The growing body of research on the onset of crime is ...



Immigration and Crime in New York City:

An Exploratory Study of Caribbean Immigrants

Joong Hwan Oh

Department of Sociology, Hunter College

Abstract

The main objective of this study is to examine the causes of the rising crime rates faced by Caribbean immigrants in terms of the structural explanation of crime. This study evaluates the general nature and pattern of Caribbean immigrants’ onset of crime and relates both marginal employment conditions and the escalating influxes of low skilled and poorly educated immigrants to their criminal opportunity in New York City. After taking account of the criminal activity as an alternative to employment in the labor market, I contend that both the lower social status of Caribbean immigrants and the impact of U.S. economic restructuring, which has lessened jobs available to immigrant workers, intensify their participation in the illegal sector. This study suggests that the both economic restructuring and low human capital of the first Caribbean immigrant cohorts hurt the second generation more. Children of Caribbean immigrants have less opportunity to obtain the high human capital due to a low educational investment from their parents and on the other hand, more opportunity to commit crime.

Introduction

Two broad rationales which researchers have neglected in sociological studies on the determinants of immigrant crime will be identified. First, the scarcity of sociological theories and empirical studies examining the causes of immigrant crime was one major barrier to sociological research on this theme. The other substantial reason originates from the difficulty in collecting data, such as the accurate numbers and rates of their criminal involvement, ethnic variations in crime trends, and the representative sample collection of immigrant appropriators and victims. The main objective of this study is to examine the causes of the rising crime rates faced by Caribbean immigrants in terms of the structural explanation of crime.

The growing body of research on the causes of crime in the United States is based upon two themes; a subculture of violence, and the structural explanation (Blau and Blau 1982; Williams and Flewelling 1988). The subculture of violence thesis maintains the assumption that the use of violence is more common and legitimate among a certain segment of the population whose subcultural value systems tolerate violent behavior. The structural explanation on crime has advanced two perspectives. One is the social change approach that identifies the influence of modernization, or industrial restructuring on crime. The other is a stratification approach that regards social class as the major source of crime. In particular, the high criminality of lower class individuals reflects their excessive experiences in unemployment and poverty that are the products of their low human capital.

This study evaluates the general nature and pattern of Caribbean immigrants’ onset of crime and relates both marginal employment conditions and the escalating influxes of low skilled and poorly educated immigrants to their criminal opportunity in New York City. After taking account of the criminal activity as an alternative to employment in the labor market, I contend that both the lower social status of Caribbean immigrants and the impact of U.S. economic restructuring, which has lessened jobs available to immigrant workers, intensify their participation in the illegal sector.

Assimilation into the Underclass

Immigration is regarded as a process of cultural, social, political, and economic adaptation into the host society. Patterns of cultural and economic adaptation are especially crucial to determine the degree and strength of immigrants’ assimilation into a host society. Central in assimilation argument is the idea of how immigrants can integrate into the systems of the mainstream culture and stratification. Portes and Zhou (1993) suggest that three kinds of adaptation apply to current immigrants and their children. The conventional mode of acculturation and upward mobility by contemporary immigrants into middle-class American society and culture is the first route. The economic achievement of the immigrants accelerates this path. The second route is acculturation into the underclass of American minorities in the inner cities. Immigrants in this category do not have an opportunity to move into as middle-class society and refuse acculturation, which reflects the American middle-class culture. Like black inhabitants residing in urban ghetto areas, cultural and economic maladjustment of some immigrants creates another category of underclass in some districts of American large cities. The third route is preservation of their ethnic culture by maintaining some distance from both American middle-class and inner-city underclass cultures. This path accepts the economically upward mobility of immigrants but keep their ethnic culture in order to protect recent immigrants and their children from assimilation into an inner-city subculture that is produced by the growth of urban underclass.

Despite the differences in cultural adaptation, the first and third routes are normal processes of integration into the host society. The assumption of the second path however raises a research question in this study which is whether both current economic restructuring at the national level and low qualifications of human capital influence the growth of the unassimilated immigrant underclass in the United States. Included in this underclass are individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or not members of the labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime and other forms of aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of poverty/or welfare dependency (Wilson 1987). Like black residents in ghetto areas, at the neighborhood levels inner-city immigrants were isolated from upwardly mobile role models, neighborhood institutions, and social ties that could help them move into the mainstream. Instead, isolations of inner-city immigrants would result in vulnerability of resistance to social problems, such as family disruption, school dropout of their children, and at worst, criminal activity.

Immigration and Crime in New York City

The impact of immigrant inflow on crime shows that increases in immigration are associated with increases in their criminal activities (Rattner 1998; Pogrebin and Poole 1989). In New York City, the number of foreign-born inmates has greatly increased during the last two decades (the New York State Department of Correctional Service 1998). The number of inmates born in the United States increased 94 percent between 1985 and 1998, while the number of foreign-born inmates increased sharply by 249 percent. More specifically, there were 9,180 foreign-born inmates under Department custody, as of December 31, 1998. Then 77 percent of the inmates who state foreign-birth originate from either the Caribbean or South America. Nearly two-thirds (60%) of the foreign-born inmates were born in one of four Countries: the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Cuba, or Jamaica. The Dominican Republic alone accounts for nearly a third (32%) of all foreign-born inmates (2975), followed by Jamaica (1,452) and Cuba (602). These sharp growths of criminal activity in Caribbean immigrant reflect their rapid inflow of migration into New York State during the current decades.

In Caribbean immigrants, the increase in the number of foreign-born inmates (from 1,660 in 1985 to 5,851 in 1998) can be understood by two explanations. One is a cultural transmission explanation, which argues that part of the criminal activity exhibited by some Caribbean immigrants is similar to the types of crime familiar to them in their countries of origin (Nettler 1984). At the world level of crime, the highest violent crime rates were experienced by the nations of the Caribbean region using 1994 Interpol data. For instance, the U.S. homicide rate per 100,000 population in 1994 was 8.9, while homicide rates were 20 for Guyana, 27.6 for Jamaica, and 11.7 for Trinidad and Tabago. Using data of the New York State Department of Correctional Service, criminal patterns of Caribbean immigrants are consistent with those of their origin countries. In Table 1,three Caribbean immigrants – Dominicans, Jamaicans, and Cubans – most concentrate on two types of crime, like violent crime and drug offense. In some points, it can be argued that immigrant crime is a function of the importation about crime in their origin countries.

Table 1. Percent Distribution of Inmates under Department of Correctional Services:

New York State, 1998

|Commitment Offense |Dominican |Jamaica |Cuba |

| |Republic | | |

|Violent Felony Offense |37% |65% |44% |

|Other Coercive Offense |2% |4% |2% |

|Drug Offense |58% |27% |47% |

|Property & Other Offenses |2% |3% |6% |

|Youthful Offender |0% |1% |0% |

|Juvenile Offender |0% |1% |0% |

|TOTAL |100% |100% |100% |

Importantly, one should note that the determinants of immigrant crime in the host society are caused by their maladjustment in the changing economic system and their low socioeconomic statuses in human capital.

Economic Restructuring and Caribbean Immigrant Crime in New York City

Economic restructuring has occurred systematically during the last several decades in the United States. Economic restructuring from centers of production and distribution of material goods to centers of administration, information exchange, and higher-order service provisions has noticeably occurred in the Northeast and Midwest regions that contained more than two thirds of the nation’s manufacturing employment over the last several decades (Kasarda 1985). The trend of the decline in manufacturing employment called deindustrialization (Bluestone and Harriston 1982) predominantly appeared in central cities of the Northeast and Midwest regions (Kasarda 1985; Frey and Speare, Jr. 1988). The consequences of manufacturing job losses in these areas are “shuttered factories, displaced workers, and a newly emerging group of ghost towns” (Bluestone and Harriston 1982:6). Moreover, major central cities located in the Northeast and Midwest regions went through employment decline in wholesale and retail trades, while some central cities located in the South and West regions experienced the economic growth in distributive services since 1970s (Kasarda 1985).

In the case of New York City, the City’s manufacturing industries have lost jobs continuously. Manufacturing employment fell by 116,900 jobs from 1980 to 1987 and by 90,800 jobs from 1989 to 1992, while health, education, and social service employment continued to arise (Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Department of City Planning 1996). Moreover, manufacturing employment lost additional 15,800 jobs, while health, education, and social services added other 32,900 jobs from 1992 to 1995 (Department of City Planning 1996). In Kings County, where most Caribbean immigrants settled down, industrial restructuring during over the last two decades was striking. In Table 2, people employed in manufacturing sector declined from 110,559 (30%) in 1980 to 66,374 (17%) in 1990to 45,925 (11%) in 1997. Instead, service sectors including health services, hospitals, and social and educational services, grew from 102,038 to 201,933, even after controlling for the population change (the Bureau of the Census 1998).

Table 2. Industrial Employment Distribution in Kings County: New York City, 1980-1997

|Industrial Sectors |1980 |1990 |1997 |

|Construction |12,424 (3.4%) |21,038(5.3%) |17,074(4.2%) |

|Manufacturing |110,559(30%) |66,374(17%) |45,925(11%) |

|Transportation and Public Utilities|27,531(7.5%) |25,631(6.4%) |24,181(6%) |

|Wholesale Trade |24,156(6.6%) |28,288(7.1%) |27,679(6.8%) |

|Retail Trade |64,052(18%) |64,973(16%) |60,775(15%) |

|Finance, Insurance, Real Estate |20,908(5.7%) |21,455(5.4%) |25,560(6.3%) |

|Other Services |102,038(28%) |171,006(43%) |201,944(50%) |

|Others |3,185(0.9%) |1,887(0.5%) |1,545(0.4%) |

|TOTAL |364,853(100%) |400,652(100%) |404,682(100%) |

Economic restructuring leads to the elimination of many manufacturing jobs and low-level service jobs, which are open to low, or unskilled immigrant workers. For instance, declining labor force participation among Puerto Ricans were closely related to their concentration in manufacturing jobs (Bean and Tienda 1987). Thus, changes in the industrial and occupational composition and size of urban employment reduced the demand for low-skilled labor. These structural changes hurt both low skill blacks and immigrants. Also, the consequence of economic restructuring partially explains the rising inflow of current immigrants into inner-city areas, in which they share social problems with black urban residents.

Central to economic restructuring is the contention that decline in economic activities in a locale will increase the rate of crime at certain location. Consistent with this logic, Humphries and Wallace (1980) expect central cities with lost manufacturing jobs to have higher crime rates and in contrast, low crime rates in central cities gaining manufacturing jobs. Another study of economic transformation and community-level crime is that local plant closings are particularly associated with property crime (Liu and Bee 1983). At the aggregate level, researchers are often aware of the importance of deleterious labor market conditions for high crime rates. The major assumption here is that the labor market conditions of a region may be conducive to the growth of criminal behavior in a population there (Allan and Steffensmeier 1989).

Like violent and property crime rates, total index crimes in New York City dropped continuously from 10,094 per100, 000 in 1980 to 5,212 in 1996 (U.S. Department of Justice 1998). One of the major reasons was caused by increased police arrests. For instance, between 1991 and 1995, the inmate population in Brooklyn grew by over 12.5 percent (from 29,327 to 32,985). Although the crime rates in Brooklyn continued to decline, more people were arrested during the same periods. The fact that more people were arrested in Brooklyn suggests that there are more motivated people to commit crime. Thus, industrial restructuring in Brooklyn might contribute to the increasing pool of people who become unemployed, underemployed, and low-paid workers. Particularly, two precincts of Brooklyn (East Flatbush and Crown Heights), in which most Caribbean immigrants reside, the homicide rates stood over the City average (13 per 100,000 as of 1996); the murder rate in East Flatbush was 19 and that in Crown Heights 29 (Karmen 1998). The total crime rates in these two precincts are also high: East Flatbush had 5027 crime rates per 100,000 and Crown Heights 7071 crime rates per 100,000 in 1995 (Department of City Planning 1996). These data suggest that residents in these areas experience severe interpersonal conflict and economic hardship that result in criminal activity. For instance, unstable economic conditions in family often generate the adverse impacts on other family members that later influence spousal conflict, family disruption, and children’s school dropout.

Moreover, a family and school environment for immigrant children has direct implication for illegal activity. According to Crime Analysis Unit in New York City, youths aged under

24 show the high crime arrests in these three precincts, as of 1998 (Office of Management Analysis and Planning 1998). For instance, about 48 percent (2624) of all arrests in East Flatbush in 1998 were under 24 ages. Although there is no direct evidence to prove the impact of industrial restructuring on criminal activity, the high concentration of the low socioeconomic conditions, including the high poverty rate, low human capital, low earnings, and the high proportion of youth population, was closely related to economic restructuring in these areas (Waters et al., 1999).

Caribbean Immigrants, Their Demographic and Human Capital Characteristics

According to the 1990 census of population, there were about 20 million foreign-born persons in the United States, comprising 8.0 percent of the total population (U.S. Bureau of Census 1990). And net immigration accounted for 39% of total U.S. population growth during the 1980s. As of 1998, U.S. Census bureau estimated that nearly 10 percent of all people in the United States were born in another country (U.S. Bureau of Census 1998). Approximately, 25.2 million persons were born abroad, an increase of more than 5 million from 1990. Using the 1990 census data, Latin Americans and Caribbean Americans are the largest immigrant population in the country. Mexicans alone accounted for 22% (4.3million) of the total foreign-born population. Besides, Mexico is also the largest source of illegal immigration. Among Caribbean Americans, the countries which reflect the greater part of the immigrant population are Jamaica (29%), Haiti (18%), the Dominican Republic (8%), Trinidad-Tobago (8%), Guyana (7%), Puerto Rico (6%), and Barbados (4%). An immigration pattern after the early 1960s revealed that the volume of immigrants from more developed countries has declined over time, while it has grown sharply from less developed countries (Rumbaut 1994).

Caribbean Americans are classified by where they came from or where their ancestors came from. The English-speaking Caribbean countries included are Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, Belize, the Bahamas, the Virgin Islands, and a range of smaller islands such as the Cayman and Leeward Islands. The main Spanish-speaking Caribbean countries are the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. The French-speaking Caribbean countries are Haiti, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guyana (See Kalmijn 1996)

Immigrants tend to concentrate in urban areas. Over 28 percent in New York City were foreign-born in 1990. Among Caribbean Americans residing in New York City, Dominicans had the largest population (226,560), followed by Jamaicans (116,100), Guyanese (73,846), Haitians (70,987), and Trinidadians (58,212), as of 1990 (Department of City Planning 1996). As a result of the rapid inflow of immigrants, Brooklyn has become the Caribbean nexus of New York City. Certain sections of Brooklyn (e.g., East Flatbush and Crown Heights) are now 90 percent the English-speaking West Indies (Green 1992: Kasinitz 1992).

Educational attainments, work experience, ability to speak other language and family background are the most important indicators of human capital. Education is the most well cited parameter of human capital. The main proposition of human capital theory is that the outcomes of labor market, such as different earnings, are a function of the individual differences in educational attainments. Outcomes of immigrant adaptation vary depending on their human capital they have brought with them into the destination country. Thus, individualistic skills those immigrants bring with them affect many facets of their own lives. For instance, immigrants with more schooling, more job experience, and with greater ability to speak English in general have more opportunity to get a job, higher earnings, or lower possibility to engage in illegal activities.

The 1990 Census data showed that adult foreign-born men had 11.5 years of schooling and the women 11.1 years, in contrast to 13.1 years and 13.0 years, respectively, for native-born men and women (Chiwick and Sullivan 1995). Moreover, educational attainment substantially varied with among different racial/ethnic groups. Immigrants from Europe and Canada have a relatively high schooling distribution (68 percent with 12-16 years of schooling), like Asian immigrants (66 percent with 12-16 years of schooling). In contrast, Mexican immigrants have a very low level (with 60 percent with 8 or fewer years, and 27 percent with 12 – 16 years). The percentage of the foreign-born immigrants with very low educational quality has continued to increase in recent decades. Among the adult immigrants in the United States in 1990 who arrived in the 1950s, nearly one-quarter (23 percent) had 10 or fewer years of schooling, while among those immigrants from 1985 to 1990 over one-third (34 percent) had 10 or fewer years (Chiwick and Sullivan 1995:236).

Among immigrants in New York City, Filipinos had the highest level of educational attainment, with 93 percent graduating high school, while the average in New York City is with 68.3 percent graduating high school. Among Caribbean immigrants, Trinidadian had about 69,8 percent of high school graduation, followed by Jamaicans (66%), Haitian (65.9%), and Guyanese (63.5%). Educational attainment was lowest for Dominicans, with 38.5 percent graduating high school (Department of City Planning 1996). In general, rapid economic restructuring in the United States required greater schooling levels for native-born population to be successful in new environment of labor market. However, new immigrants, especially from Latin America, come to America without any high levels of human capital.

Low human capital of immigrant parents influenced educational attainment of immigrant youths. Among the youths that arrived between 1987 and 1990, for example, their enrollment rates were 66 percent for the males and 69 percent for the females, far below the comparable percentage for the native-born (88 percent) (Chiwick and Sullivan 1995:236). In the Brooklyn areas, particularly the Flatbush and East Flatbush districts, public schools are overcrowded, lack some of the most basic teaching supplies, and suffer from the high dropout rates (Green 1998). These results have significant implications for those immigrant youths that were expelled from school. Those immigrant youth who had no access to job would be more likely to engage in illegal or criminal activity by associating with local gang members or career criminals.

Ability to speak English is an important determinant of fast assimilation into the American culture and economy. In the case of New York City, 56 percent of the foreign-born population reported strong English language proficiency (Department of City Planning 1996). Many black immigrants who come from the English-speaking Caribbean are proficient in the language: English proficiency stood at over 97 percent for Jamaicans, Guyanese, and Trinidadians. The same was not true for many immigrants from other parts of the Caribbean. Especially, Caribbean immigrants from Creole/French-speaking Haiti and Hispanic immigrants were generally low (e.g., in Dominicans, 30.4%). When immigrants can speak in English well, they can not only adjust into the social and economic conditions in the host society, also can find more information and knowledge to enter into formal labor market.

It is unknown about the labor market experience of new immigrants in the origin society as well as the host society. However, in general it is summarized that current immigrants including Caribbean immigrants tend to have fewer skills that are fit into the U.S. labor market. Although they have the high job experience in specific jobs, sometimes they are not hired due to language problem, different labor market structure, or no direct application of their educational credentials. Thus they have less work experience than native-born workers do.

Socioeconomic Portraits of Caribbean Immigrants and Their Criminal Activity

Although the decline of higher-paid manufacturing jobs contributed to the increasing concentration of Latinos in low-paid service jobs, their aggravating conditions of living have the potential to participate in the illegal activity of these immigrants and their children. The 1990 census data provided that for the foreign-born population as a whole, 18.0 percent lived in households with money below the poverty line. This was substantially greater than the poverty rate for the native-born, which was 12.4 percent (Chiwick and Sullivan 1995). In New York City, 19 percent of residents were below the poverty line in 1989 (Department of City Planning 1996). In general, Hispanics had the lowest household incomes ($18,100) and the highest levels of poverty of any race group (36.9 percent), respectively. However, the economic portrait for Hispanic immigrant subgroups was diverse. Dominicans had a household income just 60 percent of the level for all households in the city ($18,000) and a poverty rate of 34 percent. Some of Caribbean Americans show below-average poverty rate: Jamaicans (13.0%), Guyanese (13.8%), Haitian (17.5%), and Trinidadian (17.1%).

Although most Caribbean household are below-average poverty rate, their actual earnings are far less than the city average ($35,500 for males and $27,900 for females). More specifically, English-speaking Caribbean immigrants had a higher labor participation rate ( e,g., over 80 percent for males and over 75 percent for females) than the city average (78.7 percent for males and 64.0 percent for females) (Department of City Planning 1996). But all Caribbean groups earned less than the city average. For Caribbean male immigrants, earnings ranged from 54 percent of the city average for the Dominicans to 71 percent for Jamaicans and Trinidadians. In Caribbean female immigrants, earnings ranged from 68 percent of the city mean for the Guyanese to 84 percent for Jamaicans.

Besides, changes in the American economy in the last few decades have hit current Caribbean immigrants particularly hard because of their low human capital and their labor market positions. As of 1996, people below poverty line in Kings County were 665,680 that are about 29.3 percent of total county population (Bureau of Census 1998). Even worse statistic was that 46.4 percent of people under age 18 (approximately 297,978) had experienced poverty. Considering the involvement of young cohorts in violent and property crimes, their economic hardship would be operated as another stimulus to increase their criminal motivation. The high labor force participation but much lower levels of earnings and their lower levels of educational attainment for Caribbean immigrants imply that they might confront higher job turnover, higher rates of lay-off and discharge, and higher quit rates.

The link between low class and crime specifies the causes of crime to be structurally induced frustrations resulting from the discrepancy between aspirations and opportunity. Limitations on legitimate avenues of access to conventional goals will cause a reaction in the form of a criminal act. This is no exception to low-class immigrants who desperately need to maintain a particular standard of living. When people are highly oriented to occupational stability as a main source of resources, economic problems, due to unemployment, underemployment, or low earnings, provide a motivation to criminal behavior. Like occupational instability, the general condition linking poverty with crime is that poor state of living can make the higher crime occur than the rich state of living.

A survey of Brooklyn residents (1979-1980) that explore the relationship between employment and crime provides data on labor market participation and the respondents’ human capital (Thompson 1998). This survey data were collected from males arrested predominantly for felony offenses and residing in Brooklyn. Through information in this study, it is known about whether there is some relationship between the level of education and criminal activity, and their prior industrial involvement and crime. Unfortunately, this data are not decomposed into specific racial and ethnic categories. But, it provides the arrest precincts of male offenders. 174 samples were collected from three precincts in Brooklyn, that is, East Flatbush, Flatbush, and Crown Heights and 153 individuals (88%) were black population, including Caribbean Americans.

One question about their years of educational attainment as one of the most important human capital, revealed that most arrested males in Brooklyn were less educated. In Table 3, out of 171 persons, 153 arrested males were 12 or less years of schools. Only 4 persons had college degree or more. Without regression analysis by controlling for other variables, this descriptive statistics that show the distribution of the lower educational levels of most arrested males suggested that low education have a positive impact on the criminal activity.

Table 3. Educational Distribution of Arrested Males in Brooklyn: 171 samples, 1979-1980

| Education |Frequency |Percent |

|Less than 9 Years of Schooling |27 |15.8% |

|10 – 12 Years of Schooling |126 |73.7% |

|13-15 Years of Schooling |14 |8.2% |

|More than 16 Years of Schooling |4 |2.4% |

|TOTAL |171 |100% |

In another question about “does degree help you find a job?” Among 165 individuals answered, approximately 70 percent of respondents showed that degree is a crucial way to get a job. On the other hand, 30 percent of respondents mention no direct relationship between education and job attainment. When people have the strain between their expectation to a success (e.g., monetary success, honor, or authority) and their actual opportunity gained by their educational credentials (e.g., labor market participation), they feel frustration and relative deprivation, and later show aggressive attitudes and behavior against individuals or conventional institutions.

Conclusion

This study attempted to explore the causes of the rising crime rates faced by Caribbean immigrants in terms of the structural explanation of crime. Particularly, this study linked both marginal employment conditions and the escalating influxes of low skilled and poorly educated immigrants to the criminal opportunity of Caribbean immigrants in New York City. In sum, first, industrial restructuring seems to contribute to the increasing pool of people who become unemployed, underemployed, and low-paid workers. This suggests the criminal activity as an alternative to employment in the labor market. In two precincts of Brooklyn (East Flatbush and Crown Heights), where most Caribbean immigrants reside, the homicide rates stood over the City average and the total crime rates in these two precincts were also high. Second, the proposition that there is a positive relationship between low human capital and criminal activity was supported. Low educational attainment that increased the strain between immigrants’ aspiration and their opportunities in a host society is a key element of criminal activities in Caribbean immigrants.

One significant implication of this study is that the both economic restructuring and low human capital of the first Caribbean immigrant cohorts might hurt the second generation more. Children of Caribbean immigrants have less opportunity to finish the high educational level due to a low educational investment from their parents and on the other hand, more opportunity to live in adverse neighborhood environment. Gans (1992) speculates that the children of immigrants are more likely to face the high rates of unemployment, drug use, crime, and other pathologies. Especially, poor economic conditions, less schooling, and intimate networks of other youngsters in the inner-city neighborhood can trigger their criminal activity. Therefore, future study needs to focus on the determinants of criminal involvement in second-generation immigrants.

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