Ideology versus Economics during the Federalist Period
Ideology versus Economics during the Federalist Period
by Cyril Morong
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the economic and ideological factors influencing Congressional Roll Call Voting during the Federalist Period in the United States, 1789-1801, by applying a discrete choice analysis to that period's roll call votes. This research is relevant because it helps explain the causes of change in the institutional structure of our economy, a necessary step for developing a theory of institutional change throughout history. The major institutional question addressed in the Federalist Period was the balance of power between the states and the federal government. This research combines elements of the work done by Kalt and Zupan on voting in the U. S. Senate in the 1970's and the work done by McGuire and Ohsfeldt on the framing and ratification of the constitution. The roll call votes for each bill are analyzed with a logit model with a congressman's vote. There are three types of explanatory variables: personal ideology, constituents' economic interests and constituents' ideology. This approach uses the Principal-Agent model. Ideology is defined in the Higgsian sense of a belief system that individuals use as a guide in their personal economic actions, their public policy preferences, and group identification. The results show that both economic interests and ideology were both important factors. Ideology was more important on legislation that lacked clear cut economic implications while economic variables were more important on bills that did. Ideology must be used by economists to explain public policy. The founding fathers formed two political parties, Federalist and Republican, based on economic and ideological differences. Both factors are also important in determing why the institutional structure changes.
Introduction
The public choice literature has now produced a long list of studies examining the relative impact of ideology and economic interests on the voting behavior of legislators (several of these are discussed below). Perhaps the most important of these is Kalt and Zupan (1984). The question that the literature addresses is "does ideology matter?" Some have concluded that it does not while others have concluded that it might and that further study is needed to find out how and why. Although this seems to be the burning question, none have been concerned with the problem of defining ideology. It is assumed that there is one definition that is appropriate and that all statistical results can be interpreted through this definition. In fact, most studies use the definition of ideology from the Kalt and Zupan (K-Z) work mentioned above. No alternative definitions are mentioned and there is no discussion on the relative merits of competing definitions. This will uses an alternate definition of ideology to interpret the statistical results from the analysis of congressional voting that took place during the Federalist Period. It is the one developed by Higgs (1987). It offers a broader view of human motivations than that typically used by economists and consequently has implications for how regression results might be interpreted and the question of "does ideology matter?"
This paper does five things. The first is to summarize the definitions of ideology that have been used in the literature. The second is to outline the Higgsian definition, its differences from and similarities to the other definitions, and to identify its implications for the interpretation of regression results. The third is to formulate several hypotheses based on this definition. The fourth is to present evidence related to those hypotheses. Finally, that evidence is discussed in the context of the literature and the assumptions that economists make about human behavior. One conclusion is that ideology plays a larger role when defined differently and more broadly. A second is that regression results must be carefully interpreted because the broader definition makes it unclear if a variable measures ideology, economic interests, or some combination of both. Email me for the the theoretical model and how ideology works in voting models.
The Federalist Period
During the Federalist Period, the balance of government power between the federal government and the states, perhaps the key issue of the Constitutional Convention, had to be sorted out. Although the drafting and ratification of the Constitution represents a significant change in that balance, much legislation was passed in the period of 1789-1801 that reflected issues similar to those dealt with at the Philadelphia convention. Some of the important legislation of this period also revolved around the financial plan of Alexander Hamilton.[1] Charles Beard considered this plan to be the logical payoff to the basic principles in the Constitution.[2] The period 1789-1801 is particularly relevant since it represents the era of power for the Federalists who were the strongest supporters of the Constitution. Therefore, any legislation passed during this time is important because it shows not only how the Constitution was being interpreted, but also how it was implemented. The interpretation and implementation of the Constitution certainly show the degree of power that was actually given to the national government relative to the state governments.
In light of the different interpretations of ideology seen in the literature, the question of the relevance of applying these models to such a far removed historical period must be addressed. In one sense, the work of McGuire and Ohsfeldt shows that the public choice voting models help explain the motives of the founding fathers. But more importantly, the founding fathers themselves did recognize, at least implicitly, that the principal agent relationship could cause problems for an "ideal" form of government. Two quotes from the Federalist papers illustrate this. The first, from No. 62 reads "It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents and prove unfaithful to their important trust."[3] This clearly indicates that they knew of shirking and expected it to happen. The second, from No. 46 reads "A local spirit will infallibly prevail...in the members of congress ...Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual states."[4] The latter quote clearly indicates that they also expected that legislators would place a high value on the needs and interests of their constituents. They knew that both were important and therefore it is completely legitimate to attempt to model both motives in any analysis of congressional voting for this time period.
Choosing an ideology rating
Personal ideology of legislators is usually measured as a percentage of "correct" votes on a group of issues that may or may not be associated with each other. A vote is correct if it coincides with the viewpoint of the organization constructing the rating. For example, if the Americans for Democratic Action or ADA (a political watchdog group) finds a particular congressmen to have voted "liberal" 75% on of the votes in their sample, it gives him a score of 75. No such ideological rating currently exists for congressmen of the Federalist Period. Since the major issue of the period was the size and strength of the federal government, an ideological rating based on roll call votes for military questions is appropriate and indicative of a congressman viewpoint on the issue of of a strong versus a weak federal government. There are several justifications for using this measure. One is that two other major issues, the settling of western lands and foreign policy (mainly remaining neutral in European affairs) were directly affected by the size of the military and therefore the size and strength of the federal government. A second is that some historians of the period feel that Hamilton wanted a strong military to enforce his Federalist policies against states that may have resisted them.[5] Stourzh clearly shows Hamilton's belief in a strong peacetime military to keep the peace and preserve order.[6] Third, the Senate passed a bill giving the president authority to augment the army to execute the laws of the Union on February 16, 1799.[7] And last, there were two instances in which armed revolts against taxation were put down by the military. The first, which occurred just before the movement for the Constitution began (and helped to hasten it) is known as Shay's Rebellion. The second occurred in 1794 and is known as the Whiskey Rebellion because the protesters were opposed to paying the Whiskey Tax. The ideological rating then is a congressman's percentage of votes cast for a larger and stronger military or national defense. [8]
Since this study is using the Higgsian definition of ideology, its application to the Federalist Period must be explained. The important addition to the definition of ideology by Higgs is the fact that it helps to facilitate group membership. It will be assumed here that in the in the Federalist Period the the group membership that was facilitated by ideology was membership in the two political parties, the Federalist and Republican. One of the hypotheses to be tested is that ideology should become more important in explaining how congressmen voted when parties became important than before they were important. Email me for an explanation of the empirical model. The model used was a logit model since legislators could vote yes or no.
The Relevant Data
The data and variables used in the statistical analysis were picked for their general relevance to the larger issue of the Federalist Period, for their specific relevance to the bills analyzed and its availability. Data availability is a problem in many studies and probably even more of a problem in historical studies such as this one. This section discusses why these variables and data were chosen. Appendix B contains the details of each variable, the data used to compute it, how the computation was done and why that variable was relevant and its meaning. Here tables will be presented that contain brief definitions of these variables and their relation to the question of a strong national government. The first lists the variables used in the first stage of the two stage process that was discussed in the earlier section on the general model. The second lists the variables used in the second stage. Each variable is designated after its description as being expected to be negatively (A) or positively (P) related to the question of a strong national government. The specific reasons for this are listed in Appendix B. There is no reason to consider AGE and MF pro-national or anti-national. The variable WEALTH was not designated because it is not clear how it would be affected by a strong national government.
Table 1
Stage One Variable Definitions
________________________________________________________________
Variable Definition
AGE The average age of male voters in each state.
MF The male-female ratio in each state.
POPDENS The population density in each state and district in 1790. P
URBAN The percent of each state's and district's population that lived in urban areas in
1790. P
ENG The percent of each state's and district's population that were of English ancestry.
DIST The distance form the center of a congressional district to the nearest navigable coastline. A
MILITIA The quota of Militia assigned to each state, per capita. P
WEALTH The per capita wealth of each state.
TAX A dummy variable that indicates if being a taxpayer was required by the state to
vote. A
PROP A dummy variable that indicates if being a property owner was required by the state to vote. A
__________________________________________________________________________
Table 2
Stage Two Variable Definitions
________________________________________________________________
Variable Definition
CARR The average annual revenue collected from the carriage tax in each state. A
CUST The average annual revenue collected from customs in each state. P
DIRTAX The per capita tax assessed in each state due to the Direct Tax of 1798. A
DIST The distance form the center of a congressional district to the nearest navigable coastline. A
EXP The average annual per capita value of exports from each state. P
FUND The per capita amount of money received by each state due to the Funding and Assumption Act. P
SLAV The number of slaves per 100 white persons in each state and district in 1790. A
SUG The average annual per capita gross revenue collected from refined sugar in each state. A
TON The average annual tonnage per capita in each state employed in the coasting
trade. P
VELL The average annual per capita gross revenue collected from stamped vellum, parchment and paper in each state. A
WEALTH The per capita wealth of each state.
WHIS The average annual per capita gross revenue collected from domestic distilled spirits and stills.
RATING The percent of pro-military votes cast by each congressman. P
MILRES The ideology residual for each congressman. P
FIT This the constituents' part of RATING. P
__________________________________________________________________________
Estimation
The bills for which congressional voting was analyzed are listed in Appendix A. Each is described there and is designated as being pro-national or anti-national depending on whether it would increase or decrease the power of the national government.
The first stage in the statistical analysis is to estimate coefficients in an ordinary least squares regression on the ideology variable RATING (this allows fitted values to be calculated which can then be subtracted from the original RATING to get the residual and the constituents' part of RATING). The variables that went into this regression are seen in Table 1 (a more comprehensive explanation of the variables is in Appendix B). These variables were chosen in part because of their relevance to the Federalist Period but also because they are similar to the type of variables used in the literature. They represent a demographic profile of the constituency. The equation estimated in the first stage is
(12) RATING = a + ß1AGE + ß2MF + ß3POPDENS + ß4URBAN + ß5ENG + ß6DIST
+ ß7MILITIA + ß8WEALTH + ß9TAX + ß10PROP
Equation (12) is the empirical specification of equation (4). The intercept is given by a and the variable coefficients are given by the ß's.
The second stage of the statistical analysis involved the logit regression on the roll call votes. The variables here were also chosen for their general relevance to the period and for their specific relation to the bills. They are listed in Table 2 The variables that were picked for their general relevance are EXP, CUST, TON, DIST, WEALTH, SLAV, and WHIS. Most of the bills analyzed were expected to have an impact on the economic interests these variables represent because they were highly affected by the strength of the central government. The others, SUG, FUND, VELL, CARR, and DIRTAX were chosen more for their relation to specific tax bills. It was expected that these interests would be very much affected when taxed by the national government. But as sources of revenue for a new government, they would also be expected to be affected by any bill that dealt seriously with the basic question of the period, the strength of that new government. States that were having to pay for the larger government would tend to be against an expansion of its power.
The expressions to be estimated with logit analysis are
(13a) V = a + ß1CARR + ß2CUST + ß3DIRTAX + ß4DIST + ß5EXP + ß6FUND
+ ß7SLAV + ß8SUG + ß9TON + ß10VELL + ß11WEALTH +ß12 WHIS
(13b) V = a + ß1CARR + ß2CUST + ß3DIRTAX + ß4DIST + ß5EXP + ß6FUND
+ ß7SLAV + ß8SUG + ß9TON + ß10VELL + ß11WEALTH + ß12 WHIS
+ ß13RATING
(13c) V = a + ß1CARR + ß2CUST + ß3DIRTAX + ß4DIST + ß5EXP + ß6FUND
+ ß7SLAV + ß8SUG + ß9TON + ß10VELL + ß11WEALTH + ß12 WHIS
+ ß13 MILRES
(13d) V = a + ß1CARR + ß2CUST + ß3DIRTAX + ß4DIST + ß5EXP + ß6FUND
+ ß7SLAV + ß8SUG + ß9TON + ß10VELL + ß11WEALTH + ß12 WHIS
+ ß13 MILRES + ß14 FIT
In the equations above, V is the voting decision (yes or no) made by each congressman on each bill that was analyzed and is hypothesized to depend on the right hand side variables. The intercept is given by a and the variable coefficients are given by the ß's.
These four equations are the empirical specification of equation (7) from section. Equation (13a) uses only economic variables as regressors. Equation (13b) uses the economic variables and a measure of ideology, RATING, as regressors. These separate estimations were done in order to see how much explanatory power was added to the model by a measure of ideology. Equations (13c) was estimated to include MILRES (which is the same as rf in equation (6)), the supposedly "purer" of ideology. Equation (13d) was estimated to include constituent ideology.
Voting, for the most part, in the House of Representatives and Senate were analyzed separately. Some votes were combined. Email for detailed tables on paramaer estimates, accuracy of the models, etc.
Discussion of Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the logit regressions on the roll call votes. Tables in the appendix only show results for regressions that combined both the House and the Senate.
________________________________________________________________
Table 3
Summary Results
Senate
Variable Pro Anti Signif. Avg. E. Signs Corr. Signif. Signs Corr.
CARR-A 8 2 6 3.60 20% 16%
CUST-P 2 2 1 none 50 0
DIRTAX-A 4 6 7 1.19 60 86
EXP-P 6 4 2 .32 60 100
FUND-P 1 1 1 .22 50 0
SLAV-A 4 14 14 .45 78 72
SUG-A 4 1 1 .52 20 0
TON-P 5 6 8 .40 45 57
VELL-A 0 4 1 .83 100 100
WEALTH 2 3 1 1.15
WHIS-A 3 3 2 .27 50 100
RATING-P 14 3 14 .91 82 79
MILRES-P 13 4 14 76 69
Pro indicates for how many votes the variable was pro-national.
Anti indicates for how many votes the variable was anti-national.
Signif. indicates for how many votes the variable was significant.
Avg. E. indicates the average elasticity in terms of absolute values for each variable on votes for which it was significant.
Signs Corr. indicates what percent of the signs for that variable were correctly predicted.
Signif. Signs Corr. indicates what percent of the signs for that variable were correctly predicted on votes for which it was significant.
A indicates if the variable was expected to be negatively related to votes on pro-national.
A indicates if the variable was expected to be positively related to votes on pro-national.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Table 4
Summary Results
House of Representatives
Variable Pro Anti Signif. Avg. E. Signs Corr. Signif. Signs Corr.
CARR-A 23 5 12 1.17 18% 20
CUST-P 14 10 8 2.33 58 75
DIRTAX-A 7 21 13 1.11 84 78
DIST-A 6 19 15 .27 76 79
EXP-P 9 16 5 1.60 36 0
FUND-P 1 4 4 .70 20 40
SLAV-A 10 17 10 .19 63 100
SUG-A 8 12 6 .53 48 16
TON-P 10 15 8 .42 40 44
VELL-A 7 12 2 2.60 63 100
WEALTH 6 18 13 1.66
WHIS-A 5 23 13 .39 82 73
RATING-P 25 3 19 .78 89 90
MILRES-P 23 4 19 85 90
Pro indicates for how many votes the variable was pro-national.
Anti indicates for how many votes the variable was anti-national.
Signif. indicates for how many votes the variable was significant.
Avg. E. indicates the average elasticity in terms of absolute values for each variable on votes for which it was significant.
Signs Corr. indicates what percent of the signs for that variable were correctly predicted.
Signif. Signs Corr. indicates what percent of the signs for that variable were correctly predicted on votes for which it was significant.
A indicates if the variable was expected to be negatively related to votes on pro-national.
A indicates if the variable was expected to be positively related to votes on pro-national.
________________________________________________________________
Elasticities averages are in terms of absolute values. Elasticities were not calculated for model "c" because that model includes the variable MILRES, which has both positive and negative values. It is not clear how to interpret elasticities calculated in those cases. Also, the pattern of results for models "b" and "c" were quite similar, so calculating elasticities for model "c" would be somewhat redundant. No results are reported for model "d" which included MILRES and FIT. In general, the regression results for the model that included both variables were very similar to the model that only included MILRES in terms of significant variables and predictive power. This was also the case for the results that are reported in Table 14 that are from an alternate set of regressions. These are discussed below.
A problem that occurred in the estimation was that estimates for some coefficients could not be determined because the computer algorithm could not converge. This happened more frequently in the Senate than in the House because of the very low number of observations on Senate voting. Since the model would not converge on some votes with all variables, a strategy had to be adopted that would decide which variables would be selected. The method used to choose variables was a stepwise procedure using adjusted chi-square statistics for all variables not in the model.[11] The variables with the highest adjusted chi-square statistics were added into the model one by one (step by step) until all variables were used or until nonconvergence had been reached, at which point the analysis was stopped. Therefore, all estimates are for parameters that were put into the empirical model as a result of the stepwise procedure. If a variable was not entered into the model by the stepwise procedure before non-convergence resulted, no estimate is reported and this is indicated by a blank space. In some instances for the Senate, those variables are omitted entirely to further consolidate the data into the tables. In a few cases, the stepwise procedure succeeded in placing no variables into the model before non convergence occurred. These cases are labeled as "NOVAR."
An additional set of regressions was also run that did not require the use of a stepwise procedure. Since the last regression run by the stepwise procedure before nonconvergence occurred in many cases used a limited number of variables, the results from those regressions have to be considered less robust than if all the variables were included. Additional regressions were run to see if the similar results and conclusions could be reached without resort to a stepwise procedure. These results are listed in Table 14. These regressions were run on the subset of ten bills that were voted on in both the House and the Senate. The votes of senators and representatives were pooled. The variables were limited slightly to include the only broader measures of the constituents interests. For some bills, such as the Whiskey Tax, where a particular special interest was at stake, the appropriate variable was also included. A new variable, SEN, a dummy variable for senators, was also added. Several different combinations of variables were tried for these ten bills. Those combinations can be discerned by looking at table 14.
For purposes of interpreting the statistical results, all the bills for which voting was analyzed have been designated as "specific" legislation or "general" legislation. A bill was placed in the category of specific legislation if the economic impact of its passage on various economic interests is clear. For example, the Funding and Assumption Act is placed in this category because its passage meant that a certain amount of money would be given to each state. Another example would be the Whiskey Tax. It was clear how much money each state would have to pay due to this tax. A bill was placed in the category of general legislation in the economic impact of its passage on various economic interests is not clear. For example, it is not clear at all which economic interests would gain or lose due to the Alien and Sedition Act or the Judiciary Act.
Evidence from hypotheses
In order to make sense out of the large number of regression results, several hypotheses have been used. These are listed in Table 5. Each hypothesis and its relevant evidence is discussed after the table. The only models that are included for the purposes of presenting evidence on the hypotheses are the one with economic variables only, the one with economic variables and RATING, and the one with RATING only. Measures of ideology besides RATING are not used for several reasons. One is because RATING and MILRES had almost identical patterns of significance. The reason is obvious: the adjusted R2 in tables 10 and 11 are very low.[12] A second is that, although the model assumes that constituent ideology is important, and that FIT, the variable representing their ideology, is often significant, the pattern of significant economic variables is almost the same without FIT as it is with FIT and MILRES. The one strong exception to this is the change in significance for the variable DIST. It often becomes significant when FIT is taken out of the model. This is because DIST is the one variable that was very significant in the OLS estimation of RATING. Therefore, when RATING is decomposed into MILRES and FIT, the variable DIST largely determines the value of FIT for each congressman. A third reason is that the object of this study is really to determine the role of ideology in general and much less to determine whose ideology matters. It still has not been determined in a welfare sense what is the optimal amount of ideologically driven shirking. Also, it might be the case that RATING does capture the "true" ideology of congressmen from the Federalist Period. The public choice literature should allow for this possibility.
Table 5
Hypotheses
Hypothesis One : Ideology variables will be significant more often on bills that are general legislation than on bills that are specific legislation.
Hypothesis Two: Economic variables will be significant more often on bills that are specific legislation than on bills that are general legislation.
Hypothesis Three: Adding ideology to the model will increase its predictive power more on votes that are general legislation than on bills that are specific legislation.
Hypothesis Foura: Economic variables will retain their significance when ideology is added to the model more often on bills that are specific legislation than on bills that are general legislation.
Hypothesis Fourb: Economic variables will lose their significance when ideology is added to the model more often on bills that are general legislation than on bills that are specific legislation.
Hypothesis Five: "Key" economic variables will be more elastic and significant more often on votes that have that interest at stake than they will on other votes.
Hypothesis Six: Ideology will be more significant when there are political parties than when there are not political parties.
Hypothesis Seven: Models with economic variables only will have more predictive power than will models with ideology only.
________________________________________________________________
Discussion of Hypotheses
Hypothesis One : Ideology variables will be significant more often on bills that are general legislation than on bills that are specific legislation.
Since the pattern of significance was similar for RATING and MILRES, this hypothesis will be addressed by only looking at the variable RATING. In the Senate, nine of the fourteen votes for which RATING was significant were general legislation. There were 16 votes in the Senate that were general legislation. That means RATING was significant on more than half those bills while being significant on only five of the fifteen specific bills. In the House, ten of the fourteen votes for which RATING was significant were general legislation. There were 12 votes in the House that were general legislation. That means RATING was significant on 83% of those bills while being significant on only four of the twenty specific bills. If the results for the two houses are added together, then RATING was significant on 19 of 28 general bills while being significant on only 9 of 35 specific bills.
For the subset of ten bills which combined the voting of senators and representatives similar evidence was found. RATING was significant on five of the six general bills while it was significant on only two of the four specific bills.
A reasonable conclusion is that this evidence supports hypothesis one.
Hypothesis Two: Economic variables will be significant more often on bills that are specific legislation than on bills that are general legislation.
In the Senate, there were 14 cases of economic variables being significant on bills that were specific while there 28 cases on general bills. In the House, these were 48 and 68, respectively. The evidence, even though positive in the House, is generally weak. But the evidence here is somewhat incomplete and therefore misleading (see Hypothesis Four below).
For the subset of ten bill which combined voting by senators and representatives, economic variables were significant on general bills 11 times while being significant on specific bills ten times. It should be remembered that only four of the ten votes were specific bills.
Hypothesis Three: Adding ideology to the model will increase its predictive power more on votes that are general legislation than on bills that are specific legislation.
In the Senate, the Somer DYX increased by an average of .097 on general bills when the variable RATING was added while it increased an average of .082 on specific bills. In the House, these were .123 and .099, respectively. This is evidence to support hypothesis three.
For the subset of bills which combined voting by senators and representatives, the Somer DYX increased an average of .167 on general bills when RATING was added while it increased only .097 on specific bills.
Hypothesis Foura: Economic variables will retain their significance when ideology is added to the model more often on bills that are specific legislation than on bills that are general legislation.
In the Senate, there were 12 instances in which an economic variable retained its significance. Eight of those instances occurred on specific bills. In the House, the results were also strong. There were 73 instances in which an economic variable retained its significance when RATING was added. Forty-four of those instances occurred on specific bills. If the preceding numbers are added together for both houses, then there were 85 instances in which an economic variable retained its significance when RATING was added. Fifty-two of those instances occurred on specific bills.
Hypothesis Fourb: Economic variables will lose their significance when ideology is added to the model more often on bills that are general legislation than on bills that are specific legislation.
In the Senate, there were 24 instances in which an economic variable lost its significance. Twenty of those instances occurred on general bills. In the House, the results were not as strong, but there were 34 instances in which an economic variable lost its significance when RATING was added. Nineteen of those instances occurred on general bills. If the preceding numbers are added together for both houses, then there were 58 instances in which an economic variable lost its significance when RATING was added. Thirty-nine of those instances occurred on general bills.
This hypothesis is generally confirmed. It means that, on certain types of bills, such as general bills, economic variables will be significant less often when ideology is added to the model. It may be that including ideology in the model is the specification needed to correctly judge the significance of economic variables.
The evidence from Hypothesis Two needs to be recalled here. There it was found that economic variables were only marginally more significant on specific bills than they were on general bills. The evidence here (for Hypothesis Four) suggests that that conclusion may be incorrect and that economic variables actually are more significant on specific bills than they are on general bills because, if the correct model should include ideology, most of the instances where economic variables were significant on general bills would have to be discounted because they lost their significance. But economic variables tended to keep their significance on specific bills.
Similar evidence was found for the subset of ten votes which combined voting by senators and representatives. There were 16 instances in which economic variables retained their significance when RATING was added to the model. Ten of those were on specific bills. There were 13 instances in which economic variables lost their significance when RATING was added to the model. Only three of those were on specific bills.
Hypothesis Five: "Key" economic variables will be more elastic and significant more often on votes that have that interest at stake than they will on other votes.
Comparing the information in tables 3 and 4 with that in tables 6 and 7, it can be seen that the "key" variables were less significant and less elastic where those interests were at stake than they were in general. Some variables, like FUND and DIRTAX clearly had large impacts. The vast majority of signs were correctly predicted, too. Although in general the key variables performed poorly on these votes relative to their performance on other votes, they were still significant in about half the cases.
Five of the ten votes for which voting by senators and representatives were combined had key variables added to the analysis. This sample is small and the interested reader can examine those results. Those were combined votes 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7. The results for each of those votes has an additional variable added. In general, those variables were significant and their coefficients had the expected signs.
________________________________________________________________
Table 6
Key Variables
Senate
Vote Variable Sign/Exp. Signif.? Elast. DYX Inc.
6 FUND +/+ YES .22 .119
10 WHIS -/- YES -.23 .590
14 TON +/+ YES .675
16 CARR +/- NO .27 .104
18 TON +/+ YES .39 .028
20 WHIS +/- NO .21 -.016
21 TON +/+ YES .232
22 EXP +/- NO .10 .109
26 EXP +/+ NO .06 .334
Sign/Exp. indicates the sign the variable actually had on that vote and the sign it was expected to have.
Signif.? indicates if the variable was significant on that vote.
Elast. indicates the elasticity for the variable on that vote.
DYX Inc. indicates the increase in the Somer DYX when the variable was added to the model.
Blank spaces under Elast. indicate this variable is being evaluated under model "c".
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Table 7
Key Variables
House of Representatives
Vote Variable Sign/Exp. Signif.? Elast. DYX Inc.
3 DIRTAX -/- YES 3.78 .150
5 FUND +/+ YES 1.67 .164
6 WHIS -/- YES -.38 .015
8 DIST +/+ NO .45 .021
10 DIST +/+ YES .20 .040
11 WHIS -/- YES -.38 -.003
12 SLAV -/- NO -.02 -.016
13 CUST +/- YES 1.33 .024
14 SUG +/- NO .35 -.003
15 VELL -/- NO -3.62 -.001
16 CARR -/- NO -.27 .023
17 WHIS -/- NO -.19 .004
19 CUST -/- YES 1.33 .009
20 WHIS -/- NO -.13 -.008
21 VELL -/- NO -.35 .002
23 TON +/+ YES .32 -.019
23 CUST -/- NO -.32 -.009
25 DIRTAX +/- YES .45 .115
29 CUST +/- NO .54 .004
30 CUST -/- YES -.23 -.035
31 CARR -/- NO -.53 .009
Sign/Exp. indicates the sign the variable actually had on that vote and the sign it was expected to have.
Signif.? indicates if the variable was significant on that vote.
Elast. indicates the elasticity for the variable on that vote.
DYX Inc. indicates the increase in the Somer DYX when the variable was added to the model.
Blank spaces under Elast. indicate this variable is being evaluated under model "c".
________________________________________________________________
Hypothesis Six: Ideology will be more significant when there are political parties than when there are not political parties.
To understand the evidence here, the Higgsian definition of ideology must again be recalled. The part to remember is its relation to group membership. If political parties require their members to vote a certain way ideologically, then when parties appear, we would expect ideology to become more significant. Historians have generally said that the Federalist and Republican parties were first clearly divided at the time of the French Crisis.[13] The first important vote then was the Jay Treaty. That vote will be used as a line of demarcation for when parties became important.
In the Senate, the ideology variable RATING was significant on only five of the 16 bills voted on before the Jay Treaty. It was significant on 10 of the 15 that came after. It may have been the case that there were more general bills after the Jay Treaty, which would have made it easier for RATING to be significant in this later period. But this is not the case. Sixteen bills were voted on before the Jay Treaty and 15 were vote on after it. There were eight general bills both before and after the Jay Treaty. Thus, it is a test with ceteris paribus conditions.
In the House, the ideology variable RATING was significant on only four of the 17 bills voted on before the Jay Treaty. It was significant on 14 of the 15 that came after. It may have been the case that there were more general bills after the Jay Treaty, which would have made it easier for RATING to be significant in this later period. But this is not the case. Seventeen bills were voted on before the Jay Treaty and 15 were vote on after it. There were 3 general bills before the Jay Treaty and nine after it. But RATING was significant on only one of those three before the Jay Treaty, while it was significant on all nine of the general bills that came after. Thus the rate of significance was higher for RATING after the Jay Treaty. Evidence from both houses support this hypothesis.
Only five of the ten votes for which voting by senators and representatives were combined came after the Jay Treaty. This sample is small and the interested reader can examine those results.
Hypothesis Seven: Models with economic variables only will have more predictive power than will models with ideology only.
This hypothesis is tested by examining votes for which the stepwise procedure entered the variable RATING (which represents ideology) first. This tells how well the model predicted with ideology alone. In the Senate, the average DYX in those cases was .793 while it was .701 in the House. The averages for those votes with economic variables only are .833 and .684. These results are mixed, but it should be remembered that these are votes for which ideology was put into the model first by the stepwise procedure, and are therefore votes on which it is to be expected that ideology is important. It would seem then, that the evidence slightly supports this hypothesis. But an alternative way to look at this hypothesis it to look at the averages for general and specific bills. In both the Senate and House, the model with RATING only had higher average DYX's (.857 and .785) than did the model with economic variables only (.821 and .737) on general bills .
Similar results were obtained from the subset of ten votes for which the voting of senators and representatives was combined. The average Somer DYX for the model that contained economic variables only is .689. The average for the model that contained RATING only is .621. But just as in the discussion above, it needs to be pointed out that the model with RATING only had a higher average DYX on general bills (.717) than on specific bills (.476). The model with economic variables had a higher average Somer DYX on specific bills (.721) than on general bills (.704).
Conclusions
There are several conclusions based on the evidence presented for the hypotheses tested. The first is that the consumption of ideology during the Federalist Period probably followed the law of demand. This conclusion is based on the fact that ideology seems to matter more on general bills than on specific bills. The second is that ideology is important to group membership. This is based on the evidence that shows that ideology mattered more after the Jay Treaty, when parties became important, than before it. No direction of causality is necessarily being suggested. It may only be that there is an association between ideology and parties. Economists should perhaps look more carefully at their definition of ideology. Maybe it should be broadened due to human motives such as group affiliation and self identification that economists only recently seem to be willing to acknowledge. According to Robert Solow, the neoclassical model "underplays the significance of ethical judgements both in its approach to policy and in its account of individual and organizational behavior." This supports the approach to ideology taken by Higgs. Recall that the affective aspect of ideology deals with a person's notion of what is good or bad in a moral sense and that the programmatic and solidary aspects deal with a person's group (or organizational) behavior. This approach merely broadens the range of human desires. It need not necessarily violate or overturn the neoclassical model itself.
The second major conclusion of this work is also based on the Higgsian definition of ideology. Because ideology has several aspects it is difficult to categorize any variable as being purely economic or ideological. It is the first two aspects which bring about this difficulty. It is reasonable, given the first two aspects, the cognitive (which determines our perception of the world) and the affective, that individuals might make what seem to be on the surface purely economic decisions at least partly on the basis of ideology.
A discussion of the variable DIST, which was very significant and anti-national, will illustrate this point. It has been considered here as an economic variable. It is intended as a proxy for factors for which data is not available. People who lived near the coast line were supposed to have been more interested in trade, manufacturing, and commerce while those who lived further in land were less interested in those pursuits and more interested in farming. The question that needs to be raised and is difficult to answer is did people living on the frontier favor the Republicans and a weaker national government because they represented their interests or did they like living on the frontier, away from the coasts and commerce because that is the kind of life they preferred due to their ideology (in the Higgsian sense)? Did they live on the frontier because of their perception of the world (cognitive aspect) and sense of morality (affective aspect)? Bassett refers to these people as being "fiercely democratic."[14] One of the important differences between the Republicans and the Federalists was that the Republicans (sometimes referred to as the Democrat-Republicans during this period) were much more "democratic" in their view of the ideal government. Recall also that DIST was highly significant in the OLS regression on RATING. This problem is mentioned to show the difficulty in interpreting any variables used in statistical models that are supposed to measure ideology. For example, it is not clear if the Republicans favored government policies to help the farmers because they just happened to be farmers and planters for the most part themselves or if their ideology led them to both become farmers and support government policies to help farmers. Did the voters who lived on the frontier favor Republican policies (which were better for them than Federalist policies) because they just happened to live on the frontier or did their ideology (world view) cause them to both live on the frontier and favor Republican policies? The opposite could be asked of Federalist supporters. Did they support Federalist policies because they just happen to live in the cities and were engaged in commerce or did their ideology cause them to both be businessmen who lived in the cities near the coast and to support Federalist policies? McGuire and Ohsfeldt also used DIST, but as a variable representing the ideology of constituents, not their economic interests. In one case, they justify this labeling because those who lived nearer to the coast were more interested in trade.[15] Such reasoning makes DIST seem like an economic variable. In another case, they justify this labeling because those who lived nearer the coast were more cosmopolitan and international in their outlook.[16] Bassett also states that the people who lived on the frontier were less concerned about the affairs of the outside world.[17] The following discussion will illuminate the "ideologies" of the two parties.
Miller presents a good summary of the Federalist Party's members and their outlook:
In general, the Federalist spokesmen were the national-minded, conservative, well to-do members of the community who believed that the cure for "excess democracy" was a strong national government. If the aphorism "those who own the country ought to run it" had been realized, the Federalists were the kind of people who would have been installed in the seats of power. As befitted a body of men who thought continentally, the Federalists were not divided along sectional lines: both northern merchants and southern planters were found within the fold. In general, Federalism was weakest in the West, strongest in the cities (where the laborers, lawyers, and artisans were almost as ardent in support as were the businessmen), and firmly established among the prosperous farmers and planters of the eastern seaboard.[18]
The one alteration that Miller makes in the above description is that the coalition of northern businessmen and southern planters broke down when Hamilton's financial plan was announced that favored northern commercial and industrial interests over agriculture.[19] Bassett speaks of the idea of a "military government," "the consolidating spirit," and the right of "men of information and property" to govern.[20]
A good picture of the Republicans found in Bassett provides the appropriate contrast:
In their own minds the Republicans stood for large powers of the states, religious liberty, freedom of speech, trial by jury, economy by the government, opposition to standing armies, to paper currency, and to war, and for non-intercourse-except as to commerce-with foreign countries. Between these measures, which were loudly proclaimed, and the strong policies of the Federalists it was natural for a rural people to turn to the former.[21]
Bassett further adds, when speaking of the Arcadian simplicity and contentment of rural life sought by the Republicans that:
To these people it seemed that speculators and banks and protected manufactures were snares and delusions. They did not think that money could be rightfully gained through the rise of prices of government bonds and bank stock. They decried the whole class of speculators in securities.[22]
So it can be seen how closely related the public policy preferences of the two groups were to their philosophies. The Republicans sought the simple, rural life and also government policies that favored agriculture because both were in accord with their world view. The Federalists had no qualms about making money in business, manufacturing and finance. Their world view led them to engage in those practices, live in cities, and favor a strong central government that supported business. As Higgs points out, such a condition makes separating ideology (as previously used by economists to denote public policy preferences) and economic interests difficult. A reasonable conclusion here would be that constituents' ideology "matters" because the variable DIST was so often significant.
It is not being suggest that the public choice literature drop the assumption that voting behavior, both by the electorate and legislators is more likely to be a function of ideology than other decisions people make. This still makes sense. Why do people vote when the monetary or material reward is clearly less than the cost? Ideology is still a good answer. But it should be recognized that other choices in such areas that are always assumed to represent a person's economic interests, such as career, place of residence and business activity may also be influenced by ideology. The question then is are the variables that are assumed to represent constituents' ideology and are used to explain ideology ratings really any more ideological than the "economic" variables used to explain the legislator's roll call voting decisions? When Kalt and Zupan use a variable like URBAN to help explain ADA ratings, how can they be sure that this represents constituents' ideology? Perhaps people live in urban areas because job opportunities are better there than in rural areas. When they use variables that represent coal use in each state as an economic variable, how can they be sure that this represents constituents' economic interests only and is not partly ideology? Perhaps using the natural resources in such a way is an ideological decision that is based on cognitive and affective aspects.
What economists need to do is define ideology in such a way so that it can be analyzed in a utility maximizing framework. They must also be more careful about why they think some variables represent ideology and others represent economic interests before any conclusions can be reached about the importance of ideology in the economic theory of regulation.
Notes
1. The basics of this plan were 1) the repayment of government debts (both state and national) of the Revolutionary War at par value by the new national government, 2) raising revenue to pay those debts by enacting import duties and placing an excise tax on spirituous liquors, 3) the chartering of a national bank to handle the public revenue and issue currency, and 4) the encouragement of manufacturing through subsidies and protective tariffs. See Bassett, ch. 2, and Miller, ch.4.
2. Borden, p. 24.
3. Hamilton, Jay and Madison p. 378.
4. Hamilton, Jay and Madison p. 296.
5. Borden, p. 41.
6. Stourzh, p. 161-165.
7. Inter-Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 1789-1801.
8. Forty-nine votes on military issues from the Senate and sixty-five from the House were used to calculate the ideology rating.
9. The binomial logit model is from Amemiya, ch. 9.
10. See Ben-Akiva and Lerman, ch. 5 for the logit elasticities and Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ch. 4 for the ols elasticities.
11. Harrell writes"...this is described by Bartolucci and Fraser(1977) who propose the use of Rao's (1973) efficient score statistic in variable selection. Letting ß denote the vector of MLE'S for variables not in the model, the statistics are defined by Qi = (Ui(ß,0)2)Ji(ß,0) where Ui(ß,0) denotes the derivative of the log likelihood with respect to the ith parameter, evaluated at ß for parameters in the model and at 0 for the ith parameter not in the model and Ji(ß,0) denotes the i,i element of the inverse of the total information matrix." This statistic is recalculated every time another variable is added to the model.
12. An OLS estimation of RATING using economic variables like the ones used in the logit estimations also yielded very low adjusted R-squared scores. See Morong (1989).
13. Castel and Gibson, p. 16.
14. Bassett, p. 166.
15. McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1986), p. 96.
16. McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1989), p. 226.
17. Bassett, p. 166.
18. Miller, p. 100.
19. Miller, p. 100.
20. Bassett, p. 278.
21. Bassett, p. 278.
22. Bassett, p. 45.
Appendix A
Roll Call Vote Descriptions
The following list is a description of all the bills analyzed in this dissertation as described in United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 1789-1801 by the Inter-consortium for Social and Political Research. Additional information on some bills was provided by Castel and Gibson and The Almanac of American History. The bills will also be stated as being either pro-national or anti-national based on whether or not they strengthened the national government. The reasons for such classification will also be given where necessary. Bills that sought to raise(lower) taxes are considered to be pro(anti)-national since greater taxes increased the power of the national government. The bills are also labeled as being "general" or "specific" legislation. The listing will be given by each house of the congress.
Senate
First Congress
Vote 1. To pass the bill to establish the judicial courts of the United States. This bill is sometimes referred to as the "Judiciary act of 1789." It is pro-national because it established the national court system and defined its powers and jurisdiction and also created the office of Attorney General. It also gave the national government the ability to enforce its laws directly on the individual, something that could not be done under the Articles of Confederation. Passed July 17, 1789, 14-6. General legislation.
Vote 2. To amend the Constitution so that the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power, also that no troops shall be raised during peace time without consent of 2/3rds of the members of Congress, and that no soldiers shall be enlisted for longer than the duration of the war. This bill is anti-national because it intended to keep control of the military in the hands of a civilian congress. Failed September 4, 1789, 6-9. General legislation.
Vote 3. To pass a bill to prevent bringing goods, wares, and merchandise from Rhode Island into the United States, and to authorize a demand of money from that state. This bill is pro-national because the national government was attempting to bring all states under the jurisdiction of the Constitution. Passed May 17, 1790, 13-8. General legislation.
Vote 4. To amend the act to provide for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio river; so as to make the president's acts under the bill, subject to senate approval. This bill is anti-national because it decreases the power of the only nationally elected official. Failed August 4, 1789, 8-10. General legislation.
Vote 5. To pass the Government seat bill(Seat of Government Act). This bill established the national capitol on the Potomac river and is pro-national. Passed July 1, 1790,14-12. General legislation.
Vote 6. To pass the debt bill. This is the Funding and Assumption Act. This bill is pro-national because it gave the national government the power to decide how revolutionary war debts would be paid (funded) because it assumed payment of such debts. The bill represents and increase in the economic power of the national government because it then had the power to raise the revenue to pay back these debts. the old debts could be exchanged for new government bonds. Passed July 21, 1790, 14-12. Specific legislation.
Vote 7. To amend the senate bill, incorporating the subscribers of the Bank of the United States, by extending the term of incorporation to March 4, 1815, instead of limiting the term of incorporation to seven years. This bill is pro-national because it extended the time period of an institution that strengthened the economic power of the national government. Passed January 13, 1791, 11-10. Specific legislation.
Vote 8. To amend the Bank of the U.S. bill, by further limiting the term of incorporation from 1811 to 1801. This bill is anti-national because it shortened the time period for the national bank. Failed January 20, 1791, 5-18. Specific legislation.
Vote 9. To amend the Bank of the U.S. bill, by eliminating the provision that prevents any other bank by future law of the U.S. during the continuation of the Bank of the U.S. This bill is anti-national because it would allow competition with the national bank. Failed January 20, 1791, 5-18. Specific legislation.
Vote 10. To pass the House bill, repealing after the last day of June next, the duties heretofore laid upon distilled spirits imported from abroad and laying others in their stead, and also upon spirits distilled in the United States. This is also known as the Whiskey Tax. It is pro-national because it raised revenue for the national government. Passed February 12, 1791, 20-5. Specific legislation.
Vote 11. To amend the house bill, supplementary to an act to incorporate the subscribers of the Bank of the U.S., which amendment empowers the congress to abolish the corporation known as the Bank of the U.S. any time after March 4, 1802. This bill is anti-national because it would have made it possible for the national bank to be abolished. Failed February 25, 1791, 9-17. Specific legislation.
Third Congress
Vote 12. To pass the resolution that the following article be proposed to legislatures of states, as an amendment to the Constitution: The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state or foreign country. This is anti-national because it limited the power of the federal judiciary. Passed January 14, 1794, 23-2. General legislation.
Vote 13. To pass the amended resolution, proposing a constitutional amendment to provide that no office holder in the Bank of the United States shall be a member of congress while he holds such office. This bill is anti-national because it would limit the amount of power federal officials could have. Failed January 16, 1794, 12-13. General legislation.
Vote 14. To agree to the first section of H.R. 40, a bill regarding the suspension of importation of certain goods; said section forbids importation of any merchandise from Great Britain and Ireland. This bill is pro-national because it represents a federal attempt to control trade. It is "possible neutral" because it suspended trade with a country favored by the Federalists. Failed April 28, 1794, 11-14. Specific legislation.
Vote 15. To amend H.R. 30, a bill to authorize the president to lay, regulate and revoke embargoes; said amendment would restrict the president's authority while congress is in session. This bill is anti-national because it decreases the power of the only nationally elected official. Passed May 30, 1794, 14-5. Specific legislation.
Vote 16. To pass H. R. 55, a bill to lay duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons. This bill is pro-national it is a revenue raiser. Passed June 4, 1794, 12-8.
Specific legislation.
Fourth Congress
Vote 17. To adopt the first paragraph of the resolution to ratify the treaty with Great Britain on condition that there be added to the said treaty an article whereby it shall be agreed to suspend the operations of so much of the 12th article as respects the trade with the British West Indies. This is also known as the Jay Treaty. It mandated that the British withdraw its troops from the Northwest territory in exchange for settlement of pre-war debts owed to British citizens. This bill is pro-national because it was a use of the Constitutionally mandated power of the national government to negotiate treaties and also had commercial provisions that increased trade opportunities between the united States and Great Britain. Passed June 24, 1795, 20-10. General legislation.
Vote 18. To pass the Senate bill to authorize the president to lay, regulate and revoke embargoes. This bill is pro-national because it increases the power of the only nationally elected official. This vote was tied at 15-15 on March 1, 1797. General legislation.
Fifth Congress
Vote 19. To pass H.R. 8, an act laying duties on stamped vellum, parchment, and paper. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed, July 5, 1797, 20-7. Specific legislation.
Vote 20. To amend H.R. 32, an act to amend the several acts for laying duties on spirits distilled within the United States, and stills; by restoring the section which provides for taking out licenses on stills. This bill is pro-national because it required a license for stills used to make whiskey. Failed January 23, 1798, 9-15. Specific legislation.
Vote 21. To pass S. 22, a bill to more effectively protect the coasts and commerce of the United States. This bill is pro-national because the national government took the responsibility to protect the national commerce. Passed May 23, 1798, 16-7. Specific legislation.
Vote 22. To pass H.R. 102, an act to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France and the dependencies thereof. This bill is pro-national because the national government intervened in international trade. Passed June 7, 1798, 18-4. Specific legislation.
Vote 23. To pass S. 26, an act concerning aliens. This bill is also called The Alien Act. It authorized the president of the United States to deport any potentially dangerous or treasonable alien during peacetime. An expiration date of 1800 was written into the bill. This bill is pro-national because it represented a limitation placed on individual rights and control of immigration by the national government. Passed June 8, 1798,16-7. General legislation.
Vote 24. To pass H.R. 92, which is an act supplementary to and to amend "an act to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject." This bill is also known as the Naturalization Act. It required a residency of 14 rather than five years by Aliens before they became eligible for United States citizenship. This bill is pro-national because it represented a limitation placed on individual rights and control of immigration by the national government. Passed June 12, 1798, 13-8. General legislation.
Vote 25. To pass S. 31, which is an act in addition to the act entitled an act entitled "An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." This bill is also known as the Sedition Act. It declared any anti-government activity, including the publication of "any false, scandalous and malicious writing," a high misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment. This bill is pro-national because it represented a limitation placed on individual rights by the national government. Passed July 4, 1798, 18-6. General legislation.
Vote 26. To pass H.R. 119, an act to further protect United States Commerce. This bill is pro-national because the national government intervened in international trade. Passed July 6, 1798, 18-4. Specific legislation.
Vote 27. To amend H.R. 116 in order to make taxable all personal property. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser and it expands the scope of the national government's power. Failed July 7, 1798, 6-16. Specific legislation.
Sixth Congress
Vote 28. To consent to ratification of the treaty with France, of Sept. 30, 1800 provided that an article be inserted making the duration of treaty eight years. This bill is pro-national because it was a use of the Constitutionally mandated power of the national government to negotiate treaties. It is "possibly neutral" because it formed an alliance with the country with which the Republicans sided. Passed February 3, 1801, 22-9. General legislation.
Vote 29. To pass H.R. 186, a bill to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the U.S. This bill is pro-national because it is a federal law that superseded any state laws . Passed March 28, 1800, 16-12. General legislation.
Vote 30. To pass H.R. 248, a bill to continue in force an "act to lay additional duty on salt imported into the United States." This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed May 1,1800, 16-8. Specific legislation.
Vote 31. To pass H.R. 275, a bill to provide for the more convenient organization of the courts. This bill is pro-national because its provisions in actuality served to entrench the Federalists in the judiciary by filling so many positions that the incoming Republican President Jefferson would have no appointments to make. Passed February 7, 1801, 16-11. General legislation.
House of Representatives
First Congress
Vote 1. To amend H. R. 2, for laying a duty on goods, wares and merchandise imported into the U.S. so as to limit the date of enforcement of the above act until the -- day of -- and from thence until the end of the next session of congress which shall happen thereafter. This bill is also know as the Tariff Act. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed May 16, 1789, 41-8. Specific legislation.
Vote 2. To amend the Constitutional Resolution; by adding a clause prohibiting congress from interfering in the times, places, or manner of holding elections of Senators or Representatives, except when any state shall refuse, neglect or be unable to hold an election due to invasion or rebellion. This bill is anti-national because it reduces the power the national government had over elections. Failed August 21, 1789, 23-28. General legislation.
Vote 3. To amend the constitutional amendments resolution, by prohibiting congress from imposing direct taxes, except when duties collected are insufficient, in which event, congress may assess each state its proportionate share to defray deficiency, with interest thereon of 6% per annum. This bill is anti-national because it reduces the power of the congress to control taxes. Failed August 22, 1789, 9-39. General legislation.
Vote 4. To pass S. 12, a bill to establish the temporary and permanent seat of the U.S. government. This bill is pro-national. It is "possibly neutral" because the South, where the Federalists were opposed, wanted a southern capitol to help their economy. Passed July 9, 1790, 32-29. General legislation.
Vote 5. To agree to the amended Senate amendment to the public debt bill which would provide for the payment of the debts of the states. This is the Funding and Assumption Act(See Senate vote 6). This bill is pro-national. Passed July 26, 1790, 34-28. Specific legislation.
Vote 6. To pass H.R. 110, an act to impose import duties and taxes on distilled spirits. This bill is also known as the Whiskey Tax. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed January 27, 1791, 35-21. Specific legislation.
Vote 7. To pass S. 17, an act to incorporate the subscribers of the Bank of the U.S. This bill is pro-national because it established the National Bank. Passed February 8, 1791, 39-20. Specific legislation.
Second Congress
Vote 8. To pass H.R. 162, a bill making further and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States. This bill is pro-national because it extended the boundaries affected by the national government. Passed February 1, 1792, 29-19. Specific legislation.
Vote 9. To pass S. 27, an act establishing a mint, and regulating the coins of the United States. This bill is pro-national because it a use of the Constitutionally mandated power of the national government to control coinage. Passed March 26, 1792, 32-22. Specific legislation.
Vote 10. To pass H.R. 192, a bill for raising a further sum of money for the protection of the frontiers. This bill is pro-national because it extended the boundaries affected by the national government. Passed April 21, 1792, 37-20. Specific legislation.
Vote 11. To amend H.R. 191, a bill concerning the duties on spirits distilled within the United States; to place a duty of eight cents on certain distilled spirits. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Failed April 30, 1792, 26-27. Specific legislation.
Vote 12. To pass S. 42, an act respecting fugitives from justice and persons escaping from the service of their masters. This bill is also known as the Fugitive Slave Act. This bill is pro-national because it is definitely an expansion of the law enforcement jurisdiction of the national government. Passed February 4, 1793, 48-7. Specific legislation.
Third Congress
Vote 13. To amend H.R. 46, a bill to lay additional duty on goods, wares and merchandise imported into the united States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels; by providing for an additional duty of six cents per ton on all ships or vessels. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Failed May 16, 1794, 39-45. Specific legislation.
Vote 14. To pass H.R. 50, a bill to lay a duty on manufactured tobacco and refined sugar. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Failed May 19, 1794, 31-56. Specific legislation.
Vote 15. To pass H.R. 53, a bill to lay duties on stamped vellum, parchment and paper. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Failed May 27, 1794, 32-50. Specific legislation.
Vote 16. To pass H.R. 55, a bill to lay duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons because it is a revenue raiser. This bill is pro-national. Passed May 29, 1794, 49-22. Specific legislation.
Vote 17. To pass H.R. 56, a bill to lay duties on licenses for selling wines and distilled spirits, by retail. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed May 31, 1794, 53-23. Specific legislation.
Fourth Congress
Vote 18. To pass the resolution that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great Britain. The treaty referred to here is the Jay Treaty(See Senate vote 17). This bill is pro-national. Passed April 30, 1796, 51-48. General legislation.
Vote 19. To amend H.R. 233, a bill to raise a sum of money, by additional duties on certain articles imported; by providing an additional duty of 2 1/2% on the 10% class of goods. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Failed February 24, 1797, 30-60. Specific legislation.
Fifth Congress
Vote 20. To pass H.R. 12, a bill to lay a duty on Licenses for the sale of wines by retail, and also foreign distilled spirits. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed June 27, 1797, 56-27. Specific legislation.
Vote 21. To pass H.R. 8, a bill to lay a stamp duty on vellum, parchment, and paper. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed July 3, 1797, 47-41. Specific legislation.
Vote 22. To pass H.R. 17, a bill to lay an additional duty on salt. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed July 5, 1791, 45-40. Specific legislation.
Vote 23. To pass H. R. 102, to suspend the commercial intercourse between the U.S. and the French Republic. This bill is pro-national because the national government intervened in international trade. Passed June 1, 1798, 55-25. Specific legislation.
Vote 24. To pass S. 24, to secure or remove aliens from the U.S. This is the Alien Act(See Senate vote 23). This bill is pro-national because it represented a limitation placed on individual rights and control of immigration by the national government. Passed June 21, 1798, 46-40. General legislation.
Vote 25. To pass H.R. 116, a bill to lay and collect direct taxes within the United States. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed July 2, 1798, 62-18. General legislation.
Vote 26. To pass S. 32. This is the Sedition Act(See Senate vote 25). This bill is pro-national because it represented a limitation placed on individual rights and control of immigration by the national government. Passed July 10, 1798, 44-41. General legislation.
Vote 27. To pass H.R. 135, a bill to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy in the U.S. This bill is pro-national because it is a federal law that superseded any state laws. Failed January 15, 1799, 44-47. General legislation.
Vote 28. To pass H.R. 141, a bill for the punishment of certain crimes there-in specified, relating to the usurpation of executive authority. This bill is pro-national because it sought to protect the power of the president, the only nationally elected official. Passed January 17, 1799, 58-36. General legislation.
Vote 29. To pass H.R. 140, a bill to further suspend commercial intercourse with France. This bill is pro-national because the national government intervened in international trade. Passed January 28, 1799, 55-37. General legislation.
Sixth Congress
Vote 30. To pass H.R. 201, a bill to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France. This bill is pro-national because the national government intervened in international trade. Passed February 20, 1800, 68-28. General legislation.
Vote 31. To pass H.R. 276, a bill to continue in force the acts laying duties on licenses for selling wines and foreign distilled spirits, on property sold at auction, and on carriages for the conveyance of persons. This bill is pro-national because it is a revenue raiser. Passed January 16, 1801, 46-31. Specific legislation.
Vote 32. To pass H.R. 275, a bill to provide for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United States(See Senate vote 31). This bill is pro-national because its provisions in actuality served to entrench the Federalists in the judiciary by filling so many positions that the incoming Republican President Jefferson would have no appointments to make. Passed January 20, 1801, 51-43. General legislation.
Appendix B
Variable Descriptions
In this appendix the variables used as explanatory variables in the empirical testing of the models will be described and explained. All sources and explanations of the necessary calculations done to derive some of the variables will be noted.
The variables used in the first step regression(the ordinary least squares estimation with the ideology variable RATING as the dependent variable) will be explained first.
The type of variable used to estimate the ideology variable(the pro-military rating) is referred to as a "demographic" type of variable in the literature. Thus, a demographic profile of the legislator's constituents is formed and used to explain his ideological stance on the pro-national/anti-national question. Each variable will be described individually below. This set of variables closely matches the one used by Kalt and Zupan(1984).
Age. The average voter(males only) age of the constituencies at the state level was calculated using data from Seybert, 1969(p. 21). This source lists the the number of males in each state in 1800 for the following age categories: Of 16 and under 26 years, of 26 and under 45 years, and Of 45 years and upwards. For the latter two categories a mean age of 35 years old and 55 years old is assumed. For the youngest group, it was assumed that half of the men in this group were old enough to vote(at least 21). A mean age of 23.5 was assumed for the remaining half of the men in the youngest group. The average voter age was then calculated using a weighted average for the groups in question assuming that the mean ages for each group listed above for the total population in each group. No data from they year 1790 was used for this variable because the census for that year only lists those over and under 16 years of age.
MF. This is the male-female in each state as an average of the male-female ratios from both 1790 and 1800 from Seybert(p. 43).
POPDENS. This is the population density for each state and congressional district based on the 1790 census. Seybert(p. 45) gives the population density for each state in 1790 and 1800. But only 1790 is used because that is the only year for which appropriate data is available for the congressional districts. No population density data exists for the congressional districts of the federalist period. The population density for these districts was calculated in three steps. The first step was to calculate the population of each congressional district during the federalist period. To do so is complicated by the fact that district boundaries were changed during the period. That is, the geographical area of a given district number was not constant throughout the period. For example, District Seven in Massachusetts in the first congress was made up by Bristol, Duke, and Nantucket counties. In the second congress, District Seven in Massachusetts was made up by Worcester County only. Therefore, the population of each district in each of the six congresses had to be calculated. Which towns and counties made up which district are listed in Martis. The populations of those towns and counties are found in A Century of Population Growth(pp. 188-209). The second step in calculating the population density of the congressional districts was to determine the area in square miles of each district. This was done by placing a uniformly gridded transparency over the congressional district maps of each congress found in Martis and transforming this area into square miles using the appropriate scale. The third step was to simply divide the population of each district by the area.
URBAN. This is the percent of a state's or district's population which lived in urban areas. No definition of urban exists for 1790. A definition was derived from the definition provided in the 1970 Census of Population and Housing. In 1970 an urban area was one that had a population of 50,000 or more inhabitants. Dividing the population density of the United States in 1970(57.4 per square mile) by the population density in 1790(1.95 per square mile) leaves 29.4. This is the number of times the population density of the United Sates increased form 1790 to 1970. It is assumed here that the size of "urban" areas increased at the same rate. Therefore the size of an urban area in 1790 is assumed to be 50,000 divided by 29.4 or 1698.
In some states and districts, the population of each town is not known(a fact which is necessary for determining the percent of the population living in urban areas), although the population density is because the area and total population are known. To determine the URBAN variable for these states and districts an ordinary least squares regression was run for the 66 districts in for which both population density and the percent of the population living in urban areas is known. The dependent variable was the percent urban and the independent variable was the population density. Using the parameters generated from this regression allowed fitted values for URBAN to be calculated in the states and districts for which they were previously unknown.
One final point regarding the URBAN variable is that the federalists had their greatest support from the townspeople who were more interested in trade, commerce, and industry, areas that were favored by a strong central government). (Bassett, p. 46)
ENG. This is the percentage of a state's or district's population which was of English ancestry. The data comes from A Century of Population Growth(pp. 271-275) In some cases state averages were used for congressional districts for which the percent of the population of English ancestry was unavailable. McGuire and Ohsfeldt(1986,1989), based on the work of other scholars, use this variable as a proxy for the constituents' ideology on the issue of a strong national government. People of English descent are thought to have been pro-national because of the experience of a strong national government in England.
DIST. This is the distance from the center of a congressional district of state to the nearest navigable coastline. Many economic variables(such as imports and exports) are not available at the district level. But areas farther in land were less likely to benefit from the strong national government of the federalists since they were less interested in trade and commerce(Bassett, p.106). In fact, McGuire and Ohsfeldt use this variable as well, but twice place it in the category of constituents' ideology while arguing in one instance that it is a proxy for an interest in trade(1986) and in another that it is a proxy for "cosmopolitan" attitudes.(1989)
The distances were calculated using the district maps in Martis.
MILITIA. This is the quota of Militia assigned to each state and organized, armed and equipped in pursuance of the act of May 9th, 1794, per capita(Seybert, p. 612). It is expected that congressmen would be more likely to vote pro-military the more federal money spent in each state on the military.
WEALTH. This is per capita wealth of each state. This variable was calculated by using the values of three variables: Land, Dwelling-Houses, and Slaves. Land values and Dwelling-House values for 1798 are given in Seybert(p. 504). The same source lists the number of slaves in each state at that time but gives no price for slaves. The price of slaves was calculated in the following manner: First, the tax rates on slaves had to be determined. The table on page 504 of Seybert gives the total value of Land and Dwelling-Houses for the entire country and the total tax paid on each. Doing this gives the rate at which these two assets were taxed. Land values were taxed at a rate of .27% while the value of Dwelling-Houses was taxed at a rate of .33%. It was assumed that the value of slaves was taxed at .30%(an average of the other two rates). The same table also lists the total tax paid on slaves. This number was divided by .30%(.003) to get the total value of slaves. This total value for slaves was then divided by the number of slaves to get the average price of a slave. This number was approximately $163.00. A check was made to see how reasonable this number is by comparing it to the price of slaves in 1790 and 1815. A Century of Population Growth(p. 141) lists the average price of slave in 1790 as $150. Lebergott(p. 213) lists the average price of slave in 1815 as $250. Using logarithms, the average annual increase in the price of slaves was approximately 2%. Using this same increase for the years 1790 to 1798, the price of a slave in 1798 would have been $175. The actual value used in the per capital wealth measure was $170(a compromise between $163 and $175). This number was then multiplied by the number of slaves in 1798 in each state to get the total value. The value of these three variables was summed and then divided to get per capital wealth. This measure is assumed to be a good proxy because it is more contemporaneous than the estimates done by Jones(which are for the year 1774). Also, the three variables used here normally made up well over half of the net worth in the studies done by Jones(in her tables B.1-B.3).
TAX. This is a dummy variable that indicates if being a taxpayer was required by the state to vote. This information is listed in Porter(p. 110).
PROP. This is a dummy variable that indicates if being a property owner was required by the state to vote. The is information is also listed in Porter(p. 110). The last two variables are checks to see if the legislator-constituent connection was affected at this time by voting requirements.
These last two variables were included to see if restrictions on who could vote, which would restrict who was in the constituency to those who were wealthier, would affect the RATING of the congressmen.
The remaining variables to be described were used in the second stage of the regression analysis(the logit estimates of the roll call votes). These are variables that were very likely to be directly affected by the voting decisions of senators and representatives.
CARR. This is the annual per capita gross revenue collected from carriages for the conveyance of persons in each state, 1794-1800. This data is from Seybert(p. 484-489). There was some specific legislation voted on to raise this tax. On those bills, the coefficient estimate is expected to be negative. It also part of the tax base of the national government, so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will be negative(positive) for bills that are pro(anti)-national.
CUST. This is the annual per capita net revenue collected from customs in each state for the years 1791 to 1800 inclusive. This variable was calculated using data from Seybert(p. 425-429). The sign on the coefficient estimates for this variable are expected to be negative(positive) for bills that restrict(increase) imports. It is a variable that is connected with trade, commerce, and industry, so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will be negative(positive) for bills that are anti(pro)-national.
DIRTAX. This is the per capita tax assessed in each state on Lands, Dwelling-Houses, and Slaves due to the Direct Tax Act of 1798. This data is in Seybert(p. 504). There was some specific legislation voted on to raise this tax. On those bills, the coefficient estimate is expected to be negative. It also part of the tax base of the national government, so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will be negative(positive) for bills that are pro(anti)-national.
DIST. This is the distance from the center of a congressional district to the nearest navigable coastline(See above). In general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will be negative(positive) for bills that are pro(anti)-national.
EXP. This is the average annual per capita value of exports from each state for the years 1791 to 1800 inclusive. This variable was calculated using data from Seybert(p. 142). The sign on the coefficient estimates for this variable are expected to be negative(positive) for bills that restrict(increase) exports. It is assumed that states with trade interests would have been more likely to favor a strong national government because of the aid and protection it could provide so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will be negative(positive) for bills that are anti(pro)-national.
FUND. This is per capita net public debt(per capita amount paid or received subsequent to funding in 1793 for each state). It is expected to be positively and significantly related to voting on the Funding and Assumption Act. This variable was calculated using data from Seybert(p. 726)
SLAV. This is the number of slaves per 100 hundred white persons in each state and district in 1790. This variable was calculated from data in A Century of Population Growth (p. 188-209). Since the Federalists(led by Hamilton) had an industrial and commercial vision for the future of the American economy it is expected that in general, the sign on the coefficient estimates for this variable are expected to be negative(positive) for bills that are pro(anti)-national.
SUG. This is the average annual per capita gross revenue collected from refined sugar in each state, 1794-1800. This data is from Seybert(p. 484-489). There was some specific legislation voted on to raise this tax. On those bills, the coefficient estimate is expected to be negative. It also part of the tax base of the national government, so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will be negative(positive) for bills that are pro(anti)-national.
TON. This is the average annual tonnage per capita in each state employed in the coasting trade from 1793 to 1800. This data is in Seybert(p. 323). This variable also represents commercial, industrial, and trade interests so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will be negative(positive) for bills that are anti(pro)-national. There were some bills that dealt specifically with protecting shipping trade and the sign is expected to be positive in those cases.
VELL. This is the average annual per capita gross revenue collected from stamped vellum, parchment and paper in each state, 1794-1800. This data is from Seybert(p. 484-489). There was some specific legislation voted on to raise this tax. On those bills, the coefficient estimate is expected to be negative. It also part of the tax base of the national government, so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will Be negative(positive) for bills that are pro(anti)-national.
WEALTH. This is per capita wealth of each state(See above).
WHIS. This is the average annual per capita gross revenue collected from domestic distilled spirits and stills in each state, 1794-1800. This data is from Seybert(p. 484-489). There was some specific legislation voted on to raise this tax. On those bills, the coefficient estimate is expected to be negative. It also part of the tax base of the national government, so in general it is expected that the sign on this coefficient will Be negative(positive) for bills that are pro(anti)-national.
RATING. This is the ideology rating. It is the number of pro-military votes cast by each representative and senator divided by the number of military bills on which they voted(see appendix B for the description of each of these bills). Men who were both senators and representatives had their ideology scores calculated using all military votes(those made in both houses). These ratings were then used on votes they made in both houses. For congressmen who never voted on military bills, an average for each congressmen for whom data is available in the entire period was used.(This average was the mean of each congressman's rating and not a cumulative average). Only votes from the Federalist period are used.
MILRES. This is the ideology residual generated by the ordinary least squares regression with RATING as the dependent variable and the above mentioned demographic variables as explanatory variables.
FIT. This the fitted part of the congressman's ideology generated by the ordinary least squares regression with RATING as the dependent variable and the above mentioned demographic variables as explanatory variables.
Roll call votes come from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 1789-1801.
Bibliography
Amemiya, Takeshi. 1985 Advanced Econometrics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Bassett, John Spencer. 1968. The Federalist System, 1789-1801. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc.
Bell, Rudolph M. 1973. Party and Faction in American Politics, The House of Representatives, 1789-1801. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Ben-Akiva, Moshe and Lerman, Steven R. 1987 Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application to Travel Demand. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Borden, Morton. 1967. Parties and Politics in the Early Republic,1789-1815. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.
Buchanan, James C. and Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Castel, Albert and Gibson, Scott L.1975. The Yeas and Nays: Key Congressional Decisions, 1774-1945. Kalamazoo: New Issues Press.
Dougan, William R. and Michael C. Munger 1989. "The Rationality of Ideology." Journal of Law and Economics 32: 119-142.
Etzioni, Amitai 1990. "A New Kind of Socioeconomics." Challenge, January- February, p 31-32.
Fort, R., Hallagan, W., Morong, C., and Stegner, T. 1989. "The Ideological Component of Senate Voting: Different Principles or Different Principals?" Department of Economics, Working Paper, Washington State University, Pullman.
Hallagan, William S. 1989. "Why Do Senators From the Same State Vote Differently?" Department of Economics, Working Paper, Washington State University, Pullman.
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James. The Federalist Papers
Harrell, Frank E. Jr., Ch. 23, "The Logist Procedure".
Higgs, Robert. 1987. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Higgs, Robert "Do Legislators' Votes Reflect Constituency Preference? A Simple Way to Evaluate the Senate." Public Choice 63(2): 175-181.
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 1789-1801. Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Jones, Alice Hanson. 1980. Wealth of a Nation to Be: The American Colonies on the Eve of the Revolution. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kalt, Joseph P. and Zupan, Mark A. 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics." American Economic Review 74(3):279-300.
Kau, James B. and Rubin, Paul H. 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting." The Journal of Law and Economics 22(2):365-384.
Lebergott, Stanley. 1984. The Americans: An Economic Record. W.W. Norton: New York.
Martis, Kenneth C. 1982. Atlas of American Congressional Districts, 1789-1983 New York: The Free Press.
McDonald, Forrest. 1958.We the People: Economic Origins of the Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McGuire, Robert A. and Ohsfeldt, Robert L.1986. "An Economic Model of Voting over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787." The Journal of Economic History. (46)1:79-110
_____. 1989. "Self Interest, Agency Theory, and Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution." American Economic Review. 79(3):219-234.
Miller, John C. 1960.The Federalist Era, 1789-1801. New York: Harper and Row.
Morong, Cyril 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting During the Federalist Era."Paper presented at the annual Public Choice Society meetings.
_____. 1990. "An Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Over the Alien and Sedition Acts." Paper presented at the annual Public Choice Society meetings.
Nelson, Douglass and Silberberg, Eugene 1987. "Ideology and Legislator Shirking." Economic Inquiry. 25(1):15-25.
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Peltzman, Sam. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting." Journal of Law and Economics. 27(1):181-210.
_____."An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century." American Economic Review. 75(4):656-675.
Porter, Kirk H. 1913. A History of Suffrage in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Seybert, Adam. 1818. Statistical Annals of the U.S.A., New York: Burt Franklin Press.
Schmeckebier, Lawrence F. 1941. Congressional Apportionment. Washington, D. C.,: Brookings Institution.
Stourzh, Gerald. 1970. Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government. Palo Alto: Stanford University press.
Tindall, George Brown. 1984. America, A Narrative History. New York: W.W. Norton.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1969. A Century of Population. New York: 1969.
Walton, Gary M. and Shepard, James F. 1979. The Economic Rise of Early America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
................
................
In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.
To fulfill the demand for quickly locating and searching documents.
It is intelligent file search solution for home and business.
Related download
Related searches
- during the vernal equinox
- during the process of ecological succession
- economics is the study of
- during the light reactions of photosynthesis
- during the undergraduate period
- pa car inspections during the coronavirus
- polio quarantine during the 1940s
- events during the scientific revolution
- famous paintings during the renaissance
- art during the cold war
- during the romantic era composers
- composers during the romantic era