Taiwan approximates zero. America’s East Asian allies might want Washington to stick around to counterbalance assorted feared states (variously China, Japan and Russia), but have little incentive to put themselves at risk to advance perceived U.S. interests.
But if China was not the target of a revamped alliance, what would be the purpose? Aggression by Japan or anyone else is inconceivable. The most common sources of conflict are neither important for U.S. security nor amenable to U.S. military action—Burma, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands, for example. If South Korea or other nearby states want a local geopolitical policeman, let one or more of them perform that role.
Troops in Korea are useless – President won’t initiate a ground invasion
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Observers commonly argue that the U.S. presence in Korea is designed to achieve multiple geopolitical goals.108 But that argument is also outmoded. In fact, there is nothing left for America’s soldiers to do. The future course of Chinese-U.S. relations is uncertain, but Beijing is not an inevitable enemy. Moreover, China’s defense buildup remains modest and poses no threat to America’s survival. 109 America’s deployments in Korea would be of little use in any case. It is highly unlikely that ground forces would be used in a conflict with China; no U.S. administration would initiate a ground invasion of that state.
Troops not key to deter China – South Korea won’t approve the mission
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Advocates of a permanent US occupation talk grandly of regional stability. However, it would be a miraculous coincidence if a commitment forged in the Cold War and created to deter a ground invasion from a contiguous neighbor turned out to be the perfect arrangement to meet completely different contingencies in a completely different security environment.
In fact, there are no secondary “dual-use” functions for America’s soldiers to perform. For instance, US and Chinese interests might eventually collide, but America’s deployments in Korea would provide little value in that scenario. No US administration would initiate a ground invasion against the PRC. And South Korea, like Japan for that matter, is unlikely to allow itself to become the staging ground for such a conflict. To do so would turn itself into China’s permanent enemy.
A2: Troops Key to Deter India
Defense increases by India is good – helps counterbalance China instead of the U.S.
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Cohen also fears that India would be “potentially motivated to expand its capabilities in reaction to Chinese stratagems.”113 That should not bother Washington. In fact, it would be a highly positive step for the United States, since New Delhi already poses an important counterweight to Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia and is likely to become an even more significant player in coming years.114 The alternative could be a government in New Delhi that aligns with China and Russia to counterbalance America’s push for global dominance.115
A2: Troops Key to Deter Other Conflicts
This just gets South Koreans drawn into other conflicts – they won’t support it
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
The newly inaugurated Security Policy Initiative (SPI) talks, expected to run bimonthly over the coming year, will study, as the official statement after the first meeting explained, "how the Korea-U.S. alliance should be transformed to prepare for a future in which security conditions on the Korean peninsula, such as improved inter-Korean ties, occur." Mitchell Reiss, director of policy planning for the State Department, acknowledges that "some of the assumptions that underpinned the alliance in 1953 are being re-examined." But many Koreans worry that what Washington has in mind is the evolution of the alliance from a defense pact to a Korean blank check that will support any U.S. military action in the region. Last fall Hankyoreh, a liberal daily newspaper, editorialized: "We must not let down our guard to the possibility [that] changes in the role of U.S. troops in Korea or a changed U.S.-Korea alliance could get Korea unwillingly dragged into a regional conflict."
Seoul can prevent troops from being used for other purposes
Bandow, 06 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (Winter 2006, Doug, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, “Enlisting China to Stop a Nuclear North Korea,” Vol. XVIII, No. 4, , JMP)
In fact, the forces should be withdrawn today, since the South is well able to defend itself from North Korea and ROK and American geopolitical objectives have been steadily diverging. Indeed, South Korea has indicated that it will not allow the United States to use its forces in the region without Seoul’s consent, turning America’s ROK presence into an advanced based to nowhere. As Ted Galen Carpenter puts it, pulling out “simply involves relinquishing a waning strategic asset in return for something important.”26
A2: Troops Key to Deter Other Asian Conflicts
No risk of Asian conflicts and no threat to U.S. interests
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
An Alliance in Search of a Purpose
IT WOULD be a miraculous co-incidence if a commitment forged in the Cold War to deter a ground invasion from a contiguous neighbor functioned equally well without adjustment to meet completely different future contingencies. One cannot help but suspect that the means has become the end for most alliance advocates, to be preserved irrespective of changes in the regional and global security environments.
Some alliance advocates, however, are vigorously re-imagining the rationale for retaining U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. Advocates of a permanent U.S. occupation talk grandly of preserving regional stability and preparing for regional contingencies. Some South Koreans do so as well: Kim Sung-ban of the Institute on Foreign Affairs and National Security argues that "Even in the absence of a military threat from North Korea", the alliance should be revamped "to focus on promoting stability in Northeast Asia." Yet it is difficult to spin a scenario involving real war between real countries. No general East Asian conflict, other than a possible China-Taiwan confrontation, seems to be threatening to break out. The region is no longer the focus of global hegemonic competition. All of the major regional powers benefit from peace; none has significant and growing differences with other major powers. Nor is it clear how unexplained "instability", as opposed to widespread conflict, would harm the global economy and thus U.S. interests. Only if nations throughout East Asia essentially collapsed--an unlikely event in the extreme--would there be substantial harm to America and other countries.
A2: Troops Key to Solve Local Conflicts / Civil Wars
Troops not suitable to solve civil conflicts and deployments in South Korea aren’t necessary to solve them
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
In response, some supporters of America's position in South Korea suggest using forces stationed there to intervene in local conflicts and civil wars. However, a commitment to defend "stability" in East Asia implies a willingness to intervene in a score of local conflicts revolving around border disputes, ethnic divisions and other parochial squabbles. Of course, Washington refused to use force against Indonesia over East Timor; it is not likely to intervene in inter-communal strife in the Moluccas or independence demands in Aceh or Irian Jaya. The greatest threats to regional stability come from within weak if not outright failed states: insurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democratic protests and ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic, nationalistic and religious division in Indonesia. Most of these problems are not susceptible to solution via U.S. military intervention--nor is it clear why the Mutual Defense Pact between Seoul and Washington is required.
A2: Troops Key to Solve Diseases / Piracy / Terrorism
Troops can’t solve diseases, piracy or terrorism
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Other arguments against a change in policy border on the bizarre. For example, Haselden, in a recent issue of the U.S. Army War College Quarterly Parameters, writes of “such transnational threats as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, and infectious diseases.” 116 What, one wonders, would troops in Korea do to combat AIDS? Does the Air Force plan on bombing opium fields in Burma? Why shouldn’t South Korea—along with other nations in the region—deploy ships to combat piracy? As for the problem of terrorism, it requires accurate local intelligence and sustained police action, not the intervention of thousands of U.S. soldiers.
In sum, without any connection to the Cold War that ended over a decade ago, and absent a global hegemonic struggle, Korea is relatively unimportant to the United States from a military and strategic standpoint.
Troops in Korea not key
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
Advocates also fall back on a familiar litany of transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and infectious diseases to justify the continued existence of the alliance. One wonders, however, how stationing troops in Korea helps to combat the spread of AIDS, or whether the Air Force is preparing to bomb opium fields in Burma. Piracy is a major problem, but not only is there no reason that the regional powers--including South Korea, Singapore, Australia, Japan and Indonesia--cannot deploy more ships and other assets to cope with this threat, U.S. ground forces based in Korea cannot patrol the Malacca Strait. Terrorism, meanwhile, is best combated by accurate intelligence and special forces, not thousands of conventional forces configured to repel a land assault.
A2: Troops Key to Reunification
Presence designed to deter North Korea won’t be appropriate after reunification
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Some supporters of the U.S. troop presence imagine retaining bases even after reunification. 107 Advocates of a permanent U.S. occupation talk grandly of regional stability and preparedness for regional contingencies. However, it would be a miraculous coincidence if a commitment forged during the Cold War and created to deter a ground invasion from a contiguous neighbor would function equally well—or perhaps even better— without adjustment to meet future contingencies, despite the collapse of the potential aggressor and the disappearance of its hegemonic allies. One cannot help but suspect that the means has become the end, to be preserved irrespective of changes in the regional and global security environment.
A2: Troops Key to Economy
U.S. presence saddles taxpayers with additional costs – it is a wealth transfer
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Finally, some maintain that a “power vacuum” might be created if Washington backs away from defending Japan and the ROK. Lt. Col. Carl E. Haselden Jr. of the U.S. Marine Corps worries that “the instability between nations with combined strong economies and militaries could lead to an arms race having detrimental effects on regional stability and the global economy.”111
But such future economic problems are speculative, to say the least. Moreover, the current U.S.-ROK relationship has important economic ramifications: subsidizing the defense of populous and prosperous allies involves a substantial redistribution of wealth from Americans to, in this case, Japanese and Koreans. Their economies may gain from that process, but the U.S. economy does not; instead, the American taxpayers bear the added military burden.
A2: ROK Forces Key to Iraq / War on Terror
Seoul mandates that its forces be kept away from hostilities
Bandow, 05 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (10/22/05, Doug, , “Foreign Policy Welfare Queen,” , JMP)
Delusions about South Korea's need for assistance infects Capitol Hill as well. This summer, Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), vice chairman of the International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to other House members extolling the U.S.-ROK alliance. "Forged in the heat of battle, the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship continues to be one of our most vital and vibrant partnerships," Burton declared. The congressman cited "the continuing contributions made by South Korea to our mutual alliance—some that are all too often forgotten."
Actually, they aren't worth remembering. For instance, Burton pointed to trade. But Americans and South Koreans trade because it is mutually beneficial to do so, not because of our military alliance. The ROK "has been a strong ally in the U.S.-led War on Terror, having committed more than 3,270 troops to Iraq," the congressman noted. What Burton didn't mention was that Seoul insisted its forces be placed far away from hostilities.
Participation in Iraqi peacekeeping undermines South Korea’s reputation
Harrison, 06 – has visited North Korea 9 times and is Director of the Asia Program and Chairman of the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy at the Center for International Policy (Feb 2006, Selig S., originally appeared in The Korea Policy Review, “The New Face of the South Korea-U.S. Alliance and the North Korea Question,”
, JMP)
The most striking example of the President’s desire to avoid disturbing the status quo has been his decision to send South Korean forces to Iraq. This has been done at a high cost to South Korea’s reputation in the international community. The U.S. invasion of Iraq is widely regarded throughout the world as a blunder of historic proportions that will foster continuing instability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and is inflicting horrendous humanitarian suffering on the people of Iraq. President Roh’s determination to back the U.S. adventure in Iraq underlines his desire to avoid disruption of an alliance that still has wide public acceptance in South Korea for economic reasons. At the same time, on the plus side, it has strengthened his hand in seeking to restrain the Bush Administration from pursuing a confrontational policy with Pyongyang that could lead to war.
A2: ROK Prolif – 2ac
The U.S. can maintain the nuclear umbrella even if troops are withdrawn – risk of South Korean nuclearization is small
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,” , JMP)
What value, then, is the alliance?
Some proponents view it as a useful tool of nonproliferation, discouraging South Korea from developing a nuclear weapon. However, that possibility remains remote. Although nuclear negotiations with the North hardly look promising, China might yet forcefully weigh in to halt the North Korean program. Moreover, the U.S. could maintain a nuclear umbrella over the ROK without keeping conventional forces on the ground in South Korea, which only act as nuclear hostages vulnerable to DPRK intimidation.
Moreover, the most powerful incentive for Beijing to apply significant pressure on the North to denuclearize (and not just return to the Six-Party talks) is the threat of further proliferation. The People's Republic of China does not fear a North Korean atomic bomb. The PRC might not worry unduly about a South Korean weapon.
But Japan and even Taiwan might consider joining a growing nuclear parade. That possibility should raise more than eyebrows in Beijing, encouraging a vigorous response to halt the process at the start. The best way to keep the ROK and neighboring states non-nuclear is to make the North non-nuclear. The best way to make North Korea non-nuclear is for the PRC to use its full array of diplomatic and economic tools on Pyongyang.
The credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee has empirically been able to survive past withdrawals
Payne, et. al, 10 – Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,”
, JMP)
South Korea has been the beneficiary of a U.S. nuclear guarantee for more than a half century. Throughout that time, the guarantee has helped deter nonnuclear aggression by North Korea. In more recent years, the prevention of North Korean nuclear coercion or use has been added to the deterrence task. The nuclear guarantee is grounded in, not apart from, the basic structure of the U.S. alliance with the ROK. U.S. reaffirmations of the guarantee are essential for assuring Seoul, but they gain much of their credibility from the broader relationship between the two countries, their long-standing military pact, the forward deployment of U.S. forces, the combined exercises of the two militaries, and the U.S. track record in coming to the aid of South Korea. The United States thus assures South Korea of its military commitment and nuclear guarantee by the security interests it shares, the mutual defense treaty it signed, the words it says, the troops it stations, and the force it shows. This approach to assurance, by and large, has been successful. At different points, however, South Korean confidence in the American security commitment has been diminished by U.S. troop withdrawals and redeployments, increases in the North Korean threat, seemingly weak U.S. responses to North Korean provocations, change in alliance command arrangements, and perceived U.S. abandonment of other Asian allies. In the end, though, the U.S. nuclear guarantee has retained its assurance value.
A2: ROK Prolif – 2ac
Withdrawal won’t end U.S. commitment to Korea – we can be responsive with troops stationed outside of the peninsula
Gilbert, 04 – Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, “Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?” , JMP)
The United States commitment to Korea has not changed. We are committed to peace in Northeast Asia and our allies understand our commitment goes beyond the forward deployment of troops or repositioning of military forces within the region.22 The United States will remain committed to peace in the region both today and tomorrow, whether or not our footprint decreases in the future.
The future in this region should involve even fewer troops. Given the proven capabilities of the United States military and those capabilities that will be obtained in the next 10-20 years, the footprint on the Korean Peninsula and within the immediate area of operations (Japan) could be reduced. We have the ability and operational reach today to station our troops further from the shores of Korea and still be responsive. Many would argue this would not be feasible given the current nuclear situation, but I believe otherwise. Perhaps conventional troop strengths, both of the United States and North Korea, should be part of the current discussion concerning the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. The United States and South Korean governments have already agreed to pull U.S. forces south of Seoul. However, moving troops back from the DMZ should only be seen as the first step towards reducing the overall footprint on the Korean Peninsula. Once the troops are removed from the DMZ, a build down program should be developed to reduce the end-strength of each military while providing assurances of protection. Perhaps it would even be possible to agree to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in the future.
The United States cannot withdraw from the region completely. The vital interests of the United States preclude it from such a drawdown. I agree that complete withdrawal is not feasible nor is it in our nation’s best interest. Many analysts have argued that to withdraw U.S. forces from Asia would heighten the risk of nations engaging in arms races, both conventional and nuclear. Given the prospects of an arms race in Northeast Asia, the United States must remain engaged in the region. U.S. forces must remain forward deployed in Asia, but I am not convinced they need to be on the Korean Peninsula. Positioning the military and reducing conventional forces are two methods to underwrite peace and stability in the region. The road map to a sustained peace in the region should begin by denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.
U.S. will take intervening actions to prevent South Korea from nuclearizing
Payne, et. al, 10 – Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,”
, JMP)
During the 1970s, South Korea began a clandestine nuclear weapons program because of serious doubts about the reliability of the United States. This lack of confidence was due to U.S. troop withdrawals from the peninsula, insufficient U.S. responses to aggressive acts by the North, the Vietnam pullout, the perceived U.S. abandonment of Taiwan for rapprochement with China, and other indications of diminished U.S. commitment to allies in Asia. When the program was discovered, the United States acted to prevent certain nuclear technology transfers to South Korea, threatened to block financial assistance for South Korean civilian nuclear power, and warned that the U.S.-ROK security relationship itself was in danger. After Seoul backed off from the weapons project and ratified the NPT in 1975, the United States restated its security commitment to assure the ROK.44
Alliance doesn’t deter conflict and withdrawal won’t cause war
Bandow, 08 – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (6/9/2008, Doug, “Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance,” , JMP)
But if China was not the target of a revamped alliance, what would be the purpose? Aggression by Japan or anyone else is inconceivable. The most common sources of conflict are neither important for U.S. security nor amenable to U.S. military action—Burma, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands, for example. If South Korea or other nearby states want a local geopolitical policeman, let one or more of them perform that role.
The pro-alliance mantra includes promoting regional stability, but the contention that East Asia would dissolve into chaos and war without Uncle Sam’s restraining hand is both arrogant and presumptuous. Everyone in the region has an interest in preserving peace and promoting prosperity. North Korea remains a problem state but the threat of war on the Korean peninsula has diminished dramatically; the result of the recent Taiwanese election has moderated fears about potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Beyond these two cases, there are no obvious bilateral controversies with much likelihood of flaring into violence.
A2: U.S.-ROK Relations – 2ac
Withdrawal will boost relations
Bandow, 08 – fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (9/25/08, Doug, Asia Times, “A reason to bring US troops home,” , JMP)
Real change
Finally, downplaying America's military role would improve overall US relations with other countries. The continuing presence of bases and troops creates endless local grievances. Part of that reflects nationalist frustrations with the foreign control that inevitably accompanies foreign garrisons. There are also the inevitable problems that come from putting a large number of young American males in the middle of a foreign country and culture.
The US government has a particular image problem with young South Koreans, who tend for instance to view America as a greater threat than North Korea. But anger towards Washington extends well beyond universities; the recent protests against US beef imports were directed at far more than the fear of consuming unsafe food.
As a result, President George W Bush received a less-than-friendly reception when he visited in early August, and in Japan, the heavy concentration of US bases in Okinawa has spawned strong opposition to America's presence in that province. Without the presence of US military forces, which emphasize Washington's dominance, the bilateral relationships would be closer to one of equals, with greater emphasis on private economic and cultural ties rather than on government-to-government geopolitical relations.
Withdrawal won’t undermine relations with South Korea – cultural and economic ties will remain
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Cutting the U.S. security commitment to South Korea does not mean ending close cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Intelligence sharing and port access rights would be beneficial for both nations. Depending on the direction interKorean relations take, the ROK might become interested in cooperating with Washington in developing a missile defense and possibly nuclear weapons.
Cultural ties between the two states would remain strong. Family and friends span the Pacific, as a result of the millions of Americans who have served in South Korea and the hundreds of thousands of Koreans who have immigrated to America. More than 1.2 million Americans identified themselves as Korean in the 2000 census.117 Indeed, Americans are likely to receive a warmer welcome if our fractious military relationship is replaced by one based on commerce. An equal, cooperative relationship between the governments is more likely once the ROK is no longer dependent on America for its defense.
Finally, economic ties will remain strong after an American troop withdrawal. Korea is America’s seventh largest trading partner, with two-way trade totaling $57.4 billion in 2001.118 An obvious step forward would be a free trade agreement. In May 2001, even before congressional approval of President Bush’s Trade Promotion Authority, Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.), then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced legislation authorizing the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate such an agreement.119 The ROK has already inked a trade accord with Chile and is discussing the possibility of doing so with Japan.120
Several factors will sustain U.S.-ROK ties
Payne, et. al, 10 – Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,”
, JMP)
These interests in the security of South Korea are the foundation for the American defense commitment and nuclear guarantee to that country. They are reasons for Seoul to believe the repeated pledges of the United States to defend the ROK, including, if necessary, with nuclear weapons. While Seoul at times has questioned the credibility of those pledges because of U.S. troop withdrawals, heightened concern about the North Korean threat, and fear the United States would be unwilling to suffer the cost of another Korean war, the underlying U.S. interests in South Korean security have given the alliance ballast for withstanding such doubts.
A2: U.S.-ROK Relations – 2ac
Security commitment not key to overall relations with South Korea
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (1/25/10, Doug, American Spectator, “Letting Go,” , JMP)
There are lots of other suggested areas of cooperation, such as international development and UN peacekeeping, but none of these grow out of today's bilateral relationship — and especially America's essentially unilateral security guarantee. Whatever the future of ROK-U.S. relations, there is no need for America to defend the South.
That doesn't mean the two governments should not cooperate: both have an interest in a stable and prosperous East Asia. But their cooperation should be issue-by-issue, whether informal and bilateral or formal and multilateral.
The U.S. can spin the plan as a necessary response to new strategic realities – not as cutting and running
Cucullu, 05 – former Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and Vietnam vet (10/27/05, Gordon, “Korean Troop Withdrawal,” , JMP)
Meanwhile, from a resources and manpower perspective the question becomes, if American forces are now symbolic of a US commitment to security in Korea and on the Asian mainland, then how many need to be present to validate the symbol? Would a reinforced brigade do the job? A specially configured battalion task force? With units stretched to the max in a long, tough global fight and the costs of war-fighting rising sharply, these are not frivolous considerations.
It helps to recall also that we have a bond in blood with the South Korean military. We fought together in Korea, of course, and also in Vietnam, and now in Iraq with a 3,000+ man unit deployed there. Additionally, South Korea is one of our most important trading partners, supports us diplomatically, and is an international role model for the transformational power of freedom and democracy. A free South Korea is a necessary partner to solve current crises as well as those that will erupt in the future.
It is important that we first do no harm. By decreasing US troop presence we must make clear that it is not a sign of weakening resolve or commitment. That point made, we must recognize that we are in a different fight now and that circumstances have evolved into a new strategic paradigm. We must adjust our resources accordingly. And that is exactly what we are doing.
North Korean nuclearization makes the disad inevitable
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
As the North Korean nuclear crisis is pending, it affects changes in relations among nations in the region and their policies. It creates policy frictions between two long-time allies—the United States and South Korea. While the United States wants to financially squeeze North Korea, South Korea insists on inter- Korean economic cooperation regardless of the nuclear issue. As the tension between the United States and North Korea continues, China has increased its influence over North Korea by providing food and crude oil. Russia and Japan are also trying to expand their influence over the Korean peninsula in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis.
A2: Relations / Prolif – Cultural & Economic Ties Sustain Relations
Cultural and economic ties will continue after the plan
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,” , JMP)
Whatever the two nations' military relationship in the future--their cultural and economic ties will remain natural and vibrant regardless--it should be based on global cooperation in areas of shared interest. The old Cold War mission of America protecting South Korea from the DPRK should be gracefully retired.
A2: Japan Prolif – No Link
Won’t cause Japan nuclearization and even if it does it is preferable to continued U.S. presence
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
The suggestion that U.S. troops in Korea could help contain a resurgent Tokyo is even more fanciful. Tokyo should be doing more militarily, despite disquiet among its neighbors, but to argue that Japan is about to embark on another imperialist rampage is to engage in scaremongering. Cohen’s worry that a conventional pullout from South Korea would spark Japan to develop nuclear weapons is equally implausible because it is predicated on a long daisy chain of events with all of the intermediate steps removed.110 Moreover, the hypothetical end result of a nuclear-armed Japan is still likely to be better than the alternative of American involvement in a regional confrontation involving the PRC.
Their link is wrong – committed to regional stability
Bandow, 05 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)
Some alliance advocates argue that America's military presence addresses other potential enemies besides North Korea. That is, the alliance serves what Avery Goldstein called "dual-use" purposes. For instance, some analysts and politicians have suggested that having troops in Korea could help contain a resurgent Tokyo. Advocates of this fanciful scenario are stuck in 1945. Those who planned and initiated Tokyo's aggression in the 1930s and 1940s are long dead; Japan has achieved all of the economic benefits of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere peacefully, and pacifist sentiments remain strong in what remains an overwhelmingly commercial nation. It is to the benefit of states throughout northeast Asia that North Korea's repeated threats and China's continuing hostility have moved Japan to begin doing more to promote regional security.
Withdrawal from South Korea won’t force withdrawal from other parts of the region
Printz 06 – Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, “A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POST-UNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?”, )
Finally, it is entirely possible to withdraw the permanent U.S. military forces from Korea without withdrawing from the region. U.S. presence in Japan and Okinawa, in addition to the presence of U.S. carriers in the East and Yellow Seas, will demonstrate a sustained U.S. military commitment to the region. U.S. ship visits to ports throughout Korea will show the flag and U.S. resolve in regional security. Christopher Yung of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses recently observed, “Korea ranked in seventh in the region for Seventh Fleet port visits.”49 Increased port calls and combined training exercises is an effective means to advance U.S. interests in the region without the baggage of a permanent presence or intrusion upon the sovereign territory of another nation. Of the 75,000 troops stationed in the region, 30,000 are in Korea. The bulk of ground combat power in South Korea comes from the 680,000 man ROK Army. U.S. ground forces consists of two (to be reduced to one) brigade of mechanized infantry, and an Army headquarters with its supporting units.50 The relative combat power of U.S. ground forces in Korea vis-à-vis DPRK forces is minimal. Their presence largely represents a commitment to the bilateral treaty with the ROK and the UN Armistice. From a defense perspective, the need for continued U.S. forces presence after reunification is questionable. If Congress doesn’t dissolve them due to increased budgetary pressures and emphasis on burden sharing, they can be relocated to Hawaii, Guam, or Alaska. Prepositioned sets of brigade size equipment can ensure ready response to the peninsula in the event of crisis.
A2: Japan Prolif – Regional Prolif Better than U.S. Draw In
Regional proliferation is best – better than drawing U.S. into nuclear crises
Carpenter, 03 – vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (1/6/03, Ted Galen, CATO Policy Analysis, “Options for Dealing with North Korea,” , JMP)
Faced with those realities, Japan or South Korea (or perhaps both countries) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent.15 Additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia is obviously not an ideal outcome, but offsetting the North’s illicit advantage may be the best of a set of bad options. Bribery is unlikely to induce North Korea to return to a nonnuclear status. Economic sanctions are not likely to achieve that goal either. And preemptive military strikes are clearly too dangerous. The one chance of getting the North to abandon its current course is to make it clear that Pyongyang may have to deal with nuclear neighbors and would, therefore, not be able to intimidate them. If the United States does not adopt that approach, it is almost certain to be stuck with the responsibility of shielding nonnuclear allies from a volatile, nuclear-armed North Korea. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome, but it beats that nightmare scenario.
A2: Japan Prolif – No Impact
Japan will issue formal public statements about its nuclear doctrine before it is deployed to help reassure countries in the region and the U.S.
Yoshihara & Holmes, 09 – associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (Summer 09, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Naval War College Review, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option,” , JMP)
STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE STRUCTURE
Beyond technical and tactical decisions associated with breaking out, Japan would need to develop comprehensive policies and processes to harness its nuclear arsenal. As noted above, strategic ambiguity over Japanese intentions and capabilities is probably impossible. As a nation that has long cherished its democratic institutions and unquestioned civilian control of the military, Tokyo would need to issue formal public statements and official documents regarding Japanese nuclear doctrine. Intended for public and international consumption, such declarations would presumably predate the SDF’s deployment of a deterrent force, helping reassure Japan’s neighbors, friends, and allies, especially the United States.
A2: Japan Prolif – Technical Barriers
Japan can’t develop a full-scale nuclear deterrent – several barriers
Chanlett-Avery & Nikitin, 09 – *Specialist in Asian Affairs AND **Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service (2/19/09, Emma and Mary Beth, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects and U.S. Interests,” , JMP)
This paper examines the prospects for Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons capability by assessing the existing technical infrastructure of its extensive civilian nuclear energy program. It explores the range of challenges that Japan would have to overcome to transform its current program into a military program. Presently, Japan appears to lack several of the prerequisites for a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent: expertise on bomb design, reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets, and sites for nuclear testing. In addition, a range of legal and political restraints on Japan’s development of nuclear weapons, including averse public and elite opinion, restrictive domestic laws and practices, and the negative diplomatic consequences of abandoning its traditional approach is analyzed.
Several technical barriers to nuclearization – no delivery system for bombs
Yoshihara & Holmes, 09 – associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (Summer 09, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Naval War College Review, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option,” , JMP)
Even assuming that Japan can procure enough fissile materials to build an arsenal, its engineers would still have to leap over several technical barriers. First, Japan must devise an effective, efficient delivery system. The most direct route would be to arm Japan’s existing fleet of fighter aircraft with nuclear bombs or missiles. The fighters in the Air Self-Defense Force (SDF) inventory, however, are constrained by four factors: vulnerability to preemptive strikes while still on the ground at their bases; limited range, as Japan possesses no strategic bombers; susceptibility to interception by enemy fighters while en route to their targets; and vulnerability to increasingly sophisticated integrated air-defense systems. Compounding these shortcomings, Japan is surrounded by water, substantially increasing flight times to targets on the Asian mainland.
In light of this, ballistic or cruise missiles would likely rank as Japan’s weapon of choice.45 The challenges would be two. First, if Tokyo chose to rely on a missile delivery system, it would have to produce a workable, miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop an accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a feat is not beyond Japanese engineering prowess, but it would involve significant lead time. Second, the nation must develop the delivery vehicle itself. Even the U.S. defense-industrial sector, with its half-century of experience in this field, takes years to design and build new missiles. Japan could conceivably convert some of its civilian space-launch vehicles into ballistic missiles, but it would have to perfect key components, like inertial guidance systems. If it opted for long-range cruise missiles, Tokyo would in effect find itself—unless it could purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles off the shelf from the United States, a doubtful prospect, given the highly offensive nature of Tomahawks and thus the political sensitivity of such a sale—compelled to start from scratch. Procuring and integrating satellite guidance, terrain-contour matching, and other specialized techniques and hardware would demand long, hard labor from Japanese weapon scientists.
A2: Japan Prolif – Can’t Test / Deploy Weapons
Japan can’t effectively deploy nuclear weapons – no place to test them
Endo, 07 – former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan (8/23/07, Tetsuya, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-063A, “How Realistic Is a Nuclear-Armed Japan?” , JMP)
Feasibility
Technologically, Japan is capable of developing nuclear weapons if it invests considerable time and money. A major nuclear energy user possessing 55 nuclear reactors and committed to its nuclear fuel cycle program, Japan possesses high-level nuclear technologies, a substantial amount of plutonium and the capability to enrich uranium. Although nearly all this plutonium is reactor-grade plutonium unsuitable for nuclear explosion, Japan does possess a small amount of high-grade plutonium. A majority of its uranium is low-enriched, but Japan is capable of producing highly-enriched uranium if it wishes. Japan indeed retains highly-enriched uranium for use in research and experiments, albeit in an extremely small amount. Nevertheless, it is virtually unthinkable for this country to divert nuclear fuel to make bombs in secret. Its plutonium and uranium are kept under strict IAEA verification, and Japan is a highly transparent society. Even if Japan succeeds in manufacturing nuclear warheads, where is it going to test them? Some people say simulation technology can substitute for an onsite test, but the first nuclear warhead at least would require an onsite test. However, there is no geographically suitable place for such a test in Japan.
Given time, it is not technologically impossible for Japan to develop nuclear weapons as well as their delivery systems. However, developing more than one or two nuclear bombs would require enormous money. There is a huge gap between possessing the technology to produce one or two nuclear bombs and arming oneself with nuclear weapons "effectively".
Japan can’t test weapons – prevents their effective deployment
Yoshihara & Holmes, 09 – associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (Summer 09, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Naval War College Review, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option,” , JMP)
There is also the question of testing. Japan would need to ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. There would be no substitute for an actual nuclear test that proved this new (for Japan) technology while bolstering the credibility of Japanese deterrence. The Japanese Archipelago is simply too small and too densely populated for a test to be conducted there safely—even leaving aside the potential for a political backlash, given the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it would conjure up. Tokyo could detonate a device near some Japanese-held island in the Pacific, such as Okinotori-shima. But again, the diplomatic furor from flouting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be intense, while the Japanese populace would think back to the Lucky Dragon incident during the Bikini tests of the 1950s.46 One need only recall the uproar over French and Chinese tests on the eve of the CTBT’s entry into force. Computer simulations of weapon performance may be less optimal but would certainly be more palatable from a political standpoint for Japan. The Israeli experience may be instructive here for any Japanese bomb-making efforts.
A2: Japan Prolif – Political & Econ Relations Sustain Deterrence
Strong political and economic relations help sustain credible extended deterrence – nuclear umbrella isn’t key
Schoff, 09 – Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
(March 09, James L., Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence, , JMP)
First and foremost, extended deterrence has been supported by a consistently strong U.S.-Japan political and economic relationship. Combine that solid relationship with relatively little in the way of direct external threats, and the credibility of extended deterrence was hardly in doubt. As we have explained throughout this report, some in Japan believe that both of these main components are moving in unfavorable directions. Potential threats from North Korea and China are increasing, and the U.S. commitment to Japan is perhaps more ambiguous than before. The nuclear umbrella may have served as a principal icon of the alliance in the past, but that was more by default than anything else. After all, it is difficult to portray the “strength of the alliance” in another succinct symbolic fashion, except perhaps when the personalities and policies of the nations’ top leaders correlate well with each other, as was arguably the case between Reagan and Nakasone, or George W. Bush and Koizumi. Drawing too much attention to U.S. forces based in Japan or Japan’s host nation support is not desired politically, with the possible exception of the forward-deployed U.S. carrier, which is often perceived by the public to be less of an imposition. So even if the nuclear umbrella was a major symbol of the alliance, deterrence was best served by close bilateral political and economic relations.
Reshaping extended deterrence for the future requires continued emphasis on the political and economic relationship, but it also includes developing new habits of scenario-based defense planning and building specific capabilities and patterns of cooperation to counter the expanding array of potential threats. These new capabilities will have both a political and an operational function in the shoring up of extended deterrence. The fact that the new U.S. secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, visited Japan first in early 2009, as part of her initial tour through the region, was a good sign on the political front. It was an important symbolic gesture by the new administration, and there will always be opportunities to reinforce this sense of commitment and solidarity, but increasingly the strength of the alliance will be judged more by what the two allies do together than by such symbols or what they say to each other. This will take effort by both sides, as neither can strengthen the relationship or bolster deterrence on its own, and the encouraging news is that both allies claim to be committed to this task.
A2: Japan Prolif – Shift in Attitude Now
Your impact article concedes that the shift in attitude toward nukes is happening now
Bakanic, 08 (6/9/08, Elizabeth D., BAS, “The end of Japan's nuclear taboo,” , JMP)
Ever since the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people have possessed a strong aversion to the idea of nuclear weapons. Public discussion of developing nuclear weapons has been practically nonexistent, and politicians have been chastised for mentioning the topic: As recently as 1999, Japan's vice defense minister resigned after receiving overwhelming criticism for suggesting that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons. And despite mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle--thus, possessing the necessary nuclear technology and expertise to develop nuclear weapons--and maintaining complicated relationships with growing and unstable neighbors such as China, Tokyo has rejected even considering nuclear weapons. More largely, this "nuclear allergy" has existed alongside a rather pacifist society that has highly constrained itself militarily and politically following World War II.
Yet, in recent years, Japan has sought to become a more "normal" country--especially involving matters of defense and diplomacy, where Tokyo is transitioning from pacifism to assertiveness. In many ways, the nation is attempting to come out from the shadow of World War II. Growing nationalism has led Japan to take less apologetic stances in regards to its history and neighbors--evidenced by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine honoring the country's war dead, Japanese strikes on North Korean spy vessels, and continued controversies over distorted portrayals of World War II in Japanese history textbooks. Further, Japan has shown more interest in becoming a regional leader and global player--even expanding its military capability, often with encouragement from the United States. And most surprisingly, the attitude toward nuclear weapons has begun to change.
The attitude shift is evident in the growing prevalence and acceptance of the subject in public discourse. High-level Japanese officials such as current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his predecessor Shinzo Abe have made several open statements in recent years regarding the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, the need for deterrence in the region, and the nuclear threat presented by Japan's neighbors. As cabinet secretary for the Koizumi administration, Fukuda stated, "In the face of calls to amend the Constitution, amendment of the [three non-nuclear] principles is also possible." During his administration, Abe commented that it wouldn't violate Japan's pacifist constitution to acquire nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. In addition, the policy chief of the Liberal Democratic party has called for "active discussions" of possible nuclear weapons development. Just a few years ago, breaching these subjects openly would have been unpopular and near political suicide, but the Japanese public is now less condemning. Not surprisingly then, nationalist parties that advocate for a nuclear weapons capability are gaining popularity and traction in Japanese politics.
While these developments mostly encompass asserting the rights to debate nuclear options rather than debating the options themselves, they represent a major shift. Actual consideration of nuclear weapons is still a remote and unpopular idea, but mentioning nuclear options is no longer off limits.
In addition to increased public and political references, a generational attitude shift seems to be occurring. In interviews I conducted last fall in Tokyo, several Japanese officials, academics, and nuclear experts thought that younger generations have less of a nuclear allergy than previous generations--especially as memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki become more distant. While many still felt that strong opposition remains, they believe that younger cohorts cannot remember or directly see the effects of the bombings since they gather that history secondhand, which makes it less personal and emotive. Because of this, they're less afraid of the topic and potential consequences. Overall, the population continues to exhibit strong negative attitudes toward nuclear weapons, and younger generations are still much more adverse to nuclear weapons than populations in most other countries. But the degree of negativity seems to be waning. This isn't unreasonable or unexpected, but it's a gradual shift that's affecting the country's overall nuclear stance.
There is some historical precedent. In both the mid-1960s--when China acquired nuclear weapons--and again in the mid-1990s--following the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis--the Japanese expressed less aversion to nuclear weapons. The current shift in attitude could simply be a reaction to China's burgeoning role in the region and North Korea's continued reluctance to surrender its nuclear weapons, and public opinion could eventually swing back to a more anti-nuclear stance. But given the generational divide, firsthand aversion is likely to fade for good. Plus, the current change has been building for years and seems more widespread in the population than past reassessments. In addition, just as Japan wants to put its early twentieth-century transgressions behind it, Tokyo may also begin to move beyond its own victimization in the coming years. And it's possible that the regional security situation might become untenable enough that Japan will permanently move away from its pacifist nature. Already, the shift in defensive and diplomatic attitudes is changing in a parallel fashion, making a swing back to full pacifism unlikely.
A2: U.S.-ROK Alliance DA – Burdensharing Turn
Self-reliant defense in South Korea is key to the U.S. overall alliance with South Korea, U.S. burdensharing objectives globally, and acceptance of U.S. presence in South Korea
Roehrig, 08 – Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terence Roehrig, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Presence in Korea: Implications for Korean Security and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Academic Paper Series, )
It is likely that OPLAN 5027, the U.S. planning document that outlines the U.S. response, may be altered, but the exact nature of the U.S. response has always been dependent on the circumstances of the crisis. If South Korea is attacked and the United States deems its support crucial, that assistance will be forthcoming regardless of the specifics of the command structure. As General Bell noted:
I don’t equate the power of the alliance to the Combined Forces Command, command arrangements. I equate the power of the alliance to the willingness of the two nations to stand shoulder to shoulder in face of adversity and in the face of threat and agree together mutually to defend one another.56
Political Dimension
The more difficult dimension here is the political message these changes might send to either the ROK or the DPRK. For many in South Korea, sovereignty and a selfreliant defense are important. South Korea has grown in power and status; it is no surprise that it would and should have a more independent defense posture. These changes may, in fact, reduce some of the friction in the alliance and be important measures to sustain the long-term health and acceptance of the U.S. presence in Korea.57 For the United States, the changes are part of an overall effort to transform its military capability along with a desire to obtain more equitable burden sharing from its allies.
The changes in the force structure need not be indicators of a crumbling alliance. The alliance rests on core assessments of the political, security, and economic interests at stake in the region, not the specific command arrangements. Given the upcoming uncertainties in East Asia—China’s future, a potential Sino-Japanese competition for regional dominance, and North Korea’s fate—the U.S.-ROK alliance will continue despite the current strain in relations. In the years ahead, there will be adjustments to operational details, but U.S. and ROK leaders are likely to determine that their alliance promotes the interests of both countries.
South Korean self-reliance ultimately doesn’t send a dangerous signal to the DPRK or negatively impact the overall security environment in South Korea
Roehrig, 08 – Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terence Roehrig, “Restructuring the U.S. Military Presence in Korea: Implications for Korean Security and the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Academic Paper Series, )
Do these changes send a dangerous signal to North Korea? One could argue that these measures weaken the alliance and might embolden North Korea to invade the South. Pyongyang might assume that it could now defeat South Korea and that there would be less likelihood of U.S. intervention. At the very least, one might argue that the U.S. troop reduction and pullback from the DMZ should have been linked to concessions from North Korea.
These changes ultimately will not send a dangerous signal to the DPRK or have a negative impact on the overall security environment in Korea. The U.S.-ROK alliance will remain in place for some time, and Washington and Seoul will regularly stress the importance of the relationship for the future. A statement issued by Condoleezza Rice and Ban Ki-moon after ministerial meetings in January 2006 maintained:
[T]he U.S.-ROK alliance was forged in battle and tested through the long years of the Cold War. Today, our alliance remains a bulwark of stability in Northeast Asia and our security cooperation has provided a framework for the development and growth of our economic ties and the nurturing and protection of common values rooted in shared respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.58
Despite the current difficulties in the alliance, these are important words that indicate the continued significance of the relationship. The statement goes on to suggest that the alliance could possibly lead to “an eventual regional multinational mechanism for security cooperation.”59 Thus, the alliance is also a foundation for future security cooperation in the region.
Even if the United States drew down its forces further, North Korea could never be certain Washington would refrain from coming to South Korea’s assistance. For North Korea, a mistake here could mean the end of the current regime. In the earlier years of the alliance when U.S. military power was more crucial to the defense of South Korea, the question of U.S. credibility always existed. Would Washington really defend Seoul? The combined command structure, among other things, helped ensure this would be the case in the past.60 The strength of South Korea and the continued durability of the alliance indicate that the commitment no longer needs to be reinforced on so many levels; however, U.S. and ROK forces will maintain a significant amount of joint planning and cooperation that provide ample evidence of the U.S. commitment to ROK security.
A2: U.S.-ROK Trade / Investment DA
Won’t undermine economic relations and South Korea has the resources to deal with the transition
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
An exercise in counterfactual positive analysis, not normative prescription, this paper makes the following points with regard to these questions. First, the end of the alliance means, at minimum, the termination of the "mutual aid" provision in the 1953 ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and, quite likely, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK. Second, as with any break-up, the ROK-U.S. separation may be amicable or acrimonious; however, even if the break-up itself is acrimonious, its spillover effect on bilateral economic ties is likely to be limited. Third, although mutual deterrence between the ROK and DPRK on the Korean peninsula is likely to prevail even after the termination of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the end of the insurance provided by the alliance may weaken the ROK's position in Northeast Asia and present significant security and diplomatic challenges-but not necessarily economic difficulties per se. Fourth, the security shock of terminating the alliance can be transmitted through three economic channels: defense expenditures, bilateral economic relations, and investor confidence. The ROK's previous experiences with strained alliance relations in the 1970s and recent years provide clues as to how the economic impact of this security shock would be transmitted and managed. Although the break-up is not in the ROK's national interest, the ROK seems to have economic and security resources to deal with this shock.
Even an acrimonious breakup won’t undermine economic ties – investment and trade will endure
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
An obvious reference case for this scenario is the turmoil in the ROK-U.S. alliance following an incident in the summer of 2002, when a U.S. armored vehicle accidentally killed two Korean middle school girls.(7) When the driver and navigator of the vehicle were both acquitted in spite of their conflicting statements in a U.S. court marshal, hundreds of thousands of Koreans took to the streets. Ordinary citizens joined candlelight vigils to protest the injustice of the verdict; some students even burned American flags to express their outrage. This, in turn, triggered negative U.S. reaction.
It may be argued that this reference case is of limited use for this scenario because cooler heads ultimately prevailed on both sides, especially with regard to the phased reduction of the USFK. However, in the present context of assessing the economic impact of ROK-U.S. separation under various scenarios, it is important to note that even the most acrimonious exchange of words between the allies in recent memory did not have a large spillover effect on bilateral economic relations. In fact, investment and trade ties between the U.S. and ROK have been the saving grace of the bilateral relationship over the past five years.
3. Security Impact
As noted earlier, the termination of the ROK-U.S. alliance means that ROK forces would have to deter DPRK attack without a credible U.S. commitment to wartime intervention. It also means that the ROK would have to deal with regional powers without the benefit of the insurance provided by the alliance. This would present considerable security and diplomatic challenges-but not necessarily economic difficulties.
Even acrimonious split won’t hurt economic ties
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
4. Economic Consequences
The security shock of terminating the alliance can be transmitted through three economic channels: defense expenditures, bilateral economic relations, and investor confidence. In the extreme case, the termination of the alliance may drive up the ROK's defense expenditures, ruin its bilateral economic ties with the U.S., and undermine investor confidence so much as to bankrupt its economy. However, as the previous discussion makes fairly clear, this is a rather unlikely event.
The end of the alliance would mean, at minimum, the termination of the "mutual aid" provision in the 1953 ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and, quite likely, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK. This separation may be amicable or acrimonious. As the reference case of the events since 2002 show, however, even an acrimonious relationship in the security area is unlikely to produce a large spillover effect on bilateral economic ties. Under an amicable separation scenario, everyone agrees that the ROK can afford to increase its military expenditure to defend itself; the termination of the alliance treaty has little effect on overall bilateral relations; and investors remain confident that the peace and security of the Korean peninsula can be maintained. Under an acrimonious break-up scenario, for which "transition planning" is minimal, what matters is the current preparedness of ROK forces. An acrimonious break-up in and of itself is unlikely to disturb mutual deterrence on the Korean peninsula, although it may raise the risk of miscalculation.
A2: U.S.-ROK Trade / Investment DA
Won’t undermine trade with South Korea
Bandow, 05 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (10/22/05, Doug, , “Foreign Policy Welfare Queen,” , JMP)
Delusions about South Korea's need for assistance infects Capitol Hill as well. This summer, Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), vice chairman of the International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to other House members extolling the U.S.-ROK alliance. "Forged in the heat of battle, the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship continues to be one of our most vital and vibrant partnerships," Burton declared. The congressman cited "the continuing contributions made by South Korea to our mutual alliance—some that are all too often forgotten."
Actually, they aren't worth remembering. For instance, Burton pointed to trade. But Americans and South Koreans trade because it is mutually beneficial to do so, not because of our military alliance. The ROK "has been a strong ally in the U.S.-led War on Terror, having committed more than 3,270 troops to Iraq," the congressman noted. What Burton didn't mention was that Seoul insisted its forces be placed far away from hostilities.
Impact is small
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 126)DR
America's cultural and economic ties with South Korea are valuable, but not critical. For instance, two-way trade in 2003 exceeded $60 billion (" peaked at almost $67 billion in 2000), real money but small change for America's $10 trillion economy.26 Moreover, notes Stephen W. Bosworth, dean "I the Fletcher School at Tufts University, "The relative weights of the United States and South Korea in the increasingly global economic interests of the other are shrinking in relative terms.”The much-proclaimed “leverage” supposedly accompanying military deployments seems either absent or unused: few Koreans appear to buy GM cars out of gratitude to or in response to pressure from Washington. (In fact, lobbying Washington for trade liberalization has helped push Korean farmers and students together against the United States.)
A2: ROK Investment DA
No Link and Turn – U.S. commitment not key and our advantage makes the DA inevitable
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
Investor Confidence
Although the prevailing assumption is that foreign investment is unsustainable in the ROK without a U.S.-guaranteed peace, it should be asked how essential security is in determining investment inflows and how crucial the U.S. guarantee is in maintaining the peace on the Korean peninsula.
As for the first question, although security may be regarded as the most fundamental variable, what actually played a larger role is the ROK's policy on investment liberalization and commercial attractiveness of its assets. Figure 3 on FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) inflows and Table 1 on the foreign investors' share of ROK stock-market capitalization show that the dramatic increase in investment flows took place in the post-crisis period.
Figure 3. Foreign Direct Investment Flows into the ROK (unit: million dollars)
Table 1. Foreign Investors' Share of ROK Stock-Market Capitalization (unit: percent)
1992 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
4.9 11.9 19.6 21.9 30.1 36.6 36.0 40.1 42.0 39.7 37.3
Moreover, the investor reaction to the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula for more than a decade suggests that the critical variable is the possibility of war, not the quality of the military alliance per se. In fact, if the ROK-U.S. alliance is strong but is about to launch a pre-emptive strike on the DPRK, investors are likely to take flight from the Korean peninsula and its neighboring countries.
When the nuclear crisis broke for the first time in February-March 1993, the market capitalization of the Korean Stock Exchange declined by 6.5 percent. At this time, there was hardly any strain in the ROK-U.S. alliance, but investors were seriously concerned about a military conflict on the Korean peninsula over the DPRK's nuclear program. By contrast, when investors apparently interpreted the DPRK's brinkmanship in 2005 as an attempt to draw attention from the U.S. and break a diplomatic deadlock, the Korean stock market achieved solid gains.
No link – even an acrimonious decline in security ties won’t undermine trade or investment and South Korea isn’t economically dependent on the U.S.
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
Bilateral Economic Relations
As for the spillover effect on bilateral economic relations, it is important to recall that even the acrimonious exchange of words in the security area from 2002 to 2005 did not have a significant economic impact on investment and trade ties between the U.S. and ROK. For the United States, the ROK is now the seventh largest trading partner, ahead of such Western European countries as France and Italy; whereas, for South Korea, the United States is the third largest trading partner, after China and Japan.
Although ROK-U.S. interaction has had a positive influence on the ROK's institution-building efforts in the economic area, this effect should not be overstated. On balance, the ROK's accession to the GATT/WTO, OECD, and other international norm-setting institutions has had a greater impact on economic liberalization than has the ROK's alliance relationship with the U.S. It should also be noted that many non-U.S. allies, including China, have adopted global economic norms as part of their requirements for joining international organizations.
Moreover, the ROK's economic development since the 1960s has reduced its dependence on the U.S. In particular, as Figure 2 shows, China's increasing relative importance to the ROK in economic terms has become unmistakable in recent years. In 1991, the year before the ROK and China normalized relations, China bought only 1.4 percent of the ROK's exports while the U.S. accounted for 25.8 percent. By 2003, however, China's share of the ROK's exports had increased to 18.1 percent while the U.S. share had declined to 17.7 percent. Of course, as the controversy over the ancient kingdom of Koguryo in 2004 suggests, the increasing economic importance of China does not mean that the ROK would lean toward China at the expense of the U.S. The ROK's more diversified economic portfolio just means that it has more independence.(13)
Figure 2. ROK's Bilateral Trade Volume and Trade Balance
More fundamentally, the extent to which trade tends to "follow the flag" seems to have been reduced in the post-Cold War era. In fact, some have argued that while U.S. allies were "too important to fail" during the Cold War, security considerations no longer play a prominent role in determining a response to a major economic crisis like the Asian crisis in 1997-98. The integration of former (and some current) socialist countries into the global economy seems to have accentuated the tendency to decouple security considerations from economic issues.
A2: ROK Investment DA
Our advantage makes their disad inevitable
Reuters, 10 (3/17/10, Jon Herskovitz, “North Korea may turn more menacing but options limited,”
, JMP)
MARKETS HAVE HIGH STRESS TOLERANCE
Regional investors have become largely inured to the North's violent gestures, as long as they have been contained to saber-rattling and not full scale armed confrontation.
"If North Korea takes unpredicted, negative actions, such as nuclear tests, stock markets will be dealt a blow. But this will probably be short-lived and investors will eventually return," said Han Beom-ho, a market analyst at Shinhan Investment Corp.
Of more concern to many is the possible collapse of the mercurial North if Kim's already doubtful health worsens or the economy's troubles deepen so seriously that the tightly controlled society turns unruly.
South Korea's government, mindful of the massive risk to its own economy, has been offering major, long-term investment to the North to prepare it gradually for eventual reunification.
That, say analysts, is something Kim sees as too big a threat to his own grip on power -- he would not dare to be seen at home as treating the South as his savior.
By some estimates, South Korea could face a bill of $1 trillion or more -- about the size of its annual economic output -- if it suddenly had to absorb its destitute neighbor.
Investment flows between the U.S. and South Korea
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Investment flows both ways. The United States is a leading source of foreign direct investment in South Korea. At the same time, total Korean investment in America rose above $3.1 billion, 40 percent of the ROK’s total. The United States competes with China as the leading destination for Korean overseas investment and is ahead of all other nations.121 That trend is likely to continue as South Korean businesses grow in size, expertise, and resources.
In sum, South Koreans have built a vital, powerful, and growing nation. The best way for America and the ROK to achieve the sort of “equal” relationship desired by so many Koreans is to eliminate the ROK’s status as an American defense protectorate.
A2: ROK Defense Spending DA
Plan would not require South Korea to spend more resources
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
Andrew Krepenevich, noted scholar and expert in foreign relations, approaches the issue in a more strategic context. In an article he wrote concerning America as a global power, he makes several predictions. He states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology will likely demand an increasing share of United States defense resources for homeland defense. He maintains that this will leave less military capability available for forward presence. He argues that our policy should encourage allies to assume a larger role in providing ground forces for peacekeeping, urban control operations and regional conflicts. In the case of South Korea, this would not entail an increase of resources on the part of U.S. allies. “South Korea should be capable of effectively defending itself without major United States ground reinforcements.”13
Boosting its defenses won’t undermine South Korea’s economy – empirically proven
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
Defense Burden
With regard to the increase in defense burden caused by the termination of the alliance, it would be useful to recall that the ROK managed to build its deterrent capability in the 1970s in conjunction with its HCI drive when it was faced with a reduced security commitment from the U.S.-and when it had far less economic and security resources than now, especially relative to the DPRK. With the world's thirteenth largest economy, the ROK should be able to handle its security challenges much more effectively. In such defense-related industries as shipbuilding, electronics, steel, and automobiles, the ROK is one of the top five producers in the world. It also holds the world's fourth largest foreign reserves, after China, Japan, and Taiwan. The ROK has indeed come a long way since the early 1960s when it was one of the poorest countries in the world.
According to an estimate provided by the Ministry of National Defense to the National Assembly in September 2002, the value of USFK equipment and materiel ranges from 14.0 to 25.9 billion dollars depending on assumptions. With the ROK's current GDP close to $1 trillion, the cost of replacing USFK equipment and materiel amounts to 1.4 to 2.6 percent of GDP. Although this is not a small sum of money, it is by no means unaffordable for the ROK. In fact, as a percentage of GDP, this additional defense expenditure is much smaller than the burden the ROK had to bear in the 1970s to build up its military. As Figure 1 in the previous section showed, the ROK's defense spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 3.47 percent in 1973 to 5.95 percent in 1980.
Although an increase in defense expenditure is likely to raise fiscal deficit or reduce government spending in economic and social areas, its adverse impact on overall economic growth is likely to be manageable. According to a simulation study released in 2003, the ROK's annual GDP is expected to decline by 1.20 to 1.25 percent each year when the ROK's defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP is increased (by debt financing) from 2.9 percent to 3.5 percent for each of next seven years to replace USFK equipment and materiel.(12) Also, the ROK's experience with a rapid defense build-up in the 1970s suggests that an increased defense burden of this magnitude would not have a large adverse effect on the economy.
South Korea has empirically boosted its defense capabilities quickly without undermining economic growth
Lim, 07 – Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (11/27/07, Wonhyuk, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07-086A, “Economic Consequences of ROK-U.S. Separation,” , JMP)
DPRK Challenge
With regard to the DPRK, the ROK must secure its own deterrent capability and expand inter-Korean exchanges to facilitate the DPRK's transition. The first part of this challenge has to do with "keeping peace"; whereas, the second part is about "making peace." In the Korean context, there is a historical precedent for the first part of this challenge in the 1970s, when the ROK had to launch a rapid defense build-up program in response to changes in its security relationship with the U.S. On a global level, the process through which the Cold War came to an end may be regarded as a historical precedent for the dual challenge of maintaining deterrence and promoting "change through rapprochement."
When the U.S. began to reduce its military presence in Asia in the aftermath of the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, the ROK felt vulnerable to a DPRK attack and launched an ambitious campaign to build up its military capability in conjunction with the heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive, including a covert nuclear program.(8) Richard Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972 and the withdrawal of one of the two U.S. infantry divisions stationed in the ROK marked the beginning of the strained alliance relationship. Jimmy Carter's campaign to eliminate U.S. troop presence in the ROK posed an additional challenge to the ROK.
Although the per-capita GDP of the ROK at the time was only about $3,000 in constant 2000 U.S. dollars,(9) the ROK managed to make up for the reduction of U.S. troops and produce a wide array of conventional weapons in due course, including short-range missiles. As Figure 1 shows, the ROK raised its defense spending from 4 percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in the 1960s to well over 5 percent in the late 1970s. A 5-percent ad valorem national defense tax helped to finance the weapons program. Despite the rapid defense build-up, the ROK managed to maintain an annual economic growth rate of well over 8 percent from 1973 to 1979.
Figure 1. ROK's Defense Spending as Percentage of GDP, 1957-2005
A2: ROK Defense Spending DA
South Korea is already going to develop offensive strategic weapons
Solomon, 10 (5/31/10, Jay, WSJ, “Seoul Weighs Shift in U.S. Military Ties; American and South Korean Leaders Plan New War Games and Strategy Sessions in Face of Rising Tensions With the North,” , JMP)
SEOUL—South Korea is reviewing its defense policy following North Korea's alleged sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, a process that could significantly change Seoul's military alliance with Washington, according to officials engaged in the process.
Over the past week, U.S. and South Korean leaders have outlined plans to conduct war games and strategy sessions to better equip the South for combating the type of submarine attack Pyongyang is accused by international investigators to have staged in March, killing 46 South Korean sailors.
For the longer term, President Lee Myung-bak's conservative government could seek to alter the alliance's command structure and Seoul's weapons arsenal in ways that would affect the Pentagon's current strategic planning for Northeast Asia, according to these officials
South Korean defense strategists already are publicly pressing Mr. Lee to delay the planned 2012 transfer of operational control of the combined U.S.-South Korean fighting force to Seoul from Washington, arguing South Korea isn't prepared yet to oversee American forces.
The agreement between Washington and Seoul has a clause that allows South Korea's president to formally request a suspension of the transfer. The U.S. currently deploys 29,000 troops in South Korea, and the South Korean military deploys 600,000.
Some South Korean officials involved in the president's military-overhaul drive also are calling for Seoul to develop more offensive strategic weapons as a means to deter the nuclear-armed North from future aggression. Currently, South Korea's defense agreement with the U.S. prohibits Seoul from deploying precision-guided missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers.
"We need to have our own ways to threaten North Korea," said Kim Tae-woo, a South Korean defense expert who sits on one of two committees President Lee has established to assess Seoul's military preparedness. "We need to have this dialogue with our allies."
Mr. Lee took office in 2008 calling for an overhaul of South Korea's military apparatus, which his party had charged was weakened during 10 years of liberal rule in Seoul. But South Korea's new government initially agreed with its predecessor's plans to shrink the size of Seoul's military ranks while reining in defense spending.
Many in South Korea have viewed North Korea's million-man military as largely targeted at the U.S. South Korea's late President Roh Moo-hyun successfully pushed for the U.S. to lower it military profile in his country and to transfer control of the joint military command to South Korea's defense department.
The North's alleged attack March 26 on the South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, however, has shaken up Seoul's strategic thinking, according to South Korean and U.S. officials. A major concern here now is that Pyongyang's development of nuclear technologies has provided leader Kim Jong Il with a deterrent against the more-advanced militaries of the U.S. and South Korea. This, in turn, could allow Pyongyang to stage more-aggressive conventional attacks on the South, with the belief that Seoul won't retaliate for fear of an escalation.
This fear seems to have been borne out in recent days as Mr. Lee's government has shown a reluctance to take some new steps to challenge Pyongyang over the Cheonan incident. Seoul, for example, stepped back from an initial pledge to use loudspeakers to blast propaganda across the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, after the North threatened to attack the broadcasting structure.
South Korea's leaders also have publicly sought to play down the idea that the North's two recent nuclear tests have given it a military advantage or that it has succeeded in developing operational atomic weapons.
"Regarding North Korea's nuclear capabilities, we have not been able to verify those capabilities," South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said last week at a joint news conference with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Still, many leading defense thinkers in Seoul said Pyongyang's growing nuclear technologies are "game changers" that now require South Korea to significantly upgrade its own capabilities. In addition to urging the development of longer-range missiles, many experts are calling for the purchases of advanced new strike-fighters and antiballistic-missile batteries. They also say the Pentagon should remain in charge of the joint military command in South Korea beyond 2012, given the lethal effectiveness displayed by North Korea's mini-submarine fleet during the Cheonan attack.
"There has been an asymmetrical shift that has weakened our deterrence structure," said Kim Byungki of Seoul's Korea University. "We are supposed to have air, ground and sea dominance."
South Korea's effort to renegotiate in the coming months its decades-old nuclear-cooperation agreement with the U.S. could now prove particularly tricky, according to current and former U.S. officials.
South Korea, under the 1974 pact, faces strict guidelines on its ability to store and reprocess the spent nuclear fuel produced by the country's 20 power reactors, because of fears it could be diverted for military purposes. The U.S. is seeking to limit any major alterations in the treaty, which expires in 2014, so as not to undermine Washington's efforts to contain the nuclear advances of countries like North Korea and Iran.
South Korean officials have said they are seeking to amend the agreement to in a bid to allow Seoul to better manage the storage of its nuclear waste. They are specifically citing South Korea's need to reprocess the spent fuel into a form that can be more easily disposed. But some analysts said Mr. Lee's government also could resist the constrictive terms being sought by the U.S. by citing the North's flouting of a 1992 agreement calling for the removal of all atomic weapons on the Korean Peninsula.
"This incident with the Cheonan could be the spark for turning around a number of things" between the U.S. and South Korea, said Victor Cha, who served as a senior White House official working on Asia during President George W. Bush's second term.
A2: Reverse Defense Spending (Revenue Recycling) DA
Withdrawal would result in net spending of 3 billion
CBO, 04(May 2004, “Options for Changing the Army's Overseas Basing”. )
CBO estimates that returning the Army forces now in South Korea to the United States would save $175 million a year. Before it could realize those recurring savings, however, the Army would need to spend a total of $3.6 billion--including $3.0 billion to provide basing in CONUS for the returned units, $450 million to move them from South Korea, and $225 million to build a new consolidated base south of Seoul. At the same time, this option would avoid $300 million to $850 million in construction costs in South Korea, resulting in a net one-time cost of $2.8 billion to $3.3 billion (see Table 3-13).
A2: Spending DA
Military presence in Korea costs 15 billion
Bandow, 06 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, “The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore,” , JMP)
While there’s no obvious benefit for the U.S. in keeping troops in the ROK, there are plenty of costs. Instead of offering a cheap advanced base for America, the Korean commitment requires an expanded military to meet additional defense contingencies. Figuring out the exact cost of the Korean deployment isn’t easy, but past estimates ran upwards of $15 billion, about as much as Seoul spends on its entire defense.
Korea commitment forces Washington to create additional units
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Containing a resurgent Tokyo is an even more fanciful role. The greatest threats to regional stability are internal—insurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democratic protests and ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious division in Indonesia. But they impinge no vital American interests and are not susceptible to solution by the US military.18 Even more distant are “such transnational threats as terrorism, piracy, drug-trafficking, and infectious diseases,” cited in a recent article by Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Carl Haselden.19 What, one wonders, would troops in Korea do to combat AIDS?
In sum, without any connection to the larger Cold War and global hegemonic struggle, Korea is relatively unimportant to the United States. So some American policymakers make an entirely different argument: outposts in the ROK allow the United States to base soldiers overseas at someone else’s cost. But such security guarantees require Washington to create additional units, a cost that America’s allies do not cover.20 Moreover, friendly states are not likely to long accept a foreign occupation carried out solely to save money for Americans.
Plan is key to save money – we must reduce our number of commitments
Bandow, 08 – fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (9/25/08, Doug, Asia Times, “A reason to bring US troops home,” , JMP)
Old commitments, poor justifications
Alliances, bases and deployments should be a means, not an end. During the Cold War they helped preserve fragile allied states from potent enemies, but that world has disappeared. Instead of retiring the outmoded institutions, US policymakers turned them into an end, to be preserved irrespective of changing circumstances.
Officials have worked to come up with new justifications for old commitments. Now, Washington talks about using military alliances to address issues such as refugees, environment, and drug trafficking, as if army divisions and marine expeditionary forces have anything to do with solving such problems.
The principle reason to drop America's East Asian security commitments is their cost. The biggest expense is not the overseas bases, as both South Korea and Japan provide varying levels of host nation support, but the additional units necessary to back up America's promises to go to war.
The worst policy would be to threaten action without possessing the means to act. The United States spends as much on the military as the rest of the world combined and more in real terms than at any point since World War II - but not to defend itself - It spends that much to defend everyone else.
The United States has nearly 800 military installations sprinkled around the globe, improving Washington's ability to meddle in the affairs of other nations. But as the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated, despite all of its money and power the Department of Defense is ill-equipped to actually defend America.
The only way to cut costs is to cut commitments. The deficit is $400 billion this year and will top half a trillion dollars next year. Total military outlays, including for Afghanistan and Iraq, will run an incredible $700 billion in 2009. The only way to reduce that figure is to start doing less.
A2: Obama Good – Public Support Turn
Public supports the plan
Dujarric, 04 – Visiting Scholar at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (7/12/04, International Herald Tribune, “Japan's Security Needs U.S. Troops in S. Korea,” , JMP)
In addition, more Americans sense increased South Korean hostility to U.S. forces. Consider the demonstrations that followed the accidental deaths of two Korean schoolgirls caused by a U.S. Army vehicle. At about the same time, encounters with North Korean vessels resulted in the deaths of several South Korean sailors. There were, however, no anti-North Korea parades in South Korea.
South Korean animosity toward President George W. Bush is not equivalent to anti-Americanism. But the fact remains that many Americans doubt the strength of the U.S.-South Korean relationship at present. Some think that reducing the U.S. military presence on the peninsula will lessen tensions between Seoul and Washington.
A2: Obama Good – Congress & Pentagon Supports
Plan would be popular with Congress and the Pentagon
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
But now a growing number of commentators, including some resolute hawks, are saying that the United States need not remain in Korea, and certainly not if our forces are unwanted.88 The message has hit home even at the Pentagon. More broadly, notes Scott Snyder, the Asia Foundation’s representative in Korea, “In Washington, within the U.S. government and Congress, there is a distinct, anti-Korean backlash.”89
A2: Obama Bad – Withdrawal Will Crush Political Capital
Withdrawal will crush Obama’s political capital – Carter proves
Feffer, 04 –contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (6/23/04, John, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” , JMP)
North Korea has argued that it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops in South Korea a longstanding provocation. So let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table. With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. A Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington have the political capital to push through a complete withdrawal.
A2: Obama Bad – Doesn’t Support Plan
Obama doesn’t support the plan
Bandow, 08 – fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (9/25/08, Doug, Asia Times, “A reason to bring US troops home,” , JMP)
Washington is filled with the mantra of "change", as both the Obama and the McCain campaigns vie for support. But both major political parties represent a status quo in which the United States must forever remain dominant everywhere, subsidizing prosperous and populous allies, occupying and transforming failed states, and micro-managing world affairs. Other than disagreeing over policy toward Iraq, Obama and McCain are marching in geopolitical lockstep.
***Counterplan ANSWERS
A2: CP – CONDITIONS (SHORT)
Only a firm decision to withdrawal can solve – the counterplan risks being halfhearted, mismanaged or interrupted
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 143)DR
That assessment ultimately might run out to be wildly optimistic, but the thesis should be tested-by Seoul.
It has been evident for years that South Korea is a security free-rider, one that no longer requires American military support. Five decades' worth of American withdrawal plans and proposals have been generally halfhearted, mismanaged, and interrupted. Washington needs to adopt a new approach, based on South Korea's declining security value to America and increasing ability to defend itself The United States should make a firm decision to pull out all of its troops, while cooperating with Seoul in determining the timing and ordering of the withdrawal. The disengagement decision needs to be final, with demobilization of the troops and cancellation of the Mutual Defense Treaty to follow. The details can and should be negotiated with Seoul, but it is time to free the American people from a commitment that Costs far more than it is worth, absorbs valuable military resources, and keeps the Korean people in a dependent relationship that insults their nationhood and puts their destiny in another country’s hands.
U.S. must set a firm deadline to prevent South Korea from dragging its feet on modernization
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 142)DR
Nevertheless, while it is important for Washington to work with Seoul to shape the withdrawal and inform other States in the region privately before any plan is announced, it is vital for the United States to emphasize that the decision has been made and to set a deadline, or else the ROK will have an incentive to delay fully augmenting its military as long as possible to maintain America's security guarantee. Moreover, the opponents of disengagement then would seek postponement rather than cancellation, since the former usually turns into the latter, as it did with President Carter's plan. Unfortunately, ill the view of many supporters of the ROK defense subsidy, both American and South Korean, the timing will never be right, just as the point when Seoul is to reach military parity with the North always seems to slip a few more years into the future. Therefore, Washington must insist that only the timing and details of the pullout, not the denouement itself are subject to negotiation.
A2: CP – Conditions (Long)
The counterplan causes South Korea to drag its feet and delay modernization– only a firm signal from the U.S. can solve
Carpenter and Bandow 4 – *Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 143-144)DR
But if Pyongyang cannot be dissuaded from building a nuclear arsenal— and one dare not be optimistic on that score— those troops are no longer assets. They are nuclear hostages. There is no need to expose American military personnel to such risks. During the early decades of the Cold War, there was a respectable rationale for keeping troops in the region and giving security guarantees to Japan and South Korea. Washington understandably wanted to keep both countries out of the orbit of a rapaciously expansionist Soviet Union or a hostile and volatile China. For many years Japan and South Korea also were too weak to provide for their own defense. Today’s security environment bears no resemblance to that earlier era. The Soviet Union has been replaced by a weak, noncommunist Russia. China’s relations with the United States, although tense at times, are dramatically better than they were when America made its security commitments to Northeast Asia. Moreover, China is not even an orthodox communist state any longer, much less the kind of virulently revolutionary state that it was under Mao Zedong. Today China and Russia are both conventional great powers. While such powers may prove difficult to deal with from time to time, they do not pose malignantly expansionist threats to the peace of the region or to America’s security. Equally important, Japan and South Korea are vastly more capable than they were when they became Washington’s security dependents. South Korea now has twice the population of North Korea and an economy some 40 times as large. If Seoul spent even a respectable amount on defense, it could easily outpace its decrepit communist neighbor. But it chooses to spend a smaller percentage of its gross domestic product on the military than does the United States— even though North Korea is on its border, not America’s. True, political leaders in the ROK are now talking about increases in military spending, but those proposals are still woefully deficient. Japan’s timidity on security matters is even more indefensible. Despite the decade-long recession that has plagued its economy, Japan still has the second largest economy in the world. It also has a population six times larger than North Korea’s. It is troubling to see a country with those characteristics— one of the world’s great powers— rely on another country to resolve a security issue that so clearly impinges on Japan’s vital interests. Washington should begin to reduce its security risks in Northeast Asia. It is time— indeed, it is well past time— to tell Japan and South Korea that they must provide for their own defense and take responsibility for dealing with security problems in their region. The continuing reliance of those two countries 147 on the United States is not healthy for them— and it certainly is not healthy for America. Japan and South Korea, together with China and Russia, should bear the burden of dealing with a dangerous and unpredictable North Korea.
Nevertheless, while it is important for Washington to work with Seoul to shape the withdrawal and inform other States in the region privately before any plan is announced, it is vital for the United States to emphasize that the decision has been made and to set a deadline, or else the ROK will have an incentive to delay fully augmenting its military as long as possible to maintain America's security guarantee. Moreover, the opponents of disengagement then would seek postponement rather than cancellation, since the former usually turns into the latter, as it did with President Carter's plan. Unfortunately, in the view of many supporters of the ROK defense subsidy, both American and South Korean, the timing will never be right, just as the point when Seoul is t0 reach military parity with the North always seems to slip a few more years into the future. Therefore, Washington must insist that only the timing and details of the pullout, not the denouement itself are subject to negotiation.
As mentioned earlier, the United States should encourage the South to use an American phase-out as a bargaining chip with North Korea. Seoul should announce the withdrawal and give the DPRK two choices. One is to engage in serious negotiations over adoption of confidence-building measures and arms reduction. The other is to watch South Korea build up its military to match that of the North. Such an offer could play an important role in attempting to forestall the DPRK’s nuclear option through diplomacy.
Although it is impossible to predict how North Korea would respond, this strategy would provide a useful test of Pyongyang’s intentions. That would be useful for domestic ROK politics, given the fact, noted earlier, that many South Koreans have an inordinately romantic view of the North: Pyongyang would have to put up or shut up, without being able to use the United States as an excuse for any intransigence. And this strategy might offer the only realistic approach, assuming the North truly fears for its security. After all, Seoul could offer North Korea what it has long demanded, an American pullout joined with the prospect of economic development, while threatening to spend its adversary into the ground. In fact, in 1993 the Seoul government predicted as much:
From a mid and long-term perspective, the probability of peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea is predicted to increase. It is very likely that international cross-recognition of the two Koreas will come about as the worldwide conciliatory atmosphere warms after the Cold War era and as the four major regional powers come to increasingly desire stability on the Korean peninsula. When North Korea takes into account the considerable gap between the two Koreas in terms of national power, the predicted loss of their military supremacy and the expected limit of Kim Jong Il’s charisma after Kim Il Sung dies, they are predicted inevitably to renounce their strategy of communizing the South by force and to embrace a pragmatic opening and reforming of their society. 109 That assessment ultimately might run out to be wildly optimistic, but the thesis should be tested-by Seoul.
It has been evident for years that South Korea is a security free-rider, one that no longer requires American military support. Five decades' worth of American withdrawal plans and proposals have been generally halfhearted, mismanaged, and interrupted. Washington needs to adopt a new approach, based on South Korea's declining security value to America and increasing ability to defend itself. The United States should make a firm decision to pull out all of its troops, while cooperating with Seoul in determining the timing and ordering of the withdrawal. The disengagement decision needs to be final, with demobilization of the troops and cancellation of the Mutual Defense Treaty to follow. The details can and should be negotiated with Seoul, but it is time to free the American people from a commitment that Costs far more than it is worth, absorbs valuable military resources, and keeps the Korean people in a dependent relationship that insults their nationhood and puts their destiny in another country’s hands.
A2: CP – Conditions on NK – Kim Jong-il DA 2ac
Attacks are empirically used to rebuild political support from the military
Lee, 10 – AP's bureau chief in Seoul (5/27/10, Jean H., “Analysis: Attack may be tied to NKorean succession,”
, JMP)
SEOUL, South Korea — Young, inexperienced and virtually unknown even at home, Kim Jong Un needs at least a few political victories under his belt if he is to succeed his father as leader of communist North Korea.
The sinking of a South Korean warship may well have provided Kim Jong Il's 20-something son and rumored heir with a victory that would bolster his support within the communist country's military, a million-man force in need of a boost after a November sea battle left one North Korean sailor dead.
North Korea has vehemently denied involvement in the torpedo attack that sank the Cheonan near the Koreas' sea border in March, killing 46 sailors in one of the boldest attacks on the South since the Korean War of the 1950s.
The timing might seem inexplicable: After a year of intransigence, North Korea seemed willing and ready to return to nuclear disarmament talks.
But North Korea has never seen violence and negotiation as incompatible, and domestic issues — a succession movement and military discontent — may be more urgent than foreign policy.
North Korea's leaders tightly control information and thrive on myths and lies. However, they cannot hide that the nation is in turmoil, struggling to build its shattered economy and to feed its 24 million people. The number of defectors is rising, and the encroachment of the outside world, through videos and films smuggled from China, has shown citizens what lies beyond the so-called Hermit Kingdom's borders.
Kim Jong Il, now 68, is ailing. North Korea has never confirmed that he suffered a stroke in 2008, but his sudden weight loss last year and the persistent paralysis that has left him with a slight limp was visible during his rare trip to China last month.
None of his three sons has had the benefit of the more than a decade of grooming Kim had by the time he took over after his father Kim Il Sung's death in 1994, and the regime says it is determined to usher in a "stronger, prosperous" era in 2012, the centenary of the patriarch's birth.
Any change in leadership has the potential to be traumatic and tumultuous. A bold attack would be a quick way to muster support and favor in a country where one in 20 citizens is in the military.
North Korea has attacked the South a number of times, despite the 1953 truce that ended the devastating Korean War. South Korea has never retaliated militarily, mindful of the toll another war would have on the Korean peninsula.
The North's deadliest attack was a bomb smuggled aboard a Korean Air flight, which was decimated over the Andaman Sea in 1987, killing 115 people on board.
A North Korean agent captured in connection with that plot said the mastermind was Kim Jong Il, then a few years shy of taking over as leader.
Pyongyang has never admitted to any of the post-truce attacks and may have counted on little proof being uncovered when it sent a submarine loaded with a torpedo into the choppy Yellow Sea on March 26.
But the distinctively North Korean script scrawled on the inside of a torpedo fragment found during the investigation, among other evidence, was a damning fingerprint.
The Cheonan was a symbolic target: The 1,200-ton frigate was involved in a 1999 skirmish between the two Koreas that the South claims killed as many as 30 North Koreans.
North Korea disputes the western sea border drawn by U.N. at the close of the Korean War, and those waters have been the site of two other bloody battles since 1999: a firefight in 2002 that killed six South Koreans, and a clash just last November that Seoul says killed a North Korean sailor.
The North Korean navy was ripe for revenge. And defectors say it may have needed a boost, since even relatively well-fed military leaders in a regime built around a "military-first" policy had been going hungry in recent years.
Not long after the November skirmish, the regime enacted sweeping currency reforms. North Koreans were ordered to exchange a limited amount of bills for a new currency, and to turn the rest over to the government — a move that effectively wiped out any personal savings.
The reforms were a disaster. There were reports of riots and unrest — previously a rarity in totalitarian North Korea. If it was a move to showcase the young, Swiss-educated son's economic acumen, it was a miscalculation.
The submarine attack, however, was a stealth move. North Korea's outdated arsenal cannot match South Korea's state-of-the-art systems, but the slow-moving sub somehow went undetected by Seoul's sophisticated radars.
Regardless of who ordered the attack, credit for it may have been circulated among top military commanders to build support for the fledging heir apparent, already reportedly dubbed the "Brilliant Comrade."
A2: CP – Conditions on NK – Won’t Solve
Doesn’t solve the case – succession politics will force North Korea to reject reciprocal concessions
IISS, 09 (June 2009, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments, “North Korea’s Dangerous Game,” Vol. 5, Issue 5, , JMP)
Nuclear test and missile launches go beyond usual brinkmanship
In May, the United States Secretary of Defense called it ‘a harbinger of a dark future’. North Korea’s apparent progress on nuclear weapons and long-range missiles did not pose a direct military threat to the US, Robert Gates said at the eighth IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. However, the rogue state’s recent actions in testing its second nuclear bomb and firing off a volley of missiles did ‘give urgency’ to efforts to persuade it to change its direction.
Since April, the international community’s alarm and condemnation of North Korea’s actions have grown. Having fired a missile 3,200km over the Sea of Japan and into the Pacific Ocean, conducted a second nuclear test explosion, quit the Six-Party Talks on its nuclear programme, restarted its plutonium- production programme, expelled UN nuclear inspectors and repudiated the 56-year-old truce that ended the Korean War (see timeline, overleaf), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was talking menacingly in early June of its ‘nuclear deterrent’ being available for a ‘merciless offensive’.
Such actions herald a dangerous new phase in tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Past provocations have been viewed as attempts to gain attention and concessions from the outside world. Now, as it demands to be recognised as a nuclear-armed state and simultaneously concentrates on leadership succession, North Korea is no longer suggesting it would trade its nuclear programme for the right economic and political sweeteners.
Show of power
While it is impossible to know North Korea’s true intentions, an assertion of power seems to be a key motivator of its recent actions. Giving little warning of the nuclear test and ignoring the Obama Administration’s offers of engagement, North Korea did not appear to be bargaining for security and economic advantages. While testing the new US president or seeking his attention may have figured in the equation, it may also be that Pyongyang pre-emptively decided it had little to gain from Obama.
American scholars visiting North Korea this spring heard a consistent message that North Korea was no longer interested in normalising US relations unless on the basis of recognition as a nuclear-armed state.
The North Koreans may have believed that the best way to gain this was demonstrating that their nuclear devices and long-range missiles really work (see boxes above and below). The great fear is that they could miniaturise nuclear warheads to mount on missiles and then deliver such a weapon, but it is unlikely that they can currently achieve this (see box, next page).
A need to show strength is driven by external and internal vulnerabilities. Since 2008, North Korea has faced a firmer foe in conservative South Korean President Lee Myung Bak. Lee ended the ‘sunshine policies’ of his two predecessors and reduced the aid pledged in their summits with the North. His insistence on reciprocity has apparently prompted Pyongyang to do the opposite, lest it appear weak. North Korea broke off most communications and trade with the South, and threatened to close the Kaesong joint industrial complex, just north of the DMZ (demilitarised zone) between the Koreas, unless wage payments were quadrupled. On 30 March, North Korea arrested a South Korean manager at the plant, shortly after seizing two American journalists near the Chinese border.
Succession politics are also surely in play. After the stroke suffered by Kim Jong Il in August 2008, the regime needed to demonstrate externally and internally that it remained strong. Photos and video footage since showed Kim to be gaunt and limping. In early June, South Korean media outlets reported that North Korea has asked the country’s institutions and overseas missions to pledge loyalty to Kim’s third and youngest son, 25-year-old Kim Jong Woon.
These were later given some credence when eldest son and former heir apparent Kim Jong Nam told Japanese TV that he thought his younger brother would succeed to the position. It is also widely assessed that Chang Sung Taek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law and a National Defence Commission member, will wield power as a regent if formal authority passes to the youngest son. Given the key role generals would play in any succession scenario, Kim Jong Il had good reason to accede to military demands for a second nuclear test.
Military leveraging difficult because U.S. can’t credibly threaten an attack
Horowitz, 05 – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 2004-05, The Washington Quarterly, “Who’s Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang,” , JMP)
Militarily leveraging the North Korean regime will be difficult. Although the United States possesses overwhelming military superiority, it is not clear if it can credibly threaten an attack at the present. Military power may be more positively utilized in the form of a negative security assurance to induce North Korean cooperation, but such incentives would also incur risks. China’s military leverage over North Korea is similarly unclear. North Korea would certainly count on Chinese support in the event of a military contingency on the peninsula, but China’s actual actions are difficult to predict.
A2: CP – Condition on NK Denuclearization
The CP forces North Korea to give up its ace in the hole – wrecking regime stability – especially with the military
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
Military-First Policy
One of major reasons for North Korea’s reluctance to adopt reform policies consistently seems to be its lack of confidence in domestic political stability. The economic reforms in China in the late 1970s and in Vietnam in the mid-1980s were based on government confidence in domestic political loyalty. In fact, China and Vietnam were faced with more hostile environments, when they started their reform policies, than North Korea is facing now. China faced tensions with Russia and Taiwan, while Vietnam had troubles with the U.S., China, and Cambodia.
Instead of consistently implementing full-fledged reform policies to maintain political stability, Kim Jong-il relies on the Military-First Policy, under which he has given the military unprecedented privileges, frequently visiting events and places associated with it and promoting military officials within the official power hierarchy.
Despite the almighty status and power of KWP, it has not functioned normally since Kim Il Sung’s death. No party congress has been held since the sixth party congress in 1980. According to the Party Act, the party congress is supposed to be held every five years. The plenum of the Central Committee has not been held since the 21st plenum in December 1993. The plenum, which has the right to elect the secretary-general, was not held even when Kim Jong-il became the party’s secretary-general in October of 1997. Instead, Kim Jong-il was endorsed by both the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee. It is no longer considered strange that the plenum is not held before the Supreme People’s Assembly. It is suspected that Secretariat and Politburo meetings have not been held since Kim Il Sung’s death. It is likely that not a single organization within the party is fulfilling its decision-making functions, and thus the party is not working properly as a system. There are a number of vacant positions in the party.
Under the Military-First Policy, the KWP does not function as an institutionalized decision-making body. In fact, Kim Jong-il has said, “My business style is one without a conference.”15 Decision-making is highly centralized around Kim Jong-il, particularly in the areas of military affairs, foreign policy, and high level appointments, and he does not depend on any institutionalized body in his decision-making process. When a single paramount leader dominates the decision-making process, decision-making bodies do not operate properly, even when they are convened. When Mao ruled China, for example, he limited the degree of top leadership participation in key policy debates, and decision-making bodies were relegated to rubber-stamp organizations.16 In North Korea, where the input of formal and informal institutions in the decision-making process is extremely limited, the results can be unpredictable, irrational, and sometimes even dangerous.
There are several reasons why the Kim Jong-il regime has adopted the Military-First Policy. First, the enhanced status of the military is designed to guarantee its loyalty. In fact, the military contributes to the stability of the regime and may be its last resort. Second, this policy appears to be related to Kim Jong-il’s intention to bypass the party and control the military directly. If, as in the past, the military is controlled by the party in every aspect, it is possible that someone in the party could rise to become a strong second man on the North Korean political scene. This situation would weaken the personal power of Kim Jong-il. In fact, Kim Jong-il himself consolidated his power through the party organization, beginning in the early 1970s. As secretary of KWP’s Department of Organization and Guidance, Kim Jong-il could monopolize the personnel policy of the party, military, and government; thus he knows the power of party connections better than anybody. Therefore, he does not want to control the military through the central party organization.
Third, the enhanced status of the military may be partly aimed at the outside world. A strong military seems to be the only political leverage that North Korea has. It believes that military blackmail is its most effective bargaining chip in relations with the United States and South Korea, and that the outside world will not dare to dismiss it if it shows off its military muscle. North Korean negotiators often avoid sensitive issues and turn down the agenda raised by the United States and South Korea under the pretext of “military dissatisfaction” or “military veto.”
The nuclear program can be interpreted in the same context. Pyongyang seems to consider its nuclear program as the most reliable form of leverage in negotiating for economic aid, diplomatic normalization, and security guarantees. The nuclear program also helps promote regime stability by giving the North Korean people a sense of pride in their “Strong and Prosperous Nation.” It is noteworthy that this time, unlike the first nuclear crisis of 1993,17 North Korea actually said “We are entitled to possess nuclear weapons” and declared itself to be a nuclear power on February 10, 2005.18
A2: CP – Condition on NK Denuclearization
North Korea won’t denuclearize – even if they say yes, they’ll cheat
Bennett, 08 – Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation (Bruce, “A New National Strategy for Korea: North Korea Threats Require Deterrence, Reconciliation”, Korea Herald, 3-13, KH.html)
Arms control seeks to reduce the risks of conflict, the damage that conflict could cause, and the military cost to deter conflict or to achieve victory in conflict. For decades, South Korea, the United States, and the international community have tried to use arms control measures to moderate the North Korean threat, consistent with these objectives. Korean arms control efforts have focused on the North Korean nuclear weapons program because of the serious threat that it poses. The history of these efforts is, however, not very hopeful. North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in July 1977, and then joined the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985. In 1991, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They agreed to ... not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons ... Moreover, they would ... not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. In 1994, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States, closing the Yongbyon facilities; North Korea promised to abide by the provisions of the NPT. And now North Korea is delaying the agreements made under the six-party talks. North Korea has apparently pursued nuclear weapons development throughout this period. Two examples suggest the pattern. North Korea did operate a nuclear reprocessing facility, in violation of the Joint Declaration. And in 1999, Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan said he was shown three North Korean plutonium nuclear weapons. If Dr. Khan was right, North Korea did produce and possess nuclear weapons, in violation of the NPT and the Joint Declaration. Many experts on North Korea are skeptical that North Korea will ever dismantle its entire nuclear weapon arsenal, because these capabilities have been so critical to North Korea. Consider this: How is it that a nearly bankrupt country of only about 20 million people can stand up to three members of the U.N. Security Council and Japan, four of the wealthiest countries in the world? And in doing so, North Korea often comes out the victor. Would North Korea have such leverage without nuclear weapons? Would the North Korean regime be able to survive without such appearances of empowerment?
Kim Jong-il uses the nuclear program to extract economic concessions to ensure the survival of the regime
Sohn, 10 (6/3/10, Sohn Kwang Joo, Chief Editor, Daily NK, “Cheonan the Introduction to Kim's Second Act,”
, JMP)
What does it all mean? Why was South Korea attacked by North Korea?
Some say that the Cheonan incident was retaliation for the Daecheong naval battle of November last year, while others say it was related to the succession.
But the underlying reason is different. South Korea and the international community have not yet figured out recent changes to Kim Jong Il’s survival tactics. That is, there have been changes to Kim Jong Il’s international and domestic strategy for survival with which his foes have yet to catch up.
With the collapse of the communist bloc in the 1990s, the North Korean economy went bankrupt, and from then Kim Jong Il’s international and domestic strategy was the Military-first policy, which roughly translates as prioritizing the military economically at home, and then relying on military tensions on the Korean Peninsula to achieve other ends abroad. In other words, developing nuclear weapons and raising military tensions has been a way for the regime to extract economic aid through international negotiations.
A2: CP – Condition on NK Denuclearization
Giving up the nuclear weapons program will wreck Kim Jong-il’s regime – military won’t tolerate it
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (8/4/09, Doug, “Grumpy Old Men,”
, JMP)
Pyongyang subsequently relaxed internal controls and slightly opened the economy to the outside. Under South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun the Republic of Korea engaged in the so-called Sunshine Policy, aiding and investing in the DPRK. Since the 1994 Agreed Framework, the North also has engaged in an on-and-off negotiation with North Korea’s neighbors and the United States over ending its nuclear program. This process has significantly increased Pyongyang’s contact with the West.
Even so, a negotiated settlement remained out of reach. Despite the common assumption that the North was willing to deal, Pyongyang had reason to reject even a seemingly generous offer. Observes analyst Balbina Hwang: “For the regime itself, isolation of course serves to preserve its own power and legitimacy which would immediately be undermined by openness.” Lankov points out that the Kim regime is particularly vulnerable given the proximity of South Korea, with a prosperous and free people who share the same culture and speak the same language.
Still, hope of a solution rose in the aftermath the October 2007 denuclearization agreement. Alas, the accord crashed and burned last year. North Korea has subsequently denounced the arrangement, expelled international inspectors, announced that it will not return to the six-party talks, begun to rebuild its nuclear program and restarted reprocessing activities, renounced the 1953 Armistice, nullified boundary-demarcation accords, terminated bilateral political cooperation and reconciliation agreements, and voided economic arrangements with the South. Earlier this year, Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test and several missile tests. As international criticism increased, the DPRK ratcheted up its rhetoric, threatening military retaliation in response to varied South Korean, U.S. and UN actions.
None of this means that North Korea could not come back to the table. However, today there is far less expectation that the DPRK will ever be willing to abandon its nuclear program, let alone yield up its existing nuclear materials. Nuclear weapons offer the North security assurance, international status and extortion opportunities. If Pyongyang can still be bought off, the price has likely risen sharply.
North Korea’s current internal instability will make reaching a deal even more difficult. Despite common claims that Kim is “crazy,” the evidence indicates that he is evil, not insane. His strategy is consistent with regime preservation.
The military is central to Kim’s rule. He long has pushed a “military first” policy. Even as the regime lost authority, it continued to funnel resources to the armed forces. Nevertheless, in their prime both Kims may have had sufficient authority to sacrifice the military’s most powerful weapon as part of a political deal. A seriously ill and perhaps dying Kim Jong Il may not. A transitional collective leadership likely would not.
This prevents Kim from keeping the reins on the military
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/6/10, Doug, “An Unstable Rogue,” , JMP)
Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires.
Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it’s impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.
Empirically risks conflict
Bandow, 10 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (5/24/10, Doug, “Avoiding Pyongyang,” , JMP)
The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a malign international actor since its formation six decades ago. Kim Il-sung initiated full-scale war in 1950; over the years the regime has engaged in a variety of military and terrorist attacks on both South Korean and American targets.
However, since the downing of a ROK airliner in 1987, Pyongyang has been on better behavior. Brinkmanship has remained the North’s chief negotiating tactic, but the DPRK has avoided committing any blatant acts of war.
Why sink a South Korean ship? It could be an unauthorized military action intended to prevent resumption of negotiations over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. It could be an attempt by Kim Jong-il to demonstrate that North Korea can strike with impunity. It could be a concession by him to the military as Kim attempts to install his young son as his successor. In any case, the attack poses a significant challenge to South Korea. But not to America.
A2: CP – Condition on NK Denuclearization
The military is becoming more influential – Kim Jong-il must placate it in order to ensure a stable leadership transition
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (8/4/09, Doug, “Grumpy Old Men,”
, JMP)
Equally significant is the rising influence of the military. Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Inter-Korean Relations Studies Program at the Sejong Institute, argues that “Since the appearance of health issues with Kim Jong-il last year, the North Korean military became more influential.” Kim may have decided he must placate an institution capable of ratifying or blocking any leadership transition; the military may have become more demanding in the wake of his incapacity; both phenomena may be occurring simultaneously.
This would explain the rapid multiple international provocations, punctuated by the nuclear and missile tests. Moreover, the National Defense Commission (NDC), one of Pyongyang’s most powerful military bodies, is gaining internal authority. Responsibility for foreign intelligence apparently was recently moved to Commission. Open Radio for North Korea reports that strategic weapons development also was shifted to the NDC (from the Korean Workers’ Party). The group concluded: “The move is an indication that the National Defense Commission is expanding its role beyond being a policy council for the senior insiders, transforming into a real power with enforcement agencies under its wings.”
Indeed, Rodger Baker of Stratfor Global Intelligence goes further, telling Fox News:
the NDC has really solidified as the central leadership body of North Korea, so it sits over top of the Workers Party, over top of the military, over top of the parliament, in general terms of power. It becomes the place were Kim Jong-il is able to shape his policies, where he’s able to make sure that he has all the strongmen of North Korea in one location.
Even more problematic is the leadership transition. Although it is hard to know how actively involved and in control Kim remains—there is evidence of organizational changes designed to limit his workload—the ruling elite almost certainly is thinking about future contingencies. This can only complicate Pyongyang’s dealings with the rest of the world.
The uncertainty created by Kim’s condition is compounded by the age of many other top officials. Indeed, Kim is relatively young compared to some of those around him. For instance, eighty-one-year-old Kim Yong-nam is chairman of the National People’s Assembly and nominal head of state.
The NDC, however, is the single most important state institution and provides Chairman Kim Jong Il with his only formal position. The NDC’s first vice chairman, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, is seventy-three. General O Kuk-ryol, seventy-eight, spent some time in political purgatory in the early 1990s, but was recently elevated to vice chairman of the NDC. Another vice chairman is Vice Marshal Kim Yong-chun, the seventy-three-year-old defense minister. Thus, irrespective of Kim Jong Il’s condition, significant changes within the ruling elite are inevitable in coming years.
North Korea is prioritizing regime solidarity now
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (8/4/09, Doug, “Grumpy Old Men,”
, JMP)
As noted earlier, the North already is moving in reverse on several fronts. The regime has been restricting private markets—limiting their number and what they can sell. Able-bodied men and women have been barred from the market trade. “Slowly but surely, plans to close all general markets are becoming a reality,” warns the charity Good Friends.
The little private space that had opened up is closing: cell phones have been banned and their use now can result in a large fine and internal exile. The regime has launched a concerted campaign to prevent the sale of smuggled South Korean videos and CDs. Overall, writes Jinwook Choi, since late 2005 “Pyongyang seems to be enforcing the role of the party, prioritizing regime solidarity and implementing conservative policies at home and abroad in the aftermath of failed liberal economic policies (albeit partial and limited) over the last decade.”
Pyongyang has tightened border controls, cracked down on corruption among border guards on the north and periodically closed the border to the south. The North also reintroduced the state monopoly over food supplies and restricted activities by the World Food Program. (The WFP warns of impending food shortages, though Open Radio for North Korea, a South Korean group with contacts in the DPRK, reports the opposite.)
The North also is threatening to pull the plug on the Kaesong industrial development, which hosts 106 South Korean companies (one of which has pulled out) and employs forty thousand North Koreans. Pyongyang has torn up the agreement covering Kaesong and demanded a massive increase in rent and wages (which are pocketed by the regime). The North also arrested a South Korean in March for allegedly criticizing Kim Jong Il and has held him incommunicado. The regime appeared to back away from its expressed willingness to close Kaesong during the most recent bilateral negotiations, but the development’s future remains in doubt.
Unconfirmed reports indicate that Choe Sung-choi, the official responsible for North-South relations, was executed last year, allegedly for corruption; the more serious offense, some observers suspect, is the deterioration in inter-Korean relations. All told, notes Lankov, “Though a complete return to the 1980s system has not occurred (being perhaps impossible), the backlash has been partially successful in reversing the changes.”
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
Plan solves the net benefit – will encourage China to cooperate to prevent North Korean and allied nuclearization
Bandow, 09 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (6/16/09, Doug, “A Tattered Umbrella,” , JMP)
Moreover, while such a policy might seem to be a convenient and cheap means of protecting friends while discouraging proliferation, it would become problematic once another nation gained the ability to strike the United States. If North Korea eventually marries a nuclear weapon to a long-range missile, Pyongyang still won’t strike America. Kim Jong-il is evil, not stupid; he wants his virgins in this life, not the next.
However, such a weapon would give him a deterrent capability, modest though it might be, diminishing the credibility of Washington’s threat to intervene. The question would become: for what are American policy makers willing to sacrifice Los Angeles? Seoul and Tokyo? Sydney and Taipei? Jakarta and Bangkok? All of them?
Even if the risk was small, the cost would be catastrophic. And the U.S. government’s principal responsibility is to protect American lives, not to guarantee the security of foreign lands. Adopting a policy inviting a nuclear attack on the American homeland violates that duty. Offering nuclear guarantees also diminishes the threat—to North Korea and China—of America’s friends developing independent nuclear deterrents. Far better for Washington to indicate that it is not inclined to leave the DPRK with a nuclear monopoly among smaller powers in East Asia. While the United States would not encourage its allies to exercise the nuclear option, it should suggest that it would not stop them.
Pyongyang might not mind the further spread of nuclear weapons, but Beijing certainly would not relish the prospect of Japan, and even worse Taiwan, exercising the nuclear option. Even if the PRC was not certain that Washington was serious, it would have an incentive to bring greater pressure on the North. And that, of course, is the ultimate goal: halt proliferation to the DPRK.
Whether America and allied states would want to go down this path if Pyongyang proceeded unimpeded could be addressed then. But a written pledge now by Washington to defend South Korea against a nuclear North would eliminate perhaps the most powerful way of sharing the nuclear nightmare with China, and thus encouraging it to act against North Korea. There’s nothing unusual about American officials pledging to protect the South. Last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated: “I want to underscore the commitments the United States has and intends always to honor for the defense of South Korea and Japan.” But the justification of such a policy long ago disappeared.
Washington should devolve responsibility for the ROK’s defense to the ROK. Seoul can protect itself against conventional threats. South Korea could respond to nuclear weapons in the North by raising the possibility of building a countervailing nuclear capability. That’s not a good solution. But it might prove to be the best of a bunch of bad options.
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
China won’t accept the condition and if they do North Korea won’t denuclearize.
Scobell 4 – Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College (March 2004, Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length”, pg. 25-26, ) MGM
To sum up: a U.S. expectation that China will apply strong pressure on North Korea to move Pyongyang towards complying with Washington’s demands is problematic. This expectation is grounded in the assumption that China actually has significant influence with North Korea, is willing to use it, and Beijing shares the same policy priorities on Pyongyang as Washington. The reality seems to be that China’s influence to push for major change in North Korea is quite limited and in a sense merely potential (i.e., never to be used) because China will not apply direct pressure. Because of a lingering buffer mentality, an entrenched risk averse mindset, and a tendency to make Washington the scapegoat, Beijing believes any direct Chinese pressure is extremely unlikely to have significant positive impact on Pyongyang and likely to produce unfavorable results for China. Even if China applies additional pressure, North Korea is likely to either not respond or react negatively―in any case, not to alter its behavior in the desired direction.
Either China says no or it pursues measures that North Korea won’t accept and that collapse the regime
Scobell 4 - Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College (March 2004, Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length”, pg. 22-23, ) MGM
What pressure can China exert on North Korea? China could publicly criticize North Korea in the United Nations, but this would only make North Korea more militant and paranoid, and destroy any influence Beijing has over Pyongyang. The same would be true if China were formally to revoke the 1961 treaty of alliance. Beijing also appears unwilling to cooperate vigorously in the Proliferation Security Initiative launched by the United States, fearing that measures such as blockading and interdicting North Korean exports to check proliferation of WMD would only exacerbate the problem. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in mid-August that these steps “could make a bad situation worse.”79 China could also impose sanctions: withhold food and fuel, for example. However, China adamantly opposes the implementation of sanctions. In Beijing’s view, this would make Pyongyang more desperate and probably lead to regime collapse.80 China could throw open its border to North Korean refugees, but this act might very well hasten the collapse of regime. Beijing is highly unlikely to do this, fearing the consequences both in terms of the scale of humanitarian crisis China would face, not to mention being at odds with Beijing’s consuming priority: Pyongyang’s survival. Since the early 1990s, Beijing has faced an unwanted humanitarian problem, with hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees seeking safe haven in China. And China was embarrassed by a high profile wave of at least 130 North Korean asylum seekers, during spring and summer 2002, trying to break into diplomatic missions in Beijing and Shenyang.81 A larger infl ow of refugees from North Korea would not only threaten to swamp Northeast China but also increase international pressure on Beijing to permit access to the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) eager to provide humanitarian assistance. China has resisted efforts by the UNHCR or NGOs to gain access to the individuals, insisting they are economic, rather than political, refugees. Beijing is extremely reluctant and/or averse to taking any of these steps because it perceives only negative consequences for China.82
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
Either China will say no or agree to apply pressure and risk collapsing its influence, relations with the U.S., and spark Korean War
Scobell 4 – Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College (March 2004, Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length”, pg. 20, ) MGM
The lipstick looks good at a cursory glance; that is, it appears to have geopolitical benefits for China, but upon more careful examination, it actually might be construed as more of a liability. On the positive side, the Korean issue puts China in demand: Beijing is viewed as having a key role to play on the peninsula. It is an issue upon which China can cooperate with the United States and makes China look like a responsible and influential major power.73 But North Korea now also looms as a serious liability. For one thing, the negative side is that “the emperor may have little or no clothes.” In short, the world might discover that China has virtually no influence in North Korea after all. In such a situation where China is unable (or unwilling) to deliver results vis-à-vis North Korea, relations with the United States might be adversely affected, and at the very least China might lose face internationally.74 Indeed, Beijing has influence on Pyongyang, but this is almost certainly “soft” influence that is limited and largely “potential” rather than “hard” and “actual” because only two outcomes are likely. If China chooses to apply direct pressure to North Korea, it is quite possible that Pyongyang will not be influenced (at least in the desired manner). In fact, Chinese analysts regularly state that while China has influence this is limited, the kind that can only be exerted softly and subtly via suggestions or encouragement behind the scenes instead of blunt and direct admonishments in public view.75 RISK AVERSE MINDSET China likely will never exert substantial hard influence because it fears the result―only a negative outcome is likely: either no result or a bad result. No result would mean North Korea does nothing except to pull away from China. China would then lose any possibility of influence. If this happens, China might also gain a dangerous and unpredictable foe on its doorstep. A bad result of China’s pressure would be the possible collapse of North Korea, the emergence of a more paranoid and militant regime, or result in war on the peninsula―Beijing’s worst nightmare.
China won’t help eliminate North Korean nuclear capability or push for regime change and re-unification
Cheng, 10 – China expert at the Heritage Foundation (Dean Cheng, “China Must Choose on North Korea,” DoD Buzz, 5/28/10, )
So, why hasn’t Beijing sought to constrain North Korea? In the first place, North Korea has the ability to threaten the PRC. Not with nuclear weapons (although there is an implicit potential there), but with the threat of refugees. North Korea’s population is under sufficiently tight control that, even in the midst of the 1990s famine, in which an estimated three to five percent of the population starved to death, there was no significant outflow of people. This suggests that the government has the ability to control the flow of people—or to push them out, if need be.
Worse, from Beijing’s perspective, that level of control may be eroding, as North Korea steadily deteriorates. The recent North Korean currency fiasco suggests the government’s control may be declining, in which case more people might seek to flee. Beijing appears unprepared to push the North Koreans over the brink.
Moreover, while the downsides seem clear, the gains for Beijing from a crackdown on their neighbor are not. Eliminating the North Korean nuclear capability (which does not threaten China in any real sense) benefits the ROK, Japan, and the United States, but does not garner anything for the PRC. Pushing the North over the brink, resulting in regime change or even reunification, is even less clearly in Beijing’s interest. The Chinese Communist Party is not known for pursuing altruism as a matter of national policy.
This has now all come to a head in the wake of the Cheonan incident. Past North Korean provocations, ranging from the 1968 assault on the Blue House
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
Chinese won’t pressure North Korea – irrational decision making because relations go through the Communist Party.
Forsythe 10 (6/10/10, Michael, Bloomberg News, “China Backing Kim Jong Il Means Old Party Links Still Driving Korea Policy,” )
One reason why Chinese leaders wouldn’t join Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in denouncing North Korea for sinking a South Korean warship when they met in Beijing last month may be found in an obscure agency housed a 10-minute walk from their meeting place.
The ruling Communist Party’s International Department oversees ties with Leader Kim Jong Il’s Korean Worker’s Party and shares with the Foreign Ministry responsibility for relations with Kim’s regime in the north. The party-to-party comradeship predates the founding of both states and was cemented on the battlefield in the Korean War.
Chinese leaders have resisted condemning North Korea over the sinking for several reasons: They don’t want to undermine Kim’s regime and risk a collapse that might spark a flood of refugees, or to bolster U.S. power on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, party ties shouldn’t be underestimated as a driver of Chinese policy, said analyst Bonnie Glaser.
The International Department “has always controlled implementation of policy regarding” North Korea-China ties, said Glaser, who studies the two countries at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, in an e-mail. “I fully expect that it is arguing that there is insufficient evidence to pin blame and warning of the dangers of doing so.”
For most nations, China’s Foreign Ministry is the public face of diplomacy. Its officials conduct talks with counterparts from countries such as the U.S., Russia and Japan. With North Korea, the ministry shares the stage with the International Department, which reports to the party’s Central Committee, according to an organization chart on the party’s website.
Kim’s Visit
The department’s news office said it couldn’t respond to a faxed request for information about its role until late June.
The International Department’s influence was on show during Kim’s three-day trip to China in May. The Foreign Ministry, which publicizes most visits by world leaders, deferred questions to the department.
The ministry declined to confirm Kim’s presence in China, even after he was photographed on May 3 in the northeastern city of Dalian and was shadowed to Beijing by Japanese and South Korean reporters.
Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu said May 6 she had “no information” and that the ministry wasn’t “the competent authority on the issue.” Only after Kim had left were his meetings with leaders made public by state media in both countries.
‘Communist Solidarity’
The department’s “objectives are to maintain communist solidarity with the North Korean party,” said Susan Shirk, a professor specializing in Chinese international relations at the University of California, San Diego, and a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia. It “definitely has a different perspective than the Foreign Ministry.”
In February, Wang Jiarui, the head of the International Department, traveled to North Korea to meet Kim, according to a statement on the central government’s website. A year earlier, on a trip to Pyongyang during “China-North Korea Friendship Year,” Wang pledged that China would broaden cooperation.
China wants to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula above all else, said Shen Dingli, a profes1sor of international relations at Shanghai’s Fudan University.
Trade Ties
China depends on trade to help maintain economic growth that reached 11.9 percent in the first three months of this year and a regional war could disrupt commerce with Japan and South Korea, its No. 3 and No. 4 trading partners. China accounted for 79 percent of the North’s international commerce last year, according to Seoul-based agency Kotra. The North doesn’t release figures.
Ethnic considerations also play a role. More than 90 percent of China’s ethnic Koreans, about 1.78 million people according to Chinese census figures, live in the three northeastern Chinese provinces near North Korea, which risk being inundated with refugees in the event of a conflict on the Korean peninsula.
The International Department was founded in 1951, two years after party leader Mao Zedong announced the formation of the People’s Republic. The original mission was to build ties with Communist comrades and “other left-wing parties of the world,” according to its website.
Past History
Communists from Korea and China fought together against Japanese rule in northern China before Mao took power. China came to the aid of Kim’s father, the late leader Kim Il Sung, toward the end of 1950 by entering the Korean War.
Because the International Department is an organ of the Communist Party, which has ruled China for more than 60 years, service there can lead to higher office. State Councilor Dai Bingguo, Clinton’s counterpart during last month’s talks, headed the department from 1997-2003. Another former director, Qiao Shi, became a member of the ruling Politburo Standing Committee.
Shirk and Barry Naughton, who focuses on China’s economy and international affairs at the University of California, San Diego, say it is difficult to assess precisely how the department has tilted China’s North Korea policy.
The Chinese “can’t stand Kim Jong Il and they know that he’s a dangerous psychopath,” Naughton said. “But the strand that says ‘we stood together and fought the mighty Americans to a standstill’ is extremely powerful.”
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
China will say no - only the THREAT of military action by the U.S. against Korea can motivate it to force North Korea to cooperate
Scobell 4 - Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College (March 2004, Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length”, pg. 11-13, ) MGM
A Unique Confluence of Conditions. The outcome of Chinese pressure in this instance is due to what is very likely a unique set of conditions. It is important to put China’s diplomatic efforts in 2003 in full perspective―Beijing’s sustained efforts to bring Washington and Pyongyang to the same table are unprecedented. China has never before undertaken such an activist diplomatic initiative solely on its own initiative. Beijing literally stuck its neck out: by Chinese standards of excessive caution, it took an enormously bold and risky step well outside of its normal comfort zone. It could be argued that China had little to lose because even if this attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis had failed miserably, Beijing only would have been widely applauded for its efforts. Nevertheless, China’s efforts are nothing short of highly unusual. The closest Beijing has come to this kind of self-initiated diplomatic activism is in its leading role in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. But in this earlier case, Chinese efforts entailed bringing together neighboring countries that enjoyed good relations without a legacy of hostility and with a recent track record of confidence and trust-building measures including landmark steps at demilitarization. By contrast, in the case of North Korea, the primary actors had a long history of hostilities and antagonisms, and substantial mutual mistrust and suspicion. Certainly, some analysts stress that in recent years China has become a more confident international actor, more willing to participate in both multilateral and bilateral settings.35 Nevertheless, prior to January 2003, China had displayed no interest in taking an activist and leading role on the Korean crisis. What brought on this sudden burst of high energy activity? The answer seems to lie in the unique confluence of three conditions. The first was the impending and then actual Iraq war. This had a significant and sobering impact on both China and North Korea. Both regimes were extremely concerned about what the United States would do next. The result was a sudden sense of urgency on the part of Beijing and Pyongyang to remove any excuse for the United States to use military power on the Korean Peninsula. China’s perceived sense of crisis can be gauged by Beijing’s reported decision in early 2003 to establish a leading small group on North Korea.36 Second, China had thought more seriously about the strategic consequences of a nuclearized North Korea and began to recognize the disturbing ramifications of this.37 Some Chinese security analysts grasped that Bejing’s hierarchy of priorities vis-à-vis Pyongyang might be illusory. That is, China’s number one priority of keeping the regime afloat might be in doubt if North Korea went nuclear. A nuclearized Pyongyang could mean the end of the regime because this development could cause the United States to respond militarily and oust the regime. Moreover, if not, Pyongyang might even at some point engage in nuclear blackmail against China. Indeed, one Chinese analyst has raised this as a possibility.38 At the very least North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons might trigger a “chain reaction” or “domino effect”[duominnuo gupai xiaogai] in Northeast Asia: Japan and perhaps South Korea might also go nuclear (rarely mentioned but certainly a concern to China is the possibility that Taiwan might reconsider its non-nuclear stance).39 Moreover, unmentioned by Chinese analysts but a logical second order effect would be heightened U.S. enthusiasm for ballistic missile defense.40 Third, China was also beginning to realize the extent of the economic cost of continued tensions on the peninsula. This is not only measured in terms of China’s significant largesse to prop up North Korea’s collapsed economy, but also in terms of the potential damage to China’s economy of prolonged instability on the peninsula and the fallout on South Korea’s economic performance.41 The impact of the protracted Pyongyang nuclear crisis was being felt in Seoul, and Beijing feared this might impinge on South Korea’s burgeoning economic relationship with China. The Iraq war was almost certainly the most important condition, and the one that motivated both China and North Korea to act. But the further away from the end of major combat operations we get, declared by President Bush on May 1, 2003, the more the “shock and awe” value of the highly successful military victory in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM recedes. By the autumn of 2003, the sense of urgency in addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis that China exhibited in the spring and summer seemed to have evaporated. Chinese analysts in civilian and military research institutes in Beijing with whom the author held discussions in September 2003 seemed―with one notable exception―generally comfortable with a very gradual approach to resolving the crises. The consensus was that there was no reason to rush matters: the North Korean nuclear problem would take a long time to resolve, and patience was essential.42 Negative economic impact and nuclear fallout from the creeping crisis, by themselves, are probably not sufficient to prompt a degree of alarm necessary for Beijing to rouse itself to exert direct influence on Pyongyang.
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
China won’t cooperate to pressure North Korea – doesn’t view denuclearization as a priority and doesn’t want to risk collapse or conflict
Liff 09 – PhD student in Princeton’s Department of Politics and former MEXT research scholar affiliated with the University of Tokyo and research associate at the Japan Center for International Exchange. He spent summer 2009 in Beijing and Shanghai conducting research on China’s foreign policy to Northern Asia (10/8/09, Adam P., “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: The China Fallacy,” )
Images of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s warm embrace of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il during this week’s visit to Pyongyang to celebrate the 60th anniversary of PRC-DPRK diplomatic relations may have surprised observers of the North Korea nuclear issue. After all, the conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign policy circles is that the Chinese leadership is increasingly angry with Pyongyang in the wake of its recent provocations and that Beijing is willing and able to use its leverage to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. This embrace should give such observers pause: it manifests a clear disconnect between the conventional wisdom and reality.
Admittedly, Wen did not leave Pyongyang empty-handed. He extracted a pledge from Kim to return to multilateral negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, albeit with the condition that they be preceded by direct talks with the United States. Kim’s apparent change of heart, together with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg’s statement last week reiterating the Obama administration’s willingness to open a bilateral dialogue within the six-party framework, bodes well for bringing Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.
Before this next round of negotiations begins, however, it is incumbent upon the U.S. to ensure that it does not repeat past mistakes. In particular, it must rid itself of the illusion that six-party dialogue is the only channel through which to achieve denuclearization. In the pursuit of a resolution to the North Korea nuclear issue, a multilateral framework is necessary, but it is not sufficient.
Since 2002, U.S. policy toward North Korea has been largely predicated on the false assumption that the bulk of the heavy lifting can be outsourced to China. It is this belief that has provided one of the main rationales for the Six-Party Talks. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, UN Ambassador Susan Rice, and other U.S. officials’ effusive praise of China for its role in multilateral efforts to address the North Korea nuclear issue belie this mindset. In this core aspect of policy toward North Korea, the Obama administration differs little from its predecessor.
Yet public statements on North Korea notwithstanding, major differences between Beijing and Washington persist. In fact, peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula demand that the U.S. lower its expectations of China and reconsider its approach toward North Korea.
Most basically, China’s perception of the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea – its Cold War ally and major trading partner – differs sharply from that of the U.S. and its allies, particularly Japan. Denuclearization is a much lower priority for Beijing. If North Korea successfully miniaturizes a nuclear warhead and mounts it on a ballistic missile, the safest place to be may be Beijing. By contrast, the least safe place may be Seoul or Tokyo.
For Chinese leaders, it is not the regime of Kim Jong-il but the possibility of regime collapse that poses the most serious threat to Chinese security. Regime implosion could result in instability in China’s northeast, a flood of North Korean refugees into China, or worse, precipitous reunification with South Korea and a U.S. military presence north of the 38th parallel. Not only is China unwilling to risk open conflict with North Korea, it is also reluctant to put the screws to Pyongyang, a fact manifest in its vehement opposition to threats of force, resistance to tough sanctions, and its insistence on softened language in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874. (China and Russia threatened to veto earlier drafts that explicitly authorized the use of force during inspections of North Korean ships suspected of carrying illicit weapons or technology.)
Moreover, Chinese leaders are fatigued by their shuttle diplomacy. Many Chinese observers view North Korea’s nuclear program as a direct
[CONTINUED]
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
[CONTINUED]
response to misguided U.S. policies and believe the U.S. should clean up its own mess. Although this view has lost some traction since the Obama administration took office with a clear willingness to engage Pyongyang, they privately express resentment at Washington’s demands for Beijing to “step up” and argue that given Pyongyang’s clear desire for direct talks with the U.S., it is Washington – not Beijing – that is best positioned to push for denuclearization.
Many Chinese believe that even if they wanted to take a harder line against North Korea (e.g., cutting trade flows) Beijing does not wield sufficient influence in Pyongyang to persuade the regime to ease tensions and eliminate its nuclear weapons program. They argue that China has applied the pressure it can. Following the first North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, Yang Xiyu, a former career diplomat and the inaugural director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Office for Korean Peninsula Issues, argued that the success of negotiations “lies in Pyongyang’s desires, not in what China does.”
That isn’t to say Chinese are indifferent to North Korean behavior. Peking University scholar Zhu Feng argued in a June 1 PacNet that the May 25 nuclear test was a “slap in the face of China.” Indeed, Beijing’s backing of UNSC Resolution 1874, its support for limited sanctions, and Wen’s visit this week reveal that China is willing to pressure Pyongyang. However, the fact that even after a second nuclear test a consensus on what became a watered-down version of Resolution 1874 was not reached for 18 days – when a prompt and decisive response from the international community was called for – reveals how deep the fissures are.
Above all, Chinese see themselves as realists. While they express anger and frustration with North Korea’s provocations, a disconcerting number of Chinese observers also believe that the window of opportunity for solving the nuclear issue has closed. At a recent conference, a Chinese scholar from a government-affiliated research institute argued that North Korea’s second nuclear test demonstrates Pyongyang does not want a deal; rather, it is intent on de facto recognition from the international community as a nuclear power. Many Chinese believe that the best hope for regional stability is a focus on counterproliferation. Recent sanctions, the joint statement at the inaugural U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which “emphasized the importance of implementing” Resolution 1874, and the seizure of vanadium at Dandong on the China-North Korea border in late July should be seen in this light. When it comes to denuclearization, on the other hand, many Chinese observers take a long-term view – believing that the problem can only be solved by bringing North Korea into the international community through a process of gradual “reform and opening up” similar to China’s experience since 1978.
The lessons are clear. While China sincerely opposes Pyongyang’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal, it seems unwilling to increase pressure on North Korea to the extent that many in Washington would like. Put another way, at least in the short-term, Beijing seems willing to accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. Therefore, Washington must realize that relying on China to solve the North Korea nuclear issue is likely to fail. If the U.S. objective is denuclearization – not merely containment – it must rethink its policies.
China should be expected to faithfully implement Resolution 1874, particularly as it concerns counterproliferation measures, and pressure Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. However, barring an unprecedented provocation, regime collapse, or the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing and Washington’s views on the urgency of denuclearization are unlikely to converge anytime soon.
U.S. policy toward North Korea must have realistic expectations about China’s role. Neither country should forget that the significance of bilateral cooperation transcends the denuclearization issue. Deeper mutual trust between the U.S. and China is a prerequisite not only for resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue but also for the consolidation of stability throughout East Asia. Indeed, the number of security issues on the bilateral agenda is growing daily, running from the need to institutionalize top-level security dialogue among the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea to the need for a multilateral response to nontraditional and transnational security threats such as infectious disease and natural disasters. Both countries should view cooperation on North Korea in this context.
In addition to quietly stressing the ramifications of a nuclear North Korea for stability in East Asia, in particular a potential regional arms race, Washington should promote more extensive dialogue with Beijing on the sidelines of the S&ED and other bilateral talks to clarify the role that China is willing and able to play in denuclearization efforts. It should make a concerted effort to mitigate China’s concerns about instability in North Korea, for example by pledging to help with refugee issues or guaranteeing that U.S. troops stationed in South Korea will not move north in the event of Korean reunification. Throughout this process, close coordination and trilateral contingency planning with South Korea and Japan, together with regular briefings of Chinese and Russian officials on these plans, is imperative.
A U.S.-led approach that couples direct bilateral engagement with simultaneous “Five-Party” dialogue may pressure Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. In the latter venue, the five powers should carry out advance planning over how to respond to future North Korean provocations. This will ensure that the international response next time is swift and resolute.
Whether North Korea is prepared to willingly denuclearize is an open question. However, any chance of success is incumbent upon the U.S. reexamining its approach to the issue. While steadfast support from China – particularly on containment and counterproliferation – is essential, the idea that “the road to Pyongyang runs through Beijing” is fundamentally flawed.
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Cooperation
North Korea is increasingly wary of China – they won’t listen
Kang, 09 (11/25/09, Hyun-kyung, “Beijing’s growing influence on Pyongyang worries Seol,” Korea Times, Lexis)
China watchers say Pyongyang's ever-growing dependency on Beijing is a combined result of the latter's strategic regional development plan in its three northeastern provinces near the border - Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang - and the North's brinkmanship diplomacy.
North Korea's bilateral trade with China accounted for approximately 50 percent of its entire trade with foreign nations in 2008.
About 76 percent of bilateral trade took place in the three impoverished provinces near the border where about two million ethnic Koreans reside. In the city of Yanbian in Jilin Province, the Korean language is widely used.
On China's side, experts say, the best case scenario for the Korean Peninsula is nuclear-free and peaceful co-existence of the two Koreas and that therefore, China is expected to take measures to achieve this goal for the peninsula.
Chinese policymakers have sought for a win-win scenario where they can keep their national interests intact, while convincing the North that it would be better off if giving up its nuclear program.
In a phone interview with The Korea Times, Choi Seong-keun, a senior researcher at the Hyundai Research Institute, pointed out that China and North Korea have reaped joint gains in trade promotion in the three provinces.
Since President Hu Jintao took office in 2003, China has placed a priority on developing the three impoverished provinces with a goal to make it a gateway to Northeast Asia.
In October, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao promised that China would sponsor a new bridge project on the Yalu River that will connect North Korea to China, if completed.
Choi considered the bridge project and trade expansion between the two sides signals that the opening up of the North Korean economy may be imminent.
Despite the deepening bilateral economic ties, it would be a misunderstanding to take the North's ever-growing economic dependency on China as evidence that the two sides feel strongly about each other.
The truth is that North Koreans are weary of China's ever-growing influence at home, according to several experts The Korea Times contacted.
This atmosphere was evident when ranking North Korean officials visited Seoul in late August.
Of the six envoys who came to Seoul for the funeral of the late President Kim Dae-jung, three, including chief delegate Kim Ki-nam, met with President Lee Myung-bak.
In the closed door meeting, a think tank expert said, one of the North Koreans told Lee that the North was willing for its southern neighbor to exploit the North's rich natural resources so that both sides can become better off.
Choi said that Lee's response to the offer was unknown, but the North Koreans indirectly expressed their concern over China's growing influence in the hermetic country.
Bernhard Seliger, resident representative of Hanns Seidel Foundation Seoul Office said, "There is no open criticism of China in the North, but North Koreans are weary of them and some are disgusted with the way the Chinese make money there."
"From my observations on North Korea and conversations with North Koreans, there is a great deal of ambiguity about Chinese goods and their influence in the North. They stressed several times that Japanese bicycles and food were better than Chinese ones."
Drew Thompson, director of China Studies and senior fellow at the Washington-based Nixon Center, said the North Koreans were uncertain about China's commitment to their security.
Since 2002, trade between China and North Korea has gradually grown and it stood at 49.5 percent of the North's entire trade with foreign nations in 2008. North Korea's imports from China are three times more than its exports to the neighboring state.
The figure in bilateral trade between China and North Korea is striking, given that China, along with South Korea and Japan, was one of three core trade partners for North Korea back in 2000.
"There is a clear pattern in the North's trade with China. North Korea's reliance on China became heavier when South Korea halted economic assistance to the North," said Choi.
Another striking characteristic of the boosted bilateral trade relations is that a considerable amount of North Korea's mineral resources were shipped to China - they took up 41.3 percent of exports in 2008.
"International sanctions against the North after it tested nuclear bombs and test-fired several missiles tied the North's hands on earning cash abroad. And this facilitated North Korea's shipping of more mineral resources to China to make money," said Choi.
In the National Assembly, quite a few lawmakers, including Rep. Song Young-sun of the minor Pro-Park Geun-hye Coalition, expressed worries over draining North Korea's mineral resources, and proposed a two-track policy.
Song and her fellow legislators urged the Ministry of Unification to consider changing the course of its hard-line North Korea policy in order to find room for inter-Korean cooperation in mineral resources and to chart a strategy to deal with China's ambition on the peninsula.
Since President Lee took office in February last year, Seoul has halted rice shipment to North Korea and inter-Korean economic cooperation, linking economic assistance to the North's efforts for denuclearization.
Lee has stood firm on the conditional engagement policy.
Rep. Song speculated that the North Korean economy's ever-growing dependency on China will end up with the latter having a large influence on the peninsula if the two Koreas unify.
Her observation drew little support.
Drew Thompson said in an email interview with The Korea Times that China didn't want North Korea to fail.
"China's provision of economic and humanitarian assistance and the promotion of trade is part of a strategy to not only ensure the continued survival of North Korea as a sovereign state, but also to encourage reform and the opening up of the North's economy," he observed.
"It is hoped that a reform and opening movement in the North will create a more stable country with more moderate policies, with the expectation that they will no longer engage in provocative behaviors and otherwise threaten regional security."
Selig shared the view with Thompson, saying China likes dealing with two Koreas instead of a unified country.
"But China would prefer a more rational regime in the North, like a military junta, compared to the current situation as the incumbent regime is a difficult ally," the German economist said.
A question remains unanswered - Why should South Korean policymakers be concerned over North Korea's growing dependency on China?
Choi of the Hyundai Research Institute observed that the "heterogeneous economic infrastructure as a consequence of the North's trade expansion with China" will pose a threat to South Korea if the two Koreas are unified in the future.
"If the current trend continues and as a result North Korea becomes more and more reliant on China, South Korea will have a lot of work to do when trying to deepen economic integration with the North in the future," he said.
Choi called on policymakers to consider shifting North Korean policy, predicting that a wind of change may come in the North in the near future near the border dividing China and North Korea.
"The two sides have joint gains there. The three northeastern provinces on the China's side are the less developed areas and Chinese leadership has been trying to revitalize the region since 2003."
He pointed to the new Yalu River bridge project that will link China and North Korea, saying the bridge, if completed, will make it easier for China to transport mineral resources.
Witnessing the bilateral trade expansion, a growing number of North Korea experts in Seoul cast doubt on President Lee's hard-line policy.
They expressed concern about the consequence of South Korea's policy on North Korea at a time when China and the United States are getting closer to the communist state.
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Coop => SK Derailment
US-China cooperation scares South Korea into aiding the North, potentially derailing denuclearization
Synder 9 – Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy Senior Associate, International Relations (Scott, “China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security”, pg. 174-175) MGM
Enhanced US-Chinese cooperation and the resulting increase in China's leverage over North Korea have also had the side-effect of inducing strategic anxieties in South Korea over the possibility that China could use its leverage to obstruct Korean reunification or impinge on what many South Koreans see as their sphere of influence on the Korean peninsula. One potential result of such a development would be to stimulate South Korean competition vis-A-vis China to promote economic ties and enhance leverage and influence in North Korea. The creation of a competitive development assistance pattern in China's and South Korea's respective policies toward North Korea would ultimately not serve US interests if such assistance were to allow North Korea sufficient flexibility and freedom to avoid or delay denuclearization.
A2: CP – Condition on Chinese Coop – Chinese Influence NB Ans
Multiple states are failing now
Rotberg 3 – Adjunct Professor of Public Policy, is Director of the Belfer Center's Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, as well as President of the World Peace Foundation and a member of the Belfer Center's board of directors (Robert, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, Pg. 10-11, ) MGM
This decade’s failed states are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan.5 These seven states exemplify the criteria of failure sketched out above. Somalia is a collapsed state. Together they are the contemporary classical failed and collapsed states, but others were once collapsed or failed and many other modern nation-states now approach the brink of failure, some much more ominously than others. Another group of states drifts disastrously downward from weak to failing to failed. What is of particular interest is why and how states slip from weakness toward failure, or not. The list of weak states is long, but only a few of those weak and poorly governed states need necessarily edge into failure. Why? Even the categorization of a state as failing—Colombia and Indonesia, among others—need not doom it irretrievably to full failure. What does it take to drive a failing state over the edge into failure or collapse? Why did Somalia not stop at failure rather than collapsing?
Alt causes to state collapse
Rotberg 3 – Adjunct Professor of Public Policy, is Director of the Belfer Center's Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, as well as President of the World Peace Foundation and a member of the Belfer Center's board of directors (Robert, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, Pg. 10-11, ) MGM
Kyrgyzstan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Nigeria all fit near Nepal on the continuum of weakness tending toward failure. Kyrgyzstan, with limited resources and arbitrary rule, has contended with a sharply contracted economy, poverty, and two forms of militant insurgency. Those militant rivals for power remain, respect for human rights and democratic processes has slipped, and Kyrgyzstan’s ability to emerge from inherited weakness is questionable, even given the creation of a U.S. airbase and the arrival of free-spending Americans. Kenya is about to come to the alleged end of twenty-five years of single-man rule. Although Kenya is intrinsically wealthy, its fortunes have been badly managed, corruption is rampant, and a gang of ethnically specific thugs has distorted the rule of law, limited the supply of political goods, battered civil society and human rights, and privileged related ethnic minorities against larger, more central, but now marginalized ethnicities. Battles royal for spoils in the post-Moi era could lead to clashes between ethnic groups. A righting of scores could readily plunge Kenya into failure. Nigeria is a democracy under President Olusegun Obasanjo, but the historic rivalries between east and west, south and north, oil-states and non-oil provinces, Christian and Muslim communities, democrats and autocrats, and soldiers and citizens that have bedeviled Africa’s most populous state since independence in 1960 (and before) are still there, seething below a surface calmed or smoothed by the presence of Obasanjo. Military dictators could reemerge, intercommunal conflict could readily reoccur, and the north-south divide could once again become an obstacle to strengthening a state already softened by economic confusion, continued corruption, and mismanagement. Nigeria also performs poorly as a state, and provides political goods adequately at best across the vast mélange of poor and rich provinces that make up its little-unified and very unglued whole. Competition during the national election in 2003 could readily loosen the already tattered ties that keep Nigeria whole.
A2: CP – Consult South Korea – Regionalism Good Turn
Ignoring South Korean voices encourages its involvement in regional multilateral forums
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
This paper proposes that Korea will opt for a multilateral regional choice under two conditions: (1) The United States does not (or cannot) respond to the voices of Korea, particularly in times of economic and security crises; and (2) The regional arrangements are already being formed. As the two conditions slowly come to fruition, Korea may mix regional initiatives and bilateral loyalties, and domestic politics in Korea will naturally reflect struggles between regionalists (or risk-reducers) and inertia-driven Americanists. In other words, Korea will reluctantly opt for multilateral regional arrangements that still include the United States in them. But as the two conditions mature, the voices of regionalists may become more influential. If Korea feels it can play a leading role in East Asia and believes that the region can provide economic and security safety nets, Korea will support regional alternatives to U.S.-Korea bilateral relations.
Lack of consultation is encouraging South Korea to expand its involvement in regional forums
Lee, 09 – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” , JMP)
Korea’s Choices: Past and Present
Interestingly, Korea’s diplomatic history shows a somewhat consistent pattern of loyalty relations with superpowers. In the premodern era, China exchanged protection, economic benefits, and legitimization for Korea’s loyalty. As Asia opened to modernity, Japan colonized Korea, forcing Korean loyalty to the empire. With the end of the Korean War in 1953, Korea invested its full loyalty in the United States, which yielded military and economic gains.
But as the international context changed, the exclusive U.S.-Korea relationship became more flexible. When the bipolar system collapsed at the end of the Cold War, former enemies began transforming their own identities, which allowed Korea to consider new diplomatic relationships. This new pattern of engagement resulted in “issue-oriented balancing,” or issue-specific coalitions among different groups of countries.4 For example, South Korea joined North Korea and China in criticizing Japan on the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine, pitting Korea with two Cold War enemies against its Cold War friend. At
the Six Party Talks, the views of the Roh Moo-hyun administration were more similar to those of China and Russia than those of the United States and Japan. After the Cold War, Korea was able to spread risks through a more symmetrical loyalty portfolio.
Korea seems increasingly inclined to explore exit options in the U.S.-Korea alliance because its voice has been repeatedly ignored in the United States. When the Clinton administration discussed preemptive strikes against North Korea, it failed to consult with the Korean government in advance. During the 1997 financial crisis, the Clinton administration was reluctant in arranging quick rescue funds to Korea.5 In June 2002, the United States hurriedly released its soldiers who were involved in a vehicle accident that killed two middle-school girls in Korea. In 2008, the U.S. ambassador made a careless comment that “Koreans should learn the science” about mad cow disease. And the United States has been reluctant to pay for the environmental pollution and damage committed by the U.S. army in the Yongsan military base. Based on these experiences, many South Koreans believe there is an asymmetry between their loyalty and voice in the U.S.-Korea relationship, and they are turning their eyes toward possible exit options.
A2: CP – Consult Russia
No consultation in past – net benefit is empirically denied
Toloraya 08 – diplomat with the rank of Minister and Director of Korean Programs at IMEMO, the top Russian Foreign Ministry official in charge of the Korean peninsula, Doctor of Economy and a Full Professor degree in Oriental Studies (Georgy, Asian Perspective, “THE SIX PARTY TALKS: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE”, ProQuest)
On March 24, 1994 the Russian foreign ministry made public a suggestion for a six-party conference involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also supposed to join the discussion on Korea for finding a compromise solution to the "first" North Korean nuclear crisis. That crisis began in March 1993 when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), suspected of nuclear-weapon development, left the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1 The proposed comprehensive solution in Korea was meant to include: * promoting nuclear nonproliferation in Korea; * guarantees of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two Korean states; * military confidence-building measures; * replacement of the 1953 Korean armistice agreement with a new peace treaty; and * normalization of bilateral relations between certain members of the talks (U.S.-DPRK, DPRK-Japan).2 The idea itself was not new. After the end of the Korean War the armistice agreement of 1953 recommended that the governments of the countries concerned hold a conference to solve the problem of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and reach a peace agreement. The idea of a six-party "consultative conference" raised during the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly was first proposed by South Korea and was supported by Japan.3 Russia's support for the process was based on the presumption that the Korean security issue (including the nuclear problem) was rooted in the long history of relations between the four powers (Japan, USSR, United States, and China) on the Korean issue. Historically, imperial Japan was the colonial master of Korea and only its defeat in World War II by the United States and the USSR brought about Korean independence. The United States and the USSR agreed on the division of Korea at Yalta in 1945. Soon after, however, they became adversaries in the course of the Korean War, which also involved China. The cold-war confrontation was the product of the global competition between two systems: the USSR and China, both of which, although at odds with each other, had alliance treaties with the DPRK and supported Pyongyang, versus the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc. This system provided the security balance on the peninsula. Thus, the 1994 Russian suggestion was not spontaneous and was prompted by Russia's attempt to protect its national interests. However, at that time it was ignored. As Samuel Kim puts it: "Being left out of the Chinese bilateral approach and marginalized by US hegemonic sanctions, Russia was attempting to get back into the game. . . . Washington dismissed the Russian proposal as a harmful distraction while Beijing scuttled it as deviating from its declared party line."4 Instead, a 2+2 formula (the two Koreas, the United States, and China) formula was implemented, in 1996, rebuffing Russian attempts to be involved.
Russia favors US troops in South Korea
Itar-Tass 00 – Russian News Agency (7/16/00, “Russia's Putin comments on US presence on Korean peninsula”, Lexis)
Moscow, 17th July: Russian President Vladimir Putin, in an interview with the Japanese media, has said Russia devotes constant attention to the theme of the US military presence on the Korean peninsula, thoroughly following the course of the discussion of the issue and the approaches to it on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea and the United States. The text of the interview was made available to ITAR-TASS on Monday 17th July by the presidential press service. "The Russian side proceeds from the assumption that matters concerning the presence and status of US troops on the Korean peninsula are of substantial importance in reference to the ensurance of security in Northeast Asia - the region which is of vital importance to Russia's national interests," the president pointed out. "While recognizing the legitimacy of the inalienable rights of Northeast Asian countries to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the United Nations Charter, we still believe that the exercise of these rights must fully correspond to the common interests of easing military-political confrontation and strengthening the climate of trust and dialogue in the region without bringing about threats to anyone's security. It is from these positions that we shall approach an appraisal of the role of the US presence," Putin concluded.
A2: CP – Russian Engagement / Security Guarantee
Russia has no influence over North Korean denuclearization
Pritchard et al. 10 – President of the Korea Economic Institute (June, Charles, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”, pg. 25, ) MGM
Russia has historically played a role on the Korean peninsula, but its capacity to influence the security situation there is low. Its participation in the Six Party Talks affirms Russia’s relevance and role in Northeast Asian affairs despite its current relative lack of regional influence. Russia supports the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and welcomes progress toward inter-Korean reconciliation and possible unification, but has relatively few diplomatic or other resources available to contribute to the process. As a result, Russia’s sway in diplomatic efforts to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization has been marginal
A2: CP – Exclude Air Forces
The US should develop long-range strike aircraft and turn over the mission to the Navy’s carrier-based aircraft – reduces Navy and Marine Corps permanent presence in Korea and counters potential hot spots
Parker 03 – U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, “US Military Presence in a Unified Korea,” Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, )
While Air Force bases in Korea and Japan were useful to counter the North Korean threat, they are unsuitable to support air operations in most of the potential trouble spots of East Asia. Five hundred nautical miles is the unrefueled combat radius of the future F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, but the distance to Taiwan is 800 nm from Korea; 1,400 nm from Japan; and 1,500 nm from Guam.52 If the United States desires relevant land based air, then it must either develop long-range strike aircraft (to minimize the impact of having few bases), or turn over the strike mission to the Navy’s carrier-based aircraft. Also, the U.S. Air Force in Korea must take advantage of unmanned vehicles with intelligence gathering (satellite, above the atmosphere, and aerial) and air refueling capabilities—both of which will be needed in the alliance. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps permanent presence in Korea will continue to be small, relying on the two services’ ability to project power in the Pacific. In addition to the change in forces, U.S. command and control organizations must address the changing nature of U.S.-Korean military alliance relationships.
A2: CP – Immediate Withdrawal
Immediate withdrawal will just fuel resentment against the U.S.
Bandow, 03 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, “Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment,” , JMP)
Of course, it would be better for future relations to present a U.S. withdrawal as a result of changing geopolitical circumstances rather than an expression of national pique. A precipitous withdrawal conducted under a cloud of suspicion and recriminations could further divide Korean society and create additional animus toward the United States.90 In contrast, Ed Olsen of the Naval Postgraduate School advocates creating “a realistic timetable, perhaps two to three years, for modifying the U.S.-ROK alliance in ways that induce far more bilateral equality and reciprocity in the forms of defense burdensharing and policy decision-making.”91 Over the longer term the United States would decide on the degree of its involvement in the region, with options ranging from “deep engagement or entanglement” to “far more limited roles such as an offshore balancer.”92 Olsen favors the latter option, complete with the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces.93 A firm deadline for troop withdrawal is critical.
A2: CP – Sanction North Korea
Sanctions won’t change North Korean military goals – empirically true
Noland 09 – Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Marcus Noland, “Escalating Tensions with North Korea,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 7/9/09, )
Steve Weisman: As I said, tensions are rising. The most recent manifestation of that are missile firings by North Korea in response to the tightening of economic sanctions starting in June.
What sanctions are being applied now? Marcus Noland: Starting with North Korean military missile tests on July 4th, 2006, the United Nations has imposed escalating sanctions, first on that set of missile tests, then subsequently in October after the North Koreans’ first nuclear test, then after another round of missile tests. And most recently, after the North Korean second nuclear test in May, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1874 that broadened and tightened the existing sanctions regime.
This has been entrained for a couple years and as the North Koreans ratchet up the provocations, the UN Security Council responds by tightening sanctions. Steve Weisman: You’ve studied this over the years. What’s your general conclusion about the effectiveness of economic sanctions as opposed to military ones?
Marcus Noland: The history of economic sanctions throughout the world, not just with respect
to North Korea, is that economic sanctions seldom alter the target government
behavior, if the behavior involves some core political goal of that government. This
has been demonstrated in research by my colleagues here at the Peterson Institute—
Gary Hufbauer, Jeff Schott, Kim Elliott, and Barbara Oegg. And in the case of North Korea, it doesn’t appear any different.
The North Korean regime places an extremely high priority on its military in general and its missile and nuclear programs in particular. And I think it’s unlikely that economic sanctions are going to end those programs. What sanctions can do is increase the costs to North Korea and its partners of proliferation of those technologies.
Tightening of sanctions causes increased North Korean provocations and North Korean illicit activities like drug trafficking and missile sales
Noland 09 – Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Marcus Noland, “Escalating Tensions with North Korea,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 7/9/09, )
Steve Weisman: I’m going to ask a highly speculative question. Could, on the other hand, the tightening of sanctions cause North Korea to do something really provocative with these missile tests, for instance, that could in turn become a cause for much more serious military action by the West against North Korea? For instance, a military
strike on the nuclear facilities.
Marcus Noland: Absolutely. The current situation is very dangerous, regardless of whether sanctions are tightened or not.
The North Koreans have a variety of missiles. The short-range missiles, the ones that they fired this past Fourth of July weekend, are bothersome. They’re capable of threatening American troops in Japan and South Korea, but really they’re produced for export. North Korea has become sort of a one-stop shop for short-range missiles. They not only sell the missiles, but they sell after-sale services, a variety of sorts, they sell training, they sell maintenance, and so on.
They also have multistage medium- and long-range rockets. And those really present a much greater danger in the long run. One of the dangers is simply these rockets don’t work very well. And the North Koreans have been firing them over Japan. Under some current analysis, the flight path using the new missile facility the North Koreans have developed could actually take one of those rockets over South Korean air space.
The problem is they’ve been exploding in mid-air and we’ve really been quite lucky so far that when those things are broken up, they’ve broken up over the sea. You can imagine the reaction if one of those North Korean rockets broke up over a populated area in Japan and actually hurt people. Or same thing with South Korea.
So I think it’s a very dangerous situation, regardless of the sanctions. The sanctions could potentially make it even more dangerous in the short run and the reason is, as the North Koreans are sanctioned, as revenues are tightened, there may be a tendency on the North Korean side to intensify illicit activities in order to compensate for those lost revenues. So one could imagine an upsurge of North Korean counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and maybe even military sales as well in its attempt to compensate for the loss of revenue due to the UN sanctions. So I think it’s a very dangerous situation all around.
Other major powers won’t support sanctions – risks collapse
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Attempts at lesser levels of coercion also would be controversial and risky. Sanctions probably would not trigger a North Korean military reaction, but might not work against what remains a largely isolated country whose leaders willingly tolerate mass starvation. Moreover, sanctions require support from the surrounding countries—enforcement by South Korea and Japan, UN approval by Russia and China. All hesitate risking the collapse of the DPRK, which could spark internal armed conflict and mass refugee flows.
A2: CP – Remove Sanctions on North Korea
Removal of sanctions fail – the government is too committed and political turmoil due to succession politics negate their impact on decision-making
Noland 09 – Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Marcus Noland, “Escalating Tensions with North Korea,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 7/9/09, )
So what the sanctions can do is impede missile and nuclear proliferation and they can create an incentive, or their removal can create an incentive for some future North Korean regime to end those programs. But I think it’s unlikely these sanctions will actually stop the nuclear missile programs under the current North Korean regime. Steve Weisman: A couple of years ago, the lifting of the sanctions on that small bank in Macau [Banco Delta Asia] were an element of a package that seemed to bring about some progress. I think that fits in with the point you just made, that sometimes the removal of the sanctions can be a carrot for negotiation. Do you think that could still happen in this current round?
Marcus Noland: I think it’s unlikely with this government in Pyongyang. They simply appear to be so committed to these programs that I think that removing the sanctions is unlikely to be regarded as much of an incentive on their part. One of the things that’s complicating the situation is real uncertainty about political succession in North Korea. Kim Jong Il, the leader of the country, is ill. The most recent photographs of him really make him look quite ill. One of his sons has been designated as the next leader. But it is really unclear how that country would be governed once Kim Jong Il departs from the scene. It is not at all clear that the son will be able to govern in anything like the way his father or his grandfather [Kim Il Sung] did. Under those circumstances of really deep political uncertainty, I think it’s probably the case that any individual or institution within North Korea that may have had second thoughts about some of these provocations or may want to pursue economic reforms, for example, under the current circumstances are simply keeping their heads down and their mouths shut.
Nobody wants to be accused in some future political turmoil of being an apostate. Rather, currently, it’s in everyone’s incentive to show just how thoroughly committed they are to orthodoxy. And I think what that has done is create a kind of political dynamic within North Korea in which there are really very few breaks on provocative behavior. And the imposition of sanctions or their potential removal, I don’t think is going to have a large impact on decision-making, given that domestic political environment.
A2: CP – Engagement – Can’t Solve Nuclearization
Political and security factors outweigh – won’t give up nuclear weapons because of economic carrots
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
The North Korean nuclear crisis is often analyzed from perspectives of regional and global security and international relations, and the impact of the North Korean domestic situation on the nuclear crisis seems to be overlooked. Given North Korea’s economic difficulties, the United States wishes that North Korea give up its nuclear program in return for some economic assistance or economic pressure. However, North Korea has not shown a positive response to economic carrots or sticks. For North Korea, political and security factors seem to be far more important than economic ones. In this sense, North Korean domestic factors should be analyzed more carefully in explaining the nuclear crisis.
The purpose of this paper is to look at the North Korean nuclear crisis from a North Korean perspective. This paper presents the hypothesis that the North Korean domestic situation has a great impact on its decision to develop nuclear weapons. It also suggests that North Korea considers political factors to be far more crucial than economic factors, and that these factors prevent it from abandoning its nuclear program. To support this hypothesis, this paper will examine North Korean domestic situation: the impact of economic difficulties on social and political instability. Then it will analyze the North Korean government’s strategy to overcome its domestic problems. Lastly, this paper will forecast the outlook for the North Korean nuclear crisis, with special focus on Washington’s position, Pyongyang’s position, and the China factor.
North Korea won’t denuclearize – even if they say yes, they’ll cheat
Bennett, 08 – Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation (Bruce, “A New National Strategy for Korea: North Korea Threats Require Deterrence, Reconciliation”, Korea Herald, 3-13, KH.html)
Arms control seeks to reduce the risks of conflict, the damage that conflict could cause, and the military cost to deter conflict or to achieve victory in conflict. For decades, South Korea, the United States, and the international community have tried to use arms control measures to moderate the North Korean threat, consistent with these objectives. Korean arms control efforts have focused on the North Korean nuclear weapons program because of the serious threat that it poses. The history of these efforts is, however, not very hopeful. North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in July 1977, and then joined the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985. In 1991, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They agreed to ... not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons ... Moreover, they would ... not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. In 1994, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States, closing the Yongbyon facilities; North Korea promised to abide by the provisions of the NPT. And now North Korea is delaying the agreements made under the six-party talks. North Korea has apparently pursued nuclear weapons development throughout this period. Two examples suggest the pattern. North Korea did operate a nuclear reprocessing facility, in violation of the Joint Declaration. And in 1999, Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan said he was shown three North Korean plutonium nuclear weapons. If Dr. Khan was right, North Korea did produce and possess nuclear weapons, in violation of the NPT and the Joint Declaration. Many experts on North Korea are skeptical that North Korea will ever dismantle its entire nuclear weapon arsenal, because these capabilities have been so critical to North Korea. Consider this: How is it that a nearly bankrupt country of only about 20 million people can stand up to three members of the U.N. Security Council and Japan, four of the wealthiest countries in the world? And in doing so, North Korea often comes out the victor. Would North Korea have such leverage without nuclear weapons? Would the North Korean regime be able to survive without such appearances of empowerment?
A2: CP – Engagement – Can’t Solve Nuclearization
North Korea won’t denuclearize
Eberstadt 10 – holds the Henry Wendt chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute and is senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research (June, Nicholas, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”, pg. 57-58, ) MGM
The Korea Task Force’s recommendation for a policy of rollback to confront the North Korean government’s nuclear ambitions sounds attractive, but only in theory. In practice, it amounts to a continuation of the failed carrot-and-stick approach to denuclearization through international engagement with Pyongyang that has been attempted already for nearly two decades. Suffice it to say that over the most recent experiment in engaging North Korea (through Six Party Talks), the DPRK has gone from hinting that it is developing a “war deterrent” to stating that this deterrent is in fact a nuclear arsenal, to testing two atomic weapons, and to insisting that it will not give up its nuclear option “under any circumstances.” The sorry history of nuclear negotiations with the DPRK demonstrates that the international community has absolutely no reason to assume the current North Korean regime will actually denuclearize voluntarily—no matter what blandishments Washington and others proffer or what penalties are threatened. Pyongyang regards its nuclear potential as a vital national interest—and governments do not negotiate vital national interests away. In essence, the North Korean nuclear problem is the North Korean regime. A nonnuclear North Korea will be possible only under a different government in Pyongyang. This is a highly unpleasant reality. But unless we recognize that reality—rather than imagining Pyongyang as the negotiating partner we wish it to be—continuing the current course can only make for a more dangerous future for the United States and its Asian allies.
A2: CP – Engagement / Sign “X” Agreement With N. Korea
Won’t solve – North Korea has a history of signing agreements and then cheating
Kang & Cha, 03 – *associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND **associate professor of government Georgetown’s school of Foreign Service (May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, “Think Again: The Korea Crisis,” , JMP)
“North Korea Does Not Honor International Agreements”
Mostly true. Heralded for a half century as an outlaw state, North Korea has maintained some of its international
commitments. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Biological Weapons Convention, and Geneva Protocol.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the country signed on to two U.N. antiterrorism protocols. During the
negotiations for the Agreed Framework, the United States required the North to improve relations with South Korea.
Pyongyang eventually responded by agreeing to a summit (just prior to Kim Il Sung’s death). As of this writing. the
North has also honored its 1999 ballistic missile-testing moratorium for four years.
But the North also has a history of engaging in “strategic deception”—signing agreements to convey reliability but
purposefully cheating on them to its own advantage. The history of inter-Korean relations, for example, is littered with
pacts that Pyongyang has not honored, including the 1992 denuclearization declaration in which North Korea agreed to
forgo developing nuclear and nuclear-reprocessing facilities. The United States may have been slow to implement the
Agreed Framework, but the North is blatantly breaking the framework’s spirit, if not letter, with its covert uranium
enrichment program. But perhaps the best evidence of strategic deception occurred in June 1950: On the eve of the Korean War, North Korea put forth a major peace initiative to the South.
Unilateral agreement is unenforceable – must maintain the multilateral track
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
CONTINUE TO INSIST ON MULTI-LATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH NORTH KOREA
The Bush Administration tactic of insisting on a multi-lateral dialogue to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is smart diplomacy. History has shown that a credible unilateral agreement between U.S. and North Korea is impossible to achieve or enforce. U.S. unilateral enforcement of sanctions against North Korea helps stir anti-American sentiment. A multilateral agreement with China, Japan, and South Korea will have better results. In this way, when a multi-lateral agreement is reached and North Korea does not live up to its end of the bargain, it becomes a multi-nation problem not just U.S. problem.
A2: CP – Regime Change
North Korea perceives regime change as the biggest threat from the U.S.
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
In the midst of declining social morale, North Korea is concerned about its social and political stability. Although North Korea vigorously accuses the United States of harboring ambitions to invade or attack North Korea, it is more concerned about the U.S. aim to destabilize the Kim Jong-il regime. Pyongyang’s major concerns include U.S. policies on human rights, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and economic sanctions due to counterfeiting.
North Korea vociferously argues that the issues raised by the United States - human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting - are mere fabrications aimed at tarnishing the international image of North Korea in order to justify a hard-line policy towards North Korea in a bid to topple the Kim Jong-il regime.
North Korea suspects that the Bush administration’s ultimate policy goal towards North Korea is regime change. North Korea also suspects that the resolution of the nuclear crisis will not signal the end of present tensions and will not necessarily guarantee the improvement of relations between Pyongyang and Washington.
A2: CP – Pressure / Attack North Korea
If backed into a corner during this crisis Kim Jong-il could take extreme measures – risking nuclear use
Dvorkin, 10 – Carnegie Moscow Center expert on nuclear security (5/27/10, Vladimir, “Rising Tension Between North and South Korea,” , JMP)
The rising tension on the Korean Peninsula sparked by the torpedoing of a South Korean military vessel, which evidence suggests was committed by North Korea, once more demonstrates the unpredictable nature of Kim Jong Il’s political regime.
The incident makes forecasting the North Korean leadership’s next steps difficult. Are further military provocations likely, or will the situation be limited to belligerent rhetoric? Much will depend on the positions taken by China and Russia. However, the harsh response from the United States, coupled with South Korea’s decision to suspend humanitarian aid to North Korea, leaves little chance for a rapid settlement of the conflict.
It is hard to say what type of sanctions the UN Security Council might impose on North Korea, or how Pyongyang may react. No one has an interest in further escalation, much less outright military conflict—not least North Korea, given its severe economic difficulties.
But the latest crisis deals a heavy blow to the six-party talks on defusing the North Korean nuclear situation and to the nuclear nonproliferation regime in general. No one knows for certain what North Korea has at its disposal: nuclear warheads that could be fitted to its Nodong or other ballistic missiles, or more primitive nuclear devices that could, for example, be delivered by ship to the coast of Japan or South Korea.
But it is impossible to rule out that Kim Jong Il, if backed into a corner, could take extreme measures. Attempts to resolve the conflict must keep this danger in mind.
A2: CP – Attack NK – Laundry List 2ac
Would cause radioactive fallout, refugee flows and economic collapse and deck relations with major powers
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Threatening War
Irrespective of who is to blame, what is to be done? It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective on coercion. Those in Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil, and regional chaos. There is no constituency anywhere in the region, even among the countries most vulnerable to a North Korea with nuclear weapons, for war.
A2: CP – Attack NK – ROK won’t Support
Won’t solve – South Korea won’t support
Choi, 06 – visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” Vol. 15, pp.1-18, , JMP)
Although the Bush administration maintains a tough position towards North Korea, it would be difficult to implement a military option against North Korea without South Korea’s full cooperation. However, the South Korean government, which believes that the North Korean nuclear program is nothing more than a bargaining chip to gain a security guarantee from the United States, has been determined to oppose any military option. The possibility of a North Korean counterattack is another concern for the United States. Sixty percent of the North’s 1.2 million soldiers are forward-deployed south of the Pyonyang-Wonsan line, and 11,000 artillery pieces are aimed at the Seoul metropolitan area. Thus, a huge number of casualties and terrible destruction could be inflicted in the early stages of any war on the Korean Peninsula.
A2: CP – Attack NK – Economy Turn
Will crush the global economy
Gilbert, 04 – Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, “Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?” , JMP)
Conflict on the Korean Peninsula does not seem likely and has not seemed likely for the past decade. Without allies, principally China and Russia, North Korea could not possibly survive an armed conflict with the United States. They might succeed in launching a successful attack against Seoul, but as our military forces have so competently demonstrated in both Afghanistan and Iraq (1991 and 2003), a North Korean attack would be political suicide. The United States has too much at stake in the economic prosperity of Northeast Asia and the alliances to undertake a pre-emptive strike. A war on the peninsula would destabilize the world financial markets.
A2: CP – Attack NK – Hegemony Turn
Attack on North Korea will undermine relations with South Korea and spur balancing that kills heg
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
SHOULD THE U.S. RESORT TO THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE OPTION?
While the United States wrestles with military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il appears to be attempting to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. Recent actions by the North Korean regime toward attaining nuclear weapons and developing more advanced missile delivery systems makes North Korea a likely candidate for the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy pre-emptive strike option.
The success of three-stage No Dong missile program to achieve increasing ranges demonstrates North Korea’s propensity to develop a weapon delivery system capable of threatening targets off the peninsula. According to the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report, the North Korean’s next-generation missiles, currently under development, could reach Hawaii, Alaska, and the United States’ west coast.21 This report, coupled with the North Korean officials’ proclamations “threatening to rain fire on U.S. cities,”22 could cause moderates in the government to seriously consider the pre-emptive strike option.
Another argument for a pre-emptive strike is the perceived benefits of successful military operations. A successful military operation would eliminate the North Korean nuclear capability, destroy its missile program, and possibly topple the Kim Jong Il regime. Successful military operations could set the conditions for a united Korea.
However the costs of striking in the near future far outweigh any potential benefits. The already tenuous relations between the United States and South Korea would deteriorate even further. When former South Korean president, Kim Dae-jung, initiated the Sunshine policy, a policy of reconciliation with North Korea, his government gained the widespread support of South Korean public. Additionally, public sentiment toward the United States soured and the current South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, won the 2002 election on an anti-American platform. If the U.S. were to conduct a pre-emptive strike into North Korea, we would most likely be acting unilaterally, diplomatic opposition would intensify and the United States would be seen as the aggressor by both the South Koreans and the global community. The United States internal political upheaval would increase dramatically. World-wide opinion would be negatively impacted and political alliances attempting to curtail American power would receive more support.
CP will cause diplomatic retaliation that causes balancing
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
RULE OUT PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AS A VIABLE OPTION TO SOLVE THE KOREA PROBLEM
The costs of conducting a pre-emptive strike would cause devastating loss of human life to both United States armed forces and American/ Korean non-combatants. Additionally the United States would suffer diplomatic and economic retaliation from the global community. The support for alliances attempting to curb American power would increase.
A2: CP – Attack NK – Causes Retaliation
Military strikes will cause war – North Korea will be forced to respond militarily – spreading nuclear debris
Bandow, 09 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (7/1/09, Doug, “The China Card,”
, JMP)
The last option is war—either a limited strike on Pyongyang’s atomic bases or a more general attack. Washington obviously could destroy nuclear facilities above ground and perhaps underground. Whether doing so would permanently block the North’s nuclear efforts and eliminate its existing atomic capabilities are less clear.
Moreover, an attack probably would result in war. The Kim regime likely would see a strike as the first step in an attempt at coercive regime change. Moreover, to do nothing would wreck its credibility at home and stature abroad. While it is not likely to foolishly start a losing war, the DPRK government isn’t likely to passively accept a conflict begun by the United States. Although the North would lose any conflict, it could cause massive damage to the South, whose capital, Seoul, lies close to the Demilitarized Zone and thus within range of both artillery and Scud missiles. Other possible consequences include the dispersion of nuclear debris and creation of mass refugee flows.
Will cause retaliation – killing a million people
Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, “SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?” , JMP)
However the most compelling reason to refrain from exercising the pre-emptive strike option is the large number casualties that will result in such a conflict. The reality of a military strike would cause North Korea to retaliate. Since Seoul, with a population of over 17 million, is within North Korean artillery range, the number of non-combatant casualties would be horrendous. General Gary Luck, former commander of United States forces in Korea, estimated that another Korean War would result in 1 million casualties-52,000 of those American.23
Attacks would cause retaliation and all out war
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Some advocates of a preemptive, or preventive, US military strike say don’t worry, that Pyongyang would choose not to retaliate to save itself. But such an attack would destroy the prestige of the regime. Moreover, Pyongyang might decide that a military strike was evidence of America’s determination to remove it, the opening phase of a war for regime change. In that case, it would make sense to roll the tanks. This is how the North is threatening to respond to any US strike: “total war” and its own preemptive strike.25
Bill Taylor, formerly of the US Military Academy and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and who met with Kim Il-sung and other senior leaders a decade ago, believes: “Faced with a major military strike on its territory, the North Korean leadership will respond with everything it has against Americans and our allies.”26 A high-ranking defector, Cho Myung-chul, estimates the chances of general war at 80 percent in response to even a limited strike on the North’s Yongbyon facilities.27
Retaliation will escalate to complete war and crush relations with South Korea
Bandow, 03 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, “Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment,” , JMP)
Most likely would be a limited but devastating retaliatory strike centered against the Yongsan facility in Seoul. Retaliation could easily lead to a tit-for-tat escalation that would be difficult to halt short of general war.28 The perception that South Koreans died because the United States acted against the wishes of the Roh government would create a divisive, and perhaps decisive, split between Seoul and Washington.
A2: CP – Attack NK – Undermines Relations With China & Japan
Attacking North Korea will undermine relations with China and Japan
Ayson & Taylor, 04 – *Professor of Strategic Studies and directs the Centre for Strategic Studies, AND ** lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor, Comparative Strategy, “Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred,” 23:263–279, JMP)
In choosing war against North Korea, Washington could also damage relations with China, which have enjoyed something of a rapprochement in the war on terror period. Beijing certainly has no interest in a nuclearized Korean peninsula and claims to have worked to put pressure on the Kim Jong-Il regime, such as in late February 2003 when it closed an oil pipeline to the DPRK for a period of three days.17 Given its distaste for American unilateralism and its longstanding support for the inviolability of the principle of state sovereignty, China also has every reason to avoid seeing the world’s leading power impose itself by force in a neighboring state. Likewise, while Japan has recently created domestic legal frameworks for imposing unilateral sanctions against North Korea (with some of its politicians even advocating pre-emptive action against the DPRK’s nuclear program), it is far from clear that Tokyo possesses the resolve to accept an open conflict on the Korean Peninsula.18 Indeed, the United States is likely to find it hard to locate advocates of war even amongst its firmest allies. The United Kingdom and Australia have stood close by in recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have been generally sympathetic to the Bush Administration’s preventive war policy. However, their respective national leaders have each been subjected to intense domestic criticism as a result of support given to the US-led action in Iraq, and therefore cannot necessarily be counted on as enthusiasts for a deliberate attack on North Korea.19
Major conflict on the Korean peninsula prosecuted by Washington might therefore be regarded as the sort of destabilizing event that could upset the whole Asia-Pacific house and harm America’s regional reputation as an anchor of regional stability. Indeed, it would only increase fears in the region that the United States is something other than a benign hegemon, and give China a further boost in the long-term competition for regional allegiance.
A2: CP – Attack NK – Undermines Relations With ROK
Attack will collapse relations with South Korea
Ayson & Taylor, 04 – *Professor of Strategic Studies and directs the Centre for Strategic Studies, AND ** lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor, Comparative Strategy, “Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred,” 23:263–279, JMP)
Moreover, just as the Atlantic alliance has come under severe strain as a result of the US-led campaign against Iraq, the advent of a second Korean war could expose America’s network of Asian alliances to similar pressures. A high level of discomfort currently exists in the alliance relationship between American and South Korea, some of which is almost certainly the product of differing opinions over how to deal with the DPRK. Unlike the Bush administration, Seoul favors a policy of “Constructive Engagement”—often referred to as the “Sunshine Policy”—towards the North.15 Added to this, any American moves towards war would also likely exacerbate currents of anti-Americanism which, according to recent polls, are evident in a clear majority of South Korean public opinion.16 The Bush Administration may therefore be reluctant to lead an attack on the North that could risk the further deterioration, if not the complete collapse, of this 50-year-old alliance.
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Won’t Solve
Won’t solve – North Korea wants withdrawal of U.S. forces
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
However, short of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, North Korea will not care if the exercises are cancelled. After the cancellation of TS in 1992, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. After TS was permanently suspended in 1994 following the signing of the Geneva nuclear accord, North Korea resumed nuclear production some years later. Based on DPRK’s uncooperative history, cancelling any exercises will only put CFC readiness at risk.
Cancelling exercises doesn’t solve instability – empirics prove
Global Security ’07 (“US Forces Korea- Exercises,” )
The Team Spirit exercise, held between 1976 and 1993 by the U.S. and South Korean militaries, was canceled in hopes North Korea would abandon its nuclear program and allow international inspections. Team Spirit continued to be scheduled from 1994 to 1996 but was canceled each year as an incentive to improve relations. About 200,000 U.S. and South Korean servicemembers participted in Team Spirit.
Lashout from exercises is empirically denied
WMF ‘10 (3-8, World Military Forum, “ North Korea put army on combat alert as Key Resolve/Foal Eagle 2010 joint military drills begins,” )
North Korea said on Monday it had put its army on full combat alert, ready to “blow up” South Korea as joint drills between the South and the United States got underway.
The drills, seen by Pyongyang as nuclear war maneuvers, last for about two weeks and are aimed at testing the allies’ defense readiness. They draw fiery rhetoric from the North each year that fuels tensions on the Korean peninsula, though they have been held for decades without major incident.
North Korea won’t retaliate
WMF ’10 (3-18, “Key Resolve/ Foal Eagle joint military exercise over despite North Korea threats”, )
SEOUL — A major US-South Korean military exercise ended Thursday without incident despite harsh North Korean criticism of the drill and its threats of retaliation for any aggression.
“No unusual North Korean military movements were detected during the exercise,” said a spokesman for the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to NB
Cancelling exercises links to Deterrence/Politics/Brinkmanship/Concessions
Farrell ’09- Dr. John F, MA, University of the Philippines; EdD, University of Southern California, Professor of Warfighting at Air University’s Squadron Officer College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, (“Team Spirit A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations,” )
Although Team Spirit had proven an efficacious negotiating tool, several supporters did not want the exercise sacrificed on the altar of nuclear compliance. Individuals in the ROK government later saw the advantage of using Team Spirit as a bargaining chip during nuclear negotiations, but prior to 1991 the ROK government and military viewed the exercise as invaluable in maintaining military readiness and conducting a show of force against the North. Hence, the United States was not about to cancel an exercise demonstrating its commitment to the ROK without the concurrence of the South Korean government. When a Clinton administration proposal to cancel Team Spirit 94 in exchange for nuclear inspections of DPRK facilities leaked to the press in November 1993, Kim Young Sam, during his first official visit to Washington, voiced his displeasure in the Oval Office at America’s not including his government in the decision process and declared that he—not the Americans—would make the final decision as to the disposition of Team Spirit. The White House agreed that Kim would make any announcement concerning the future of the exercise.51 Several Americans also opposed cancelling Team Spirit. Columnist Charles Krauthammer described it as “the foremost symbolic expression of America’s commitment—a solemn, binding treaty commitment—to the defense of South Korea.”52 Former secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger also objected to the cancellation of the exercise in 1994:
We have an offer on the table to them which I think is totally misplaced: to cancel the “Team Spirit” exercise on the grounds that, yes, maybe it is provocative. It did not seem provocative to me during the years we held it regularly when I was in office. It seemed absolutely vital to me that we have the training and the experience and the practice of working together with our South Korean allies, and that we continue to do that on the scale that has been involved in those exercises in the past.53
Despite the utility of the exercise, several US government and military officials did not want Team Spirit held hostage to North Korean threats or promises. When the Clinton administration was considering deferring the exercise in 1993, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Colin Powell resisted its efforts.54 Several US senators also opposed cancellation of the 1994 Team Spirit exercise. Senator Bob Smith (R-NH) noted that the NPT required the inspections and that they should not have been contingent upon holding the exercise: “The cancellation of Team Spirit rewards North Korean intransigence and sends a terrible message to the international community that treaty accountabilities can be bargained away.” Senator William Cohen (R-ME) expressed concern that cancellation of the exercise would make it difficult to restart because the United States “will be accused of ratcheting up the tension.”55 To Senator John McCain (R-AZ), cancelling Team Spirit “for the sake of a single concession which is entirely inadequate as a means of determining the extent of North Korea’s nuclear program
is without a doubt the worst signal the United States could send.”56
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to Deterrence
Military exercises key to readiness and nuclear deterrence
Farrell ’09- Dr. John F, MA, University of the Philippines; EdD, University of Southern California, Professor of Warfighting at Air University’s Squadron Officer College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, (“ Team Spirit A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations,” )
Commanders have long valued the efficacy of exercises. In World War II, Army leaders benefited from the Louisiana maneuvers. REFORGER exercises during the Cold War ensured the capability of US forces to deploy to Europe. Modern exercises at the national and joint readiness training centers, as well as the simulated air wars of the Air Warrior and Flag exercises, have proven invaluable in preparing forces for conflict. Short of actual combat, realistic training exercises are considered the best vehicles to prepare armed forces for war.
Military exercises, however, can have value beyond the obvious benefit of readying troops for battle. Just as Carl von Clausewitz postulated that opponents wage war for political purposes, so can the preparation for war have value in the political realm. Such was the case with Team Spirit, an annual combined exercise held in the ROK. Born during a time of political controversy in the 1970s, this exercise, directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took on a life of its own as it became an effective tool for the United States when negotiating with both South and North Korea. Now dormant, Team Spirit nevertheless serves to further US and ROK political aims on the Korean peninsula, especially in ensuring that North Korea lives up to its nuclear treaty obligations. Skillfully employed, military exercises such as Team Spirit can serve as a show of force to extract concessions from adversaries without having to resort to direct military intervention.
Cancelling the exercise crushes US deterrence credibility
Coughlin ’10 (6-19, Christopher, The Examiner, “Playing with fire on the Korean peninsula,” )
Now, the US is in the worst of two worlds.
If the US suddenly backs off its commitment to send a carrier to the Yellow Sea, what message does that send to North Korea, which may make an "extinction level event" decision based on American Hamlet-esque behavior?
Indeed, when American nerve is being tested globally - by the Taliban, Hamas, the Iranian regime, just to name a few - what does a reversal of policy like this say about America's willingness to honor treaty commitments?
A2: CP – End Military Exercises – Links to ROK Relations
Exercises key to ROK relations and deterrence
Martinez ’10 (3/11, Claudio A., Lance Corporal, Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, “Exercises Key Resolve/Foal Eagle 2010 kick off,” )
Foal Eagle is designed to exercise the defensive field and air capabilities of participating service members in the defense of South Korea in the event of an attack.
“This is one of the few chances we get to go and work with the people in Korea,” said Maj. Brendan O’Connell, MAG-12 plans officer. “We get to work pretty close with them and we get to go see some of the ranges, see some of the ground that we would either be living on or working at in the event that we had to go to Korea.”
Aside from being a great training opportunity to work jointly with other U.S. forces, the greatest benefit seen by some of the participating service members is being in South Korea.
“I think both the familiarity with the way things are run on the peninsula and then building the relationships, those two things together are probably the most important things to gain from the exercises,” said O’Connell.
Exercise cancellation kills ROK relations and doesn’t solve
ROK Drop, ’09 (3-10, “Key Resolve/ Foal Eagle Exercise Begins in South Korea,” )
There is absolutely nothing during this training exercise that deals with an invasion of North Korea. The North Korean complaints are typical and are just yet another attempt by them to get a major training exercise between the US & ROK militaries cancelled in order to drive a wedge between the two allies. This is something they have been able to do in the past for other exercises such as Team Spirit that the North Koreans were able to get cancelled by prior Korean administrations.
A2: CP – Realignment / SQ Solves
Realignment doesn’t build trust and only increases North Korean aggression
Chu, ‘06(2-13, John S., MAJ, US Army, “ Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?”, )
While these activities sound reasonable and achievable, employing CBMs to increase transparency, verification, and communication has been incorporated partially and selectively in the past, but has not been successful. The reason is trust. “Under current conditions, there is no trust.”69 North Korea will continue to see America as an impediment to Korean reunification regardless of the minor changes it makes to build confidence. Furthermore, DPRK may see the use of FAPI as preparation for preemptive war. The North Koreans argue that the realignment and reduction in U.S. forces is a first step by the United States to move American troops out of danger as she prepares for a preemptive attack. The new position would give America a better second strike capacity as the troops in the DMZ or in Seoul would face substantial losses in the first strike. Similarly, FAPI measures may be seen as a weakness in the U.S-ROK resolve and could have negative effects on the on-going negotiations with DPRK over nuclear proliferation and stability in the region.
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