BBC Monitoring International Reports
ALGERIA DISAD
INC SHELL
(A) ALGERIAN ECONOMY RELIES ON OIL REVENUES – IT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRICE SHOCKS
AFRICA REVIEW WORLD OF INFORMATION, 2003
(Sept. 23, l/n)
Despite the civil war, the economy improved during 2002, with GDP reaching 3.1 per cent. Algeria remains vulnerable to oil price fluctuations and depends heavily on oil and gas exports for revenue. This dependency has attracted the attention of the IMF which is encouraging Algeria to develop the growing non-hydrocarbon sector.
(B) LINKS
1. HIGH OIL PRICES ARE KEY TO THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY
HUNTER, 2004
(Catherine, staff, World Markets Analysis, "Algeria calls for maintenance of current OPEC output ceiling," January 8, l/n)
Given that Algeria has been pushing for an increase in its quota for some time, and is consistently producing above its quota to the tune of some 200,000 bpd, Khelil's comments seem out of key. However, high prices have been extremely good for the Algerian economy, boosting earnings by a third in 2003 (see Algeria: 7 January 2004: Algerian Oil Revenues Up One-Third in 2003 to US$24bn). This has obviously swayed Algeria in favour of the status quo where it can break its production quota with virtual impunity and reap the rewards of collective restraint. In addition, producers remain wary of the effects of increased Iraq output and slackening demand from Q2 2004, as well as the depressed dollar exchange rate.
2. [insert specific link]
(C) IMPACTS
1. OIL INSTABILITY TRIGGERS POLITICAL INSTABILITY
SAMUELSON, 2004
(Robert, staff, Newsweek, "The cartel we love to hate," Feb. 23, l/n)
It's this roller coaster that OPEC wants to avoid. Low prices deprive producer governments of their biggest source of money and, thereby, threaten their existence. Oil instability promotes political instability, which may cause more oil instability.
ALGERIA DISAD
INC SHELL
2. SMALL-SCALE AFRICAN CONFLICTS CAN IGNITE A NUCLEAR WAR
DEUTSCH, 2002
(Jeffrey – Macroeconomics prof at Keiser College, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, vol. II, no. 9, Nov. 18, )
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
ALGERIA DISAD
Uniqueness: Oil production increasing
OIL OUTPUT IS INCREASING – AND NOT DEPENDENT ON OPEC PRICING
TOWNSEND, 2002
(David, staff, Petroleum Economist, "pressing ahead," May, wilsonselect)
Meanwhile, in Algeria, oil and gas output are expected to rise rapidly over the next decade. Crude capacity of 1m barrels a day (b/d) will reach 1.5m b/d by 2005, Khelil predicts. "We are on target for this; in fact, we are ahead of schedule." Gas output is 130bn cubic metres a year (cm/y), of which 62bn cm/y is exported. Khelil is "hopeful" exports will reach 85bn cm/y by 2005, mainly because of new fields due on stream by that date, almost all in the In Salah region. These alone will add over 9bn cm/y of export capacity over the next three years. Algeria's adherence to its Opec oil output target, Khelil says, has no bearing on the future growth potential of crude production. He notes that oil produced "in association" in the country -- by Sonatrach in partnership with foreign operators -- accounts for around 25% of total output. "But that doesn't mean 25% of the oil belongs to the foreign companies; it's around only 6%." By 2005, he adds, 50% of Algerian crude production will be from "associated" fields, "but even then, their [the foreign operators'] share of that will be only a minor part", and this is unlikely to be affected by quota cuts, which can be made by Sonatrach.
ALGERIA DISAD
Uniqueness: Econ improving
ALGERIAN ECONOMY IS IMPROVING
BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, 2004
("French minister meets Algerian president," July 27, l/n)
Thus, this is an agreement between two great countries where everybody is the winner as it is an honour for France to participate in the construction of Algiers underground and after participating in the electrification of Algiers outskirts, (France will participate) in the installation of new trains; then 700m of low-interest loans and 1bn Coface credit, then France's determined support within the framework of the Paris Club so that Algeria - whose economic situation is improving - can repay its debt quicker and ease debt servicing and find the political support from France which it needs.
ALGERIAN ECONOMY IS IMPROVING
KOREA HERALD, 2003
("envoy celebrates Algerian president's visit," Dec. 10, l/n)
During the last few years, the Algerian government has made tremendous efforts to improve the economy and achieved outstanding results. Indeed the country, now back on the right track, is building up determinedly an efficient and performing economy. The market economy has taken root and is growing steadily. Algeria offers new attractive perspectives for its foreign partners for the promotion of business relations and investments.
ALGERIA DISAD
I/L: Oil key to the econ
THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY EMPIRICALLY GETS TANKED WHEN OIL PRICES PLUMMET
EVANS, 2003
(Martin, staff, History Today, "transition, history and human rights," Nov. 1, l/n)
Undoubtedly this younger generation has a different relationship with the colonial period because they themselves had no direct experience of colonial exploitation. What concerned them was post-independence, especially given that this new generation had borne the brunt of the economic hardship during the 1980s when the Algerian economy was hit very hard by the collapse of oil and gas prices. By 1990 unemployment was as high as 30 per cent among this sector of the population, and in the face of this protracted social crisis many became deeply cynical about the way in which the anti-colonial struggle was constantly invoked by the older generation to smother criticism.
OIL IS KEY TO THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY
AFRICA NEWS, 2003
("US energy official testifies on US oil and gas imports," Oct. 27, ln)
Energy from West Africa plays an increasingly important role in our energy security as we diversify our sources of oil supply. Currently, more than 12 percent of imported U.S. oil is from Africa. However, Africa's oil exports to the U.S. are set to rise. African oil is a key engine for economic development in Africa.
ALGERIA DISAD
I/L: Algeria key supplier to the US
ALGERIA IS A KEY OIL EXPORTER TO THE U.S.
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 2003
("an olive branch to North Africa," December 13, l/n)
In Algeria, he praised the government's cooperation on terrorism and said he looked forward to "free, fair and transparent elections" next year. But Powell avoided references to the thousands who died in a slaughterhouse of political repression and civil war in the 1990s. Algeria, a major supplier of oil to the U.S., is on the right track and that's good enough for Powell, at least for now.
ALGERIA IS A KEY OIL EXPORTER TO THE U.S.
SLAVIN, 2003
(Barbara, staff, USA Today, "N. Africa may test U.S. on rights," Dec. 1, l/n)
In all three countries, governments have justified their authoritarian practices as necessary to combat Islamic fundamentalism. All three have been staunch supporters of the U.S. war on terrorism. They have assisted in tracking down North African members of the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The Pentagon announced in July its desire for closer military ties with Morocco and Tunisia. The Bush administration is quadrupling economic aid to Morocco to $ 40 million and doubling military aid to $ 20 million next year. Algeria, meanwhile, is a major supplier of oil and natural gas to the USA and has received $ 4 billion in U.S. investment.
ALGERIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Genocide
CIVIL WARS RISK TURNING INTO GENOCIDES
DIAMOND, 2003
(Jared – prof of geography and envtl health sciences at UCLA, Harper's Magazine, "the last Americans," June 1, l/n)
The connection between the two lists is transparent. Today, just as in the past, countries that are environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or both are at risk of becoming politically stressed, and of seeing their governments collapse. When people are desperate and undernourished, they blame their government, which they see as responsible for failing to solve their problems. They try to emigrate at any cost. They start civil wars. They kill one another. They figure that they have nothing to lose, so they become terrorists, or they support or tolerate terrorism. The results are genocides such as the ones that already have exploded in Burundi, Indonesia, and Rwanda; civil wars, as in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands; calls for the dispatch of First World troops, as to Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines, Rwanda, the Solomon Islands, and Somalia; the collapse of central government, as has already happened in Somalia; and overwhelming poverty, as in all of the countries on these lists.
ALGERIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Terrorism
Oil is the foundation for American military commitment to Algeria – fear of terrorist attack on Oil interests results in creation of US listening posts
Barth, Senior analyst Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, 12-16-2k3
(Mustafa, “Sand Castles in the Sahara: US military basing in Algeria,” p. )
ALGERIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Terrorism
US-Algeria relations are critical to the overall success in the War on Terror
Barth, Senior analyst Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, 12-16-2k3
(Mustafa, “Sand Castles in the Sahara: US military basing in Algeria,” p. )
American listening posts in Algeria critical to breaking down terror-cells
Barth, Senior analyst Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, 12-16-2k3
(Mustafa, “Sand Castles in the Sahara: US military basing in Algeria,” p. )
ALGERIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Terrorism
American listening posts in Algeria critical to breaking down terror-cells
Barth, Senior analyst Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, 12-16-2k3
(Mustafa, “Sand Castles in the Sahara: US military basing in Algeria,” p. )
TERRORISM RISKS EXTINCTION
JOHNSON, 2002
(Reed, staff writer, Los Angeles Times, June 18, l/n)
But in the bleak months since Sept. 11, the phantom menace of nuclear catastrophe has come back with a vengeance--stalking our imaginations, confounding our leaders, confronting us with a host of atomic terrors hitherto barely imagined: hijacked airliners rammed down the throats of nuclear power plants; "dirty bombs" spraying lethal radiation and rendering huge swaths of cities uninhabitable for years to come. Looming over these lesser catastrophes is the threat of an actual nuclear weapons attack. After the lull of the '90s, we're learning to start worrying and fear The Bomb all over again. Only now America must face the possibility of dealing with more than just one or two mega-adversaries capable of sending our entire country up in a mushroom cloud. Now we're conjuring up visions of a suitcase bomb detonated at Times Square, a 10-kiloton dose of megadeath delivered in a truck to downtown Los Angeles or Chicago. Or a regional conflict, like the present one pitting India against nuclear rival Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir territory, escalating into global Armageddon. On the one hand, we're being confronted anew with the sublime terror of extinction; on the other, with the banality and ridiculousness of a threat to our lives and our civilization from something that may be lurking in a briefcase, a pair of Hush Puppies or, as in the new Hollywood blockbuster "The Sum of All Fears," a cigarette-vending machine.
ALGERIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Basing Rights
( A ) US OIL NEEDS MAKES TROOP PRESENCE IN ALGERIA CRITICAL TO BASING RIGHTS
TREMLET. SENIOR STAFF WRITER, 3-15-2K4
(GILES, “PENTAGO FEARS GROWTH OF TERRORIST HAVEN, “ THE GUARDIAN P.LN)
( B ) US hegemony is critical to preventing nuclear war
Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Defense Analyst, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 1995, p. 84
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
ALGERIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Basing Rights
Oil is the foundation for American military commitment to Algeria – fear of terrorist attack on Oil interests results in creation of US listening posts
Barth, Senior analyst Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, 12-16-2k3
(Mustafa, “Sand Castles in the Sahara: US military basing in Algeria,” p. )
Algerian oil assets ensure American military commitment
World Tribune 7-22-2k3
(“US Requests Basing Rights in Algeria,”
CAIRO — The United States has asked Algeria for military basing rights.
Algerian government sources said the Algerian Defense Ministry and the U.S. Defense Department are discussing basing rights for U.S. aircraft and troops in Algeria. The sources said the discussions do not include the prospect of a permanent U.S. military presence in the North African state. On Sunday, the Algerian Le Quotidien d'Oran daily reported that the United States wants to employ Algerian military bases for counter-insurgency missions and the protection of oil interests in North Africa. >
ALGERIA DISAD -- AFF
General
ALGERIA DIVERSIFYING INTO NATURAL GAS
TOWNSEND, 2002
(David, staff, Petroleum Economist, "pressing ahead," May, wilsonselect)
ENERGY OFFICIALS are expected to launch a major new Algerian integrated gas project imminently. This will become the largest hydrocarbons project of its kind in the country's energy history says Chakib Khelil, the minister for energy and mines. It will consolidate its traditional role as a crude supplier and its newer position as a gas and power exporter to the energy-hungry European Union (EU). In addition, Khelil expects Algeria to play a pivotal role in the creation of an integrated Mediterranean energy market, covering the southern countries of the EU and North Africa. Furthermore, Khelil continues to lobby for improved energy and infrastructure links across the whole of Africa and support the ambitious gas pipeline plan to link Nigeria and Algeria. The integrated gas project, Khelil says, will be opened to international energy firms, which will also be involved in the design of the project. "We want bids from major companies -- such as Shell and BP," he tells Petroleum Economist. Potential candidates include "those that are interested in mega-projects that can integrate big gas developments, including exploration and production (E&P), field development, pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities."
ALGERIA DIVERSIFYING INTO NATURAL GAS
TOWNSEND, 2002
(David, staff, Petroleum Economist, "pressing ahead," May, wilsonselect)
Khelil claims there is "major" interest in Algeria not least because of the country's great gas potential. He notes that around 40% of national revenues come from gas, "not from oil". Gas, he says, offers "more stability in terms of contracts and it is directed at different markets. [Foreign] companies that come to Algeria know that if they find gas they won't be stuck with it." He adds: "There will be a ready market for this gas, because we are building infrastructure to export it."
ALGERIA IS FACING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, DESPITE HIGH OIL PRICES
LUXFORD, 2004
(Kate, staff, World Markets Analysis, "social tensions boil over as riots hit Northern Algeria," March 10, l/n)
Although government revenues from oil and gas exports have reached record highs in recent years, social and economic conditions in Algeria have continued to deteriorate and unemployment is estimated to be as high as 30%. Despite growing anger at politicians, however, Bouteflika is expected to be re-elected in next month's poll.
ALGERIA DISAD -- AFF
General
EMPIRICALLY HIGH OIL PRICES DON'T GUARANTEE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY IN ALGERIA
ADDI, 1995
(Lahouari – prof of sociology at Univ d' Oran in Algeria, Oil in the New World Order, ed by Gilllespie & Henry, p. 91-2)
Armed with large financial resources from oil exports, Algeria chose to invest in a vast industrialization program. The objective was to regain the investment and, in time, to move away from hydrocarbons as a source of revenue. This objective was not achieved. First, many industries were established in the absence of necessary infrastructure such as water, communications, transportation, and skilled labor. Second, market equilibrium was not respected as industrialization was realized. Decision makers, thinking only in terms of technical networks, ignored the balance between production and consumption, and political authorities refused to acknowledge – and fueled – inflation by paying high salaries without respect for monetary constraints. Inflation reduced the value of salaries but supported the accumulation of vast private fortunes in business. The accumulated deficit of Algerian state businesses, the source of these economic difficulties, can be explained essentially in political terms. The government refused to face up to fiscal limitations; it failed to pressure workers to increase production; and it failed to pressure management to expand markets and improve product quality. Such confrontational actions might lead, at least temporarily, to the shutting down of state enterprises. Algeria's rulers, concerned with their own interests and not with the nation's economy, sidestepped these difficulties, preferring to finance the deficit and to import consumer goods, thus wasting the oil wealth for their own political preservation.
INDONESIA DISAD
1NC SHELL
(A) INDONESIA IS A KEY OIL EXPORTER TO THE U.S. – AND IT HELPS THEIR ECONOMY
AFX EUROPEAN FOCUS, 2004
(april 20, l/n)
The World Bank said growth projection for world trade volume this year has been revised upwards to 8.2 pct from the previous projection of 7.9 pct. Exports are expected to benefit from the recent economic recovery of Indonesia's major trading partners, the US and Japan. Along with this, oil prices are now seen at 25 usd per barrel this year against 22 usd projected earlier, it said, adding that these factors could push Indonesia's growth rate higher by 0.3 percentage points.
(B) LINKS
1. THE PLAN CAUSES A SEVERE BLOW TO OIL PRICES
[insert specific link]
2. NOW IS A CRITICAL TIME – INDONESIA NEEDS REVITALIZATION IN ITS OIL EXPORTS TO BOOST THE ECONOMY
MULJADI, 2002
(Kartini – energy attorney, International Financial Law Review, "the Indonesian oil and gas sector," v. 21, wilsonselect)
When the Petroleum and Natural Gas Law No 22 of 2001 passed Parliament in November 2001 it was greeted with mixed emotions. The government team who drafted the law prioritized the transition of Pertamina from a state-owned corporation established by a special law to a state-owned company like any other, based on general legislation applying to state enterprises. No more special privileges, no more monopolies, no more control over foreign oil companies. The purpose of the new law was, mainly, to set Pertamina on the road to restructuring. Little in the law provided encouragement to the foreign oil companies (also known as the PSCs), who are the major investors Indonesia's oil and gas industry that things were going to be better for them from this point onwards. What the PSCs were looking for was, and still is, assurances that a greater degree of control over their operations would be restored to them, incentives to spur much-needed exploration, procurement procedures and personnel procedures especially for the use of expatriates to be simplified, and better protection to be provided for PSC field operations from dangers ranging from harassment by local hooligans to outright armed insurrection like in Aceh province. It was soon realized that the new law had left many gaps to be filled and that further clarification would be required before the investors could say that the new law presented a definitive improvement over the status quo. The good news is that these investor woes are understood by the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, who has stated that the gaps will have to be closed in the forthcoming implementing regulations. The minister authorized the formation of a broad forum almost immediately following the enactment of Law 22, called the Bimasena Forum (under the auspices of the Bimasena Energy Club chaired by the former Secretary General of OPEC, Professor Subroto). The Bimasena Forum embraced all "stakeholders", including but not limited to the Indonesian Petroleum Association, the Indonesian Gas Association, Pertamina, all oil companies, all oil field support companies, law firms, government agencies and academia, to provide the ministerial team working on the implementing regulations of Law 22 with technical advice on how to fill the gaps in the law. These efforts resulted in the completion by the Bimasena group of two documents presented to the ministerial team in June 2002. The documents contain the industry's technical advice to the government team, one document each for the upstream and downstream sectors of the industry. The government team is digesting all input and is expected to issue both the upstream and the downstream implementing regulations shortly. The ministerial team is also working on implementing regulations relating to the new Pertamina. The new executive agency (Badan Pelaksana Migas) has taken over Pertamina's control of the PSCs since July 2002. The new regulatory agency (Badan Pengatur Migas) will coordinate the efforts to convert downstream operations from a Pertamina monopoly to a fully market-driven operation by 2005. Needless to say, given the present dire situation of the Indonesian economy, it is of utmost importance that changes contemplated in Law 22 really work. There is simply too much at stake. Investors will need to give the whole package, ie Law 22 and its implementing regulations, a nod of approval evidenced by their willingness to make new investments in exploration. Only with the influx of large amounts of capital will the industry be able to generate a renewed momentum that will, over time, provide the incremental production to keep the country from becoming a net importer. The latter is a doomsday scenario that even today is not fully anticipated in Indonesia. The transition of the downstream sector to fully market-driven operations could also be fraught with disaster if not handled carefully. The bad news is that politics could enter the picture, and that badly needed reforms in the investment environment do not come to pass due to vested interests of the political elite relating to the 2004 elections. By that time, the country could already be a net importer of crude oil, having to pay for the barrels it refines into oil products. For the country to be forced to pay for imported barrels while the country maintains among the richest oil
INDONESIA DISAD
1NC SHELL
(CON'T)….
reserves in the world would be tragic indeed. To mitigate this unfortunate development, the necessary changes in the investment climate need to be made now. It is, therefore, essential that the new executive agency and regulatory agency be non-political, consisting of business oriented people with an impeccable track records over many years of experience, not as government officials but as business people. They will need to be able to relate to the interests and concerns of present and prospective investors and vice versa. The establishment of agencies having credibility with industry investor is a crucial step for the revitalization of the industry. The country cannot afford any mistakes in this effort. The bottom line is that the oil and gas sector could still be one of the few if not the only industrial sector to supply a steady source of sorely needed revenue to the state.
(C) THE IMPACT
1. OIL INSTABILITY TRIGGERS POLITICAL INSTABILITY
SAMUELSON, 2004
(Robert, staff, Newsweek, "The cartel we love to hate," Feb. 23, l/n)
It's this roller coaster that OPEC wants to avoid. Low prices deprive producer governments of their biggest source of money and, thereby, threaten their existence. Oil instability promotes political instability, which may cause more oil instability.
2. INDONESIAN STABILITY IS KEY TO REGIONAL STABILITY
PacNet Newsletter, 2001
(#30, July 31, "Indonesia: US policy issues," CSIS, )
Southeast Asia is more volatile today than at any time since the Vietnam war. The region, which is home to 530 million people and ranks as our fifth or sixth largest trading partner, is plagued by political turbulence and economic fragility. Throughout recent American history, when we have not paid sufficient attention to Southeast Asia, we have paid a price for it. As recent events have made clear, there can be no stable and developing Southeast Asia without a stable and developing Indonesia. This would go without saying were it not for the lack of knowledge of Indonesia that is widespread in U.S. government, particularly in the Congress, but also in parts of the executive branch.
3. ASIAN INSTABILITY RISKS USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
KUNIHIKO, 1996
(Saito – former Japanese ambassador to the US, Fordham International Law Jnl, June, ln)
Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe. At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability.
INDONESIA DISAD
Uniqueness: Econ improving
INDONESIA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH IS SLOWING
Xinhua General News Service, 2004
("Indonesian economic growth slows in second quarter," august 18, ln)
The Indonesian economy grew at a slower rate in the second quarter, compared to the first quarter of the year as consumer spending weakened due to rising inflation, a local newspaper reported Wednesday. The economic growth in the April-June period of this year was 4. 32 percent compared to the same period last year while year-on- year growth in the first quarter was 5 percent, reported The Jakarta Post.
The rising inflationary pressures during the past three months due to weakening of the rupiah (the local unit has declined by nearly 10 percent against the dollar) reduced consumer spending as purchasing power weakened. Inflation hit a 15-month high of 7.2 percent in July, higher than the government's annual rate target of 6.5 percent, due to soaring prices of food and other basic commodities.
INDONESIA ANTICIPATES CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH
Xinhua General News Service, 2004
("Indonesia projects higher economic growth in 2005," august 16, l/n)
Indonesia's economic growth is projected to reach 5.4 percent in 2005 to fare better than the targeted 4.8 percent this year, which is estimated to be achievable.
"This growth is estimated to remain supported by the increase in domestic consumption, in addition to the increase in exports and the improving investment climate," President Megawati Soekarnoputri said while addressing the House of Representatives Monday.
INDONESIA'S ECONOMY WILL IMPROVE
ANTARA, 2004
("RI economy to improve despite world slow-down in 2005," august 13, ln)
Finance Minister Boediono said although the world's economic growth is expected to slow down in 2005, Indonesia's economy will improve, especially if its presidential election runs well. "If the election as well as the transfer of power run well and smoothly, they could compensate the weakening of the global economic situation," the minister said here Friday. With social and economic conditions in Indonesia improving, investment could be expected to enter the country and revitalize the economy.
INDONESIAN ECONOMY IS A MAGNET FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS
BHASKARAN, 2004
(Manu -- partner and member of the board of Centennial Group Inc, an economics consultancy, The Edge, "Indonesia: Getting Better," July 19, l/n)
It's been a long time since Indonesia received such positive exposure in the international media. Foreign observers are now recognising the political progress Indonesia has made in the past few years, something which the just-concluded first round of presidential elections underlined. Is it time to become much more bullish about Indonesia? Indonesian democracy maturing, reducing political risks for investors
INDONESIA DISAD
Uniqueness: Econ improving
INDONESIA'S ECONOMY WILL IMPROVE
BHASKARAN, 2004
(Manu -- partner and member of the board of Centennial Group Inc, an economics consultancy, The Edge, "Indonesia: Getting Better," July 19, l/n)
Is the improved political stability sufficient to propel the economy to higher growth? We believe there is a good chance of Indonesian economic growth surprising on the upside for at least a year or two for the following reasons:
. The Indonesian rupiah has strengthened significantly in the past week as the initial results of the presidential elections came in, reversing the sizeable depreciation of around 10% in the early part of the second quarter. This will help reverse inflationary expectations and allow Bank Indonesia to continue with policies to boost growth rather than focus on inflation - which had risen recently partly because of rupiah weakness.
. We think domestic firms will step up capital spending significantly, now that the political uncertainty has cleared a lot. In fact, trade data for January to May suggest that capital goods imports are already rising strongly - indicating that many Indonesian businesses are not waiting for the final round of presidential elections to step up expansion plans. Also encouraging are indications that investment in the vital oil and gas sector will rise substantially this year.
INDONESIA DISAD
I/L: Oil key to the econ
OIL REVENUE IS KEY TO THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY
MENON, 2001
(Rajan, staff, The National Interest, "another year of living dangerously," Oct 24, ln)
The 1997 East Asian economic crisis illustrated globalization's power as both opportunity and vulnerability-this everyone by now understands. What remains unclear is why Indonesia alone has been rocked to its foundations when every other Asian country hurt by the 1997-98 crisis has recovered its balance to one degree or another. The basics of its economy were sound, and for nearly three decades Indonesia experienced an economic and social transformation that bettered the lives of most of its people. Between 1970 and 1997 the percentage of those in poverty fell from 60 percent to 15 percent, life expectancy and literacy increased significantly, and an urban middle class arose. Revenue from oil exports enabled the expansion of infrastructure and social services, and the share of GDP accounted for by the production of natural resources then shrank as industrialization advanced. Non-Javanese peoples in outlying areas and students, workers, and democrats chafed, the disparities in wealth and power among classes and regions were wide, and cronyism, nepotism, and corruption were rife. But the "New Order" (the authoritarian edifice Suharto built after taking power in 1965) promoted growth and kept order. The 1997 economic crisis was its death knell. Indonesia's GDP plummeted from $250 billion to below $100 billion at the end of 1998, and inflation rocketed to 60 percent. Capital fled abroad, millions were pushed deeper into poverty, and the dreams of others whose lives had improved during the decades of rapid growth were dashed. The absence of democratic institutions led simmering dissatisfaction to boil over onto the streets.
OIL IS KEY TO INDONESIA'S ECONOMY
INTERNATIONAL OIL DAILY, 2003
("Indonesia plans security decree," august 13, l/n)
Indonesia plans to issue a decree on security for energy firms that may include deploying a special force to guard their operations after last week's bombing of a hotel in Jakarta. Energy Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said mining, oil, and gas operations were vital to Indonesia's economy and hoped the presidential decree would be issued as soon as possible, Reuters reported.
INDONESIA DISAD
I/L: Indonesia key supplier to the US
INDONESIA IS A KEY OIL EXPORTER TO THE U.S. – AND IT HELPS THEIR ECONOMY
AFX – Asia, 2003
("Outlook," January 31, l/n)
The US is Indonesia largest trading partner followed by Japan and Singapore.
With this export profile, GK's Song estimates Indonesia GDP growth to be around 3.5 pct this year compared to a government forecast of 4.0 pct. "It will very much depend on how much oil will remain a key contributor to the economy over the coming months," he said.
INDONESIA DISAD
I/L: high risk of collapse
INDONESIAN COLLAPSE FROM ECONOMIC DECLINE IS A SERIOUS RISK
RICHARDSON, 2002
(John, staff, Chemical Market Reporter, "if only…" May 6, l/n)
Indonesia is the prime example. The country has plenty of oil and gas, but in the case of gas, it is in the wrong location for use by domestic petrochemicals in Indonesia. And in the case of political risk, the risks of the collapse of another government, social unrest and even the breakup of Indonesia remain substantial. In Indonesia, dodgy business practices, as to a lesser extent is the case in Thailand, are a significant hindrance. It used to be the case in Indonesia that would-be investors in small businesses would literally have to queue outside the homes of generals first thing in the morning to 'incentivise' them to grant approvals. The queues, literal and metaphorical, may be shorter these days because of the country's long-term economic decline, but until they vanish altogether, the more ethical of investors will continue to shy away from Indonesia.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Terrorism
INDONESIAN INSTABILITY WILL TRIGGER MASSIVE TERRORISM
DJALAL, 2001
(Dino Patti – Counselor/Head of the Political Department at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, D.C., PacNet Newsletter #16, April 20, CSIS, )
Second, preventing the disintegration of Indonesia is infinitely better than curing it once it happens. Indonesia's break-up would open a Pandora's box which will unleash protracted ethnic conflicts even more difficult for Jakarta and the international community to control. In such a situation, the country's transition would descend from a matter of managing change to managing chaos, especially as secessionist regions become a breeding ground for terrorism, anarchy, and extremism.
TERRORISM RISKS EXTINCTION
JOHNSON, 2002
(Reed, staff writer, Los Angeles Times, June 18, l/n)
But in the bleak months since Sept. 11, the phantom menace of nuclear catastrophe has come back with a vengeance--stalking our imaginations, confounding our leaders, confronting us with a host of atomic terrors hitherto barely imagined: hijacked airliners rammed down the throats of nuclear power plants; "dirty bombs" spraying lethal radiation and rendering huge swaths of cities uninhabitable for years to come. Looming over these lesser catastrophes is the threat of an actual nuclear weapons attack. After the lull of the '90s, we're learning to start worrying and fear The Bomb all over again. Only now America must face the possibility of dealing with more than just one or two mega-adversaries capable of sending our entire country up in a mushroom cloud. Now we're conjuring up visions of a suitcase bomb detonated at Times Square, a 10-kiloton dose of megadeath delivered in a truck to downtown Los Angeles or Chicago. Or a regional conflict, like the present one pitting India against nuclear rival Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir territory, escalating into global Armageddon. On the one hand, we're being confronted anew with the sublime terror of extinction; on the other, with the banality and ridiculousness of a threat to our lives and our civilization from something that may be lurking in a briefcase, a pair of Hush Puppies or, as in the new Hollywood blockbuster "The Sum of All Fears," a cigarette-vending machine.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Indonesian instability = regional instability
TURMOIL IN INDONESIA CAUSES REGIONAL INSTABILITY
DJALAL, 2001
(Dino Patti -- Counselor/Head of the Political Department at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, D.C., PacNet Newsletter, "Indonesia: Not There Yet, But Getting There," April 20, )
Second, preventing the disintegration of Indonesia is infinitely better than curing it once it happens. Indonesia's break-up would open a Pandora's box which will unleash protracted ethnic conflicts even more difficult for Jakarta and the international community to control. In such a situation, the country's transition would descend from a matter of managing change to managing chaos, especially as secessionist regions become a breeding ground for terrorism, anarchy, and extremism. The most sensible way to deal with Indonesia's troubled nationhood is simply to preserve and heal it. Nationalism now ranks among the most important factors shaping Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies. While Indonesians were willing to tolerate the 1999 secession of East Timor (which was not part of the Republic in 1945), they are much more sensitive and protective of the existing nationhood, which was conceived by the founding-fathers at the time of independence. Which explains why the secessionist movements in Aceh and West Papua are seen as issues of national survival as much as of national unity and identity.
Third, given its strategic position and size -- it is the largest state in Southeast Asia -- Indonesia's problems matter to regional order and stability. Unless democratic transition brings stability, prosperity, and unity, Indonesia would not be at peace with itself and one way or another this may adversely impact the region and beyond. A stable, united, and prosperous Indonesia best serves the region's interests.
ASIAN REGIONAL INSTABILITY RISKS TOTAL COLLAPSE INTO WAR
CAMPBELL, 2001
(Kurt – sr vp & dir of the int'l security program at CSIS, Orbis, "the cusp of strategic change in Asia," June 22, l/n)
Asia embarks upon the new century with a dubious distinction. While the much-overused phrase "the Pacific Century" conjures up images of commercial promise and political dynamism, the reality is that Asia is a dangerous place. For the first time in modern political history, every major challenge to peace and stability in the international arena is currently found in greater Asia. Any of three situations could trigger a major conflagration virtually overnight: the still-dangerous division of the Korean peninsula, the increasingly tense and unpredictable situation across the Taiwan Strait, and the volatile nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. Europe by comparison seems absolutely peace loving-ongoing troubles in the Balkans notwithstanding. Indeed, every major state in Asia is in the midst of profound change. China is rising (or at least is perceived to be by its neighbors), Japan continues to languish in the economic doldrums, the Koreas have embarked on a diplomatic course of historic significance, Russia is still struggling with market reforms as its international reputation suffers, and Indonesia teeters precariously close to collapse. Furthermore, a number of recent developments among Asian states create further unpredictability, such as the high-profile diplomatic initiatives between North and South Korea and the increasingly troubling machinations between China and Russia. It is important to review briefly some of these trends to gain a clearer picture of the shifting strategic landscape.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Indonesian instability = regional instability
INDONESIA IS KEY TO REGIONAL STABILITY
DJALAL, 2001
(Dino Patti – Counselor/Head of the Political Department at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, D.C., PacNet Newsletter #16, April 20, CSIS, )
Third, given its strategic position and size -- it is the largest state in Southeast Asia -- Indonesia's problems matter to regional order and stability. Unless democratic transition brings stability, prosperity, and unity, Indonesia would not be at peace with itself and one way or another this may adversely impact the region and beyond. A stable, united, and prosperous Indonesia best serves the region's interests.
INDONESIAN INSTABILITY DEVASTATES THE ENTIRE REGION
MONTAPERTO et al., 2000
(Ronald, "Indonesian democratic transition," Strategic Forum, April, )
Indonesia is important to U.S. military strategy. The largest nation in Southeast Asia, covering some 2 million square kilometers and stretching nearly 5,000 kilometers from east to west, the Indonesian archipelago straddles the critical sea lines of communication that run from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia.
More important, Indonesia has provided the political and strategic center of gravity for Southeast Asia. In an area that defines interstate relations hierarchically, Indonesia's location, size, and resources have made it the acknowledged leader of the subregion. For more than three decades, Jakarta has used its clout to help achieve and maintain regional stability and to support economic development. A linchpin of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Indonesia also made major contributions to the diplomacy of the Paris Accords on Cambodia and the territorial disputes of the South China Sea, resisting strong pressures in the late 1970s and early 1980s from Vietnam, Russia, and China. Indeed, Southeast Asian opposition to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has served as a restraining influence on Beijing. Jakarta also has supported the U.S. regional military presence. Indonesia's future is critical to the stability of Southeast Asia and a matter of vital national interest to two U.S. allies, Australia and the Philippines, and to friendly Thailand and Singapore. Positive U.S. relations with a stable Indonesia help Washington manage its position in the region.
Southeast Asia is already becoming less cohesive and more sensitive to external influences, in part due to uncertainties in Indonesia. Should Indonesia become unstable or fragment, the consequences would ripple across the region. The effects probably would include a destabilizing refugee exodus and could strengthen Islamist opposition in Malaysia and the Philippines and, in some cases, separatist movements. An increase in piracy also would be likely.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Indonesian instability = regional instability
OTHER COUNTRIES MODEL INDONESIA'S REACTION TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
MENON, 2001
(Rajan, staff, The National Interest, "another year of living dangerously," Oct 24, ln)
Indonesia's neighbors have other worries, as well, as they watch this wobbly behemoth. For Malaysia, one is that the Malaysian Islamic Party, already powerful in northern Malaysia, could receive a fillip were militant Islam to become more significant in Indonesia's politics as a result of the turmoil-or were it to dominate its successor states. Thailand and the Philippines, which have breakaway Islamist groups in their southern regions, fear that Indonesia's collapse could produce an undesirable demonstration effect. Papua New Guinea, which borders West Papua, could be swamped by refugees and also face an older problem: incursions from the Indonesian military in hot pursuit of Papuan guerrillas. Singapore and Malaysia have invested in pipelines carrying energy from Riau and from Indonesia's Natuna gas fields (located in the South China Sea between peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak) and are watching nervously. ASEAN, whose economic and political clout has fallen short of members' hopes, will be reduced to a salon if Indonesia, its keystone, crumbles.
OTHER COUNTRIES MODEL INDONESIA'S REACTION TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
DALPINO, 2001
(Catharin – analyst at the Brookings Institute, "Indonesia at the Crossroads," Brookings Policy Brief #89, Sept.,
)
Once a critical 'domino' in the cold war Asian security arena, Indonesia has new significance in the post-cold war world as a model for other countries in the process of rapid political and social change. As a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia's democratic experiment offers lessons for other societies with significant Muslim populations that are emerging from authoritarian rule. As the most ethnically diverse country in Asia, Jakarta's ability (or failure) to accommodate communal differences while maintaining national unity will influence stability in its neighbors with sharp internal divisions. If the fundamentalist province of Aceh withdraws from Indonesia, it will embolden separatist groups in the Philippine province of Mindinao and leaders of Malaysia's Islamic Party, which is gaining strength at the local level. Indonesia's experience in establishing democratic civil-military relations could have some influence on the course of political development in Burma, where the military is hinting it may restart political dialogue with the civilian opposition. The junta in Rangoon has publicly drawn parallels between the Indonesian and Burmese systems.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Global Economy
INDONESIAN ECONOMIC INSTABILITY AFFECTS THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
BOLTON, 2000
(John – VP of the American Enterprise Institute, "Indonesia: Asia's Yugoslavia?" January 1, )
Although worlds apart, does Yugoslavia provide any lessons for the contending factions within Indonesia, and especially for its government? And does it likewise provide lessons for interested international powers, especially the U.S.? Indonesia's January announcement that it could accept independence for East Timor seems unquestionably to have had the unintended consequence of bolstering separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Dissatisfaction in those provinces stems largely from disputes with Jakarta about the allocation of economic returns from their natural resources. And while this might seem amenable to compromise, it could also lead to far more intense disputes. The risk of fiercer confrontation is exacerbated by Indonesia's economic turmoil, ethnic and sectarian strife, the continuing struggle for national political power and demands for greater democracy. To the military and other remaining power centres from Suharto's regime, these diverse pressures appear as an overall threat, and may provoke a predictable response. For now, however, even the key Indonesian players cannot clearly see the way forward. In Indonesia's neighbourhood, there is nothing comparable to the EU, certainly not Asean. Australia obviously has critical interests, especially with respect to East Timor, and Portugal, a former colonial power, can claim a limited role. Most disturbingly, China could gain enormously from the confusion and disunity entailed by a long, painful disintegration of Indonesia. For the United States, which has enormous interests in the region, the alternatives are perplexing. Inexplicably, until recently at least, the level of political attention paid to Indonesia in Washington has not matched the economic attention Indonesia receives there. While there is no tangible American interest in the ultimate political relationships of Indonesia's pieces -- central control, autonomy or independence -- this imbalance in focus must change. There is a critical American interest in the manner in which the political outcome in Indonesia occurs: That it not be through force by any party; further disrupt the regional (and global) economy; cause a massive humanitarian trauma or refugee flows; or allow mainland-Chinese adventurism to prosper. A piecemeal approach to Indonesia, as in Yugoslavia, almost guarantees that the process will be unacceptable, whatever the actual outcome.
Economic collapse Causes Extinction
Bearden, Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2000
[Tom, June 24, ]
Bluntly, we forsee these factors- and others not covered-converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Civil War
INSTABILITY WILL SPARK A CIVIL WAR
ROTBERG, 2002
(Robert – dir of the Kennedy School's Program on Intrastate Conflict and president of the World Peace Foundation, Washington Quarterly, "the new nature of nation—state failure," summer, l/n)
The civil wars that characterize failed states usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity. The fear of "the other" that drives so much ethnic conflict may stimulate and fuel hostilities between ruling entities and subordinate and less-favored groups. Avarice also propels antagonism, especially when discoveries of new, frequently contested sources of resource wealth, such as petroleum deposits or diamond fields, encourage that greed.
There is no failed state without disharmonies between communities. Yet, the simple fact that many weak nation-states include haves and have-nots, and that some of the newer states contain a heterogeneous collection of ethnic, religious, and linguistic interests, is more a contributor to than a root cause of nation-state failure. In other words, state failure cannot be ascribed primarily to the inability to build nations from a congeries of ethnic groups. Nor should it be ascribed baldly to the oppression of minorities by a majority, although such brutalities are often a major ingredient of the impulse toward failure.
CIVIL WARS RISK TURNING INTO GENOCIDES
DIAMOND, 2003
(Jared – prof of geography and envtl health sciences at UCLA, Harper's Magazine, "the last Americans," June 1, l/n)
The connection between the two lists is transparent. Today, just as in the past, countries that are environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or both are at risk of becoming politically stressed, and of seeing their governments collapse. When people are desperate and undernourished, they blame their government, which they see as responsible for failing to solve their problems. They try to emigrate at any cost. They start civil wars. They kill one another. They figure that they have nothing to lose, so they become terrorists, or they support or tolerate terrorism. The results are genocides such as the ones that already have exploded in Burundi, Indonesia, and Rwanda; civil wars, as in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands; calls for the dispatch of First World troops, as to Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines, Rwanda, the Solomon Islands, and Somalia; the collapse of central government, as has already happened in Somalia; and overwhelming poverty, as in all of the countries on these lists.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Civil War
ECONOMIC INSTABILITY IN INDONESIA RISKS LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE AND DEATH
FUKUDA-PARR, 2003
(Sakiko – dir of human development report at UN development programme, Journal of Human Development, "New threats to human security in the era of globalization," v. 4, July, EbscoHost)
Uneven globalization also divides communities, nations and regions,
impacting on human security. Social tensions and conflicts are ignited when
there are extremes of inequality between the marginalized and the powerful.
Indonesia shows what can happen when an economic crisis sets off latent
social tensions between ethnic groups — or between the rich and poor.
More people have died or suffered from violent conflict between groups
within countries than in wars between countries in the past two decades.
In the 1990s, almost 3.6 million people died in conflict within states, while
220 000 have died from wars between states. The number of internally
displaced persons has increased dramatically, accounting for six million
people by the end of 2000 (United Nations Development Programme, 2002).
INSTABILITY STILL A RISK IN INDONESIA
BHASKARAN, 2004
(Manu -- partner and member of the board of Centennial Group Inc, an economics consultancy, The Edge, "Indonesia: Getting Better," July 19, l/n)
First, while Indonesian security agencies appear to have succeeded in dismantling a good part of the terrorist network responsible for the Bali and Marriott bombings, risks remain. There are credible reports that smaller groups of terrorists, who can mount assassinations and one-off bombings, have entered the country and could disrupt political stability as well as hurt Indonesia's recovery.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: SLOCs
SUSTAINED ECONOMIC INSTABILITY THREATENS TO BOTTLENECK KEY SOUTHEAST ASIAN SLOCS WHICH WOULD DECIMATE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
MENON, 2001
(Rajan, staff, The National Interest, "another year of living dangerously," Oct 24, ln)
Indonesia may survive the combined assault of an ailing economy, deepening separatism, and a failing state. Such an outcome is certainly desirable, but it is not likely. American leaders must therefore brace for the possibility that Indonesia could still collapse in chaos and disintegrate in violence. Alternatively, the current instability could continue until economic recovery and political compromise give rise to a country of a rather different shape and size. With Wahid gone and Megawati in place, this is now somewhat more likely. Even the loss of Aceh and West Papua need not spell national disintegration; without such provinces Indonesia would still retain the critical mass to endure as a state. The second of these denouements is preferable to the first, but both will create strong shock waves. Indonesia's size and location are the reasons why. The three major straits that slice through it are pivotal passages for the global economy. Malacca is by far the most important, particularly for energy shipments. Some 450 vessels and about 10 million barrels of oil pass through daily, and East Asian demand, driven by China, is expected to rise from 12 million barrels a day in 2000 to over 20 million barrels in twenty years. Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea would suffer severely and soon if fallout from turmoil in Aceh (at its northern end) or Riau (at its southern end) blocked this passage. Its narrowness, 1.5 miles in the Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait, and ten miles between Singapore and the Riau archipelago, adds to the danger. The Lombok Strait, which ships use to sail to northeast Asia through the Strait of Makasar between Borneo and Sulawesi, is next in importance, although it handles a far smaller volume of traffic than Malacca and is of negligible importance for energy shipments. The Lombok-Makasar route is, however, a critical corridor for Australia's coal and iron ore exports to northeast Asia and for manufactured exports moving south from there. It is also the most likely detour were Malacca rendered impassable or hazardous. By comparison, Sunda is a minor shipping channel; the consequences of its closure would be minimal for transcontinental trade. Rerouting Malacca traffic through Lombok would strain the capacity of the world's merchant fleet, increase transportation costs, and create severe bottlenecks. The problems would be even worse if all three straits were unusable and ships had to transit northeast Asia by skirting Australia's northern coast. Market signals would eventually add other carrying capacity but the question is how quickly and smoothly the adjustment occurs, and what the economic and political consequences would be in the meantime. The ramifications of blocked or delayed maritime traffic, or even just panic over the possibility, would spread speedily throughout globalization's many circuits. Insurance rates would rise; coverage may even be denied if underwriters deem the risks excessive. The effects of obstructed energy, machinery and manufactured goods would register in capital markets, short-term investors would be scared off, and the flow of much-needed foreign direct investment into a region still convalescing from the blows of 1997 would slow.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: SLOCs
DISRUPTION IN THE SLOCs CREATES MASSIVE ASIAN INSTABILITY
CALDER, 1996
(Kent – dir. of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Foreign Affairs, "Asia's empty tank," March/April, l/n)
FOR NEARLY 5 years, since oil shock began to recede, energy has had remarkably low priority in global policy councils. The time has come for a reevaluation, and nowhere is one more urgent than in the Pacific. Major changes in East Asian energy patterns are creating both danger and opportunities for troubled trans-Pacific relations chronically oriented toward the past.
Asia's emerging energy problems cut subtly across the conventional boundary between economics and security. They have been further masked by the temporary collapse of demand in many markets, such as eastern Europe, since 1990. But they are no less perilous for their obscurity.
The coming decade -- if buoyant economic growth continues in Asia, as seems likely -- holds the potential for severe strains between Asian powers as regional oil markets tighten while contenders for supplies grow more diverse and competitive. China, Japan, the Koreas, and most Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members will be vigorously bidding for imports in energy markets that until recently were much simpler and more relaxed.Changing supply routes for northeast Asian importers may spark geopolitical rivalries along the vulnerable sea-lanes that link Asia with the Middle East. Countries have already come to blows over their conflicting claims to offshore areas that may be rich in oil and gas. n1
INDONESIAN INSTABILITY RISKS CHOKING OFF KEY SEA-LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOCS)
SHERRILL, 2004
(Clifton – prof at Florida State, Military Review, "the military and democracy in Indonesia," May 1)
American security interests in Indonesia include developing a cooperative partner in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism and maintaining a stable government capable of preventing internal unrest from threatening adjacent maritime chokepoints that link the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Previously, Indonesian armed forces (TNI) helped perpetuate stability under the autocratic government of Suharto; however, post-Suharto democratic reforms seek to phase out the TNI's formal political role.
INDONESIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Prolif
INSTABILITY RISKS INDONESIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
POPHAM, 2003
(Peter, staff, The Independent, "nuclear war risk grows as states race to acquire bomb," April 29,
)
More and more states are likely to buy the argument that the only way to be secure in a unipolar world is to go down the nuclear road – "to pre-empt pre-emption", one analyst said. "People look at the different ways that the 'Axis of Evil' states – Iraq and North Korea – have been treated and they draw their own conclusions."
"What other countries are going to sit around after dinner saying, if Pakistan's got the bomb why haven't we?" said Mr Plesch. On the list of those likely to be holding such conversations, he said, are Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey and perhaps pre-eminently Japan, North Korea's uneasy neighbor.
INDONESIA DISAD -- AFF
General
N/U – THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS DEVASTATED INDONESIAN SOCIETY
FUKUDA-PARR, 2003
(Sakiko – dir of human development report at UN development programme, Journal of Human Development, "New threats to human security in the era of globalization," v. 4, July, EbscoHost)
Net financial inflows to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand totalled US$93 billion in 1996. In 1997, as turmoil hit financial
markets, these flows reversed in just weeks to a net outflow of US$12 billion,
a swing of US$105 billion, or 11% of the pre-crisis Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the five countries. In Indonesia, the country that experienced the
most extreme reversal of economic and social achievements in just one year,
GDP growth fell from 4.7% in 1997 to a negative 13.2% in 1998. Bankruptcies
spread all over the region. Over 13 million people lost their jobs. Real wages
fell sharply, down to 40% or even 60%. Economic difficulties triggered or
exacerbated social tensions between ethnic groups as well as rich and poor,
resulting in erosion of the social fabric, rise in crime, violence and conflict.
The global repercussions of the East Asian crisis meant an estimated US$2
trillion drop in global output between 1998 and 2000.
POLITICAL STABILITY IS INCREASING IN INDONESIA
DILLON, 2004
(Dana – Senior Policy Analyst in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, "Elections in Indonesia," WebMemo #469, April 2, )
There are also indications that Indonesia’s civil society continues to mature. In the past, election violence was a major problem in Indonesia. Hundreds of people were killed in 1997, the last election under Suharto, and about 175 were killed in the 1999 elections. This year, little election related violence is expected and only 10 deaths have been directly attributable to election violence. Another favorable indicator is that the police have been able to enforce order at political campaign rallies. During the 1999 elections, the police and military, associated with Suharto-era repression, were reluctant to approach campaign rallies for fear of inciting riots. This year, reports are that the police, detached from the military in 2000, were able to enforce traffic regulations and good order at rallies.
INDONESIA DISAD -- AFF
General
INDONESIA IS SWITCHING TO GAS PRODUCTION
WORLD OIL, 2003
("Energy demands spur oil/gas developments," August, wilsonselect)
The country has oil and gas reserves of 5.9 Bbbl, and over 70 Tcf. It is considered the world's largest LNG exporter. However, oil production has fallen, averaging 1.265 MMbopd. There is a continued evaporation of foreign funds. Total oil wells drilled were 5.2% less than 2001; however, offshore drilling increased to a new high of 240. For exploration, ConocoPhillips will test the Suban-8 delineation. BP Bawean and Santos Group will abandon Titan BP 1 well, located 100 km NE of Kepodang gas field. Its Calypso BP 1 was also P/A'd. Santos (Madura Offshore), as operator of the Madura Offshore PSC located SE of Madura, flow tested the Maleo-1 wildcat, 140 km east of Surabaya. And CNOOC of China, successfully appraised the KE 40-2, on the KE 40 discovery in Madura block. In development drilling, Pertamina and Bumi Siak Pusako, will maintain crude oil output at a field run by ChevronTexaco. Pertamina will drill five wells to keep production at 40,000 bopd, after taking over from PT Caltex Pacific. The Clough Group won an $80 million bid for the first deepwater oil production field, West Seno, in the Makassar Straits. Production was to commence in first quarter, 2003. And Unocal's Indonesian subsidiary, Unocal Rapak, has drilled its fifth successive well on the deepwater Ranggas oil field, testing 8,158 bopd.
IRAN DISAD
Link: Iran wants stable oil prices
IRAN SEEKS STABLE OIL PRICES
AMIRAHMADI, 1995
(Hooshang– prof of urban planning and policy development & dir of Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers Univ, Oil in the New World Order, ed by Gilllespie & Henry, p. 211-212)
To begin with, "price stability and revenue predictability," I was told by an Iranian official in Tehran, "constitute the government's major areas of concern." Iran will focus on the actual market situation and will seek a stable price rather than a higher unstable price. For stability to be achieved, the Iranian official argued, OPEC must cooperate with market forces in determining a "fair price" for oil, the so-called invisible hand concept. The OPEC marker price of $21 per barrel is considered by Iran as a "reasonable" price and should be protected. Iran needs to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and international oil companies ("consumers") if this price level is to be maintained. Therefore, depoliticizing OPEC has been a major aspect of Iran's new oil policy. The new pricing policy also accounts for economic growth in the West. Accordingly, oil prices should be set at a level commensurate with the affordability level of Western, industrialized, commercial, and residential consumers. Finally, the oil price should be set in relation to exports so that a minimum level of oil revenue is guaranteed for Iran. Given its current revenue needs, at $21 per a barrel of oil Iran can observe its OPEC quota of 3.41 million b/d.
IRAN SEEKS STABLE OIL PRICES
AMIRAHMADI, 1995
(Hooshang– prof of urban planning and policy development & dir of Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers Univ, Oil in the New World Order, ed by Gilllespie & Henry, p. 222)
Consequently, more than at any other time in recent history, the politico-economic interests of the GCC countries are in line with those of Iran. They need the security of stable foreign exchange earnings that come primarily from oil exports. Accordingly, the relative success of OPEC meetings since 1991 – especially the cordial and cooperative relations between the two largest producers, Iran and Saudi Arabia – should have come as no surprise. The Islamic Republic's foreign policy establishment has taken advantage of the present trend in the politics of oil in the region and has consequently made overtures to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and others as a basis for expanded regional cooperation.
IRAN DISAD
I/L: oil key to econ
OIL IS KEY TO IRANIAN ECONOMY
AMIRAHMADI, 1995
(Hooshang– prof of urban planning and policy development & dir of Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers Univ, Oil in the New World Order, ed by Gilllespie & Henry, p. 185)
Oil is indisputably Iran's lifeline. During the 1970s and 1980s, an average of 90 percent of the country's foreign exchange was earned through oil. This hard currency has paid for Iran's sizable imports of industrial inputs, consumer goods, defense procurement, and food. Iranian industry requires $8 billion a year in foreign currency to operate a zero-growth level. Iran currently lays out over $5 billion a year for food and related imports, about $2 billion for peacetime defense procurement, and around $2 billion for miscellaneous expenses relating to foreign operations of the government. Based on these figures, the sum total for a scenario of no growth comes to about $17 billion a year. Another $7 billion to $8 billion will be needed for 5 to 6 percent economic growth.
IRAN DISAD
I/L: oil key to Iran's status
OIL REVENUE KEY TO IRANIAN PROMINENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AMIRAHMADI, 1995
(Hooshang– prof of urban planning and policy development & dir of Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers Univ, Oil in the New World Order, ed by Gilllespie & Henry, p. 209)
As Aghazadeh, minister of petroleum, stated in a meeting with the ruling clergy in Qum in September 1991: "If the Islamic Republic is to maintain its regional preeminence, it must improve its economy by increasing its [oil] production." In 1992, the minister insisted that "we are more concerned with the level of revenue than the number of barrels of oil exported." Thus, once again, as under the Shah, oil revenue would be used to spur economic growth and military strength to ensure a prominent role for the Islamic Republic within OPEC and in regional security matters.
IRAN DISAD – AFF
General
IRAN'S OIL EXPORTERS HAVE BEEN DWINDLING STEADILY
ENERGY, 2004
("OPEC still declining," January 1, l/n)
Today, Iran accounts for about 10 percent of total OPEC net oil export revenues, down from 17 percent-19 percent in the 1970s. Third, Iraq's oil export revenue share has fluctuated sharply, from a high of around 14 percent in the late 1980s, to basically 0 percent for several years following its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait (and the subsequent U.N. oil embargo, which continues to this day). Iraqi oil export revenues increased since late 1996 under the U.N. "oil-for-food" deal, which permitted Iraqi oil exports to buy food and medicine, for war reparations, and for other U.N.-authorized purposes. For 2003, Iraq's share of total OPEC oil revenues was about 4 percent, with the share expected to reach 7 percent in 2004 and 9 percent in 2005.
KUWAIT DISADS – AFF
General
TURN: low prices cripple their Kuwaiti economy
Prusher, CSM staff writer, 3-28-2k
(Illene, “Kuwait wrestles with insecurity as oil-based economy As OPEC nations yesterday met to raise output, Kuwaitis ponder reforms to generous governmental perks,” Christian Science Monitor p.ebscohost)
MEXICO DISAD
Uniqueness: Oil revenue increasing
MEXICO OIL-EXPORT REVENUE IS ON THE RISE
ENERGY 1-1-2K4
(“OPEC Still Declining: Export revenues still lag far behind peak years,” Energy Journal vol. 29 no. 1)
Increase Mexican oil output propels Mexican economy; curbing trade deficit
World Market Analysis 7-20-2k4
MEXICO DISAD
Links: Low oil prices
Low oil prices will push the Mexican economy in the red
Lange, AP writer, 7-29-2k4
(Jason, “World Bank Off: Oil Price Drop Fiscal Trouble for Mexico,” The Main Wire p.ln)
MEXICO DISAD
I/L: Oil key to econ
MEXICO'S ECONOMY DEPENDS ON MORE OIL EXPORTS
BROWER, 2003
(Derek, staff, Petroleum Economist, "Reform or Bust," May, wilsonselect)
MEXICO'S ENERGY sector needs investment of $20bn a year if the economy is to continue growing, says Fernando Alonso, a senior official in the country's energy ministry. To ease chronic poverty and reduce state subsidies -- which find their way to 75% of Mexicans one way or another -- the economy must strengthen. Says Eduardo Andrade, president of the Mexican electricity association: "We need reform of an energy sector that, in its present state, is a brake on development." Oil has long been the country's dominant industry. Proved crude reserves -- estimated at about 26.9bn barrels -- are the fourth largest in the Western Hemisphere. Output has consistently been more than 3m barrels a day (b/d) for the past decade. About 1.7m b/d is exported to the US.
OIL IS VITAL FOR THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
Business News Americas, 2004
("Fox administration adds 8,900MW capacity," August 13, l/n)
"With economic modernization underway and its renewed growth, and the population growth over the next few years, it is necessary to make progress in future electricity requirements," Fox said, calling for an electricity reform that will increase private sector participation without privatizing the CFE. Electric power, oil and gas are key to Mexico's economic growth, Fox emphasized, adding that power sector spending this year would be US$5bn with oil and gas spending at US$13bn.
OIL IS KEY TO THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
CAMPBELL, 2002
(Ian, staff, United Press International, "Latin America bad to worse?" Dec 8)
The oil sector, the heart of the economy, is controlled by the monopoly of the state-owned Pemex, a corrupt, inefficient company that squanders Mexico's oil wealth while charging Mexicans exorbitant prices for fuel. The electricity sector is also state-run and in need of huge investments if Mexico is to grow. Telephone service, a virtual monopoly of the privatized Telmex, is ridiculously expensive and poor. Public education is disastrous. Only half the population has health insurance. Millions of Mexicans enter the United States illegally to seek work.
OIL IS VITAL FOR THE MEXICAN ECONOMY
Channel NewsAsia, 2002
("APEC members must work on long-term energy plan," July 24, ln)
Mr Fox, speaking at an APEC meeting in Mexico City, said investment and cooperation in the energy sector was vital to economic growth. Mexico, which has large oil reserves, relies heavily on the energy sector to provide 40 percent of its income.
MEXICO DISAD
I/L: Oil key to econ
Mexican oil revenues critical to economic stability and growth
Mexico Business Monthly 10-1-1999
(“Mexico Economic Outlook p.ln)
Oil key to stabilize Mexican economy and budget
Cordova and Cevallos, staff writers and oil analysts, 8-10-1999
(Diego and Luis, “Oil-Mexico: Yesterday’s Threat is Today’s Guarantee of Stability,” IPS p.ln)
MEXICO DISAD
I/L: Oil key to econ
Mexican inflation is in check because of high revenues from oil exports
Baeza, 7-29-2k4
(Gonzalo, “Latin American Markets Roundup,” UPI p.ln)
MEXICO DISAD
I/L: Mexico key supplier to the US
Iraq war and instability in the Mid-East has resulted in America increasing Oil imports from Mexico – sustained American import will continue to drive Mexico’s economy
Xinhua News Agency 3-30-2k3
MEXICO IS A MAJOR OIL SUPPLIER TO THE U.S.
RIA Novosti, 2004
("Russian president to pay first official visit to Mexico," june 7, l/n)
Presidents of the two countries Vicente Fox and Vladimir Putin will conduct negotiations together with their ministers and other officials. The talks will focus on bilateral cooperation, interaction between Russia and Latin American countries, the situation in Iraq and on global oil markets (like Russia, Mexico is a major non-OPEC crude oil producer; Mexico is also a major supplier of light oil to the southern part of the U.S.).
MEXICO DISAD
I/L: Mexico key supplier to the US
Mexico is a key oil exporter to America – they supply a majority of our oil
Kay and Quispe-Agnoli, research analyst’s at the Atlanta Latin America Research Group, 2k2
(Stephen and Myriam, “A Mixed Blessing: Oil and Latin American Economies,” Vol. 4, no. 3 EconSouth p. )
Mexico is the center-piece for America’s new energy diversification strategy
Abraham, Secretary of NRG, 6-20-2k2
(Spencer, “Oil Diplomacy: Facts and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency,” FNS p.ln)
Latin America and African oil sources key to diversifying and meeting America’s energy needs
McManus, Acting Director Office of International Energy and Commodity, 10-21-2k3
(Matthew,” US NRG Security: West Africa and Latin America,” FNS p.ln)
BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS PURSUING POLICIES TO OPEN MEXICO’S HYDROCARBON SECTOR
Brodman, Deputy Assistant Secretary DOE, 10-21-2k3
(John, “US NRG Security: West Africa and Latin America,” FNS p.ln)
MEXICO DISAD
I/L: Mexico key supplier to the US
MEXICO IS A KEY OIL SUPPLIER TO THE U.S.
REDDY, 2003
(Sudeep, staff, Dallas Morning News, "a powerful connection," Dec. 11, l/n)
The PUC already has a pre-existing relationship" with Mexico utility Comision Federal de Electricidad. Officials and companies have been slowly building new energy relationships between Texas and Mexico for years. Mexico is a major supplier of oil to the United States, while it imports some natural gas from Texas as it seeks foreign companies to develop its own natural gas fields.
MEXICO IS A KEY OIL SUPPLIER TO THE U.S. – AND OIL EXPORTS ARE KEY TO THEIR ECONOMY
Latin America News Digest, 2004
("oil drilling in Gulf of Mexico to start soon," June 23, l/n)
Mexico is to shortly start oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, the President Vicente Fox said on June 22, 2004. Drilling in the depths of the Gulf of Mexico will be aimed at ensuring enough oil reserves for Mexican state monopoly Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Fox added. Oil sector is key for Mexico's economic growth and budget revenue, Fox said. The president did not provide any details on the oil drilling initiative. Foreign and private investments in Mexican oil and energy sector are limited by the state legislation. Yet the oil sector provides some 60 pct of the total budget revenue of Mexico. The country is also one of the main oil producers worldwide and among the main importers of oil to the USA.
MEXICO DISAD
Impact Extension: Civil War
MEXICO NEEDS OIL REVENUE TO PREVENT A CIVIL WAR
JAFFE AND MANNING, 2000
(Amy Myers Jaffe – dir of the Energy Research Program at the James Baker Institute for public policy at Rice Univ, and Robert Manning – sr fellow and dir of asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, "the shocks of a world of cheap oil," Jan/Feb, l/n)
Neither, frankly, is Washington. The political reverberations of a sustained oil glut should not be underestimated. Several important regimes -- in the Gulf states, Russia, the former Soviet republics, and such key Latin American countries as Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia -- count on healthy oil revenues for calming restive populations, assuaging social tensions, and in some cases, nation-building writ large. Without the salve of rising oil revenues, many of these nations can expect to see heightened political instability, social unrest, or even civil wars, which could be grimly reminiscent of recent Balkan slaughters. In the Gulf, such instability could trigger the next oil shocks in the form of short-term disruptions. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the West's capacity to defend important oil regions from traditional external threats like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But America's painful experiences with revolutionary Iran in the late 1970s and the Balkans in the 1990s are grim reminders of how hard it can be to cope with internal instability. The new dynamics of the global oil market have profound implications for U.S. national security policy. Washington had better gird itself.
CIVIL WAR IN MEXICO WILL ESCALATE
DAVID, 1999
(Steven – prof of political science at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, "Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars," Jan/Feb, ln)
Conflict in Mexico threatens a wide range of core American interests. A civil war would endanger the 350,000 Americans who live south of the border. Direct American investments of at least $ 50 billion would be threatened, as would $ 156 billion in bilateral trade and a major source of petroleum exports. Illegal immigrants would swarm across the 2,000-mile frontier, fleeing civil conflict. And armed incursions might follow; during the Mexican Revolution of 1910, fighting spilled over the border often enough that the United States had to deploy roughly half its armed forces to contain the conflict. In a future war, the millions of Americans with family in Mexico might take sides in the fighting, sparking violence within the United States.
MEXICO DISAD
Impact Extensions: Global Economy
Collapse of Mexican economy sinks the global economy into depression
Rangel, editor Monterrey Bureau of the Dallas Morning News, 11-28-1995
(Enrique, “Mexico: Caught Between Oil and New,” The Dallas Morning News p.ln)
< Mexico's role in the global economy goes beyond the continent, said Noel
Nava, an economist at the Mexico City campus of Monterrey Tech.
"The peso troubles are having a major impact in Europe and in Asia as well,"
Dr. Nava said. "Many countries in those continents have a lot at stake in
Mexico." In Germany, for example, Volkswagen announced shortly after the Mexican
currency was devalued that it would temporarily stop manufacturing automobiles
in Mexico. And in Asian countries such as India, Indonesia and Malaysia, financial
markets suffered losses of up to 30 percent because U.S. and European investors,
fearful that the peso woes would spread to other Third World countries,
temporarily withdrew their money from those emerging markets.
"That was a big blow for those emerging markets of Asia," said Dr. Lpez of
Monterrey Tech. "They were indirect victims of the peso's troubles."
And that's unfortunate because most Asian countries are prospering because
they have avoided Mexico's main mistake, which is borrowing heavily, Dr. Lpez
said.>
Economic collapse Causes Extinction
Bearden, Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2000
[Tom, June 24, ]
Bluntly, we forsee these factors- and others not covered-converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
MEXICO DISAD
Impact Extensions: Global Economy
Mexican economic collapse will wreck the global economy
Rangel, editor Monterrey Bureau of the Dallas Morning News, 11-28-1995
(Enrique, “Mexico: Caught Between Oil and New,” The Dallas Morning News p.ln)
MEXICO DISAD – AFF
AT: War on Terror Impact
TURN: Supply Side – War on Drugs fuels corrupt governments increasing demands for drugs and creating false promise of security and success in the War on Drugs
Sharpe and Spencer, professor of political science at Swarthmore College and deputy director of the Washington Office on Latin America, 11-1-2k1
(Kenneth and William, “Refueling a doomed war on drugs: Flawed policy feeds growing
conflict; Report on U.S. policy,” NACLA Report on Americas Vol. 35 no. 3 p.ln)
4. This Risks Nuclear War in the Kashmir
Fai, Executive Director Kashmiri American Council, 7-8-2k1
(Ghulam Nabi, “The Most Dangerous Place,” The Washington Times p.ln)
NORWAY DISAD
Uniqueness Extensions: Oil production increasing
NORWEGIAN OIL PRODUCTION INCREASING
BARNARD, 2002
(Bruce, staff, Europe, "Norwegian Crude," Feb., wilsonselect)
Norway is consolidating its position as the key player in the European energy markets as it steps up oil and gas production from the icy depths of the North Sea. Norway's rising output, which contrasts with the declining production of the other main North Sea producer, the United Kingdom, has also made it a major force in the global market where it is the second-largest exporter after Saudi Arabia. Norway's status in the world oil business was underscored late last year when a procession of top officials from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) visited Oslo seeking its support for coordinated production cuts to halt the slide in oil prices. The government's decision to back the cartel intensified pressure on a reluctant Russia, the world's second-largest producer, to follow suit. Norwegian oil production rose to around 3.3 million barrels per day in 2001, almost double the rate in 1991, while it is supplying an increasing volume of the European Union's consumption of natural gas.
NORWAY DISAD
Uniqueness Extensions: Econ improving
Oil is propelling Norway’s economy back to strength
Nordic Business Report 8-6-2k4
Norwegian oil is vital to Oslo’s ability to mediate international conflict
Hartzok, analyst US Basic Income Guarantee Network, 2-22-2k4
(Alanna, “Citizen Dividends And Oil Resource Rents A Focus on Alaska, Norway and Nigeria,” p. )
NORWAY DISAD
I/L: oil key to diplomacy – honest broker
Norway was integral to brokering the Israeli-Palestinian and Guatemalan peace accords – large budget ensures
Conman, Staff Writer London Daily Telegraph, 12-12-1996
(Julian, “How Little Norway Makes big Peace,” The European P.ln)
Tamil conflict reverberates into India – it’s considered a threat to the territorial integrity of India
Miriam, the executive director of the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace, 10-4-2k
(Young, “Problems with Current U.S. Policy,” Foreign Policy in Focus Vol. 5 No. 35)
NORWAY DISAD – AFF
General
STABLE OIL PRICES ARE KEY FOR NORWAY – NOT HIGH ONES
INTERNATIONAL OIL DAILY, 2004
("Norway sees oil prices remaining strong through next year," Aug. 25, l/n)
Oil prices are likely to remain very high for the rest of 2004 and through 2005, but there is nothing that Norway can do to prevent high prices from hurting the world economy, the country's Energy Minister Thorhild Widvey said on Tuesday.
"I don't think the price is going to stay at current levels in the future, but I do think it will remain at a high level at the end of 2004, and probably also in 2005," Widvey said during a briefing at the Offshore Northern Seas conference in Stavanger. "Of course they could hurt the world economy, the very high prices. [But ] there's nothing Norway can do. We are producing at full capacity, at about 3.3 million barrels per day, and our oil production is expected to remain at this level for the next couple of years."
Addressing the conference later in the day, Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik said high oil prices could also hurt Norway's economy because of their effect on the country's currency. "Some may believe that for Norway it's only a great advantage, with the extremely high prices we have nowadays," Bondevik said. "But it may have an effect on the value of our currency, which is not good for us. With an open economy, Norway depends on a stable world economy. What we want is ever more stable oil prices. High energy prices pose a threat to the development of the global economy, and they hit the least developed countries hardest."
NORWAY INCREASING ITS NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
QUINLAN, 2004
(Martin, staff, Petroleum Economist, "Pushing out to the frontiers," April, wilsonselect)
Norway's gas production, in contrast, is growing strongly. With last year's 12.1% increase to 73.4bn cm, Norway became a larger gas producer than the Netherlands for the first time. Within a few years it will probably surpass the UK -- certainly by 2007, when deliveries from the 375bn cm Ormen Lange field are due to start. According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate's forecast, production will build up to 110bn cm/y by 2008 and will continue at that level.
NORWAY DISAD – AFF
AT: Sri Lanka impact
NO INTERNAL LINK: Thailand is considered a honest broker and is attempting to resolve the Sri Lanka crisis
Macan-Markar, staff writer, 3-27-2k2
(Marwaan, “Thailand’s Neutrality Ideal for Sri Lankan Peace,” IPS p.ln)
No Internal Link: Norway is in the back-seat compared to Thailand
Macan-Markar, staff writer, 3-27-2k2
(Marwaan, “Thailand’s Neutrality Ideal for Sri Lankan Peace,” IPS p.ln)
No Internal Link – Norway isn’t key to Lanka peace accords, India’s taken over
Miriam, the executive director of the Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace, 10-4-2k
(Young, “Problems with Current U.S. Policy,” Foreign Policy in Focus Vol. 5 No. 35)
OPEC DISAD
1NC SHELL
(A) WEAK THREATS ENSURE OPEC MARKET CONTROL
Saunders, Vice President and Energy Analyst Deutsche Bank, 2004
(Jay, “Energy Information Administration 2004 Energy Outlook Report,” FDCH , March 24, p.ln)
(B) ALTERNATE ENERGY PRODUCTION RISKS OPEC FLOODING THE MARKET IN RETALIATION
Stelzer, dir of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute, 2004
(Irwin, “Soaring Oil Price Lubricates the advance of Kerry,” Sunday Times (London), Aug. 1, p.ln)
OPEC DISAD – AFF
General
STRONG DOLLAR WILL SPARK MARKET SELL-OFF OF CRUDE – OPEC MUST MAINTAIN HIGH PRICES TO PREVENT MARKET SELLOFF
Saunders, Vice President and Energy Analyst Deutsche Bank, 3-24-2k4
(Jay, “NRG Information Administration 2004 Energy Outlook Report,” FDCH p.ln)
OPEC DISAD – AFF
General
SPR critical to offset Saudi swing production capability
Woolsey, former CIA director, 8-2k2
(James, “Defeating the Oil Weapon,” Commentary Vol. 114, iss. 2 p. ebscohost)
OPEC DISAD – AFF
General
OPEC cheating is inevitable –cant prevent it
Singer, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 8-13-2k3
(Max, “audi Arabia's Overrated Oil Weapon,” The Weekly Standard p.ln)
( B ) OIL IS KEY TO RUSSIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
World Markets Analysis 5-27-2k4
AND, FOR EACH $1 DROP IN PRICES, RUSSIA LOSES A BILLION
VICTOR AND VICTOR, 2003
(David – dir of the program on energy and sustainable development at Stanford and sr fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Nadejda – research associate in the dept of economics at Yale, Foreign Affairs, "axis of oil?" March/April, l/n)
It is neither wise nor effective to use strategic reserves to manage prices, but the likely result of these actions would be much lower prices that will expose a rift between consuming nations and producers such as Russia. Every $1 shift in world oil prices translates into about $1 billion for the Russian state budget. Russia ran a surplus of $5 billion in 2002, and the 2003 state budget (which forecast a price for Urals crude of $21.50 per barrel) calls for saving $17 billion of oil revenue for the future by paying down the current external debt. Contingency plans predict red ink if oil prices fall below about $18 per barrel. Low prices would be a disaster for Russia. If they also trigger disarray in OPEC, then a sustained period of cheap oil could spread fiscal pain across the oil-producing world. In the past, however, U.S. policy has not changed in response to collapses in world oil prices; U.S. energy firms generally fare poorly in that environment, but consumers gain when they can guzzle more at lower cost and the economy is freer to soar when prices are low.
RUSSIA DISAD
1NC SHELL
( C ) RUSSIAN ECONOMIC FAILURE RISKS NUCLEAR WAR
HAMILTON, 1995
(Lee – representative from Indiana & member of the House international relations committee, Christian Science Monitor, April 24, ln)
RUSSIA today struggles between the forces of reform and repression. It is neither authoritarian nor democratic. It has neither a state-controlled nor a market economy. The challenge for US foreign policy is to keep Russia heading toward political and economic reform. Mr. Clinton's opportunity When President Clinton visits Moscow in May, he should express United States support for reform and democracy but voice strong opposition to Russia's brutal assault on Chechnya, one of its own territories, and to other policies with which we disagree. This visit will also be an opportunity for the president to state US support for principles instead of personalities and to meet important Russian reformers. The good news is that Russia has a Constitution and an elected president and parliament. Dissenting voices are heard. The media is free. Russia is preparing for parliamentary elections this December and presidential elections next June. Private enterprise makes up half of Russia's economy, and its share is growing. Russia is committed to tough reforms approved by the International Monetary Fund.
There is also bad news, beginning with the assault on Chechnya. Inflation, unemployment, and wrenching economic change have left a third of Russians poor. Corruption, organized crime, militant nationalists, and narrow-minded presidential advisers threaten future reform. Government secrecy is returning. Authorities disregard the law. There is no middle class. Churches and unions are discredited. Political parties are struggling to emerge. Frictions with the US have resulted from Chechnya and from Russia's opposition to NATO expansion, its drive to lift sanctions against Serbia and Iraq, and its plans to export arms and nuclear power stations to Iran. If Russia loses, so does US. If Russia continues to move toward a free society and economy, the US will benefit. There will be less risk of nuclear war, lower US defense budgets, new markets for US exports, and more cooperation on regional and global problems. If Russia fails, we lose. Russia and the US are still the world's leading nuclear powers. If Russia returns to tyranny, or disintegrates, the future for US-Russian relations could be grim. There could be a return to the cold war and an expensive arms race. An unstable Russia may lose control of its thousands of nuclear weapons. Some could fall into the hands of outlaw states. Our new friends in Central Europe could come under threat.
RUSSIA DISAD
Uniqueness: Oil Exports Increasing
RUSSIA IS INCREASING ITS OIL EXPORTS
QUAYAT, 2003
(David -- Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS Review, "the Russian oil sector and the global oil economy," Summer/Fall, wilsonselect)
Like its production, Russia's crude oil exports have risen steadily since 1997. Forecasts for 2002 have placed total exports at approximately 5 mb/d,(FN66) approximately 1.3 mb/d of that to the rest of the FSU.(FN67) Of the remainder, about 3 mb/d finds its way into the Western European market, especially to Germany, France, the UK, and Switzerland.(FN68) In the summer of 2002, Russia also made its first oil deliveries to the United States, though this was mostly a ceremonial gesture ahead of energy talks held in October.(FN69) The steady rise in Russian oil exports makes it the second-largest exporter behind Saudi Arabia.
RUSSIAN SUPPLY OF GLOBAL OIL MARKET INCREASING
QUAYAT, 2003
(David -- Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS Review, "the Russian oil sector and the global oil economy," Summer/Fall, wilsonselect)
What does the above analysis of Russia's upstream oil production, policy environment, and transportation system suggest about the broader role of Russian oil in the global market? As noted earlier, interest in Russian crude oil production has increased since the September 11 terrorist attacks, with many arguing that Russia could rival Saudi Arabia in overall production and exports. This optimistic assessment of Russia's future role seems at best generous, at worst na"ive. Russia's importance in the global oil market will no doubt increase over the next decade. But neither the realities of Russia's transportation system nor, more importantly, the projected structure of global oil demand in the coming years, support the conclusion that Russia will be able to assert any form of dominance.
RUSSIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE ONE OF THE WORLD'S KEY OIL SUPPLIERS
NAIM, 2004
(Moises – ed of Foreign Policy, "Russia's Oily Future," Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb, l/n)
Russia's future will be defined as much by the geology of its subsoil as by the ideology of its leaders. Unfortunately, whereas policymakers can choose their ideology, they don't have much leeway when it comes to geology. Russia has a lot of oil, and this inescapable geological fact will determine many of the policy choices available to its leaders. Oil and gas now account for roughly 20 percent of Russia's economy, 55 percent of its export earnings, and 40 percent of its total tax revenues. Russia is the world's second largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia, and its subsoil contains 33 percent of the world's gas reserves. It already supplies 30 percent of Europe's gas needs. In the future, Russia's oil and gas industry will become even more important, as no other sector can be as internationally competitive, grow as rapidly, or be as profitable. Thus, Russia risks becoming, and in many respects may already be, a "petro-state." The arrest of oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky sparked a debate over what kind of country Russia will be. In this discussion, Russia's characteristics as a petro-state deserve as much attention as its factional struggles.
RUSSIA DISAD
Uniqueness: Oil Exports Increasing
Russia is poised to capture the Lion’s share of the global oil economy
Morse and Richard, Executive Adviser at Hess Energy Trading Company and was
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy and portfolio manager
at Firebird Management, an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.3/4 2k2
(Edward and James, “The Battle for Energy Dominance,” Foreign Affairs p.ln)
RUSSIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Nuclear War
Russian civil war ensures proxy wars, and nuclear exchange
David, professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb 1999
(Steven, “Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars,” Foreign Affairs p.ln)
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: High Oil Prices Key to Econ
HIGH OIL PRICES ARE KEY TO THE SAUDI ECONOMY
QUINN, 2004
(Eamon, staff, Sunday Business Post, "more oil price blues ahead," July 18, l/n)
Continued strong demand and slowing Russian production means the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), and in particular Saudi, will yet again have to take up the slack.'' The brokers said that the new capacity constraints spelled good news for investors in oil stocks. There was a very low'' probability of oil falling to $ 25 a barrel, because Saudi Arabia now needed a high oil price to service its burgeoning budget deficit, according to the analysts.
SAUDI ARABIAN ECONOMY IS DEPENDENT ON OIL PRICES
McCARTHY, 2004
(John, staff, Florida Today, "Saudis must get tough on terror," June 18, l/n)
If the Saudi government didn't have incentive to do that before, they do now. The stated goal of the terrorists is to drive all Westerners out of the region. And the State Department has recommended all 25,000 Americans there leave Saudi Arabia. But the Saudi economy is almost totally dependent on the export of oil. And the Saudi oil industry is dependent on foreign workers. If foreigners were to pull out, it is unlikely the nation would be able to continue to export oil in any sizeable amounts, experts say.
SAUDI ARABIAN ECONOMY IS DEPENDENT ON OIL PRICES
Middle East Review World of Information, Sept. 28, 2000 (l/n)
Saudi Arabia's rapid economic development since the 1950s is entirely due to its vast hydrocarbon resources - it has one-quarter of the world's proven oil reserves. Oil accounts for around 90 per cent of the country's exports and three-quarters of the government's revenues. Oil revenues have funded major infrastructure developments and the modernisation of the country's cities, but this dependency means that the economy is vulnerable to falls in the price of oil.
THE SAUDI's BENEFIT FROM HIGH OIL PRICES – THEY CHECK THE OUTPUT FROM OTHER OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS
ENERGY, 2004
("OPEC still declining," January 1, l/n)
Saudi oil export revenues are projected to decline by 14 percent during 2004, to $ 70 billion, compared to $ 81 billion earned in 2003. During the Iraq war starting in March 2003, Saudi Arabia benefited both from higher world oil prices as well as from its ability to increase production and exports sharply and rapidly, due to the country's large spare production capacity. As a result, Saudi Arabia was able to make up for lost production from Venezuela, Iraq, and Nigeria as well as to reap higher revenues. During 2004, Saudi Arabia will likely cut back its production as the year progresses in order to help keep oil prices at desired levels.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Low Oil Prices Cause Instability
PLUMMETING OIL PRICES RISKS MASSIVE POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA
GAUSE, 2000
(Gregory – prof of political science at Univ of Vermont, Foreign Affairs, "Saudi Arabia: Over a Barrel," May/June, l/n)
More ominously, a recurrence of serious fiscal problems could spur a political crisis in Saudi Arabia. Fiscal crises impose on governments the sort of hard choices that can split a ruling elite. With the issue of succession to King Fahd settled in favor of Abdallah, the Saudi elite remained united during the difficult year of 1998. If the next oil price decline coincides with the more difficult succession question of the future -- how to move from the generation of the sons of the kingdom's founder, Abd al-Aziz, to the generation of his grandsons -- oil and economic policy could become enmeshed with struggles for power within the al-Saud family. That generational shift might not come for a decade or more, but a fiscal crisis would certainly exacerbate the underlying tensions in the ruling family. Family factions would then look to mobilize those already discontented due to hard economic times. Serious political instability in the world's biggest oil exporter would be at hand. That prospect is reason enough for the United States to urge its friends in Riyadh to get their house in order.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Low Oil Prices Cause Instability
LOW OIL PRICES PUT SAUDI POLITICAL STABILITY AT RISK
BRONSON, 2001
(Rachel – fellow for national security studies at the council on foreign relations, Orbis, "beyond containment in the Persian Gulf," march 22, ln)
Difficulties are compounded by the instability of the oil markets. When oil prices were low in 1998, GCC economies grew by just 1.2 percent. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts the global growth rate in 2000 to be 4.8 percent, Saudi Arabia is expected to grow by 3.5 percent, and other studies predict that growth in almost all Gulf states will fall below the world average. [7] Perhaps most tellingly, Saudi Arabia's per capita gross domestic product dropped from $ 15,500 in 1980 ($ 2,500 more than the U.S. figure that year) to $ 6,600 in 1998 ($ 25,000 less than in the United States). [8] Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a priority for all of the GCC states, which need capital to fund crucial infrastructure projects. [9] Over the past twenty-five years, Saudi Arabia has drawn only $ 5 billion in foreign capital, although $ 139 billion was available worldwide in 1999 alone. [10] A more transparent economic and legal system would help both to encourage FDI and to end the drain on money kept outside the Gulf. According to the World Bank, GCC nationals hold between $ 150 billion and $ 200 billion abroad, while other analysts put this number closer to $ 500 billion. [11] In addition, the large foreign labor pool remits approximately $ 20 billion per year. [12] Although Gulf states are now reviewing and redrawing domestic laws governing investment, accounting, and adjudication, experts believe the changes are not happening fast enough. For example, Saudi Arabia is opening its multibillion-dollar energy sector, but is unlikely to hit its year-end target for signing memoranda of understanding with big oil firms. [13] Kuwait's privatization efforts remain mired in parliament. Beyond the problems of weak growth and a shortage of capital, the training Gulf college graduates currently receive is not keeping up with the needs of business. As a result, although unemployment is increasing, firms in the region are hiring thousands of skilled foreign nationals. Each state is now trying to strike a balance between religious training and professional skills, and between traditional rote methods and creative thinking. The GCC recently began encouraging the development of a labor exchange that links training and educational programs throughout the region, and each state has offered incentives to hire local nationals. [14] Saudi Arabia, for instance, has set up a fund to assist, share costs, and give loans to private firms that train and employ Saudis. [15] But training costs are high, and companies are reluctant to invest time and money in employees who are often poached by rival firms. The difficulties are compounded by cultural expectations that make it difficult for a firm to fire a natio nal. Oman provides a good example of the region's problems: although the total expatriate labor force declined in 1998 by 2.3 percent, the number of Omani citizens employed by the public sector increased by 2.6 percent. [16] To be sure, Gulf states have taken steps to address some problems. Governments are using the windfalls created by high oil prices to pay down external debt and correct structural weaknesses rather than provide free social services and support inefficient industries, as in the past. [17] But as sluggish economic forecasts and weak job growth indicate, the greatest structural flaw of all has yet to be tackled. The local economies (with the notable exception of the UAE) remain undiversified and excessively vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of oil. Their attractive short-term prospects rely on a tenuous and by most estimates unsustainable revenue stream.
New Opposition
It is difficult to predict exactly how the frustration generated by structural inefficiencies will manifest itself, but Gulf leaders are justifiably worried. Senior Saudi planners and members of the royal family have even identified economic problems as a chief national security problem.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Low Oil Prices Cause Instability
LOW OIL REVENUES COULD WRECK THE SAUDI ECONOMY, RISKING A CIVIL WAR
DAVID, 1999
(Steven – prof of political science at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, "saving America from the coming civil wars," Jan/Feb., l/n)
AS LIKELY as is conflict in Mexico, there is even less hope for Saudi Arabia -- and if the kingdom succumbs to civil war, the outcome will be catastrophic not just for the United States but for the world. A country built on contradictions, Saudi Arabia is extremely vulnerable to internal war. The same factors that have kept its regime in power -- the oil economy, the military, Islam, the royal family -- could now fuel an insurrection. Meanwhile, global dependence on Saudi oil will only increase in coming years, making an interruption in its flow even more dangerous. Fabulous oil wealth has been a mixed blessing for Saudi Arabia. Oil has spared the Saudi government from the need to tax its citizens; as a result, the regime has never learned to convince its subjects to sacrifice for the good of the state (nor have the citizens learned to weather privation). The timid Saudi government must constantly buy the people's loyalty with material comforts. That might not have become a problem had oil prices not begun to drop in the 1980s. Saudi Arabia's per capita GDP plunged from $ 17,000 early in that decade to around $ 7,000 today. Unemployment among high school and university graduates rose to an alarming 25 percent. Struggling to cope with these problems, the government has incurred large deficits since 1983. Meanwhile, the estimated $ 65 billion it spent on the Gulf War only exacerbated matters. But as long as the royal family continues to benefit from government spending by receiving lavish kickbacks from foreign contractors, there seems little hope of major cuts in expenditures. Rather than reduce its reliance on oil, in the face of increased expenses the Saudi economy has become more and more dependent on it, even as oil revenues plummet (oil export earnings are expected to shrink from $ 43 billion in 1997 to just over $ 29 billion in 1998). The government thinks that the damage done to the economy by failing to raise taxes or make major spending cuts is less dangerous than the alternative, which might alienate large portions of the population. But if the economy continues to deteriorate, the government will have to make hard choices that could rock the Saudi state.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Oil Key to Econ
OIL IS KEY TO THE SAUDI ECONOMY
MIHAILESCU, 2004
(Andrea, staff, United Press International, "Saudi Arabia minimizes dependence on oil," Aug 19, ln)
The Saudi oil sector represents 80 percent of the country's budget revenue, generating massive profits, according to Russia's Finansovyye Izvestiya. For instance, the prime cost of extracting oil from the Shaybah field costs approximately $1 per barrel and it costs around $4 per barrel to ship oil from Saudi Arabia to the United States. The field extracts some 600,000 barrels of oil per day; Saudi annual income can be roughly computed to approximately $4 billion. Meanwhile, a skilled worker at the field earns around $15,000 per month, according to Russia's Finansovyye Izvestiya.
LOW OIL PRICES TRASH THE SAUDI ECONOMY, RIPENING IT FOR CIVIL UNREST
JAFFE AND MANNING, 2000
(Amy Myers Jaffe – dir of the Energy Research Program at the James Baker Institute for public policy at Rice Univ, and Robert Manning – sr fellow and dir of asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, "the shocks of a world of cheap oil," Jan/Feb, l/n)
Sustained low oil prices also mean tremors in the Persian Gulf -- the site of a fundamental U.S. military commitment. The longer oil prices droop, the more daunting the political, social, and economic challenges that the Gulf countries will face. Social unrest already bubbles under the surface in most Gulf countries, and succession crises may erupt as a generation of aging leaders passes. Populations in the region are swelling at a rate of 4 percent or more per year -- a pattern that foreshadows the worsening demographic bulges caused by large populations under the age of 25 throughout the Gulf. Already, half of the Gulf's inhabitants are under 15 years old, portending daunting problems in education and employment as well as increased strains on local infrastructure and resources such as food, water, health, and electric power. Per capita incomes have plummeted; in Saudi Arabia, for example, real per capita GDP fell from $ 11,450 in 1984 to $ 6,725 a decade later. And oil is no panacea. Since 1982, Saudi Arabia has gone from $ 140 billion in surplus revenues to run up a national debt of almost $ 130 billion. As the Gulf's economies shrink, jobs are becoming an increasingly critical problem. In the ten largest Saudi cities, for example, unemployment is socking the middle classes, and about 20 -- 30 percent of Saudis lack jobs. Broad cultural and demographic shifts do not help, either. Many countries, especially Saudi Arabia, now have a large, idle class of students, some favoring religious study. If employment opportunities in the kingdom remain bleak, Riyadh could lose its ability to co-opt this expanding younger generation, which could become a major constituency for Islamist opposition movements.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Saudis Perceive Oil Prices
SAUDI ARABIA WATCHES OIL PRICES CLOSELY
CAREY et al., 2004
(Glen, staff, Platt's Oilgram News, "Naimi says new Saudi fear is flooded market," June 3, l/n)
The Saudi minister said last month Riyadh was prepared to raise output to its full capacity of 10.5-mil b/d if its customers needed more oil. Naimi did not repeat that pledge in the same manner June 2, saying instead he feared saturating the market. "The kingdom currently has spare capacity of around 2-mil b/d and we have absolutely no objection and we are absolutely ready to raise the kingdom's production. But our main fear is flooding the market. We have to be wary of [this] because this is what happened in 1998-99," Naimi said. "The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, together with producers inside and outside OPEC, is working together to guarantee there are sufficient supplies of oil on the market. But at the same time, we want to avoid oversupply which could lead to the market collapsing." "We need to reduce this perception of a potential shortage in the market...Eventually people will see that fundamentals are in balance and that prices will hopefully stabilize," Naimi said. Saudi Arabia and other cartel members were all watching oil prices carefully, he said. "I can assure you the kingdom, and all OPEC members, are concerned by the oil price issue.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Price Fluctuations Hurt Econ
OIL FLUCTUATIONS DRASTICALLY AFFECT SAUDI ECONOMY
BAER, 2003
(Robert – former agent in the CIA, Atlantic Monthly, "The fall of the House of Saud," May, wilsonselect)
The functioning of the world's most advanced welfare state is influenced overwhelmingly by fluctuations in the price of oil. In 1981, when the entire kingdom was in effect being put on the dole, oil was selling at nearly $40 a barrel, and the annual per capita income was $28,600. A decade later, just before Iraq invaded Kuwait, refiners were able to buy oil for about $15 a barrel. The Gulf War sent prices back up to about $36 a barrel before they quickly fell. Today a barrel of oil once again fetches around $40, but twenty years' worth of inflation, combined with a population explosion, has brought per capita income down to below $7,000. Because roughly 85 percent of Saudi Arabia's total revenues are oil-based, every dollar increase in the price of a barrel of oil means a gain of about $3 billion to the Saudi treasury. In the early 1980s the kingdom boasted cash reserves on the order of $120 billion; today the figure is estimated to be $21 billion.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Saudi Arabia Key Supplier to US
SAUDIA ARABIA IS A KEY OIL SUPPLIER TO THE U.S.
LeBLOND, 2004
(Doris, staff, Oil & Gas Journal, "international oil summit addresses high oil prices," May 24, ln)
One political view was expressed by Petrostrategies Director Pierre Terzian, who pointed to the tensions between the US and its major supplier, Saudi Arabia -- which already has started diversifying its oil partnership base away from the US -- and to the fact that "Washington's opinion no longer has much impact within OPEC" because of the Bush administration's "unreserved support" for Israel's Ariel Sharon.
SAUDI ARABIA IS A KEY OIL SUPPLIER TO THE U.S.
ECONOMIC NEWS, 2004
("share of import in US oil processing increased to 62.9%," Jan. 5, l/n)
Saudi Arabia was the key oil supplier to the US in 2003. This country supplied to America on average 1,76 million barrels per day. Then follows Mexico (1,57 million barrels per day), Canada (1,53 million barrels) and Venezuela (1,16 million barrels). K2-Kapital Company reported on it.
U.S. DEMAND IS THE LINCHPIN OF THE SAUDI OIL ECONOMY
MORSE AND RICHARD, 2002
(Edward Morse – exec advisor to Hess Energy Trading Company & former depty asst secretary of state for int'l energy policy, & James Richard – manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund in Eastern Europe, Foreign Affairs, "The Battle for Energy Dominance," March/April, ln)
One of the hidden aspects of the relationship is the Saudi dependence on the United States for providing an expanding market. Although Asian demand for oil is expected to grow dramatically in coming decades, no other economy rivals that of the United States for the growth of its oil imports. Over the past decade, the increase in the U.S. share of the oil market, in terms of trade, was higher than the total oil consumption in any other country, save Japan and China. The U.S. increase in imports accounts for more than a third of the total increase in oil trade and more than half of the total increase in OPEC's production during the 1990s. This fact, together with the fall in U.S. oil production, means that the United States will remain the single most important force in the oil market. The hope of Saudi Arabia and OPEC for an increased market and for greater market share is uniquely dependent on growth in U.S. demand. Hence it is not for security alone that Riyadh depends on the United States but for the very economic basis of the Saudi regime, which relies almost entirely on oil for revenue.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Saudi Arabia Key to World Oil Market
SAUDI ARABIA IS KEY TO GLOBAL OIL MARKETS
MORSE AND RICHARD, 2002
(Edward Morse – exec advisor to Hess Energy Trading Company & former depty asst secretary of state for int'l energy policy, & James Richard – manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund in Eastern Europe, Foreign Affairs, "The Battle for Energy Dominance," March/April, ln)
RIYADH'S RELATIONS with Washington are much more complex than they appear on the surface, because they involve unspoken understandings and a number of useful fictions. September 11 has complicated these understandings, because the publics in both countries are suspicious of the cooperation between the two governments. Washington recognizes Saudi Arabia's critical role in the global oil sector, especially Riyadh's price moderation. Saudi Arabia, in turn, plays its Washington cards diligently. The kingdom has protected its position as the top U.S. supplier. Today, Saudi Arabia supplies around 1.7 mbd of the roughly 10 mbd imported into the United States -- a market share higher than that of any competitor. The kingdom maintains this share to show how important Saudi supplies are to the United States. The Saudi leadership can thus ensure that Washington will help defend Saudi Arabia, which means not only the defense of the kingdom's oil fields and territorial integrity but the defense of the House of Saud.
SAUDI ARABIA IS VITAL FOR THE GLOBAL FLOW OF OIL – THEY HAVE MORE RESOURCES AND ARE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE OIL PRICE
ECONOMIST, 2004
("What if? Saudi Arabia and oil," May 29, l/n)
Surely all this investment and discovery prove that the Saudis are ever less important to the oil market these days? Nonsense. Ignore the headlines and look instead at geological and market realities, and it quickly becomes clear that Saudi Arabia remains the indispensable nation of oil. The Saudis not only export more oil than anyone else, but they also have more reserves than anyone else—by a long shot. Fully one-quarter of the world's proven reserves lie in Saudi Arabia. Four neighbours—Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait—each have about one-tenth. Russia, Nigeria and Alaska put together do not match Saudi reserves. Even more important is Saudi Arabia's role as swing producer. Unlike other countries, the Saudis keep several million barrels per day (bpd) of idle capacity on hand for emergencies. Today Saudi Arabia is the only country with much spare capacity available (see chart 1), though the precise amount is a matter of intense debate. Nansen Saleri, an official at Saudi Aramco, the country's state-owned oil company, will say only that Saudi output will rise in June to about 9m bpd, and that the country can raise its output above 10m bpd "rapidly". This spare capacity allows the Saudis to moderate oil-price spikes. They have done precisely this at various times: during the Iran-Iraq war, when output from both countries was disrupted; during and after the first Gulf war, when output from Iraq and Kuwait was lost; and last year, when civil strife in Venezuela and Nigeria curbed output from both countries on the eve of last year's invasion of Iraq (which itself disrupted Iraqi output).
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Saudi Arabia Key to World Oil Market
SAUDI ARABIA IS A KEY OIL SUPPLIER WITH PROVEN RESERVES
BAHGAT, 2003
(Gawdat – director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Department of Political Science, at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, World Affairs, "Oil and Militant Islam," January 1, EbscoHost)
With approximately 261 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (more than one-fourth of the world total) and up to 1 trillion barrels of ultimately recoverable oil, Saudi Arabia is the world's leading producer and exporter.(n5) In addition to this enormous oil reserve, Riyadh's cost of production is one of the lowest in the world--less than $1.50 per barrel, whereas the global average cost is about $5, and much higher in some places. Also, Saudi Arabia has a great advantage when it comes to adding new reserves or increasing production capacity. According to the Saudi oil minister, Ali al-Naimi, it costs the kingdom less than ten cents a barrel to discover new reserves; the cost in some other areas of the world can be as high as $4 per barrel.(n6)
SAUDI ARABIA IS KEY TO THE GLOBAL OIL MARKET
BAER, 2003
(Robert – former agent in the CIA, Atlantic Monthly, "The fall of the House of Saud," May, wilsonselect)
Promoters of Alaskan, Mexican Gulf, Caspian, and Siberian oil all like to point out that the United States has been weaning itself from Saudi Arabian oil, for protection against the effects of just such an attack on the Saudi oil system. Saudi Arabia may sit on 25 percent of the world's known oil reserves, they argue, but it provides somewhere around 18 percent of the crude oil consumed by the United States--and that is down from 28 percent in only a decade. What these people fail to mention is that Saudi Arabia has the world's only important surplus production capacity--two million barrels a day. This keeps the world market liquid. Not only that, but because the Saudis more or less determine the price of oil globally by deciding how much oil to produce, even countries that don't buy Saudi oil would be vulnerable if the flow of that oil were disrupted.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Saudi Arabia Key to World Oil Market
SAUDI ARABIA IS KEY TO THE GLOBAL OIL MARKET
BAHGAT, 2003
(Gawdat – dir of the Center of Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana Univ in Pennsylvania, Orbis, "The new geopolitics of oil," summer, EbscoHost)
Second, Saudi Arabia, like other large Persian Gulf oil producers, is a very small oil consumer. Non-Persian Gulf producers such as the United States and Russia consume either all or a large portion of their production. This gives the kingdom extra weight in global oil trade. Third, unlike Russia, which is moving toward privatization, the kingdom has a nationalized oil industry, with the government exercising full control and ownership of all the country's oil fields. Fourth, Saudi Arabia has free access to the sea. Its export pipeline infrastructure is extremely well developed, linking crude fields with marine export terminals and loading platforms on the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Fifth, most of the world's spare productive capacity is located in Saudi Arabia. This is an important strategic asset for the kingdom: whenever a sudden interruption of supplies occurs, the kingdom can fill the gap in a very short time. This serves as an insurance policy against temporary shortages in world oil supplies. All these characteristics of the Saudi oil industry taken together make the kingdom one of the most important players, if not the most important, in the global oil market. The United States therefore has a strong and continuing interest in securing Saudi cooperation on the non-interruption of its oil supplies and stability of oil prices.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: High Oil Price Checks Political Instability
SAUDI ECONOMY RELIES ON OIL REVENUE WHICH IS KEY TO PREVENT POLITICAL INSTABILITY
NEIL, 2002
(Andrew, staff, Scotland on Sunday, "Hostages to Fortune," April 7, ln)
But the Achilles heel of any potential Opec conspiracy to hike oil prices to levels that might threaten world economic stability is that paradox, Saudi Arabia, sitting astride 25 per cent of the world's known oil reserves, with probably more at its command should it ever stir itself to fresh exploration efforts. The Saudis may foment anti-Americanism in the region and bankroll terrorism while publicly posturing as America's ally; but its freedom to strong arm the US by using the oil threat is undermined by a greater realpolitic: the survival of its corrupt, despotic regime. Saudi attempts since the 1970s to build a diversified economy from the fat profits of higher oil process have failed miserably. If anything, its royal family is even more heavily in hock to an uninterrupted stream of oil revenues to keep revolution, always a risk, at bay now than it was then. Put simply, the Saudis need the oil revenues more than America needs the oil.
With 30 years of accumulated oil revenues invested in global markets, the last thing Saudi princes want to see is global recession and a collapse in the value of their share portfolios. Oil revenues account for 70 per cent of Saudi income, spent mostly on the 21st-century's equivalent of Julius Caesar's beer and circuses: free housing, water, worthless, prejudiced, anti-Western education, subsidised desert crops and pointless construction projects. Any glitch in this would spell doom for the ruling family.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Economy Key to Political Stability
FAILED ECONOMIC REFORMS IN SAUDI ARABIA RISK INSURRECTION
POLLACK, 2003
(Kenneth -- Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs, "Securing the Gulf," July/Aug, l/n)
Terrorism and internal instability in the Persian Gulf are ultimately fueled by the political, economic, and social stagnation of the local Arab states. It is true that American policies anger many Arabs and that the Palestinian issue is a matter of great popular concern. But these are not really what creates fertile ground for domestic insurrection or the recruitment efforts of radical Islamist groups such as al Qaeda. What is more important is that too many Arabs are unemployed or underemployed because of the utter failure of their economic systems. Too many feel powerless and humiliated by despotic governments that do less and less for them while preventing them from having any say in their own governance. And too many feel both threatened and stifled within a society that cannot come to grips with modernity. Most Middle East experts think that a revolution or civil war in any of the GCC states within the next few years is unlikely, but few say so now as confidently as they once did. In fact, even the Persian Gulf regimes themselves are increasingly fearful of their mounting internal turmoil, something that has prompted all of them to announce democratic and economic reform packages at some point during the last ten years. From Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to the emir of Qatar to the new king of Bahrain, the Persian Gulf rulers recognize the pressure building among their populations and the need to let off some of the steam. If the reforms do not succeed and revolution or civil war ensues, the United States might face some very difficult security challenges. Widespread unrest in Saudi Arabia, for example, would threaten Saudi oil exports just as surely as an Iranian invasion.
OIL INSTABILITY TRIGGERS POLITICAL INSTABILITY
SAMUELSON, 2004
(Robert, staff, Newsweek, "The cartel we love to hate," Feb. 23, l/n)
It's this roller coaster that OPEC wants to avoid. Low prices deprive producer governments of their biggest source of money and, thereby, threaten their existence. Oil instability promotes political instability, which may cause more oil instability.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
I/L: Economy Key to Political Stability
OIL EARNINGS ARE KEY TO QUIESCE RADICAL MOVEMENTS
JAFFE AND MANNING, 2000
(Amy Myers Jaffe – dir of the Energy Research Program at the James Baker Institute for public policy at Rice Univ, and Robert Manning – sr fellow and dir of asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, "the shocks of a world of cheap oil," Jan/Feb, l/n)
Distributing economic spoils has been a major vehicle for the Gulf regimes to sustain their power base and legitimacy. In some Gulf countries, as many as 90 percent of the labor force work in government jobs. Political critics and potential opposition leaders are frequently bought off through subsidies, high offices, or other tokens of wealth and status. The regimes also build religious centers, medical facilities, and other services to placate the disgruntled. But economic stagnation has already strengthened local resentment over official corruption and greed and has widened disparities between rich and poor. Without healthy oil revenues to buy off restive populations, the Gulf leaders will be left with only repression to silence foes and quell public discontent, which could fuel even more violent opposition. Radicalized local populations could also threaten the Middle East peace process; disgruntled Gulf states might be tempted to placate Islamist movements by funding the terrorists of Hamas, for instance.
DETIORATING ECONOMY CAN TRIGGER MULTIPLE CAUSES OF SAUDI CIVIL WAR
DAVID, 1999
(Steven – prof of political science at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, "saving America from the coming civil wars," Jan/Feb., l/n)
As the above suggests, Saudi Arabia suffers from the fact that the various threats to domestic peace all reinforce one another. The bad economy intensifies religious extremism, which in turn exacerbates divisions in the armed forces. The catalyst for civil war can therefore come from one of several different sources. A power struggle in the royal family over succession to the throne, squabbles over shares of an ever-shrinking economic pie, or disenchantment in the military with the royal family's selfish behavior could all set off a major conflagration.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Instability Causes Depression
SAUDI INSTABILITY CAN IGNITE A GLOBAL RECESSION
MORITSUGU, 2004
(Ken, staff, Courier Mail, "fine line to tread at OPEC," June 4, l/n)
As the only country with significant spare production capacity, Saudi Arabia alone can offset any cutoff in supply elsewhere. If Saudi production were lost, no country could fill the gap. "The market is fearing its worst fears," said Joseph Stanislaw, the president of Cambridge Energy Research Associates in the US. "If something happens in Saudi Arabia, there's nothing to make up for it." That fear has added $US6 to $US8 to the price of a barrel of oil, many analysts think. Others put the premium in the $US3 to $US5 range. A successful attack on Saudi facilities would push up prices even further, threatening the US and global economic recovery. That is bad news from OPEC's point of view, too, because recessions reduce the demand for oil.
COLLAPSE OF SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION WILL TRIGGER A GLOBAL DEPRESSION
POLLACK, 2003
(Kenneth -- Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs, "Securing the Gulf," July/Aug, l/n)
America's primary interest in the Persian Gulf lies in ensuring the free and stable flow of oil from the region to the world at large. This fact has nothing to do with the conspiracy theories leveled against the Bush administration during the run-up to the recent war. U.S. interests do not center on whether gas is $2 or $3 at the pump, or whether Exxon gets contracts instead of Lukoil or Total. Nor do they depend on the amount of oil that the United States itself imports from the Persian Gulf or anywhere else. The reason the United States has a legitimate and critical interest in seeing that Persian Gulf oil continues to flow copiously and relatively cheaply is simply that the global economy built over the last 50 years rests on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil, and if that foundation were removed, the global economy would collapse. Today, roughly 25 percent of the world's oil production comes from the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for roughly 15 percent -- a figure expected to increase rather than decrease in the future. The Persian Gulf region has as much as two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, and its oil is absurdly economical to produce, with a barrel from Saudi Arabia costing anywhere from a fifth to a tenth of the price of a barrel from Russia. Saudi Arabia is not only the world's largest oil producer and the holder of the world's largest oil reserves, but it also has a majority of the world's excess production capacity, which the Saudis use to stabilize and control the price of oil by increasing or decreasing production as needed. Because of the importance of both Saudi production and Saudi slack capacity, the sudden loss of the Saudi oil network would paralyze the global economy, probably causing a global downturn at least as devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930s, if not worse. So the fact that the United States does not import most of its oil from the Persian Gulf is irrelevant: if Saudi oil production were to vanish, the price of oil in general would shoot through the ceiling, destroying the American economy along with everybody else's.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Instability Causes Depression
SAUDI ARABIA NEEDS OIL REVENUE TO PREVENT A CIVIL WAR
JAFFE AND MANNING, 2000
(Amy Myers Jaffe – dir of the Energy Research Program at the James Baker Institute for public policy at Rice Univ, and Robert Manning – sr fellow and dir of asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, "the shocks of a world of cheap oil," Jan/Feb, l/n)
Neither, frankly, is Washington. The political reverberations of a sustained oil glut should not be underestimated. Several important regimes -- in the Gulf states, Russia, the former Soviet republics, and such key Latin American countries as Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia -- count on healthy oil revenues for calming restive populations, assuaging social tensions, and in some cases, nation-building writ large. Without the salve of rising oil revenues, many of these nations can expect to see heightened political instability, social unrest, or even civil wars, which could be grimly reminiscent of recent Balkan slaughters. In the Gulf, such instability could trigger the next oil shocks in the form of short-term disruptions. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the West's capacity to defend important oil regions from traditional external threats like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But America's painful experiences with revolutionary Iran in the late 1970s and the Balkans in the 1990s are grim reminders of how hard it can be to cope with internal instability. The new dynamics of the global oil market have profound implications for U.S. national security policy. Washington had better gird itself.
A REVOLUTION IN SAUDI ARABIA WILL CRUSH THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
BAER, 2003
(Robert – former agent in the CIA, Atlantic Monthly, "The fall of the House of Saud," May, wilsonselect)
Not all the wishing in the world will change the basic reality of the situation.
* Saudi Arabia controls the largest share of the world's oil and serves as the market regulator for the global petroleum industry.
* No country consumes more oil, and is more dependent on Saudi oil, than the United States.
* The United States and the rest of the industrialized world are therefore absolutely dependent on Saudi Arabia's oil reserves, and will be for decades to come.
* If the Saudi oil spigot is shut off, by terrorism or by political revolution, the effect on the global economy, and particularly on the economy of the United States, will be devastating.
SAUDI POLITICAL INSTABILITY WILL DEVASTATE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
COHEN, 2003
(Ariel – Heritage Foundation, Washington Times, "energy security at risk," May 23, l/n)
Al Qaeda's recent attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the closure of the U.S. Embassy there, have exposed the weaknesses of the kingdom's security apparatus. These developments also further one of Osama bin Laden's goals to drive the "infidels" from the "Land of the Two Mosques" and topple the monarchy. Clearly, the global economy and the United States are at risk. If the Saudi regime falters, if the kingdom's vast oil infrastructure is damaged, or if a prolonged civil war erupts, oil prices are likely to skyrocket. A deep economic recession would be triggered by the high cost of energy, with devastating consequences, particularly in an election season. The United States must draw the obvious conclusions and take precautions, and it has to act now.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Instability Causes Depression
SAUDI POLITICAL INSTABILITY WILL TRIGGER MASSIVE OIL SHOCKS
COGGAN, 2004
(Philip, staff, Financial Times, "the short view," July 2, ln)
Although oil prices are well below their 1970s levels in real terms, it is not difficult to imagine them returning to such peaks, at least in the short term, should the Saudi Arabian regime collapse. That would be a real "oil shock" for the global economy.
SAUDI CIVIL WAR WILL CAUSE A GLOBAL RECESSION
ROBERTS, 2004
(Paul – author of The End of Oil, Fresh Air, May 6, l/n)
Well, it depends how quickly that happens. I mean, there are essentially two scenarios to move into a post-oil order. The first is the real nasty one. That's where a country like Saudi Arabia or Venezuela falls into civil war, and all of a sudden you have, in the case of Saudi Arabia, you know, eight million barrels of oil of daily production taken off the market. And it's chaos, it's oil price spikes, it's recession, and we're forced to cut back our oil use and to rapidly develop alternatives, you know, which means you'd get the quickest energy source you could, which in this country would be coal. And that would be disastrous for our efforts to keep climate from changing. So that's the bad scenario.
SAUDI CIVIL WAR WILL CAUSE A GLOBAL DEPRESSION
SAMPSON, 2004
(Anthony, staff, Daily Mail, "forge Iraq, this is the real threat," June 1, ln)
The Saudis, with much American help, have responded by massively increasing the military defences of their oilfields, with between 20,000 and 30,000 troops and security guards. But the loyalty of these guards has become much less certain in recent months, to the extent that the prospect of a civil war in Saudi Arabia is no longer altogether fanciful; nor would the result of such a war be predictable. A fundamentalist victory in Saudi Arabia would provide a greater challenge to Western security than either Iraq or Afghanistan, for it could create an energy crisis which would damage the world economy. The Western consuming countries are normally not worried about radical governments taking power in oil-producing countries, because even rogue states have to sell their oil to pay for their ambitious plans. But if the fundamentalists were eventually to take control of Saudi Arabia, they would not feel the same necessity. They have always said that the oil wealth has corrupted their country and the austere Islamic faith on which the kingdom was founded. They would be glad to reduce their oil exports to punish the West, and to revert to a simpler way of life.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Instability Causes Depression
A SAUDI CIVIL WAR WILL TRIGGER A GLOBAL DEPRESSION
DAVID, 1999
(Steven – prof of political science at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, "Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars," Jan/Feb, ln)
As the above suggests, Saudi Arabia suffers from the fact that the various threats to domestic peace all reinforce one another. The bad economy intensifies religious extremism, which in turn exacerbates divisions in the armed forces. The catalyst for civil war can therefore come from one of several different sources. A power struggle in the royal family over succession to the throne, squabbles over shares of an ever-shrinking economic pie, or disenchantment in the military with the royal family's selfish behavior could all set off a major conflagration. In a Saudi civil war, the oil fields will be a likely battle site, as belligerents seek the revenue and international recognition that come with control of petroleum. For either side to cripple oil production would not be difficult. The real risk lies not with the onshore oil wells themselves, which are spread over a 100-by-300 mile area, but in the country's dependence on only a few critical processing sites. Destruction of these facilities would paralyze production and take at least six months to repair. If unconventional weapons such as biological agents were used in the oil fields, production could be delayed for several more months until workers were convinced it was safe to return. Stanching the flow of Saudi oil would devastate the United States and much of the world community. Global demand for oil (especially in Asia) will increase in the coming decades, while non-Persian Gulf supplies are expected to diminish. A crisis in the planet's largest oil producer, with reserves estimated at 25 percent of the world's total, would have a massive and protracted impact on the price and availability of oil worldwide. As the disruptions of 1973 and 1979 showed, the mere threat of diminished oil supply can cause panic buying, national hysteria, gas lines, and infighting. Prices for oil shot up 400 percent in 1973, 150 percent in 1979, and 50 percent (in just 15 days) in 1990. The oil shocks of the 1970s threw the United States into recession, causing spiraling inflation and a decline in savings rates that plagues the U.S. economy even now. Trillions of dollars were lost worldwide. And all this occurred at a time when the United States was less dependent on foreign petroleum than it is now. Cutting the Saudi pipeline today would cause a severe worldwide recession or depression. Short of physical attack, it is the gravest threat imaginable to American interests.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: US Power Projection
Saudi stability key to US power projection
Pollack 2003 (Kenneth; Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs July/August l/n wdc/wbw)
But the United States is not simply concerned with keeping oil flowing out of the Persian Gulf; it also has an interest in preventing any potentially hostile state from gaining control over the region and is resources and using such control to amass vast power or blackmail the world. And it has an interest in maintaining military access to the Persian Gulf because of the region's geostrategically critical location, near the Middle East, Central Asia, eastern Africa, and South Asia. If the United States were denied access to the Persian Gulf, its ability to influence events in many other key regions of the world would be greatly diminished. (Much of the air war against Afghanistan, for example, was mounted from bases in the Persian Gulf.) The tragedy of September 11, 2001, finally, has demonstrated that the United States also has an interest in stamping out the terrorist groups that flourish in the region.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Genocides
CIVIL WARS RISK TURNING INTO GENOCIDES
DIAMOND, 2003
(Jared – prof of geography and envtl health sciences at UCLA, Harper's Magazine, "the last Americans," June 1, l/n)
The connection between the two lists is transparent. Today, just as in the past, countries that are environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or both are at risk of becoming politically stressed, and of seeing their governments collapse. When people are desperate and undernourished, they blame their government, which they see as responsible for failing to solve their problems. They try to emigrate at any cost. They start civil wars. They kill one another. They figure that they have nothing to lose, so they become terrorists, or they support or tolerate terrorism. The results are genocides such as the ones that already have exploded in Burundi, Indonesia, and Rwanda; civil wars, as in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands; calls for the dispatch of First World troops, as to Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines, Rwanda, the Solomon Islands, and Somalia; the collapse of central government, as has already happened in Somalia; and overwhelming poverty, as in all of the countries on these lists.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Climate Control
SAUDI CIVIL WAR WILL UNDERMINE GLOBAL CLIMATE CONTROL
ROBERTS, 2004
(Paul – author of The End of Oil, Fresh Air, May 6, l/n)
Well, it depends how quickly that happens. I mean, there are essentially two scenarios to move into a post-oil order. The first is the real nasty one. That's where a country like Saudi Arabia or Venezuela falls into civil war, and all of a sudden you have, in the case of Saudi Arabia, you know, eight million barrels of oil of daily production taken off the market. And it's chaos, it's oil price spikes, it's recession, and we're forced to cut back our oil use and to rapidly develop alternatives, you know, which means you'd get the quickest energy source you could, which in this country would be coal. And that would be disastrous for our efforts to keep climate from changing. So that's the bad scenario.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Prolif
CIVIL WAR RISKS SAUDI PROLIFERATION OF WMD
DAVID, 1999
(Steven – prof of political science at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, "saving America from the coming civil wars," Jan/Feb., l/n)
There is something to this view. Most civil wars do not directly threaten the United States or its allies. While recent internal conflicts have raised humanitarian concerns, none has seriously affected American security or economic interests. This, however, was largely a matter of luck. The United States should recognize a vital and sobering truth: that Russia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia all now stand on the brink of civil war, conflicts that would have devastating consequences for the United States. These consequences are not the traditional dangers of state-to-state aggression, such as outside attack or invasion. Though largely ignored by scholars and policymakers, who remain fixated on the idea of international conflict, internal war has emerged as a principal threat to security in the post-Cold War world.
THE END OF THE WORLD (AS WE KNOW IT)
CONFLICTS FOUGHT within the borders of a single state send shock waves far beyond their frontiers. To begin with, internal wars risk destroying assets the United States needs. Were the Persian Gulf oil fields destroyed in a Saudi civil war, the American economy (and those of the rest of the developed world) would suffer severely. Internal wars can also unleash threats that stable governments formerly held in check. As central governments weaken and fall, weapons of mass destruction may fall into the hands of rogue leaders or anti-American factions. More directly, internal wars endanger American citizens living and traveling abroad. Liberia will not be the last place America sends helicopters to rescue its stranded citizens. Finally, internal wars, when they erupt on U.S. borders, threaten to destabilize America itself. U.S. intervention in Haiti was spurred, in large part, by fear of the flood of refugees poised to enter the United States.
Saudi fears of Iran, Israeli nuclear programs and fear of America/Saudi rift risks Saudi going nuclear
Russell, adjunct assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, 1-4-2k4
(Richard, “Saudi Nukes,” p. )
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: Prolif
Reports prove that Saudi is pursing membership in the ‘Nuclear Club’
Dvali, research assistant Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 3-2k4
(Akaki, “Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Wepons,” p. )
SPLIT IN US-SAUDI TIES RISKS SAUDI PROLIF
LEVI, 2003
(Michael – science & technology fellow at Brookings Institute, "Would the Saudis go nuclear?" The New Republic, June 2,
)
Realists counter that the United States needs Saudi oil and Saudi military bases. But there's a less obvious argument for making sure the long-standing Washington-Riyadh partnership doesn't fracture: If it does, the Saudis might well go nuclear. Saudi Arabia could develop a nuclear arsenal relatively quickly. In the late '80s, Riyadh secretly purchased between 50 and 60 CSS-2 missiles from China. The missiles were advanced, each with a range of up to 3,500 kilometers and a payload capacity of up to 2,500 kilograms. What concerned observers, though, was not so much these impressive capabilities but rather the missiles' dismal accuracy. Mated to a conventional warhead, with a destructive radius of at most tens of meters, these CSS-2 missiles would be useless—their explosives would miss the target. But the CSS-2 is perfect for delivering a nuclear weapon. The missile itself may miss by a couple of kilometers, but, if the bomb's destructive radius is roughly as large, it will still destroy the target. The CSS-2 purchase, analysts reasoned, was an indication that the Saudis were at least hedging in the nuclear direction. July 1994 brought more news of Saudi interest in nuclear weapons when defector Mohammed Al Khilewi, a former diplomat in the Saudi U.N. mission, told London's Sunday Times that, between 1985 and 1990, Saudi Arabia had actively aided Iraq's nuclear weapons program, both financially and technologically, in return for a share of the program's product. Though Khilewi produced letters supporting his claim, no one has publicly corroborated his accusations. Still, the episode was unsettling. Then, in July 1999, The New York Times reported that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud had recently visited sensitive Pakistani nuclear weapons sites. Prince Sultan toured the Kahuta facility where Pakistan produced enriched uranium for nuclear bombs—and which, at the same time, was allegedly supplying materiel and expertise to the North Korean nuclear program. The Saudis refused to explain the prince's visit. If Saudi Arabia chose the nuclear path, it would most likely exploit this Pakistani connection. Alternatively, it could go to North Korea or even to China, which has sold the Saudis missiles in the past.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: US-Saudi Relations Key to Check Prolif
TIES WITH THE US KEEP THE SAUDIS FROM PROLIFERATING
LEVI, 2003
(Michael – science & technology fellow at Brookings Institute, "Would the Saudis go nuclear?" The New Republic, June 2,
)
Holding back the Saudi nuclear program, of course, has been the kingdom's relationship with the United States. Though America has never signed a formal treaty with Riyadh, since World War II the United States has made clear by its actions—most notably, by protecting Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf war—and by informal guarantees given to Saudi leaders by American officials that it will protect the monarchy from outside threats.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: US-Saudi Relations key to Mid-East Peace Coop
US-Saudi relations are critical to security cooperation in the Mid-East
Chanin & Gause III, president of The Legacy Project & Professor of Mid-East Studies U of Vermont, 12-22-2k3
(Roger and Bob, “U.S.-Saudi relations: bump in the road or end of the road?” Middle East Policy Vol. 10 no. 4 p.ln)
Conflict in the Middle East will Escalate to Global Nuclear War
Steinbach 2002 (John; Center for Research on Globalization, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace” March accessed 8/6/04 wdc/wbw)
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: US-Saudi Relations key to Mid-East Peace Coop
US-Saudi cooperation critical to Mid-East Peace Process
Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program, 5-16-2k3
(Anthony, p. 5)
US-Saudi cooperation critical to US training of Saudi National Guard and regional security
Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the Center's Middle East Program, 5-16-2k3
(Anthony, p. 5)
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: US-Saudi Relations Key to Global Oil Flow
Saudi-US relations are critical to maintain stable flow of oil
Chanin & Gause III, president of The Legacy Project & Professor of Mid-East Studies U of Vermont, 12-22-2k3
(Roger and Bob, “U.S.-Saudi relations: bump in the road or end of the road?” Middle East Policy Vol. 10 no. 4 p.ln)
US-Saudi relations secure American air-basing rights
Gause, Professor of Political Science at U of Vermont, 5-22-2k2
(Gregory, “The Future of US-Saudi Relations,” FDCH p.ln)
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extensions: US-Saudi Relations Key to Basing Rights
Saudi airbases are critical to air-force power projection in the Mid-East/Afghanistan
Kaiser & Ottaway, Washington Post Staff Writers, 2-11-2k2
(Robert and David, “Oil for Security Fueled Close Ties,” The Washington Post p. ln)
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD
Impact Extension: US-Saudi Relations Prevent Coup
US-Saudi relations are critical to Mid-East stability and anchoring preventing Saudi Royal family coup
Gawdat, Winter 2k3
(Bahgat, “Oil and Militant Islam: Strains on US-Saudi Relations,” World Affairs Vol. 165, issue. 3 P.Academic Search Premier)
Saudi basing rights aren’t stable – American commitment to GCC states secures needed bases
Gause III, Professor of Mid-East Politics and IR U of Vermont, 5-20-2k3
(Gregory, “The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of US-Relations with the Gulf States,” p. )
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD – AFF
AT: US Relations Impact
Even hard-right neo-conservatives oppose the current Saudi-American relationship
Gause III, Professor of Mid-East Politics and IR U of Vermont, 5-20-2k3
(Gregory, “The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of US-Relations with the Gulf States,” p. )
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD – AFF
AT: Coup/Succession Impact
SAUDI ARABIA NOT AT RISK TO SUCCESSION
BRONSON, 2001
(Rachel – fellow for national security studies at the council on foreign relations, Orbis, "beyond containment in the Persian Gulf," march 22, ln)
To be sure, by traditional measures the region is more stable than it has been for some time. Leadership succession is no longer the pressing concern it was just a few years ago. The speed with which the Qatari and Bahraini transitions occurred was promising, and Crown Prince Abdallah's assumption of power in Saudi Arabia has occurred in all but name. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to face a succession crisis for a decade or more, when the decision will need to be made on how to pass the mantle of leadership from the sons of Abdel Azziz to his grandsons. In the UAE, power is likely to pass seamlessly from Sheikh Zayed to his oldest son, Khalifa, who will himself determine his successor. The transitions in Kuwait and Oman, however, remain unclear. For its part, Iran is also no longer aggressively trying to export Islamic revolution and, particularly under President Mohammed Khatami, has sought to engage its Arab neighbors rather than threaten them. [19]
EVEN IF RADICALS OVERTHROW SAUDI ARABIA THE US OIL SUPPLIES WOULD NOT BE SHUT DOWN. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIES ARE TOO DEPENDENT ON OIL TO SHUT OFF THE SUPPLY
Paul Blustein, Washington Post Staff Writer, 1996 [Sept. 18, The Washington Post HEADLINE: An Unstable Middle East Won't Put the U.S. Over a Barrel\\jan]
Even the West's worst nightmare -- a coup by radicals to overthrow the Saudi monarchy -- would probably lead to only a short-term disruption in oil prices, according to experts, because the new rulers would need cash, too. "Look at what's happening in Turkey," said Michael Lynch, an energy expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "An Islamic fundamentalist becomes head of a coalition government, and the first thing he does is increase spending. " A radical Saudi regime might be tempted to try increasing revenue by slashing production to drive up prices. But such a strategy would be unlikely to pay off because, over time, demand for oil would fall and new supplies would come on stream -- pushing prices back down. "They've seen this lesson work in the '80s," said John Lichtblau, chairman of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation. "It isn't just some theoretical capitalist point. "
MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES WILL NOT SHUT OFF OIL SUPPLIES REGARDLESS OF WHO IS RULING
Paul Blustein, Washington Post Staff Writer, 1996 [Sept. 18, The Washington Post: HEADLINE: An Unstable Middle East Won't Put the U.S. Over a Barrel\\jan]
But OPEC's ability to rig the market has withered away as its members' thirst for cash has risen. That's a stark contrast with the 1970s, when Saudi Arabia and a couple of other Persian Gulf states were so flush with petrodollars that they could easily afford to curb production.
"What we've learned since then is that nobody supplies oil on the world markets because they have friends," said Milton Russell, director of the Joint Institute for Energy and the Environment at the University of Tennessee. "They supply oil on world markets to make money." Iran and Libya may be radical Muslim states, but they pump as much oil as they can to raise funds for their rapidly growing populations. Saudi Arabia's welfare state has become so costly that the desert kingdom's net foreign assets (its holdings of overseas assets, minus its liabilities) have shrunk from well over $ 100 billion in the early 1980s to less than $ 10 billion today.
SAUDI ARABIA DISAD – AFF
AT: Terrorist Attack Oil Fields Impact
LITTLE RISK OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON SAUDI OIL FIELDS
ECONOMIST, 2004
("What if? Saudi Arabia and oil," May 29, l/n)
Not everyone is worried. Nawaf Obaid, an adviser to the Saudi royal family, argues in the latest issue of Jane's Intelligence Review that the risk of a successful attack on oil facilities remains "very low". He explains: "At any one time, there are up to 30,000 guards protecting the Kingdom's oil infrastructure, while high-technology surveillance and aircraft patrols are common at the most important facilities and anti-aircraft installations defend key locations." Mr Obaid claims that the Saudi government has added $750m over the past two years to its security budget (which totalled $5.5 billion last year, according to him) specifically to fortify the oil sector.
Kevin Rosser of Control Risks Group, a business-risk consultancy, agrees. He observes that there is plenty of redundancy built into the Saudi network—through multiple ports, pipelines and excess capacity—that should ease the blow from any attack. Besides, he insists, to do any real damage terrorists would have to hit bottlenecks, not just blow up random bits of pipeline. Mr Rosser quips that, "the golden goose is not a sitting duck."
LITTLE RISK OF TERRORIST ATTACK ON SAUDI OIL
ECONOMIST, 2004
("What if? Saudi Arabia and oil," May 29, l/n)
Not everyone is worried. Nawaf Obaid, an adviser to the Saudi royal family, argues in the latest issue of Jane's Intelligence Review that the risk of a successful attack on oil facilities remains "very low". He explains: "At any one time, there are up to 30,000 guards protecting the Kingdom's oil infrastructure, while high-technology surveillance and aircraft patrols are common at the most important facilities and anti-aircraft installations defend key locations." Mr Obaid claims that the Saudi government has added $750m over the past two years to its security budget (which totalled $5.5 billion last year, according to him) specifically to fortify the oil sector. Kevin Rosser of Control Risks Group, a business-risk consultancy, agrees. He observes that there is plenty of redundancy built into the Saudi network—through multiple ports, pipelines and excess capacity—that should ease the blow from any attack. Besides, he insists, to do any real damage terrorists would have to hit bottlenecks, not just blow up random bits of pipeline. Mr Rosser quips that, "the golden goose is not a sitting duck."
AT: DEPENDENCY TURNS
Dependency Causes Price Shocks/Spikes
TURN: CYCLICAL OIL SPIKES STIMULATE THE OIL MARKET
ENERGY 1-1-2K4
(“OPEC Still Declining: Export revenues still lag far behind peak years,” Energy Journal vol. 29 no. 1)
TURN: HIGH OIL PRICES STIMULATE OPEC NATIONS ECONOMY
ENERGY 1-1-2K4
(“OPEC Still Declining: Export revenues still lag far behind peak years,” Energy Journal vol. 29 no. 1)
Collapse of China’s economy would cripple the US economy and create an unstable power vacuum in Northeast Asia
Hwee, 1998 (Yeo Heng, Captain in the Singapore Armed Forces, “The US-Japan-China Triangle: Maintaining Peace And Security In A Troubled East Asia,” )
In 1994, US trade with North-East Asia amounted to US$300 billion. While security paves the way for viable economics, economics in turn determines in a relative sense, the inclinations of foreign policy. Instability in North-East Asia will upset the US economy as much as the Asian ones. The US had provided assurance that it would continue to remain engaged in North-East Asia. The bilateral relationships that the US has developed with various nations in the Asia-Pacific have been the principal basis for US presence in the region since the 1950s. They have been the pillars on which the US relied upon in the containment of Soviet influence in the Cold War and can still be mutually exploited to influence regional events. To eliminate or undermine them would be to inject an essence of instability in the region whereby great power rivalries may occur.
DEPENDENCE GOOD: MID-EAST ENGAGEMENT
AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF IS CRITICAL TO MAINTAIN THE FREE-FLOW OF OIL – AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT RISKS COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
POLLACK, Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, JULY/AUGUST 2K3
(KENNETH, “SECURING THE GULF,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS VOL. 82, ISSUE 4 P. ACADEMIC SEARCH PREMIER)
U.S. LEADERSHIP PREVENTS GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
KHALILZAD, 1995
(Zalmay -- rand corp., “losing the moment,” Washington Quarterly, spring, l/n)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
DEPENDENCE GOOD: SOLVES IRAN AGGRESSION/SAUDI CIVIL WAR
AMERICAN PULLOUT FROM GCC STATES RISKS IRANIAN AGRESSION AND CURTAILS AMERICAN EFFORTS TO CONTAIN INTERNAL SAUDI CIVIL WAR
POLLACK, Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, JULY/AUGUST 2K3
(KENNETH, “SECURING THE GULF,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS VOL. 82, ISSUE 4 P. ACADEMIC SEARCH PREMIER)
AGGRESSIVE IRAN JEOPARDIZES U.S. HEGEMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
FOLLMAN, 2003
(Mark, staff, , "is Iran next?" July 10, l/n)
Beyond containing a potential nuclear threat, hawks see considerable benefit to the U.S. in "going to Tehran." Iran, with its strategic location, represents the last major military obstacle to U.S. hegemony in the Gulf, and hawks fear it could seriously undermine U.S. plans to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. As one of the two remaining "axis of evil" states, and alongside Syria the last significant rejectionist, terror-supporting state in the Mideast after the collapse of Saddam's regime, Iran is a natural target for U.S. hawks.
U.S. LEADERSHIP PREVENTS GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
KHALILZAD, 1995
(Zalmay -- rand corp., “losing the moment,” Washington Quarterly, spring, l/n)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
AT: DEPENDENCY TURNS
China
HIGH OIL PRICES HAVEN'T AFFECTED CHINESE ECONOMIC GROWTH
XINHUA, 2004
("East Asia enjoys robust growth despite oil price hike," July 30, ln)
The East Asian countries enjoyed robust economic growth with increasing exports and domestic demands in the first half this year, despite the hiking of world oil price and uncertainty over U.S. interest rates, said the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in a semi-annual report published Thursday. The report, entitled "Asia Economic Monitor" which comes out every six months, said that the "synchronized" economic growth which began in the latter half of 2003 continued throughout the first half of 2004, with an 8 percent increase of GDP in the countries of the region in the first quarter this year, higher than the 7.6 percent growth in the last quarter of 2003. Due to their similar levels of economic development, ADB includes China, South Korea and the 10 member countries of the Southeast Asian Association in the east Asian region. Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are not included. ADB said that China leads the region by striking a 9.8 percent growth in the first quarter this year, while Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia also saw unexpected quick growth. Because of drought, avian flu and troubles in southern provinces, Thailand 's GDP growth slowed down to stand at 6.5 percent in the first quarter.
BACKSTOPPING ANSWERS
High oil prices key to make alternatives cost-competitive; this is critical to renewable integration
Richter, 12-7-2k3
(John, “Is the End of Cheap Oil the End of Civilization?” The Rant p. )
AT: ISRAEL DEPENDENCY TURN
ISRAEL IS DECREASING ITS DEPENDENCE ON OIL
HUNTER, 2004
(Catherine, staff, World Markets Analysis, Aug. 11, l/n)
Israel's use of crude oil for power generation fell by 47% in Q2, following the commissioning of the country's first gas-fired power units at the start of the year, reported Globes. The use of low-sulphur and low-asphalt crude oil for power generation fell from 372,000 tonnes in the second quarter of 2003 to 196,000 tonnes in the second quarter of 2004. However, fuel consumption for transportation continued to rise to 1.05m tonnes of petrol (gasoline) and 1.31m tonnes of diesel in H1 2004, from 1.02m tonnes and 1.21m tonnes in H1 2003 respectively, it added.
Significance: Given Israel's almost entire dependence on imports of crude oil, for energy and transportation, the increased use of gas for domestic power generation is already beginning to have a positive impact on import quantities and costs.
DEPENDENCY TURNS
Uniqueness: Mid-East Dependency Increasing
THEIR CLAIMS ARE ALL HYPE – GLOBAL OIL CONSUMPTION WILL INCREASINGLY BECOME MORE RELIANT ON MIDDLE EASTERN OIL
POLLACK, Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, JULY/AUGUST 2K3
(KENNETH, “SECURING THE GULF,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS VOL. 82, ISSUE 4 P. ACADEMIC SEARCH PREMIER)
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